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Stephen SchilterPSC 5355Dr. Campbell5/2/2016

Development of German Strategy: Enabling Tradition

Over two thousand years ago the Roman Legion had secured its place in history as one of

the most effective and formidable fighting forces the world has ever seen. Roman warriors

marched out of central Italy and proceeded to dominate every enemy force they encountered,

conquering for themselves an empire that stretched from Scotland to the Persian Gulf. Writing in

the late fourth century, Vegetius asserted that “victory was granted not by mere numbers and

innate courage, but by skill and training. We see that the Roman people owed the conquest of the

world to no other cause than military training, discipline in their camps, and practice in warfare”

(Hanson 2005). In addition to having excellent soldiers, Machiavelli describes the Roman way of

conducting war as “short and massive” (Machiavelli 1998). Long after the collapse of the Roman

Empire, another state in the northern part of central Europe would transform from a provincial

backwater into a great power by developing a military apparatus that would earn its place in

history as the greatest fighting force of its time. The standing army established by the Elector of

Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm, in the mid seventeenth century would evolve into a universally

admired model of a professional army and make enormous contributions to the development of

strategic thought. While maintaining a strict adherence to many of the traditions established in its

earliest years, the Prussian, and later German, army would show an incredible ability to learn

from its past experiences and adapt to changes in military strategy. Its vulnerable location in a

region of central of Europe lacking natural resources would require Prussian and German leaders

to create an effective standing army capable of confronting powerful states seeking to expand

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from all sides. Perpetually outnumbered, this force would become masters of aggressive

operations of encirclement, wars of movement, and tactical innovation.

In order to understand the development of the German military’s tradition of aggression,

one must first consider the geographic and demographic environment under which the state

emerged. The principality of Brandenburg was a border province of the Holy Roman Empire and

was seen as the frontier of civilization. The early Prussian state had a largely underdeveloped

economic structure dominated by a powerful noble caste, the Junkers, that drew the majority of

its wealth from exploiting the peasants and serfs that worked on their large agricultural

plantations east of the Elbe River. Robert Citino writes that: “Prussia, and later Germany, was

die Macht in der Mitte, the power in the center of Europe. Crammed into an unfortunately tight

spot in the heart of the continent, ringed by enemies and potential enemies, more often than not

the chessboard on which other played out their strategies, it had neither the resources nor the

manpower to win long, drawn-out wars of attrition. Even by drafting every available man and

squeezing out every last taler in taxes, Prussia could not fight and win a long war.” These

strategic obstacles would persist throughout the entire existence of the Prussian and German

states until the end of the Second World War, leaving a clear mark on the development of its

military strategy.

The solution to this perilous strategic situation has its roots in the Thirty Years war that

devastated Europe from 1618 to 1648. The war decimated the population of central Europe with

some estimates claiming 25-40% of the German population being killed (Britannica 2016).

Brandenburg was hit especially hard by the ravages of the war, losing half of its entire

population (Riches 2005). Friedrich Wilhelm saw his territory occupied by professional Swedish

armies, which was unusual in an era when most of the fighting was done by the mercenary

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Landsknecht. However, The Elector of Brandenburg was aware from his time spent studying

modern government systems and changes in military science in the Netherlands that he was

living in a time of change. In 1637 he sought to press his rightful claim to the coastal territory of

Pomerania after the death of duke Bogislav XIV, but his claim alone had little effect against the

physical presence of Swedish infantry on the ground in the region (Citino 2005). This

demonstrated that military power is what lends weight to a ruler’s foreign policy and position in

the international system.

Ironically, the Elector of Brandenburg had initially allied with the legendary Swedish

King Gustavus Adolphus when he landed in northern Germany to save the Protestant cause

(Citino 2005). However, Niccolò Machiavelli warned of the dangers related to relying on

mercenaries and auxiliaries; a lesson Wilhelm would learn shortly after his “allies” marched into

his realm. Machiavelli’s opinion was that “of all other kinds of soldiers, auxiliaries are the most

harmful, for the prince or republic who puts them to work in his aid does not have any authority

over them, but he who sends them alone has authority there…. Such soldiers, when they have

conquered, usually prey as much on him who has led them as on him against whom they are led”

(Machiavelli 1998). More than anything, the Thirty Years War convinced Wilhelm that a modern

state needs a standing army (Citino 2005).

