Details of Major Incidents from July, 2013 to December, 2014

1. Incident at Dada Nagar, Kanpur

Date of incident : 19.07.2013 Time : 12:40 hrs Entity : CUGL Location : Near Bank of Baroda, Dada Nagar Industrial Area, Kanpur Description:

On 19th July, 2013, the contractor started HDD activity to lay their OFC network in Dada Nagar Industrial Area near CUGL pipeline. At about 12:40 hours, due to negligence of the HDD operators, CUGL MDPE pipeline of diameter 125 mm was damaged. Due to damage, there was leakage of gas which resulted in fire due to the ignition source from the nearest dhaba. Immediately the gas supply was stopped from DRS and the fire was controlled by fire tenders within 20 minutes. One worker of Dhaba succumbed to burn injuries.

This incident affected 30 industrial consumers which were connected to the pipe line. After the isolation, supply of 12 industries was resumed with bypass arrangement; however rest of industries were started after restoring the damaged pipeline on 20.07.2013. The gas supply was interrupted to these industries for about 36 hours.

Observation:

• Due to negligence of HDD operator, the MDPE pipeline of diameter 125 mm was damaged.

• There was fire due to ignition from the nearest dhaba. • Immediately the gas supply was stopped from DRS. • One worker of dhaba had fatal injury due to the heat of the fire. • Fire department controlled the fire within 20 minutes. • One vehicle was also burnt. • A meeting was conducted by ADM city directing the construction companies /

contractors for prior intimation to the Utility body before undertaking any excavation job.

Cause:

• The incident occurred due to the negligence of the HDD operators of the contractor. • Fire was due to the potential source of ignition from a nearby dhaba.

Recommendations:

• The accident occurred due to negligence of the HDD operator’s deployed contractor. Thus the accident could be avoided if prior intimation would have been given to CUGL before starting any construction activity.

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• The construction companies / contractors should be directed for prior intimation to the Utility body before undertaking any excavation job.

• “Dial before you dig” notices should be supplemented by GIS mapping of the CGD network so as to minimize the damage caused by the third party activities.

2. Incident at Visakh Refinery

Date of incident : 23.08.2013 Time : 16:46 hrs Entity : HPCL Location : VRCFP Cooling Tower, Visakh Refinery, Vishakhapatnam

Description:

On August 23, 2013, one of the cells of the Salt Water Cooling Tower of Visakh refinery was being commissioned. During the opening of the water line at about 16:46 hours, there was a minor explosion and fire. The cooling tower burned down and collapsed. Due to the fire, workers working near other cells and surrounding area sustained burn injuries. There was one fatality (company employee) and 39 persons sustained injuries and were shifted to INS Kalyani and other hospitals in the city. On the next day, another 6 dead bodies were found in debris.

Observation:

• One new cell was added to the existing cooling tower, and the existing cells were under maintenance.

• Hot jobs were going on in the nearby area. • The ingress of hydrocarbon in the cooling water was due to leakage of cooler /

condenser in process units connected with this return line. • There was imbalance in load of two distribution headers on the top of cooling tower

cells. To reduce the load on the cooling towers, a process modification scheme was issued whereby the cooling water return headers were proposed to be re-routed to the ground level and construction of riser pipes from the bottom header to the top of each cell, for uniform supply of hot cooling water to the Cooling Tower. With this, the load of return header, which earlier was on top of the cell, would be shifted from Cooling Tower structure to the separate supports outside the Cooling Tower.

• There is distinct possibility of entrapped / accumulated light hydrocarbon in the portion of the new line since it is located at an elevation and that there was no escape route for this entrapped hydrocarbon as the other end of the header was closed by valve.

• The entrapped hydrocarbon gushed into the Cooling Tower as soon as the cooling water return line valve to the new cell was opened. The hydrocarbon got ignited by the spark of welding jobs being carried out nearby causing explosion and major fire. The wooden structure of the Cooling Tower got ignited in the process which continued for about 45 minutes till the fire was extinguished by F&S personnel.

• The accident resulted in serious burn injuries and fatality to a number of persons working in the cooling tower area.

