Determining Staffing Solutions for the Duck Volunteer Fire

Determining Staffing Solutions 1

Running head: DETERMINING STAFFING SOLUTIONS FOR THE DUCK

Determining Staffing Solutions for the Duck Volunteer Fire Department

Donna M. Black

Duck Volunteer Fire Department, Duck, NC

Appendices Not Included. Please visit the Learning Resource Center on the Web at http://www.lrc.dhs.gov/ to learn how to obtain this report in its entirety through Interlibrary Loan.


CERTIFICATION STATEMENT

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of

others is set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given where I have

used the language, ideas, expressions, or writings of another.

Signed__________________________________________

Donna M. Black


Abstract

The Town of Duck, located on the Outer Banks of North Carolina, is home to a year round

population totaling 520 and a tourist population that swells to 22,000 which in turn places serious

demands upon public safety personnel. Due to the small year round population, volunteer

recruitment is difficult. In spite of the integration of four career personnel to supplement its

volunteer membership, the DVFD does not have consistent staffing to meet its present day

service demands. The purpose of this research was to evaluate the status of the DVFD while

concurrently addressing both the technical and adaptive impacts. Through descriptive and

evaluative research, the following research questions were examined: (a) what is the current

status of the DVFD in regards to call volume, response time and personnel compared to previous

years within the department; (b) how does the DVFD call volume, response time and personnel

compare to nationally recognized standards; (c) How does the DVFD call volume, response time

and personnel compare to other combination fire departments on the Outer Banks; (d) what are

the factors that affect recruitment and retention of volunteers; (e) what effect would the addition

of part- or full-time firefighters have on the current membership, Town of Duck or the North

Carolina insurance rating; (f) what effect would consolidation have on the current membership of

the DVFD and Southern Shores volunteer fire department members, Town of Duck, and the

North Carolina insurance rating? This paper assisted in identifying realistic expectations for the

DVFD’s future funding and staffing while supporting the USFA’s strategic goals.

Recommendations identified included: consideration of immediate part-time staffing;

collaboration with the Town of Duck to define level of service for the Town; continuation of

recruitment efforts; initiation of a personnel improvements plan; and evaluation of consolidation

as a future solution.

Duck Volunteer Fire Department 4

Table of Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………...page 3

Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………page 4

Introduction………………………………………………………………………….page 7

Background and Significance………………………………………………………..page 8

Literature Review………………………………………………………………..…page 11

Procedures………………………………………………………………………….page 26

Results……………………………………………………………………………...page 29

Discussion………………………………………………………………………….page 62

Recommendations………………………………………………………………….page 70

References………………………………………………………………………….page 72

Tables

Table 1 NFPA 1720 Staffing and Response Time Criteria.………………………..page 14

Table 2 CFAI Response Time Criteria…………………………………….……….page 15

Table 3 DVFD Call Volume……………………………………………………….page 30

Table 4 DVFD Medical Call Response Time and Personnel……………..……….page 31

Table 5 DVFD Station Call Response Time and Personnel………………….……page 32

Table 6 DVFD First Alarm Response Time and Personnel………………………..page 33

Table 7 DVFD First Alarm Suppression Personnel on First-out Apparatus and

Total on Scene……………………………………………….……………..page 34

Table 8 DVFD First Alarm Support Personnel on First-out Apparatus and

Total on Scene……………………………………………….……………..page 34

Table 9 DVFD Call Volume by Demand Zones/Densities………………..……….page 35


Tables (con’t)

Table 10 Comparisons of DVFD to NFPA 1720………….………………….……page 35

Table 11 Comparison of 2010 DVFD to CFAI…………...………………………..page 36

Table 12 Comparison of 2011 DVFD to CFAI…………...………………………..page 37

Table 13 Fire Department Comparison of Personnel……..………………………..page 39

Table 14 Fire Department Comparison of Call Volume and Total Personnel……..page 39

Table 15 Fire Department Comparison of First Alarm Response Time and

Total Personnel……………………………………………………………..page 40

Figures

Figure 1 Trends in Call Volume……………..……………………………………..page 31

Figure 2 Year Round and Tourist Population by Municipality………………….…page 38

Figure 3 Career, Total Firefighters, and Suppression by Year………………..……page 41

Figure 4 Percentage of In-Town Suppression Firefighters by Year……….……….page 42

Figure 5 Perception of Effective Recruitment..…………………………………….page 44

Figure 6 Reasons for Volunteering…………………………………….…….…….page 45

Figure 7 Reasons to Stop Volunteering………..…………………………………...page 45

Figure 8 Career Response by Percentage of Calls (2010-2011)……………...……page 46

Figure 9 Volunteer Response by Percentage of Calls (2010-2011)…………….….page 47

Figure 10 Percentage of Incidents by Day of Week (2008-2011)...…………….….page 48

Figure 11 Percentage of Incidents by Time of Day (2008-2011)……………….….page 48

Figure 12 Perception of Personnel Response on Medical Calls…..…………….….page 49

Figure 13 Perception of Personnel Response on First Alarm Calls…………….….page 50

Figure 14 Perception of Personnel Response on Station Calls …..…………….….page 50


Figures (con’t)

Figure 15 Benefit of Part-time Firefighters…………..…………………………..page 51

Figure 16 Effect of Part-time Firefighters on Volunteer

Participation and Response………………………………………………...page 52

Figure 17 Effect of Full-time Firefighters on Volunteer

Participation and Response………………………………………………...page 52

Figure 18 SSVFD Would Benefit from Part-Time Firefighters…..……….……….page 55

Figure 19 Effect of Part-time Firefighters on SSVFD Volunteer

Participation and Response..……………………………………………....page 56

Figure 20 Effect of Full-time Firefighters on SSVFD Volunteer

Participation and Response..……………………………………………....page 57

Figure 21 Effect of Consolidation Regarding Improved Level of Service………...page 58

Figure 22 Perception of Consolidation on Enhanced Volunteer

Participation and Response…………………………………………...……page 59

Figure 23 Perception of Consolidation on Decreased Volunteer

Participation and Response…………………………………………...……page 60

Appendices

Appendix A: Fire Chief Questionnaire ……………………..………………..……page 76

Appendix B: Sample DVFD Firefighter Personnel Feedback……………....……..page 77

Appendix C: Sample SSVFD Firefighter Personnel Feedback…………………….page 80


Introduction

The Duck Volunteer Fire Department Inc. (DVFD), founded in 1982, provides fire

protection for the small tourist village of Duck on the northern Outer Banks of North Carolina. In

1994, the DVFD began its first responder/EMT level response for emergency medical calls. Like

similar destinations, Duck has a small year round population (520) which swells to over 22,000

during the summer. The Outer Banks as a whole has experienced tremendous growth over the

last 10 to15 years precipitating increased service demands on public safety. This researcher’s

first applied research paper entitled Duck Volunteer Fire Department: An Evaluation of

Deployment and Response to Emergency Incidents (2008) was the first use of data analysis for

the assessment of the department’s operations. Before 2007, the Fire Chief was the sole career

position. In August 2007 and 2008, respectively, a career deputy chief and captain position was

funded. As a result of that paper, the DVFD is now staffed with five career personnel to assure

that at least one firefighter/EMT is on duty (all the time) “to respond to medical calls and have

consistent initial response to all station calls” (Black, 2008, p. 35). Since this initial assessment,

and the addition of career personnel, a short-term solution for staffing was satisfied. However,

generating staffing solutions for the long term necessitates further, more comprehensive

examination. The problem is the DVFD does not have consistent staffing for its service demands.

An emerging concern is maintaining an adequately sized combination department, trained to the

demands of an all-hazards response, and in an area, limited by personnel availability remains a

challenge.

The purpose of this research was to evaluate the status of the DVFD and identify options

that would improve staffing while prudently addressing both the technical and adaptive impacts.

Through descriptive and evaluative research, the following research questions were examined:


(a) what is the current status of the DVFD in regards to call volume, response time and personnel

compared to previous years within the department; (b) how does the DVFD call volume,

response time and personnel compare to nationally recognized standards; (c) How does the

DVFD call volume, response time and personnel compare to other combination fire departments

on the Outer Banks; (d) what are the factors that affect recruitment and retention of volunteers;

(e) what effect would the addition of part- or full-time firefighters have on the current

membership, Town of Duck (Town) or the North Carolina insurance rating; (f) what effect

would consolidation have on the current membership of the DVFD members and the Southern

Shores volunteer fire department (SSVFD) members, Town of Duck, and the North Carolina

insurance rating? Data was collected to determine the technical and adaptive challenges related

to staffing. Data based on current fire department operations was evaluated in tandem with

financial and insurance implications as well as surveyed opinions regarding staffing, operations

and consolidation. A literature review was conducted to identify acceptable standards and

processes for assessing staffing and successfully implementing change.

Background and Significance

Town of Duck History

With merely 2.32 square miles, the Town of Duck provides unique challenges for public

safety. In 2002, the area known as Duck incorporated into a unique municipality. Once

incorporated, the Town of Duck continued to contract for fire protection from the DVFD, for

ocean rescue through a private entity, and created its own municipal police department. The

average home in Duck costs $746,242 (Dare County, 2008), though this is anticipated to

decrease upon completion of the 2013 assessments and in the wake of the nationwide housing

crisis. A six-mile barrier island -- flanked by the Atlantic Ocean and Currituck Sound -- Duck is


home to approximately 520 year round residents and hosts over 22,000 during its peak tourist

season. The Town is responsible for providing a variety of services for a locale with

predominantly investment vacation properties that causes a surge in population. Duck consists of

111 businesses and mercantile occupancies; 2,101 single family residential structures; 449 multi-

family units; a 122-unit hotel; and one five-unit bed and breakfast (A. Garman, personal

communication, September 12, 2011). The commercial area with various retail shops,

restaurants, and offices accounts for approximately five percent of Duck’s total land use. Only

eight percent of the Town remains undeveloped. Vigilance is required to balance the divergence

between tourist and resident impact on costs. In an area that is prone to weather impacts such as

nor’easters and hurricanes, reliable public safety services are imperative to the functioning and

wellbeing of the Town.