The ideas of military reform along the lines of what Friedrich Wilhelm would carry out in

Brandenburg were not by any means new. In fact, many of the military officials from

Brandenburg-Prussia, including Wilhelm himself, were familiar with the reforms of the Dutch

army starting as far back as the 1580s. Daniel Riches describes the need for reforms in the Dutch

army that would allow it to successfully combat their Spanish rivals. “An elaborate system of

drill and discipline unlike any other existing in Europe at the time,” he writes, “was necessary in

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order to achieve the rapidity of fire and maneuverability upon which the success of the Dutch

formations against the much more powerful tercio depended, and the Orange-Nassau reformers

revived the exercises and military vocabulary of ancient Greece and Rome to supply this need.

The unique tactical demands of the Dutch system with its small units and precise movements

placed additional emphasis on the ability of officers to react and perform in the field” (Riches).

No doubt Machiavelli would be pleased to see his advice being taken to heart. Failure of these

reforms being carried out in Brandenburg was more the fault of Wilhelm’s predecessor Georg

Wilhelm, who was a rather weak ruler and lacked the will to carry out such reforms. On the other

hand, the great Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus not only reformed his army in line with the

Dutch, but also added his own innovations. The Dutch focused on a defensive strategy and

sought to focus on small encounters, whereas the Swedish improved their offensive abilities and

created a campaign strategy that aimed at producing rather than avoiding decisive battles (Riches

2005). This was the army that the more energetic Friedrich Wilhelm faced and in which many of

his own future officers served in the lead up to his own reforms in the 1640s.

The 17th century was a time when rulers all over Europe invested in the project of state-

building primarily spurred by the need to improve their war making capabilities. For a monarch,

the possession of a trained and equipped army at the ready presents many obvious benefits.

Standing armies give a certain prestige to the state internationally and are also useful for

maintaining domestic order and stability, which allows for further expansion of the military.

While the future Prussian state was no exception, the particular policies with which Friedrich

Wilhelm endeavored to centralize military and political authority would shape the character of

German strategic development. Wilhelm passed laws to encourage trade and levied taxes, but, as

Robert Citino points out, “he treated with his nobles not in the style of Louis XIV, who built

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pleasure palaces for them at Versailles, but by enrolling them in royal service. In return he

granted them an even tighter hold on their peasants and serfs. With allowances made for regional

variation, this was the basic recipe for absolutism.” By 1644 Wilhelm had established his modest

standing army, which was bolstered by the new lands in eastern Pomerania granted to him in the

Treaty of Westphalia. In order to further expand his army Wilhelm looked to the noble Junkers

to finance his military. In 1653 at the Brandenburg Recess a social contract of sorts between the

Junkers and the monarch in which the nobility would secure funding in return for greater control

over their own personal holdings. Additionally, after the devastation of the Thirty Years War,

Wilhelm actively sought to increase the number of immigrants taking up residence in

Brandenburg. One particular example of this was the Edict of Potsdam in 1685, which resulted in

tens of thousands of highly skilled French Huguenots moving to Prussian lands. They would

provide both an economic boost and pool of recruitment for the growing army. When the

Elector’s army took part in its first engagement as part of a coalition during the First Northern

War, his well-trained troops demonstrated great battlefield effectiveness. However, after their

victory over the Swedes Wilhelm was abandoned by the more powerful states of the coalition

seeking their own interests and the ensuing peace saw the return of the just conquered western

region of Pomerania to the Swedes. The Elector concluded that “alliances are good, to be sure,

but it is better to rely on one’s own forces” (Citino 2005). This would not be the last time a

German state had difficulties managing its foreign relations.

A large part of Friedrich Wilhelm’s legacy was indeed his creation of an army that would

grow to roughly 30,000 men by his death in 1688, however the way he wielded it tactically and

strategically would inspire German officers for the greater part of the next three centuries. While

the army and commander proved itself in the First Northern War, most Prussian officers would

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look to the victory at Fehrbellin in 1675 as the real “creation myth” of the Prussian army (Citino

2005). The Elector and his army found themselves 250 kilometers away from their home

territories, fighting as part of a coalition against Louis XIV, when the Swedish army again

invaded at the behest of the French King in December of 1674. Again his “allies” would fail to

support Wilhelm, leaving him no choice but to set out alone to deal with the situation on the

opposite side of the Holy Roman Empire. This crisis had a sort of liberating effect on the Elector:

“As he recognized that he would now establish his immediate future by his own good sword,

there was no more hesitating. His actions were as bold and rapid as lightning. He could now

bring his own energy to bear, free from diplomatic considerations” (Citino 2005). In spite of the

logistical obstacles of moving an army during that era, Wilhelm spread out his forces and crossed

the 250 kilometers in just over two weeks. Upon catching the Swedish by surprise, the flexible

German army was able to single handedly defeat what was widely considered one of the best

armies of Europe. At the conclusion of this operation Wilhelm would become known as “The

Great Elector.”

In what became known as “The Great Sleigh Drive,” the Great Elector made spectacular

use of mobility in the winter of 1678-79 against, you guessed it, the Swedes. The significance of

this event was described by a German officer in 1927:

The Winter campaign 1678-79 was a complete success, but not because of successful battles (in fact most of the tactical encounters were either indecisive or even entirely unfavorable). Rather, it was the moral effect of the relentless pursuit, pressure on the retreat routes, and especially of the tremendous speed of the Brandenburger advance that convinced the exhausted Swedes that only the fastest possible retreat could save them from destruction.

In the fifteen days between January 18th and February 2nd, the Elector’s troops covered 540 kilometers, that is 36 kilometers daily, and this despite bad roads, snow, and ice. The rough winter was in many respects a comrade to a commander like the Great Elector. River crossings could proceed without any

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time lost due to bridges. In fact, the water courses and bays actually served as excellent routes, open plains over which the sleds of the infantry and artillery sleighs…. Could both advance rapidly and preserve their strength. The use of sleighs was an improvisation, and thus doubly noteworthy. The drive brought Bewegungskrieg directly to the enemy.

This was the lesson that this particular German officer by the name of Heinz Guderian would

learn from the Great Elector (Citino 2005). The wars of the Great Elector demonstrated to future

German officers the value of boldness, speed, and aggression.

There remains one final development from the period of the Great Elector that is most

responsible for the great success of the Prussian and German armies, namely their ability to

mitigate what Clausewitz would later define as “friction in war.” To understand the concept of

friction, Clausewitz asks of his readers to “imagine a traveler who late in the day decides to

cover two more stages before nightfall. Only four or five hours more, on a paved highway with

relays of horses: it should be an easy trip. But at the next station he finds no fresh horses, or only

poor ones; the country grows hilly, the road bad, night falls, and finally after many difficulties he

is only too glad to reach a resting place with any kind of primitive accommodation.” He adds that

“it is much the same in war. Countless minor incidents – the kind you can never really foresee –

combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the

intended goal” (Clausewitz 1989). A partial solution to this problem of friction can be found in

Machiavelli, when he describes the benefit of allowing a great level of freedom to Rome’s

military commanders. If the Roman senate had imposed restrictions on their commanders

freedom to operate then “the Senate would have been obliged to wish to give counsel about a

thing that it could not understand, for notwithstanding that in it were men all very much trained

in war, nonetheless, since it was not on the spot and did not know infinite particulars that are

necessary to know for whoever wishes to give counsel well, it would have made infinite errors in

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giving counsel. Because of this they wished that the consul should act by himself and that the

glory should be all his – the love of which, they judged, would be a check and a rule to make him

work well” (Machiavelli 1998). He also points out that the Romans did not harshly punish

commanders when they failed “for they judged that it was of such importance to those who

governed their armies that they have a free and ready spirit, without other extrinsic hesitations in

making policies, that they did not wish to add new difficulties and dangers to a thing in itself

difficult and dangerous” (Machiavelli 1998).

That the Great Elector seemed to conform to the Roman policies praised by Machiavelli

has two main causes. The first follows the same basic reasoning of the Roman Senate, namely

that granting a high level of freedom to subordinate commanders reduces the negative influence

of friction by encouraging commanders on the ground to take the initiative and capitalize on

opportunities that work to achieve the ultimate objective. A great example of this can be found in

the career of one Colonel Joachim Hennigs, who was responsible for the victory at Fehrbellin in

1675. Hennigs lead his cavalry unit on raids ahead of the retreating Swedish forces, burning

bridges and blocking roads to limit the paths open to the enemy. When the Swedish troops

finally reached Fehrbellin, they found the bridge already destroyed and themselves surrounded

by Wilhelm’s main army. Hennigs was ennobled for his actions. A few years later, during The

Great Sleigh Drive, Colonel Joachim Hennigs von Treffenfeld (note his new title indicating

nobility) again found himself commanding an advance guard unit when he made contact with a

Swedish force. He did not hesitate to charge at the enemy, inflicting great casualties and

capturing supplies. This son of a peasant was promoted to Major General on the spot (Citino

2005).This is a prime example of Auftragstaktik, mission tactics, in action. However, there is

another reason why Prussian officers were granted such high levels of freedom.

