Derrida’s Deconstruction - Saul Newman

8/10/2019 Derridas Deconstruction - Saul Newman

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Saul Newman

Derridas DeconstructionOf Authority

2001


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Contents

Deconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Inversion/subversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

e end(s) of man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Beyond poststructuralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Differance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

e outside of ethical responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Law, justice and authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

e politics of emancipation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Derridas an-archy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21


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Abstract: Tis article explores the political aspect ofDerridas work, in particularhis critique of authority. Derrida employs a series of strategies to expose the antago-nisms within Western philosophy, whose structures of presence provide a rational and

essentialist foundation for political institutions. Terefore,Derridas interrogation of

the universalist claims of philosophy may be applied to the pretensions of politicalauthority. Moreover, I argue that Derridas deconstruction of the two paths of read-ing inversion and subversion may be applied to the question of revolutionary

politics, to show that revolution oen culminates in the reaffirmation of authority.

Derrida navigates a path betweenthesetwo strategies,allowing onetoformulate

philosophical and political strategies that work at the limits of discourse, thereby

pointing to an outside. is outside, I argue, is crucial to radical politics because it

unmasks the violence and illegitimacy of institutions and laws.


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e political aspect of Jacques Derridas thinking, in particular his critiqueofau-thority,has been somewhatneglected. Howeverhisinterrogation of rationalandessentialiststructuresin philosophymakes his work crucial to anycontemporarycritique ofpolitical institutions and discourses,and indeed anyunderstanding

of radical politics. Derrida instigates a series of strategies or moves to unmaskthe suppressed antagonisms and differences withinthe Western philosophicaldiscourse whose claims to universality, wholeness and lucid self-reflection havebeen sounded since the time of Plato. His critique has important implications forpolitical theory: his questioning of the claims ofphilosophymaybe appliedtothe claims ofpolitical institutionsfounded uponthem. Derridas discussion of therelation between metaphysical structures of essence and presence and the hierar-chies and dominations they make possible, as well as his critique of oppositionaland binary thinking,allows his workto beread as an assaultonthe place ofpower.e place ofpower refers heretothetendencyof radicalpoliticalphilosophies andmovementstoreaffirmtheverystructures ofauthority theyseekto overthrow.

However, thelogic ofdeconstructionoperatesin a way that is somewhatdifferentfrom the poststructuralist logic of dispersal that characterizes the work of suchthinkers as Foucault and Deleuze. Derrida allows us to explore the possibility ofstrategies of politics that refer to a radical exteriority an outside to power andauthority. roughthis outside one caninterrogate andresistauthoritywithoutinvoking another form of authority in its place.

Deconstruction

Deconstruction is the term most commonly associated with Derrida and,whileit is a widelymisunderstood and misusedterm, it willnevertheless be usedhere to describe the general direction ofDerridas work. Christopher Norrisdefines deconstruction as a series ofmoves, whichincludethe dismantling ofconceptual oppositions and hierarchical systems of thought, and an unmaskingof aporiasand moments ofselfcontradictionin philosophy.1 Itmightbe saidthatdeconstruction is a w ay of reading texts philosophical texts with the intentionof making these texts question themselves, forcing them to take account of theirown contradictions,and exposing the antagonisms they have ignored or repressed.Whatdeconstructionis not,however, is a philosophicalsystem. Derrida does notquestion one kind of philosophy from the standpoint of another, more complete,less contradictorysystem. is would be,asIshallargue,merely to substitute onekind ofauthority foranother. isis atrap Derrida assiduously triesto avoid. He

1 Christopher Norris,Derrida(London: Fontana Press, 1987), p. 19.


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therefore does notcomefrom a pointofdeparture outside philosophy. ereis noessential place of outside the system. RatherDerrida workswithinthe discourseof Western philosophy itself, looking for hidden antagonisms that jeopardize it.Moreover,his aimis not to undermine philosophy,as has oen been claimed. On

the contrary,Derridas critiqueofphilosophy is itself fundamentally philosophical.Byopening philosophy tothis questioning,Derridais beingfaithful tothe spiritofphilosophy: unquestioning and slavish adulation ultimately makes a mockery ofphilosophy. Deconstruction is, therefore, a strategy of questioning philosophysclaims to reflexive self-identity.

Deconstruction maybe seen as a critique of the authoritarian structuresinphilosophy, in particular logocentrism that is, philosophys subordination,throughout its history,ofwriting to speech. e privileging ofspeech over writingin philosophical textsis an example ofwhat Derrida callsthe metaphysics ofpresence in Western philosophy. It is anindication ofhowfarphilosophy is stillgroundedinthe metaphysicalconceptsit claimsto havetranscended. Derrida

pointsto PlatosPhaedrusin which writingisrejected as a mediumforconveyingand recordingtruth: it is seen as an artifice, aninvention which cannot be asubstitutefor the authenticityand immediate presence ofmeaning associatedwith speech. Where speechis seen as a means ofapproachingthetruth because ofitsimmediacy,writingis seen as a dangerous corruption ofspeechalesser formofspeech,whichis destructive ofmemoryand susceptibleto deceit. Moreover,speechis associated withthe authorityof theteacher,while writingis seen byPlato as a threat to this authority because it allows the pupil to learn without theteachers guidance.2

Derrida aacks this logocentric thinking by pointing out certain contradic-tions within it. He shows that Plato cannot represent speech except through themetaphorofwriting,while at the sametime denyingthatwriting has any realefficacyas a medium atall.As Derrida says: it is notany lessremarkable herethat the so-calledliving discourse should suddenlybe described bya metaphorborrowed from the order of the very thing one is trying to exclude from it.3

Speech is, therefore, dependenton the writingthat itexcludes. Writingis anexample of the logic of supplementarity: asupplementis excluded by presence,but is,at the sametime,necessary for theformation of itsidentity.Writingisthusa supplement to speech: it is excluded byspeech,but is nevertheless necessaryfor the presence ofspeech. e unmasking of thislogic ofsupplementarity is oneof the deconstructive moves employed byDerridatoresist thelogocentrismin

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ibid., p. 31.3 JacquesDerrida,Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,1981), p. 148.


