DH B5 Staff Statement 17 Comments Fdr- DOD Comments on Staff Statement 17

8/14/2019 DH B5 Staff Statement 17 Comments Fdr- DOD Comments on Staff Statement 17

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Office o f the U nder Secretary o f Defense (Intelt igence)

Warfighter Analysis and Integration5000 Defense Pentagon, Rm 3C281Washington, DC 20301-5000Date:

From:

Time:Phone:F a x :Phone:703-695-1831Unclassified Fax: 703-695-8215Classified Fax: 703-614-7687

Subject: T>D < w -#/*Number of pages including coversheet:Message:


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DoD Comments on Staff Statement No. 17"Improvising A Homeland Defense"

# ORG/REVIEWER

Pg# Paratf Line# CommentsJS Statement: "NORAD was, and is, responsible for the air defenseof the continental United States."

Recommendation: Change to reacL/TQORAD was, and is,responsible for the air defense of tHe continental United States.NORAD has the dual missioivof aerospace warning andaerospace control. On thexfay of 9/11, NORAD's focus wasoutward-looking, addressing the threat of an external attackfrom a foreign militaryRationale: As written, understates the NORAD mission, and isalso misleading as it does not note the threat that NORADwastasked to address.NORAD Statement: 'They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet,vectored to a position five miles direeuy behind the hijackedaircraft, where it could perfornufsrnission."Recommendation: Chape to read, ".. .where it could perform itsmission to monitor tbe flight path of the aircraft."Rationale: Correctness. The statement as re-written morecorrectly defines the role of th e fighter escort.

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NOR AD Statement: 'The nine minutes notice...">RecoiriknendatipHf^Add wording to clarify that notification wasprobablyVlpser to six minutes considering the phone wasanswecpdxaXp837 and the call completed at 0840.

\:Completeness.NORAD 11 Statement: Tfae communication betweenJFAA and NEADS thatfollowed is referenced as beginningal 21(reference ID Op,Channel 7, at 09f21:10, NEADS^vSce data recording.)

Recommendation:report from FA A." :harfge to read,/At 9:22JXEADS received a

Rationale: curacy.between FAA and NEAPS > , ChanneL4, has this communication^ginning/at 09:22:24.NOR AD 12 Statement: "The Mission Crew Commander (MCC) at NEADSissued an order at 9:22: Okay...sc/ambleLangley. Head themtowards the Washington DC arcecommendationNChange to read, "....issued the order at9:23:. Then add the following statement: "That orderwas

processed and transmitted fo Langley at 9:24, and the Langleyfighters were airborne arRationale: Accuracy. The MCC statement was made at 09:22:32according to MCC Op, Ch 2, NEADS voice data recording.

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Rounding to the nearest m inute , as was done in the rest of thereport, makes the time 9:23 vs. 9:22. The NEADS AirSurveillance Technician (AST)confirms the Langley scrambletime as 9:24 on AST,Channel 15, at 09:24:33: "Scramble time24, 24 LF1 [Three-letter identifie r for Lang ley] 1324, did you getthat?"NO RA D 13 Statement: "Boston Center called NEADS at 9:39 and identifiedDelta 1989,a 757 jet tha t departed Logan Airport destined for LasVegas, as a possible hijack."RecommeniNEADS a i : Change to read, "Boston Center called

" jRationale: Consistency, accuracy. ID Op, Channel 4, documentsthe time as 09:41:08.NORAD 14 Statement: ".. .NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was nothijacke d..." The footnote referenced, "MCC Op, Ch.,at13:42:08," is incorrect.JUeoinmendation: The correct reference is: ID 2, Chann el 8, at09:45:22 fromFAA.Rationale: Accuracy.

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8 NORAD 16 Statement: NEADS first received a call about United 93 from themilitary liaison at Cleveland Center, at 10:07." No footnotereference was cited.Recommendation:CJiaage^p read, "...the military liaison atCleveland CenterRationale: Accuracy, consistency. Reference footnote should beID 1, Channel4, 10:06:28.N O R A D 18 1 -6 Statement: "Yet this response to a phantom aircraft, American11, is not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issuedby FAA or DoD....to an actual hijacked aircraft."Recommendation: Reword paragraph to read, "Yet this responseto a phantomaircraft, American 11, has not been widelydisseminated by the FAA or NORAD. Early official timelinesindicated the scramble of the Langley fighters was a response tothe reported hijacking of American 77, or United 93, or somecombination of the two. This inaccurate account created theappearance that the Langley scramble was a logical response to anactual hijacked aircraft."Rationale: Correctness. Original timelines incorrectly identifiedthe notification of American 77 to coincide with the Langleyfighter scramble. That information was not corrected untilCommission interviews and NORAD review of tapes clearlyindicated th e inaccuracy. While NQRAD did not issue a public

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announcement of corrected timeline, NORAD did freely share thecorrections with Commission staff in 2003 an d 2004.

10 OUSD(I) 19 Statement: Referencing NORAD's initial timeline inaccuracies:"They also had the effect of deflecting questions about themilitary's capacity to obtain dmely and accurate information fromits own resources."Recommendation: Delete quoted sentence above.Rationale: The meaning of the sentence is not clear. As written,statement seems to imply that NORAD may have purposelymisled the Commission to deflect other criticism concerning themilitary's handlingof events. Based on the Commission'sinterviews with NORAD/NEADS personnel, Commission staffhas acknowledged that the inaccuracies were not intentional.