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Cause:

• Gushing out of entrapped hydrocarbon from the cooling water return header to new cell, which got ignited since hot jobs were being carried out in close vicinity. The ingress of hydrocarbon was due to leakage of hydrocarbon in cooler/condenser in connected process units.

• Not adhering to the practice of stopping all work (especially hot work) and prohibiting

all unrelated contractor and company personnel at site, before commissioning a new system/ facility. Also, carrying out hazard analysis/ risk assessment would have probably indicated that there could be trapped HC gas, and prompted commissioning/ operation team to vent out entrapped gases.

• Undertaking commissioning activities, even though several jobs were unfinished:

HC and H2S detectors were not installed. Instrument cabling, cooling fan jobs were still unfinished. Decision to go ahead with commissioning was taken at fag end of the day. Improper coordination amongst Operation, Maintenance and Project

departments. Non – liquidation of the gaps identified in internal safety audit & operation check-

list before commissioning.

Recommendations:

• Do not allow simultaneous hot work and commissioning activity at site as this increase manifolds the chances of accidents.

• While commissioning activity is planned/ undertaken, it must be ensured that other than the required personnel, nobody should be allowed to be present at the work site.

• Hazard analysis must be done prior to commissioning of any new facility. • Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment must be carried out before commissioning of

any new/ temporary facility / system; this analysis by a multi-disciplinary group can easily identify the risks involved and suggest measures to overcome the same.

• Facility(s) must not be commissioned unless pre-com audit is carried out. • No facility should be commissioned unless it is ensured that internal audit points /

precom check-list points are liquidated; further a multi-disciplinary group must carry out the internal audit.

• There must be a proper coordination amongst the various departments; in the instant case there was clear communication gap and lack of coordination amongst Operation, Project and Maintenance Departments.

• No facility must be commissioned unless safety devices like Hydrocarbon or Hydrogen Sulphide detectors are installed.

• Standard Operating Procedure must be prepared; shared with operating personnel and ensured its display at site prior to commissioning.

• Proper house-keeping must be done at the commissioning site; the site should be clear of unwanted materials and debris.

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3. Incident at Narmada crossing

Date of incident : 25.08.2013 Time : 23:32 hrs Entity : GAIL, RGTIL, ONGC & GSPL Location : Narmada crossing near Bharuch Description: On 25th August, 2013, it was reported that flow from Sardar Sarovar Dam was approximately 14.5 Lac Cusecs. Approximately 150 meter width of Narmada River bank was washed out on South Bank near Dhantoriya village upto a depth of 13-14 meters. On the night of 25-26 August, 2013, there was incident of multiple pipe lines rupture belonging to GAIL, ONGC, GSPL and RGTIL. Couples of loud sounds were heard by villagers during the night and also oil spill was reported in the coastal areas of the Gulf of Khambhat following a rupture in ONGC’s pipeline.

Due to such a high flow, 30 inch NB Dahej Urban Pipe line (DUPL) of GAIL was thrown away few hundred meters and was twisted and fractured at many places and was completely damaged. Approximately 160 meter of pipeline is lying on Dhanturia side with almost 8 (Nos.) of joint failures. It seemed that the pipeline section was exposed to the water body and was floating. The pipeline was not stable due to lower thickness and absence of concrete coating and hence oscillating due to water currents.

48 inch East West gas pipeline (EWPL) of M/s RGTIL laid towards far west end of Bhadbhut pipeline corridor remained under operation and has not been affected. The construction approach road for 48” pipeline was damaged due to floods.

24” GSPL Pipeline was exposed for 60 meters in land. However, the extent of exposure in the river bed could not been ascertained. Temporary protection works using bags (1:10 ratio Cement: sand mixture) were started on 29th August, 2013 and completed by 4th September, 2013. As reported, the geo-bags and sand cement bags were being used as back fill upto 1.0 m cover on sides as well as top. Additionally, Bamboo sticks and sand bags have been provided for protection along river bank. Test Lead Point (TLP) post near Dhantura end has also got uprooted due to severe erosion

Observation on DUPL:

• 30 inch NB DUPL pipeline was completely damaged and the debris of the pipeline could be seen all over.