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Inversion/subversion

Itmustbe made clear,however, thatDerrida does notsimplywant toinvert theterms of these binaries sothat the subordinatedterm becomesthe privilegedterm.

He does notwant to putwritinginthe place ofspeech, for instance. Inversioninthis way leavesintact the hierarchical,authoritarian structure of the binarydivision. Such a strategyonly reaffirmsthe place ofpower intheveryaempt tooverthrow it. One could argue that Marxism fell victim to this logic by replacingthe bourgeois state with the equally authoritarian workers state. is is a logicthat haunts our radical political imaginary. Revolutionary political theories haveoen succeeded only in reinventing power and authority in their own image.However,Derrida alsorecognizesthe dangers ofsubversion that is, theradicalstrategyofoverthrowingthe hierarchyaltogether, rather thaninvertingitsterms.For instance, the classicalanarchists critique ofMarxism wentalongthelinesthatMarxism neglected politicalpower in particular the powerof the state

foreconomic power,andthis would mean arestoration ofpoliticalpower ina Marxist revolution. Rather, foranarchists, the state and all forms ofpoliticalpowermustbe abolished asthefirst revolutionaryact. However,Derrida believesthatsubversion andinversion both culminateinthe samething thereinventionofauthority, in different guises. us, the anarchist critique is based on theEnlightenment idea ofa rationaland moralhuman essencethatpowerdenies,and yet we know from Derrida that any essential identity involves a radicalexclusion orsuppression ofother identities. us,anarchism substituted politicaland economic authority fora rationalauthority founded on an Enlightenment-humanist subjectivity. Both radical politico-theoretical strategies then thestrategy of inversion, as exemplified by Marxism, and the strategy of subversion,

as exemplified by anarchism are two sides of the same logic of logic of place.So for Derrida:

Whatmustoccur thenis notmerelya suppression ofallhierarchy, foranar-chy only consolidates just as surely the established order of a metaphysicalhierarchy; nor is it a simple change or reversal in the terms of any given hi-erarchy.Rather the Umdrehung mustbe atransformation of the hierarchicalstructure itself.4

In otherwords, to avoidthelure ofauthorityone mustgo beyond boththeanarchic desireto destroyhierarchy,andthe merereversalof terms. Rather,asDerrida suggests, if one wants to avoid this trap the hierarchical structure itself

4 Jacques Derrida,Spurs: Nietzses Styles(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 81.


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must be transformed. Political action must invoke a rethinkingof revolution andauthority in a way that traces a path betweenthesetwoterms,sothat it does notmerely reinvent the place ofpower. Itcould be arguedthatDerrida propounds ananarchism ofhis own, ifbyanarismone means a questioning ofallauthority,

includingtextualand philosophicalauthority,as wellas a desireto avoidthetrapof reproducing authority and hierarchy in ones aempt to destroy it.

is deconstructive aempt to transform the very structure ofhierarchy and au-thority, to go beyondthe binaryopposition, is alsofoundin Nietzsche. Nietzschebelievesthatone cannotmerelyoppose authoritybyaffirmingits opposite: thisisonly toreact to and, thus,affirmthe domination oneis supposedly resisting. Onemust,he argues, transcend oppositional thinking altogether go beyondtruthand error,beyond being and becoming,beyond good and evil.5 ForNietzscheit issimply a moral prejudice to privilege truth over error. However, he does not tryto counter this byprivileging errorover truth,becausethisleavesthe oppositionintact. Rather, he refuses to confine his view of the world to this opposition: In-

deed whatcompels usto assumethat there exists anyessentialantithesis betweentrueandfalse? Isit notenoughto suppose grades ofapparentness and asitwerelighterand darkershades and tones ofappearance?6 Nietzschedisplaces,rather than replaces, these oppositional and authoritarian structures of thoughthe displaces place. is strategyofdisplacement,similarlyadopted byDerrida,provides certain cluesto developing a non-essentialist theory of resistancetopowerand authority.Rather thanreversingtheterms of the binaryopposition,one should perhaps question, and try to make problematic, its very structure.

Te end(s) of man

e prevalence of these binary structures indicates, according to Derrida, howmuch philosophy is still tied to metaphysics: it is still dominated, in other words,by the place ofmetaphysics. In the same way,one might argue thatpoliticaltheory is stilldominated by the needfora place, forsome sortofessencethatit has neverhad, andyet continually tries toreinvent. e demand for a self-identical essence in politics and philosophy would be, according to Derrida, theresidue of the category of the divine. God has not been completely usurped fromphilosophy,as has always been claimed. God has onlybeenreinventedinthe

5 See Alan D. Schri, Nietzsche and the Critique of Oppositional inking,HistoryofEuropeanIdeas

11 (1989): 78390.6 Friedrich Nietzsche,Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, Mx: Penguin,1990), p. 65.