11 OUSD(I) 21 Statement: "As one witness described, "[It] was almost likethere were parallel decisionmaking nrocesses going on; one was avoice conference orchestrated byfne NMCC.. .and then, there wasth e [White House video cWfcrence].. .in m y mind they werecompeting venues for o>mjnand and control and decisionmaking."Recommendation": For accuracy, add a sentence after currentfinal sentenceto clarify the point that "competition" betweenvenues was for the time of participants rather than control ofC2/decisionmakmg.

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Rationale: Althou gh this statement was made by an officer onduty in the NMCC on 9X11, as^uoted, the statement ismisleading. It is more acWrate to say that the concurrentcommunication venuegxreated competition for the time of theparticipants and should nottmply that there were two commandand control/decisionmaking venues.12 JS 21 8 Statement: "Inside the National Militdirector ofoperations..."

Recommendation: ChangeOperations (DDO) . . . "Rationale: Correct duty title.

Command Center, theDeputy Director for

13 JS 22 Statement: "He recommended transitkThreat Conference call."Recommendation: Chan;Air Threat Conference call."Rationale: More accurate

ung the call into an Air

directed the transition to an

14 OUSD(l) 22 Statement: "But the highest level Defense Department officialsrelied on the NMCGI's Air TJjieat Conference alone, in whichFAA did not meaningftUlypaiticipate."*^^ w m. 1Recommendation: Re-write sentence to read: "But the highestlevel Defense DepartmentNofficials, acting on established

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protocol, relied on the NMCC's Air Threat Conference alone, inwhich FAA did not meaningfully participate."Rationale: As written, this statement is technically correct.However, the conclusion derived is misleading because it is notfully explained. NORAD's commanders and staff followedinternal DoD guidance per CJCSI6130.01A, "Aircraft Piracy(Hijacking) and Destruction oft)erelict Airborne Objects" dated 1June 2001, on the moniuSg/oi 9/11. This instruction directs that"The DDO, NMCC, is designated as the DOD coordinatingauthority between the^AAand operational commanders." DoDand Joint Staff directives, instructions, and policies are developedand adapted over years with careful consideration andmeasurement of best-odds options for the Wa^ighter and NationalDefense.

15 JS 22 Statement: "At 9:39, the NMCC s director, ...Recommendation: ChanDirector forOperations . .Rationale: Correct duty title

9:39, the NMCC's Deputy

16 NORAD 22 2-3 Statement: "[the commander of] NOdefense emergency at this point. is not declaring air

Recommendation: Add clarififcajj-on to explain the implicationsof NQRAD declaring "Air Defense Emergency."6/15/2004 4:30PMUNCLASSIFIED7/11


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Rationale: Completeness and clarity. Air Defense Emergency isa DoD term that triggers national defense responsesnot suitable tothe eventsof 9-11-01.17 JS 22 Statement:

Recommendfor Operation

'C director . . .C hange to "the N M C C ' s Deputy Director

Rationale; Correct duty title18 JS 23 Statement: "The NMCC direct

Recommendation: Chfor Operations . . . "Rationale; Correct duty title

the NMCC's Deputy Director

19 JS 23 Statement: "At 9:52, NORAD suggestedoperations. . ." he director of

Recommendation: Change to\"At^f52, NORAD suggested tothe Deputy Director of OperatiRationale; Correct duty title

20 JS 23 Statement: "At9:58, thedirector of operations stated that theVice Chairman, General Richard Myers, was recommendingevactuating the.Sears Tower in Chicago...."6/15/2004 4:30 PMUNCLASSIFIED8/11


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Recommendation: Change to "At 9:58, the Deputy Director forOperations and the Vice Chairman, General Richard Myers,discussed the possibility of evacuating the Sears TowerRationale: Correct duty title\for DF9O. Also, Gen Myers was toldby the DDO that other agencie\rex5ommended evacuating theSears Tower. Gen Myers agreed with the recommendation but hedid not initiate the recommendation as the statement currentlyimplies. '21 OUSD(I) 27-28 Beginning line

4Statement: Draft quotes the Vice President and the Secretary ofDefense from the ATCC directly.

x SJRecommendation: Textus classified. Permission to declassify orquote these passages direc^y from the ATCC resides with theWhite House.

22 JS 28 Statement: "The first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at10:38."Recommendation: Change to". . airborne at 10:33."Rationale: NORAD's best timelines indicate a take-off time of10:33 (unless the Commission staff has a better citation, but noneis provided). /

23 AF/XOH/NORAD

29 Statement: "There was only one set offigJHfersorbitingWashington....the Langley F-15s." \

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Recommendation: Change to read, "., .the LangJey F-16s."Rationale: Correctness. The alert fighters from Langley were F-I6s permanently assigned to the 119FW at F

24 N O R A D 29 6-7 All Statement: "Once the target was known and identified, NEADSneeded orders to pass to the pilots. Shoot down authority wasfirst communicated to NEADS at 10:31 . Given the clear attack onthe United States, it is also possible hough unlikely hat theNEADS commander could have ordered the shoot down withoutthe Vice President's authorization.N O RA D Officials have maintained in the past that they weretracking United 93 and would ha^e intercepted and shot down theaircraft. We are. not so sure."Recommendations Reword/to read:"Once the target was knowij and identified, NEADS neededorders to pass to the pilots/ Presidential shoot down authoritywas first communicateij to NEADS at 10:31. Given the clearattack on the United States, it is also possible that the NEADS,CONR, or NORAD Commanders could have ordered theshoot down without specific Presidential authority. Eachcommander would have first pursued authorization from thePresident, but without Presidential authorization in time,NORAD would have defended the Washington, D.C. areafrom attack."

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Rationale: NORAD leaders believe there would have beenactions attempted to gain shoot d ow n authority had UA93continued in to Washington, DC.

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Documents

DH B5 Staff Statement 17 Comments Fdr- DOD Comments on Staff Statement 17