Dhammajoti Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.IV.2009

Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma

SarvāstivādaAbhidharma

Bhikkhu KL Dhammjoti 法光

Centre of Buddhist Studies,The University of Hong Kong

2009

First Edition: Colombo 2002Second Revised Edition: Colombo 2004

Third Revised and Enlarged Edition: Hong Kong 2007Fourth Revised Edition: Hong Kong 2009

Published in Hong Kong by Centre of Buddhist Studies

The University of Hong Kong2009

© Kuala Lumpur DhammajotiAll Rights Reserved.

This publication is sponsored by the Li Chong Yuet Ming Buddhist Studies Fund

of the Li Ka Shing Foundation.

ISBN: 978-988-99296-5-7

CONTENTS

Preface v

Abbreviations x

Chapter 1 Abhidharma – Its Origin, Meaning and Function 1

1.1. Origin of the abhidharma 11.2. Definitionsofabhidharma 61.3. Thesoteriologicalfunctionoftheabhidharma 10

Chapter 2 The Ābhidharmika – Standpoint, Scope and Methodology 15

2.1. FundamentalstandpointoftheĀbhidharmikas 152.2. ArgumentsforĀbhidharmikasbeingbuddha-vacana 162.3. ScopeofstudyoftheĀbhidharmikas 182.4. Ābhidharmikasmethodologyfordharma-pravicaya 25

Chapter 3 The Sarvāstivāda School and Its Notion of the Real 55

3.1. HistoryoftheSarvāstivāda 553.2. Sarvāstivādavs.Vibhajyavāda 593.3. ProofofthethesisofsarvāstitvaintheVKŚ,MVŚandAKB 613.4. Sautrāntikacritiqueoftheepistemologicalargument 633.5. Notionofthereal/existent 653.6. ThevariouscomponentsoftheSarvāstivādaschool 73

Chapter 4 The Abhidharma Treatises of the Sarvāstivāda 83

4.1. Sevencanonicaltreatises 834.1.1. Treatisesoftheearliestperiod 854.1.2. Later,moredevelopedtexts 91

4.2. DevelopmentoftheSarvāstivādamanuals 1034.2.1. Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā(MVŚ) 1034.2.2. Developmentofthemoreconcisemanuals 108

Chapter 5 Sarvāstitva and Temporality 117

5.1. Thebigdebate 1175.2. Timeandtemporality 1185.3. ThefourmaintheoriesoftheSarvāstivāda 1195.4. CommentsonthefourtheoriesandFrauwallner’sobservations 1205.5. TheVaibhāṣikatheoryofkāritra 126

SarvāStivāda abhidharma

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5.6. Saṃghabhadra’stheory—aninnovation? 1315.7. Bhāva, svabhāvaandthedharma 134

Chapter 6 Theory of Causality I: The Six Causes 143

6.1. The 6 hetu‑s,4pratyaya‑sand5phala‑s—theircorrelation 1436.2. SpecialimportanceofthedoctrineofcausalityfortheSarvāstivāda 1456.3. Definitionsofthesixcauses 1496.4. Saṃghabhadra’sdefenseofsimultaneouscausation 1576.5. ExplanationsintheYogācārasystem 1596.6. Summaryofthenotionoftheco‑existentcausegiveninthevarious

sources 1606.7. Doctrinalimportanceoftheco‑existentcausefortheSarvāstivāda 1616.8. Conclusion 164

Chapter 7 Theory of Causality IIThe Four Conditions and the Five Fruits 169

7.1. Doctrineofthefourconditions(pratyaya) 1697.2. Differencesbetweenacauseandacondition 1767.3. Fivefruits(phala) 1777.4. The‘grasping’and‘giving’ofafruit 183

Chapter 8 The Category of Matter (rūpa) 187

8.1. Generalnatureanddefinitionofrūpa 1878.2. Primaryandderivedmatter 1928.3. ‘Atomic’theory 198

Chapter 9 The Categories of Thought and Thought-concomitants (citta-caitta) 2119.1. Definitionsofcitta, manasandvijñāna 2119.2. Thought‑concomitants(caitta/caitasika) 2129.3. Developmentofthetheoryofcaitasika 2139.4. Sarvāstivādadoctrineofconjunction(saṃprayoga) 2259.5. DārṣṭāntikaandSautrāntikaDoctrineofsuccessivearising 2259.6. Differenceinfunctionalitybetweencittaandcaitta‑s 2279.7. Differencebetweenthefirstfiveandthesixthconsciousnesses 2299.8. Originalnatureofthought 232

Chapter 10 Theories of Knowledge 241

10.1. Sarvāstivādarealism:Fromepistemologytoontology 24110.2. Variousmodesofoperationofprajñā 24610.3. Reflexiveknowledgeandomniscience(sarvajñā) 25210.4. PrajñāoftheBuddhaandthetwoyāna‑s 25610.5. Instrumentofperception 260

ContentS

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10.6. ImportantSarvāstivādathought‑concomitantsinvolvedin discriminativecognition 26510.7. Ontologicalstatusoftheobjectsofknowledge 26610.8. Directperception,ākāra, sākāra-vijñānavāda, nirākāra-jñānavāda andtheSarvāstivāda 269

Chapter 11 The Category of the Conditionings Disjoined from Thought (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) 285

11.1. Doctrinalevolutionofthecategory 28511.2. Definitionofconditioningsdisjoinedfromthoughtinlatertexts 29111.3. ClassiclistintheAKB 292

Chapter 12 Defilements 321

12.1. Thegoalofspiritualpraxisandtheabandonmentofdefilement 32212.2. Kleśaandanuśayaasthegenerictermsfordefilement 32412.3. Otherdoctrinaltermsdenotingdefilements 32612.4. Defilementsastherootofexistence 32912.5. Ābhidharmikainvestigationofdefilements 33112.6. Classificationofdefilements 33312.7. Relationshipbetweendefilementsandthemind 33912.8. Operationofthedefilements 34212.9. Abandonmentofdefilements 34512.10.Traces(vāsanā)ofthedefilementsanddistinctionbetween thewisdomofaBuddhaandofanarhat 357

Chapter 13 The Doctrine of Karma 369

13.1. Meaningandgeneralnatureofkarma 36913.2. Classificationofkarma 37413.3. Informative(vijñapti)andnon‑informative(avijñapti)karma 37513.4. Definitionandintrinsicnatureofinformativeandnon‑informativekarma 37613.5. Non‑informationasrestraint,non‑restraintand neither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint 38213.6. Pathsofkarma (karma-patha) 38613.7. Rationaleforthedoctrineofnon‑informativekarma 38713.8. Roleofthenon‑informativeintheprocessofkarmicretribution 389

Chapter 14 Karma and the Nature of its Retribution 409

14.1. Karmicretributionasamiddle‑waydoctrine 40914.2. Sixcausesaffectingthegravityofakarma 40914.3. Determinateandindeterminatekarma 41114.4. A karmathathasbeendone,andonethathasbeenaccumulated 41314.5. Projectingandcompletingkarma‑s 41714.6. Karmaintermsofpratītya-samutpāda 418


iv

14.7. Pastkarma of the arhat‑sandtheBuddha 42314.8. Man’skarmaandhisenvironment,andcollectivekarma 425

Chapter 15 The Path of Spiritual Progress 433

15.1. Doctrineofgradualenlightenment 43315.2. Preliminariesforthepreparatorystage 43515.3. Differentstagesofthepath 44015.4. Directrealization(abhisamaya),pathofinsight (darśana-mārga)andstreamentry(srotaāpatti) 45115.5. Non‑retrogressibilityofstream‑entry 45915.6. Pathofcultivation(bhāvanā-mārga) 46015.7. Attainmentofthefourfruitsofthespirituallife 46215.8. Out‑of‑sequenceattainments 46315.9. Retrogressibilityofanarhat 463

Chapter 16 The Unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) Dharma-s 471

16.1. Threeunconditioneddharma‑softheSarvāstivāda 47116.2. Cessationthroughdeliberation 47416.3. Cessationindependentofdeliberation 48516.4. Space 491

Select Bibliography 501

Glossary 511

Index 550

PrefaCe

v

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Asstatedinmyprefacetothefirsteditionpublishedin2002,thisbookwasoriginally intendedasanoutlineof theSarvāstivādadoctrines. ItmainlygrewoutoftheoutlinesandnotesthatIhavegiveninthepastyearstomystudentsatthePostgraduateInstituteofPaliandBuddhistStudies,UniversityofKelaniya.SomeoftheseoutlineswerealsodistributedtostudentsattheDepartmentofReligiousStudies,UniversityofCalgarywhenIservedthereastheNumataProfessorofBuddhistThoughtinwinter,2002.Inresponsetotheneedofmystudents,Ihadalsobeenelaboratingondifferentpartsoftheseoutlinesandnotesatdifferenttimes.Theresultwasthisbookwhichnowcomestobeentitled“SarvāstivādaAbhidharma”.

ChapterFiveon“SarvāstitvaandTemporality”wasadaptedfromanessayofminewhichwasfirst included in the appendixofmyEntrance to the Supreme Doctrine (Colombo, 1998) as “TheTheoryofSarvāstitva”, andsubsequentlyslightlyrevisedandpublishedas“SarvāstitvaandTemporality:TheVaibhāṣikaDefence” in theJournal of the Postgraduate of Pali and Buddhist Studies,vol.I,1999.

Ifsomechaptersappearmoreterseandsuccinctcomparedtoothers,itwasbecausetheoriginaloutlineswereusedatdifferent timeswithsomewhatdifferentemphasesforthedifferentclasses,andwerenotplannedasasingleprojectfromthebeginning.IwouldhavelikedtopostponeandelaboratefurtherontheseoutlinesinthelittleleisurethatIhave,toimproveonthematerialpresentedherein.However,inviewofthefactthatthereishardlyanybookavailableinEnglishdealingcomprehensivelywiththedoctrinesoftheSarvāstivāda,Ihavedecidedtobringoutthispublicationatthisjuncture,inspiteofitsmanyimperfections.IlookforwardtothenottoodistantfuturewhenIshallbeabletofindsufficienttimetoofferamorecarefullyrevisededitionforthestudentsofAbhidharmawhoIhopewillfindthisbookuseful


vi

fortheirstudies.Inthepastseveralyearsofmyteaching,IhavealsodiscussedvariousAbhidharmacontroversies;andsomeofthesediscussionshavebeenpublishedinacademicjournals.Itismybeliefthatthesecontroversiescanofferusmuchinsightintotheabhidharmathoughtsystemasawhole,andhelpusimportantlytogainaproperperspectiveofthedevelopmentinBuddhistthoughtingeneral–theperiodoftheAbhidharmaschoolsbeingoneofthemostcreativephasesofthisdevelopmentinIndia.Ihave,however,withoneortwolimitedexception,refrainedfromincorporatingthesediscussionsintothisbookasmostofthemareratherlengthy.Itismyintentiontohavethemsummarizedandintegratedinabookformtobepublishedasasequeltothepresentbookonanotheroccasion.

IsuggestthatthisbookbeusedtogetherwithmyEntrance to the Supreme DoctrinetowhichIhavereferredquitefrequently.However,readersshouldtakenotethatIhaveinthispresentpublicationchangedsomeofmyearlierrenderingoftheSanskrittechnicalterms;anotableexampleis‘activity’(作用 zuo yong)forkāritaandfuntion(功能 gong neng)forvṛtti,vyāpāra,etc.

IwouldliketotakethisopportunitytoexpressmydeepgratitudetoProfessorY.KarunadasaforhisconstantencouragementtomyAbhidharmastudies,andmoralsupportinmytimesofdifficultiesinSriLanka.IamalsogratefultoVenerableBhikṣuṇīChunYiforspendingseveralsleeplessnightcarefullygoing through theentireproofof thisbookexcepting the lastchapter; toVenerableDhammapālaforproof‑readingpartofthebook;andtoVenerableBangladeshBhaddiyaTanchangyaforgeneratingtheindex,andcheckingthroughagainpartofthefinalproof.VenerableBangladeshAssajiTanchangyaandMr.W.SugathChandramustalsobethankedforhelpingatthefinalstage

ofthepreparatorywork.

Inthissecondedition,Ihaveaddedachapter(10)onthetheoriesofknowledge

oftheSarvāstivādaandtheSautrāntika.Someminoradjustmentshavealsobeen

madeinafewplaces.Imustthankmydisciples,Ven.BhaddiyaTanchangya,

PrefaCe

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Ven.Dhammadīpa(JoyadipTanchangya)andVen.DhammarakkhitaBarua,

for theirdevotedeffort inproof‑readingandgenerating the indexof this

newedition.

KLDhammajoti(法光)22ndJuly2004,Mulleriyawa


viii

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

Thiseditionisasubstantialrevisionofthesecondeditionpublishedin2004.Ihaveelaboratedonnumerouspointsinthechapters,andincorporatedrelevantmaterialfromseveralpapersIhavepublishedinjournals.Inaddition,IhavepreparedaglossaryoftheSanskrittermsoccurringinthebook,whichmayotherwisescareawaythosereadersunfamiliarwiththeSanskritlanguage.Thewholerevisionprocess,however,wasconstrainedwithinthetimeframeofsometwoandahalfmonthsduringthissummervacation,andthereisnodoubtfurtherrevisionandadditionistobedesired.

IbelievethatthiseditionisstylisticallymuchmorepresentableandfreefromtypologicalandEnglisherrorscomparedtotheprevioustwoeditions.Thisislargelyduetothetirelessproofreadingeffort—withnumeroussuggestionsandcriticism—ofVen.GelongLodröSangpoandGelongmaMigmeChödrön,bothmembersoftheChökyiGyatsoTranslationCommitteeattheGampoAbbeyMonastery.Imustthereforerecordmydeepappreciationforthesetwovenerables.Whateverstylisticimperfectionstillremainsisduetomyownobstinacyandoversight.

Myspecialthanksarealsoduetomystudent,LizaCheung,forherequallytireless effort in the proof‑readingprocess.At theCentre, shehas beenoverseeingthevariousaspectsofthewholerevisionprocess,workingfromearlymorning till late night.Shewas also responsible for extracting theSanskrittermsforinclusionintheglossary.Mythanksarealsoduetomystudents,Ven.Huifeng,AlanMokandAosiMak;theformertwo,especiallyforthedifficulttaskofgeneratingtheindex,thelatter,especiallyfordrawingandrevisingthechartsthroughoutthewholebook.OtherstudentswhohadhelpedinonerespectoranotherofthepublicationprojectincludeSandraLam,Ven.Chandaratana,Ven.ZhenJueandFrancisKwan.IamalsogratefultoSandraforlookingaftermeinvariousways,inspiteofherengagementwithourAbhidharmaDictionaryproject.MythanksarealsoduetoProfessorCFLee,Ven.Dr.JingYin,Ven.HinHungandothermembersof theLiChongYuetMingBuddhistStudiesFundoftheLiKaShingFoundation,

PrefaCe

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foracceptingthisbookasthefirstEnglishbookofthepublicationseriesoftheCentreofBuddhistStudies,UniversityofHongKong.

Finally, andmost importantly, I’d like to expressmydeepgratitude forVenerableDr.YinShunandProfessorY.KarunadasaforencouragingmetoembarkonmyAbhidharmastudies,andtheprofoundinspirationthatIhavederivedfromthem.

KLDhammajoti 法光August2007,HongKong


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PREFACE TO FOURTH EDITION

Inthisedition,Ihavedonesomerevisiononmostofthechapters.Ihavealsotakentheopportunitytocorrectnumeroustypologicalerrors,andemendsomestylisticand translation inconsistencies.Theglossaryhasalsobeenconsiderablyexpanded.

IwouldliketoexpressmydeepappreciationtoLisaCheung,AosiMak,PaulLaw,VenerableZhenJue,MeiLingFokandVenerableChandaratana,fortheirdevotedhelpintheproof‑readingprocess.Lisa,PaulandAosi,inparticular,havesacrificedmuchoftheirvaluabletimeandenergytolookafter thevarious stagesof thepublicationwork.My thanks are alsoduetoVenerableLodröSangpo,oftheGampoAbbeyMonastery,Canada,forprovidinguswithapartiallistoferrataonthepreviousedition.

IwouldalsolikeheretogratefullyacknowledgethefinancialsponsorshipoftheLiChongYuetMingBuddhistStudiesFundoftheLiKaShingFoundationforthepublicationofthisnewedition.

KLDhammajoti 法光July2009,HongKong

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ABBREVIATIONS

Note:

(i) All references ofChineseTripiṭaka texts are to theTaishō edition, unlessotherwisestated.

(ii) AllreferencesofPālitextsaretothePTSedition,unlessotherwisestated.

(iii) All referencesofPāli ṭīkā andanuṭīkā are thoseof theChaṭṭha Saṅgāyana editionof theTipiṭaka published electronically by theVipassanāResearchInstitute,Dhammagiri,Maharastra,India.

A Aṅguttara Nikāya.

ADV Abhidharmadīpa (with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti).

AH *Abhidharma-hṛdaya,(Tno.1550).

AHS *Abhidharma-hṛdaya Sūtra,(Tno.1551).

AKB Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

AKB(C) Chinesetr.ofAKBbyXuanZang,(Tno.1558).

AKB(E) Englishtr.ofAKB(F).

AKB(F) L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu,byLaValléePoussin

AmRŚ *Abhidharmāmṛta-rasa-śāstra. Chinese tr. (Translator unknown),(Tno1553).

Asm AbhidharmasamuccayaofAsaṅga.Ed.,Pradhan,P(Santiniketana,1950).

AsmB Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya. Ed.,Tatia,N(Patna,1976).

Avatāra *AbhidharmāvatārabySkandhila.

Avatāra(T) Tibetantr.ofAvatāra

BAM Karunadasa,Y,Buddhist Analysis of Matter . (Colombo,1967.)

BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,University ofLondon.

D Dīgha Nikāya.

DhsA Dhammasaṅgani Aṭṭhakathā ( =Atthasālinī).

DKŚ *Dhātu-kāya-śāstra, 阿毘達磨界身足論,(Tno.1540).DSŚ *Dharma-skandha-śāstra, 阿毘達磨法藴足論,(Tno.1537).EnB Encyclopaedia of Buddhism. Ed.,Malalasekera,GP (Colombo,1961).

Entrance Dhammajoti,KL,Entrance into the Supreme Dharma. 2ndrevisededition(HongKong,2008).

Frauwallner Frauwallner,E(1995).


xii

HVy *Abhidharma-hṛdaya-vyākhyā,(Tno.1552).

IAKB Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

IHQ Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.

ISVm 唯識學探源. (An Investigation into the Source of the Vijñaptimātratā Philosophy)Reprint.Taipei.(1974a).

JCBSSL Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies,SriLanka.

JPŚ Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra, 阿毘達磨發智論,(Tno.1544).JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.

Katō “NotessurlesdeuxmaîtresbouddhiquesKumāralātaetŚrīlāta.”In:Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte;197–213.Katō,J(1980).

Kvu Kathāvatthu.

M Majjhima Nikāya.

MA Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā.

MCB Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, I’InstituteBelge desHautesEtudesChinoises,Bruxelles.

MPPU *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa, 大智度論,(Tno.1509).MVŚ *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra, 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, (T no. 1545).Ny *Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra, 阿毘達磨順正理論,(Tno.1562).Perception Dhammajoti,KL,Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy on Perception. 3rd

revisededition(HongKong,2008).

PjŚ Prajñapti-śāstra, 施設論,(Tno.1538).PrŚ Abhidharmaprakaraṇa-śāstra, 阿毘達磨品類足論,(Tno.1542).PTS ThePāliTextSociety,London.

PVV Pañcavastuka-vibhāṣā-śāstra,(Tno.1555).

S Saṃyutta Nikāya.

S& Saṃyuktagāma, 雜阿含,(Tno.99).SatŚ *Satyasiddhi-śāstra, 成實論,Chinesetr.byKumārajīva.SDS Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha.

SgPŚ Abhidharma-saṅgīti-paryāya-śāstra, 阿毘達磨異門足論,(Tno.1536).Siddhi(C) *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi, 成唯識論,compiledbyXuanZang,(Tno.1585).Siddhi(F) Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi, vol.I–II.Paris.(1928).

