Derrida on Identity and Difference_A Radical Democratic Reading of The Other Heading

Critical Horizons 1:1 February 2000© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2000

Matthew R. Calarco

Derrida on Identity and Difference:A Radical Democratic Reading of The OtherHeading

ABSTRACT

What is the significance of and logic behind JacquesDerrida’s recent “political” writings? While Derrida’s workrefuses to obey any singular movement or register, hedoes, nonetheless, make recurrent attempts to negoti-ate between a politics of identity and difference. A sim-ilar undertaking can be found in the radical democraticwritings of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Anencounter between these thinkers is here carried outin order to elucidate key themes in Derrida’s The OtherHeading. The reading aims at developing and contextu-alising Derrida’s relation to radical democratic thoughtso that his political strategies can be made more explicit.

KEYWORDS: Derrida, identity, difference, Europe, poli-tics, democracy, capital

The landscape of contemporary political the-ory is marked by a predominance of debatessurrounding identity and difference in politics.More often than not this debate results in thecrystallisation of a binary opposition betweena politics of identity and a politics of differ-ence. It is important to note, however, thatthese two options are not the only alternatives

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available. A relatively recent and unique intervention into the political dynamicof identity/difference has been suggested by radical democratic theory asdeveloped in writings by Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe, and others.1 Laclauand MouffeÕs version of radical democracy attempts to develop political strate-gies that negotiate the tension between identity and difference rather thanprivileging either side of the binary, or attempting to overcome the dialecticaltogether. In the remarks that follow, I will attempt to demonstrate thatJacques DerridaÕs work on European identity in The Other Heading followsand enacts this radical democratic logic, and that divorced from this back-ground understanding, the political dimension of his work remains largelyhidden. To locate the radical democratic moment in DerridaÕs text, and inorder to set up a discussion of radical democracy, it will be necessary to givea fairly careful reading of his text The Other Heading. Ultimately, I suggestthat the Derridean and radical democratic approach to the debates over iden-tity and difference offers a more promising direction for contemporary polit-ical theory than does a politics of pure identity or difference.

The text The Other Heading was first delivered as a public lecture by Derridain 1990 at a colloquium on ÒEuropean Cultural Identity,Ó then revised andshortened in order to appear in the newspaper Liber. From the outset, thepolitical edge of DerridaÕs text is apparent. Much like his earlier essay ÒTheEnds of ManÓ in which he marks his paper as coterminous with the politi-cal events of May 1968, Derrida here notes that his text and the colloquiumat which he is delivering it are marked by a definite political pressure, anÒimminence.Ó This imminence takes the form of the debates over identity ingeneral and European identity in particular. What makes this situation espe-cially pressing is that all over Europe horrible injustices are being perpetratedin the name of European identity:

Hope, fear, and trembling are commensurate with the signs that are com-

ing to us from everywhere in Europe, where, precisely in the name of identity,

be it cultural or not, the worst violences, those that we recognise all too well

without having yet thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism,

anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism, are being unleashed . . .2

It is the imminence of these crimes and injustices that motivates DerridaÕsremarks and frames his discussion of identity and identity politics.

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The topic of European identity is of late a much discussed one, and Derridaconfides to the reader that he himself carries a certain ÒwearyÓ feeling, a feel-ing of being an ÒoldÓ European. But Derrida is not alone in this feeling;Europe as a whole, he suggests, carries with it an air of age and exhaustion.These two statements together form the first of DerridaÕs two ÒaxiomsÓ: 1)in the text, his form of address shifts from the individual, European ÒIÓ tothe ÒweÓ of European identity, and 2) he takes note of EuropeÕs state ofexhaustion, its finitude. Counter to the latter half of this first axiom, how-ever, Derrida acknowledges that Europe is also ÒyoungerÓ than ever Òsincea certain Europe does not yet exist.Ó For Derrida, out of this state of exhaus-tion and finitude arises the possibility of a new Europe. But, Derrida asks,how is this Òyounger than everÓ Europe to begin again? Should it aim at are-establishment of traditional European identity, a reunion with the tradi-tional conception of European identity? Or should Europe orient itself inanother direction, toward another possibility? As may already be clear, Derridahere poses the question of the future of an exhausted Europe within the famil-iar framework of identity and difference.