History of the DVFD

The DVFD plays an essential role in the public safety of the Town. The primary

responsibility of the DVFD is to provide fire protection and suppression. The DVFD also

provides first responder/basic life support response to all medical calls though delivery service is

the responsibility of Dare County EMS. Due to the proximity of the nearest EMS station (three

miles from the southern Duck border), fire units are usually first on scene. Furthermore, the fire

department provides an all-hazard response. The types of emergency incidents include structure

and brush fires, medical emergencies, as well as ocean rescue assists. Motor vehicle collisions,

hazardous condition mitigation, and response to weather related incidences also fall under the

purview of the DVFD. During its busiest season, it is common for the DVFD to respond to

lightning strikes, flooding, and structural damage from severe storms.


In 2012, the DVFD will have been providing fire protection services for 30 years. During

its first two decades, revenues were generated through a designated fire tax and fundraising.

Once Duck incorporated, two major changes resulted. First, Duck’s municipal charter specified

that the DVFD would continue to provide fire protection through annual budget requests to the

town (North Carolina General Assembly, 2001). Second, in 2003 the DVFD changed its by-laws

and passed the oversight of career personnel to the Town of Duck (Duck Volunteer Fire

Department, 2004). Revenues provided from the Town of Duck for the 2011/2012 budget year

was $717,610 (Town of Duck, 2011). The DVFD continues its fundraising to finance duty gear,

meals for members after major trainings or incidents, an annual awards banquet, annual

physicals, and when possible, capital contributions towards equipment or the public safety

building which houses both police and fire.

Between August 2007 and October 2009, four additional career positions supplemented

the efforts of the volunteers (a recommendation from Black’s 2008 applied research project).

These additions enhanced the operations of the DVFD by securing a reliable officer presence for

station duties and emergency incidents. Moreover, training for the volunteers was expanded and

morale improved. By observation, one might conclude that staffing problems have been solved.

However, there remain times when coverage is insufficient due to lack of available personnel.

As with all districts on the Outer Banks, major incidents require the response of

neighboring fire departments through mutual aid agreements. The DVFD’s primary mutual aid

department is the SSVFD whose district borders the Town of Duck’s southern boundary.

The goal of the Executive Leadership Class (2011) at the National Fire Academy was to

develop “a framework of executive-level competencies by focusing on personal effectiveness”

(U.S. Fire Administration, 2011 pg. 1-7). The knowledge gained in Heifetz, Grashow, and


Linsky’s The Practice of Adaptive Leadership (2009) and the Executive Leadership Class were

used to address DVFD staffing issues. “The single most important skill and most undervalued

capacity for exercising adaptive leadership is diagnosis” (Heifetz et al., 2009, p. 7). Arguably,

while staffing issues are a technical problem that additional personnel could address, in a small

combination department this might not prove to be the ideal solution. One must recognize that

adaptive challenges arise when an organization is changed from its comfortable status quo.

Central to this process is recognizing the need for education once it is determined that a problem

exists. Lastly, reasonable and attainable options should be presented. A clear diagnosis of

operations coupled with a methodical analysis of potential options can produce the information

needed for sound decision-making.

This applied research project assisted in identifying realistic expectations for DVFD’s

future funding and staffing. It supports the United States Fire Administration’s (USFA) strategic

goals to: (a) “improve local planning and preparedness-the effectiveness an incident is handled at

the local level is a direct result of the preparedness of the local responders and the community

they serve; and (b) improve the fire and emergency service’s capability for response to and

recovery from all-hazards-the effectiveness an incident is handled at the local level is a direct

result of the preparedness of the local responders and the communities they serve” (U.S. Fire

Administration , 2009, p. 14).

Literature Review

The literature review provided valuable insights in the following areas: staffing and

response; volunteer recruitment and retention; personnel compensation; and consolidation. “To

cope with future growth, local administrators are turning increasingly to the concept of master

(comprehensive) planning of municipal functions. Such plans include an examination of existing


programs; a projection of future needs of the community, and a determination of methods to fill

those needs. They seek the most cost-effective allocations of resources to help ensure that the

needs will be met” (Granito, 2008, p. 12-20).

Response and Personnel

In order to address staffing, it is essential to evaluate current personnel and apparatus

response relative to previous years (for DVFD) and recommended standards. When analyzing

fire suppression response, Granito (2008) states there are two considerations: capability and

capacity. “Capability is the ability to respond within a short time with sufficient trained

personnel and equipment to rescue any trapped occupants and confine the fire to the room or

building of origin on initial attack. Capacity is the ability of the fire department to respond

adequately to multiple-alarm incidents and/or simultaneous calls of any type, including

emergency medical services” (Granito, 2008, p. 12-8). Both capability and capacity can be

greatly affected by deficiencies in personnel availability. According to Granito (2008) two

common thoughts regarding response according to Granito are: (a) within 10 minutes, on duty

crews should have enough personnel to carry out a first alarm assignment; and (b) response from

an unmanned volunteer station could exceed six minutes (dispatch to first-out apparatus). The

ability to provide response of the first arriving apparatus within five minutes of dispatch is

recommended, however, “time cannot become the all-important factor at the expense of safety”

(Granito, 2008, p. 12-14).

Rosters often prove misleading as to the availability and response of personnel. A full

complement of members may not materialize for an emergency incident requiring a large

number of personnel. So one central question becomes what is the ideal quantity for staffing.

With an emphasis on safety and the reduction of line of duty deaths and injuries incident


commanders, safety officers, and rapid intervention teams need to be factored into the personnel

count as encouraged by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation.

The well-documented two-in/two-out standard (OSHA, 2008; NFPA, 2010) fails to address the

need for the additional required personnel to accomplish all fireground tasks. The occupancy

distribution in the Town of Duck is comparable to a moderate-to-high risk occupancy as defined

by the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI, 2006) and low-hazard occupancy

as described by Granito (2008). Suggested fire response to such occupancies is 13-17 personnel

by CFAI standards and a minimum of 16 personnel (plus a rapid intervention crew, two engines

and a ladder truck) according to Granito (2008).

Nationally Recognized Response Standards

Selected literature and results from Black’s 2008 applied research paper Evaluating the

DVFD’s Deployment and Response to Emergency Incidents was germane to this paper. The same

three recognized standards (Insurance Service Organization’s (ISO)-Fire Suppression Rating

Schedule, NFPA 1720 and CFAI) for determining performance objectives and operating

guidelines were used to measure current service levels of the DVFD. A more detailed review and

explanation of these standards can be found in Black’s 2008 literature review.

The first standard identified is the ISO-Fire Suppression Rating Schedule (2003), an

assessment of a fire department’s fire suppression facilities, equipment, and programs to

determine its community’s fire insurance rating. The rating system is complex. The process

involves tallying these elements in order to determine a public protection classification between

one and ten; a lower classification number signifying better potential capability for fire

suppression. For the purpose of this research, focus was on minimum standards for personnel and


apparatus. In July 2000, the Office of the State Fire Marshal and ISO signed a contract creating

the North Carolina Rating System (NCRS) that allowed North Carolina to conduct its own rating

inspections using the ISO format (B. Waters, personal communication, November 8, 2011). The

actual numerical ratings are identical to that of the ISO. To meet the 9S requirement in North

Carolina (minimum rating to meet certification), a fire department “must have a minimum of 20

personnel with 18 designated as firefighters; and shall assure the response of at least four

members and one engine to all fires and fire alarms in structures, the chief may be one of the

four” (North Carolina Department of Insurance, 2001, p. 2).

NFPA 1720, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression

Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer

Fire Departments provides guidelines for staffing and response relative to population density.

Fewer than 500 people per square mile are defined as rural; suburban as 500 to 1000 people; and

urban as a minimum of 1000 people. Recommended staffing and response times outlined by

NFPA 1720 and corresponding performance standards are shown in Table 1. In addition to the

listed criteria, the following shall occur: (a) a minimum of four members must be available

before interior fire-fighting operations begin; (b) a minimum of two firefighters shall work

together in the hazardous area; (c) a minimum of two firefighters shall be ready outside the

hazardous area to assist; and (d) an outside member cannot abandon a critical task to perform a

rescue if leaving would jeopardize the health and safety of the firefighters (NFPA, 2010, p. 7).

There are no recommended response times or personnel response recommendations for

emergency medical calls in NFPA 1720.

Table 1

NFPA 1720 Staffing and Response Time Criteria


Rural Suburban Urban

Staffing (#) 6 10 15

Response Time 14 min 10 min 9 min

Percentage Met 80 % 80 % 90 %

CFAI (2006) provides a self-assessment process designed so that service level objectives

can be established specific to an agency. Through a range of variables -- both subjective and

quantifiable -- performance baselines are determined and benchmarks (goals) are set for a

department. Service delivery is then evaluated against these benchmarks in order to determine if

adequate resources are available to meet staffing, response time, and performance measures.

Population density is used to define service areas. Rural areas are those with populations less

than 10,000 or a density of 1,000 per square mile; suburban is 10,000 to 29,999 or a population

density of 1,000 to 2,000 per square mile; urban areas are those with over 30,000 in population

or 2,000 people per square mile; and metropolitan is an area with a population of over 200,000 or

a density of over 3,000 per square mile. CFAI response times and performance standards are

depicted in Table 2.

Table 2

CFAI Response Time Criteria

Rural Response Times

Suburban Response Times

Metropolitan Response Times

1st Unit Benchmark 10 min 5 min 4 min

1st Unit Baseline 13 min 6 min 30 sec 5 min 12 sec

2nd Unit Benchmark 14 min 8 min 8 min

2nd Unit Baseline 18 min12 sec 10 min 24 sec 10 min 24 sec


Performance Met 90 % 90 % 90 %

The challenge in determining staffing and response times becomes identifying a realistic

operational expectation. The determinants regarding response as outlined by CFAI (2006) are (a)

the prevention of flashover for structure fires and (b) six minute response time for medical calls.

The guideline pertaining to structure fires is used because it is well documented that the

probability of property loss and life safety increases at this critical juncture. The guideline for six

minutes is a direct result of the potential for brain damage after that period in a cardiac arrest.