Siddhi(S) SanskrittextofSthiramati’sTriṃśikā Vijñaptimātratā (-siddhi)(=Siddhi).

Siddhi(T) Sum cu pa‘i ‘grel pa (Tibetan version of Sthiramati’s Triṃśikābhāṣya). Ed.,Teramoto,E(Kyoto,1932).

SPrŚ *Abhidharma-samaya-pradīpikā-śāstra, 阿毘達磨顯宗論,(Tno.1563).

abbreviationS

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Study YinShun說一切有部為主論書與論師之硏究 (A Study of the Śāstras and Ācāryas of the Sarvāstivāda and Other Schools).Taipei.(1968).

T Taishō Shinshu Daizokyo,大正大藏經.Ed.,Takakusu,J.19241932.Tatia Tatia,N“Sarvāstivāda.”In:Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra Research Publication,

vol.II;75–138.(1960).

TA(U‑J) Shogaito,M.Studies in the Uighur Version of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya-ṭīkā Tattvārthā. Vol.I.Kyoto.(1991).

TSP Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā. Ed.,EmbarKrishnamacharya(Baroda,1984).

ZY Selected Chinese Tripiṭaka Texts, 藏要. Ed.,OuYang Jian. (Nanking,1930—1945).

UdA Udāna Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī).

Viṃś Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.

Vism Visuddhimagga.Ed.,Kosambi,D(Bombay,1940).

VKŚ Abhidharma-vijñāna-kāya-śāstra, 阿毘達磨識身足論,(Tno.1539).Vy Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyāofYaśomitra(=Vyākhyā).Ed.,Wogihara,

U(Tokyo,1971).

YBŚ Yogācārabhūmi śāstra of Asaṅga.

ZW 藏外佛教文獻,Vol.I(Bejing,1995).


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1

1. AbhidharmaIts Origin, Meaning and Function

1.1. Origin of the abhidharma

1.1.1. Originaccordingtotradition

1.1.2. Historicalorigin

1.2. Definitionsofabhidharma

1.3. Thesoteriologicalfunctionoftheabhidharma

1.1. Origin of the abhidharma

1.1.1. Origin according to tradition

Traditionally,theabhidharma-piṭakaisgivenasthelastofthetripiṭaka -swhoseorderis:vinaya,sūtra,abhidharma—orsūtra,vinaya,abhidharma in the northern tradition.Thisveryprobablyreflectsthehistoricalfactthattheabhidharmatextswereevolvedandcompiledasapiṭakalaterthantheothertwo.ThissamefactisalsodiscernibleintheancienttripledesignationsgiventothespecialistsoftheBuddhistCanon—vinaya-dhara,sūtra-dhara,mātṛkā-dhara.Significantly,the third term in the list has, insteadofabhidharma, the termmātṛkā (Pāli:mātikā),meaningamatrixintheformofalistsummarilyenumeratingtopicstobeelaboratedupon.Thissuggeststhatattheearlierstage,thestudyofthesemātṛkā‑shadservedasamajorbasisforthedevelopmentoftheabhidharma-piṭaka.(Seebelow).

Itispossiblethatmostoftheso‑calledHīnayānaschoolsinIndiapossessedtheirownsetsoftripiṭaka.Unfortunately,mostofthesetripiṭakatextsarenolongerextant.Asfarasthecanonicalabhidharmatextsareconcerned,wearenowinpossessionofonlytwocompletesets:theseventextsoftheTheravādapreservedinPāli,andthesevenSarvāstivādatextsinChinesetranslation.Ofthelatter,however,thePrajñapti-śāstra(PjŚ)isonlyapartialtranslation;afullerversionispreservedintheTibetan(seeinfra,§4.1.1.3).Itisintheabhidharmatreatises—comprising commentaries, sub‑commentaries and compendia besides thecanonicaltexts—thattheseHīnayānaschoolsgraduallydefinedandarticulatedtheirdistinctivedoctrinalpositions.Whileitisafactthattheextantvinaya‑andsūtra-piṭaka-scannolongerclaimtobethepristinewordsoftheBuddha,muchaswewouldlike,thesectariancoloringwithinthesetwocollectionsarebyandlargemarginalcomparedtothatintheabhidharmatexts—awell‑knownfactborneout by comparative studies of the extantPālinikāya and theChineseāgamatexts.


2

AccordingtotheTheravādatradition,Śāriputratransmittedtheabhidhamma to thedisciples.AllofthesevencanonicalabhidhammatextsaresaidtobebytheBuddha,thefirstābhidhammika.1TheBuddhafirsttaughtittothegodsintheThirty‑three(tāva-tiṃsa)‑Heaven;anditwasstudiedandtransmittedthroughŚāriputrabyasuccessionofteachers.2

The Sarvāstivāda tradition, on the other hand, accepts that their canonicalabhidharmaworkswere compiled by the disciples.Nevertheless, like theTheravāda,it toomaintainsthattheBuddhaistherealauthor;thecompilerssimplygatheredupandre‑arrangedHisdispersedteachings:

Withouttheexpositionoftheabhidharma,thepupilisunabletoexaminethe dharma-s.However,itwasspokenbytheFortunateOneinadispersedmanner.TheVenerableKātyāyanīputra andothers, having collected it,establishedit [as theabhidharma]—justas theVenerableDharmatrātamadetheUdāna-varga[bycollectingthescatteredsayingsoftheBuddha].(na hi vinābhidharmopadeśena śiṣyaḥ śakto dharmān pravicetum iti /sa tu prakīrṇa ukto bhagavatā /bhadantakātyāyanīputraprabhṛtibhiḥ piṇḍīkṛtya sthāpito bhadanta-dharmatrātodāna-vargīya-karaṇavat //)3

The Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā (MVŚ) likewise speaks ofKātyāyanīputracompilingwhattheBuddhahadspokeninthesūtra‑s.Itfurtherdeclares:

The abhidharmawasoriginally thewordsof theBuddha; it isonly thecompilationof theVenerable [Kātyāyanīputra].Moreover,whether theyaretheBuddha’sorthedisciples’words,[solongas]theydonotcontradictdharmatā,theBhagavatallowedallofthemtobestudied(lit:upheld)bythe bhikṣu-s.Accordingly,theVenerablemadethecompilationfromwhathehadheardfromthelineoftraditionorfromhisexaminationthroughthepowerofhisresolution‑knowledge(praṇidhi-jñāna).

The 5thcenturyC.E.orthodoxVaibhāṣikamaster,Saṃghabhadra,speaksinthesamevein:

…theBuddhafirstexpoundedtheabhidharmaHimself.WithouttheBuddha’sexposition,thegreatdisciples,Śāriputraandothers,wouldnothavebeencapableoftheproperinvestigationintothecharacteristicsofthedharma-s.…[ThecompilationoftheBuddha’sdispersedabhidharmateachings]byVenerableKātyāyanīputraandothers…waslikethecollectivecompilation(saṃgīti)ofthevinayaandthesūtra-sbytheVenerableMahākāśyapaandothers.Thetwopiṭaka-s,sūtraandvinaya,werecompiledinaccordancewiththewords;itwasonlytheabhidharma-piṭakathatwascompiledinaccordancewiththemeanings.…Thecompilationoftheabhidharma in accordancewiththeBuddha’snobleteachingswaspermittedbytheBuddhaandcanthereforebecalledtheBuddha’swords.4

1. abhidharma - itS orgin, meaning and funCtion

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1.1.2. Historical origin

Inallprobability,theabhidharmahasitsorigininthesūtra-s.However,thetermabhidharma—althoughoccurring,oftenalongsideabhivinaya, in the sūtra-s—doesnotrefertotheabhidharmatextsconstitutingthethirdpiṭaka,forinthe sūtra-sthemeaningofabhidharmaseemstobe‘aboutthedhamma’,or‘theprofounddoctrines’(oftheBuddha).

Thefollowingtypesofsūtra-sareparticularlynoteworthyashavingfeatureswhichcontributedtothedevelopmentoftheabhidhamma/abhidharma in the later specialized sense, all aiming at unfolding and clarifying theBuddha’sprofoundteachings:

(a)Those featuringabhidharma-kathā—a solemndialoguebetween twobhikṣu-s concerning the spiritual path; others listening are not permitted tointerrupt.Anexample is theMahāgosiṅga-sutta:5 Sāriputta asksĀnanda,Anuruddha,Revata,MahāKassapaandfinallyMahāMoggallānainturnwhatkindofbhikkhucouldenhancethebrillianceoftheGosiṅga‑sālavana‑dāyawhichisdelightfulinthemoon‑litnight.Moggallānareplies:“Here,friendSāriputta,twobhikkhu-s engage in anabhidhamma-kathā, and each, beingquestionedby the other, answerswithoutfloundering, and their discussionproceeds inaccordancewith theDhamma.Suchkindofbhikkhu-s could illuminate thisGosiṅga‑sālavana‑dāya.”The6thcenturyTheravādacommentator,Buddhaghoṣa,infact,linksdhammakathikawithabhidhamma. (Atthasālinī,25)

(b)Those featuringvedalla (Skt.vaidalya):Derived from√dalmeaning to‘crack’/‘open’, this featuresignifies theextensiveunravelingof theprofounddoctrinalmeaningsthathavebeenhidden.Inform,itconsistsofaquestionandanswersessionondoctrinalmatterswithascopeapparentlybroaderthanthatin abhidhamma-kathā—eitherbetweentheBuddhaandthefourfolddisciples(withotherslistening)oramongthedisciplesthemselves.Vedalla-kathāisalsosometimes juxtaposed toabhidhamma-kathā;6 e.g.,theMahā-vedalla-sutta7 whereMahākoṭṭhita questions andSāriputta answers; theCūḷavedalla-sutta8 whereVisākhaquestions,Dhammadinnāanswers.

In the Theravāda classificatory schemeof theBuddha’s nine‑fold teachings(navaṅga-satthu-sāsana),vedallaoccursasthelastmember,whichmaysuggestthatitcametobeincorporatedintotheschemeatthetimeoftheevolutionofabhidharmaintothegenreofwhichitwasconsideredtocorrespond.BoththeSarvāstivādaandtheYogācāraequateitwithvaitulyaandvaipulya. Saṃghabhadra’sexplanationisasfollows:

Vaipulya refers to the extensive analytical clarificationofdharma-s bymeansoflogicalreasoning(正理;*yukti,*nyāya);for,alldharma-shavenumerousnaturesandcharacteristicswhichcannotbeanalyticallyclarifiedwithoutextensivediscussion.Itisalsoknownasextensivebursting(廣破;


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vaidalya < vi+√dal),forthisextensivediscussioniscapableofburstingtheextremelystrongdarknessofnescience(ajñāna).Itisalsoknownasunmatchability(無比;vaitulya < vi+√tul),forthisextensivediscussionhassubtleandprofoundprincipleswhichcannotbematched.9

ThesameequationofthethreetermsisalsoseenintheAbhidharma-samuccaya (underDharma-viniścaya)andits bhāṣyawhichnoteworthilygivesaMahāyānicstressinthiscontext,speakingofthethemasbeingsynonymsforMahāyāna.10 ItmaywellbethatbyAsaṅga’stime,ifnotearlier,thishadbecomeacommonnorthernBuddhisttradition.11

(c)Thosefeaturingthevibhaṅga(‘analysis/exposition’)style—abrief,summarizedteaching is elaboratedby theBuddhaor a competentdisciple.Thevibhaṅga methodology,however,istobeunderstoodasoriginallyrepresentingadistinctivecharacteristicof theBuddha’steachings,andnot justafeaturecharacterizinganexpositiononthebriefteachings.Thetwoterms,abhidharmaandabhivinaya (‘concerning thedharma’, ‘concerning thevinaya’), often juxtaposed in thesūtra‑s,areindicativeoftheearliestdevelopment.Thesignificanceofbeingtheelaborationonbriefteachings,however,cametopredominateatleastbythetimeofformationofthenikāya/āgamacollections.IntheMadhyamāgama,wefindsome35sūtra-s groupedas*vibhaṅgarecitations(分別誦).Likewise,therearesome12sutta‑s groupedunder thePāliVibhaṅga-vagga.Likevedalla, then,italsocametosignifytheexplicationoftheprofoundmeaningsintendedintheBuddha’swords,andthevibhaṅgamethodistoeffectthisthroughananalyticalelaboration.Suchadevelopmentwasobviouslyconnectedwiththeemergenceof the abhidharma.Indeed,theearliestabhidharmatexts,suchastheDharma-skandha-śāstra, exhibit the feature of being a technical commentaryon thesūtra‑s, andoneof the earlyPāli canonicalabhidhamma texts is noticeablynamedaVibhaṅgappakaraṇa.

(d)Thosefeaturingmātṛkā/mātikā—originallymeaningamatrixorlistofheadingspurporting to systematically summarize theBuddha’s teaching (seeabove),e.g.,thelistof37doctrinaltopicsoftenknownasbodhipakṣya-dharma12 —four smṛtyupasthāna‑s, four samyak pradhāna‑s, four ṛddhipāda‑s, fiveindriya‑s, fivebala‑s, sevenbodhyaṅga‑s, eightāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga‑s. IntheKinti-sutta13 these are given as thedhamma taught by theBuddhawhohasrealizedthemdirectly(ye vo mayā dhammā abhiññā desitā),andthebhikkhu‑sareexhortedtotrainthemselvesinthemconcordantly.Itisnoteworthythat,inthiscontext,thetermabhidhammaoccurs:tesañ ca vo bhikkhave samaggānaṃ … sikkhataṃ, siyaṃsu dve bhikkhū abhidhamme nānāvādā …(“Obhikkhu‑s,whileyouare trainingconcordantly…, twobhikkhu-s mightdispute as regards theabhidhamma …”).Thesamelistof37aregivenintheMahāparinibbāna-suttanta asasummaryoftheDhammataughtbytheBuddhathroughoutHiswholecareer.The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya(AKB)referstothemasconstitutingtheBuddha’s


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Saddharma pertaining to realization (adhigama); that pertaining to teaching(āgama;lit.‘tradition’)issaidtocomprisethesūtra,vinayaandabhidharma.14 Inthenortherntradition,however,itcametoincludeaswellthefundamentalabhidharmatextsandthetruthfulabhidharmiccommentariesontheBuddha’swords.(Seebelow).

This feature represents a tendency towardorganization and systematizationwhichistheessentialcharacteristicofabhidharma.Manyscholarsbelievethatabhidharmaevolvedfrommātṛkā.Imentionedabove(§1.1.1)thecanonicaltriplet,vinaya-dhara—sūtra-dhara—mātṛkā-dhara. In the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā (fullycompiledaroundmid2ndcenturyA.D.)oftheSarvāstivāda,weactuallyfindmātṛkā-dharareplacedbyabhidharma-dharaintheVinayaversioncitedtherein.15Asamatteroffact, thewholeoftheSaṅgīti-suttanta of the Dīgha-nikāyamaybeconsideredasamātṛkā,whichintheSarvāstivādaevolvedintoafundamentalabhidharma textentitledtheSaṅgīti-paryāya. It isnoteworthythat,aslateasthe5thcenturyC.E.,wefindSaṃghabhadramentioningmātṛkā unambiguouslyasbeingsynonymouswithabhidharmaandupadeśa(seebelow),andcitesasmātṛkātheearlySarvāstivādacanonicaltexts:theSaṅgītiparyāya,the Dharma-skandha and thePrajñapti-śāstra. Similarly, in explaining theabhidharma-piṭaka, theMūla-sarvāstivāda-vinaya-kṣudraka-vastu also says,“thefoursmṛtyupasthāna‑s,thefoursamyak-prahāṇa‑s,…theDharma-saṃgīti (=SgPŚ),theDharma-skandha—thesearecollectivelyknownasmātṛkā‑s”.16 The Aśokāvadāna,too,speaksofthemātṛkā-piṭaka,givingsimilarcontents.17

(e)Thosefeaturingupadeśa—anexpositoryorexegeticaldiscourse.ThisisexplainedbySaṃghabhadraasfollows,equatingitwithmātṛkāandabhidharma:

Upadeśa refers to the non‑erroneous (aparyasta,aviparīta) revealing,answeringof objections and ascertainment, of the preceding [eleven]members.Accordingtosome,upadeśaalsoreferstoanalyticalexplanations,inaccordancewithreasoning,givenbythosewhohaveseenthetruthoftheprofoundmeaningsofthesūtra‑s,orbyotherwiseones.18Itisnoneotherthanwhatiscalledmātṛkā,for,whenthemeaningofothersūtra-s istobeexplained,thisservesasthemātṛkā.Itisalsocalledabhidharma,onaccountofitsbeingfacetoface(abhi)withthecharacteristicsofdharma - s,andofitsbeinganon‑erroneousunravelingofthecharacteristicsofdharma‑s.19

The Yogācāratraditionalsoequateslikewise:

Whatisupadeśa?Itreferstoallthemātṛkā‑s,abhidharma-s.Theinvestigationintotheprofoundsūtra-piṭakaandtheproclamationofalltheessentialtenetsof the sūtra‑s—thisisknownasupadeśa.20

Suchequationpointsclearlytothedefiniteconnectionthatthislastmember(aṅga)of the dvādaśāṅgahaswiththeevolutionoftheabhidharma. The 12 aṅga‑s,asgivenbySaṃghabhadra,21 are: 1.sūtra, 2.geya, 3.vyākaraṇa, 4.gāthā, 5.udāna,


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6. nidāna,7. avadāna,8.itivṛttaka/ityuktaka,9.jātaka,10.vaipula/vaitulya(whichalsoseemstobeconnectedwithvaidalya=Pālivedalla),11.adbhuta-dharma,12. upadeśa.22Aswehave seen above,Saṃghabhadra asserts thatupadeśa is thenon‑erroneous revealing, unravelingof difficulties and ascertainment,ofthemeaning ofallthepreceding11partsofthedvādaśāṅga.ThisisinfactaSarvāstivādadescriptionofthenatureandfunctionofabhidharma.

Saṃghabhadra’sassertionofupadeśabeingthetruecriterionfortheBuddha’swords(buddha-vacana)isquiteinlinewiththedefinitionintheMVŚ:

What isupadeśa (議論)? It refers to those teachingswithin the sūtra-s whichserveascriteriafortheblack‑teachings(黑23說),thegreat‑teachings(大說),etc.Furthermore, it isas in thecasewhereonce theBuddha,havingbrieflyexpoundedonasūtra,enteredintohisroomremainingsilentforalongtime,[whereupon]thegreatdisciplesassembledtogether,eachexplainingtheBuddha’swordswithdifferentwordsandmeanings.24

In brief, three basicmeanings ofupadeśa are discernible in the northerntradition:

(i) Those teachingswithin the sūtra-piṭaka, givenby theBuddhaHimself,whichservetoascertainwhatmayormaynotbeacceptedastheBuddha’strueteachings.InSaṃghabhadra’sterms,theyarerepresentedbythelastoftheBuddha’stwelve‑foldteachings,servingtoascertaintheauthenticityofalltheotheraṅga‑sasbuddha-vacana.

(ii)The collective elaborate discussionby the great disciples on the briefdiscoursesoftheBuddha.25

(iii)Since,asSaṃghabhadrastates,upadeśaalsoreferstotruthfulexpositionsby“thosewhohaveseenthetruth”ofthesūtra-s or“otherwiseones”,itcanthen subsumenot only the canonicalabhidharma texts but also certainauthoritative post‑canonical commentaries satisfying theSarvāstivādinconditions.26

1.2. Definitions of abhidharma

InthePālitradition,twomainmeaningsaregiven:(i)supplementary(atireka)doctrines,(ii)special/superior(visesa/visiṭṭha)doctrines.27Therearealsoothermeanings,notably‘supreme(uttama)doctrines’.28Thesemeaningsarebasedontheinterpretationoftheprefix,abhi,as‘supreme’or‘excellent’,andofdhamma as‘doctrine’.Theotherinterpretationofabhi,whichseemstobehistoricallyearlier,29 is ‘pertaining to’, or ‘facing/envisaging’;abhidhamma accordinglymeans‘pertainingtothedoctrine’or‘concerningthedoctrine’.