With his second axiom Derrida appears to align himself with the differencepole of the identity/difference binary. His second axiom is that Òwhat is proper

to a culture is to not be identical to itself.Ó3 On DerridaÕs insightful reading ofthe logic of identity, any subject that takes up an identity position does so inrelation to a certain difference with that identity. This Òstrange and violentsyntaxÓ ensures that any identity will always be marked by its constitutiveoutside, its own difference to itself. Thus, no exhausted culture can point toa single, pure origin or identity in order to recapture it and model itself onthis identity in the future. Based on this preliminary analysis of identity, theanswer for an exhausted EuropeÕs future seems fairly straightforward: sinceit is impossible to return to a single, pure identity, the only option is to cul-tivate the differences to that identity and to move away - without lookingback - from the traditional conception of Europe. (Derrida will want to chal-lenge this seemingly obvious conclusion later in the text.)

Many readers would be tempted to close The Other Heading at this point, sat-isfied that Derrida is a typical multiculturalist and postmodernist. On thosegrounds, the reader might either reject DerridaÕs position because he is irre-sponsible with respect to European tradition and identity, or celebrate that

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same conclusion on the pretense that his text is another edifying instance ofa call for a politics of difference and a ÒdeconstructionÓ of European colo-nialism. As with all of DerridaÕs texts, however, there is more than one layerof argument, and each unfolding complicates both DerridaÕs position andany interpretation of it. And those content with a passing familiarity withDerrida will fail to see that, when read carefully, his text undermines theposition of both those who prematurely congratulate or hastily criticise hisapparent ÒpostmodernÓ celebration of difference.

Returning more closely to the text, then, we find that DerridaÕs deconstruc-tive intervention into identity is focused not only on an imminence promptedby the injustices in European identity politics, but also by the following ques-tion posed by Paul Val�ry in his discussion of European identity: ÒWhat areyou going to do TODAY?Ó Why does Derrida choose to focus on this briefquotation from Val�ry? What special promise does today hold? DerridaÕsanswer is that Europe today is located in a singular, unprecedented time andposition. For perhaps the first time, Europe does not have to identify itselfsimply for or against a traditional idea of Europe. Both the all too familiartalk of a ÒNew Europe,Ó viz., a pro-Eurocentrism popular at the time ofDerridaÕs lecture (and still popular in certain forms today), and the oppos-ing trend of anti-Eurocentrism risk oscillating between the fixed poles of theidentity/difference binary. Derrida suggests that today there is another pos-sibility beyond these two programs.

Before examining this possibility in more depth, allow me to return to anextended treatment of the logic of identity through an analysis of the title ofthe text under consideration. The title, The Other Heading (in French, LÕautre

cap), is polysemous; as Derrida explains, Òle capÓ can mean title, chapter, let-terhead, and heading among other things. In French one can also say Òfaire

capÓ or Òchanger de capÓ meaning to have a heading or change headings.Throughout the text, Derrida plays on this term ÒcapÓ especially in the formof a head or a heading, developing relations between a thingÕs heading andits telos, extremity, and eschaton. As he notes, ÒheadingÓ usually coincideswith a calculated, deliberate orientation. Traditionally, it has been men whodecide on headings, which suggests an obvious link between heading andphallic points. Indeed, Derrida notes that teleology and eschatology have tra-ditionally been menÕs business. The title, The Other Heading, suggests another


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direction is on the horizon, that there is a changing of goals or headings. Itcould even mark a change in the sex or age of the captain.

The oppositional distinction between the heading and the Òother headingÓas explained thus far, however, remains trapped within the logic of identity,defining difference in terms of the original identity of the heading. Derridais, of course, interested in this antinomy, but he also seeks to orient his textin a wholly other direction, to the other of the heading, something that is otherthan headings altogether. As he explains this orientation, re-calling oneselfto the other of the heading would be to engage in a relation to the other thatno longer obeys the logic of the heading. This would consist of relating tothe other in a relationship no longer governed by the traditional logic of iden-tity. Derrida argues that the singular moment of Europe, EuropeÕs today, coin-cides with an unavoidable confrontation with this question of the headingand the other of the heading. What heading will an exhausted, but youngerthan ever, Europe take? Towards identity, difference, or perhaps the other ofboth? As we shall see, Derrida directs himself toward all three of these gestures.

With the words, ÒI should myself interrupt these recollections and changeheadings [changer de cap],Ó Derrida moves from a discussion of Europeanidentity and EuropeÕs heading into a discussion of responsibility.4 This moveis occasioned by the realisation on DerridaÕs part that the self-reflection onEuropean identity - both his own and that of his contemporaries - is worn-out. The logic of identity is in many ways the legacy par excellence of moder-nity, a tradition that many today would argue is itself a bit weary. Thoseconsidered to be ÒpostmodernÓ thinkers, for example, often look beyond thismodern tradition to its other, refusing to participate in modernityÕs obses-sion with the logic of identity and its totalising narratives (I have in mindhere LyotardÕs early work and BaudrillardÕs more recent writings). Derridais usually lumped in with these thinkers, along with Foucault and Lacan, toform a seemingly homogenous group called Òpostmodernists.Ó What makesthis grouping somewhat spurious in DerridaÕs case in particular is that hedoes not seek to move outside of or totally beyond the modern tradition. Onthe contrary, Derrida understands the modern tradition as leaving us a legacyto which we are responsible: Ò. . . we must ourselves be responsible for thisdiscourse of the modern tradition . . . We did not choose this responsibility;it imposes itself upon us . . .Ó5