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While the system of Auftragstaktik clearly boosts combat effectiveness, the nature of the

social relationship between the noble Prussian officers and the monarch also had its hand in its

implementation. The previously mentioned Brandenburg Recess of 1654 set up the social

contract between the monarch and the nobility. The monarch gained the support of the nobles,

who largely made up the officer corps, by granting political concessions that increased their

personal sovereignty. As Citino puts it, “the granting of operational prerogatives to the nobles in

combat was not just a good idea; it was of a piece with the social contract of the Prussian state.

For the monarch to insist on close supervision of a subordinate commander’s plan of action

would be a grievous infraction. In other words, Auftragstaktik grew directly out of Prussian

culture.” One incident in particular from Friedrich the Great’s campaign in 1758 is worth noting.

At the Battle of Zorndorf, King Friedrich II became aggravated that the forces under the great

Prussian cavalry commander Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz had yet to engage the enemy. The

King’s orders for the commander to attack began to include threats if he did not obey. In

response to these threats Seydlitz told the messenger to “tell the king that after the battle my head

is at his disposal, but meantime I hope he will permit me to exercise it in his service” (Citino

2005). Seydlitz eventually charged when he decided the time was right and the Prussians carried

the day.

The strategic dilemmas that faced Brandenburg-Prussia are reflected in the state created

by the Great Elector. Its geographical location in the center of Europe left it in a constant state of

vulnerability to foreign powers. The societal changes and technological developments in Europe

in the 17th century made the possession of a standing army a requirement for continued existence.

This demanded a more centralized government, creating a power struggle between the traditional

noble estates and ruling monarch. Brandenburg’s sense of insecurity was only made more acute

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due to its lack of natural barriers. The relatively underdeveloped economic structure gave the

Prussian nobility a strong position vis-à-vis the monarch, necessitating the need to provide

political concessions to the landed Junkers. Citino reminds us of the fact that “in central Europe,

surrounded by dangerous foes and inconsistent allies, a passive policy of defense would only

stave off inevitable defeat.” Additionally, a lack of manpower dictated the aggressive nature of

the wars conducted by the Great Elector. This need to fight short and lively wars meant that the

army had to be thoroughly drilled and highly trained to be effective in offensive wars of

movement. The state created out of these conditions would be the foundation on which the future

Prussian and German would be constructed.

The second ruler of the now united state of Prussia, King Frederick William I, made two

relevant contributions to Prussian development. His success in elevating the status of army

officers and making improvements in the military capabilities of the Prussian army earned him

the epithet of the “Soldier King.” This title is not due to his actual experience fighting any

battles, for he never did, but rather because of his obsession with the military in general.

Friedrich Wilhelm I would often dawn his uniform when he made appearances, increasing the

status of those who also wore uniform. The nobility also took up more of a role in the officer

ranks of the army. Walter Goerlitz describes how “service as an officer became the privilege of

the nobility. The officer began to look upon himself as the servant of the monarch in whom the

State was held to be personified, and the military oath in which the Junkers swore loyalty to his

sovereign gained a new and profound significance. Indeed, this conception of personal loyalty

was the real moral foundation of the Army and was the thing that shaped the highly distinctive

mental attitudes of the Prussian and later German officer corps as a whole” (Goerlitz 1953). The

other improvement made by the Soldier King was in the tactical training of the army.

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The eighteenth century was perhaps the most mechanical time for European soldiering.