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Inthenortherntradition,thesecondforegoinginterpretationisthepredominantone, andXuanZang consistently rendersabhidharma as ‘facing/envisagingdharma’(對法).However,thetwocomponents,‘facing/pertaining’and‘dharma’,arefurtherelaborateddifferently.Thus,theMVŚgivesnumerousexplanatorydefinitionsofthetermabhidharmaasfollows:

(I) AccordingtotheĀbhidharmikas,itissocalledbecause(1)itcanproperlyandutterlydetermine(vi-niś‑√ci)thecharacteristicsofalldharma-s;(2)itcanproperlyexamineandpenetratethedharma-s,(3)itcandirectlyrealize(abhi-sam‑√i)andrealize(sākṣāt‑√kṛ)withregardtoalldharma-s;(4)itcangettotheverybottomoftheprofoundnatureofdharma-s;(5)throughit,thewisdom‑eyeofthenobleonescomestobepurified;(6)itisonlythroughitthatthenatureofthedharma-s,subtlefrombeginninglesstime,comestoberevealed;(7)whatitexpoundsisnotcontradictorytothenatureof the dharma-s—onewhoisextremelywell‑versedwithregardto the specific and common characteristics in theabhidharma cannotbefaultedinanywayandmadetocontradictthenatureofthe dharma-s;(8)itcanrefuteanddefeatallthehereticalviews.

(II) According to theVenerableVasumitra, it is so called because(9)itcanalwaysascertainthenatureofthedharma-s given in the sūtra‑s;(10)itcanproperlyunderstandthenatureofthetwelve‑linkconditionedco‑arising (pratītya-samutpāda); (11)it candirectlyrealize thedharma-s of the four noble truths; (12)it skillfullyexpoundsonthepracticeofthenobleeightfoldpath;(13)itcanrealizenirvāṇa; (14)it repeatedly analyses thedharma-s frominnumerabledoctrinalperspectives.

(III) AccordingtotheBhadanta(Dharmatrāta),itissocalledbecause(15)—bymeansofwords,phrasesandsentences—itsystematicallycompiles, organizes and analyses thedharma-s pertaining todefilement,purification,bondage,liberation,andtothesaṃsāricprocess(pravṛtti)anditscessation(nivṛtti).

(IV) AccordingtoVenerableParśva,because(16)itisthefinal,judgmental,absoluteandnon‑erroneousprajñā.

(V) According toVenerableGhoṣaka, because (17)it canproperlyexplain,toaseekerofliberationengagedintheproperpractice,whathehasnotunderstood:“thisisduḥkha;thisisthecauseofduḥkha;thisisthecessationofduḥkha;thisisthepathleadingtothe cessation;thisisthepreparatorypath(prayoga-mārga);thisisthe unhinderedpath(ānantarya-mārga);thisisthepathofliberation(vimokṣa-mārga);thisisthepathofprogress/advancement/distinction(viśeṣa-mārga);30thisisthepathofthecandidate(pratipannaka);thisistheacquisitionofthespiritualfruit.”

(VI) AccordingtotheDharmaguptas,becausethisdharmaispredominant.


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(VII) AccordingtotheMahīśāsakas,because(18)prajñācanilluminatethe dharma-s.

(VIII)AccordingtotheDārṣṭāntikas,because(19)itisnexttonirvāṇa,thesupremeamongalldharma-s.

(IX) According to theGrammarians (Śābdika,Śābdavāda), because(20)itcanabandonthefetters,bondages,proclivities,secondarydefilementsandenvelopments;anditcanascertaintheaggregates(skandha),abodes(āyatana),elements(dhātu),conditionedco‑arising(pratītya-samutpāda),truths(satya),foods(āhāra),spiritualfruits(śrāmaṇya-phala),factorsconducivetoenlightenment(bodhipakṣya-dharma),etc.—ameanstoabandon,andbhimeanstoascertain.

(X) AccordingtoVenerableBuddhapālita,because(21)theprefixabhimeans‘facetoface’,andthisdharmacaninducealltheskillfuldharma-s—the bodhi-pakṣya-dharma-s,etc.—toappearfacetoface.

(XI) According toVenerableBuddhadeva, because (22)abhimeans‘predominant’,andthisdharmaispredominant.

(XII) AccordingtoVāmalabdha,because(23)abhimeans‘veneration’,andthisdharmaishonorableandvenerable.31

Amongthevariousmeaningsgivenabove,somearemoreorlessoverlapping,andsomefindcorrespondenceintheTheravāda.Theymaybesubsumedintotwobroadsenses:(i)thatofclear,decisivediscernmentandascertainment;(ii)thatofbeingdirect,facetoface.32Thefirst,whilebringingoutthecharacteristicconcernofabhidharmaarticulatedbytheĀbhidharmikatradition,emphasizesits intellectual function; the second, the spiritual or soteriological function.Intheseexplanations,dharmaisexplicitlyinterpretedaseitherthefundamentalconstituentsofexistenceorasnirvāṇaquathesupremeDharma,andimplicitly,insomecases,asdoctrine.

Unlikeinlatertexts(e.g.,theAKB.Seebelow),thereisnoexplicitdefinitionondharmaassuchinthecanonicalabhidharmatextsortheMVŚ.Nevertheless,thenotionofadharmabeingauniqueexistentpossessinganon‑changingintrinsicnatureiscertainlyattestedatleastintheJPŚandtheMVŚ.Thelatterspeaksof“dharma‑seachabidinginitsintrinsicnature”(T27,42b)and,“theessentialnatureofadharmadoesnotchangethroughouttime.”(T27,105c).TheJPŚstates:

... dharma‑s aredeterminedwith respect tonature and characteristic ...Dharma‑saredetermined,withoutbeingco‑mingled.Theyabideintheirintrinsicnatures,anddonotrelinquishtheirintrinsicnatures.(T26,923c)

Bothaspects—thetraditionalunderstandingofabhias‘excellent’(eulogistic)and ‘pertaining’, on the one hand, and the essential characteristic of theābhidharmicexegesis,ontheother—arebroughtoutinthefollowingdefinitionof Saṃghabhadra:


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All themost excellent discourses associatedwithadhiśīla are calledabhivinaya,astheyarecapableofbeingfacetofacewiththevinaya.Alltheprofoundexegeticaldiscourses(論道)associatedwiththecharacteristicsofdharma‑sarecalledabhidharma,astheyarecapableofbeingfacetofacewiththenatureandcharacteristicsofdharma‑s.Orrather,thesūtra‑sarecalleddharma;the[abhidharma]treatises,beingcapableofdirectly(facetoface)discerntheirmeanings,arecalledabhidharma.33

AKBexplainsthetermasfollows:

A dharmaissocalledbecauseitsustainsitsowncharacteristic.Thisdharma faces(abhi)towardthedharmainthehighestsense,i.e.,nirvāṇa,ortowardthecharacteristicsofdharma-s,34thusitisabhidharma.35

Abhidharma in the highest, real, sense is noneother than the pureprajñā definedasthediscernmentofdharma-s(dharma-pravicaya).Inkeepingwiththe ĀbhidharmikadefinitionofabhidharmawhichwehaveseenintheMVŚ(supra,§1.2.(1)),Saṃghabhadra,inthisconnection,distinctivelyspellsoutthesenseofabhiassignifyingabhisamaya,‘directrealization’:

Now,whyisitthatonlytheoutflow‑freeprajñāaloneiscalledabhidharma?Because,whenthecharacteristicsofdharma‑shavebeendirectlyrealized(現觀;abhi-sam-√i)throughit,onewillnolongerbedeluded[therein].36

Secondarily or conventionally,abhidharma also refers to thewith‑outflow(sāsrava)prajñā—derived from listening, reflectionandcultivation (śruta-cintā-bhāvanā-mayī prajñā) or innately acquired (upapattipratilambhikā)—whichhelpstobringaboutthepure(i.e.,outflow‑free)prajñā. The abhidharma śāstra‑s,too,inasmuchastheyserveasameansorasrequisites(saṃbhāra)toitsacquisition,arealsotobeconsideredasabhidharma.37

Thenatureandcharacteristicsoftheabhidharmaaredistinguishedfromthoseoftheothertwopiṭaka‐sasfollows:38(Seealso§1.3below)

TheSūtra is theemanation(niṣyanda)of theBuddha’spower(bala), fornonecanrefutethedoctrinestherein.

TheVinaya is theemanationofgreatcompassion (mahā-karuṇā), for itadvocatesmorality(śīla)forthesalvationofthoseintheunfortunateplanesofexistence(durgati).

The Abhidharmaistheemanationoffearlessness,foritproperlyestablishesthetruecharacteristicsofdharma‑s,answeringquestionsandascertainingfearlessly.39


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Intermsofscopeofdiscourse:

TheSūtracomprisesvariousmiscellaneousdiscourses; theVinayadealswiththetrainingfactors(śikṣā-pada);theAbhidharmainvestigatesintotheintrinsicandcommoncharacteristicsofdharma‑s.

Intermsofstage(avasthā)ofdiscourse:

TheSūtradiscoursesareinrespectofthestageofthebeginners(ādhikarmika).TheVinayadiscoursesareinrespectofthestageoftheadepts(kṛta-parijaya).The Abhidharmadiscoursesareinrespectofthestageofcompletemastery(atikrānta-manaskāra:Onewho‘hastranscendedmentalapplication/effort’).

1.3. The soteriological function of the abhidharma

Theabovediscussion(§1.1.2,§1.2)shouldsufficetoindicatethatabhidharma originatedwithaspiritualmotivation:Itdevelopedintheprocessofthedisciplesdesiringtoproperly,fully,andsystematicallyunderstandtheprofoundteachingsoftheBuddha.Amongthetenetslistedinthe*Samayabhedoparacaṇa-cakraasbeingcommonlyheldbyallSarvāstivādins,onestatesthat“thenobleeightfoldpathconstitutestheTrueDharma‑wheel(dharma-cakra)”;another,that“notallsūtra‑sspokenbytheBuddhahavetheirmeaningsfullydrawnout(nītārtha).”40 Takentogether,thesetenetsamounttoastatementoftheĀbhidharmikapositionthattheAbhidharma,whichistheabsolute,trueteachingoftheBuddha,constitutesthetruespiritualpraxistaughtbytheBuddhafortherealizationofNirvāṇa—thenobleeightfoldpath.

IntheAKB(ca. 5thcenturyC.E.)andabhidharmaworkssubsequenttoit,wecan still clearly discern thefirmconviction in the soteriological functionofabhidharma.Thus, in theAKB theĀbhidharmikadeclares thatabhidharma hasbeentaughtbytheBuddhabecauseitistheonlyexcellentmeansfortheappeasementofdefilementsenablingworldlingstogetoutofsaṃsāra:

Sinceapartfromtheexaminationofdharma‑s(=prajñā = abhidharma),there is no excellentmeans for the appeasement of the defilements; Anditisonaccountofthedefilementsthatbeingswanderintheexistence‑ocean.Forthisreason,therefore,itissaid,the[abhidharma]istaughtbytheMaster.41

Theimportanceofthediscernmentofdharma‑shasinfactalreadybeenemphasizedintheSūtraamongtheearliestBuddhistteachingsonspiritualpraxis:Itisthesecondmemberoftheseven“factorsconducivetoenlightenment”(bodhyaṅga;Pali:bojjhaṅga);tobecultivatedimmediatelyafteronehasacquiredmindfulness(smṛti)whichisthefirstmember.


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The Ābhidharmikadistinctionintermsofthefunctionsofthethreepiṭaka‑sisalsoindicativeofthespiritualfunctionoftheabhidharma:thesūtra-piṭakaistaughtsothatthosewhohavenotplantedtheskillfulroots(kuśala-mūla)andbecomedelightedthereinwillplantthemandbedelighted;thevinaya,sothatthosewhohaveplantedandbecomedelightedintheskillfulrootswillmaturetheirseries,practicingwhatshouldbepracticed;theabhidharma,sothatthosewhohavesomaturedandpracticedwillhavethepropermeanstobeenlightenedandliberated.42

Intellectual studies andĀbhidharmika analysismust serve the sole purposeofspiritualrealization.ThissoteriologicalfunctionisalsobroughtoutinthefollowingexplanationintheMVŚregardingthepractitionersofinsightmeditation(vipaśyanā-bhāvanā):

Thosewhomostlycultivatetherequisites(saṃbhāra)ofinsightarethosewho, at the stageof preparatory effort, alwaysdelight in studying andreflectingonthetripiṭaka.Theyrepeatedlyexaminethespecificandgeneralcharacteristicsofalldharma-s[—topicsoffundamentalimportanceforabhidharma].When they enter into the noble path, they are called thevipaśyanā-typeofpractitioners(vipaśyanā-carita).43

Thesametextfurtherexplains theultimatepurposeofabhidharmicanalysiswhichistoproceedfromourdeludedstateandreachabsolutequiescencethroughagradualprogressionfromintellectualtospiritualinsight:

Onewishingtoexaminealldharma-sshouldfirstexaminetheirsubsumption(saṃgraha)intermsofintrinsicnature.

Whatarethebenefitsandmeritstobederivedfromtheexaminationofthesubsumptionintermsoftheintrinsicnatureofdharma-s?

ItremovesthenotionsofSelfandunityandtrainsinthenotionofdharma-s…whichintensifydefilements….WhenthenotionsofSelfandunityareremoved,oneisthenabletogaintheinsightthatmaterialdharma-s…willsoonbedispersedandimmaterialdharma-s…willsoonperish.…

Inthisway,onewillcometoacquiretheseedssimilartothegatewayofliberationofemptiness(śūnyatā).

Examiningthatconditioneddharma-sareemptyandnot‑Self,onewillcometobedeeplyaversetosaṃsāra,thusfurtheracquiringtheseedssimilartothegatewayofliberationofthesignless(animitta).

Notdelightinginsaṃsāra,onethencomestotakedeepdelightinnirvāṇa,thus further acquiring the seeds similar to the gatewayof liberationofnon‑aspiring(apraṇihita).


12

With regard to these three samādhi‑s [of liberation], onegenerates themediumwiththesupportofthelower,andthehigherwiththesupportofthemedium,bringingforthprajñā,becomingdetachedfromthetriplespheres,attainingperfectenlightenmentandrealizingabsolutequiescence.44


13

NOTES

1 DhsA,17.2 DhsA,3,5,21.3 AKB,3.4 Ny,779c.5 M,i,212ff.6 E.g.,A,ii,107.7 M,i,293ff.8 M,i,299ff.9 T29,595a–b.10 AsmB, 96: vaipulyaṃ vaidalyaṃ vaitulyam ity ete mahāyānasya paryāyāḥ | tad etat saptavidha-

mahattva-yogān mahattva-yānam ity ucyate | saptavidhaṃ mahattvam ālaṃbana-mahattvaṃ … pratipatti-mahattvaṃ … jñāna-mahattvaṃ … vīrya-mahattvaṃ … upāyakauśalya-mahattvaṃ … prāpti-mahattvaṃ … karma-mahattvaṃ …

11 Seealso:Dhammajoti,KL,‘AbhidharmaandUpadeśa’,inJournal of Buddhist Studies,Vol.3,112f.,(Colombo,2005).

12 MVŚ,496,equatesbodhiherewiththeknowledgeofexhaustion(kṣaya-jñāna)andtheknowledgeofnon‑arising(anutpāda-jñāna).

13 M,ii,238f.14 AKB,459.Alsocf.MVŚ,917c,wheretheSaddharmaissubdividedintotheconventionalandtheabsolute(paramārtha)ones.Theformercomprises theverbal teachingsof thetripiṭaka;thelatteristhenoblepath,i.e.,theoutflow‑freeindriya,bala,bodhyaṅgaandthe mārgāṅga.

15 MVŚ,546a.16 T24,408b.17 T50,113c.18 Seealso*Satyasiddhi-śāstra,T32,245b.19 T29,595b.20 T30,419a.21 Ny,595a–b.22 ThisenumerationagreeswiththatintheMVŚ,2a.23 默inMVŚ.ButasYinShun(Study,24)pointsout,itclearlyisanerrorfor黑.24 MVŚ,660b.25 MVŚ,660b.SeeYinShun,原始佛教聖典之集成 (Compilation of the Canon of Primitive

Buddhism),(Taipei,1971),617ff.26 Seealso,Dhammajoti,KL,op. cit.,113ff.27 DhsA, 2:kenaṭṭhena abhidhammo | dhammātireka-dhamma-visesaṭṭhena | atireka-

visesaṭṭhadīpako hi ettha abhisaddo ||28 Aṅguttara-nikāya Aṭṭhakathā,iii,271.29 SeeSakurabe,H,俱舍論の研究(Kyoto,1969),14ff.


14

30 Forthesepaths,seeinfra,§15.31 MVŚ,4a–c.32 Cf. Study,38.33 Ny,330b.34 TA(U‑J),139,statesmorespecificallythatthedharma‑shereexcludeākāśaandapratisaṃkhyā-

nirodha.35 AKB, 2: svalakṣaṇa-dhāranād dharmaḥ | tad ayaṃ paramārtha-dharmaṃ vā nirvāṇaṃ

dharma-lakṣaṇaṃ vā praty abhimukho dharma ity abhidharmaḥ ||36 Ny,329b.37 MVŚ,3b–4a.AKB,2:yāpi ca śrutā-cintā-bhāvanā-mayī sāsravā prajñā upapattipratilambhikā

ca sānusārā | yac ca śāstram asyāḥ prāptyartham anāsravāyāḥ prajñāyāḥ tad api tatsaṃbhārabhāvād abhidharma ity ucyate |

38 MVŚ,1c–2a.39 MVŚ,1c;Ny,595b.40 T49,16c.41 AKB,2:dharmāṇāṃ pravicayam antareṇa nāsti kleśānāṃ yata upaśāntaye ‘bhyupāyaḥ |

kleśaiś ca bhramati bhavārṇave ‘tra lokas taddhetor ata uditaḥ kilaiṣa śāstrā ||42 MVŚ,2a;Ny,595b.43 MVŚ,148b.44 MVŚ,307a.