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We are responsible for this modern tradition, Derrida tells us. Yet, this respon-sibility is far from straightforward since Europe and the modern traditionhave left us a contradictory and paradoxical legacy. As Derrida insists, thequestion of the heading of Europe left to us is not a singular question. Itinvolves a call to be responsible both to EuropeÕs heading and to the otherof its heading. Derrida calls this an aporia, a double bind, or a double oblig-ation. Yet how might we begin to assume such an aporetic responsibility, onethat is contradictory and double? How can we make ourselves both theguardian of European identity as well as - and at the same time - guardiansof an idea of Europe that consists in not closing off its identity, in not clos-ing itself off to the other of the heading?

This double bind between European identity and difference would, accord-ing to the logic of non-contradiction, force us to choose between continuingor opposing European identity. We have already mentioned that the Òpost-modernistÓ solution to this double bind is to oppose European identity andits modernist legacy with a postmodern celebration of difference. Thinkersin the modernist tradition would choose the other option: protect Europeanidentity and the modernist legacy against any opposing force. It is just thisbinary logic, however, that Derrida is resisting. Rather than opting for oneside over the other, Derrida maintains that radical responsibility lies in nego-tiating the tension between the two responsibilities and renouncing neitherof these imperatives. As I will attempt to show in more detail below, this isthe radical democratic logic of political responsibility.

Examining this radical democratic logic, however, is perhaps premature atthis point. After all, what is the source of these double obligations? Why mustduty be aporetic and paradoxical? To answer these questions, I turn now toa discussion of capital which takes up the bulk of DerridaÕs text and shedslight on the double legacy of European identity and modernity.

DerridaÕs French text allows for a clear play on capital in the masculine andfeminine that the single English term ÒcapitalÓ can mask. In French, the mas-culine Òle capitalÓ refers to capital in the monetary sense and the feminine Òla

capitaleÓ refers to the capital of a city or country. These two different types ofcapital, Derrida will argue, are our inheritance from European modernity. Ibegin with a discussion of the feminine Òcapitale.Ó6 Derrida notes that theissue of a single, central capital for all of Europe is no longer much considered


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in European politics. Nonetheless, this does not mean that struggles forEuropean hegemony do not exist in other forms. Once again, Derrida positsa double bind. In deciding on the status of a central European capital, we areforced to consider the problematics of European cultural identity being Òdis-persed into a myriad of provinces, into a multiplicity of self-enclosed idiomsor petty little nationalisms, each one jealous and untranslatable.Ó7 On theother hand, Europe also must resist being subjected to and standardised bya centralised authority. The task in working through the question of capitalis to avoid the extremes of monopoly and dispersion, of pure identity andpure difference. For Derrida, responsibility consists precisely in squarely fac-ing this aporia between identity and difference and attempting to create polit-ical strategies to work with and through this tension. As he phrases it:

Responsibility seems to consist today in renouncing neither of these two

contradictory imperatives. One must therefore try to invent gestures, dis-

courses, politico-institutional practices that inscribe the alliance of these two

imperatives, of these two promises or contracts: the capital and the a-cap-

ital [a-capitale], the other of the capital. That is not easy.8

Indeed, it is not. In fact, the project of creating a politics that accommodatescontradictory imperatives seems upon initial consideration to be impossible.But, as Derrida argues, impossibility or aporia is the enabling condition forthe emergence of genuine responsibility. When we are presented with a sit-uation to which we are able to apply some type of moral or political calcu-lus, responsibility has no place. Responsibility, as Derrida understands it,consists in making decisions when no clear and easy choice is available.9 Theresponsible task in the face of the aporia of capital, then, is to create politi-cal gestures and practices that do not hide the tension between monopoly(identity) and dispersion (difference), but work within it. Radical democracy,as I attempt to show below, is an attempt to enact such a politics.