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form ofessence. Derridaisinfluenced here byNietzsche,who arguesthataslongas we continueto believe absolutely in grammar, in essence, inthe metaphysicalpresuppositions of language, we continue to believe in God. As much as wemayclaim the contrary,we have notoustedGod from philosophy. e place,

the authorityof the category of the divineremainsintact, only reinscribedinthe demandforpresence. ForDerridathe Man ofhumanistdiscourse has beenreinscribed in the place of God:

Whatwas namedinthis waywas nothing other thanthe metaphysicalunityofMan and God, therelation ofmanto God, the projectofbecoming God asthe project of constituting human-reality.Atheism changes nothing in thisfundamental structure.7

is spectre of God-Man has yet to be exorcized from our midst. For instance,Derrida showsthatHeideggers notion ofBeing does notdisplacethe categoryofGod-Man-Essence asit claimsto have done: onthe contrary,Being merelyreaffirms this place. e notion ofBeing is only a reinscription ofhumanistEssence, just as Man was only a reinscription of God. e authority, the place, ofreligion and metaphysics, remainsintact.8 Derridas analysisisimportantbecauseitexposesthe authoritarianismthatstill inhabits certain structures of thought.Moreover, itshowsthatanykind of radicalpolitical theorymust firstbe awareof its own latent metaphysical structures, andtherefore its own potential fordomination.

Derrida argues that it is necessary to think the end of Man, without thinkingessence. In other words, one must try to approach the problem of the end ofMan in a way that avoids the perilous trap of place. Philosophys proclamationof the death ofMan does notentirelyconvince Derrida. So perhaps Foucaults

sounding of the death-knell of Man when he predicted that the figure of Manwould disappear like aface drawninthe sand at the edge of the sea shouldbe taken with a grain of salt.9 ere is still, at least for Derrida, the intransigentspectre ofGod-Man-Essencethat refusesto be exorcized: it remains asfirmlyentrenched in philosophy, and indeed in politics, as ever.10 Moreover, as Derrida

7 Jacques Derrida, e Ends of Man, ine Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass (Brighton, UK:Harvester, 1982), p. 116.

8 ibid., p. 128.9 Michel Foucault,e Orderof ings:an Araeologyof the Human Sciences(New York: Vintage,

1973), p. 386.10

Derrida plays upon this idea of spectre or spirit. See Jacques Derrida,Spectres of Marx: the Stateof Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge,1994), pp. 1201.


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has argued, it is notpossibleto destroy this place. Heidegger,bypositing a pre-ontological Being to overcome metaphysics, has remained only more faithful tothe metaphysical tradition.11 is strategy of absolute rejection, as we have seenalready,neverworks: itmerely reinvents authority in another form. Itconstructs

the dubious binary of authority-power/revolution, in whichrevolutionbecomespotentially the new form of power.

However,have poststructuralistslike Foucaultand Deleuzefallenintothe sametrap? Itcould be arguedthatFoucaults dispersalof the subject into sites ofpowerand discourse,and Deleuze and Guaarisfragmentation of the subject into ananarchic and haphazardlanguage ofmachines,parts andflows,are operationsthatdeny radicalpolitics a necessary pointofdeparture. Sointheir rejectionofhumanism,perhaps Foucault,and Deleuze and Guaari,have paradoxicallydeniedthemselvesthe possibilityof resistance against the dominationtheyseeas inextricably involved in humanist discourse. Poststructuralism, in this sense,has le a theoretical void in radical politics. Derrida points here to the limits of

the poststructuralist argument.

Beyond poststructuralism

Derrida allows us to re-evaluate the problem of humanism. He describes twopossible ways ofdealing with the problem ofplacein philosophy the twotemptations of deconstruction. e first strategy is:

To aemptan exitand a deconstruction withoutchangingterrain,by repeat-ing what isimplicit inthefounding concepts andthe originalproblematic,byusing against the edificetheinstruments orstones availableinthe house,that is, equally, in language. Here, one risks ceaselessly confirming, consoli-dating, reliing(relever),atan always more certain depth, thatwhich oneallegedly deconstructs. e continuous process of making explicit, movingtoward an opening, risks sinking into the autism of the closure.12

Sothis strategyofworkingwithinthe discourse ofEnlightenmenthumanistmetaphysics,usingitsterms andlanguage, risksreaffirming and consolidatingthestructure, the place ofpower, thatoneistryingto oppose. Derridaistalking here

11

Rodolphe Gasch,e Tain of the Mirror: Derrida & the Philosophy of Reflection(Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 119.12 Derrida, e Ends of Man, p. 135.


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about Heideggers critique ofhumanism, which, he argues, involved a replacementof Man with the equally essentialist and metaphysical Being.

e second strategy, according to Derrida, is:

To decideto change terrain, in a discontinuous andirruptive fashion, bybrutallyplacing oneselfoutside,and byaffirming an absolute break ordiffer-ence. Withoutmentioning all the other forms of trompe-loeilperspectiveinwhich such a displacement can be caught, thereby inhabiting more naivelyand strictly than ever theinside one declares one has deserted, the simplepractice of language ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain on the oldestground.13

is alternative move ofmaking an absolute break withthe discourse ofhu-manistmetaphysics,ofseeking an outsideto which one can escape,and fromwhich one can resist authority, would represent the logic of poststructuralism.14

Alan Schri, for instance,seesthis strategy in FoucaultseOrder of ings.15

AsI suggested before, Foucaultand Deleuze may be seen to be making an ab-solute break with humanism dispersing the subject into fragments and effectsofdiscourses, machines, desires and practices, etc. Accordingto Derrida, thiswould havethe same effectasthefirststrategy: byaempting a complete changeof terrain one only reaffirms ones place withinthe oldterrain. e more onetries to escape the dominant paradigm, the more one finds oneself frustratinglywithinit. isis because, inits over-hasty rejection ofhumanism andthe subject,poststructuralism has denied itself a point of departure for theorizing resistanceto essentialisthumanistdiscourses such as rationality. Derrida arguesthatde-construction and for that maer, any form of resistance against authority isalways caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of these two possible strategies,

and must therefore navigate a course between them. ese two strategies of de-construction skewerpolitical theory: theyarethetwo possible paths confrontinganti-authoritarianthoughtand action. eyare both dominated by thethreatofplace.