• Approx. 160 meter of pipeline was lying on Dhanturia side with almost 8 Nos. of joint failure.

• The pipeline section was exposed to the water body and thus floated. • The helical pipe was damaged at weakest part of the pipeline joint of girth weld i.e. near

heat affected zones. • OFC cable & duct were ruptured along with the pipeline.

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Observation on EWPL:

• EWPL pipeline was not exposed during the floods. • Pipeline markers and TLP post have been washed away during the floods in that area. • On 3rd September, 2013 pressure in EWPL was 82.0 Kg/cm2 and the flow was 16.0 MMSCMD.

Observation on GSPL:

• GSPL 24” pipeline was exposed for 60 meters in land. However, the extent of exposure in the river bed could not be ascertained.

• Test Lead Point (TLP) post near Dhantura end had also got uprooted due to severe erosion.

• Divers reported that approximately 25 meters of pipeline from river bank is exposed out of which 15 meters is under water.

• No foreign line had been observed to be crossing GSPL pipeline. Also, debris from any line was not found over GSPL pipeline.

• OFC link for the pipeline was snapped. Thus operational data for north side is logged at Shirki near Vadodara and Sajod end data at Mora near Hazira. The entity tried to restore communication link between SV-1 Bhadbhut & SV-2 Sajod by installation of microwave link.

• The pipeline pressure was maintained under normal pressure of 70-75 Kg/cm2 and flow of 1.5 MMSCMD.

• Pipeline to Soil potential (PSP) value was noted on Dhanturia bank as -1.335 V.

Cause:

• It was a natural disaster due to unprecedented rainfall in catchment area of Narmada River.

• It seemed that Narmada River had changed its course during that monsoon season possibly due to formation of sand bars on Bhadbhut (north) side in front of Adiliya Bet Iceland.

• Consequently, Sardar Sarovar Dam overflowed after crossing the maximum height of 121.92 meters on July 18th, 2013. Water level touched 129.48 meters on 2nd August, 2013. No warning of water flow was given by Irrigation or other related departments.

• Construction of transmission line tower of a power company in the recent time may have led to the further loosening and erosion of Narmada bank.

• Due to lower thickness, absence of concrete coating and oscillation due to water currents led to instability of pipeline.

• The pipeline section was exposed to dynamic loads of heavy flow velocity and current of river and was damaged due to high fatigue loads.

Recommendations:

• The effective measures for prevention of erosion of River bank need to be taken. Energy & Petrochemical Department, Govt. of Gujarat may contact leading institutions like Central Water and Power Research Station, Gujarat Maritime Board, Irrigation

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Department and Gujarat Energy Research Institute to study morphology of Narmada river, carry out physical / mathematical modeling and suggest suitable measures to arrest further erosion of Narmada river bank. Suitable action may be taken jointly by administration as well as pipeline entities.

• Control on the excessive flow rate through Narmada River must be exercised by giving advance warning. This shall help pipeline operators to monitor pipeline closely and take preventive actions like shut-down of pipelines in time, which can result in mitigation of loss due to any accident.

• The new pipelines for replacing the damaged sections should be laid through longer HDD span and also deeper with adequate cover below the scour level. However, actual design needs to be decided by the Pipeline entities based on engineering data viz pipeline route survey, soil investigation report, size, etc.

• Due to excessive rains this year, there have been spate of similar incidents of pipelines exposures across other rivers also, namely Yamuna & Sutlej. It is learnt that Regulatory bodies have already formed a technical committee who have visited the incident sites and also interacted with pipeline operators and state bodies. This exercise may result into relook in design & laying of cross country pipelines at river crossings by HDD. One such aspect may be location of sectionalizing valves as close to river bank as possible. This shall enable to minimize loss of hydrocarbons and other toxic substances in case of the rupture.