We have yet to examine capital in its French masculine form, capital in themonetary sense. Here, too, Derrida seeks to negotiate a double path; this timeit is between anti-capitalist dogmatism and the counter-dogmatism that bansany discussion of capital and considers Marxist critiques too reductionist. Todraw out this double orientation, Derrida analyses Val�ryÕs use of the termcapital in his The Freedom of Spirit. Val�ryÕs text is important for us today,Derrida suggests, because it is marked by an imminence that parallels our


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own in many ways. Val�ryÕs text was written in 1939, and in it he Òrecallsthe imminence of a tremor that was not only going to reduce to rubble - amongother things - what was called Europe. It was also going to destroy Europein the name of an idea of Europe, of a Young Europe that attempted to assureits hegemony.Ó10 Derrida recalls for us that this move was countered in Val�ryÕstime by Western democratic nations that sought to destroy Nazism and itsunification of Europe. Throughout this section, Derrida suggests that ourÒtodayÓ is not all that different from Val�ryÕs own. The democratising forcesat work today seem to be constantly haunted by a return to the basest nation-alisms, racisms, and religious fanaticisms, similar to the threatening forcesagainst which Val�ry responds.

Val�ry locates this threatening imminence in a threat to culture in the formof capital. What makes the European/Mediterranean capital unique for Val�ryis its ability to Òmake civilisation.Ó He calls the Mediterranean a Òveritablemachine for making civilisation.Ó11 The European capital accomplishes thisthrough navigation - carrying its capital, merchandise, ideas, and methodsto other nations. Yet the extension of European capital (in both senses of theterm) is threatened when specifically European human existence is threat-ened. European capital (the material stuff of capital) is useless, Val�ry argues,without ÔmenÕ who need and know how to use it. The essence of Europeanman that Val�ry seeks to protect is quite similar to the capitalist ÒEconomicManÓ of liberal democratic theory, or as Derrida phrases it, the man whoseessence is the Òmaxim of maximisationÓ [la maxime de maximalit�].12

Derrida reads Val�ryÕs discourse on capital as an attempt to salvage notEurope itself but the universality for which Europe is responsible. And Derridais not wholly unsympathetic to Val�ryÕs project. There is a certain responsi-bility to the European heritage of capital which Derrida does not want tooverlook. What makes this responsibility difficult is that it cannot be a sim-ple repetition of European capitalism if it is to be a genuine response. ValeryÕsresponse to the threat of European capital is typical, and perhaps even irre-sponsible; his response is to save the identity and essence of European man.There is a paradoxical movement, however, in the attempt to save identityas both Val�ry and Derrida are aware. A particular identity is always (para-doxically) claimed as the universal ideal. No cultural identity claims to rep-resent a differentiated group without appeal to some ideal universal. Val�ry


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notes this paradox when he writes that the French are Òmen of universalityÓwho Òspecialise in the sense of the universal.Ó13

Unlike Val�ry, Derrida decides to labour over this paradox and illustrate howit creates the possibility of a responsible response to the imminence of EuropeÕstoday. The paradox of having an identity that is responsible for the univer-sal is that the identity is immediately opened up onto its own difference withitself. The European capital that seeks to be responsible to the universal runsthe risk of de-identifying itself. As Derrida describes this movement, theEuropean capital Ò. . . is related to itself not only in gathering itself in the dif-ference with itself and with the other heading, with the other shore of theheading, but in opening itself without being able any longer to gather itself.Ó14

From this tension between the identification and de-identification of Europeancapital (in both forms) arises the imposition of a double duty, and hence aradical responsibility, one that answers to the call of European heading andthe other heading, as well as the other of the heading. Derrida lists nine suchdouble duties, which I quote in part below:

Hence the duty to respond to the call of European memory, to recall what

has been promised under the name Europe, to re-identify Europe . . . This

duty also dictates opening Europe . . . opening it onto that which is not, never

was, and never will be Europe . . . The same duty also dictates welcoming

foreigners in order not only to integrate them but to recognise and accept

their alterity . . . The same duty dictates criticising . . . a totalitarian dogma-

tism that, under the pretense of putting an end to capital, destroyed democ-

racy and the European heritage . . . The same duty dictates cultivating the

virtue of such critique, of the critical idea, the critical tradition, but also sub-

mitting it beyond critique and questioning, to a deconstructive genealogy

that thinks and exceeds it without yet compromising it . . . The same duty

dictates assuming the European, and uniquely European, heritage of an idea

of democracy, while also recognising that this idea . . . is never simply

given . . . but rather something that remains to be thought and to come [�

venir] . . . The same duty dictates respecting differences, idioms, minorities,

singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for transla-

tion, agreement, and univocity, the law of the majority, opposition to racism,

nationalism, and xenophobia. The same duty demands tolerating and respect-

ing all that is not placed under the authority of reason . . . For these thoughts


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may in fact also try to remain faithful to the ideal of the Enlightenment . . .

while yet acknowledging its limits, in order to work on the Enlightenment

of this time . . . This same duty surely calls for responsibility, for the respon-

sibility to think, speak, and act in compliance with this double contradic-

tory imperative - a contradiction that must not be only an apparent or

illusory antinomy . . . but must be effective and, with experience, through exper-

iment, interminable.15

I have quoted Derrida at length here for two reasons: most obviously, to high-light the specific double duties for which DerridaÕs deconstructive readingof European capital calls, and more obliquely, to question the particular formthat these duties take. What exactly is at stake in characterising duties as dou-ble or aporetic? Why are responsibilities and duties always presented byDerrida in such a way as to prevent their fulfilment a priori?

