Dewan 1995. St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Intellection

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ItT ES M WTAIN ENNES

MAIMAI STUDIE

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par Vassociat ion canadienne Jacques Mari ta i

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ETUDES MARITAINIENNES - MARITAIN STUDIE

S

N o

. 11, 199

5

r~Ah

O U r T T E U N I V E R S I T Y

SONV RE -

Introduction

DEC ' O

2

T H E O R I E S

OFTHE

H I S T O R Y

OF

J

1

History of Philosophy, Personal or Impels ' 9

P

t*C4W Y

E t i e n n e Gi l s o n

L a w r e n c e D e w a n , o

.p .

7

H i s t o ir e d e l a p h i l o s o p h i e e t p h i l o s o p h i e a u t r i b u n a l d e l a v e r i t e

Henr i -Pau l Cunn ingham

3 2

Th e Pandora 's Box M o d e l of the History of P h i l o s o phy

Alan Gabb ey

6

1

S a y in g W h a t A r i s t o t l e W o u l d H a v e

Sai

d

Martin Tweedale

7

5

Richard Rorty

's History-of-Philosophy-A s-Story-of-Progres

s

Patricia Easton

85

ProblPmes de

p h i l o s o p h i e s o c ia l e a u Q u e b e c : Videe de pauvrete

aprk 184

0

Andre V idricaire

98

History and Ethic s

Ralph McInerny

14

6

J A C Q U E S M A R I T A I N A N D C O N T E M P O R A R Y T H E O R I E S O F K N O W L E D G

E

JACQUES MARITAIN ET LES

THEORIESC O N T E M P O R A I N E S D E LA

C O N N A I S S A N C

E

Can There

B e

M oral Know ledge

?

William Sweet

15

9

C o n n a t u r a l K n o w l e d g e

J a m e s T h o m a s

19

1

Maritain, Gilson, and the Ontology of Knowledg

e

Leslie Armou r

20

2

S t

. Thom as and Pre-Conceptual K nowledg e

Lawrence Dewan, o

.p 22 0


2/8

Etudes maritainiennes/Maritai

n Studies

2 2

1

ST

. THOMAS AND PRE-CONCEPTUA

L

I N T E L L E C T I O

N

Lawrence Dewan, o

.p

Co118ge dominicain de philosophie et de thdologi

e

Questions 84 to 89, in the

Sum ma theologiae, prima pars,

o f S t

Thomas Aquinas have, it seems to me, a good claim to be the firs

t

system atic treatise, in our philosophical tradition, on the human act o

f

understanding

. Obviously not a mere commentary on the relevant part

s

of the

De anima

of Aristotle, neither are they on altogether the sam

e

lines as treatises like A lbert the Great

s

De intellectu et intelligibili

.

T h

e

discussion is divided into five questions on the act of understanding, a

s

performed by the soul when united with the body, and one question o

n

intellection by the separated soul

. The five questions comprise, first o

f

all, three on the human intellection of corporeal things, then one on ou

r

intellection of the human soul itself and the things to be found in it (suc

h

as intellection), with lastly a question on our understanding of thing

s

which are higher in the order of being than the human soul itself

. Thus

we have an order of discussion appropriate to the nature of huma

n

intellection (as taught in the treatise), as taking its start from th

e

knowledge of bodies, and moving from them to itself and things abov

e

itself

The three questions on understanding bodily reality constitute

thus, the largest part and the foundation for the discussion as a whole

In them, the order is such that the first speaks of the principle of our ac

t

of

understanding

bod ie s, na m e ly th e

species

in te l l ig ib i l i s

i t s e x i s t e n c e ,

c a u s e s a n d n a t u r e

; t h e s e c o n d s p e a k s o f t h e a c t ' s a b st r a c t i v e m o d e , a n

d

h a s q u e r i es c o n c e r n i n g o r d e r i n s u c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g

; a n d t h e t h i r d a s k

s

a b o u t t h e p r e c i s e t a r g e t s , i n b o d i l y t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h a r e a t t a i n e

d

b y t h i s c o g n i t i o n

. T h e o r d e r i s t h u s o n a p a t t e r n o f b e g in n i n g , m i d d l

e

a n d e n d o f t h e a c t

. W e s h o u l d , h o w e v e r , m e n t i o n t h e r o l e o f t h e v e r

y

f i r s t a r t i c l e o f t h e v e r y f i r s t q u e s t i o n , c r u c i a l fo r a l l t h e r e s t : d o e s t h

e

s o u l t h r o u g h i n t e l l e c t k n o w b o d i e s ? I s t h e r e a n y s u c h t h i n g a s i n t e l le c t i o

n

o f b o d i e s , o r w a s P l a t o r i g h t , a n d i s in t e l l e c t i o n r e a l ly a b o u t s o m e t h i n

g

e l s e , a h i g h e r o r d e r o f b e i n g s ?

I have said all this to call attention to the systematic character o

f

this treatise on the human act of understanding

. One would expect t

o

find in it Thomas Aquinas

s most important v iews on the m atter

Now, at this point I wish to draw attention to a phenomeno

n

among writers on St

. Thomas, viz how much has been written in thi

s

century on Thoma s

'

s views on knowledge , and more part icula r ly on tha

t

i tem called the concept

or the inner (or mental) word

; and there is

a somewhat associated topic, the divine ideas

. This interest is no

t

surprising, since Thomas, particularly in his teachings on the Trinity o

f

persons in God, has written extensively on the mental word or inne

r

word or concept

. He also has lots to say about the divine ideas

.