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2. The ĀbhidharmikaStandpoint, Scope and Methodology

2.1. FundamentalstandpointoftheĀbhidharmikas2.2. Argumentsforabhidharmabeingbuddha-vacana2.3. ScopeofstudyoftheĀbhidharmikas

2.3.1. Intrinsic/uniquecharacteristic(svalakṣaṇa)2.3.2. Commoncharacteristic(sāmānya-lakṣaṇa)2.3.3. Subsumption/inclusion(saṃgraha)2.3.4. Association/conjunction(saṃprayoga)2.3.5. Cause(hetu),condition(pratyaya)andfruit(phala)2.3.6. Endowment,non-endowment(samanvāgama, asamanvāgama)

2.4. Ābhidharmikamethodologyfordharma-pravicaya2.4.1. Taxonomyofskandha(aggregate),āyatana(abode/entrance),dhātu (element)2.4.1.1.Thefiveaggregates(skandha)2.4.1.2.The12abodes(āyatana)2.4.1.3.The18elements(dhātu)2.4.1.4.Controversyontherealityofskandha,āyatanaanddhātu2.4.2. Five‑grouptaxonomy2.4.3. Doctrinalperspectives

2.4.3.1. Saṃskṛta (conditioned),asaṃskṛta (unconditioned)2.4.3.2. Kuśala(wholesome/skillful),akuśala(unwholesome),avyākṛta (non‑defined)2.4.3.3. Sāsrava (with‑outflow)andanāsrava (outflow‑free)2.4.3.4. Darśana-heya (abandonablebyvision),bhāvanā-heya (abandonablebycultivation),

aheya (nottobeabandoned)2.4.3.5. Othertaxonomicalcategories

2.4.4. Methodofcatechism

2.1. Fundamental standpoint of the Ābhidharmikas

Succinctly,anĀbhidharmikaisonewhospecializesintheabhidharmaandtakesthe abhidharma as thefinal authority.For him, theabhidharma is definitive(lākṣaṇika)andrepresentsthetrueintentionoftheBuddha,taughtatthelevelof absolutetruth(paramārtha-satya),withfullydrawnoutmeanings(nītārtha).Incontrast,thesūtra‑sareimplicit(ābhiprāyika)anddonotrepresenttheBuddha’strueintention.1Theygenerallyrepresenttheexpedient(aupacārika)teachingswhosemeaningsareyettobefullydrawnout(neyārtha).2

This fundamental standpointmaybecontrastedwith thatof theSautrāntika,aschoolthatwasevolvedfromtheDārṣṭāntikaandwhichcameintoprominencein the process of constantly repudiating and criticizing theĀbhidharmikas.A Sautrāntikatakesthesūtra‑sasthefinalauthorityandrejectstheabhidharma textsasrepresentingtheBuddha’steachings.Forhim,abhidharmarefersonlyto


16

certaintypesofsūtra‑scharacterizedbytheconcernwithproperlydeterminingthemeaning(arthaviniścaya)ofwhattheBuddhahastaught.3

TheAKBrepresentsthestandpointoftheVaibhāṣikaĀbhidharmikas,themostestablishedĀbhidharmikas,asfollows:“Withouttheexpositionsintheabhidharma,astudentisunabletodiscernthedharma.”4

Inexactcontrasttothis,theauthorofArthaviniścaya-sūtra-nibandhana,whooftenfavors theSautrāntika standpoint, states, as if correcting theVaibhāṣika claim:“Withouttheexpositionsinthesūtra‑s,thestudentisunabletodiscernthedharma.”5

ContradictingtheVaibhāṣika,theSautrāntikamaster,SthaviraŚrīlāta,asserts:

ThosenobleteachingselaboratedbytheBuddhaHimselfarecallednītārtha-sūtra‑s;alltheothersūtra‑saresaidtobeneyārtha.6

Besides theSautrāntika, thereareotherschools,particularly thosebelongingto the Mahāsāṃghikalineage,whichalsocontradicttheVaibhāṣikastandpoint.For the Mahāsāṃghika,“allthesūtra‑sdiscoursedbytheBuddhaarenītārtha”.7

However,whileupholdingthesupremeauthorityoftheSūtra,theSautrāntika‑Dārṣṭāntikaswho are engaged in theAbhidharma controversieswith theĀbhidharmikasalsoattimesresorttothedistinctionbetweennītārthaandneyārtha sūtra‑s.Oneoftheireminentleaders,Śrīlāta,claimsthatthosesūtra‑swhereintheBuddhahimselffirsthighlightsatopicandthenproceedstoelaboratearenītārtha;alltheothersūtra‑sareneyārtha.8 Saṃghabhadrarejectsthisclaim,citingsūtra‑swhichareconsideredasnītārthaevenwhentheylackthesaidfeature.HeridiculesŚrīlāta:

Thusnotcomprehendingthedistinctivefeaturesofthenītārthaandneyārtha sūtra‑s,heclaims:“WetaketheSūtraastheauthority(sūtra-prāmāṇikāḥ)”.Thisisextremelyillogical.ItisforthisreasonthattheirschoolofthoughthasbeenrepeatedlyridiculedbyusVaibhāṣikas.Inthiscontext,theSūtrakāra(i.e.,Vasubandhu)makesthispretentiousassertion:“TheSautrāntikamastersstatethus.”Aretheyheremakingtheirownassertionorisittheintention of the sūtra?Ifitis[supposedtobe]theintention of the sūtra,then[Imustsaythat]thesūtradoesnotintendthus....9

2.2. Arguments for abhidharma being buddha-vacana

ItisimportantforallBuddhistschoolstoestablishthattheirteachingsaregenuinebuddha-vacana(‘wordsoftheBuddha’).FortheĀbhidharmikas,theabhidharma doctrinesarenotspeculativephilosophyorintellectualinventions;theyarethebuddha-vacana par excellence.Theiropponents,theSautrāntikas,repudiatethisclaim.SaṃghabhadraanalysestheSautrāntikadisagreementasbeingthreefold:

(a)TheyweresaidtobecomposedbyKātyāyanīputraandothers.

2. the ābhidharmika - StandPoint, SCoPe and methodology

17

(b)TheBuddha nevermentioned thatabhidharma is a reliance(pratiśaraṇa).

(c)Thetenetsofthedifferentabhidharmaschoolsvary.10

Saṃghabhadra11replies:

a. As theabhidharma [texts]were compiledby the great disciples onthebasisoftheBuddha’steaching,theyareapprovedbytheBuddha;theyarealsobuddha-vacana.Astheyareinaccordwiththeknowledgewhichknowsfully(pari-√jñā)thecausesandeffectsofdefilementandpurification,theyarelikethesūtra‑s.IfwhathasbeenapprovedbytheBuddhaisnotcalledbuddha-vacana,theninnumerablesūtra‑swouldhavetobeabandoned!

b. IfyousaythatwhattheBuddhahasnotmentionedasapratiśaraṇaisnot buddha-vacana, then thevinayawouldnotbebuddha-vacana. … Moreover,theabhidharmashoulddefinitelybeacceptedassūtraviśeṣa,and thusconstitutingapratiśaraṇa.Or, it shouldbe thecase that thegāthā‑s,etc.,donotconstitutepratiśaraṇa,fortheBuddhaonlyexhortedustotakethesūtra‑saspratiśaraṇa….Furthermore,whentheBuddhaexhortedĀnandatotakethesūtra‑saspratiśaraṇa,Hewasinactualfactexhortinghimtotaketheabhidharmaaspratiśaraṇa;forthelatteristheauthority(pramāṇa)ofthesūtra‑s,henceitisthesūtra-pramāṇa,thatis,itcomprisesthedefinitivemeaningsofthesūtra‑s;fortheabhidharma canascertainastowhichsūtra‑sarenītārtha,whichonesareneyārtha. Thename,‘abhidharma’,cansubsumeallwordswhichdonotcontradictanyof thenoble doctrines; basedon this principle, it is knownas anītārtha-sūtra.Whatevercontradictsthisprincipleissaidtobeneyārtha.

c. As to your assertion that theabhidharma is notbuddha-vacana on accountofthefactthatthetenetsofthedifferentabhidharmaschoolsvary—inthatcase,thesameshouldapplytothesūtra‑s,fordifferencesinwordingandmeaningdoexist in theextantsūtra‑sof thevariousschools;onaccountofthesedifferences,theirtenetsbecomedifferent.

Thus,asSaṃghabhadraargues,theabhidharmaisnotonlysūtrainthehighestsense,itistheultimatecriterionorauthorityforascertainingthegenuinesūtra‑s(sūtra-pramāṇa).(Cf.natureandfunctionofupadeśaasabhidharma—§1.1.2.e).Inthatsense,theĀbhidharmikaswouldargue,itistheythemselveswhoproperlytakethesūtra‑sasthefinalauthority.TheclaimthattheabhidharmarepresentstherealwordsoftheBuddhaisalsoreflectedinSaṃghabhadra’sdefinitionofsūtraasthefirstofthedvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana (= buddha-vacana):

Bysūtraismeantthatwhichsubsumesandcontainsallthewordswhichaccordwiththefirmprinciplesofboththesaṃvṛti‑andparamārtha-satya‑s.Sūtra‑sinthissenseareeitherdiscoursedbytheBuddhaorthedisciples,for[thelatter]discoursedbecause[thecontentwas]approvedbytheBuddha.12


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2.3. Scope of study of the Ābhidharmikas

LiketheTheravādins,theSarvāstivādinstooclaimthattheBuddhaHimselfwasthesupremeĀbhidharmika.13OnewaytodefineanĀbhidharmikaistolocatehisscopeofstudy.TheMVŚspeaksofthescopeoftheabhidharma-piṭakaasfollows:

Themeaningsoftheabhidharma-piṭakashouldbeunderstoodbymeansof14things:(1‑6)thesixcauses(hetu),(7‑10)thefourconditions(pratyaya),(11)subsumption/inclusion (saṃgraha), (12)conjunction (saṃprayoga),(13)endowment(samanvāgama),(14)non-endowment(asamanvāgama).Thosewho, bymeans of these 14things, understand theabhidharma unerringly,arecalledĀbhidharmikas,not[thosewho]merelyreciteandmemorizethewords.

Othermasterssaythatthemeaningsoftheabhidharma-piṭakashouldbeunderstoodbymeansofseventhings:(1)skillfulnesswithregardtocauses(hetu-kauśalya),(2)skillfulnesswithregardtoconditions(pratyaya-kauśalya),(3)skillfulnesswithregardtointrinsiccharacteristic(svalakṣaṇa-kauśalya),(4)skillfulnesswith regard to common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa-kauśalya),(5)skillfulnesswithregardtosubsumptionandnon‑subsumption(saṃgraha-asaṃgraha-kauśalya),(6)skillfulnesswithregardtoconjunctionanddisjunction (saṃprayoga-viprayoga-kauśalya), (7)skillfulnesswithregardtoendowmentandnon-endowment (samanvāgama-asamanvāgama-kauśalya).Thosewho, bymeans of these seven things understand theabhidharmaunerringly,arecalledĀbhidharmikas,not[thosewho]merelyreciteandmemorizethewords.14

Skandhila’s*Abhidharmāvatāra (Tno.1554)tooexplainsthecaitasika prajñā as“theexamination(upalakṣaṇa),asthecasemaybe,ofthefollowingeightkinds ofdharma‑s: subsumption, conjunction, endowment, cause, condition,fruit, intrinsic characteristic, common characteristic.”15 Sinceabhidharma in thehighestsenseisnoneotherthanthepure(amalā)prajñā,thisdefinitiontooconstitutesastatementofthescopeofabhidharmaitselfandhenceadefinitionofanĀbhidharmika.Inbriefthen,anĀbhidharmikaasaspecialistisonedevotedto the studyofthesedoctrinalcategories.

Amongthesetopics,some,likeintrinsiccharacteristicandcommoncharacteristic,areusedinconjunctionwiththeapplicationofĀbhidharmikamethodologicaldevices (more in §2.4) forAbhidharma investigation,while others— likesubsumptionandconjunction—themselvesconstitutemethodologicaldevicesof fundamental importance.For instance, the applicationof subsumption isindispensableforthestudyoftheintrinsicnature/intrinsiccharacteristicofalldharma‑sandofconjunctionamongthoughtandthought‑concomitants.


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2.3.1. Intrinsic/unique characteristic (svalakṣaṇa)

Bydeterminingtheintrinsicoruniquecharacteristicofeachconstituentinthecomplexof human experience, sensory and suprasensory, andof thewholeuniverse—eitherthroughdirectexperienceorinference—alistofdiscrete,real,entities(dravya)calleddharma‑sisderived.

A dharmaisdefinedasthatwhichholdsitsintrinsiccharacteristic(svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇād dharmaḥ —§1.2).Theintrinsiccharacteristicofthedharmacalledrūpa,forexample,isthesusceptibilityofbeingmolested(rūpyate),obstructabilityandvisibility;thatofanotherdharmacalledvedanāissensation,etc.Andforadharma tobeadharma,itsintrinsiccharacteristicmustbesustainablethroughouttime:A rūparemainsasarūpairrespectiveofitsvariousmodalities.Itcanneverbetransformed into another differentdharma (such asvedanā).Thus, auniquelycharacterizableentityisauniquelyreal(intheabsolutesense)entity,havingauniqueintrinsicnature(svabhāva):“Tobeexistentasanabsoluteentityistobeexistentasanintrinsiccharacteristic(paramārthena sat svalakṣaṇena sad ityarthaṛ).”16

AstheMVŚexplains,thisisonaccountofthefactthat“theentityitselfis[its]characteristic,andthecharacteristicistheentityitself;foritisthecaseforalldharma‑s that thecharacteristiccannotbepredicatedapart fromthedharma itself.”17ThisisnodoubtquiteinkeepingwiththefundamentalBuddhiststancewhichconsistentlyrejectsanysubstance‑attributedichotomy.Byaccountingforthe svalakṣaṇaofadharma—itsphenomenologicallycognizableaspect—itsveryontologicalexistenceasasvabhāva/dravyaisestablished.Ultimatelythesetwoareone.18

ThegeneralSarvāstivādatraditionrecognizesalistof75dharma‑s(seeinfra).

2.3.2. Common characteristic (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa)

TheMVŚ19distinguishesintrinsiccharacteristicfromcommoncharacteristicasfollows:

Theanalysisofthecharacteristic(lakṣaṇa)ofasingleentityisananalysisof intrinsiccharacteristic.Theanalysisofthecharacteristicofnumerousentities[collectively]isananalysisofcommoncharacteristic.

Furthermore, the analysis of an individual aggregate (skandha), etc.,isananalysisofintrinsiccharacteristic.Theanalysisoftwo,threeaggregates,etc,isananalysisofcommoncharacteristic.

Elsewhere in theMVŚ, thedistinctionbetween the twocharacteristics isalsostatedthus

The intrinsicnature(svabhāva)ofadharmaistheintrinsiccharacteristicofadharma.Homogeneityinnatureiscommoncharacteristic.20


20

Thus,allrūpa‑s,vedanā‑s,saṃjñā-s,etc.,havethenatureofbeingimpermanent.Thisimpermanentnatureisacommoncharacteristic.

Whereasasensoryconsciousnesscognizesonlytheintrinsiccharacteristicof adharma,thementalconsciousnesswithitsabilityofabstractioncancognizethecommoncharacteristic.Thus,thelatterpertainstothedomainofinference(anumāna),theformer,todirectperception(pratyakṣa).

However, distinguishing the understanding (prajñā) that examines intrinsiccharacteristicfromthatwhichexaminescommoncharacteristic,theMVŚalsostates:

Furthermore, the understanding derived from listening (śruta-mayī)and reflection (cintā-mayī)mostly analyze intrinsic characteristics.Theunderstandingderivedfromcultivation(bhāvanā-mayī)mostlyanalyzecommoncharacteristics.

The understandingnot subsumedunder the16modesof understanding(cf. infra,§15.3.2.1)mostlyanalyzesintrinsiccharacteristics;theunderstandingsubsumedunder the16modesofunderstandinganalyzesonlycommoncharacteristics.

Furthermore,theunderstandingthatapprehends(行;√car,lit:‘courses’)the[four]truthsmostlyanalysesintrinsiccharacteristics;theunderstandingat the timeof direct realization (abhisamaya) analyses only commoncharacteristics.21

Thesestatementsaretobeunderstoodasfollows:The16modesofunderstanding(ākāra)arethosepertainingtothefournobletruths(foureach):unsatisfactoriness,impermanent,etc.,forthetruthofunsatisfactoriness,etc.(§15.3.2.1).Thesearenodoubtthecommoncharacteristicsofdharma‑s.Buttheyarethenon‑erroneousuniversalcharacteristics(principles)discernibleonlybyspiritualvisionasdirectperceptionpar excellenceintheprocessofdirectrealization.(cf.§10.8.8).

As regards the three typesofwith‑outflowunderstanding: thatderived fromlisteningisessentiallyofanintellectualnatureandthatfromreflectioninvolvesmeditativepraxis;onlythoseofanāryabackedbytruespiritualvision(thesocalled“subsequentlyobtainedknowledge”,pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna)cantrulydiscernthecommoncharacteristicsconstitutingthe16universalprinciples—hence“mostlyanalyzeintrinsiccharacteristics”.Ontheotherhand,thatderivedfromcultivationcontemplatespreciselyon the16principles (modesof activities)pertainingtothefournobletruths.22


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2.3.2.1. Relativity of the notion of intrinsic and common characteristics

OfalltheĀbhidharmikastudies,theexaminationofintrinsiccharacteristicandcommoncharacteristicmaybeconsideredasthemostimportant.Infact, the MVŚgoessofarastodeclarethat“abhidharmais[precisely]theanalysisofthe intrinsiccharacteristicsandcommoncharacteristicsofdharma‑s”.23Itappearsthatatfirst,theĀbhidharmikaanalysisofintrinsiccharacteristicswasthatoftheindividualdoctrinaltopicsfoundinthesūtra‑s—skandha, āyatana, dhātu, satya, indriya,etc.Later,varioustaxonomicaltopicswereutilizedfortheanalysisintermsofcommoncharacteristics.

Inthisconnection,therelativityasregardsthenotionsofintrinsiccharacteristicandcommoncharacteristicistobenoted.Thus,amongvariousrūpa‑s—differentcolors,differentshapes—thereisthecommonnatureofbeingresistantandsubjectto deterioration.Accordingly,thisintrinsiccharacteristicofarūpa isdistinctfromavedanā,etc.But,atthesametime,itisalsothecommoncharacteristicofthesevarioustypesofrūpa‑s.Similarly,theGreatElement,Earth(pṛthivī),isboth an intrinsic characteristic anda commoncharacteristic— it is saidtobeanintrinsiccharacteristicincontrasttotheotherthreeGreatElements;andacommoncharacteristic,sinceallEarthElementshavethecharacteristicoffirmness.Inthisway,the MVŚdeclares,“thereareinfinitedistinctions[thatcanbemade]betweenintrinsiccharacteristicandcommoncharacteristic”.24

TheSarvāstivadaĀbhidharmikasdistinguishtwokindsofintrinsiccharacteristic:Thefirst,dravya-svalakṣaṇa, is the intrinsic characteristic of thedharma as aunique entity in itself; for instance, that of a particular color, say, blue.Thesecond,āyatana-svalakṣaṇa, refers to the intrinsic characteristic of thedharmaasamemberofauniqueclass—anāyatana—ofwhichitisamember;forinstance,theparticularbluecolorasauniqueclassofdharma‑sknownas“visibles” (rūpa), i.e., therūpa-āyatana.Wecan see from this example that,inthiscontext,theāyatana-svalakṣaṇais,inasense,acommoncharacteristicinrelationtothedravya-svalakṣaṇa.ItisforthisreasonthattheMVŚstates:

Fromthepointofviewofdravya-svalakṣaṇa,thefivesensoryconsciousnesses(pañca-vijñāna-kāya) also take common characteristic as their cognitiveobject(ālambana).Butfromthepointofviewofāyatana-svalakṣaṇa,thefivesensoryconsciousnessestakeintrinsiccharacteristicaloneastheirobject.25

It isprobablyinconsiderationof therelativity in thenotionsof theintrinsiccharacteristicandcommoncharacteristicofagivendharmathattheSarvāstivādamaster,Skandhila,prefers tospeak in termsofdifferentdegreesofcommoncharacteristiconly,givingathreefoldclassificationofthecharacteristicsofdharma‑s—(i)specificallycommon,(ii)partiallycommon,(iii)universally‑common.26 Thesethreecharacteristicsrepresentthreeascendingdegreesofgeneralityoruniversality.Theexampleshegivesmakethispointevident:(i)anexampleof


22

the specifically‑commoncharacteristic is therūpaṇa (/rūpaṇā)ofallrūpa‑s;(ii)examplesofthepartially‑commoncharacteristicareanityatāandduḥkhatā;(iii)examplesoftheuniversally‑commoncharacteristicarenairātmyaandśūnyatā.

2.3.3. Subsumption/inclusion (saṃgraha)

The term saṃgrahameans ‘subsumption’, ‘inclusion’, ‘holding together’,etc.This represents an importantmethodological device throughwhich theĀbhidharmikasarriveatafinallistofuniquedharma‑s.TheMVŚ,disputingthe viewthatdharma‑shavingdifferentintrinsicnatures—“other‑nature(para-bhāva)asopposedtointrinsicnature —aremutuallysubsumable,declaresthat“alldharma‑saresubsumablewithrespecttointrinsicnature.”27Thissubsumptionvis-à-vis intrinsicnatureisexplainedasfollows:

Because,vis-à-vis intrinsic nature, an intrinsic nature is existent, real,apperceivable(upa‑√labh);henceitiscalledsaṃgraha.Because,vis-à-vis intrinsicnature,anintrinsicnatureisnotdifferent,notexternal,notseparated,notdistinct,notempty;henceitiscalledsaṃgraha....Whendharma‑saresubsumedvis-à-vis intrinsicnature,itisunlikethecaseoftakingupfoodwiththehandorthatofnippingagarmentwiththefingers.Rather,eachofthemsustainsitselfsoasnottobedisintegrated;henceitiscalledsaṃgraha. Itisnamedsaṃgrahainthesenseofsustaining.Hence,saṃgraha in the absolutesense(paramārtha)issubsumptionofintrinsicnaturealone.