Derridacan perhapsshow us a way out of this theoretical abyss. ere may be ameans ofcombiningthesetwo seemingly irreconcilable pathsin a way thatallowsradicalpoliticsto advance beyondthe problematic ofmetaphysics and humanism,without reaffirmingthese structures. Rather than choosing one strategyover

13 ibid.14 Derrida says that this style of deconstruction is the one that dominates France today. See ibid.15

Alan D. Schri, Foucaultand Derridaon Nietzscheand the End(s) of Man, in ExceedinglyNietzse:Aspects of Contemporary Nietzse-Interpretation, ed. David Farrell Krell and David Wood (London:Routledge, 1988), p. 137.


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another,Derrida believesthatwe must followthetwo paths simultaneously.16 Wemust find a wayofcombining orweavingthesetwo possible moves, thereby tran-scendingthem. For instance,as Alan Schriargues,Derrida does notdispensewiththe categoryof the subject ratherhe seeksto displace,and re-evaluate,

it.17 Rather thanthinkinterms of the end ofMan,as Foucaultdoes,Derridarefersto the closure of Man in metaphysics.18 e difference is that, for Derrida, Manwill not be completely transcended, but rather re-evaluated, perhaps in terms ofNietzsches HigherMan.19 ForDerrida, the authorityofMan willbe decentredwithinlanguage,but the subjectwillnotbe discarded altogether.Derridasrefusalto dispense withthe subjectpointsto a numberof interesting possibilitiesforpolitical thought: perhapsthe categoryof the subjectcan beretained as a de-cen-tred,non-essentialistcategory,existing asits ownlimit, thus providing a pointofdepartureforpolitics. Bydiscarding Man so hastily, thinkerslike FoucaultandDeleuze have perhaps neglectedthe possibilityofhisre-emergencein anotherform. So Derridas critique works at the limits of this problematic, thereby point-

ing beyondthe possibilities of the poststructuralistargument. He suggests, forinstance, that the motifofdifferenceisinadequate whileit claimsto eschewessence, perhaps it only allows another essence to be formed in its place.

Differance

Deconstruction tries to account for the suppressed, hidden differences andheterogeneities in philosophical discourse: the muffled, half-stifled murmurs ofdisunityand antagonism. Derrida callsthis strategy differance difference speltwith an a, in order to signify that it is notan absolute,essentialdifference. It is

rathera difference ormovementofdifferences,whoseidentityas differenceisalwaysunstable, never absolute.AsDerridasays: differance is thenamewemightgivetotheactive,moving discord ofdifferent forces,and ofdifferences of forces. . . against the entire system ofmetaphysical grammar.20 Because differancedoes notconstituteitselfas an essential identityofdifference,becauseit remainsopento contingency, therebyunderminingfixedidentities, itmaybe seen as atool of anti-authoritarian politics: It governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and

16 ibid., p. 138.17 ibid.18

ibid., p. 145.19 ibid.20 Derrida,e Margins of Philosophy, p. 18.


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nowhere exercises any authority. . . Not only is there no kingdom of differance,but differance instigates the subversion of every kingdom. 21

is series ofdifferences has a structure or,as Rodolphe Gasch argues,aninfrastructure.22 e infrastructure isaweave,an unordered combination ofdiffer-

ences and antagonisms. It is a system, moreover, whose very nature is that of anon-system: the differencesthatconstituteit are notdissolved by theinfrastruc-ture, nor are they ordered into a dialectical framework in which their differencesbecome only a binary relation of opposites. 23 is is a system of non-dialectical,non-binary differences: it threads together differences and antagonisms in a waythatneitherorders noreffacesthem. Infrastructures are notessentialist: theirvery essence is that of a non-essence.24 It does not have a stable or autonomousidentity,nor isitgoverned byan ordering principle orauthority. It is aplace thateschews essence, authority and centrality: it is characterized by its very inabilityto constitute anidentity, toform a place. Moreover, its structural inability toestablish a stable identity is a threat to the authority of identity. As Derrida says

then:

ereis no essence of the differance;notonlycan it notallowitself to betaken upintothe as such of its name or its appearing,but it threatenstheauthority of the as such in general, the things presence in its essence. 25

It is here also that Derrida goes beyond the poststructuralist argument. Whilehe employs a modelofdifference, as do Foucaultand Deleuze, he uses it in aslightlydifferentway: differancerefers backto some sortofstructure orinfra-structure,some sortofunityconstructed onthe basis of its own disunity, andconstituted through its own limits. Because poststructuralism lacks this idea ofaninfrastructurethat remains structurallyopeneventothe possibilities of the

Same itcould be seen as essentializing difference. So paradoxically,maybeitis preciselybecause poststructuralismlacks a structure orplace, inthe way thatDerrida provides, that it falls back into a place a place constituted by essential-ist ideas. Derridas argument is pointingtothe needforsome kind ofpointofdeparture not one based on an essential identity but rather one constructedthrough the logic of supplementarity, and based on its own contaminatedness.

21 ibid., p. 22.22 See Gasch,Tain of the Mirror, pp. 14754.23 ibid., p. 152.24

ibid., p. 150.25 Jacques Derrida,Spee and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserls Teory of Signs, trans. DavidAllison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 158.