However, much of the writing by others on these matters has had as it

s

f o cu s T ho mas

s theory of knowledge, and one sees discussions which i

n

Thomas himself only arose in a Trinitarian context now introduced t

o

interpret his v iews on knowledge in general

What I wish to underline is that, in the aforementioned treatise o

n

human understanding, one finds in the whole of it only one small repl

y

to an objection giving

ex professo

attention to what Thomas elsewher

e

calls the concept

or "mental word

. The present paper takes its ris

e

from this interesting situation

. A recent paper, typically bearing on th

e

raison d'2tre

of the mental word according to St

. Thomas, notes thi

s

failure of Thomas to discuss the word in qq

84-89

with momentary

surprise, but then immediately shrugs off the situation by suggestin

g

that, after all, enough had been said about it elsewhere in the

prima

pars .'

It is just this sort of solution which I wish to question

. I believ

e

that the silence of S t

. Thomas on the concept in this treatise i

s

deliberate, and that it has to do with how he thinks the human act o

f

understanding ought to be p resented

.

It i s generally appreciated that Thom as underwent a developmen

t

of doctrine regarding the mental word or concept,

but less attention ha

s

been pa id to th is same deve lopment as a changing conception of the rol

e

of that other form of the known in the knower, what Thomas calls th

e

'Tirot, Dom

Paul, O .S .B

.,

La raison d'etre du verbe mentale dans la pens6

e

de saint Thomas ,

Doctor Communis

1994, 3-21, at p

. 1 5

. In fact, he sees onl

y

that it is no t discussed in 1

.85.2

. It does not seem to strike him that it is absen

t

from the who le treatise

'See the bibliography at the end of the paper

. Ch@ nevert is most aware of th

e

changing conception

of the SI. Lonergan is

moving towards

what

I am proposing

i .e

. a pre-conceptua

l

character for the fundamental act of knowing, though

I

suspect him still of a sort of interiorism

of intellection


3/8

22 2

D e w a n

: St

T h o m a s a n d P r e - c o n c e p t u a l In t e l le c t i o

n

species intelligibilis [SI]

.

I wish to highlight

this development as a

n

increasingly important role for the SI, so that

it

becomes the sta

r

performer in Thomas

s conception of the nature of the act o

f

understanding

I will call attention to a string of texts, stretching from end to en

d

of Thomas's career

. Some are taken from discussions of divin

e

knowledge, and some are taken from discussions of Averroes' doctrin

e

of the u nity of the intellect for the entire

h u m a n race

. What I propose i

s

that they start with a

confusion

of the SI and the concept (I wil

l

henceforth use that term, in the main, for the other item)

; that Thoma

s

then sharply

distinguishes between them (all the while giving the concep

t

a central role in the act of

knowledge)

;

and that finally the act i

s

understood as of such a nature that the SI must be featured, while th

e

concept, however important for the inner life of the mind, is eliminate

d

from the explanation of the very act of understanding

I suppose, a t the ou tset, that everyone is f amiliar wi th such a tex

t

a s

Summa contra gentiles ["SCG"]

1

.53, in its third redaction. In thi

s

famous

locus

in the

autograph

of the

SCG,

Thomas wrote, struck out

,

and rewrote the chapter, only to com e back som etime later to strike ou

t

the second redaction and write in the margin still a third

. I mention i

t

because it is a

painstaking

presentation of the human act o

f

understanding as involving two likenesses of the understood thing, one

,

the SI, which is the principle of the act, and the second, there calle

d

primarily the

intentio intellecta '

(though

ratio

verbum ,

an

d

conceptio

are used), w hich the intellect, forme d by the S I, must i tsel

f

form in order to

understand

the thing

This much cited

passage

show s

us Thomas

making

a hard and fast distinction between the two forms

.

Moreover, both seem to be of the essence of human understanding, w it

h

its abstractive view of concrete things

. This text seems to have serve

d

as

a

key for much subsequent interpretation of St

. Thomas by hi

s

commentators

. Let us look at some of the things Thomas said, not onl

y

before he wrote it, but also after he wrote it

Our first text comes from Thomas

s

Commentary on th

e

SEN TEN C ES

of Peter Lombard,

bk . 1

. Thomas is speaking of God'

s

knowledge of things other than himself

. He presents a view o

f

intellection patterned on ocular vision

. In doing so, he obviously see

s

'This expression has some p rominence in a text of A verroes which is o

f

importance f or the present discussion, i

.e

. A verrois Cordubensis,

Commentariu

m

magnum in A ristotelis De anima,

ed

. F

Stuart Crawford, Cambridge, Mass

1953, 3

.5 (p

. 402)

E t u d e s m a r i t a i n i e n n e s /M a r i t a i n St u d i e s

22 3

himself as following in the footsteps of Aristotle, using the senses as a

n

approach to mind

. He will never leave off,

t h rough ou t

his career

making this comparison, but in this first instance the picture is ver

y

dif ferent f rom wh at i t wi ll soon becom e

. He says that in ocular vision

the seen

[visum]

is twofold

. There is first of all the likeness within th

e

sense (or within the eye), and there is secondly the thing itself outsid

e

the eye

: it too is the seen

. On this model, then, we have two item

s

called the understood

[intellectum],

one the likeness of the thing foun

d

in the intellect, and the second the thing itself outside the intellect

. I

n

accordance with this, Thomas can explain how Aristotle can say tha

t

God knows only himself

. God knows only himself, taking th

e

understood

in the first way

; yet God knows all things other tha

n

himself, taking the understood

in the second way

.