4. Incident at Banganga Road, Indore

Date of incident : 30.08.2014 Time : 11:40 hrs Entity : Avantika Gas Limited (AGL) Location : Banganga Road, Indore Description: On 30.08.2014 at around 11:40 hrs, AGL’s 125 mm dia MDPE pipeline (operating at a pressure of 4 Bar) was damaged by a road construction agency which was expanding the road. The damage was caused due to usage of Poclain machine despite objections by patrolling agency of AGL. Immediately AGL Team rushed at site and isolated gas supply by closing the nearest valve. The damage was controlled by O&M personnel of AGL within 5-7 minutes of leakage of gas. The pipeline was restored to full functionality immediately. Due to fire, 3 persons sustained minor burn injuries who were admitted to hospital immediately and discharged subsequently. During repairs, some aggressive and antisocial elements interrupted the work and damaged the equipments and emergency vehicle and also manhandled entity’s personnel. All the necessary repair work and gas supply restoration were completed by 1600 hrs on 30.08.2014.

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Cause: • No information was given by the third party to AGL before digging damaging the

pipeline. • Lack of supervision & negligence by third party during the digging activity.

Observation: • The damage was caused due to usage of Poclain machine despite objection by patrolling

agency of AGL. • Immediately AGL Team rushed at site, isolated gas supply by closing the nearest valve

and controlled the situation within 5-7 minutes of leakage of gas. • Due to fire, 3 persons sustained minor burn injuries. • AGL repaired the PE line and started the gas supply around 16:00 hrs.

Recommendations: • “Dial before you dig” notices should be supplemented by GIS mapping of the CGD

network so as to minimize the damage caused by the third party activities. • Start daily patrolling of all the gas pipeline network in Indore. • Any digging activity if observed being done on or near vicinity of the alignment of the

gas pipeline then AGL’s O&M department to be informed from site itself. Third party work is to be stopped until the O&M team reaches the site for inspection to ensure the safety of the gas pipeline.

• Increase the frequency of patrolling. • Conduct public awareness camps in various parts of city for safety and operation of

pipeline.

5. Incident at Moran (AGCL)

Date of incident : 01.09.2014 Time : 04:30 hrs Entity : AGCL

Location : Moran-Namrup Pipeline, near Hingrijan, Moran, Assam Description: On 1st September, 2014 at around 04:30 hours, a major fire incident occurred in AGCL

pipeline at Hingrijan about 6 km from Moran Town. The fire was caused by gas leak from AGCL’s pipeline. Personnel from OIL and AGCL stationed at Moran immediately closed the valves at Moran “0” point. AGCL personnel rushed from Namrup to shutdown the valve at Nagamati by 05:00 hours which is at a distance of about 3 km from Namrup. Immediately on receipt of information, AGCL officials from Duliajan rushed to the site of the fire incident. Mutual Aid partners, Fire & Emergency Services and District Authorities were informed about the emergency and the fire was completely doused by about 07:30 hours.

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Observation:

• An oval shaped crater measuring about 8.5m x 3.50m was formed at the site which was about 5 meters from the edge of the road within Higrijan Tea Estate.

• Damage was restricted to an area of approx 70 meters to 130 meters from the rupture site.

• Five bamboo and mud walled huts with CGI roofs within this area were partially/ fully damaged.

• Tea bushes and other vegetation within the zone were singed by the heat of the fire. • The crater was full of liquids both water and condensate. • The seam of the ERW pipe had opened up for about 4.0 meters. The seam was in 4 O’

Clock position away from the road. The lower portion of the pipe was still submerged under water.

• Due to action taken by Fire Tenders, the crater pit is full of water and the ruptured pipeline was not visible.

• There was a cloud of ignited inflammable substances and natural gas over the zone for a very short period and damages seems to have been caused by the intense heat. The fire was then restricted to the immediate rupture site only.

• The top part of bamboo groves within the zone seems to have been singed. Tea bushes in two locations within the zone have become brown/ black.

• Orifice Chart of OIL’s Orifice Meter, location GCS-2, Moran was checked for the period from 29/08/2014 to 31/08/2014 (Chart record from 7AM to 7AM) and verified the Gas Pressure at OIL’s Moran Source (in its upstream side). It was found that M/s OIL maintained the upstream gas pressure within normal range i.e. 13.5 Kg/ cm2to 14.5 Kg/ cm2 during this period. Then the downstream pressure recorded in AGCL’s Moran “0” point was checked from corresponding Orifice Chart for the same period. It was found that the downstream gas pressure was within normal range i.e. 8 Kg/ cm2 to 10 Kg/ cm2

in AGCL’s 200 mm pipeline during this period. It reduces to 6 Kg/ cm2 to 8 Kg/ cm2 at AGCL’s MS pipeline. The flow quantity during the last three days was checked and found that it varied from 14,452 SCM to 54,714 SCM during this period.