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e infrastructure may be seen as a tool of anti-authoritarian thought: it is amodel which, by its own structural absence of place, by its own lack of essence,undermines from within various structures of textual authority. At its centre isan absence. It isgovernedbya principle ofundecidability: itaffirms neither

identitynornon-identity,but remainsin a state ofundecidabilitybetweenthetwo. einfrastructureis a wayof theorizing differencethatmakestheformationofstable,unifiedidentitiesin philosophy impossible. It is also a model thatallowsthinkingtotranscendthe binarystructuresthathavelimitedit. Sothe aim of thisstrategy is not to destroy identity or presence. It is not to affirm difference overidentity,absence overpresence. is would be,as I have suggested, toreversethe established order, only to establish a new order. Difference would become anew identity, and absence a new presence. e point of Derridas thinking is notto seekthefounding ofa new order,but rather to seekthe displacementofallorders including his own.

Derrida arguesthat the strategyofdeconstruction cannotwork entirelywithin

the structures of logocentric philosophy;norcanit work completelyoutsideit.Rather, it traces a path of undecidability between the two positions. In this waydeconstruction avoidsthetrap ofplace. Itestablishes neitheraplace of power,noraplace of revolution which,as I have suggested,are two sidesof the same logic ofdominationbut rather,constructs a path betweenthem,disruptingtheidentityofbothterms. Itworksfrom withinthe discourse and metaphysicalstructures ofphilosophy,operating at itslimitsin order tofind an outside.26 Deconstructioncannotaemptan immediate neutralization ofphilosophys authoritarian struc-tures. Rather, itmustproceedthrough a strategyofdisplacement whatDerridacalls adouble writing,whichis aform ofcritique neitherstrictly inside, norstrictlyoutside philosophy. It is a strategyofcontinually interrogatingthe self-proclaimedclosureof this discourse. It does this by forcing it to account for theexcess which always escapes, and thus jeopardizes this closure. For Derrida, thisexcess has nowhere to escape to: it does not constitute a place of resistance and,onceit escapes, itdisintegrates. is excessis produced by theverystructuresit threatens: it is a supplement, a necessary,but at the same time, dangerousand wayward, part of the dominant structure. is excess which deconstructiontriestoidentifyconfronts philosophywith a limit toitslimitlessness,a limit toits closure. e proclaimed totalityandlimitlessness ofphilosophy is itselfalimit. However, its complete closureto what threatensit isimpossible because,as deconstruction has shown, thethingthat it aemptsto excludeis essential toitsidentity. ereis a strangelogic atwork here,alogicthatcontinually impedes

26 Rodolphe Gasch,Inventions ofDifference:On Jacques Derrida(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1994), p. * 28.


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philosophys aspirationto be a closed,complete system. Deconstruction unmasksthis logic, thislimit of the limit.

e limits that Derrida identifies are produced within the tradition ofphilosophy theyare not imposedfrom a nihilistic, irrationaloutside. As Derrida says: e

movements ofdeconstruction do notdestroystructuresfrom outside. eyarenotpossible and effective,norcanthey take accurate aim,exceptby inhabitingthose structures.27 is positioning of limits is important here because it pointsto the possibilityofan outside an outside, paradoxically, on the inside. Toposition oneselfentirelyon the outside ofanystructure as aform of resistanceis only to reaffirm, in a reversed way, what one resists. is idea, however, of anoutside created by the limits of the inside may allow us to conceive of a politicsof resistance which does not restorethe place ofpower.So notonlydoes Derridasuggest a way of theorizing difference without falling back into essentialism, healso point to the possibility of an outside.

Te outside of ethical responsibility

Sothislimit, this impossibilityofclosure, is perhaps,at the sametime, theconstitution of a possible outside an outside constructed from the limitationsand contradictions of theinside. ese contradictions make closureimpossible;they open philosophicaldiscourse to an Other. is is a radical outside. It isnotpartof the binarystructure of inside/outside andit does nothave a stableidentity. It is notclearlydividedfromtheInside byaninexorableline: itsline iscontinuallyreinterpreted, jeopardized, and constructed by relationsofantagonism.It is an outside that is finite and temporary. Moreover, it is an outside that obeys

a strange logic: it exists only in relation to the inside that it threatens, while theinside exists only inrelationtoit. Eachis necessary for the constitution of theidentity of the other, while at the same time threatening the identity of the other.It is therefore an outside that avoids the two temptations of deconstruction: onthe one hand, it is an outsidethat threatenstheinside;onthe otherhand, it is anoutsidethat isformulatedfromtheinside.Derrida makesitclear that it cannotbe seen as an absolute outside, as this would only reconsolidate the inside that itopposes. e more one tries to escape to an absolute outside, the more one findsoneself obstinately on the inside. As Derrida says: the logic of every relationtothe outsideisverycomplexand surprising. It is precisely theforce andtheefficiency of the system that regularly changes transgressions into false exits. 28

27 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1976), p. 24.