Since, clearly, God

'

s own self-knowledge is being explained b

y

the first sort of understood

, Thoma s means very l i terally that there i

s

actual understanding of this inner likeness

. I stress this because Fr

Geiger tried to tone down the sense of know

regarding the inne

r

likeness, as presented in this text, thus bringing it into line with late

r

texts

.' The full extent of the difference between this text of St

. T ho ma

s

and later ones will only be appreciated when one sees the use of th

e

sense of sight as an approach to understanding in the later texts

Since Thomas here uses the sense of sight to present the role o

f

the likeness in the mind, and since this is how he regularly presents th

e

SI later, I think it is safe to say tha t, here in this text, the S I is presente

d

as something itself known

. And f rom this and some associated texts on

e

can see that we have here also what will later be called the concept

.

The two forms in the intellect are not yet distinguished from each other

Is this text an isolated and entirely anomalous one? No, a littl

e

later on in Thomas

's career, in the

De veritate,

we f ind Thoma

s

identifying the SI and the

intentio

e

However, we also find the doctine of the SI as

not itsel

f

something know n, save through reflection on the f undamental act whic

h

is directed towards external sensible things

.

'

This is important bu

t

°Thomas, In Sent

.

1 .3 5

.1

.2

(Mandonnet, pp

. 813-815)

5

Geiger, Les idles divines

. .

. ,

p . 196 .

6 Thomas, De veritate

10 .8 ,

where he

is

closely following Averroes

. Earlier

we have 8

.15,

where Thoma s speaks of ocular vision, and intellection, as a seein

g

of something in , in the sense

of through , a

cognitional

form

'In

DV 10 .9 .ad 10

(first series), it is quite clear that the species intelligibilis


4/8

224

Dewan

:

St .

T h o m a s a n d P r e - e o n e e p t u a l In t e l le c t i o

n

ambiguous

.

It is ambiguous because, while we have just seen texts i

n

which the likeness in the mind is what is first known, and while late

r

texts on the SI will stress that it is not a known, but a principle fro

m

which the act of

u n d e r s t a n d i n g

originates (thus only known b

y

reflection), still the concept or mental word, likewise, will be called

a

known

, s

yet a

known which has the role of making the externa

l

thing known, and which thus itself is somehow only known throug

h

reflection

.' Thus, to be only knowable through reflection does no

t

i s on ly known thro ugh r e f l e c t i on

. And th i s a c cord s w i t h wha t i s sa i d i n t h e bod

y

of the ar t i c l e

. I w o u l d c o n t r a s t t h i s w i t h

DV

8 .15,

whi ch sugge s t s t h e

In Se n t

v i s um

t ext

. Remember tha t 10

. 9 i s in t h e a cad emi c year f o l low ing

8 .15 (I

a m n o t

s u r e w h e r e t o m ake t h e d i v is i o n i n t o t h e t h r e e y e a r s

; S y n a v e d i v i d e d i n t o 8

4

a r t i c le s e a ch y e a r , b u t i t l o o k s a s t h o u g h 8 a n d 9 g o t o g e t h e r

; 1 0 w o u l d b e a g o o

d

p l a c e t o s t a r t t h e 2 n d y e a r , a s t o t o p i c s )

.

'DV 4

.2

. a d 3

. .

. t h e c onc ep t i on o f t h e i n t e l le c t i s i n t e rmed i a t e

[ m e d ia ]

b e t w e e

n

the intellect and the thing understood, because through it

s

medi a t i on t h e ope ra t i on o f t h e i n t e l l e c t a t t a i n s

[per tingit]

t o t h e

th ing

. And s o t h e c onc ep t i on o f t h e i n t e l l e c t i s no t on ly t ha t wh i c

h

i s u n d e r s t o o d

[i d

q u o d in t e l l e c tu m e s t ] ,

bu t a l so tha t through whic

h

t h e t h i ng i s und er s t ood

[ id q u o

res intell igi tur]

;

s o t h a t b o t h t h

e

t h i ng i t s e lf a nd a l s o t h e c on c e p t i o n o f t h e i n t e ll e c t c an b e c a l le

d

" tha t wh ich i s und ers to od"

[id

q u o d in t e l lig i tu r ]

A n d i n SC G 4

.11

But the und ers to od in the und er s tand er i s the

in t e n t io in t e l le c ta

an d

t h e w o r d

. T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s in G od und e r s t and i ng h i m s e l f t h

e

W o r d o f Go d , a s Go d U n d e r s t o o d

: j u s t a s t h e w o r d o f t h e s t o n e

i n the i n t e l l e c t , i s

t h e s t o n e u n d e r s t o o d

'C f

. T h o m a s ,

SC G

4.11

:

N o w , I c a ll

i n t e n t i o in t e l le c t a

t ha t wh i ch t h e i n t e l le c t c onc e i v e

s

i n i t s e lf c onc e rn i ng t h e und er s t ood t h i ng

[ d e r e i n t e l le c t a ]

In u

s

[human s ] , t h i s i s ne i t h e r t h e t h i ng i t s e l f wh i ch i s under s t o od , no

r

i s i t t h e v e ry sub s t anc e o f t h e i n t e l l e c t

; bu t i t i s a c e r t a i n l i kene s

s

conceived in the intellect concerning the understood thing [

a

l i kene s s ] wh i ch ex t e rna l s poken w ords s i gn i f y

: h enc e , t h e

in t e n t io

i t s e lf i s c a l led t h e " i nn er wo rd" , wh i ch i s s i gn i f ied by t h e ex t e rna

l

w o r d

.

T hom as t h e r e a r gue s f o r t h e d i s t i n c t io n b e t w e e n t h e

in t e n t io

and t h e t h i n

g

w h i c h w e u n d e r s t a n d , th e

res in te l lec ta

a s f o l lows

:

A nd t h a t th e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d

in t e n t io

is not in us the thin

g

under s to od app ea rs f rom th i s , tha t i t i s o n e th ing to und ers ta nd th

eth ing and i t i s someth ing e l s e t o und ers tand the und ers to od

in t e n t i

o

i t sel f

[ ipsam

in te n t io n e m in te l l e c ta m ] ,

whi ch [ la t t e r ope ra t i on ] i

s

what the intellect does when it reflects on its own operation

.

H e nc e , a ls o , t h e s c i e n c e s w h i c h a r e ab ou t t h i ng s

[ d e r e b u s ]

ar e

E t u d e s m a r i t a i n ie n n e s /M a r l t a i

n

S t u d i e s

225

altogether rule out being essentially something known

. Accordingly ,

when we are told that the SI is only known through reflection, we canno

t

be sure that Thomas is yet

distinguishing

between the SI and th

e

concept

. He might still be conceiving of the SI as known

, in the sens

e

that the concept can be known

However, with the previously mentioned SCG 1

.53 (3r

d

redaction), we have Thomas very explicitly setting out the distinctio n

between the two forms, stressing that the SI is prior to the act o

f

understanding and only knowable through reflection, and presenting th

e

intentio intellecta

as a sort of necessary inner picture

, if I may us

e

such an expression

. It is called, in

SCG 4

11, the inner word, and it

s

being is described as being understood

[ipsum

intelligt7

Taking th e

example of knowledge of a stone, Thomas says that, while the inne

r

word is not the stone, it can be called the stone

u n d e r s t o o d

Th

e

intentio intellecta is

not called

intellecta

[ understood

] lightly

This doctrine

is developed

to its fullest in

De potentia

9

.5 . This

is a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, using human intellectua

l

life as the approach

. Accordingly, Thomas sets out to say, given tha

t

intellection involves necessarily an understander and an understood, jus

t

what precisely is the essentially understood

(primo et per s

e

intellectum]

.

The answer is unequivocal

. It is neither the SI nor the thin

g

outside the mind

. It is the concept, terminating the act of understanding

,

which is firstly and intrinsically the understood

t 0

At the same time, however, we must pick up a line of discussion

,

starting back in the

SCG 2

.7 5

:

Thomas dealing with a certain line o

f

thinking coming from Averroes

. The line of thinking is that, if there ar

e

many intellects, then there are many

species intellectae

in them ; an

d

these will be merely understood in potency

; and one will have t o

abstract something common from them

. One point in Thomas

'

s criticis

m

of this is that it treats the

species as

that which is understood

, wherea

s

other than the sciences which are abo ut understood

intentions We

intentionibus intellectis]

.

1 'De potentia 9

.5

:

This, therefore, is primarily and essentially

[Primo

et per se

]

understood

, viz that which the intellect conceives within itsel

f

a b o u t [de]

the thing understood, whether it be a definition or a

n

enunciat ion

.

. [It] is called the interior word

; for it is this whic

h

is signified by the voca l utterance

: for the external vocal u tteranc

e

does not signify the intellect itself, or its intelligible form, or th

e

act of understanding, but rather the concept of [i

.e . in] th e

intellect , through m ediat ion o f which it signif ies the thing


5/8

226

Devvan

:

St.


n

its true role is by virtue of which som ething is unde rstood

. If this wer

e

not so, says Thomas, all sciences would be about mental items rathe

r

than about things

. The

universality

of our intellectual cognition o

f

material singulars stems from the

universality

of the SI

. In thi

s

presentation, there is no mention of

a n y

c o n c e p t o r

intentio intellecta

to be distinguished from the SI, and which would be an

understood

This is hardly s urprising,

inasmuch as the expression

intentio intellecta

is right out of the Latin translation of Averroes, discussing the ver

y

issue

. Mention of such a form might be thought to confuse the issue

.

However, in the

De spiritualibus creaturis,

a group of

quaestione

s

disputatae

dating from

slightly

bef ore [?] the

Prima pars,

we have th

e

same Averroist issue discussed, and in it, Thomas speaks of the thin

g

understood

[res

i n t e l lec t a ]

be i ng

in a w a y

o n e , y e t

in

a w a y

many .