Discipline in the ranks, fast deployment, and increasing the rate at which the soldiers could fire

their weapons was a key part of battlefield success. Friedrich Wilhelm I constantly drilled his

troops, even claiming that his infantry could “form up more rapidly than any other troops on

earth” (Citino 2005). While he never lived to see his now 80,000 man army in the field, it was

crucial to the battlefield success of the next ruler of Prussia (Goerlitz 1953). Friedrich II, who

compared his infantry to that of Caesar, owes his success at his first battle at Mollowitz to his

predecessor’s preparation. Citino writes that “For the most part, they fought in the new three-

rank formation, rather than the pre-war four, to maximize their firepower. The troops had been

practicing it for months under their drill instructors at home, and it paid off in combat, as realistic

training always does.” He also quotes a German staff-officer’s claim that victory was won “on

the exercise squares at home.” The Austrian Field Marshal Neipperg observed that the Prussian

infantry had outshot his own by a ratio of five shots to two (Citino 2005). Friedrich’s successful

campaigns would earn him the title of “Great.”

During his campaigns, Friedrich II would carry out coordinated operational level

maneuvers, made use of strategic interior lines, and instill a spirit of aggressiveness in his tactical

and operational strategies. After his battle at Mollowitz, young Friedrich II began drawing up a

number of new regulations for his army. Friedrich II’s regulations did not formulate “a theory of

war, these were highly specific documents that spoke to situations that the army had either

already faced in Silesia or would be likely to face in a future war. This was something new, the

first time that an army had drawn up a formal body of shared principles and procedures. It was

the tentative birth of what we today call doctrine” (Citino 2005). Aggressive action was the main

characteristic of this Prussian doctrine of war. Friedrich II threatened to remove any cavalry

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officer who did not initiate a charge at an advancing enemy. He also focused on hussar light

cavalry which was more maneuverable. Rather than equipping his army with the heavy artillery

used by other commanders, he favored lighter cannons that could move with the advancing

infantry more effectively. This achieved a greater level of firepower at the point of contact.

While these developments made the Prussian army excellent at the linear battle of the time, the

conventional style of engagement still lead to high casualties with indecisive results. The need

for Prussia to fight short and lively wars in the style of the Great Elector was still relevant,

leading Friedrich II to adopt changes at the operational level.

Friedrich II’s answer to the question of achieving a decisive victory came in the form of

the “oblique attack” (Citino 2005). Essentially, the idea is to mass one’s forces on the flank of an

enemy and attacking from more than a single direction. The command structures of 18th century

armies remained fairly primitive, making it immensely difficult for a commander to reorder his

troops to face a surprise attack from the flank or rear. Friedrich II achieved these oblique attacks

by taking huge risks. He had to divide his armies before the battle and hope they would appear at

the right place at the right time. However, the elevation of the oblique attack to the operation

level did not take place from the start. Initially it was a tactical move, as demonstrated at the

battles of Prague and Kolin. The Prussian flanking force had to attempt its flanking maneuver

while under enemy fire, which severely undermined its effectiveness. In fact, those two opening

battles of the Seven Years War were defeats for Friedrich II. His Austrian opponents had

improved their army at the tactical level since its previous encounters with the Prussian King, but

their operational moves remained passively static (Citino 2005). At the Battle of Rossbach, the

Prussian flanking force went undetected and the attack was successful. While Rossbach can be

analyzed as an example of an operational move, it was not exactly planned as such. It was at the

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Battle of Leuthen in December of 1757 that Friedrich II implemented what he learned at

Rossbach and executed a true operational war of movement. At Leuthen, Friedrich II managed to

bring down his entire army on the unsuspecting Austrian flank. Another noteworthy point is that

this battle further demonstrated the effectiveness of each independent arm of the Prussian force

working together. The artillery provided constant supporting fire while “with remarkable skill,

each of the arms fulfilled its own mission and supported the others. On the right wing, infantry

and cavalry competed with each other in a hard struggle to drive the enemy from position to

position. In open order struggle for the villages, the infantry was resourceful and agile, and those

same battalions, despite their exertions and their losses, were immediately reassembled in

preparation for new attacks. Driesen and his riders won the decision on the left flank at the

precise moment that the infantry reached the exhaustion point… and he succeeded when they

were no longer capable of proceeding alone” (Citino 2005). Here we see how Auftragstaktik is a

perfect way for an army to utilize combined arms.