• The Gas Charts of all flow recorders orifice are not changed everyday by Moran Office. • The records of Pipe to Soil (PSP) potential were checked for this part of pipeline to

ascertain the extent of Cathodic Protection level. The records were checked from January ’14 to August ’14. The average PSP readings as recorded near the Bridge are 936.5 mV.

• Seven persons out of 10 persons who suffered burn injuries in the incident expired. • Five huts along with the contents were damaged. It was reported that some of the

owners have lost cattle tied to stakes outside their huts. • About 45 tea consumers in the Moran Naharkatiya area were affected. On 3rd

September, 2014 the company resumed gas supply to 5 nos. tea gardens at the Namrup end from Duliajan source. On 7th September, 2014 gas supply was resumed to 25 nos. tea gardens in MPGGSA (Moran Plantation Gas Grid Suppliers’ Association). To resume gas to the rest 15 nos. of gardens in Rajgarh area, contractor was mobilized on 8th September, 2014.

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• On 05.09.2014 a huge quantity of about 3000 liters of condensate and other liquids were taken out from the crater at the site by OIL. Normally such pipelines should carry only dry natural gas.

Cause:

• The opening in the pipeline seam caused condensate mixed with gas to escape into the atmosphere which formed a mist of condensate vapor and gas over the area. This inflammable mist caught fire from the flame of a lamp from one of the five houses within the zone

• The damaged portion of the pipeline was checked and it was found that failure of the pipe occurred at seam (longitudinally welded joint) of length of approximately 4.15 meters. Visually no corrosion was seen in the pipeline and also the thickness of the pipeline seemed to be in order and all protective coating and wrapping was found intact.

• The leakage of gas from the pipeline due to rupture and ignition of leaked gas by some mean.

Recommendations:

• Intermediate isolation valve needs to be installed as per requirement for isolation of

pipeline sections during emergency. • Emergency drills needs to be carried out periodically for each pipeline to enable faster

response time. • Safety consciousness of all technical and non technical personnel of the company must

be enhanced. • It is necessary to ensure that the mechanical recorders visibly mark the charts. The

charts should be properly identified and sent to the concerned department on regular basis.

• All preventive maintenance work must be planned carefully in advance and field reports analyzed and corrective action should be taken. Historical data of leakages and repairs need to be analyzed to understand the causes and, if necessary, take holistic corrective action.

• Curative maintenance work should also be recorded in a systematic manner from the moment of receipt of first information to closure of curative maintenance work. The nature of complaint, location, probable cause, immediate remedy, personnel involved, reporting, medium and long term solution/ plan for resolution, etc are to be recorded.

• There should be a clear cut line of responsibility for management and maintenance of each pipeline of the company.

• All Statutory and Regulatory tests and reports must be taken up within the given time frames.

• The ISO Work Instruction Manual needs to be updated at least for all technical departments to incorporate T4S Regulation of PNGRB. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for different types of emergencies need to be developed and all personnel trained in practice of the SOPs.

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6. Incident at Pandesara (GGCL)

Date of incident : 15.10.2014 Time : 15:26 hrs Entity : GGCL Location : Near Plot No. 271, Bhagyalaxmi Industry, Pandesara, GIDC, Surat. Description:

On 15th Oct9ober, 2014, at around 15:26 hours, there was a damage to the GGCL Polyethylene Gas pipeline (125 mm) due to the excavation work for water line in front of Bhagyalaxmi Industries. The excavation by the contractor for water line resulted into the escape of the gas & subsequent fire causing damage to the third party mechanical excavator, 4 motorcycles parked near the incident site, a tea stall and also two passer-by sustained superficial burn injuries due to heat of fire.