T h

e

things

are the concept and the thing outside the mind

. The SI ha

s

its own proper role as control of the situation

One might think, then, that Thomas has decided to bring th

e

concept into the framework for discussion of the previously mentione

d

Averroist line of

a rgum e nt

However, wi th the

Prima pars

it definitel y

takes a back seat

. Let us consider the texts

The main text is 1

.8 5

.2

. Prior to this, there is the direc

t

consideration of the Averroist position, in 1

.7 6

.2

. In it there is n

o

mention of the concept

. It is, in the relevant parts, pretty much a long th

e

lines of

SCG 2

.7 5

How ever, I say that the m ain text is 1

.85

.2 becaus e

that is the moment in the treatise on the act of understanding at whic

h

the role of the SI is discussed

. Before looking at it, I would like to not

e

that, in the decisive 1

.84 .1, the

keynote text for the whole treatise

stress is upon science bearing on things, with the universality of ou

r

knowing located in the realm of our mode of knowing the things

Platonism is associated with a confusion of the thing known with th

e

universal mode of knowing

.

De spiritualibus creaturis 9

.ad 6

.

This is another answer to A verroes on th

e

unity of the possible intellect

. Thomas is replying to the argument tha

t

multiplication of intellects would multiply the thing understood

. He says

:

Therefore, the

res

i n t e l l e c t a

by t wo

i n t e l lec t s i s in a w ay on

e

a n d t h e s a m e , a n d i n a w a y m a n y

: b e c a u s e , o n t h e s i d e o f t h

e

th ing

which is known

[ex

p a n e rei quae

cognosciturl ,

i t i s o ne a n d

t h e s a m e , b u t o n t h e s i d e o f k n o w l e d g e i t s e lf

[ex parte

. .

. ipsiu

s

c o g n i t i o n s ] ,

i t is

o the r a nd o the r . Just

as , i f t w o [p eo p le] see o n e

w a l l, i t i s t h e s a m e t h i n g s e e n , o n t h e s i d e o f t h e t h i n g w h i c h i

s

seen, and nevertheless other and other a ccording to the divers

e

seeings

E t u d e s m a d t a i n i e n n e s /M a r i t a i n S t u d i e s

2 2

7

A longer presentation would dote on the scientific portrait of th

e

SI presented in 84

.2-8

. However, let us say only that it is presented a

s

the principle of the act of understanding corporeal things, though it

s

need of being a senior partner

along with the phantasms in th

e

imagination and the senses is brought out

. In 85, we begin with a

n

article on the abstractive mode of our knowing, i

.e

. abstracting the S

I

from the phantasms

. A. 2 then asks whether the SI is that which i

s

understood

. We should no te no t only the main reply but the answers t

o

the preliminary argu ments o r o bjections

The main reply begins with two reasons why the SI cannot b

e

tha t which is unders tood

. I t would mean that sciences would be abou

t

items in the mind

rather than

abo u t

things outside the mind

.

It would

also mean that all

judgments

ar e

true, and

thus that contradictories ar

e

simultaneously true

; every opinion would be true, and every way o

f

taking things

. We then get the u sual doctrine, that the S I i s the principl

e

of the act, but that

that which is known

i s the thing ou tside the sou l

The SI is, of course, known by subsequent reflection

. No mention i

s

made of the concept

The objections and replies are of the greatest interest

. The firs

t

uses the doctrine that the understood in act

must be in the one wh

o

unders tands

: since the understood in act is the very intellect in act

And since nothing else of the thing u nderstood is in the intellect actuall

y

understanding ex cept the SI, the SI mu st be the very

t

understood in act

T h o m a s '

s reply interprets the doctrines proposed by the objector a

s

meaning simply that there is a likeness of the thing understood in th

e

mind

. This likeness is the S I

. That i s what i s meant by the known bein

g

in the knower, or the understood in act being the intellect in act

. Thus ,

the SI is not that which is actually understood

; it is just its likeness

No whisper of a concept

The second objector argues that

the understood in act has to b

e

in something, for otherwise it would be nothing at all

. He rules out it

s

being in the thing outside, because that is material

. The only option i

s

to place it in the intellect, and thus it must be the SI

. T ho mas

'

s reply i

s

a lesson on abstraction,

distinguishing

between the thing which i

s

understood, which is the nature of the thing outside the soul, and it

s

being understood or its universality

. It is a reply in the line of th

e

doctrine of a mode of understanding

. It does, however, mention th

e

intentio universalitatis

,

seemingly as a note attached to the natur

e

which we consider

. The reply actually proceeds in two steps, firs t

speaking of the being understood

[ipsum

intelligtl of the nature, an

d

then

adding the being

abstracte

d

and

the

intentio

u n i v e r s a l i t a t i s

T hi s


6/8

228

Dewan

:

S t

. Thomas and Pre-conceptual

I n t e l l e c t i o

n

is certainly not the concept of the thing

. The understood is the thin

g

[ . .

outside

accidit

.

a n

d

.]its being understood is something that

happens to i

t

,

We come now to

the third objection and reply, the

one plac

e

h e r e w e h a v e

a n

ex

professo

d i s c u s si o n o f t h e c o n c e p t ( t h o u g h n o t s

o

alled in

this

place)

.