Friedrich II made good use of interior lines at the strategic level, demonstrating his ability

to defeat an enemy in one area before rapidly moving his army to engage another. Interior lines

are essential for a state facing multiple threats from all sides. Friedrich had essentially

“conducted a war of five million against 80 million” (Citino 2005). However, Friedrich the

Great’s campaigns, particularly the events at the Battle of Zorndorf, raise questions about the

Prussian and German strategy of offensive operations and short wars that have major

implications for the future generations. As Dennis Showalter points out, “German soldiers did

not prepare for wars they expected to lose.” Despite all of Friedrich the Great’s six years of

operational victories, Prussia only survived the Seven Years War because of the sudden death of

Czarina Elizabeth and the rise of her Prussian loving son Peter (Byman and Pollack 2001). This

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instance, which had nothing to do with the battlefield successes of the Prussian army, is

strikingly similar to the events on the eastern front of the First World War and reveals a serious

flaw in German strategic thinking.

While Friedrich the Great showed remarkable skill in using his relatively small army on

the operational level, the revolution in France and the consequent increase in the size of armies

made it impossible for a single general to effectively command his troops. For later German

observers, Napoleon’s major contribution was the improvement of army command and control

by organizing it into divisions and corps. Each division and corps had its own officer staff and

could operate on its own to a greater extent than preceding armies. The French army became

more capable of executing complex operations with much larger and much more motivated

forces.

Every Prussian monarch from the Great Elector to Friedrich the Great realized that the

army was the foundation of their state. However, the leadership of Prussia after Friedrich the

Great spent little energy on making new improvements to their army. The extremely

conservative Junker class expanded its dominance over the army and failed to adapt the military

to the changing times. Karl Demeter writes that “even if everything else in the Army had been in

first-class condition, one thing is perfectly plain: two-thirds of the general-officers were either

near the biblical age or had long since passed it; a quarter of the regimental and battalion-

commanders – the men who have to carry the main burden in battle – had passed the age of

60….” Young officers, like Scharnhorst, who advocated for reforms in the army in response to

the revolutionary changes that were underway in France were ignored. The catalyst for the next

stage of development came after the shocking defeat of the Prussian army at Jena in 1806.

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Looking back at the Prussian army that was defeated at Jena, Friedrich August von der

Marwitz wrote in his memoirs that “so much evidence of neglect of duty has been brought to

light that one might suppose the Army had been nothing but a collection of cowards, traitors and

idiots, whereas those who represented it as such were in fact merely ignorant, malicious,

Frenchified scribblers. It should not, however, be forgotten that…. the main defect was at the

top, and therefore all the acts of real bravery, devotion and self-sacrifice that took place at the

lower levels had no effect upon the whole” (Demeter 1965). Shaken by the defeat at Jena, the

Prussian monarch now saw sense in the advice given by officers like Gneisenau and Scharnhorst.

The newly created Military Reorganization Commission, headed by Scharnhorst, removed 100

of the 142 generals in the Prussian army and allowed individuals from all social classes to serve

in the officer corps. A major goal of the reformers was the creation of a national army, but the

old nobility resisted that notion (Citino 2005). Scharnhorst saw the need to overhaul the Prussian

army staff system and improve the education of officers to meet the needs of a modern army.

The anti-intellectual emphasis on personal character and noble blood over the technically trained

expert that characterized the old style of officer had to adapt to the new developments in military

organization. Graduates of the elite school that Scharnhorst established, which would come to be

known as the Kriegsakadamie, was to provide recruits for the general staff. Carl von Clausewitz

was among the first to enroll. Frederick William III issued a decree in 1813 assigning a chief of

staff, educated at the War Academy, to every commander in the field (Citino 2005). Thus began

the Prussian tradition of combining the traditional aggressiveness of the commanding officer

with a highly trained military expert that would persist through the Second World War.

Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, another graduate from the elite War Academy, would

adapt the offensive Prussian tradition to the realities presented by the mass armies of his time.

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While the training of soldiers in the ways of combat remained an important aspect of the

Prussian army, the nature of massive armies and new technology brought logistical planning to

the fore. Moltke realized that the increasingly massive size of armies made operational planning

far more complex than during the Napoleonic era. In 1857, Moltke began expanding the general

staff to draft detailed plans for offensive operations. However, being a student of Clausewitz,

Moltke also believed that “no plan survives first contact with the enemy’s main body” (Citino

2005). Von Moltke had to figure out a way to synthesize the ideas of Auftragstaktik to reduce

friction and the need for careful planning that made decisive victories with mass armies possible.