Recruitment and Retention

An important piece of literature addressing the volunteer fire service is the 2004 Blue

Ribbon Report (BRR) (Buckman et al., 2004). For the purpose of this applied research paper, this

report is briefly summarized but it should be considered in its entirety as it specifically speaks to

the challenges facing the DVFD. According to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA):

(a) there are nearly 800,000 volunteer firefighters in the United States; (b) 73% of all fire

departments are volunteer; and (c) volunteers save taxpayers 37 billion dollars per year

(Buckman et al., 2004). A crucial observation by the Blue Ribbon Committee was that in the

post 9/11 era, local emergency responders are the “first line of response, regardless of the event”

(Buckman et al., 2004, p. 2).

The BRR points to two major deficiencies -- financial resources and volunteers -- as the

explanation for the loss of volunteer departments. The shortage of financial resources has made it

difficult for volunteer fire departments to maintain adequate, modern equipment and to offer

diversified training for an all-hazards response. Thus, most volunteer fire departments continue

to rely on fundraising as their primary source of income which detracts from firefighter training.


This in turn directly affects volunteers. The report shows a steady decline in volunteers since

1984 and points to recruitment and retention as factors. “National retention average of a

volunteer firefighter is about four years per department; with an approximate cost in the first year

of $4,000 (to orient, train, and equip); and costs approximately $1,000 per year to retain”

(Buckman et al., 2004, p. 9). In 1993 the United States Fire Administration (USFA) conducted a

national study to address factors changing retention of firefighters. Balancing increased training

demands and call volume with the time constraints of career and two income families; losing

trained volunteers to full-time employment; and the lack of benefits and incentives, and effective

leadership were all cited as factors affecting volunteerism (Buckman et al., 2004). Consistent

training and performance standards and an integrated tactical rank structure were recognized as

necessary components for successful integration of career and volunteer firefighters in

combination departments. “The quantitative measure of success is the retention rate of the

minority group” (Buckman et al., 2004, p. 11).

Buckman, et al. (2004) suggest that the responsibility for determining and maintaining

level of service is the responsibility of volunteer firefighters, fire service leaders, community

leaders, elected officials, and citizens alike. The success of volunteer and combination

departments require strategic planning, continued emphasis on recruitment and retention, and

providing community programs for prevention and safety.

The Red Ribbon Report (RRR) published in November 2005 (Scott et al., 2005)

expanded upon previous reports by addressing staffing. “The goal of the report was to call

attention to some of the strategies and options available to fire service and community leaders

who are looking to deliver the highest possible level of service consistent with the need at the

lowest possible cost consistent with safety” (Scott et al., 2005, p. 2). Indications that change may


be necessary include: community growth, community aging, over-dependence on mutual aid,

increased response times, and decreased personnel to carry out designated fireground tasks.

Other indications germane to the DVFD include: officers filling lower operational positions due

to shortages; unaffordable housing for volunteers; and demographic changes (Scott et al., 2005).

To objectively determine the needs of the community requires balancing expectations of service

with available funding.

Data to consider when analyzing and justifying staffing changes include: response times,

personnel response, recruitment and retention statistics, average call per volunteer, fundraising

and revenue data, and cost controls for new personnel. “An effective indicator of transition

casualties is the retention rate of the minority component of the organization” (Scott et al., 2005,

p.10). Considerations cited for successful transitioning of staff are: designing a system to address

the majority of incidents rather than the worst-case scenario, integrating career and volunteer

firefighters at the tactical level, and considering a response model specific for one’s community

(Scott et al., 2005, p. 14, 16).

Several researchers studied recruitment and retention issues in their own fire departments.

As stated in the White Ribbon Report (2006), “the best recruitment program that a department

can have is a high retention rate of existing volunteers” (Buckman et al., 2006, p. 7). Sewell

(2009) examined volunteer retention in the Sauk Village Fire Department (Illinois). A shift in

economic factors in the area caused retention of members to become a challenge. Sewell (2009)

conducted a survey of both Illinois and Wisconsin fire departments to determine strategies for

improvement. Aside from time demands and the economy, lack of leadership and ineffective

training can negatively affect an organization. Sewell’s recommendations for increasing benefits


and participatory pay to improve retention could be attributed to the economic environment that

existed during his study.

Bright (2009) discovered similar reasons for decreased participation when he researched

the Bloomington Township Fire and Emergency Services (Illinois). Diminishing workforce and

increased demands on members by new training mandates coincided with a decline in

participation (Bright, 2009, p. 29). He recommended aligning the values and goals of the

organization with that of the membership to foster a safer more effective environment.

A four year decline in volunteer participation prompted Addington (2009) to conduct an

applied research project on volunteer retention. A survey of fire chiefs and officers identified that

volunteer decline was related to economic, social, generational and organizational factors. A

generational factor would include a shift in people’s focus towards financial success and away

from community service. An economic factor is people’s need to work more and divert their

limited free time back to the family. Further, “a sense of belonging, active involvement and long

term appreciation (i.e. pension plans, etc.) were effective in helping retard decline” (Addington

II, 2009, p. 22). Financial compensation was not recognized as an effective means to improve

retention. Addington concluded that those leaders that understand the needs of the members are

effective in implementing change.

Yengoyan (2010), through telephone interviews of past and current members of the

Camano Island Fire and Rescue, attempted to determine what influenced a decline in volunteer

participation concurrent with the transition from all-volunteer to combination. For Camano

Island Fire and Rescue, the primary motivator for volunteering was service to the community

and pride in being a firefighter. Additional benefits included camaraderie among volunteers,

training, and leadership from the officers. And while disadvantages included time constraints and


poor chief-level leadership, the main reason cited for leaving the department was “conflicts or

changes in their personal lives” (Yengoyan, 2010, p. 24). Two recommendations that resulted

from the study was improving rewards and recognition of the volunteers and designating a

training officer to work with the volunteers. “The volunteers want to train and use the skills they

train for on emergency incidents” (Yengoyan, p. 42).

Janke (2010) recognized that the Howard Fire Department was showing a decrease in

volunteer response. Through his research, he attempted to determine why response had changed

and what measures could improve response. He found the most cited impediments were work-

related and family conflicts, as well as immediate reports of false alarms after dispatch (Janke,

2010, p. 22). When asked whether duty shifts would improve response, “nearly 50% of the

department felt it did not matter; 35% indicated it would make it easier to respond; and the

remaining members felt that it would make it more difficult” (Janke, p. 23). Time was the

overriding factor for a member’s response capability. Janke (2010) concluded that a clear

staffing plan could improve member motivation and participation.

Staffing

According to national standards, the tangible measurement of a fire department’s ability

is available resources (personnel and equipment) and response times. As Denlinger (2008)

pointed out, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the fire service. “The success of the

operation of a fire department does not depend on whether the personnel are paid or unpaid but

on their individual and collective ability to perform and to accomplish department objectives”

(Denlinger, 2008, p. 12-55). Denlinger identified five factors that can help determine the type

and amount of personnel needed for career, combination, or volunteer departments. These factors

included (a) financial resources of the community; (b) availability of on-call or volunteer


personnel; (c) frequency of fire incidents; (d) range of services expected from the department;

and (e) type of department preferred by the community (Denlinger, 2008). How successfully a

fire department can operate at emergency incidents while being cognizant of safety is the central

challenge for fire service leaders. That being said, Denlinger (2008) also emphasized the

difficulty of quantifying success of firefighting activities. Would fires be increased or intensified

without fire prevention activities since despite fire prevention practices, fires and disasters still

exist. “The fact that most fires are suppressed with minimal losses and injuries does not indicate

conclusively that an adequate level of fire department service has been provided” (Denlinger, p.

12-70). Staffing challenges include not only the direct effect on structure fire operations and

accomplishing critical tasks but also in allowing for time off. Training, vacations and illness need

to be planned for. Allotting 20% or more for time off is a more accurate guideline by today’s

standards. (Denlinger, p. 12-73).

Sanford (2010) compared the Springfield (NJ) Fire Department with industry standards.

His department, a combination department with primarily career personnel, faced budget cuts

that directly affected operations, primarily initial fire attack. As a researcher, he surveyed other

departments for solutions and procedures for improving operations. The culmination of

Sanford’s research produced the following recommendations: (a) until additional personnel are

provided for a sustainable interior attack, alternative methods of fire suppression should be

considered; (b) training should include defensive search tactics for when signs of flashover exist;

(c) in the absence of a rescue situations, firefighters should be trained in indirect fire attack

methods (using positive pressure ventilation and infrared technology); (d) incident commanders

must establish a new culture in calling for more manpower sooner and waiting for resources to

arrive (Sanford, 2010, pp. 51, 58).


Fulk (2009) looked at staffing shortfalls of the Morehead City Fire-EMS Department in

North Carolina. This department was similar to the DVFD with limited manpower and shifts in

population due to tourism. His research examined national standards for comparison and he

conducted a survey of similar demographics in order to evaluate his staffing. The data supported

the need for additional personnel in order to perform necessary critical fireground tasks for

engine and ladder companies and to meet national standards.

Yancey (2008) recognized that the Minooka Fire Protection District did not have a

staffing plan (based on actual data) for determining personnel needs nor managing staffing if

acquired. His research identified that NFPA 1710 and 1720; ISO, OSHA and NIOSH had

delineated staffing recommendations or standards. His survey of 28 combination departments

revealed that the primary determinant for planning was apparatus staffing. Yet the respondents

lacked agreement on the number required to staff an apparatus. “Fifty four percent stated three

firefighters, 29% stated four, 7% stated two, and 7% stated one” (Yancey, 2008, p. 27).

Interestingly, in spite of published recommendations and results of this survey, inconsistency

persists in quantifying acceptable staffing. Yancey’s most valuable recommendation was his

emphasis on “conducting an analysis of historical data from his department, assessing

community demand and the current fire problem, then using those recognized staffing

suggestions to optimize the department’s personnel resources” (Yancey, pp. 34-35).

Through survey and literature search, Floyd (2010) investigated optimal levels for

staffing of apparatus in the Poquonnock Bridge Fire Department. He found “the majority of the

studies show that a four person crew is not only what is found in the standards, but it is more

efficient, faster, safer, and less apt to experience long lasting injuries” (Floyd, 2010, p. 23). He

stated, “until a standard of performance is enforced by standards that are backed up by law,


jurisdictions will continue to staff fire apparatus with what they can afford” (Floyd, p. 47). For

his department it would be cost prohibitive to meet the recommended staffing of four firefighters

per apparatus. He offered a possible solution via functional consolidation with area departments

in order to optimize personnel, resources, and avoid duplication of services.