VasubandhuelaboratesontheSarvāstivādapositionthatsubsumptionisvis-à-vis intrinsicnatureonly:

Thisisbecauseadharma isdistinctfromanother‑nature(i.e.fromthatwhichisnotitself).Thereforeitisnotreasonablethatitissubsumedbythatfromwhichitisdistinct.Forinstance,thevisualfaculty(cakṣur-indriya)issubsumedunderthematter‑aggregate,bythevisualabode(cakṣur-āyatana)andthevisualelement(cakṣur-dhātu),andthetruthsofunsatisfactorinessandorigin.Thisisbecausetheyconstituteitsintrinsicnature.Itisnot[subsumedunder]theotheraggregates,etc.,foritisdistinctinnaturefromthem.29

Putdifferently, thestudyofsubsumption in termsof intrinsicnature isnoneotherthanthestudyoftheintrinsiccharacteristicsofalldharma‑s.Thisanalysismaybemadebetweenonesingledharmaandanotherdharma,orbetweenonedharmaandseveralotherdharma‑s,orbetweenonecategoryofdharma‑sandanothercategory,orbetweenonecategoryandseveralothercategories.

However,thisshouldnotbeunderstoodasanambiguousapplicationofthetermintrinsicnature—tobothindividualdharma‑sandcategoricalgroupsofdharma. Although themethodof subsumptiondoes serve to discriminate the differentcategorical‑types, its fundamental function is to investigate into theessentialor intrinsicnatureofagivengroupofforces(phenomenalorunconditioned)which


23

thoughhavingthesameintrinsicnatureareexperiencedbyusindiversemodesorforms.Thisistheessentialmeaningof“subsumptioninrespectofintrinsicnature”.

Furthermore,whenSarvāstivādaAbhidharmastatesthattheintrinsicnatureofthethreeperiodsoftimeistheconditioneddharma‑s(e.g.,MVŚ,393c),itdoesnotmeanthatatimeperiodisarealentity(dharma)initselfpossessingauniqueintrinsicnature,orthatithasmultipleintrinsicnatures(thoseoftheconditioneddharma‑s).Itmeans:initsessentialnature,timedoesnotexist(isnothing)apartfromtheactivitiesoftheconditioneddharma‑sthemselves.Thiskindofquestionandanswerservestodeterminethetrueessentialnatureandcharacteristicofagivenexperientialdatum—andthisistheprimaryfunctionofsubsumption.ThisformofinvestigationisinfactseenfrequentlyintheMVŚ.Asanotherexample:tothequestion,“whatistheintrinsicnatureofthesefourtopsy‑turvi‑ness(takingtheimpermanentaspermanent,etc.)?”,theansweris,“theyhaveviewastheirintrinsicnature.”(MVŚ,537a).

TheSarvāstivādinconceptionofboththephenomenalexistenceandthedomainofthe unconditioned(asaṃskṛta)isapluralisticoneineachcase.Thereareinnumerablerealentities—dharma‑s—ineitherdomain.Theuniquelycharacterizedtypesaredesignatedbydifferentnames,oftenonaccountofthefactthattheBuddhaHimselfspeaksofthesamethingorphenomenonindifferentterms.

Thus,fromtheĀbhidharmikaperspective,thedharma‘understanding’(prajñā)subsumeswhat are given as various synonymous terms in the sūtra‑s: light(āloka), illumination (prabhā), facultyofunderstanding(prajñā-indriya), powerof understanding (prajñā-bala), discernmentofdharma‑s(dharma-pravicaya),etc.Throughtheprocessofsaṃgraha,then,theycanreduceallofthemtooneuniquedharma,withtherealizationthattheyarealljustdifferentmodalitiesofthesamecategoryofdharma.TheĀbhidharmikasinfactarriveatfurthermodalitiesofprajñāsuchasknowledge(jñāna),receptivity(kṣānti),view(dṛṣṭi),non‑defiledignorance(akliṣṭājñāna),etc.Inbrief,twoentitieshavingtwodistinctlydifferent svabhāva/svalakṣaṇa are established as twodistinctdharma‑s sinceeachdharmaisunique.Theabhidharmicclassificationofthesedharma‑sintoskandha, āyatana anddhātu(seebelow)isanapplicationofthismethodologyof saṃgrahainrespecttosvabhāva/svalakṣaṇa.

2.3.4. Association/conjunction (saṃprayoga)

Conjunctionisanotherimportantmethodologicaldeviceforabhidharmastudies,employedinthementaldomain.TheunderstandingofmentalprocessesisofparamountimportancefortheBuddhistpractitioners,Ābhidharmikasincluded.Throughtheinvestigationofsaṃprayoga,theĀbhidharmikasderiveanunderstandingofwhichmentalfactorsareconascent,andwhichfactorsaffectthemindandotherthoughtconcomitants,andinwhatways.Inotherwords,itisaninvestigationintothedynamicinteractionamongsimultaneouslyexistingmentalelements.


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The Sarvāstivādaeventually arrivedat a setoffiveconditions—afivefoldsamenessorequality(pañca-samatā)—forthementalconstituentssaidtobeinconjunction[bytheSarvāstivāda/Vaibhāṣika]:

1. theymustbesupportedbythesamesenseorgan(āśraya-samatā); 2. theymusttakethesameobject(ālambana-samatā);3. theymusthavethesamemodeofunderstanding(ākāra-samatā);4. theymustbesimultaneous(kāla-samatā);5. theymust, in each case, beof a singular substance (dravya-samatā):onlyonesensation(vedanā),oneideation(saṃjñā),etc.,isconjoinedinone citta, thoughtherecanbevarioustypesofsensationandideation.

2.3.5. Cause (hetu), condition (pratyaya) and fruit (phala)

Alldharma‑sinphenomenalexistencearepratītya-samutpanna—dependentlyoriginatedfromanassemblageofconditions.Inthisrespect,theyareoftencalledsaṃskṛta‑s,‘thecompounded/conditioned’.

In the Sarvāstivādaconception,dharma‑saredistinctontologicalentitieswhich,in their intrinsicnature,abidethroughouttime,totallyunrelatedtooneanotherandtotallydevoidofanyactivities.30Givensuchatheory,itisoffundamentalimportancethattheschoolhasanarticulatedcausaldoctrinecapableofaccountingforthearisingofdharma‑sasphenomenaandtheirdynamicinter‑relatednessinaccordancewiththeBuddha’steachingofpratītya-samutpāda.Moreover,fortheestablishment of eachof thedharma‑s as a real entity, a conditioning force(saṃskāra),itscausalfunctionineachcasemustbedemonstrated.Itisprobablyfor this reason that theSarvāstivādawasalsoknownasHetuvāda—aschoolspecificallyconcernedwiththetheoryofcausation.31Inthisconnection,wemayalsonotethatinthedefinitionofanĀbhidharmikaquotedabovefromthe MVŚ(§2.3),hetu/hetu-kauśalyaandpratyaya/pratyaya-kauśalyatopthelistsineachcase.

TheSarvāstivādins eventually articulated a doctrine of four conditions, sixcauses andfive fruits (see infra, §6 and§7). Significant portions of theSarvāstivādacanonicalabhidharmatreatisesaredevotedspecificallytothesetopics.Thus,theVijñāna-kāya-śāstradiscussesthefourconditions(pratyaya)atlength;theJñāna-prasthāna-śāstraexpoundsonthesixcauses;thechapter‘Onsaṃgraha,etc.’ofthePrakaraṇa-pāda-śāstracontainsatotalof20doctrinalperspectivesconnectedwithhetu-pratyaya. (See infra,§4.1.2ff)

2.3.6. Endowment (samanvāgama), non-endowment (samanvāgama)

Acquisition(prāpti)becameatopicofincreasingimportanceintheestablishmentanddefenseofthethesisofsarvāstitva. A dharma—e.g.,adefilementlikerāga —thoughpast,cancontinuetobelongtoapersonalstream(santāna)byvirtue


25

ofthefactthatacorrespondingforce—innatureneithermaterialnormental(cf. infra,§11.3.1),i.e.,itsprāpti—continuestolinkittotheperson.Whenthe defilementisabandoned(prahīṇa),itisnotthatthedefilement(adharma)loses any existential status—dharma‑s are existent always (sarvadā asti).Whathappensisthatitsprāptiisrenderedinoperativeand,atthesametimeitscorrespondingnon-acquisition(aprāpti),anotherforcealsoneithermaterialnormental,comesintoplay,continuouslypreventingitfrombeingassociatedwiththeperson.

Endowment (samanvāgama) seems to be a relatively late doctrinal concern(thatis, latecomparedto theother topicsabove).Butat leastbythetimeofthe MVŚ,thedoctrinehadalreadybeenwellarticulated.Whenapersonfirstacquiresadharma,heissaidtohavetheprāptiofthatdharma. Havingacquiredthe dharma,whenhecontinuestopossessit,heissaidtohavetheendowmentofthatdharma.Thus,whatissamanvāgata(endowed)isprāpta(acquired);butnotvice versa,aswhatisacquiredmaybelostsubsequently.

2.4. Ābhidharmika methodology for dharma-pravicaya

Aswehaveseen,abhidharmaintherealsenseisamalā prajñā,andprajñāisdharmapravicaya—discernmentorexaminationofdharma‑s (supra,§1.2).For theĀbhidharmikas, it isonlybya thoroughandsystematicexaminationofthetruenatureofalldharma‑sthatthetrueimportoftheBuddha’sDharmacanbeascertainedandliberationassured.TheJñāna-prasthāna-śāstraquotesthefollowingstanzatoemphasizethefundamental importanceofexaminingthe dharma‑s:

Theforestisthesphere(gati)propertothebeasts;theskyisthespherepropertothebirds; nirvāṇa isthespherepropertothenobleones;distinctionisthespherepropertothedharma‑s.32

TheMVŚ33comments:

Withregardtothesūtra‑s,oneshouldskillfullydistinguishbetweentheexplicit(nītārtha)andimplicit(neyārtha)[teachings].…Thewiseshouldskillfullydistinguishthemeaningsinthesūtra‑sandnotsimplyexplaininthemannerthatthewordsareuttered[therein].Ifonesimplyexplainsin themanner that thewordsareuttered,onewill createcontradictionsamongthenobleteachingsandalsogiverisetotopsy‑turvyattachmentinone’sownmind.

Thisjust‑mentionedprincipleisapparentlyputintopracticewithoutapologiesbythe SarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikas.Herewemayillustratethiswiththeexampleoftheirdoctrineonthelife‑principle(āyus)whichtheyidentifywiththecategoryknownasjīvitendriya. The Sarvāstivādadoctrineisthatthisviprayukta-saṃskāra-


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dharmaoperatesonbothmaterialaswellasmentaldharma‑s.Asentientbeingin a thought‑less (acittaka) state ofmeditation (see infra, §11.3.3) is alivethankstothefunctionofthisforce,despitetheabsenceofallmentalactivities.TheVibhajyavāda,however,assertsthatāyusiscittānuvartin;i.e.,itoperatesnecessarilywiththought.Theycitethesūtrawhichspeaksofāyus,ūṣmanandvijñāna asalwaysgoingtogether.TheSarvāstivāda,ofcourse,cannotdenythestatementinthesūtra.Instead,theyarguethatthestatementmustbeproperlydiscernedandnottakenliterally:

Ifthesethreedharma‑snecessarilygotogether,thereoughttobeūṣman in the ārūpya-dhātu, and [likewise] themanifestationofvijñāna in the ideationlessmeditationalstate,etc.Ifthisweretobeconceded,thenobleteachingsandlogicalreasoningwillbecontradicted.Hence,onemustnottaketheliteralmeaningsofthestatementrigidly.Onemustunderstandthatthestatementherereferstothepossiblecasewhenitspeaksofthegoingtogether[ofthethree].34

ItisinaccordancewiththeaforementionedprinciplethattheĀbhidharmikasproceededtosystematizeandclassifytheBuddha’sdiscourses.Inthisprocess,theycreatedmanynewdoctrinalcategorieswhichtheybelievedtobedoctrinallyjustifiable and eventuallyfinalized a list of the ultimate reals— theuniquedharma‑s.Themethodologicaldeviceswehavediscussedabove(§§2.3.3,2.3.4), areusedbytheĀbhidharmikastostudythedynamicinteractionamongthem.WewillexaminebelowsomeoftheothermoreimportantmethodologicaldevicesemployingtheseAbhidharmadoctrinalcategories—sometakenoverfromthesūtra‑s—whichserveasdoctrinalperspectives(paryāya)withwhichtheystudyandclassifythesedharma‑ssoderived.

2.4.1. Taxonomy of aggregate (skandha), abode/entrance (āyatana), element (dhātu)

Atfirst,thetaxonomiesofthefive‑aggregate,twelve‑abodeandeighteen‑elementweretakenoverfromthesūtra‑sbytheĀbhidharmikasfortheexaminationofdharma‑sintermsofsvabhāva,byapplyingthemethodologicaldeviceofsaṃgraha. Thefive‑skandhataxonomyisseenintheearliercanonicalabhidharmatextssuchasthe*Dharma-skandha-śāstra (DSŚ),thePrakaraṇaśāstra (PrŚ),andalsolatertextswhichconformtothesūtratradition,suchasthe*Abhidharmāmṛta-rasa-śāstra(AmRŚ).Inthepost‑AKBworkssuchastheAbhidharmadīpa (ADV)andtheAbhidharmāvatāra (Avatāra),thethreeasaṃskṛta‑sareaddedtoformtheapparentlymorepopulareight‑category(padārtha)scheme.35

2.4.1.1. The five aggregates (skandha) constitutethetotalityofphenomenalexistence:1.rūpa (matter),2.vedanā(sensation/feeling),3.saṃjñā (ideation),4. saṃskāra(conditionings),5.vijñāna (consciousness).Theanalysisinterms


27

ofthefiveskandha‑sisoftenemployedinthesūtra‑stoexplaintheBuddhistdoctrineofno‑Self(nairātmya).ThisfundamentalBuddhistdoctrinecontinuestobethecentralconcernofabhidharma,andaccordingly,thefive‑skandhaschemecontinuestobeanimportantĀbhidharmikataxonomy.

Skandhaisexplainedas‘heap’(rāśi):Eachofthesefiveformsaheapofitsowncategorywhichmaybepast,presentorfuture.Theimportofthistaxonomyistheemphasisthatphenomenaarealldependentlyarisen,withoutanyontologicalstatus;theyareallreducibletothesefiveskandha‑swhichalonearetheultimaterealsformingthebasisofourconceptualsuperimposition.

The saṃskāra-skandha includes the conjoined (saṃprayukta)dharma‑s, i.e.,caitta‑s, aswell as the disjoined (viprayukta)dharma‑s.The rūpa-skandha includesapeculiarmattercalledavijñapti (infra,§13.4.2)andspecialtypesofsubtlemattersuchasthoseofthesensoryfacultiescalled‘clearmatter’(rūpa-prasāda)andthatofabeingintheintermediateexistence(antarābhava).

In the abhidharmaconception,alldharma‑saresaṃskāra‑s—conditioningforces.Theseforcesthemselvesareconditioned;hencethetermisalsosynonymouswith saṃskṛta.This is quite in keepingwith the notion in earlyBuddhismwhichdeclaresthat“allsaṃskāra‑sareimpermanent”(sarve saṃskārā anityāḥ).However,inthefive‑skandhascheme,thesaṃskāra-skandhareferstoallotherdharma‑sexcludingtheotherfourskandha‑s.36Thistaxonomydoesnotincludethe unconditioneddharma‑s,asthelatter,beingbeyondspaceandtime,donotformsuchheaps.

Total:72dharma-s

Five skandha-s

5 indriya-s, 5 viṣaya-s, avijñapti11rūpa

vijñāna1vijñāna

saṃjñā (a caitta)1saṃjñā

saṃprayukta (caitta-sexcludingvedanā, saṃjñā)

viprayukta-saṃskāra (#notabsolutelyfixed)14

44saṃskāra

vedanā (a caitta)1vedanā


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2.4.1.2. The 12 abodes (āyatana)comprisethesixsensefaculties(indriya)—eye,ear,nose,tongue,body,mind;andthesixcorrespondingobjects—thevisible,sound,smell,tasteandthetangible.Themeaningofāyatanais‘gateofarising’(āyadvāra):37Theyare thegateways throughwhich thecittaand thecaitta‑soriginate.Thatistosay,theyservethefunctionsofbeingthesupportingbasis(āśraya, i.e., the faculties)and theperceptualobjects (ālambana)—the tworequisites—forthearisingofconsciousness(vijñāna)andthementalfactorsassociatedwithit.Inabhidharma,asinearlyBuddhism,citta,manasandvijñāna refertothesamereality,thoughwithdifferentfunctionalstresses.

ĀyatanaisetymologicallyexplainedintheAKB38as“thatwhichextendsthearisingofcitta-caitta‑s”(cittacaittānām āyaṃ tanvantīti āyatanāni /).TheMVŚprovidesmoreelaborationonthismeaning:

Themeaningofāyatanais‘gateofarising’:Justasvariousthingsarisewithinacityonaccountofwhichthebodiesofsentientbeingsarenourished,so,within thesupportingbases(āśraya)andobject‑supports(ālambana)—[thetwoconstituentcomponentsoftheāyatana‑s]—variouscitta-caitta-dharma‑sariseonaccountofwhichthedefiledandpureserialcontinuities(santati)arenourished.39

1. eye(cakṣus)2.ear(śrotra)3.nose(ghrāṇa)4.tongue(jihvā)5. body(kāya)6.mind(manas)

7. visible(rūpa)8. sound(śabda)9. smell(gandha)10. taste(rasa)11. tangible(spraṣṭavya)12.mentalobjects(dharma)(64)

caitta (46)viprayukta-saṃskāra (14)avijñapti (1)asaṃskṛta (3)

{

12 āyatana-s

The Sautrāntika objects to the doctrine thatdharma‑s exist tri‑temporarily.Forthem,sarvāstivādacanonlybeacceptedinthesensegiveninthesūtra:‘All’referstothe12āyatana‑s.40Nothingexistsoutsidewhatisempiricallyverifiablethroughthesixsenses.Itmust,however,benotedthattheorthodoxSarvāstivādinSaṃghabhadraseesnodifficultyinacceptingthissūtrastatement.Forhim,the12 āyatana‑sindeedsubsumeallthedharma‑srecognizedbytheSarvāstivāda.Infact, alldharma‑s, including theasaṃskṛta‑s, areālambana‑s—objectscontributing to the arising of consciousness and its associatedcaittas‑s in acognitiveprocess.41 Even nirvāṇaisverifiable—bythesaints.


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2.4.1.3. The 18 elements (dhātu) comprise the six sense faculties, the sixcorrespondingobjectsand thesixcorrespondingconsciousnesses.TheMVŚenumeratesthefollowingsensesofdhātu:

(1) Family/kin/species(gotra)—likethedifferentspeciesofmetals,gold,iron,etc,inamountain.

(2) Cluster/lump(段;kavaḍa?)—likeaclusteroftimbersetc.arrangedinacertainorderresultinginwhatiscalledamansion,ahouse,etc.

(3) Part/constituent(分;bhāga?)—likethe18partsofahumanbody.

(4) Piece/division(片)—likethe18pieces/divisionsofahumanbody.(5) Dissimilar—theeye‑element isdissimilar to theotherelements in

ahuman;etc.

(6) Demarcation/boundary—thedemarcationoftheeye‑elementisdistinctfromtheother17elements.

(7) Distinctivecause—thatbyvirtueofwhichthereistheeye‑elementis a cause distinctively for the eye‑element alone, and not forotherelements.

(8) Running(√dhāv)—theseelementsrunaroundsaṃsāra.