He would conclude that the decisive point was the successful execution of rapid mobilization and

initial deployment. Effective use of the new railroad system required the special attention of the

general staff officers. Moltke emphasized that “if the views shaping original deployment are

incorrect, the work is completely without value. Even a single error in the original assembly of

the armies can hardly ever be made good again during the entire course of the campaign.

However, all measures for the assembly can be thoroughly thought out long in advance” (Citino

2005). If the mobilization phase went according to plan, before any contact with the enemy, then

a decisive offensive operation could be carried out. Another key aspect of his strategy, since

concentrating such a huge army in a small area would make it ineffective, was to have several

armies assemble in different locations. Once they were ready, an operation by separate armies to

envelop the enemy army could be carried out. Every war from this point on would be conducted

in this general fashion.

The strategy of the united German state under the chancellorship of Otto von Bismarck

showed signs of shifting from a purely military strategy on the operational level to something

more akin to a real grand strategy. Bismarck used diplomacy to achieve what Germany needed

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more than anything else, namely stability in Europe. Byman and Pollack describe him as “a

brilliant diplomatic tactician, Bismarck forged a complex series of alliances to strengthen

Germany's position as a status quo power and preserve the peace in Europe. Bismarck's alliances

were designed to prevent Germany from falling victim to a coalition of great powers on both its

borders-a German nightmare later realized in World War I.” The traditional focusing on building

up overwhelming offensive capabilities to ensure the German army would be able to carry out a

short and decisive war often left Prussia isolated and at a greater risk of being attacked on several

fronts by a coalition of great powers. Bismarck used diplomacy to reduce the threat felt by other

nations, which allowed other great powers to focus on national concerns other than a sudden

attack by a German army. Nevertheless, Bismarck was removed from office and Germany

became more bellicose. As Showalter puts it, “from the turn-of-the century days of Count Alfred

von Schlieffen, and arguably before, German strategic thought has allegedly devolved

downward, toward the tactical and operational levels, rather than upward.” However, Bismarck

was more of an exception than a rule (Herwig 1994).

The German offensive in the west followed the same principles that lead von Moltke to

victory in previous wars. When the German forces, due to slow moving units and lack of

reinforcing support, proved unable to exploit the holes they punched in the enemy lines, the

resulting war of attrition was the natural result. For the German officers looking back at on the

Great War, “the Stellungskrieg (war of position) in the middle of the war interested them hardly

at all. The hardening of the front into a state of near permanency, the difficulty of cracking it, the

monstrous casualties on both sides – none of these had taken the Germans by surprise. That was

exactly what happened in a war of position: it soon became a war of attrition” (Citino 2005).

Still, the well-trained German general staff was able to quickly adapt to new tactical situations

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and constantly outperform their opponents on the tactical level (Corum 1992). Future German

officers would focus more on the opening campaign in 1914, which was always the decisive

moment in their offensive strategy.

The lessons of the French, English, and American commanders who had fought in on the

western front of the First World War were very different from what the German officers fighting

in the East had experienced. In the east, German generals like Erwin Rommel, Erich Manstein,

and Karl von Rundstedt fought a war that was very much in line with the traditional German war

of movement (Corum 1992). For instance, in May 1915, the German eleventh Army opened the

Gorlice offensive “with a short but heavy artillery barrage and rolled over the Russians with the

whole army. For six weeks the Germans advanced at a rate of 6.5 miles per day, capturing

240,000 prisoners and 224 guns for a loss of 40,000 casualties” (Corum 1992). After the horror

of attrition warfare, the western allies had concluded that the offensive war of movement was no

longer valid. It is a great irony that the armies that most benefited from the use of armored

offensive tactics failed to recognize the potential of fully armored divisions.

While every state is compelled by the security dilemma to organize some form of military

defense, the development of the Prussian and German armies is both unique and remarkable.

From its origins in the miniscule province of Brandenburg, with a population massacred and

economy devastated by war, emerged a military force that would eventually dominate Europe

and shape world history. The story of Prussia demonstrates the impact of tactical expertise and

power of will. Brandenburg lends credence to Machiavelli’s claim that “I say therefore that not

gold, as common opinion cries out, but good soldiers are the sinew of war; for gold is not

sufficient to find good soldiers, but good soldiers are quite sufficient to find gold.”

19

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