Derrida himself offers an answer to this question elsewhere. In describingthe justification for the particular form that duty takes in his writings, Derridaresponds in his text Aporias that duty must take this aporetic form since Òonemust avoid good conscience at all costs.Ó16 For Derrida, a responsibility com-pletely fulfilled or assumed is a responsibility done in good conscience. Thismore straightforward understanding of responsibility is contrasted by Derridawith his more extreme notion of radical or infinite responsibility, which incharacterising responsibilities as aporetic and contradictory, prevents the fullassumption or completion of any responsibility. Clearly, the avoiding of goodconscience suggests certain affinities with L�vinasÕs writings - especially onthe topic of mauvaise conscience - many of which have recently been exploredby a number of authors.17 In his more explicitly political writings, however,Derrida seems to have more in common with radical democratic theory thanwith L�vinasian ethics.18 Although there are significant parallels betweenL�vinasian ethics and radical democratic politics, the two do differ in signif-icant ways. But rather than concentrate upon those differences, in the fol-lowing section an elaboration of the basic structure of radical democraticpolitics is given along with an explanation of how DerridaÕs work comple-ments and draws from this project.

Derrida tells us that what motivates his text is injustices that have been occur-ring in the name of European identity and a certain version of democracy.What makes such injustices all the more distressing for those in the liberal


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democratic tradition (a tradition for which Derrida argues we are responsible)is that such resurgences of nationalism, racism, and sexism are happening inspite of the increased democratising of European society - a movement thatwas supposed to put an end to such injustices. As radical democratic authorChantal Mouffe points out, even at its most triumphant point, the liberaldemocratic project has not provided the Òsmooth transition to pluralist democ-racy,Ó that many had predicted, but has instead Òopened the way to a resur-gence of nationalism and the emergence of new antagonisms.Ó19 What are weto make of this resurgence of antagonisms? Is there a way to create a politicsthat addresses the fundamentally antagonistic character of the political sphere?

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe begin their radical democratic projectwith the acknowledgement that society and the political signifiers that rep-resent various social groups are never self-identical precisely because iden-tity always produces its own antagonistic, constitutive outside. They arguethat antagonisms and conflicts are witnesses to the impossibility of societyever fulfilling its own identity, what they call Òthe impossibility of closure.Ó20

Antagonism in this sense should not be understood as an objective ontolog-ical condition of the political realm, but as an experience of the limits of iden-tity and identity politics. The logic of identity ensures that the constructionof any social ÒweÓ always prefigures a ÒthemÓ that functions as the limit ofthe Òwe,Ó preventing any full self-identity. This is why the crisis of identityis central to the radical democratic project; if society were completely self-identical and there were no conflicts or antagonisms, there would be no needfor democracy or democratic contestation. Realising that identities are alwaysin crisis and that antagonism is the necessary outcome of taking up identi-ties necessitates a rethinking of the goal of achieving a self-identical and non-antagonistic society.

Recognising that the political sphere is fundamentally antagonistic and con-flictual does not necessarily negate the impossibility of unifying the variousantagonisms. Laclau and Mouffe argue that ÒarticulationÓ is one means ofachieving a unification - albeit a partial one - of the antagonistic politicalfield. Before examining the role of articulation, it may be helpful to definethe terms that Laclau and Mouffe utilise in their analysis. As they use theterms: ÒelementsÓ are differences that are not discursively articulated, Òmo-mentsÓ are differential positions within discourse, ÒdiscourseÓ is the structured


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totality resulting from various articulations, and ÒarticulationÓ is any prac-tice that establishes a relation among elements such that the identity of a dis-cursive formation is modified in the process.21 Following DerridaÕs analysisof the logic of identity, Laclau and Mouffe maintain that all identity is rela-tional and marked by a ÒsurplusÓ that escapes that identity. They furtherexplain that since all discursive formations are disrupted and destabilised bytheir own surplus of elements (their own constitutive outside), the transitionfrom elements (pure non-articulated differences) to moments (fixed discursiveidentities) is never complete. In other words, the transformation of differ-ences into intelligible identities is never fully achieved, hence the never-endingtask of creating and modifying political and social identities to cover overthe impossibility of full closure. Articulation is the name given to this taskof trying to halt the slide of pure elements/difference by bringing them undera fixed moment/signifier. It is an attempt to give an identity to a field of dif-ferences that would otherwise remain pure, unintelligible differences.