(9) Sustaining/holding(√dhā)—theseelementseachholdsorsustainsitsownintrinsicnature.

(10)Nourishing(√dhā)—theynourishotherentities.

The last threemeanings are attributed to the grammarians (śābdika). In theAKB,Vasubandhugivesthemeaningsofdhātuasspecies/familyandascausaloriginaregiven.42

2.4.1.3.1.Inthisscheme,themano-dhātuisnotanentityontologicallydistinctfromtheminditself.Itissimplythemindinaprecedingmomentoftheseriesservingasthe‘similarandimmediatecondition’(samanantara-pratyaya)forthearisingofthesucceedingmoment.

Asforthedharma-dhātu,theMVŚgivesthefollowingdefinition:

Whatisdharmadhātu?Dharma‑sthathavebeen,arebeing,andwillbecognizedby themind are calleddharmadhātu. ‘Those that havebeencognizedbythemind’referstothedharmadhātuthathasbeencognizedbythepastmind.‘Thosethatarebeingcognizedbythemind’referstothedharmadhātuthatisbeingcognizedbythepresentmind.‘Thosethatwillbecognizedbythemind’referstodharmadhātuthatwillbecognizedbythefuturemind.43


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ThesamedefinitionisalsofoundintheearlierPrŚ.44Accordingly,asfarasthedefinitiongoes,dharmadhātuclearlyreferstothetritemporalmentalobjects,andtheseshouldincludeallpossible“categories”ofdharma‑s.ThisisexplicitlyindicatedinthefollowingpassagefromtheVKŚwhichspecifiestheobjectsofeachtypeofconsciousness.Inthedescription,theobjectsofmentalconsciousnessclearlyamounttoallpossibletypesofdharma‑s—allthetypesofdharma‑sconstitutingthe12āyatana‑s:

Thereisthegroupofsixconsciousnesses:visual,auditory,olfactory,gustatory,bodilyandmental.

Whatdoesvisualconsciousnesscognize?Visualconsciousnesscognizesthevisibles.

Whatdoesitnotcognize?The[remaining]11āyatana‑s.

[Likewiseforthenextfourconsciousnesses]…

Whatdoesmentalconsciousnesscognize?Mentalconsciousnesscognizes:eye,visiblesandvisualconsciousness;ear,soundsandauditoryconsciousness;nose, odors andolfactory consciousness; tongue, tastes andgustatoryconsciousness;body,tangiblesandbodilyconsciousness;mind,dharma‑s(mentalobjects)andmentalconsciousness.…

There are 12 abodes (āyatana): the eye‑abode, the visible‑abode, […]dharma‑abode.

Byhowmany consciousnesses is the eye‑abode cognized?….Byhowmanyconsciousnessesisthedharma‑abodecognized?Thevisibleabodeiscognizedby twoconsciousnesses:visualandmentalconsciousnesses.[Likewiseupto]thetangible‑abodeiscognizedbytwoconsciousnesses:bodilyandmentalconsciousnesses.Theremainingsevenabodesarecognizedbymentalconsciousnessalone.45

Sincethedharmāyatana in the 12-āyatanaschemecorrespondstothedharma-dhātuinthe18‑dhātuscheme,theabovepassagehasalsospecifiedthenatureandscopeofthedharmāyatana.Itisclearthattheobjectsofmentalconsciousnessincludeeventhemind,objectsofthemind,andmentalconsciousness.Asforthought,itistruethatthepresentthoughtcannotknowitselforitsconcomitantsandco‑existents(suchastheco‑existentconditioningsdisjoinedfromthoughts).But itcanknowpastandfuture thoughtsandother’s thoughts/the thoughtofothers,etc.Asforrūpa,thesubtlerūpaofthefaculties46andthenon‑informationmatter(avijñapti)can,infact,becognizedonlybythought.

Wemustrememberthatoriginallyinthesūtra‑s,the18‑dhātutaxonomywasapragmaticclassificatoryscheme,mainlyemployedtounderscoretheBuddha’sno‑Selfdoctrine.Thisschemewas intendedtoshowthecorrelationbetweenthe six faculties of a humanbeingwith their correspondingobjects and theconsciousnesses generated. It is essentially an epistemological consideration


31

without anyexplicit ontological commitment. In this scheme,dharma-dhātu correspondedtotheobjectsofthemindandmentalconsciousnessjustasthevisiblescorrespondedtothoseoftheeyeandvisualconsciousness.Whenthisscheme(togetherwiththoseoftheskandha-andāyatana‑taxonomies)cametobeadoptedasamethodologyofdharma-pravicaya,whatistheAbhidharmicprinciplethatitwasmadetorepresent?Wehaveseenabovethatitisessentiallyamethodfor the understandingofdharma‑sintermsoftheirintrinsiccharacteristics.InthewordsoftheMVŚ,“these18dhātu‑sareestablishedonthebasisof(intrinsic)characteristic”.47WhiletheAbhidharmicapplicationoftheschemetoo—inkeepingwith the characteristicallyBuddhist emphasis— is also primarilyfromanepistemological perspective, the consideration in termsof intrinsiccharacteristicwouldmean,amongotherthings,thatthespecificitemsassignedtoeachofthe18dhātu‑smustrepresentultimaterealexistents(i.e.,dharma‑sintheproperAbhidharmicsense).Accordingly,eventhoughthemindcanthinkofallkindsofthings,thedharma-dhātucannotbesaidtocompriseobjectsthatarerelativelyreal.ThisisclearfromtheitemsenumeratedintheVKŚandPrŚasobjectscognizedbymentalconsciousness(eye…mentalconsciousness).

Inthiscontext, theMVŚelaboratesfurtherontheprinciplesinvolvedinthedhātutaxonomy:

Howarethe18dhātu‑sestablished?

The18areestablishedonthebasisofthreethings:1.thesupportingbasis,2.thatwhich issupported,3.theobjects (viṣaya).On thebasisofbeingsupportingbases,theeyeelementuptothemindelementareestablishedasthesixinternalelements.Onthebasisofbeingthesupported,thevisualconsciousnesselementuptothementalconsciousnesselementareestablishedasthesixconsciousnesselements.Onthebasisofbeingobjects,thematterelementuptothedharmaelement(dharma-dhātu)areestablishedasthesixexternalelements.48

Thetwoexplanationsaboveondharmadhātu—fromtheVKŚandMVŚ—maybesaidtobestillinkeepingwiththesūtra‑s.Bothspeakofdharma-dhātuasreferringtoobjectsofthemindandmentalconsciousness.

ButwhenweexaminefurthertheVaibhāṣikaposition,atleaststartingfromtheJPŚ,49wefindthatthecontentofdharmadhāturefersnottomentalobjectsper se,butspecificallyto“sevendharma‑s”:

Herein,wehave analyzed the essential nature of the three aggregates,i.e.,sensation,ideationandtheconditionings.Theyshouldalsobeestablishedasāyatana‑s anddhātu‑s.That is, these three aggregates, togetherwiththe non‑informationmatter and the three unconditioned— these sevendharma‑s—areestablishedasdharmāyatana in the āyatanaschemeanddharma-dhātu in the dhātuscheme.50


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2.4.1.3.2. Incongruities concerning the Sarvāstivāda explanations on dharmāyatana/dharma-dhātu

TheforegoingdiscussionsshouldsufficetohighlightcertainincongruitiesintheSarvāstivādapositionconcerningthedharmāyatana/dharma-dhātu.Whileontheonehand,influencedbytheintention in the sūtra,theSarvāstivādinsspeakofthe‘mentalobjects’,asincludingallpossibletypesofdharma‑s,atthesametimetheywouldnotstatethatdharmadhātusubsumesthe“totality”ofrealexistents—eventhoughsomeSarvāstivādamastersapparentlymaintainpreciselythat.51

OnereasonforthisisthattheVaibhāṣikasmustmaintaintheirontologywhichincludesdharma‑sotherthanthosesevenmentalobjectsspecifiedbythetraditionasbeingdharmadhātu,asrealexistents.

Anotherreasonisthat,sincethePrŚ,thefive‑grouptaxonomywasgraduallybecomingthestandardclassificationofdharma‑sbettersuitedforsubsumingthetotalityofdharma‑samongwhichtheavijñapti rūpaandthethreeunconditionedhadcometobedecisivelyupheldbytheorthodoxVaibhāṣikasasbeinganintegralpart.Theolderclassificationintermsofskandha,āyatanaanddhātumustnowbereformulatedtoincorporateallthesedharma‑sandtocorrelatethemwiththenewtaxonomyasawhole.

Saṃghabhadra, repudiating theSautrāntikamasterŚrīlāta’s position that alldharma‑saresubsumedunderthedharmāyatana in‑as‑muchasalldharma‑sarethedomainofactivityofthemind,arguesasfollows:

Ifthisisthecase,thenonlyonesingle[āyatana]—dharmāyatana—oughttobeestablished,sincealldharma‑swithoutexceptionwouldbetheobjectsofthemind.52

Inthisconnection,theJPŚ53(likewisethefirstchapteroftheAKB)statesthatthetotalityofdharma‑sissubsumedbyoneaggregate(i.e.,rūpa-skandha),oneabode(i.e.,mana-āyatana)andoneelement(i.e.,dharma-dhātu).54TheMVŚ,citingthisstatement,goesontoexplainasfollows:

Whyisthat?Thetotalityofdharma‑siscomprisedofthefivecategories(pañca-vastu):matter,thought,thought‑concomitant,conditioningsdisjoinedfromthought,andtheunconditioned.Therūpa-skandha (matter‑aggregate)subsumesmatter; themanāyatana (mind‑abode) subsumes thought; thedharmāyatanasubsumesalltherest.Thus,thetotalityofdharma‑scomestobesubsumed.

Furthermore,alldharma‑sarecomprisedofthe18dhātu‑s.Amongthem,the rūpa-skandhasubsumesthetenrūpa-dhātu‑s;themanāyatana subsumesthe sevencitta-dhātu‑s; thedharma-dhātu subsumes thedharma-dhātu. Thus,thetotalityofdharma‑scomestobesubsumed.


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Furthermore, alldharma‑s are included in the aggregates, elements andabodes,andthesethreearemutuallysubsumed:therūpa-skandhasubsumesthe ten matter‑elements,thetenmatter‑abodes,andonepartofthedharma-elementanddharma‑abode;themanāyatanasubsumestheseventhought‑elementsandtheconsciousness‑aggregate;thedharma-dhātusubsumesthedharma‑abode,theaggregatesofsensation,ideationandtheconditionings,andonepartofthematter‑aggregate.Thus,thesethreesubsumethetotalityof dharma‑s.55

But apparently, evenSaṃghabhadra,while upholding the sameorthodoxVaibhāṣikaposition,ostensiblyundertheshadowofthesūtratradition,attimesspeaksofthedharmāyatanaexplicitlyasthecognitiveobjectscorrespondingtomentalconsciousness:

Thetotalityofdharma‑sisjustthetwelveāyatana‑s,i.e.,thevisual,auditory,olfactory, gustatory andmental consciousness,with their correspondingcognitiveobjects,thevisibles,sound,odors,tastestangiblesanddharma‑s.56

Inthissamecontext,itisnoteworthythathestates,justastheMVŚdoes,thattheconditionquaobjects(see§7.1.3)comprisesthetotalityofdharma‑s.Thismeans,amongotherthings,thatalldharma‑scanserveasthecognitiveobjectsofthementalconsciousness.

Another incongruity concerns the case of the faculties.According to theĀbhidharmikas, these faculties are objects cognized exclusively bymentalconsciousness—thefirstfivesensoryfaculties,determinedtobeasubtleformof matter,aresaidtobeinvisibletotheeye.Yettheyarenotsubsumedaspartof the dharmāyatanaanddharma-dhātu.Thereasonforthis,however, isnotfartoseek.Inkeepingwiththeclassificationinthesūtra,thesixfacultiesmustberetainedasthecorrespondingsupportingbases(āśraya)ofthesixtypesofconsciousnessgeneratedbythesixcorrespondingtypesofobject.Thismeansthat thedharma‑s, constituting thedharmāyatana anddharma-dhātu,mustnot be comingledwith thefive sensory faculties or themental faculty (themind).Thefivesensoryfacultiesmustberetainedasfiveofthetentraditionalsubdivisionsofmatter.Thementalfacultylikewisehastobeseparatedfromthementalobjects.Theresultisthatthedharma-dhātuthencametosubsumealltheremainingdharma‑squamentalobjectsexcludingthefivesensoryobjects,thesixfacultiesandthesixconsciousnesses.Itmustofcoursefurthertakeinthenon‑informationmatter,theconditioningsdisjoinedfromthoughtandthethreeunconditionedwhichwerenewlyestablishedasrealentitiesbytheorthodoxy.


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Correlationbetweenthe5categories,5skandha‑s,12āyatana‑sand18dhātu‑s

5 categories 5 skandha-s 18 dhātu-s12 āyatana-s

DiagramTextAbbreviationssk=skandha āy=āyatana dh=dhātuvij=vijñāna

rūpa‑sk

5faculties

5sensoryobjects

avijñāpti

cakṣur-āyśrotra-āyghrāṇa-āyjihvā-āykāya-āy

cakṣur‑dhśrotra‑dhghrāṇa‑dhjihvā‑dhkāya‑dh

mano‑āy mano‑dh

rūpa-āyśabda-āygandha-āyrasa-āyspraṣṭavya-āy

rūpa‑dhśabda‑dhgandha‑dhrasa‑dhspraṣṭavya‑dh

dharma‑āy dharma‑dh

vedanā‑sk

saṃjñā‑sk

saṃprayukta= caitta(44)

saṃskāra‑skviprayukta(14)

rūpa(11)

citta(1)

caitta(46)

viprayukta-saṃskāra(14)

vijñāna‑sk

cakṣur‑vij‑dhśrotra‑vij‑dhghrāṇa‑vij‑dhjihvā‑vij‑dhkāya‑vij‑dhmano‑vij‑dh

cakṣur‑vijśrotra‑vijghrāṇa‑vijjihvā‑vijkāya‑vijmano‑vij

asaṃskṛta(3)pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaapratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaākāśa

2.4.1.4. Controversy on the reality of skandha, āyatana and dhātu

Ofthethree—skandha, āyatanaanddhātu—theVaibhāṣikaregardsallasreal.The Sautrāntikaarguesthatskandha‑sareunrealasthetermsignifiesaheap.Asfortheāyatana,someSautrāntikas,aswellasVasubandhu,theKośakāra,acceptthemasreal.


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ButforŚrīlāta,theytooareunreal.This,however,isnotanewproposition,astheSamayabhedoparacaṇaalsorecordsthePrajñaptivādaviewthat“the12āyatana‑sarenotreal”.57Śrīlāta’scontentionisthatneitheravisualfacultynoranobjectcanfunctionassuch(asāśrayaandālambanarespectively)inthecognitiveprocessexceptasaconglomerationofatoms.Infact,eachindividualatomisdevoidofthe functionofseeing,andaconglomerationofthemislikewisedevoidofsuchafunction,asinthecaseofagroupofblindmenwhocannotsee.Thedhātu‑salone,hedeclares,arereal,58inthesenseofbeingcausallyefficaciousfactorsofexistence(dharma‑s)existingonlyinthepresentmomentofadharma‑series.Inthissense,asSaṃghabhadraargues,dhātuwouldhaveessentiallythesamesignificanceastheSautrāntikanotionofseeds(bīja),59thecausalefficacythatis passeddown in the series frommoment tomoment.Thissignificance isbroughtoutwellbythedoctrineoftheanudhātu or *pūrvānudhātu (隨界,舊隨界),proposedbyŚrīlāta.ThisisaversionofthebījadoctrineoftheSautrāntika‑Dārṣṭāntikas.Thecomponent,*pūrva‑('previous','former'),isintendedtoconveythesensethatvariouscausalefficacieshavebeenfromthepastaccompanyingorfollowing(anu‑)thehumanserialcontinuity.Itisthesecausalefficacies—these(anu‑)dhātu—whichalonearereal.

Saṃghabhadra, however, points out the difficulty in thebīja doctrine, sincetheSautrāntikasdonotconsiderbīja—thoughrealasacausalefficacy—asbeinganontologicalentity.Thiscausalefficacy—thedharma—issaidtobeneitheridenticalwithnordifferentfromtheserialcontinuityitself,andtheserialcontinuityisconsideredunreal(amereconcept);andyet,at theculminatingmomentoftheserialtransmissionofthecausalefficacy,itisacknowledgedasbeingproductiveofafruit!60

2.4.2. Five-group taxonomy

StartingfromthePañcavastuka of Vasumitra’sPrŚ,thefive‑groupclassificationinto rūpa, citta, caitta‑s,viprayukta-saṃskāra‑sandasaṃskṛta‑scameintovogue.GroupIV, the conditionings disjoined from thought, represents a distinctivedoctrinal development inSarvāstivādaAbhidharma, not to be found in theTheravāda.

The Five-group-Seventy-five-dharma classification of the Sarvāstivāda

I. rūpa (matter,11)1. cakṣur-indriya(visualfaculty) 6. rūpa-artha(visualobject)2. śrotra-indriya(auditoryfac) 7. śabda-artha (auditoryobj)3. ghrāṇa-indriya(olfactoryfac) 8. gandha-artha(olfactoryobj)4. jihvā-indriya(gustatoryfac) 9. rasa-artha(gustatoryobj)5. kāya-indriya (tangiblefac) 10. spraṣṭavya-artha (tangibleobj)11. avijñapti-rūpa (non‑informativematter)


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II. citta(thought)

III. caitasika dharma-s (thought‑concomitants,46)

1)mahābhūmika dharma‑s(universaldharma‑s,10)1. vedanā(sensation) 6.prajñā (understanding)2. cetanā(volition) 7. smṛti (mindfulness)3. saṃjñā (ideation) 8.manaskāra (mentalapplication)4. chanda (predilection) 9. adhimokṣa(resolve/determination)5. sparśa (contact) 10.samādhi (concentration)

2)kuśala-mahābhūmika dharma‑s(skillfuluniversaldharma‑s,10)1. śraddhā(faith) 6.apatrāpya(shame)2. apramāda(diligence) 7. alobha(non‑greed)3. praśrabdhi(calm) 8.adveṣa(non‑hatred)4. upekṣā(equanimity) 9. avihiṃsā(harmlessness)5. hrī(modesty) 10.vīrya(vigor)

3)kleśa-mahābhūmika dharma‑s (universaldharma‑sofdefilement,6)1. moha(delusion) 4.āśraddhya(lackoffaith)2. pramāda(non‑diligence) 5. styāna(torpor)3. kauśīdya(slackness) 6.auddhatya(restlessness)

4) akuśala-mahābhūmika dharma‑s(unskillfuluniversaldharma‑s,2)1. āhrīkya(non‑modesty) 2. anapatrāpya(shamelessness)

5)parīttakleśa-bhūmika dharma‑s(Defilemnetsofrestrictedscope10)1. krodha (anger) 7.mātsarya(avarice)2. upanāha(enmity) 8.māyā(deceptiveness)3. śāṭhya(dissimulation) 9.mada(pride)4. īrṣyā(jealousy) 10.vihiṃsā(harmfulness)5. pradāśa(depravedopinionatedness)6. mrakṣa(concealment)

6)aniyata dharma‑s(indeterminatedharma‑s,8)1. kaukṛtya(remorse) 5. rāga(greed)2. middha(sleep) 6.pratigha(hostility)3. vitarka (reasoning) 7.māna(conceit)4. vicāra(investigation) 8.vicikitsā(doubt)


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IV.cittaviprayukta saṃskāra dharma-s (conditioningsdisjoinedfromthought,14)1. prāpti (acquisition)2. aprāpti (non-acquisition)3. nikāyasabhāga(grouphomogeneity)4. āsaṃjñika (ideationlessness)5. āsaṃjñi-samāpatti(ideationlessattainment)6. nirodha-samāpatti (cessationattainment)7. jīvitendriya(vitalfaculty)8. jāti-lakṣaṇa (production‑characteristic)9. sthiti-lakṣaṇa(duration‑characteristic)10. jarā-lakṣaṇa (deterioration‑characteristic)11. anityatā-lakṣaṇa (impermanence‑characteristic)12. nāma-kāya (words)13. pada-kāya(phrases)14. vyañjana-kāya(syllables)

V. asaṃskṛta dharma-s (unconditioneddharma‑s,3)1. ākāśa2. pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (cessationthroughdeliberation)3. apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (cessationindependentofdeliberation)

2.4.3. Doctrinal perspectives

Theexaminationofdharma‑sisalsocommonlymadethroughvariousdoctrinalperspectives—taxonomicalcategoriesintheformofdyads,triads,etc.Someoftheseweretakenoverfromthesūtra‑s,othersinnovatedbytheĀbhidharmikas.Themethodologicaldevicesdescribedaboveareappliedinjuxtapositionwiththesecategories.Thismethodoftaxonomicalinvestigationisessentiallythedharma-pravicayaintermsofsāmānya-lakṣaṇa. Itisalreadyevidentamongtheoldestoftheextantabhidharmatextssuchasthe*Śāriputra-abhidharma,61andwasundoubtedlyinstrumentalinbringingaboutacharacteristicallyabhidharmicfeatureofthesetextsmarkinganimportantdevelopmentinabhidharmamethodology.