Th e

objector

recalls

Aristotle's

teaching

tha t spo ke

n

ords are

the signs

of

the

soul's

affections

. Thus,

since

spoken

word

s

signify the things understood

[res

intellectas],

the affections of the soul

that is, the

species intelligibiles,

are what we understand

. Thoma

s

answers, once more

using his technique

of

approaching the

intellect b

y

comparison with the senses

. In sense knowledge, there is first th

e

opera tion in function of the sense powe r's being affected by the sensibl

e

hing

. Then, secondly, there is the operation of the

imagina t ive

power

which forms pictures of absent or even never seen things

. In th

e

intellectual power, both of these operations are found

t2

First, there i

s

the operation pertaining to the possible intellect's being informed by th

e

I

. Then, the intellect, so formed, itself forms a definition, or

a

composition or division

; and it is these that are signified by spoke

n

ords

. Thus, the spoken words do not signify the SI, but rather the

y

signify the items which the intellect forms for itself with a view t

o

judging

abou t the exte rna l th ings

[ad

i u d i c a n d u m

de

rebus exterioribus]

.

H e r e , t h e n ,

w e

have

th e

n o t i o n ,

t h e d e f i n i ti o n , e t c

., i

.e . wha t

e l s e whe r e a r e c a l l e d t h e c onc e p t , th e me n t a l wo r d , o r e v e n t h e

i n t e n t i

o

intellecta .

The obj e c t o r had a r gue d t ha t t h e spoke n wo r d s i gn i f ie s t ha

t

wh i c h i s unde r s t o od , a nd t ha t t h e spoke n w or d s i gn i f ie s t h e S I

. Thomas

,

in his reply, simply says that it does not signify the SI

Is he

ackn ow l ed g in g t h a t t h e c on c ep t i s t h a t wh i ch i s u n d e r s t ood ? H ard l y

. H i

s

w h o l e p o i n t i s t h a t i t is t h e e x t e r n a l th i n g w h i c h i s

t h e u n d e r s t o o d "

.

Ne ve r th e le s s , h e do e s no th i ng t o c ou n t e r t h e i d e a t ha t t h e c on c e p t i s " t h

e

n d e r s t ood "

. Su r e l y , t he r e a s o n m us t b e tha t he ha s , i n h i s e xp l ana t i o

n

of the role of the concept here, said enough to make it clear that i

t

c ann o t have t ha t r o l e

. T h e p l a in m e a n i n g i s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t c o m e s o

n

t h e s c en e t oo l a t e t o b e " t h e u n d e r s t ood "

. I t is , ra ther , a prod uc t f l owin

g

f r o m t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e t h i n g , a n d u s e d b y t h e m i n d w i t h a v ie

w

o

maki ng

. j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e t h i n g

. Su ch

a n i d e a

w o r k s i n

c l e a r l

y

e nough w i t h t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e know l e dge o f t r u t h i n 1

.16

. 2 , w h i c h

s a y s t ha t i n e v e r y c ompo s i t i o n and d i v is i o n , i

.e

. e v e r y a c t o f p r e d i c a t i o n

,

t h e i n t e l le c t p r e d i c a t e s a f o r m , r e pr e s e n t i ng t h e i n t e l le c t ' s know l e dge o

f

1 2

The word here

(ST

1

.85

.2

. a d 3

; e d

. O t tawa 52 8al ) i s

coniungitur ,

b u t S t

Th om as cer ta in ly does n o t m ean to con fu s e th e two

E t u d e s m a r i t a i n ie n n e s / M a r i t a i n S t u d i e s

22 9

the thing, of the thing itself

. The formation o f such predicates would b

e

what Thomas seems to have in mind as conceptualization

.

My hypothesis, then, is that the reply of St

. Thomas to the

object ion speaks of the concept in such a way as to make impo ssible an

y

confusion between the concept and the understood

If I am right, I am correcting Cardinal Cajetan

. In his commentar y

on this article, he complains that St

. T ho mas

'

s answer to the objectio

n

is inadequate

. The reason is that, while it rejects the doctrine that the S

I

i s that which is understood

, i t does nothing to reject the doctrine tha

t

the concept is that which is understood

. Cajetan proceeds t

o

supplement what Thom as has sa id

. He explains that bo th the SI and th

e

concept can be considered in two ways

: as a thing, and as a likeness o

f

the thing outside

. Taken as a thing, neither is known save throug

h

reflection

. Bu t the concept, taken as a likeness, is known

. Still, it is one

and the same thing for it to be known, and for that of which it is th

e

likeness to be known

. Hence, it creates no problem

Caje tan

s view supposes a problem, and works to overcome tha

t

problem

. His view is that the external thing is known only throug

h

knowledge of the concept

. My qu estion is

: is that really the role of th

e

concept here at this stage in St

. T ho mas '

s career? The strategy of th

e

Prima pars

suggests that it is not

. Thomas is well aware of th

e

possibilities of knowing one item in or through another, as in or throug

h

a mirror

. He certainly presents the role of the concept as a sort o

f

mental mirror, and there seems every reason to believe that it ca

n

function either as a noticed mirror or as an unnoticed mirror

.