Consolidation

According to Denlinger (2008), standardized training, shared facilities as well as

purchases of specialized apparatus and equipment, and coordinated long range planning are

examples of how fire departments have expanded mutual aid agreements beyond emergency

response in order to improve operations.

In 1994, Volunteer Fire Insurance Services (VFIS) published a guide on fire department

consolidation and seventeen years later, the fire service continues to grapple with the same

issues. “Many fire departments are turning to a variety of joint ventures to provide the level of

service their communities need while conserving scarce resources” (Thomas, 1994, p. 1).

Consolidation can take various forms. In a functional consolidation, fire departments remain

separate while duties are shared amongst the members of the different departments (i.e. joint

training center). An example of partial consolidation is shared staffing at a fire station that serves

multiple jurisdictions. Lastly, an “operational consolidation legally combines separate fire

departments into a unified department (Thomas, p. 2). Advantages to consolidation include (1)

better utilization of resources (apparatus and equipment) by decreasing redundancy and

replacement; (2) ability to provide stronger or enhanced programs and services; (3) potential for

improved fire ground operations including response times, increased resources, better

communication; (4) better utilization of staff and increased career opportunities; and (5) cost-

sharing with resources, training, facilities, etc. Nevertheless, potential failure can result from its


disadvantages: (1) lack of support among members; (2) dissimilarity of departments; (3) identity

of the new organization (name, apparatus color, leadership); (4) loss of power or control by

governing body; and (5) poor timing. Leadership, proper planning, and buy-in from all

stakeholders is vital for success. “Every type of consolidation carries with it its own individual

needs that must be met consistently if the operation is to succeed” (Thomas, p. 15).

Young (2010) conducted an extensive literature search and survey of fire department

consolidation. Young examined the feasibility of Shadeland Volunteer Fire Department and the

surrounding volunteer departments consolidating into one county department. Ultimately he

concluded against consolidation because it was being driven by legislation rather than the will of

the individual departments. Positive aspects of consolidation were identified for safety programs,

administrative duties, standard operating guidelines, equipment standardization, and fleet

maintenance. Negatives aspects were use of a department’s equipment and resources outside of

its district and concerns over changes in organizational structure and authority (Young, 2010, p.

38). It was determined that service delivery would most likely be unchanged with consolidation.

The economic implications of consolidation were not specifically addressed in Young’s paper

and it was unclear whether there would be any cost savings. For consolidation to succeed, Young

identified good planning, communication, and use of a task force for planning and

implementation.

Functional consolidation evaluated by Nichols (2006) demonstrated that it could prove

valuable to a small or moderately sized emergency services agency. The following have been

reported as a result of functional consolidation: staffing improvements, efficiency in resource

deployment, improved ISO ratings, as well as direct and indirect savings (Nichols, 2006, pg. 18).

His survey of fire chiefs and officers in York County, PA supported functional consolidation as a


means of improving department operations in the following areas: finances, specialty resources,

response times, property loss, firefighter experience, staffing, training, firefighter safety,

customer service and officer development (Nichols, 2006, p. 24). Nichols suggested that

initiating some degree of functional consolidation could prove or disprove the viability of a full

consolidation. In other words, departments could retain their identities while determining if

merging would enhance or hinder service delivery.

Brazunas (2010) looked at consolidation as a consideration for both the Berwyn and Paoli

Fire Companies where each experienced decreasing volunteerism and tighter financing. While

his research identified advantages in cost savings and improved services, they were countered by

reluctance due to poor leadership and the loss of tradition. He concluded that the “plan to

advance some level of consolidation should be supported if it can meet the ultimate objective, to

provide the same level of service delivery or better to the community and to have the support of

both municipalities” (Brazunas, 2010, p. 37).

Contemplating consolidation is often the result of noticeable declines in personnel,

increasing response times, and leaner budgets. Leonard Matarese of the ICMA Center for Public

Safety Management recognized the effect of the economy on services. He stated, “there has to be

a real partnership between the law enforcement leadership, the fire department leadership, and

municipal government leadership to identify alternative strategies to provide comparable levels

of service with less” (International City/County Management Association [ICMA], 2011, p. 1).

Consolidation could include the merging of governments, not just departments, in order to

reduce costs and return to core mission. When contemplating consolidation, is it wiser to

combine two existing entities as they exist or redesign from scratch? This question should be

asked when identifying potential models for change (ICMA, 2011).


Adaptive and Technical Challenges

Problem solving staff issues in a small combination department directly relates to the

Executive Fire Officer Program’s Executive Leadership course (2011) and the concepts

presented in The Practice of Adaptive Leadership by Ronald Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and

Marty Linsky (2009). The aforementioned text is based on the concept of a four part matrix

addressing: (a) the diagnosis of a system, (b) diagnosis of self, (c) action of system and (d) action

of self. “The process of diagnosis and action begins with data collection and problem

identification (the what), moves through an interpretive stage (the why) and on to potential

approaches to action as a series of interventions into the organization, community, or society (the

what next)” (Heifetz et al., 2009, p. 6). The authors stress the importance of diagnosing the

system by taking an objective view –through a process they describe as “getting on the balcony”

– in order to see what is occurring. Only then, they maintain, can options or actions emerge for

solving organizational problems.

Once identified, it is critical to recognize whether problems are technical or adaptive in

nature. “While technical problems may be very complex and critically important they have

known solutions that can be implemented by current know how. “Adaptive challenges can only

be addressed through changes in people’s priorities, beliefs, habits, and loyalties” (Heifetz et al.,

2009, p. 19).

Procedures

Descriptive and evaluative research was used for this applied research project. Six

research questions were answered through raw data collection. Area combination fire chiefs

completed a questionnaire and the members of the Duck and Southern Shores fire departments

completed a survey. Interviews with the Duck Town Manager and a NCRS inspector were also


conducted. When evaluated in its totality, the data creates a picture of both the technical and

adaptive challenges relative to staffing solutions.

To provide consistency with comparisons of Black’s (2008) DVFD data, the following

assumptions regarding demand zones (as defined by NFPA 1720) and densities (defined by

CFAI) were incorporated into these procedures. The months of January, February, and December

see an average a population of 500: considered rural at 224 persons per square mile. During the

shoulder months of March, April, October, and November, the average population increases to

5,000: considered suburban at 2,155 persons per square mile. During May through September

(peak visitation months) the average population swells to 22,000: urban/metropolitan at 8,620

persons per square mile. Additionally the same definitions for emergency incident types were

used. Emergency incidents are defined as medical calls, station calls, or first alarm calls for

service. Medical calls also include dispatch to surf ocean rescue events. The DVFD assists surf

rescue once victims are ashore. All fires, fire alarm activations, hazardous conditions, motor

vehicle accidents, and general public service occurrences are considered station calls. Actual

fires or those emergency incidents that pose a fire threat are further classified as first alarms.

Call volume, response times, and personnel response data was gathered for the dates

January 2008 through October 2011 using FireHouse® software. This was compared with

Black’s (2008) applied research paper that presented data from January 2005 through October

2008. The following specific items were analyzed: (a) call volume; (b) total number of medical

calls; (c) total number of station calls; (d) average response time for medical calls and average

number of personnel present; (e) average response time for all station calls and average number

of personnel present; and (f) average response time for the first arriving apparatus on first alarm

fire calls and average number of personnel present. Additional data assessed call volume by


identified populations and corresponding densities, and the classification of personnel for both

the first-out apparatus and total on scene for structure fire incidents. Firefighters, as defined by

the DVFD standard operating guidelines, are either suppression or support. Suppression

firefighters are certified for SCBA use while support firefighters are not but instead perform

essential fireground tasks (Duck Volunteer Fire Department, 2010, p. admin2-2).

The DVFD response and personnel data was then compared to nationally recognized

standards identified in the literature search (NCRS/ISO, NFPA, and CFAI). Results from 2010

and 2011 represent the current staffing model of five career positions (chief, deputy chief, two

captains and one lieutenant) in addition to the volunteers. Comparisons are shown in the form of

matrixes.

A short questionnaire was sent to the fire chiefs of five combination departments in Dare

County (Appendix A). Respondents were asked to provide year round population and estimated

tourist population figures, and make-up of the department personnel. Additionally they were

asked to report the average response times for first-out apparatus, the average number of

personnel present, and the breakdown between suppression and support firefighters on first alarm

structure fire calls. Particular attention was paid to the SSVFD, Duck’s primary mutual aid

department. SSVFD is the likely department for consolidation therefore response comparisons

provided important decision-making information. All results are presented in table or graph form

for comparison.

Recognizing the adaptive nature of change within organizations, a survey was designed

to capture firefighter perceptions on staffing (Appendix B and C). A survey committee consisting

of an emergency service consultant, doctoral student (non-fire field), two fire personnel, as well

as the author designed the questions. The majority of the survey was formatted using the Likert


scale and SurveyGizmo administered and compiled the results. It was disseminated to 38

members of the DVFD and 30 members of the SSVFD via email through their chiefs. Ten days

were allotted for completion with a reminder email sent at day seven. A reminder email was sent

at day seven.

Additional data was gathered through two interviews. The Duck Town Manager was

interviewed on October 23, 2011 to gain perspective on fire operations as it pertains to the Town.

NCSR inspector Bryant Waters was interviewed on November 8, 2011 to gain insight on the

effect of fire operations on the district’s insurance rating.

One assumption of this research was the accuracy of response times and personnel data.

All data can be influenced during dispatcher or firefighter input into reporting databases. There

are several limitations to this project. First, the intent of the firefighter survey was to grasp

subjective reactions to possible changes in staffing. Questions about consolidation provided little

information on the operational impact it could have on a department and this may have shaped

responses. Additionally, the legal aspects of consolidation were not addressed as they were

beyond the scope of this paper. Lastly, a deficiency of the questionnaire sent to the area fire

chiefs was failure to include questions regarding recruitment and retention. Strategies could have

been gleaned from these departments and should be sought out considering recruitment and

retention is a major challenge for the DVFD.