Theinvestigationmaybedonewithregardtoalldharma‑s,e.g.:

“Howmanyarevisible(sanidarśana)?Howmanyareinvisible(anidarśana)?”—adyad.

“Howmanyareskillful(kuśala)?Howmanyareunskillful(akuśala)?Howmanyarenon‑defined(avyākṛta)?”—atriad.

Itmay also be donewith one particular doctrinal category as the focus—amethodologywhichisessentiallyoneofcollectingscattereddataandtheir


38

analysis.Thus,inthechapteronkarma in *Śāriputra-abhidharma,thevarioustypesofkarmamentionedinthesūtra‑s—fromthegroupoftwokarma‑stothegroupof40karma‑s—areincrementallyclassified.

ThefollowingareamongthemostimportantdoctrinalperspectivesemployedbytheĀbhidharmikas:

1. saṃskṛta, asaṃskṛta;2. kuśala, akuśala, avyākṛta;3. sāsrava, anāsrava;4. darśana-heya,bhāvanā-heya,aheya.

Thediscussionofthesemajortopics,withtheirvarioussubdivisions,coverthewholescopeofabhidharmaanalysis.

2.4.3.1. Saṃskṛta (conditioned), asaṃskṛta (unconditioned)

TheMVŚgives various distinctions between the saṃskṛta- andasaṃskṛta- dharma‑s,thefirstofwhich—themostcomprehensiveone—isasfollows:

A dharmaissaidtobeconditionedifithasarisingandceasing,causeandeffect,andacquiresthecharacteristicsoftheconditioned.

A dharma is said to be unconditioned if it has no arising and ceasing,nocauseandeffect,andacquiresthecharacteristicsoftheunconditioned.62

Itisexplainedthattheconditioneddharma‑shavecausesandconditionsbecausetheyareweakinnatureandmustthereforedependoncausesandconditionsfortheiractivities.Theunconditioneddharma‑s,ontheotherhand,arestrongandthereforenotdependentonthem.Moreover,theunconditioneddharma‑shavenoactivitiesatall,hencenouseofcausesandconditions.63

TheAKBdefines saṃskṛta as follows: “Conditioned—because they aremade(kṛta)byconditionsco‑existinginassemblage—thereisnothingthatisproducedbyasinglecondition.”64Whatisconditionediswhatisdependentlyoriginated(pratītya-samutpanna)andcharacterizedbythefourcharacteristicsofthe conditioned(saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇāni: jāti, sthiti, jarā/anyathātva, anityatā/vyaya).Thesefour—eachadistinctforce—arerealentitiesbelongingtotheclassofviprayukta-saṃskārawhichtogethercauseaso‑calledconditioneddharma to beimpermanent,nay,momentary(kṣaṇika).(Seeinfra,§11.3.5).

Allofthefiveskandha‑sareconditioned.Intermsofthefive‑group(pañca-vastu)classification,theycomprise:rūpa‑s, citta, caitta‑s,viprayukta-saṃskāra‑sandasaṃskṛta‑s.ThisfivefoldtaxonomywasfirstarticulatedbyVasumitrainthePañca-vastukaofhisAbhidharma-prakaraṇa-śāstra.


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The unconditioneddharma‑s are permanent, non‑arising, non‑ceasing—totally beyond the temporal process.They comprise three typesof dharma‑s: (i)pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha—cessation obtained throughdiscriminative effort; (ii)apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha—cessationobtainedwithoutanyselectiveeffort,butsimplyduetothedeficiencyintheconditionsforarising;(thesecessationsalsoserveasrealobstructiveforcesmakingitimpossibleforthedharma‑sconcernedtoariseagain);and(iii)ākāśa—nottobeconfoundedwithākāśa-dhātuwhichisemptyspacethatisvisibleinbetweenobjectsoccupyingspace—thatbyvirtueofwhichthingscanbeaccommodatedandhavetheiractivitiesinspace.(Cf. infra,§16).

2.4.3.2 Kuśala (wholesome/skillful), akuśala (unwholesome/unskillful), avyākṛta (non-defined)

Thisclassificationconcernsthemoralcausalorder.TheMVŚexplainsthetriadasfollows:

A dharmawhichistobesubsumedasbeingskillful,whicheffectsadesirablefruit,andwhichisbynaturesecure(kṣema)issaidtobekuśala. …Somesay:Adharmawhichcanproducethegermsofadesirableexistenceandofliberationissaidtobekuśala.

A dharmawhichcannotproducethegermsofadesirableexistenceandofliberationissaidtobeakuśala.

Thatwhichisopposedtothesetwoclassesissaidtobeavyākṛta.65

Various additional definitions are given elsewhere in theMVŚ:Askillfuldharmaisthatwhichissustainedbyskillfulness,whichinducesthesproutsofdesirableexistenceandliberation,whichcausesrebirthinthedesirableplaneofexistence(sugati),whichpertainstoregression(nivṛtti)fromsaṃsāra,etc.Thosewhichareopposedinnaturetotheseareunskillful;thosewhichareneitherarenon‑defined.66 Saṃghabhadraexplainsthus:Anon‑defineddharmaisthatwhichcannotbedefinedasbeingeitherskillfulorunskillful,itsnaturebeingindistinct.Adharmaissaidtobe(morally)defined(vyākṛta)ifitispraise‑worthyorcontemptible,anddefinableaspertainingtothe‘black’or‘white’(i.e.,goodorbad)species.Askillfuldharmaisthatwhichisopposedtotheunskillful,orthatwhichsustainsorissustainedbyunderstanding(prajñā),orthatwhichbringsabouttheauspicious.Theoppositetothisisunskillful.67Ofthe18dhātu‑s,10canbeskillful,unskillfulornon‑defined—the7mentaldhātu‑s,rūpa-,śabda-,anddharma-dhātu‑s.Theremaining8arenon‑defined.

2.4.3.2.1. Dharma‑saresaidtobeskillful/wholesomeinfourways:

(i) absolutely(paramārthatas)—thisreferstonirvāṇawhichcompletelytranscendsduḥkha;


40

(ii) intheirintrinsicnature(svabhāvatas)—thisreferstomoralshame(hrī) andmoral fear (apatrāpya) and the three rootsof skillfulness(kuśala-mūla‑s);

(iii) throughconjunction(saṃprayogatas)—thisreferstomentalfactorswhichbecomeskillfulthroughconjunctionswiththedharma‑swhichareskillfulintheirintrinsicnature;

(iv) throughtheiroriginatingcause(samutthānatas)—thisreferstobodilyandvocalkarma‑s,andtothecitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra‑swhichbecomeskillfulthroughtheiroriginatingcause.68

Saṃghabhadragivesanadditionalexplanationonnirvāṇa asparamārthataḥ kuśala:itisparamabecauseitissupremeandwithoutanequal.Itisanartha becauseitexistsasarealentity.Henceitisparamārtha.Itiskuśalainthesenseofbeingsecure,foritiskuśalaandpermanent(nitya).69 In the MVŚ,thisfourfolddistinctionisattributedtoVenerableVāṣpa.

AccordingtotheVibhajyavādins,knowledge(jñāna)isskillfulinitsintrinsicnature;consciousness(vijñāna)isskillfulthroughconjunctionwithknowledge;thebodilyandvocalkarma‑sandthedisjoinedconditionings —jāti,etc.,prāpti,the asaṃjñi‑andnirodha-samāpatti‑s—originatedbyit,areskillfulthroughorigination;nirvāṇaisabsolutelyskillful.70

2.4.3.2.2.Likewise,dharma‑saresaidtobeunskillfulinthesamefourways:

(i) saṃsāraisunskillfulabsolutely;

(ii) moralshamelessness(āhrīkya)andmoralfearlessness(anapatrāpya)andthethreerootsofunskillfulnessareunskillfulintheirintrinsicnature;

(iii) thementalfactorsconjoinedwiththeprevious[i.e.,(ii)]areunskillfulthroughconjunction;

(iv) thebodilyandvocalkarma‑sandthedisjoinedconditioningsoriginatedbythesameareunskillfulthroughtheiroriginatingcauses.

AccordingtotheVibhajyavādins:(i)issaṃsāra;(ii)isdelusion(moha);(iii)isconsciousness conjoinedwith delusion; (iv)are the disjoined conditioningsoriginatedbythesame.71

2.4.3.2.3. The non‑defineddharma‑sare furtherdivisibleasbeing(i)veiled‑non‑defined (nivṛta-avyākṛta)and(ii)non‑veiled‑non‑defined(anivṛta-avyākṛta).

(i) Aveiled‑non‑defined dharma,beingweakinnature,isthatwhich,thoughincapableofinducinganundesirablefruit,isneverthelessobstructivetothearisingof the outflow‑freeunderstandingorthenoblepath.Thisfactofobstructiveness


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ofthedefileddharma‑siswhatismeantbyitsbeing‘veiled’.72Anexampleofthisisthe‘Self‑view’,satkāya-dṛṣṭi,whichisadefiledprajñā.TheMVŚ73explainswhysatkāya-dṛṣṭiisnotunskillful,butnon‑defined(i.e.,veiled-non-defined):

Question:WhyistheSelf‑viewnon‑defined[andnotconsideredunskillful]?

Answer:Thatdharmawhichis,initsintrinsicnature,moralshamelessness(āhrīkya)andmoralfearlessness(anapatrāpya),whichisconjoinedwithmoralshamelessnessandmoralfearlessness,andwhichistheemanation(niṣyanda)ofmoralshamelessnessandmoralfearlessness—thatisunskillful.Self‑viewisnotmoralshamelessnessormoralfearlessnessinitsintrinsicnature,notconjoinedwithmoral shamelessnessandmoral fearlessness,notanemanationfrommoralshamelessnessandmoralfearlessness;henceitisnotunskillful.

Furthermore,thisSelf‑viewisnotalways(ekaṃśena)ofevilintention (āśaya-vipanna),hencenotunskillful.Itisnotalwaysofevilintentionbecauseitisnotconjoinedwithmoralshamelessnessandmoralfearlessness.

Furthermore,itisbecausethisviewisnotopposedtothepracticeofgivingand ethical conduct (dāna-śīla-aviruddha).Onewho is attached to theSelfholdsthus:“Bygiving,Ishallbecomerichandhappy;byobservingethicalrules,Ishallbereborninheaven;bypracticingmeditation,Ishallbeliberated.”Henceitisnon‑defined.

Furthermore,thisSelf‑viewismerelyadelusionwithregardtoaperson’sownSelf;itisnotanoppressionofothers;hencenon‑defined…Furthermore,thisSelf‑viewdoesnothavearetribution‑fruit(vipāka-phala);hencenon‑defined …

However,theDārṣṭāntikasdenythisveiled‑non‑definedcategoryofdharma‑s.74

(ii) Anon‑veiled‑non‑defineddharmaisthatwhichisneithercapableofinducingaretribution‑fruit—desirableorundesirable—norobstructingthearisingofthenoblepath.Examplesofthiscategoryare:theknowledge(aprajñā)ofaparticularartandcraft(śailpasthānika),orthemindassociatedwithasupernormalpower(abhijñā-phala)orwithdeportment(īryāpatha).(a)Karmicretributionand(b)physicalmatter—rūpa, gandha, rasaandspraṣṭavya—arealsoanivṛta-avyākṛta. Thelatterareinfactavyākṛta in their intrinsicnature(svabhāvatas).Thetwoasaṃskṛta‑s— apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha andākāśa—which are non‑definedabsolutely(paramārthato’vyākṛta),alsobelongtothiscategory.Thefollowingchartsummarizesthewholeclassification:


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nivṛtāvyākṛta

avyākṛta

anivṛtāvyākṛta

saṃskṛta

asaṃskṛta — paramārthatas

vipākaairyāpathika (citta)śailpasthānikaabhijñāphalasvabhāvataḥ

{2.4.3.3. With-outflow (sāsrava) and outflow-free (anāsrava)

‘Outflow’(āsrava;lit.:‘flowingout/toward’)isasynonymfordefilement (kleśa).Avatāra:

Theoutflowsaresonamedbecausetheykeep(āsayanti)beingsforalongtimeinthethreespheresofexistence,[thus]hinderingtheirprogresstowardliberation.Or,becausetheycausebeingstoflowaround(āsravanti)fromthehighestplaneofexistence(bhavāgra) to[thelowest], theAvīcihell.Or,because they incessantly discharge (√kṣar) inexhaustible impuritiesthroughthesixwound‑likeentrances[—thesixsensefaculties—]ofbeings(ṣaḍbhir āyatanavranaiḥ).”75

Awith‑outflow(sāsrava)dharma isone thataccordswith thisnatureof theoutflow.Evenactswhichareskillfulmayalsobewith‑outflow.Forinstance,onemaypracticegenerosityinthehopeofhavingafavorablerebirthinthefuture.Thusthescopeofthewith‑outflowisgreaterthanthatoftheunskillful.76

TheAKBdiscussesthisclassificationwithrespecttothefournobletruthsandexplainsthemeaningof“with‑outflow”:

Dharma‑sareeitherwith‑outfloworoutflow‑free.Theconditioned,withtheexceptionof the noble path, arewith‑outflow, for therein the outflowsgrowconcordantly(sam-anu-√śī;等隨).77Itistruethattheoutflowsareborntakingthenirodha‑andmārga-satyaasobjects,buttheydonotgrowconcordantlytherein;thusitdoesnotfollowthatthetwoareofthenatureofbeingwith‑outflow.78

Thus,althoughanoutflow‑freedharmamayserveasanobjectforadefilement(forinstance,afalseviewmayarisewithregardtothenoblepath),itdoesnotaccordwithorconducetothegrowthofthedefilement;or—moreinconformitywiththeSanskritanu-√śī —itdoesnotadheretherein.

Thenotionof“with‑outflow”and“outflow‑free”seenintheAKBmusthavebeenarticulatedatafairlyearlystageofdevelopment,mostprobablyevenbeforethecommonera.TheMVŚalreadyinterpretsinsimilarterms.Itsantiquityis


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alsosuggestedby the fact thatvariousessentially similar interpretationsareattributedtotheancientmasters,Pārśva,Dharmatrāta,GhoṣakaandVasumitra:

The outflow‑freedharma‑sareallnotbasesconducivetothegrowthoftheproclivities(anuśaya,asynonymfordefilement.Cf. infra,§12.2).Why?Thosedharma‑swhicharethebasesfortheSelf‑view,fortopsy‑turvi‑ness(viparyāsa),fortheproclivities;whicharethefoot‑holdforgreed,hatredandignorance;whichare tainted, soiledand turbid— theyaccordwith thegrowthoftheproclivities.Theoutflow‑freedharma‑snotbeingsodonotaccordwiththegrowthoftheproclivities....AccordingtoVenerablePārśva...According to theBhadānta, ...AccordingGhoṣaka, ...TheVenerableVasumitraexplains thus:whenaproclivityariseshavingawith‑outflowdharmaasitscognitiveobject,theproclivitygrows/waxesgradually.Thisislikethecaseofamanlookingatthemoonwhichhelpsthegrowthofhisvisualfaculty.Thus,thewith‑outflowdharma‑saccordwiththegrowthoftheproclivities.Whenaproclivityariseshavinganoutflow‑freedharmaasitscognitiveobject,theproclivitywanesgradually.Thisislikethecaseofamanlookingatthesun,whichdamageshisvisualfaculty.Thus,theoutflow‑freedharma‑sdonotaccordwiththegrowthoftheproclivities.79

A defilementcangrowconcordantlywith theconascentdefiled thoughtandthought‑concomitantsassociatedwithit,throughthefactofbeingconjoinedwiththem(saṃprayogato ’nuśete; 相應隨增).Itcanalsogrowconcordantlybytakingawith‑outflowcognitiveobject(ālambanato ’nuśete; 所緣隨增).(Seeinfra,§12.8.2).

2.4.3.4. Darśana-heya (abandonable by vision), bhāvanā-heya (abandonable by cultivation), aheya (not to be abandoned)

Thefirsttwocategoriespertaintothewith‑outflowdharma-s;thethird,tooutflow‑free dharma‑s.

The darśana-heya dharma‑sarethedefilementsabandonablebyvisionintothefournobletruths.Thebhāvanā-heya dharma‑sarethosedefilementsabandonablebythepathofcultivationwhichmaybemundane(laukika;i.e.,with‑outflow)or supramundane (lokottara; i.e.,outflow‑free). (See infra, §15.3).The thirdcategoryreferstotheoutflow‑freedharma‑s—theyarenottobeabandoned.

Among thewith‑outflowdharma‑s, thekuśala andavyākṛta ones, not beingdefilements,arenotreallyabandonableinthepropersense.However,whenthedefilementwhichtakesakuśalaoranavyākṛta dharmaasitsobjectisdestroyed,thisdharmaissaidtobeabandoned(tadālambana-kleśa-prahāṇāt);foratthattimethedharmacomestobedisconnected.Infact,havingbeen‘abandoned’,akuśala dharmacanstillre‑arise.Thus,thisisnotacaseofabandonmentintermsofthedharma’sintrinsicnature(svabhāva-prahāṇa).80


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2.4.3.5. Other taxonomical categories

There are various other such taxonomical categories employed as doctrinalperspectives.TheAKBdiscussesthe18dhātu‑sintermsofatotalof22suchdoctrinalperspectives.81Themore importantamongtheseotherperspectivesare:rūpin (material),arūpin(immaterial);sanidarśana(‘visible’),anidarśana (‘notvisible’);sapratigha (‘resistant’),apratigha (‘non‑resistant’);sālambana (which takeobjects),anālambana (whichdonot takeobjects);ādhyātmika (internal),bāhya(external);indriya(ofthenatureofafaculty),nendriya (not of thenatureofafaculty);śaikṣa(‘pertainingtothetrainee’),aśaikṣa(‘pertainingto the non‑trainee’),naiva-śaikṣa-naśaikṣa (pertainingneither to the traineenor thenon‑trainee);kāmāvacara-pratisaṃyukta (pertaining to the sphere ofsensuality),rūpāvacara-pratisaṃyukta(pertainingtothefine‑materialsphere),ārūpyāvacara-pratisaṃyukta(pertainingtotheimmaterialsphere),apratisaṃyukta (notpertainingtoanysphere);etc.

2.4.4. Method of catechism

Intheoldestcanonicalabhidharmatexts,suchastheSarvāstivādinDharma-skandha-śāstra (DSŚ) and theTheravādinVibhaṅgappakaraṇa, the simplermethodofdefiningadoctrinal categorybyansweringaquestionconstitutesadominantfeature.IntheDSŚ,theseriesofquestionsandanswersisusuallyprecededbyabriefsūtraquotationofeachimportantdoctrinaltermwhichisthencommentedonintheformofquestionandanswerintheabhidharmicstyle.Thisisananalysisofintrinsicnaturewithamethodologyderivedfromacombinationofthecatecheticalformatofthesūtricabhidhamma-kathā,vedalla-kathāanduddesa-vibhaṅga;e.g.:theDSŚ:82

Whatiscakṣur-indriya?The cakṣuswhichhasseen,isseeing,andwillseerūpa;aswellasitsfacsimile(tatsabhāga).Further,theādhipatya of cakṣusinducescakṣur-vijñānawhichhascognized(vi-√jñā),iscognizingandwillcognizerūpa—[thiscakṣus] anditsfacsimilearethecakṣur-indriya….