How ever, in this discussion, he is presenting in the most f ormal way th

e

act of unde rstanding

. A nd he raises the question

: should it be conceive

d

as a knowing of a mental item? His reasons for not so conceiving it ar

e

most se rious

. It would do away w ith knowledge of ex tra-mental reality

He does not say

: it would be angelism . I

.e

., he does not say that i

t

would an unsuitable mode of knowing for the human being, though i

t

might suit a separate intelligence

. He rather says that it would destro

y

knowledge

: all opinions would be true and every way of taking thing

s

whatsoever

Cajetan'

s judgment that St

. Thomas

'

s reply is inadequate, an

d

Caje tan '

s supplement to the reply strike me as leading the mind in

a

direction Thomas was deliberately rejecting

. At the very least , i t shoul d

Cf

. ST 1

.16

.2 , in toto

.

See abo ve, no te 9, the text

from SCG

4.11 .

The

intentio intellecta i

s

understood only through reflection

.


7/8

3

Dewan:

t


n

be said that Thom as is ma king the SI the crucial i ssue in the conceptio

n

of knowledge

. The concept, however it fits in, is secondary

Confirmation of this is provided by the presentation of th

e

understood in the later

De unitate intellectus

Just as in earlie

r

discussions, the adversary is accused of error concerning th

e

understood

. S t

. Thom as carefully presents the understood as the thin

g

outside the soul . Knowledge, he insists, is about things, not about an

y

sort of

species

Thus we read :

Bu t i t remains to be inquired what is the ve ry

understood

[quid sit

ipsum intellectum]?

For if they say that th

e

u n d e r s t ood "

is one immaterial

species

existing in

th

e

intellect, they fail to notice

that they

drift in a

certain

wa

y

into

th e

doctrine of

Plato, who

posited

that concerning

sensible

things

no

science

ca n

be had,

but a ll science is ha

d

concerning one separate fo rm

. For it makes no differenc

e

for the present issue, whether someone say that the scienc

e

which is had concerning the stone is had

concerning

o n

e

separate

form of the stone, or of one form of the ston

e

which is

in the intellect

:

it will follow for both that science

s

are not about the things which are here, but only abou

t

separate things

. But because Plato maintained that suc

h

immaterial forms are subsisting by themselves, he coul

d

also, alon g with that, posit severa l intellects participating i

n

the knowledge of the one tru th f rom the one separate fo rm

.

But these [people], who posit such immaterial forms

-

which they call the understoods

[intellecta] -

in th

e

intellect, necessarily hav e to po sit that there is one in tellec

t

only, not only of all men, but even unqualifiedly

All this, then, merely makes the point that there is something seriousl

y

wrong with the conception these people have of the object o

f

understanding, i

.e

the unders tood

.

Now, we come to the positive presentation of the true nature o

f

the understood

. We read

:

Therefore, it is to be said, according to the vie

w

[sententiam]

of Aristotle, that the

understood", which i

s

one, is the very nature or quiddity of the thing

; for natural

science and the other sciences are about things, not abou

t

understood

species [species intellectis]

For if th

e

understood we re not the very nature of the stone, whic

h

"Thomas

Aquinas,

De

unitate intellectus 5

(L eonine lines

164-185)

E t u d e s m a r U d n i e n n e s /M a r U

dn

S t u d i e s

2 3

1

is in things, but the

species

which is in the intellect, i

t

would follow that I would not understand the thing whic

h

is the stone

[rem

q u a e

est lapis],

but only the

intenti

o

which is abstracted from the stone

6

This, then, is the

fundamenta l

answer, but it remains to be explaine

d

how it can be true, given the mode of being which the nature has i

n

singular things . And he continues

:

But it is true that the nature of the stone, as it is i

n

singulars, is understood in potency

[intellecta i

n

potentia] ;

but it is rendered understood in act

throug

h

this, that the

species

come from sensible things, by th

e

mediation of the senses, right to the imagination, an

d

through the power of the agent intellect are abstracted th

e

species intelligibiles,

w hich are in the possible intellect

. B u

t

these

species

do not stand related to the poss ible intellect a

s

the understoods

[intellecta],

but as the

species

by whic

h

the intellect unde rstands, just as also the

species

which ar

e

in [the sense of] sight are not the very [items] seen

[ips

a

visa],

but those [factors] by which the sight sees

[ea q u i b u

s

visus

videt]

:

save inasmuch as the intellect reflects upo

n

i tself, which cannot happen in the sense

.

17

The important thing for Thomas is to change the idea o

f

understanding, so that it does not have as its target of attention som

e

pure intelligible existing within the intellect, but the thing which i

s

outside the intellect

. Certainly, the mental word would only caus

e

confusion in the presentation, since it can easily be taken for just suc

h

an inner object

. Still, in the SC response, Thomas used the twofol

d

th ing unders tood

doctrine, and brought in the concept . And in the

D

P

he even presented the concept as the primarily and essentiall

y

understood

. Nevertheless, in the

ST

and the

UI,

the concept is almos

t

entirely (ST) or entirely

(UI)

omitted

. And while the vocabulary of th

e

ST prefers

id

q u o d i n t e l l ig i t u r ,

t h e

UI

p r e s e n t s t h e i s su e w i t h t h

e

s i m p l e t e r m

intellectum

,

identifying it with the quiddity which i

s

present in the singular thing

.

Is Thomas

s variation in approach entirely dictated by th

e

argument with the Averroists? Or does the argument simply help t

o

bring ou t what is truly essential to the accou nt of the act of intellection

?