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For Derrida, as we have seen, the notion ofan absolute break, an absolutetransgression, which is central to classical revolutionary politics, is only a reaffir-mation of thesystemone wishesto escape. Transgression,as Derrida argues,can only be finite, and it cannot establish a permanent outside:

. . . bymeans of the work done on one side andthe otherof thelimit thefieldinsideis modified,and atransgressionis producedthatconsequently isnowhere presentas afaitaccompli. Oneis never installed withintransgres-sion, one never lives elsewhere.29

So deconstruction maybe seen as aform of transgression,which, intransgress-ingthelimits ofmetaphysics,alsotransgressesitself.30 Itaffirms nothing,doesnotcomefrom an oppositionaloutside,and dissipates upon crossingthislimit. Itexposes the limits of a text by tracing the repressed absences and discontinuitieswithin the text the excessthat the text fails to contain.31 Inthis sense, it istransgressive. However, it is also a self-effacing movement a transgressionthatcancelsitselfout. Deconstruction neitheraffirms nordestroysthelimit itcrosses: rather it re-evaluatesit, reinscribingit as a problem,a question. isuncertainty as to the limits of transgression this undecidability, is the closestDerrida comes to an outside.

is radical outside is, forDerrida, ethical. Philosophyhas been opened towhat it excludes, toits other. e actof forcing philosophy to confront its ownstructures of exclusion and repression, is a thoroughly ethical gesture. Derrida isinfluenced here by Emmanuel Levinas, who tries to think the limits of the Hegeliantradition by showing the point at which it encounters the violence of an ethicaloutside, of analteritythat is ethical in its exclusion and singularity. Levinas triesto transcend Western philosophy, to rupture it by confronting it with the Other,

the point of irreducibility which will not fit into its structures.32 Deconstructionmaybe seen, therefore,as an ethicalstrategywhich opens philosophy totheother.It triesto step, ifonly foraninstant,beyondthe confines of reason and historicalnecessity, and this stepping beyond, this momentary transgression, constitutesan ethical dimension anethics of alterity. Derrida writes:

28 ibid., p. 135.29 Jacques Derrida,Positions, trans. Alan Bass (London: Athlone Press, 1981), p. 12.30 See Michael R. Clifford, Crossing (out) the Boundary: Foucault andDerrida on transgressing

Transgression, Philosophy Today31 (1987): 22333.31

ibid., p. 230.32 See John Lechte,Fiy Contemporary inkers: from Structuralism to Postmodernity(London: Rout-ledge, 1994), p. 117.


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Todeconstructphilosophy, thus,would betothink in a most faithful,interiorway the structured genealogyofphilosophys concepts,butatthe sametimeto determine from a certain exterior that is unqualifiable orunnameable by philosophy what this history has been able to dissimulate

or forbid,makingitself into a historybymeans of this somewhere motivatedrepression.33

is questioning of philosophy does not lead to the moral nihilism that decon-struction has oen been accused ofpromoting. AsJohn Caputo argues,decon-structionis a strategyofresponsibilitytothe excluded other.Unlike hermeneutics,whichtriesto assimilate differenceintothe orderof the same,ofBeing,decon-struction tries to open a space fordifference. Derridas thinkingis, therefore,aresponsible anary,notanirresponsible anarchyas some have claimed.34 De-construction, then, is byno means arejection ofethics,even whenitquestionsmoral philosophy: rather, it is are-evaluationof ethics.35 It shows us that moralprinciples cannotbe absolute orpure: theyare always contaminated bywhatthey try to exclude. Goodis always contaminated byevil, reason byunreason.What Derrida questions is the ethics ofmorality: if morality becomes an absolutediscourse, then can it still be considered moral or ethical? Deconstruction allowsusto opentherealm ofethicstoreinterpretation and difference,andthis openingisitselfethical. It is an ethics ofimpurity. Ifmorality is always contaminatedby its other if it is neverpure then everymoral judgementordecisionisnecessarilyundecidable. Moral judgementmustalways be selfquestioning andcautious becauseitsfoundations are notabsolute. Unlike much moralphilosophygrounded onthefirmfoundations ofhuman essence,deconstructive ethics hasno such privileged place and, therefore, enjoys no such self-assurance.

Law, justice and authority

eundecidabilityof judgement,whichisthe necessaryoutcome ofa decon-structive critique,has implications for political discourses and institutions,particu-larlythe institution of law.Derrida argues that theauthority of law is questionableand, to a certain extent, illegitimate. isis becausethe authority thatsuppos-edly grounds law is legitimized only when law is instituted. at means that the

33 Derrida, Positions, p. 6.34 See John Caputos Beyond Aestheticism: Derridas Responsible Anarchy, Resear in Phenomenol-

ogy18 (1988): 5973.35 Richard Kearney, Derridas Ethical Re-Turn, in Working rough Derrida, ed. Gary B. Madison(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993, p. 30).


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authority upon which law is established is, strictly speaking, non-legal, becauseit had to existprior tolaw. erefore, the originalact of institutinglawis anillegitimacy, a violence: Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground,the position of the law cant by definition rest on anything but themselves, they

are themselves aviolence without ground.36 Like Foucault,Derrida showsthat theorigins of laws and institutions are violent they are antagonistic and withoutessential ground. is does not mean that the origins of law are illegal: becausetheyare prior tolaw, theyare neither legalnor illegal.37 Rather, thelegitimacyof lawis undecidable. A deconstructiveinterrogation of lawrevealsthe absence,the emptyplace at the base of the edifice of law, theviolence at therootof institu-tional authority. e authority of law can, therefore, be questioned: it can neverreign absolute becauseit is contaminated by its ownfoundational violence. iscritique allows onetointerrogate any institutionaland politicaldiscoursethatclaimstoreston the authorityof thelaw,and this makesit aninvaluabletoolofradical anti-authoritarian politics.