Immediately after the incident GGCL emergency call center received complain of fire in gas network and the GGCL Emergency team reached the incident site at 15:32 hours.

The height of the fire was approx. 15-20 feet. The third party mechanical excavator involved in damaging the gas pipeline was also engulfed in the fire.

The GGCL Emergency Team then isolated the damaged pipe section by closing down the relevant sectional valves at 16:00 hours which resulted into stoppage of gas supply to the damaged section of the pipe line / fire point which lead to stoppage of the gas leakage and hence the fire got extinguished.

The site was cordoned off by the local authority and no repair work was allowed until the investigation by the police department and insurance company were completed.

Observation:

• There was an interruption of gas supply to only 4 industrial consumers and no impact on gas supply to any domestic/CNG customers due to this incident.

• GGCL Emergency Team took about 6 minutes to reach at incident spot after receiving the emergency call.

• A tea stall near the incident site might be the potential source of ignition for the leaked gas.

• The flame height was approx. 15-20 feet. • Four motorbikes parked near the incident site might also be the potential source of

ignition and were also damaged due the fire heat radiation. • The mechanical excavator of the third party contractor might also be a potential source

of ignition that was involved in the damaging of the pipeline and it was also damaged on being engulfed in the fire.

• A moveable tea stall was also found damaged due to the fire. • Two passer-by sustained superficial burn injuries due to the fire heat. • Fire tenders were deployed by the Fire department on the incident site to extinguish

the fire.

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Cause:

• The third party contractor directly engaged for the private water line work without any formal NOC from GGCL.

• The third party contractors have no practice of doing the trial pit for accessing the utility lines before excavation.

• The lack of intimation of the job to GGCL that was planned to be carried out by the third party mechanical contractor.

• The moveable tea stall near the incident site could be a probable source of ignition. • The four motorbikes parked near the incident site could also be a probable source of

ignition. • The mechanical excavator that damaged the pipeline could also be a probable source

of ignition.

Recommendations:

• GGCL should continue to influence third party contractor to have intimation to GGCL through “Dial before you Dig” process prior to Excavation or HDD activities.

• GGCL should continue to coordinate with third party contractors and their staff to raise their awareness on risks associated with damage to the live gas pipeline network.

• Refresher trainings, briefings, case studies, discussions to be taken up in the Control rooms, to educate and sensitize the staff.

• Checking of all the safety gadgets tools & tackles in all the areas to be carried out.

7. Incident at Kheteshwar Chokdi (GGCL):

Date of incident : 16.10.2014 Time : 23:37 hrs Entity : GGCL Location : Near ESS PEE Industries, Kheteshwar Chokdi, GIDC Sachin, Surat. Description:

On 16th October, 2014 at around 23:37 hrs, there was a damage to GGCL PE gas pipeline network near ESS PEE Industries by third party engaged in HDD activity, resulting into escape of the gas & subsequent fire. There was no intimation given for the HDD activity to GGCL by third party. The damage to PE pipeline caused the gas leakage and the subsequent fire was observed approximately 12 meter away from the PE pipeline damaged part in the open drainage chamber.

At 23:37 hrs GGCL emergency center received the fire complaint from the by passer & also from the fire brigade. GGCL Emergency team reached the incident site at about 23:55 hrs.

GGCL Emergency team isolated the damaged pipe section by closing down the relevant sectional valves which resulted into stoppage of gas supply to the damaged section of the pipeline/ fire point and thus the fire was extinguished.

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As the pipeline was damaged due to HDD activity by third party, the third party had stopped the activity and left the incident area with their drilling equipment without intimating anyone. Third party was unknown to GGCL.

Observations:

• The GGCL Emergency response team took about 18 minutes to reach at the incident spot.

• The HDD drilling machine of the third party contractor that was used for drilling horizontal hole in the soil likely to get water connection which damaged the gas pipeline was not found at the incident site.

• The fire took place in open chamber of the drainage line. • A tree got slightly affected due to the fire flame height as the pictorial proofs are

available that determine the fire impressions on the tree. • The height of the fire was approx. 20-25 feet. • Sachin fire brigade station that was at a distance of approx. 2 kilometers from the

incident site sent their fire fighting team at the incident site and they carried out the operation to extinguish the fire and were also trying to cool the surrounding area.