Within the terms of Laclau and MouffeÕs analysis, articulation is achieved byconstructing Ònodal pointsÓ (a term borrowed from Lacanian psychoanaly-sis) which partially fix the meaning of non-articulated elements in a field ofdifferences.22 Perhaps the best explanation of the significance of nodal pointsfor radical democracy is provided by cultural theorist Slavoj Zizek in hisimportant text, The Sublime Object of Ideology. Regarding what I have beencalling a Òfield of differencesÓ or Òdiscursive formations,Ó Zizek (in a moreAlthusserian/Lacanian vein) writes about Òideological spaceÓ as formed ofÒnon-bound, non-tied elements . . . whose very identity is Òopen,Ó overde-termined by their articulation in a chain with other elements . . .Ó23 The wayto unify these non-bound elements, Zizek explains (following Laclau andMouffe), is through nodal points that ÒquiltÓ or stop the sliding of the mean-ing of elements. Zizek writes: ÒThe ÔquiltingÕ performs the totalisation bymeans of which this free floating of ideological elements is halted, fixed -that is to say, by means of which they become parts of the structured net-work of meaning.Ó24 Zizek offers the example of environmentalism as a nodalpoint through which various different elements of an ideological space/dis-cursive formation are unified and linked. Zizek argues that the meaning ofenvironmentalism and its links with other ideological elements can never befully determined in advance. For instance, one could be a state-oriented envi-ronmentalist who insists that only state intervention will stop ecological


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catastrophe, a socialist environmentalist who argues that the solution to theexploitation of nature lies in a change in the means of production, or a deepecologist who believes that the environmental crisis can only be averted bya spiritual return to our identity with nature. One could offer similar histor-ical examples of feminism, class struggle, and democracy serving as nodalpoints that quilt the field of differences within those struggles and give thema common identity. The problem with these approaches traditionally, how-ever, is that they are all essentialist and reductionistic insofar as they attemptto reduce the field of differences down to side-effects of a ÒrealÓ or essentialcore. The task of contemporary anti-essentialist political struggles, arguesZizek, is to construct nodal points that escape the trap of reductionism andessentialism.

Laclau and Mouffe suggest that radical democracy can serve as a non-essen-tialist nodal point to unify and give a common identity to an otherwise diversefield of political struggles (feminism, socialism, environmentalism, queer pol-itics, anti-racism, etc.). What makes radical democracy somewhat differentfrom essentialist political movements is that the specific differences of vari-ous political struggles are maintained even through the creation of a newcommon identity. ZizekÕs explanation of this seemingly paradoxical projectis extremely helpful here. As he explains, the radical democratic project is:

. . . an articulation of particular struggles (for peace, ecology, feminism,

human rights, and so on), none of which pretends to be the ÒTruth,Ó the

last Signified, the Òtrue MeaningÓ of all the others; but the title Òradical

democracyÓ itself indicates how the very possibility of their articulation

implies the Ònodal,Ó determining role of a certain struggle which, precisely

as a particular struggle, outlines the horizon of all other struggles. This

determining role belongs, of course, to democracy . . . according to Laclau

and Mouffe, all other struggles [feminism, anti-racism, environmentalism,

and others] . . . could be conceived as the gradual radicalisation, extension,

application of the democratic project to new domains . . .25

Yet even though each particular struggle mentioned above can be seen as anextension of and a struggle for certain democratic goals, democracy is by nomeans the underlying essence or core of these struggles. As Zizek explains,the Òdialectical paradoxÓ lies in the fact that the nodal point of radical democ-racy, Òfar from enforcing a violent suppression of the differences, opens the


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very space for the relative autonomy of the particular struggles: the feministstruggle, for example, is made possible only through reference to democratic-egalitarian discourse.Ó26 In this sense, the nodal point Òradical democracyÓcontains only those Òpolitical movements and organisations which legitimise[and] designate themselves as ÔdemocraticÕ . . .Ó27 In using radical democracyas a nodal point, Laclau and Mouffe are not trying to suture the entire polit-ical field, only those movements that make some appeal to democratic dis-course.28 The common identity created by the nodal point Òradical democracyÓis thus to be understood as a performative enactment of a common identityrather than an essentialist reduction. Radical democracy is not the essence ofthese struggles but a contingent quilting point that performatively enacts acommon identity through which the demands of disparate struggles can becoalitionally articulated.