Results

In order to determine the effectiveness of the DVFD itself, data regarding response times

and personnel exclude assistance from mutual aid. Where indicated, statistics dating back to

2005 were incorporated into the analysis.


Data from FireHouse® software was used to determine the status of the DVFD in regards

to call volume, response time, and personnel. Recent data from 2008 to 2011 was compared to

previous years (2005-2007) depicted in Black’s 2008 paper. Table 3 shows total calls, medical,

and station calls between 2008 and 2011. Figure 1 shows the total call volume trend from 2005

to October 2011. This trend indicates a plateau in call volume with calls for service split between

medical and station incidents.

Table 3

DVFD Call Volume

Year Total Calls / % Change

Medical Calls / % Change

Station Calls / % Change

2008 444 230 214

2009 420/-5.7% 223/-3.1% 197/-8.6%

2010 435/+3.4% 245/+9.0% 190/-3.7%

2010*(Oct) 407 222 185

2011*(Oct) 401/-1.5% 194/-14.4% 207/+10.6%

Note. Totals for 2010 and 2011 through October are included in order for the most recent data from 2011 to be used.


Figure 1 Trends in Call Volume

Table 4 depicts response time and average number of personnel for medical calls between

2008 and 2011. The DVFD has been largely able to maintain a consistent response time and

three-person average for medical related calls from 2005 through 2011. There was a significant

increase in response time in 2008 before the addition of the third career employee.

Table 4

DVFD Medical Call Response Time and Personnel

Year Avg. Response Time Avg. Personnel Response


2005 4 min 28 sec 3

2006 4 min 42 sec 3

2007 4 min 25 sec 3

2008 7 min 9 sec 3

2009 4 min 9 sec 3

2010 4 min 20 sec 3

2011* (Oct.) 4 min 24 sec 3

Avg. 2010/2011 4 min 22 sec 3

Table 5 reflects response times for DVFD personnel first on-scene and the average

number of personnel responding to station calls for the years 2005 through 2011. Data shows

declining personnel response despite the increase in career staffing. Personnel response in 2005

and 2006 was all-volunteer; 2010 and 2011 data include the presence of full-time staffing. Since

2010, routine staffing has been scheduling one shift duty officer with the availability of one chief

(on duty or on-call).

Table 5

DVFD Station Call Response Time and Personnel

Year Avg. Response Time/ % Change

Avg. Personnel Response

2005 5 min 25 sec 8

2006 5 min 4 sec/-6% 8

2007 5 min 5 sec/--- 7

2008 4 min 57 sec/-17% 7

2009 5 min 18 sec/+6.6% 6


2010 4 min 11 sec/-26.8% 7

2011* (Oct.) 6 min 52 sec/+61% 6

Avg. 2010/2011 5 min 32 sec 6.5

Table 6 shows average response time for first-out apparatus and average personnel

response for first alarm incidents. The inclusion of data with decimal points was intentional to

avoid skewing actual numbers due to rounding. The average personnel response was the same in

2005 as it was in 2011. However, personnel response in 2011 reflected the minimum of one

career firefighter on scene.

Table 6

DVFD First Alarm Response Time and Personnel

Year Avg. Response Time First Apparatus/ % Change


2005 9 min 13 sec 10

2006 11 min 10 sec/+21% 9

2007 10 min 36 sec/-5% 8

2008 9 min 19 sec 8.8

2009 10min 32 sec/+11.5 % 10.3

2010 10 min 35 sec/+.5 % 9.6

2011* (Oct.) 8 min 35 sec/-23 % 10.7

Avg. 2010/2011 9 min 35 sec 10.15

Of importance to fireground operations, is the composition of firefighters on scene.

Tables 7 and 8 depict the breakdown of suppression and support firefighters on first-out

apparatus and total available on scene for first alarm fires. This data excludes the incident


commander (chief or deputy chief both of whom may function in a suppression capacity). Both

graphs reveal an average of three suppression and one support on the first-out apparatus. These

numbers include a minimum of one career firefighter. In addition, there are an increasing number

of firefighters performing support roles due to increasing age.

Table 7

DVFD First Alarm Suppression Personnel on First-out Apparatus and Total on Scene

Year Avg. Suppression First Apparatus

Avg. Suppression On Scene

2008 3.0 4.8

2009 2.6 5.1

2010 3.2 4.9

2011* (Oct.) 2.9 5.5

Avg. 2010/2011 3.05 5.2

Table 8

DVFD First Alarm Support Personnel on First-out Apparatus and Total on Scene

Year Avg. Support First Apparatus

Avg. Support On Scene

2008 0.6 3.0

2009 1.3 4.2

2010 1.2 3.7

2011* (Oct.) 0.9 4.3

Avg. 2010/2011 1.05 4.0


The DVFD’s call volume, response time, and personnel were compared to nationally

recognized standards. Table 9 reflects call volume by designated demand zones and densities.

Clearly, the DVFD is most challenged by the demand zone considered “urban” by NFPA 1720/

“metropolitan” by CFAI. Volunteer availability is most challenged during this period of high call

volume.

Table 9

DVFD Call Volume by Demand Zones/Densities

Year (Total) Pop/Density *

Jan/Feb/Dec 500/224

Mar/Apr/Oct/Nov 5,000/2,155

May-September 22,000/8,620

2006 (336) 24 84 228

2007 (397) 29 77 291

2008 (444) 40 88 316

2009 (420) 57 72 291

2010 (435) 38 82 315

2011* (401) 27 (no Dec) 68 (no Nov) 306

Note. Density equals persons per square mile. Totals for 2011 through October are included in order for the most recent data from 2011 to be used.

Table 10 shows the number of personnel and response times for NFPA 1720 in regards to

rural, suburban, and urban demand zones. The DVFD met the 80 percent performance standard

for all years between 2008 and 2011. It rarely met the suburban or urban performance standards.

During 2010, the first full year with five career staff, 91% of calls occurred in the suburban and

urban demand zones.

Table 10

Comparison of DVFD to NFPA 1720


1720 Performance

Rural 80%

Suburban 80%

Urban 90%

Staffing (#) 6 10 15

2008 % Met 85% 31% 0%

2009 % Met 100 % 78% 0%

2010 % Met 100 % 46% 8%

2011 (Oct) % Met 87% 67% 20%

Response Time 14 min 10 min 9 min

2008 % Met 92 % 61.5% 54 %

2009 % Met 100 % 44% 33%

2010 % Met 85 % 46% 31%

2011 (Oct) % Met 100 % 67% 47%

CFAI response time standards were compared for only the years 2010 and 2011. As these

two years best represent current staffing models. Tables 11 and 12 represent the DVFD data for

2010 and 2011 compared to CFAI response time standards. Overall, the DVFD met or neared the

performance standards for a rural service area. However, when compared to suburban and

metropolitan standards, the DVFD consistently fell short -- a direct result of declining volunteer

response. In the absence of full crews staffing the station, CFAI standards will remain

unattainable.

Table 11

Comparison of 2010 DVFD to CFAI

2010 Rural Suburban Metropolitan



2010 % Met 100% 54% 31%


2010 % Met 100% 85% 62%


2010 % Met 85% 15% 15%

2nd Unit Baseline 18 min 12 sec 10 min 24 sec 10 min 24 sec

2010 % Met 100% 54% 54%

Performance 90% 90% 90%

Table 12

Comparison of 2011 DVFD to CFAI

2011 (Oct) Rural Suburban Metropolitan


2011 % Met 87% 27% 13%


2011 % Met 87% 60% 33%


2011 % Met 100% 40% 40%

2nd Unit Baseline 18 min 12 sec 10 min 24 sec 10 min 24 sec

2011 % Met 100% 67% 67%

Performance 90% 90% 90%

Results from the questionnaire sent to area fire chiefs were used to compare the DVFD

with the other combination fire departments in Dare County. For the purpose of this research

paper, a combination department was defined as a department with both career and volunteer

personnel. Department data is listed geographically (north to south). As previously stated, the

DVFD contracts with the Town of Duck for fire protection. Like Duck, the SSVFD contracts

with its town as well as with Dare County for service to Martin’s Point. Colington Fire


Department is incorporated and contracts with Dare County to provide service to the

unincorporated area known as Colington. Kitty Hawk, Kill Devil Hills, and Nags Head are

municipal fire departments serving their respective towns.

Figure 2 is a graph depicting year round and estimated tourist populations for each of the

respective fire districts. The primary response areas (in square miles) are listed as well. At peak

season, the DVFD protects more people per square mile than any of the area combination

departments. Table 13 illustrates the breakdown of emergency personnel (part- or full-time,

volunteer) in each of the six departments. Fire Chiefs are considered full-time personnel and of

the six area departments, only Duck’s acts in a suppression capacity.

Figure 2

Year Round and Tourist Population by Municipality


Table 13

Fire Department Comparison of Personnel

Fire Department

(Total Personnel)

Full-time/Part-time Volunteer Suppression

(Total Suppression)

Volunteer Support

Duck (33) 5 16 (21) 12

Southern Shores (49) 1 31 (31) 17

Kitty Hawk (33) 10/9 11 (29) 3

Kill Devil Hills (52) 19 27 (45) 6

Colington (36) 9 21 (29) 6

Nags Head (43) 25 15 (39) 3

Table 14 depicts 2010 call volume and total personnel by department. Kill Devil Hills

and Nags Head rank one and two (respectively) in call volume, which corresponds with their

tourist populations. While Duck, Southern Shores and Colington all have similar call volume;

only Duck and Southern Shores are impacted by population swells due to tourism. Kitty Hawk

ranks third in emergency incidents that correspond with both year round and its tourist

population.

Table 14

Fire Department Comparison of Call Volume and Total Personnel

Fire Department Call Volume

Total Personnel

Duck 435 33

Southern Shores 437 49

Kitty Hawk 609 33


Kill Devil Hills 1368 52

Colington 453 36

Nags Head 896 43

Table 15 depicts the average response times of the first-out engine for their district first

alarm incidents and average personnel on scene. Southern Shores and Colington were unable to

provide complete data for this table. Duck has the highest response times of the reporting

departments and the fewest total suppression firefighters. Moreover, Nags Head averages fewer

total personnel than all departments despite having the greatest number of career personnel.