U

5 (186-194)

7

U/ 5 (194-206)


8/8

2 32 D e w a n

:

St

.

T h o m a s a n d P r e - co n c e p t u a l I n t e l le c t i o

n

Notice that i t i s no t a m atter of

making

conc

eptua l iza t ion opt iona

l

for the human mind

. Thoma s is qu i te clear that a ll

hu

man intellection i

s

ecessarily

completed

by the concept

. 1 8

It is rather a question of wha

t

is the essenc e and w hat is the property in the situation

. To the ex tent tha

t

intellection is conceived of as essentially an inner picturing, then th

e

concept is e ssential

. That, I believe, is what Thomas is rejecting

.

The importance of this doctrine is that it gives things themselve

s

an absolute priority over knowledge itself, as to the order of objects o

f

nowledge

A ddend

a

L One could say that 1

.8 5

.3-4 has to do with the concepts and thei

r

rder

. But this feature of the situation is not brought out

. Thomas i

n

.84

.1 has set a pattern, and so we talk about acts of knowing the mor

e

univ ersal and the less universal, etc

. Definitions are discussed somewhat

Is the fact that we are talking abo ut con cepts implicit in the very additio

n

f 1

.86? i

.e

. that the order considered in 1

.85 is of concepts? So be it

but the

key point

for us is 1

.8 5 .2

2

. I think that it is important to consider the arguments in 1

.8 5

.2 give

n

gainst

the SI being

that which is understood

. I think the doctrine i

s

tied to the view that our knowledge starts with sense knowledge o

f

ensible things

. This is the source of our very idea of knowledge

. It i

s

entirely based on the complete ignorance of itself and the thoroug

h

attainment of the thing itself

. It is thus that we see the reality o

f

knowledge (through our subsequent power of reflection) as

knowing

things even ou tside o urselves

. We can thus dev elop the doctrine of th

e

two modes o f being, which alone explain the phenomeno n

Once one has the idea of cognition, then one can posit knowings o

f

one thing through another, where the one thing is even a form in

a

knower (as in the theory of the concept)

. However, the essence o

f

1 8 Cf

.Super Evangelium

S

. IOannis

L e c t u r a ,

g e n e r a ll y d a t e d i n t h e s e c o n

d

arisian

P

rofessorship

( 126 9 -1272)

. There, in cap

. 1 , l e s t

. 1 ( 5 th rev i s ed ed

. R

ai , O

.P., R

o m e/Turi n , 195 2

: M ar ie t t i , # 25) , Th om as s ay s

Patet

ergo quod

in

qualibet

natura intellectuali necesse est poner

e

erbum

: quia de

ration intelligendi est

quod

intellectu

s

ntelligendo

a l iquid formet huiusmodi a utem forma tio dic itu

rerbum

;

et

ideo

in

O m n i

intelligente oportet ponere

verbum

atura

autem

i

ntel lectual is est triplex, sci l icet

humana, angel ica

e

tivina

et ideo t r ip l ex es t v erbum

. . .

E t u d e s m a r i t a i n ie n n e s / M a r i t a i n S t u d i e s

2 3

3

k n o w l e d g e i s t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e b e i n g o f o t h e r t h i n g s (a n d t h u s o f a l

l

t h i n g s ) , a n d i t s v e r y e x i s t e n c e i s k n o w n t o u s t h r o u g h t h e k n o w i n g o

f

sens ib le th ings (s ens ib ly a nd in te l l ec tua l ly )

Bi bl i ograph

y

Ch@nevert ,

J

., L e Verbum

d a n s l e C o m m e n t a i r e s u r

les Sentences

d

e

s a in t T h o m a s d ' A q u i n ,

in

S c i e n c e s E c c l i s ia s t i q u e s

1 3 ( 1 9 6 1 ) 1 9 1

223 ,

359-390

.

Cromp, Germaine,

L es

s o u r c e s d e V a b s t r a c t i o n d e V i n t e l le c t a g e n t

dan s

la Somme de thbologie de Thomas d Aquin,

M o n t r 6 a l, s . d

I n s t i t u t d 'E t u d e s M 6 d i6 va le s

.

Gau th ie r , Ren6-Antoine , O

. P

., Introduction

, in Saint Thomas d' Aquin

,

Som me contre les gentiles,

[Paris?], 199 3

: Editions Unive rsitaire

s

[Collection Philosophie

Europ6enne,

dirigbe par Henri Hude]

,

[This introduction is a separate volume

.] at pp

. 105-108

Geiger, L .- B

., O

.P

., Les id6es divines dans l'oeuvre de s

. T ho mas

in S t.

T h o m a s A q u i n a s ,

1274-1974

: Commemorative Studies

Toronto, 1974

: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, vol

. 1 ,

pp

. 175-209

Geiger, L

.-B

., O

.P

. , Les r6dactions successives de

Contra Gentiles 1

,

53 d'apr8s 1'autographe , in

Saint Thomas D'Aquin A ujourd

'

hui ,

Paris, 1963

: Descl6e de Brouwer [Recherches de philosophie

VII], pp

. 221-240

Lonergan, Bernard J

. F ., S

.J

., Verbum

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Documents

Dewan 1995. St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Intellection