• Fire location was about 12.0 meters from the damaged pipe section.

Cause:

• The third party did had not inform the GGCL before carrying out such activity and continued horizontal drilling activity that caused the damage to the PE Natural Gas pipeline that led to the major fire incident. They did not perform the safe HDD activity also.

• The probable source of ignition could be a lighted cigarette butt or ignited match stick thrown towards open drainage line by anybody from the nearby pan shop.

Recommendations:

• GGCL should continue to influence the third party contractors to intimate GGCL through “Dial before you dig” process prior to the Excavation or HDD activities.

• GGCL should continue to coordinate with third party contractors and their staff to raise their awareness on risks associated with damage to the live gas pipeline network.

• Refresher trainings, briefings, case studies, discussions to be taken up in the Control rooms, to educate and sensitize the staff.

• Checking of all the safety gadgets tools & tackles in all the areas to be carried out.

8. Incident at Rampura (GGCL)

Date of Incident : 19.10.2014 Time : 22:00 hrs Entity : GGCL

Location : Near Radha Krishna Temple, Main Road, Rampura, Surat.

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Description:

On 19th October 2014 at around 22:00 hours, there was a damage to GGCL Polyethylene Gas network due to melting of exposed 20 mm PE service line by fire cracker thrown by unknown persons during Diwali festival, resulting into escape of the gas & subsequent fire in two storm water drainage chambers.

Due to fire crackers, PE line was melted & gas release took place which spread into two storm water drainage chambers and subsequently fire took place in two storm water drainage chambers.

Katargam fire brigade reached the incident site and carried out the fire fighting operation to cool the area surrounding the fire location and control the fire.

GGCL Emergency response team received the call from the fire brigade and police control room at 22:00 hours and reached the incident site at 22:14 hours.

GGCL Emergency team isolated the damaged pipe section by closing down the relevant sectional valves at 22:55 hours which resulted into stoppage of gas supply to the damaged section of the pipe line / fire point and gas fire got extinguished.

The incident affected 1900 domestic customers due to isolation of the damaged section. The gas supply was resumed to approx. 1700 customers at 23:55 hours. On the next day i.e. 20.10.2014, further repair work was carried out and the gas supply was resumed at 10:50 hours to the remaining 200 affected customers.

There was no damage to any third party property as well as no human injury was reported.

The site was cordoned off by local authority and no work was allowed until the investigation by the police department and insurance company was completed.

Observations:

• GGCL Emergency team took about 14 minutes to reach at the incident spot • Height of the flame of fire was approx. 5.0 to 6.0 feet in two storm water drainage

chamber. • Approx. 1900 customers were affected due to isolation of damaged pipe section. • Fire tenders were deployed by Katargam fire department of Local Municipal

Corporation to control the fire. • The flame height was about 5 to 6 feet. • The fire took place in the two storm water drainage chambers which were constructed

last year only that caused covering of PE pipeline in the chambers. • 20 mm PE service pipeline got melted due to fire crackers thrown by unknown persons.

Cause:

• The probable cause is exposure of 20 mm GGCL PE pipeline during construction of Storm water chamber by the third party and falling of fire crackers thrown by the

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unknown third party on it which resulted in melted of the exposed 20 mm GGCL PE service line.

• The ignorance of the safety norms and throwing of the fire crackers into the storm water drainage chamber can be the probable source of ignition.

Recommendations:

• Awareness program for the safety should be undertaken during Diwali and other such events.

• GGCL should continue to increase the awareness on risks associated with live gas pipelines & gas pipelines network.

• GGCL should make aware to the third party to construct the drainage line and drainage chamber away from gas pipeline. Aware and warn the third party not to encompass the gas pipeline by constructing drainage line and drainage chamber.

• GGCL should continuously monitor that no gas pipeline should be opened and encroached by third party.

• Checking of all the safety gadgets tools & tackles in all the areas to be carried out. • Refresher trainings, briefings, case studies, discussions to be taken up in the Control

rooms, to educate and sensitize the staff.

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