Table 15

Fire Department Comparison of First Alarm Response Time and Personnel

Fire Department Avg. Response Time First Apparatus


(Suppression/Support) Duck 9 min 35 sec 10 (6/4)

Southern Shores --- 16 (15/1)

Kitty Hawk 6 min 51 sec 11 (11/0)

Kill Devil Hills 4 min 44 sec 18 (15/3)

Nags Head 4 min 50 sec 8 (7/1)

When compared to the other combination departments, many factors affecting DVFD

personnel availability and response can be explained by the status of its membership. Comprised

of 33 total members (5 career and 28 volunteers), of its career staff only the chief resides in the

Town of Duck. Among 28 volunteers, 13 reside in the Town, three work in the Town, and the

remaining 12 reside in other areas and volunteer through standby time. The DVFD membership


ranges in age from 23 to 68 (average age 43). The average age of a suppression firefighter is 39

and that of a support firefighter is 51. The average term of service is 6.1 years with a range of 1.5

to 19.5 years.

Figure 3 depicts the trend in personnel (career, total volunteer, total suppression) from

2006 to 2011. Even though data showed a slight increase in total personnel, a plateau in the

number of suppression firefighters has occurred despite the addition of career staffing. Between

2010 and 2011, anticipated attrition was mostly countered by a gain in new members. Reasons

for the attrition were medical, age, inactivity, lack of interest in volunteering, and lack of time.

Moreover, while this may not be indicative of a problem, further examination proved differently.

A temporary but profound limitation of membership gains is the rookie, who does not operate to

full capacity until properly trained. Further complicating this is that not all new members wish to

become suppression firefighters.

Figure 3

Career, Total Firefighters, and Suppression Firefighters by Year


Figure 4 shows the percentage of suppression firefighters residing in Duck and the

significant losses of same experienced from 2006 to 2011. This trend influeced both response

time as well as personnel availability and has emerged as a primary recruitment challenge.

Figure 4

Percentage of In-Town Suppression Firefighters by Year

Yet, the age of Duck’s year round population makes recruitment of volunteers difficult. It

is estimated that approximately 520 people live in Duck year round coupled with extreme

fluctuations in population due to tourism. The first census conducted since incorporation

occurred in 2010. It indicated a population of 369 (A. Garman, personal communication,

September 12, 2011). It is generally agreed among Town of Duck staff to be a low estimate. The

voter registration roles include 465 persons between the ages of 18 and 90. Moreover, the Town

of Duck zoning department maintains a record of 229 year round occupied residences (S. Cross,

personal communication, August 18, 2011). Assuming individuals per residence these records


indicate a population of 458. With the addition of children and non-registered voters, 520 seems

a more reasonable estimate. Nevertheless for the purposes of this paper voter registration

numbers were used.

Of the 465 people living in the Town of Duck, only 68% fall between 18 and 68 years

old. With one exception, all suppression firefighters on the October 2011 DVFD roster were

under the age of 55. The voter registration rolls revealed 167 people between the age of 18 and

55, the most appropriate age for recruitment of suppression firefighters. Of those, 7.2% (12) are

already serving the fire department.

The majority of DVFD volunteers joined due to word of mouth or personal connection.

To address recruitment in 2009, approximately 250 postcards were sent to Duck homeowners

inviting them to find out more about opportunities with the fire department. That campaign

resulted in eight new members. In September 2011, a similar mail campaign resulted in no viable

recruits. Annual open houses held during fire prevention week provide a limited opportunity to

spark interest via demonstrations of equipment and tasks.

Of 38 DVFD members (thirty-two current, six past) asked to complete the survey -- 32

(84%) submitted responses. Six questions directly addressed recruitment and retention issues.

Figure 5 shows the results from the following question asking if the DVFD was effective at

bringing in new volunteers. Approximately 69 percent agreed while 22 percent disagreed. The

survey provided an opportunity for members to suggest strategies for attracting new volunteers.

Twenty-one responses were categorized for evaluation. Eight suggested advertising at

fundraisers, events, open houses, internet, or radio. Three were satisfied with the status quo and

three others acknowledged the limitations of recruitment given Duck’s population.


Figure 5

Perception of Effective Recruitment

To capture perceptions on volunteerism questions were asked on why members

volunteered and why they would stop volunteering. Figure 6 shows the reasons why DVFD

members volunteer -- most were community oriented rather than self-serving. Figure 7 lists the

reasons that would cause them to stop volunteering with the DVFD. The most common

responses include factors that cannot be addressed by changes in the DVFD (i.e. physical

limitations, relocation, and time). The opportunity to expand upon their responses was used by

only four members.


Figure 6

Reasons for Volunteering

Figure 7

Reasons to Stop Volunteering


In the interview conducted with Mr. Layton regarding the DVFD (C. J. Layton, personal

communication, October 23, 2011), he was asked his opinion on the DVFD’s recruitment and

retention efforts. Given the population pool, Layton felt that the DVFD did a good job but could

be more proactive in generating interest from the community.

The DVFD current staffing model is three career personnel work a 24/48 duty schedule

allowing for one suppression firefighter per shift (less sick time, training, vacation, and Kelly

days). The two chief positions alternate on shift and on call schedules. Both chiefs occasionally

work the same shift and are responsible for covering the duty officers in their absence. Figure 8

shows the responses from the career firefighters in 2010 and 2011. This directly paralleled both

work schedules and availability. Residing in Duck, the chief is available to respond whether

scheduled or not. The deputy chief and captain 1 live close enough to have the ability to respond

off duty. The remaining two positions live out of the area and have less ability to respond off

shift for callbacks.

Figure 8

Career Response by Percentage of Calls (2010-2011)


Volunteer response data statistics for 2010 and 2011(Figure 9) accurately represents the

DVFD personnel dilemma. Forty-five percent and 64% of the volunteer firefighters (2010 and

2011 respectively) responded to less than 10% of the emergency incidents. With only five

suppression firefighters residing in the Town of Duck, and the low volunteer response data

depicted above, it confirms the operational challenges faced by the DVFD in regards to

availability of manpower and aggressive firefighting capabilities.

Figure 9

Volunteer Response by Percentage of Calls (2010-2011)

Understanding when emergency incidents occur is vital when determining a staffing plan.

Figure 10 shows when calls occurred by day of week and Figure 11 shows when calls occurred

by hour (2008 to 2011). While call volume does not differ from day to day, there were a greater

percentage of calls between 8 am and 11 pm.


Figure 10

Percentage of Incidents by Day of Week (2008 – 2011)

Figure 11

Percentage of Incidents by Time of Day (2008 – 2011)


Response statistics provide tangible data, but the perceptions of the members and the

Town Manager are also worthy of consideration. The results of three questions asked of the

membership are shown in Figures 12 to14 and represent the membership’s observations on

adequacy of personnel response. The vast majority of the members (87.5%) concurred that the

DVFD provided suitable response on medical calls (Figure 12). Figure 13 shows the results

regarding structure fire calls and responses that were more diverse; 37.5 % responding agreed

and 37.5% responding disagreed. The membership showed more agreement with station calls

(69%) as depicted in Figure 14.

Figure 12

Perception of Personnel Response on Medical Calls


Figure 13

Perception of Personnel Response on First Alarm Calls

Figure 14

Perception of Personnel Response on Station Calls


When the membership was asked about the implications of hiring part- and full-time

personnel (Figure 15) 81.2% of the membership indicated that the DVFD would benefit from

part-time firefighters.

Figure 15

Benefit of Part-time Firefighters

Figure 16 shows that the majority of the members (65.6%) believed part-time firefighters

would not hinder volunteer participation and 50% believed it would enhance it. Though

approximately a quarter of the membership think it would hinder and not enhance participation.

The same set of questions regarding volunteer participation and response were asked of the

membership in regards to additional full-time firefighters. Figure 17 shows that the results

closely matched the response related to part-time firefighters. The majority (71.9%) did not think

that more full-time would hinder the volunteers and over half (56.3%) though it would enhance

participation.


Figure 16

Effect of Part-time Firefighters on Volunteer Participation and Response

Figure 17

Effect of Full-time Firefighters on Volunteer Participation and Response


An interview was conducted with Chris Layton, Town Manager of Duck (C. J. Layton,

2011). The interview addressed career staffing and the DVFD combination department. What

follows are summary statements of this interview. “Duck is a small town with high expectations

for level of service and professionalism.” With the addition of career personnel from 2006

through 2009, the Town Manager shared that he thought the level of service had increased. He

credited the presence of an officer at calls and felt that their presence helped to stabilize the

department, providing consistent mentorship to the members. He reflected upon earlier

conditions and affirmed that response and coverage was not sustainable with only the chief as

career.

Layton discounted the notion of combination departments failing. “I don’t know how it

could be working any better. The DVFD is functioning like a career department (with a majority

of volunteers), where the needs of the department and the Town are in sync” (C. J. Layton,

2011). He credited the successful integration of career and volunteers to the department’s ability

to maintain balance where career staff supplemented the efforts of the volunteers. Placing key

people in leadership positions is essential. The DVFD’s focus is on service provision rather than

who gets credit. The DVFD is included in the Town’s budgeting process and its planning for

capital improvements similar to other municipal departments.

When asked what Layton thought the response expectations for the DVFD were, he

replied 24- hour coverage by a firefighter/EMT and mobilizing the first-out apparatus

expeditiously. His expectation of the DVFD on first alarm calls is preventing injury and loss of

life and limiting loss of property. This perspective validated his belief in engaging citizens to

support community cohesiveness. However, he also cautioned against a volunteer system that


fails to provide the expected level of service. “Quality over quantity can make a big difference,

people need to be active” (C. J. Layton, 2011). Layton believes the role of municipal leaders

demands building community in order to understand the expectation for level of service. “The

combination model provides opportunities for people to serve, to build relationships and to

ultimately help build community” (C. J. Layton, 2011).