Despite the promise of using radical democracy as a nodal point to unifyvarious struggles, this link by itself will not accomplish the goal of unifyinga diverse political field. Laclau and Mouffe are well aware that the variousstruggles that may deem themselves Òradically democraticÓ can be pursuingcompletely different goals or even be directly at odds with one another oncertain issues. Hence, Laclau and MouffeÕs radical democratic project doesnot end with establishing a single nodal point, but rather they posit that itis necessary to ÒhegemoniseÓ the political sphere. Although they borrow theterm ÒhegemonyÓ from Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe redefine the term to per-form a different but related function than the one that Gramsci intended.29

As they define the term, hegemony is the creation of links among diversepolitical struggles. Where they differ from Gramsci is that Laclau and Mouffeconsider these links not to be a priori or essential links, but contingent linksthat expose a Òregularity in dispersionÓ in a given discursive formation.30

Reading hegemony through Foucault can be helpful in understanding Laclauand MouffeÕs position. Foucault argues that discursive formations are creatednot by singular power struggles, but by multiple matrices of power that cre-ate varied differential subject positions. Foucault exposes the impossibility ofa discursive formation having an underlying core or essence that ties the var-ious subject positions together by showing that power is not centralised butdifferential and Òeverywhere.Ó Laclau and Mouffe accept this basic descrip-tion of discursive formations, but go a step beyond Foucault (at least the


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work of his early period) to argue that despite the differential subject posi-tions and varied forms of power, there are contingent regularities in the dis-persion of power and subject positions. Hegemonic formations function toexpose those regularities, all the while realising that such regularities in dis-persion are not essential but contingent upon the discursive formation.

In this way, Laclau and MouffeÕs theory of radical democratic hegemonyanswers the demand of linking identity and difference without sacrificingeither. By conceiving of radical democracy as a nodal point that performa-tively enacts a common identity rather than unearthing an essential one,Laclau and Mouffe understand that the differences they are attempting tounite will always exceed the limits of the radical democratic nodal point. Theradical democratic project recognises and accepts this excess of identity andworks with a double dialectic, maintaining various identities but exposingthose identities to their outside through the creation of hegemonic links thatunify identities that would otherwise remain singular and particular. Thisdouble dialectic is perhaps the most creative and promising means of work-ing with identity and difference in the political sphere.

Derrida aligns himself with such radical democratic strategies insofar as heis unwilling to side with either pure identity or pure difference in politics.Derrida is content neither with simply repeating the European tradition uncrit-ically, nor with renouncing the tradition altogether. It is in reference to theradical democratic logic of Laclau and Mouffe that we can begin to appreci-ate the significance of this double movement in DerridaÕs text. Divorced froman understanding of Laclau and MouffeÕs work, the logic behind DerridaÕsrecent writings on politics may appear incomprehensible, and at worst, apo-litical. My suspicion is that by situating DerridaÕs work within the radicaldemocratic tradition we can begin to re-read his works on politics with acloser eye toward the double bind and double obligations of the politics ofidentity and difference, and begin to realise the potential for a radical rethink-ing and restructuring of politics inherent in his work.31

I would also suggest that the radical democratic approach to identity anddifference in the political sphere harbours some extremely helpful ideas anddirections for contemporary debates in political theory. Instead of aiming tocreate a politics that attempts to give final solutions to the debates over iden-tity and difference, we might turn our attention to creating and enacting


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strategies that respond to the contingencies of the political field. Within aradical democratic framework, the liberal democratic dream of creating asociety that would forever end conflict and antagonism would be replacedwith a democracy that allows for, and attempts to respond to, the identitiesand alterities that no political movement can ever fully contain. This is whypolitics as conceived by Derrida and Laclau and Mouffe is always Ò� venir,Óalways something Òto come.Ó Yet an Ò� venirÓ politics is not futural, utopian,or uninterested in present political injustices. We should read this Ò� venirÓaspect instead as a commitment to infinite responsibility, as a perpetual avoid-ance of political good conscience. A politics to come, a politics that is radi-cally responsible to the other, can never be final and complete; it must allowa certain space so that the other can be heard. I would suggest that it is towardsuch a politics that DerridaÕs The Other Heading aims.

* Matthew R. Calarco, Department of Philosophy, Binghamton University, Binghamton,

New York, USA

Notes

1 Examples of similar writings on radical democratic politics can be found in the

works of Judith Butler, Henry Louis Gates, and Cornel West to name a few of the

most prominent figures.

2 J. Derrida, LÕautre cap, Paris: Minuit, 1991, pp. 12-13. English translation: The Other

Heading, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992, p. 6.