However, asDerrida argues, deconstruction cannot have as its aim the completedestruction of all authority: this only succumbs, as we have seen, to the logic ofplace. As Derrida says, the two temptations of deconstruction can be likened toWalterBenjamins notion of the alternate paths of the generalstrike toreplacethe state or to abolish it:

For thereis something of the generalstrike,and thus of therevolutionarysituation in every reading that founds something new and that remainsunreadable in regard to established canons and norms of reading, that is tosay the presentstate of reading orwhat figuresthe State,with a capitalS, inthe state of possible reading. 38

In this sense, then, deconstruction may be seen as a strategy of resistanceagainst the authority of meaning the state in the text of philosophy, just asother struggles might resist the state in the text of politics. Indeed, there is nopoint separating the deconstruction ofphilosophical texts from the deconstructionof power: the two realms of struggle are inextricable because political authorityis dependent upon its sanctioning by various texts, such as those by Hobbes,and by the logocentric discourse of reason. e deconstructive moment is arevolutionary moment in this sense.

36 JacquesDerrida, Force of Law: e Mystical Foundation ofAuthority, Deconstruction & the Possi-

bility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell et al. (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 366 (p. 14).37 ibid.38 ibid., p. 37.


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However, ifoneisto avoidre-establishingthe authorityof lawin ones struggleagainst it, thenlaw mustbe distinguishedfromjustice. Law, forDerrida, is merelythe generalapplication ofarule,whilejusticeis an opening of lawtothe other, tothe singularitywhichlaw cannotaccount for. Justice existsin arelation ofalterity

to law: it opens the discourse of law to an outside. It performs a deconstructivedisplacing of law. Fora decisionto bejust, for it to account for the singularitydenied by law, it mustbe differenteachtime. Itcannotbethe mere application ofthe rule it must continually reinvent the rule. erefore, justice conserves thelaw because it operates in the name of the law; but at the same time, it suspendsthe law becauseit is being continually reinterpreted. As Derrida says: for adecisionto bejustand responsible, itmust . . . be bothregulated and withoutregulation: it must conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough tohave to reinvent it in each case, re-justify it.39

Justice, moreover, existsin an ethical realm becauseit impliesfreedom andresponsibilityofactions.40Justiceisthe experience of theimpossible becauseit

always existsin a state ofsuspension and undecidability. It is alwaysincalculable:the promise ofsomethingyet to come,which mustneverbe completelygraspedorunderstood,becauseif it isit would ceaseto bejustice and becomelaw. AsDerrida says: ere is an avenir for justice and there is no justice except to thedegree that some event is possible which, as an event, exceeds calculation, rules,programs,anticipations.41Justiceis an event thatopensitself tothe other, totheimpossible. Its effects are always unpredictable because it cannot be determined,aslaw can,byan a prioridiscourse. It is an excess which overflowsfromlawand cannotbe grasped by it. Justicefunctions as an open,emptysignifier: itsmeaning orcontent is notpredetermined. Derridas notion of justiceis withoutapre-determininglogic,a justice whoseverystructureis governed bya lack,anemptiness which leaves it open to reinterpretation and contestation.

Te politics of emancipation

Justice occupies a politico-ethical dimension that cannot be reduced to law orinstitutions,and it is for thisreasonthat justice opens up the possibility foratransformation of law and politics.42 is transformation though is not an absoluterejection of the existing order,becausethisleads only tothefounding ofa new

39 ibid., p. 23.40

ibid., pp. 223.41 ibid., p. 27.42 ibid.


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order. It is much more radical than that: it is a refounding of political and legaldiscourse in a way that unmasks the violence and lawlessness of its origins, andlack of legitimate ground, thusleavingit opento continualand unpredictablereinterpretation. islogic ofunmasking whichis a political logicpar excellence

may be applied to our political reality to expose its limits. is is not to rejectour contemporary political discourses but, rather, to reinterpret and re-evaluatethem. For instance, the discourse of emancipation, which has been with us sincethe French Revolution,should notberejected but, rather, reformulated. WhiletheEnlightenment-humanist idealofemancipation hasthe potential forbecominga discourse ofdomination throughits essentialization of rationaland moralcategories itcan also become a discourse of liberationif itcan be unmooredfrom its essentialist foundations and radically refounded as a non-essentialist,constitutively open political signifier. As Derrida says:

Nothing seemsto meless outdatedthanthe classicalemancipatory ideal. We

cannotaempt to disqualify it today,whethercrudelyorwith sophistication,at leastnotwithout treatingit toolightlyandformingthe worstcomplicities.Butbeyondtheseidentifiedterritories of juridico-politicisation onthe grandpoliticalscale,beyond allself-servinginterpretations . . . otherareas mustconstantly open up that at first seem like secondary or marginal areas. 43

One could arguethatbecause poststructuralism abandonsthe humanistproject,it robs itselfof the possibility ofutilizing the politico-ethical content of thisdiscoursefor theorizingresistance againstdomination. In other words, ithasthrownthe proverbialbabyoutwiththe bathwater.Because Derrida,onthe otherhand,does not rule out the Enlightenment-humanistproject,he does notdenyhimself the emancipative possibilities containedinits discourses. Norshould

radicalpolitics deny itself these possibilities. Derrida suggeststhatwe canfreethediscourse ofemancipationfromits essentialist foundations, therebyexpandingit toinclude otherpoliticalstruggles hithertoregarded as of lileimportance.In otherwords, the discourse ofemancipation can belestructurallyopen,sothat its contentwould no longerbelimited ordetermined by itsfoundations. TeDeclaration of the Rights ofMan, for instance,maybe expandedto encompasstherights ofwomen,sexualand ethnic minorities,and even animals.44 elogic ofemancipation is still at work today, although in different forms and representedby different struggles.

43 ibid., p. 28.44 ibid.