In addition to the interview, Mr. Layton provided financial data to consider if hiring part-

and full-time firefighters. The minimum salary for a firefighter in the Town of Duck is $37,383

plus $13,031 in benefits (total of $50,314). A mid-range salary is $47,534 plus $15,267 (total of

$62,801). The maximum salary for a firefighter is $57,786 plus $17,503 in benefits (total of

$75,289) (Town of Duck, 2011). Per Town of Duck personnel policies, the maximum hours for a

part-time firefighter would be 1,000 hours. This information supports a part-time salary of

$15/per hour for cost analysis purposes (minimum salary divided by a full-time pay hours).

To determine the effect of response and personnel on insurance ratings, Bryant Waters, a

fire ratings inspector for the North Carolina Office of the State Fire Marshal, was interviewed

(B. Waters, 2011). The DVFD has a NCRS rating of four. When questioned about minimum

staffing, Waters referred to the minimum requirements for a 9S rating. In the ratings process, a

department’s rating improves as the number of personnel increases. Each responding engine is

required to have four personnel, each responding truck is required to have six, and one on scene

should be designated as the incident commander for full credit. In theory, on a structure fire

requiring the response from two engines and a ladder truck, the DVFD would require 19 full-

time personnel available at the station to receive a NCRS score of one. Compounding this

requirement is that three volunteers equal the credit of one full-time firefighter.


To address the potential adaptive challenges of consolidation, questions were asked of the

members of both fire departments. Eighty-four percent of the DVFD and 77% of the SSVFD

members completed the survey. Questions regarding adequacy of current staffing as well as the

addition of career firefighters were included. For the SSVFD, there was strong agreement about

the adequacy of personnel on all types of calls (medical, structure fire and station alarms);

83.4%, 95.9%, and 95.9%, respectively stating agree or strongly agree.

Figure 18 represents the results of whether the SSVFD believed it would benefit from

part-time firefighters. In this case, responses were split between agreement (37.5%) and

disagreement (41.7%).

Figure 18

SSVFD Would Benefit from Part-time Firefighters

Figure 19 shows the results of SSVFD member perceptions about the effect part-time

firefighters would have on volunteer participation. There was strong opposition to part-time


firefighters evidenced by a majority (54%) believing they would hinder volunteer participation.

Moreover, 43.4% did not believe part-time firefighters would enhance participation and another

third answered, “I don’t know.” The majority of the SSVFD members (69.5%) believed that full-

time firefighters would hinder volunteer participation (Figure 20). There was strong

disagreement that it would enhance it (66.7%). Significantly fewer members responded, “I don’t

know, than with the part-time question indicating there were stronger opinions regarding full-

time firefighters.

Figure 19

Effect of Part-time Firefighters on SSVFD Volunteer Participation and Response


Figure 20

Effect of Full-time Firefighters on SSVFD Volunteer Participation and Response

Figure 21 shows the results to the question of whether consolidation of the Duck and

Southern Shores Fire Departments would improve level of service to the community. Forty-three

and eight percent of the membership agreed that level of service would improve in stark contrast

to 45.8% of the SSVFD membership who disagreed.


Figure 21

Effect of Consolidation Regarding Improved Level of Service

Figure 22 depicts the responses to whether consolidation would enhance volunteer

participation and response. The DVFD and SSVFD varied greatly with perceptions about

consolidation. Forty-six and nine percent of the DVFD saw it as an enhancement whereas 66.7%

of the SSVFD did not.


Figure 22

Perception of Consolidation on Enhanced Volunteer Participation and Response

Figure 23 illustrates the contrasting views of the DVFD and SSVFD on the effect of

consolidation decreasing volunteer participation and response. The answers were diverse. Both

the DVFD and SSVFD members responded similarly to agreeing there would be a decline and

“not knowing” the effect. A larger majority of the DVFD membership (43.8%) agreed that

consolidation would cause a decline versus only 33.3% of the SSVFD. This graph illustrates the

variety of opinions on the effect of consolidation.


Figure 23

Perception of Consolidation on Decreased Volunteer Participation and Response

As part of the survey, the members of both departments were also given the opportunity

to comment on consolidation. They were encouraged to provide up to three reasons why

consolidation would be a positive and negative approach for the DVFD and SSVFD. The survey

also allowed for comments regarding volunteer response, participation, and future staffing

solutions. When summarized and categorized for evaluation, both memberships identified similar

reasons why consolidation would be a positive: (a) increased numbers of volunteers and

response; (b) improved and consistent training; (c) fiscal responsibility; and (d) resource sharing.

Only two negatives were consistently identified by both the DVFD and SSVFD -- politics and

personality or cultural differences. Apart from the SSVFD, the DVFD membership identified


additional negatives including a lack of unified training, management and standard operating

guidelines as well as the loss of organizational identity and ownership. The most commonly cited

negative by the SSVFD was the potential for conflicts resulting from integrating paid and

volunteer staff. Of the 12 additional comments from the DVFD membership: eight

acknowledged increased staffing was necessary whether it be paid or volunteer. Four SSVFD

members commented that more cooperation and training between the departments would be

beneficial, and four acknowledged that staffing and consolidation are topics worthy of

discussion.

The final area of discussion with Mr. Layton was the potential to consolidate with the

SSVFD. This interview provided direct insight to the current management and decision making

that affects the DVFD. Layton re-emphasized that level of service and community building

should be the focus of decision-making. Advantages offered were: (a) cost lowering by keeping

volunteer system viable; (b) cost savings and consistency in acquisition of equipment and

apparatus; (c) standardized training; (d) uniform standard operating guidelines; and (e) larger

pool of paid staff to cover absences. The greatest disadvantage of consolidation would be the up-

front costs for hiring firefighters. In order to provide the same standard for response there must

be a consistent staffing model that includes career personnel (DVFD). He expressed concern

about what consolidation could do to the current model of success. In addition, there is the

unknown ISO implications (rating change) and question of whether there is a true benefit when

the departments currently provide mutual aid to each other.

Mr. Waters provided his insight and expertise about potential consolidation. Emphasized

the technical issues and that a consolidation is still based upon the same minimum requirements

of 9S certification. In order for consolidation to occur, departments must: (a) legally dissolve


existing charters and merge into one (including name changes for titles on apparatus and

properties); (b) contract with Dare County, Southern Shores and Duck under the new name; (c)

designate a main station and maintain personnel of 20 at the main station and eight at the other

two stations for a total of 36; (d) maintain a minimum of 36 hours of training; and (e) provide

pagers and gear for all members and continue to provide workman’s compensation.

He clarified that North Carolina “inspects the fire district, not the department, unless

municipalities merge” (b. waters, personal communication). The implication for insurance

ratings is that a merger could potentially improve the rating as the result of an improved fire

department with more people and apparatus. If the two departments have similar ratings they

may improve on paper. On the other hand, the citizens could be negatively affected by the

sharing of equipment out of district.

Based on experience across the state Mr. Waters offered insights on the adaptive issues of

consolidation. It can improve morale if the common goal is to improve fire protection,

operations, training, standard operating guidelines and breaking down barriers. However,

members must elect to be a part of the consolidation and often it triggers attrition. The fire

service, notoriously resistant to change, is wary of measures that cause morale to suffer. Waters

emphasized that buy-in is the hardest obstacle because ultimately it is up to the corporation’s

decision makers (Board of Directors). Keeping all stakeholders informed and allowing them a

voice can improve the chance for a successful transition.

Discussion

Successful strategic planning demands evaluation of existing conditions, predicting future

demands and determining realistic solutions. The intent of this applied research paper was to

present an overall picture of current trends in staffing to objectively plan for future needs. Both


technical and adaptive aspects were examined alongside of the implications for the Town of

Duck and the district’s insurance rating.

The service demands on the Town and the DVFD are constantly evolving and continued

evaluation of operations is necessary. This paper directly relates to the recommendations

identified in Black’s (2008) first research paper regarding DVFD operations in order to show

where improvements have been made. The first -- to hire career personnel to address coverage --

came to fruition and its impact was further examined in this paper. Second, a comprehensive risk

assessment was recommended to gauge resource needs -- the topic of Black’s second research

paper (Black, 2009). Thirdly, stakeholder education remains a continuous process of information

sharing at Council meetings, open houses, and Town retreats. Fourth, evaluating volunteers to

ensure that qualified staff fulfills emergency incident duties remains on-going. This also is an

ongoing process so that gaps in skills can be identified and mitigated. Lastly, the

recommendation to compare the DVFD to similar departments was addressed in this paper.

Trends in call volume since 2005 have shown a steady increase with a slight plateau over

the past four years. The plateau is important in regards to emergency planning and staffing. It can

be anticipated that call volume should not dramatically increase due the following factors: only

eight percent of the Town remains undeveloped, a stable year round population, and a relatively

stable tourist population. However, the vulnerability of the Outer Banks lends itself to severe

weather disasters that can tax any public safety agency.

Response times and personnel response for medical calls between 2005 and 2011 have

remained largely consistent. The cause for the significant increase in response time in 2008

remains unclear. A third employee was not added until August 2008 lending to a higher

dependence on volunteer response. The addition of career personnel (four) from 2007 to 2009


improved the level of service by allowing the DVFD to maintain low response times and

adequate personnel on medical calls.

Of concern, there has been a consistent decline in personnel response to both station calls

and structure fire calls. This is supported by static personnel response numbers in spite of

escalating call volume from 2005 to 2011. This is with the addition of a one on duty firefighter

and chief on call. The plateau of total personnel on scene with the addition of career personnel

confirms the decline in volunteer response.

From 2005 to 2011, the DVFD experienced fluctuation in response times for both station

calls and structure fire calls. Station call response times reflected the first fire unit on scene --

most often the chief, deputy chief, or duty officer -- not apparatus. Average response times

therefore were quicker than first-out apparatus data for structure fires explained by the wait for

personnel to fill the apparatus. Of interest is that the average response times for 2010/2011 were

similar to 2005 for both station and structure fire calls. Of note, current response time included

career personnel in contrast to 2005 when the DFVD was all volunteer (with the exception of the

chief). Evaluating the status of the DVFD has shown that supplementing the volunteers with

career staff has allowed response times to be maintained (based on historical data). Nevertheless,

one question remains: is this response time adequate in meeting both national standards and

community expectation?