3 Ibid., p. 16. English translation: p. 9.



6 Ibid., pp. 38-56. English translation: pp. 36-56.



9 DerridaÕs most lucid explanation of this type of radical responsibility can be found

in his The Gift of Death, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995,

esp. pp. 53-81. This rethinking of responsibility has parallels in the writings of


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Emmanuel L�vinas and Maurice Blanchot as well. See, for example, L�vinasÕs

Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981, and BlanchotÕs

The Writing of the Disaster, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986.

10 Derrida, LÕautre cap, pp. 61-2. English translation: 62.

11 Val�ry cited in Derrida, LÕautre cap, p. 64. English translation, p. 64.


13 Val�ry cited in Derrida, LÕautre cap, p. 73. English translation: p. 74.


15 Ibid., pp. 75-8. English translation: pp. 76-9.

16 J. Derrida, Aporias, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 19.

17 Several attempts have recently been made to develop and critically analyse the

background for DerridaÕs ethical writings, especially with respect to L�vinas. On

this topic see, for example, Simon CritchleyÕs, The Ethics of Deconstruction, Oxford:

Basil Blackwell, 1992, Drucilla CornellÕs, The Philosophy of the Limit, New York and

London: Routledge, 1991, esp. pp. 62-90, as well as much of the work done by

Robert Bernasconi. Here, I am attempting to give a parallel context for the under-

standing of DerridaÕs political writings, even though there is considerable overlap

in the two projects and they should not be seen as wholly separate. For more on

the background and potential of a Derridean politics that further develop the

themes explored here, the reader may want to begin with Bill MartinÕs, Humanism

and itÕs Aftermath, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995, Ernesto LaclauÕs

ÒDeconstruction, Pragmatism, HegemonyÓ in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed.

C. Mouffe, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, as well as the essays collected

in C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, London: Verso, 1993.

18 By glossing over the L�vinasian influence in DerridaÕs work, I do not mean to

suggest that L�vinasÕ understanding of politics and third party justice are not

themes that inform DerridaÕs own political writings. As is clear from his recent

book Adieu � Emmanuel L�vinas, Paris: Galil�e, 1997, Derrida believes that the rela-

tion between singular responsibility (ethics as hospitality) and third party justice

(politics and justice as perjury) as described by L�vinas offers the possibility for

a radical rethinking of the political. What is perhaps missing in L�vinas, and what

Derrida is intent upon thinking through more fully, is a more exacting articula-

tion of what an ethical politics might consist in. I want to suggest that with the

help of radical democratic theory, presented in more detail in the second half of


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this paper, we can begin to sketch in some of the contours of this more ethical (in

the sense that L�vinas gives this term) politics.

19 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, London: Verso, 1993, p. 1.

20 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic

Politics, London: Verso, 1985, p. 122.

21 Ibid., p. 105.

22 Ibid., p. 113.

23 S. Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso, 1989, p. 87.

24 Ibid., p. 87.

25 Ibid., p. 88.

26 Ibid., pp. 88-9.

27 Ibid., p. 98.

28 In a series of perceptive comments on this section of the paper, Martin Dillon won-

ders whether the radical democratic project can or should serve to form alliances

between radically divergent positions such as extreme left and right wing posi-

tions. My answer to this query would have to be no. As I understand the radical

democratic project, it is intended only to form alliances between broadly defined

leftist positions and other movements that embrace radical democratic ideals (see,

Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 1; Mouffe, Return, p. 69). That such limits create

antagonisms and constitutive outsides of their own, I think, would be openly

admitted by Laclau and Mouffe. I am also indebted to Andrew Feenberg for rais-

ing similar questions about the limits of radical democratic theory in comments

on an earlier version of this paper.

29 For more on Laclau and MouffeÕs use of Gramscian theory, see the first two chap-

ters of their Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.

30 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 136.

31 I want to stress that this is only one means of approaching the political in DerridaÕs

writings, and that my reading of The Other Heading does not pretend to tell the

whole story of the place of politics and the political in his work. In particular,

what my reading tends to underplay is DerridaÕs insistence that we begin to try

to think the other of the heading, that is, something beyond or other than iden-

tity and difference. The Other Heading brings us up to this question, but falls short

of treating it with any sort of sustained attention. Radical democratic thought, too,

I would suggest, has not given the question of the other of the heading enough


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attention. However, it is at this level - where radical democratic theory meets

Derridean thought - that this question can be posed in all of its rigour and impor-

tance. This question undoubtedly signals one of the future directions for both rad-

ical democratic thought and DerridaÕs writings.


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Documents

Derrida on Identity and Difference_A Radical Democratic Reading of The Other Heading