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e question of rightsreflects uponthe differences between deconstructivepolitics and classical revolutionary politics. Both strategies have a notion ofpolitical rights and a form of emancipative struggle on the basis of these rights.e difference is, though, that classical revolutionary politics sees these rights as

essential and founded in natural law, while the politics of deconstruction wouldsee these rights as radically founded: in otherwords, these rights are withoutstable foundations and, therefore, their content is not prefixed. is leaves themopen to a plurality of different political articulations. Adeconstructive analysisquestions the idea ofnatural, inalienable rights. Derrida, for instance, in hiscritique of liberalsocialcontract theory,argues that thesenatural rights areactually constituted discursively through the social contract and that, therefore,theycannotclaimto be natural.45 eserights, then,are displacedfromthe socialto the natural realm, and the social is subordinated to the natural, just as writingis subordinatedto speech. As Derrida arguesin his critique ofRousseau, thesocial isthe supplement that threatens, and at the same timeis necessary for,

the identity of the natural: the idea ofnatural rights can be formulated onlydiscursively throughthe contract. ereis no pure natural foundationfor rights,andthisleavesthem opento change andreinterpretation. eycan nolongerremaininscribed within human essence and, therefore,can nolongerbe takenforgranted. If theyare without firmfoundations,one cannotalways assumethattheywillcontinueto exist. eymustbefought forand, inthe process,willbereformulated by these struggles.

Derridas an-ary

It isthroughthisform ofdeconstructivelogicthatpoliticalaction becomesan-aric. An-archic actionis distinguished herefrom classicalanarchistpolitics the anarchism of Kropotkin and Bakunin which is governed by an originalprinciple such as human essence or rationality.Whileit is conditioned bycertainprinciples, an-anarchic action is not necessarily determined or limited by them.An-archic actionisthe possible outcome ofa deconstructive strategyaimed atunderminingthe metaphysicalauthorityof various politicaland philosophicaldis-courses. ReinerSchurmann defines an-archic action as action withoutawhy?.46

However,a deconstructive notion ofan-archymightbe somewhatdifferent: it

45 Michael Ryan, Deconstruction and Social eory: the Case of Liberalism, in Working rough

Derrida, ed. Madison, p. 160.46 Reiner Schurmann, HeideggeronBeingandActing:From PrinciplestoAnary, trans. Christine-MarieGros (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 10.


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mightbe seen as actionwithawhy? that is,actionforcedto account for itselfand questionitself,not inthe name ofafounding principle,but inthe name of thedeconstructive enterprise whichithas embarked upon. In otherwords,an-archicaction is forced to account for itself, just as it forces authority to account for

itself. It is this selfquestioning that allows political action to resist authority, toavoid becoming what itopposes. Sothis notion ofan-archism maybe seen asmakingradicalpolitics account for itself,makingit aware of the essentialistandpotentially dominating possibilities within its own discourse. Moreover, throughsome of the deconstructive moves and strategies outlined above,an-anarchismseekstofreeradicalpoliticsfrom essentialistcategoriesthat inevitably limit it.Derridas unmasking of the authorityand hierarchy thatcontinuetoinhabitWest-ernthought,as wellas his outlining of various strategiesto counter them,havemade this an-archist intervention possible.

Derrida occupies a numberofcrucial terrainsinthe radical imaginary,andhas capital consequences for anti-authoritarian politics. rough the unmasking

and deconstruction of the textual authority of logocentrism, Derrida allows us todevelop a critique,usingthe samelogic,of the contemporarypolitical institutionsand discourses based on this authority. He also shows us that no identity is pureand closed it is always contaminated bywhat itexcludes. is underminesoppositionalpolitics,becauseidentity isin partconstituted bywhat it opposes.More importantly, through the various deconstructive strategies and moves thatDerrida employs, he allows us to examine the subtle and pernicious logic of the

place of power the propensity for radicalpoliticstoreaffirmthe authority itseeks to overthrow. He points to the limits of the two possible strategies ofradical politics inversion and subversion showing that they both culminateinthe reaffirmation ofauthoritarian structures and hierarchies. at isto say,they both fall victim to the logic of the place ofpower. ese strategies arethe two poles that skewer radicalpolitical theory. Derrida, however,shows ameans of transcending this impasse by weaving together subversion and inversion,affirmation and absolute rejection, in a w ay that re-evaluates these terms,and thusdisplacesplace. In doing so, he goes beyond the problematic of poststructuralismby retaining Man as his ownlimit leaving him constitutivelyopento a radicaloutside. is notion ofan outside constructedthroughthelimits of theinside thelimits ofphilosophyand politics is central to anyunderstanding of thepolitical. It constitutes a politico-ethical dimension of justice and emancipation,which works at thelimits of thelaw and authority,unmaskingits hiddenviolence,and destabilizinginstitutionsthatare based onit. Derridas political thinking maybe seen, then,as anan-arism,aninterrogation ofauthority,a politico-ethical

strategywhich questions evenits ownfoundations,and forces ustore-evaluatethe limits of our contemporary political reality.


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Macquarie University, Department of Sociology, Sydney, Australia


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eAnarchist LibraryAnti-Copyright

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Saul NewmanDerridas Deconstruction Of Authority

2001

Originally appeared inPhilosophy &SocialCriticism, vol 27, no 3.Retrieved on September 14, 2009 from www.infoshop.org
http://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authorityhttp://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authorityhttp://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authorityhttp://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authorityhttp://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authorityhttp://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authorityhttp://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authorityhttp://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authorityhttp://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authorityhttp://www.infoshop.org/library/Newman:_Derrida%27s_Deconstruction_Of_Authority

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Derrida’s Deconstruction - Saul Newman