How does the DVFD response compare to national standards? Response times and

personnel response averages for 2010 and 2011 were used to evaluate the DVFD against national

standards. The reason for this was it reflects the DVFD’s current staffing model of a minimum of

one on duty firefighter and one chief on duty or on call. NFPA 1720 standard for medical


response pertains only to delivery service agencies. The current DVFD staffing model

consistently meets the CFAI benchmark of six minutes for response time to medical calls.

The average first-out apparatus response time was 9 minutes 35 seconds with an average

of 10.15 personnel for structure fires. When compared to rural standards (NFPA 1720 and

CFAI), the standard is either met or attainable. However, in 2010 when 91% of the calls occurred

in the urban (NFPA 1720) or suburban/ metropolitan (CFAI) demand/density zones, the DVFD

failed to meet the minimum standards. Alarmingly, this is the period when the DVFD’s service

demand is at peak.

The DVFD averages 3.05 suppression firefighters on the first-out apparatus in addition to

an incident commander on structure fire calls. In this case, the DVFD meets the minimum two-

in, two-out rule defined by OSHA, the minimum standards for NCR of 9S, and that of NFPA

1720 (four firefighters). However, according to NFPA 1720 to include the incident commander

is to jeopardize operations and as such is not advised. The DVFD initial response of four

(including incident command) meets a generally accepted level to initiate firefighting activities.

The minimum of four firefighters should be an operational objective of the DVFD. Yet trends

indicate that this cannot be maintained thus a change is warranted. Moreover, while the use of

mutual aid enables the DVFD to meet personnel requirements for a structure fire, an operational

challenge is assembling a full complement of firefighters due to the geography of the Outer

Banks.

The six combination departments on the Outer Banks vary in population, membership,

district size, and call volume. The Town of Duck and the DVFD see the greatest population shift

due to tourism. The DVFD protects the third largest tourist population in the smallest district

with the fewest personnel. Although total call volume is lowest when compared to the other


districts, 72% of the calls occur between May and September. The greatest demand falls on the

volunteers at a time when they are least available. Correcting this imbalance is supported by data

that proves the advantage of having crews available for immediate response. Kitty Hawk, Kill

Devil Hills, and Nags Head have significantly lower response times than Duck. Duck with only

one career firefighter on shift must still wait for a volunteer crew in order to respond with

apparatus. Duck ranks the lowest in suppression firefighters on scene, which directly correlates

with available suppression firefighters in the department. To improve response and personnel

again would require increased staffing. Local data showed that all districts require the assistance

of mutual aid in order to provide safe and efficient operations on structure fires or large

incidents.

In evaluating DVFD trends compared to national standards and local fire departments,

two conclusions emerge: (a) to improve staffing, the number of available personnel must

increase; and (b) to improve response times, the availability of response personnel in town or on

duty personnel must increase. Both the capability and capacity of the DVFD would improve with

increased personnel availability.

Data gathered from the first three research questions support the need for increased

staffing. The task is to determine the best way accomplish this. Initially, the current model of a

combination department (primarily volunteer with a few career personnel) must be evaluated.

What can be done to improve or increase volunteerism? Most significant is the lack of year

round population in a viable age range for firefighting. Scarcity of human resources is evident by

the fact that only five year round suppression firefighters reside in the Duck fire district.

The DVFD ranks above average for retention rate of volunteers. Survey results revealed

that the membership believed that the DVFD is effective in recruiting new members.


Furthermore, while some acknowledge the population constraints, the most suggested

recruitment tool was continued advertising. The membership’s reasons to begin or cease

volunteering do not differ from those published in the literature. The majority responded that

they volunteer out of a sense of duty and community service. The membership cited reasons

outside of the DVFD’s control for why they would stop volunteering -- physical limitations,

relocation, and time. The Town Manager while satisfied with recruitment efforts would still like

for the DVFD to be more proactive. No concerns regarding the organization or leadership were

expressed to explain the loss of volunteers. Community size and population age continue to be

the primary challenges affecting recruitment of volunteers. Thus, the next viable option for

increasing staffing is hiring.

The DVFD has successfully integrated career personnel into its volunteer model

evidenced by continued volunteer support. Much of the success can be attributed to the fact it

was acknowledged and requested from among the volunteer ranks. The functional integration of

career and volunteer officers into the command structure also secured the success of the

combination model.

Several methods of compensated staffing were evaluated in conjunction with volunteer

response. The career officer response (by percentage) is consistent with a 24/48 duty schedule.

Each on duty firefighter answers approximately a third of the calls. The chief and deputy chief

respond to more calls based on work schedules and response to major incidents regardless of

shift. The change in volunteer response is staggering -- the majority makes only a minimal

amount of incidents. As stated above, there is no apparent problem with volunteerism based on

the survey. Of value would have been asking for reasons that prevent a volunteer from

responding. The survey revealed that although the majority of the DVFD membership believed


that there to be adequate personnel response for medical and station calls, there was some

disagreement about first alarm calls.

The literature review revealed that several researchers have examined staffing in their

respective departments. Often staffing with the ideal number of personnel is cost prohibitive.

While standards are in place, there is no law requiring minimum staffing. Due to personnel and

financial limitations, staffing varies from department to department. A best practice for all fire

departments is to engage in defensive tactics if fire personnel are insufficient.

There is strong agreement that the addition of both part- and/or full-time firefighters

would benefit the DVFD. While the majority did not think it would hinder volunteer

participation and response, 25% disagreed it would enhance and 25% did not know. This could

suggest that additional help may not be a motivating factor for participation if paid staff can do

it.

In the discussion with the Town Manager, he acknowledged an increase in level of

service and a positive outcome for the Town with the addition of staffing and the integration into

the volunteer system. In considering the addition of future career staffing, the Town Manager’s

first concern was not financial, but rather community expectation and level of service. He

cautioned against changing the DVFD’s volunteer/career model as long as it is working.

Assuring that volunteers have a sense of community and feel needed is essential. However,

maintenance of service level is paramount and thus it becomes a key factor for considering any

change. The financial data provided by the Town Manager can be used for fiscal planning of

future personnel.

The effect of staffing on the Duck fire district’s NCR is a relatively simple concept. To

receive full credit, Duck would need to have the equivalent of 19 full-time firefighters on a


structure fire. This is not a realistic expectation for the department. Only with mutual aid can the

DVFD maintain its current rating. A continued decline in personnel response could affect this

portion of the rating in the future.

The final research question looked at the impact of consolidation on the membership of

the DVFD and SSVFD, Town of Duck and the NCRS rating. As stated in the background and

significance, consolidation with the SSVFD due to its proximity and present mutual aid response

warrants consideration. Questions remain whether consolidation of the two entities would

improve personnel response, operations, and level of service to their respective districts. The

DVFD and SSVFD have similar annual call volumes. In addition, the chiefs of the departments

reciprocate for one another as needed. The greatest difference in the departments is that the

DVFD has already integrated career staff into its department; the only career position in

Southern Shores is their chief.

According to both Chris Layton and Bryant Waters, consolidation on a purely technical

level could improve such things as personnel availability, cost savings on acquisition of

equipment and apparatus, training, unified standard operating guidelines and potentially improve

insurance rating for both districts. However, the adaptive nature of merging two entities is most

challenging and should be approached cautiously. The member survey revealed divergent

opinions between the DVFD and SSVFD in regards to adequate staffing. An extremely high

percentage of the SSVFD did not recognize a current or emerging staffing problem. Furthermore,

SSVFD responses revealed little support for adding career firefighters and an overall belief that

career staffing would hinder rather than enhance volunteer participation and response. One could

infer that there is little support for a change in SSVFD personnel operations. In contrast, the

DVFD survey results showed more acceptance to career staffing, a response most likely


influenced by experienced successful integration. Open-ended comments from both departments

regarding consolidation revealed that the positives cited for consolidation were technical in

nature (volunteers, response, training, finances) and that negatives were adaptive (politics and

personality/cultural differences). In addition, the DVFD listed additional technical and adaptive

reasons (management and SOG issues, and identity and ownership). The primary concern for the

SSVFD was conflicts between paid staff and volunteers, clearly an adaptive issue.

Recommendations

The purpose of this applied research was to gain knowledge about the status of the DVFD

identifying staffing shortfalls and solutions and assessing what, if any, consequences potential

solutions might cause. The knowledge gained throughout the course of synthesizing the six

research questions guided the development of future staffing solutions.

First, the status of the DVFD compared to historical data revealed that the addition of

career staff has slowed the potential gaps in coverage and response times. However, the trends in

response also suggested that the DVFD is vulnerable to shortfalls in coverage. The addition of

part-time staffing could provide a cost-effective means to safeguarding sufficient coverage in the

short-term. The fire chief and Town Manager to assure level of service while exercising financial

restraint, should study such an approach.

Second, in order to meet national standards for response times and personnel, particularly

when service demands are challenged, increased staffing must be implemented. Using the data

from this paper, the fire chief and Town Manager should collaborate to better define both

realistic and defined expectations for level of service and risk that meets the Town of Duck’s

unique demands.


Third, the DVFD must continue its attempt at recruitment despite the challenges inherent

in the local population. By using its current volunteers, creation of a recruitment committee

could help implement inventive, novel approaches to recruitment. In addition, acquiring

recruitment and retention strategies from the area fire chief may reveal alternative methods.

Fourth, the Town Manager utilizes an effective five-year capital improvements program

for fiscal planning. This tool should be utilized for a personnel improvements plan. The scope

could broaden beyond the DVFD to all of public safety (police and surf rescue) in order for the

Town to better plan for the financial impacts of inevitable full-time staffing.

Fifth, considering consolidation is prudent with respect to future planning. However, in

order for this concept to succeed, a comprehensive understanding of the process and its specifics

will be required of all stakeholders—firefighters, community members, and municipal leaders.

Forming an independent consolidation task force with diverse stakeholder representation in order

to study, investigate, and formulate a definitive plan is shrewd.

The challenge for all fire service leaders is being able to provide a high level of service,

with an acceptable level of risk, with the least financial impact on a community. This requires

constant evaluation, planning, and education of decision makers. For the DVFD and Town of

Duck, striking a balance among technical problems while remaining cognizant of the resultant

adaptive challenges will require diligence and awareness.


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Documents

Determining Staffing Solutions for the Duck Volunteer Fire