AbhidharmicanalysisbasedonthecatecheticalformatcametobehighlydevelopedintheJPŚ(seebelow),andisfullyutilizedintheMVŚwhichpurportstocommenton the JPŚ.Eveninthelatercommentariessuchasthe AKB,analysisintermsofvariousdoctrinalperspectivesusingsuchcatecheticalformatcontinuestobeheavilyreliedon.Often,aquestionmayleadtoanotherwhichagainleadstoothers(calledanuṣaṅga/prasaṅga).

Another importantmethodology adopted in theabhidharma texts is that ofansweringapropositionalquestioninalternatives(pāda):


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Thesimplestisananswerineither“yes”(evam)or“no”(na evam)tothequestion:“Isptrue?”.Thisiscalledanevaṃ-pādaka,e.g.:Question:“Thosedharma‑swhichareconjoinedwiththevigorEnlightenment‑factor(bodhyaṅga),aretheyalsoconjoinedwithProperExertion(samyak-pradhāna)?”Answer:“Yes(or‘Itisso’).”83Thisisastraightforwardtypeofanswer.Inthisexample,itisclearthatthevigorEnlightenment‑factor isnoneother than theExertion.Theanswer,althoughsimple,helpstosystematizeandorganizeknowledge.

Thequestionmayalsobeintheform:“Ifpistrue,isqalsotrue?”.Theanswerthenmaybeeither:“pistrue,butnotq”—apūrva-pādaka(ananswerwhichaffirmsonlytheformerpartofthequestion);or“qistrue,butnotp”—apaścāt-pādaka (ananswerwhichaffirmsonlythelatterpartofthequestion).

This samequestionmayhave an answer in four alternatives, atetralemma (catuṣ-koṭi):

(i) pistrue,notq(ii) qistrue,notp (iii) bothpandqaretrue(iv) neitherp nor qistrue

Anexampleofsuchatetralemmaregardingthequestion,“Isallfaith(śraddhā)affection(premā)?”,isasfollows:

(i) There is faithwhich is not affection— faith havingduḥkha‑ andsamudaya-satyaasobjects.

(ii) Thereisaffectionwhichisnotfaith—thedefiledaffection.(iii)There is faithwhich is also affection— faith havingnirodha‑ and

mārga-satyaasobjects.(iv)Therearedharma‑swhichareneitherfaithnoraffection—theother

dharma‑s.84

Averyrigoroussystemofcatecheticalinvestigationintotherelationshipviś-à-viśseveraldharma‑swasinnovatedintheJPŚ,andelaborateduponintheMVŚ.Foragivensetofdharma‑s,A,B,C,D,E,etc.,thismethodexaminestherelationshipfirstbetweenAandB,AandC,AandD,AandE…;next,thatbetweenBandC,BandD,BandE,….Thisisthesimplestoperation,calledthe“single‑foldoperation”(一行).Itissocalledbecauseitisastraight‑forwardanalysisoftherelationshipamongseveraldistinctdharma‑swithoutbringingintoconsiderationthefactoroftemporality(past,present,future).Whenthetemporalfactoristakenintoconsideration,theinvestigationbecomesmorecomplicated,andassumestheformofapastAinrelationtopastA(samedharma,butindifferenttemporalperiods),etc;orinanevenmoreinvolvedmanner:apresentAinrelationtoapastB,ortoapastBandapastC;etc.(differentdharma‑sin


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relationtodifferentdharma‑s,indifferenttemporalperiods).ItisalsoappliedintheDKŚ.85Thewholeprocesscanbearathercomplexone.86Thefollowingisapartialillustrationofaninvestigationintointerrelationamongmembersofagroupofninefetters(saṃyojana):A=lust,B=hostility,C=conceit,D=ignorance,E=view,F=irrationaladherence,G=doubt,H=jealousy,I=avarice.Forreasonofspace,IshallillustratefromtheJPŚ,onlythetwosimplertypesofoperation:the“single-fold operation”andthe“six‑passoperation” (六歷; withdetailsofonlythefirstfewcases):87

(1) The “single-fold operation” (no time factor involved)

(i) Wherein there is lust, is there also hostility? (A ⊃ B ?)

Wherein there is thehostility fetter, there is necessarily the lust fetter.Therecanbe the lust fetterwithout the hostility fetter:With regard todharma‑softhefinematerialandnon‑materialspheres,therecanbethelustfetteryettobeabandoned.

(ii) Wherein there is the lust fetter, is there also the conceit fetter? (A ⊃ C ?)Yes.Ifthereistheconceitfetter,istherealsothelustfetter?(C⊃A?)Yes.

(iii) Wherein there is the lust fetter, is there also the ignorance fetter? (A ⊃ D?)Whereinthereisthelustfetter,thereisnecessarilytheignorancefetter.Therecanbetheignorancefetterwithoutthelustfetter:[Intheprocessofdirectrealizationofthefourtruths](cf.infra,§15.4),whentheknowledgeofunsatisfactorinesshasarisenandtheknowledgeoforiginhasnotarisen,withregardtodharma‑sabandonablebyvision,thereistheignorancefetterabandonablebythevisionoforiginyettobeabandoned.

(iv) Wherein there is the lust fetter, is there also the view fetter? (A ⊃ E ?)

Thereisatetra‑lemma:(a)A.~E:Whentheknowledgeoforiginhasarisenandtheknowledgeofcessationhasnotarisen,thereisstilllustwithregardtothedharma‑snotconjoinedwiththeviewfetterabandonablebythevisionofcessationandofthepath,andwithregardtodharma‑sabandonablebycultivation.Whentheknowledgeofcessationhasarisenandtheknowledgeofthepathhasnotarisen,thereisstilllustwithregardtodharma‑snotconjoinedwiththeviewfetterabandonablebythevisionofthepath,andwithregardtodharma‑sabandonablebycultivation.


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InthecaseoftheBuddha’sdiscipleswhohaveperfectedviews(具見,dṛṣṭi-sampanna),thelustfetterisstillnotabandonedwithregardtodharma‑sabandonablebycultivation.

(b)E.~AWhentheknowledgeofunsatisfactorinesshasarisenandtheknowledgeoforiginhasnotarisen,thereisstillviewfettertobeabandonedbythevisionoforiginwithregardtothedharma‑sabandonablebythevisionofunsatisfactoriness.

(c)A.E

For those [ordinaryworldlings]who are boundby all bonds (sakala-bandhana;i.e.,whohavenotyetabandonedanydefilementsthroughthemundanepath),boththefettersexistwithregardtodharma‑sabandonablebycultivation.

Whentheknowledgeofunsatisfactorinesshasarisenandtheknowledgeoforiginhasnotarisen,thereexistboththefetterswithregardtodharma‑sabandonablebythevisionoforigin,cessationandthepath,andtothoseabandonablethroughcultivation.

Whentheknowledgeoforiginhasarisenandtheknowledgeofcessationhasnotarisen,thereexistboththefetterswithregardtodharma‑sconjoinedwiththeviewfettersabandonablebythevisionofcessationandofthepath.

Whentheknowledgeofcessationhasarisenandtheknowledgeofthepathhasnotarisen,thereexistboththefetterswithregardtodharma‑sconjoinedwiththeviewfetterabandonablebythevisionofthepath.

(d)~A.~E

Whentheknowledgeoforiginhasarisenandtheknowledgeofcessationhasnotarisen,neitherof the two fettersexistwith regard todharma‑sabandonablebythevisionofunsatisfactorinessandoforigin.

When theknowledgeofcessationhasarisenand theknowledgeof thepathhasnotarisen,neitherofthetwofettersexistwithregardtodharma‑sabandonablebythevisionofunsatisfactoriness,oforiginandofcessation.

InthecaseoftheBuddha’sdiscipleswhohaveperfectedviews,neitherofthefettersexistwithregardtodharma‑sabandonablebyvision.

Inthecaseofthosewhohavebeenfreedfromsensuality(vītarāga),neitherofthefettersexistwithregardtothedharma‑spertainingtothesensualitysphere.

Inthecaseofthosewhohavebeenfreedfromattachmenttomaterialitysphere,neitherofthefettersexistwithregardtothedharma‑spertainingtothesensualityandfine‑materialityspheres.


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Inthecaseofthosewhohavebeenfreedfromattachmenttonon‑materialitysphere,neitherofthefettersexistwithregardtothedharma‑spertainingtoallthethreespheres.

(v) The relation with the doubt fetter (A ⊃ G ?) is the same as that with the view fetter.

(vi) Wherein there is the lust fetter, is there also the fetter of irrational adherence? (A ⊃ F ?)Thereisatetra‑lemma:(a)A.~F...(b)F.~A...(c)A.F...(d)~A.~F...(Similartypeofconsiderationasinthetetralemmaof(iv) above)

(vii) Wherein there is the lust fetter, is there also the jealousy fetter? (A ⊃ H ?)Wherein there is the jealousy fetter, there isnecessarily the lust fetter.Therecanbethelustfetterwithoutthejealousyfetter:Thelustfetterstillexistswithregardtodharma‑spertainingtothesensualityspherewhichareabandonablebyvisionandtodharma‑spertainingtothefine‑materialityandnon‑materialityspheres.

(viii) The relation with the avarice fetter (A ⊃ I ?) is the same as with the jealousy fetter.As with the lust fetter, the same “single-fold operation” is to be applied for the conceit fetter in relation to the members succeeding it. (C ⊃ D ?; etc.)Wherein there is the hostility fetter, is there also the conceit fetter? (B ⊃ C ?)... .Wherein there is the hostility fetter, is there also the ignorance fetter? (B ⊃ D ?)... Wherein there is the hostility fetter, is there also the view fetter? (B ⊃ E ?)Thereisatetralemma:...The relation with the doubt fetter (B ⊃ G ?) is the same as with the view fetter.Wherein there is the hostility fetter, is there also the fetter of irrational adherence? (B ⊃ F ?)Thereisatetralemma:...Wherein there is the hostility fetter, is there also the jealousy fetter? (B ⊃ H ?)...


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The relation with the avarice fetter (B ⊃ I ?) is the same as with the jealousy fetter.Wherein there is the ignorance fetter, is there also the view fetter? (D ⊃ E ?)...The relation with the doubt fetter (D ⊃ G ?) is the same as with the view fetter.Wherein there is the ignorance fetter, is there also the fetter of irrational adherence? (D ⊃ F ?)...Wherein there is the ignorance fetter, is there also the jealousy fetter? (D ⊃ H ?)...The relation with the avarice fetter (D ⊃ I ?) is the same as with the jealousy fetter.Wherein there is the view fetter, is there also the fetter of irrational adherence? (E ⊃ F ?)...Wherein there is the view fetter, is there also the doubt fetter? (E ⊃ G ?)Thereisatetralemma:...Wherein there is the view fetter, is there also the jealousy fetter? (E ⊃ H ?)Thereisatetralemma....The relation with the avarice fetter (E ⊃ I ?) is the same as with the jealousy fetter.As with the view fetter, the same “single-fold operation” is to be applied for the doubt fetter in relation to the members succeeding it. (G ⊃ H ?; etc.)Wherein there is the fetter of irrational adherence, is there also the doubt fetter? (F ⊃ G ?)...Wherein there is the fetter of irrational adherence, is there also the jealousy fetter? (F ⊃ H ?)Thereisatetralemma....The relation with the avarice fetter (F ⊃ I ?) is the same as with the jealousy fetter.Wherein there is the jealousy fetter, is there also the avarice fetter? (H ⊃ I ?)...


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(2) The “six-pass operation” (歷六 A given dharma in one temporal period in relation to the same dharma in another temporal period)

Wherein there is a past lust fetter, is there also a future one?

Yes.If thereisafutureone,is therealsoapastone(/Isonealsofetteredbyapastlust)?Thereis,ifapreviouslyarisenonehasnotbeenabandoned.Iftherehasnotbeenapreviouslyarisenone,orifapreviouslyarisenonehasbeenabandoned,thenthereisno[pastlust](/heisnotfetteredbyapastlust).Whereinthereisapastlustfetter,istherealsoapresentone?...Whereinthereisafuturelustfetter,istherealsoapresentone?...

Example involving a given fetter pertaining to more than one temporal period

Wherein there is a present lust fetter, are there also a past and a future one? Thereisnecessarilyafutureone(/Heisnecessarilyfetteredbyafutureone).Heisfetteredbyapastoneif,havingbeenarisen,ithasnotbeenabandoned.Heisnotfettered[byapastlust],ifithasnotbeenpreviouslyarisen,orhavingbeenarisenithasbeenabandoned.Ifthereareapastandafutureone,istherealsoapresentone?Thereare,iftheymanifestinthepresent.

Example involving a given fetter pertaining to one temporal period in relation to another fetter pertaining to the same temporal period

Wherein there is a past lust fetter, is there also a past hostility fetter?

Thereis,ifithaspreviouslyarisenandhasnotyetbeenabandoned.Thereisno[pasthostility](/Heisnotfetteredbyapasthostility) if ithasnotpreviouslyarisen,orifhavingarisenithasbeenabandoned.

Ifthereisapasthostilityfetter,istherealsoapastlustfetter?

Heisfettered[byapastlust],ifithasarisenpreviouslyandhasnotbeenabandoned.Heisnot[so]fettered,ifithasnotarisenpreviously,orhavingarisenithasbeenabandoned.

Example involving a given fetter pertaining to one temporal period in relation to another fetter pertaining to a different temporal period

Wherein there is a past lust fetter, is there also a future hostility fetter?


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[Thereis,]ifithasnotyetbeenabandoned.

Ifthereisafuturehostilityfetter,istherealsoapastlustfetter?

Heisfettered[byapastlust],ifithasarisenpreviouslyandhasnotbeenabandoned.Heisnot[so]fettered,ifithasnotarisenpreviously,orhavingarisenithasbeenabandoned.

Theaboveillustration,thoughapartialone,shouldsufficetodemonstratetheĀbhidharmikas’extremelyrigorousandthoroughmethodologyofanalyzingthenatureofdharma‑sthroughdifferentformsofcatechism.TheMVŚhighlightstheimportanceofsuchcatecheticalmethodologyforabhidharma:

Whatisapūrva-pādaka?Whatisapaścāt-pādaka?Whatisanevaṃ-pādaka (如是句)?Whatisanaivam-pādaka (不如是句“notthus”)?Nothingcanmatchabhidharmainitsabilitytoenlightensentientbeingswithregardtosuchobjectsofknowledge.(MVŚ,2c).

For theĀbhidharmikas, by investigating a givendharma bymeansof suchmethodologicaldevicesanddoctrinalperspectives,itsnatureandcharacteristiccomestobefullyandaccuratelydetermined.Thus,thedharma,consciousness(vijñāna),canbesodeterminedtobe:conditioned(saṃskṛta), non‑material(arūpin),invisible (anirdarśana),non‑resistant(apratigha);eitherwithoutflow(sāsrava)or outflow‑free (anāsrava); eithermorally skillful,unskillfulornon‑defined;eitherpast,present,orfuture;etc.


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NOTES

1 Cf.AKB,133:abhiprāyikaḥ sūtre lākṣaṇiko ’bhidharmaḥ |2 Saṃghabhadra (Ny,708b–c):“Thenoble teachingsare inbriefof two types: from thepointofviewofbeingnītārtha or neyārtha,ofbeingrelativeornon‑relative,ofbeingexpositionsof theconventionalorabsolute truth,ofbeingdiscourses thataccordwithone’sownintentionorwithothers’,ofbeingcategorizableasdharma‑characteristicorasdharma‑instruction...Inordertobenefitbeingstobeconverted(vineya)theBhagavatfirstconsiderstheplace,timeandthetypeofrecipient(indriya;‘faculty’)andteachesacertaindoctrineaccordingly.”

3 Vy,11:kaḥ sautrāntikārthaḥ | ye sūtra-prāmāṇikā na śāstra-prāmāṇikāḥ … sūtra-viseṣā eva hy arthaviniścayādayo ’bhidharma-saṃjñāḥ | Cf.AKB,146:sūtra-pramāṇakā vayaṃ naśāstra-pramāṇkāḥ |

4 AKB,3:na hi vinā abhidharmopadeśena śiṣyaḥ śakto dharmān pravicetuṃ5 Arthaviniścaya-sūtra-nibandhana: na hi vinā sūtropadeśena śiṣyaḥ śakto dharmaṃ

pravicetuṃ | ThiscontrastispointedoutbySamtani,NH,inhiseditionoftheArthaviniścaya-sūtraanditsCommentary(nibandhana)(Patna,1971),140f., inadiscussionontheSautrāntikaleaningofthecommentator.

6 Ny,495b.7 T49,16c.8 Ny,495b.9 Ny,495c.ThisisgoodevidencethatŚrīlāta,mostlycalledaDārṣṭānikamasterintheNy,iswithintheSautrāntikaschoolofthought.

10Ny,329c.11Ny,loc. cit.12 Ny,595a.13 MVŚ,542c.14 MVŚ,116b.15 Entrance,§4.5.8.16 Vy,889f.17 MVŚ,777a.Cf.Ny,432b:lakṣaṇa = svarūpa/svabhāva.18 MVŚ,196c.19 MVŚ,217a.20 MVŚ,179b,196c,etc.21 MVŚ,217a.22 Thesecontemplationsarepractisedatthestageofprogresscalled“thestagepertainingtopenetration(nirvedhabhāgīya)”.Cf. infra,§15.3.2.

23 MVŚ,1c.24MVŚ,405c.25MVŚ,65a.26 Cf. Entrance,47ff.


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27MVŚ,306b–c.28MVŚ,308a.29 AKB,12:viyukto hi parabhāvena dharmaḥ | tasmāt na yena viyuktas tenaiva saṃgṛhīto

yujyate | tadyathā cakṣur-indriyaṃ rūpaskandhena cakṣurāyatanadhātubhyāṃ ca duḥkhasamudayasatyābhyāṃ ca saṃgṛhītam | tatsvabhāvatvāt | nānyaiḥ skandhādibhis tadbhāva-viyuktatvāt |

30 Cf.MVŚ,105c,108c,283b,396a,etc.31T49,15b.32 Forthevariousversionsofthisstanza,seeLaValléePoussin,Lde(1930),‘Documentsd’Abhidharma’,249,n.1.

33MVŚ,145c.34MVŚ,770c–771a;cf.infra,§1.3.4.35 Cf. Entrance,3ff.36 Cf.AKB,10.37 AKB,13.38 AKB,loc. cit.39MVŚ,379a.Some14meaningsforāyatanaaregivenherein.40AKB,301.Cf.S,iv,13;M,i,3;Mahāniddesa,133:sabbaṃ vuccati dvādasāyatanāni41 Ny,477b.42AKB,13.;Ny,343c(whichindicatesapreferenceforthemeaningofgotra);SPrŚ,782a.43MVŚ,370c.44T26,699a.45VKŚ,T26,546c.46 Cf.AKB,i,understanza48.SPrŚ,823b:“Thesixfacultiesaretheexclusiveobjectsofmentalconsciousness”.Also,Ny,377a:“Amongthe18dhātu‑s,thefivedhātu‑s,visibles,etc,…eachiscognizedbytwoamongthesixconsciousnesses.Bythis,itisknownthattheremaining13dhātu‑sareallcognizedbymentalconsciousnessalone,astheyarenottheobjectsofthefivesensoryconsciousnesses.”

The Theravādainfactspeaksofthemasdhammāyatana-rūpa-s.SeeKarunadasa,Y,BAM,35.47 MVŚ,367b.48 MVŚ,367b.49 JPŚdoes not enumerate the seven, but the implication in the assertion “one skandha,

one āyatanaandonedhātu”isclearenough.50MVŚ,783b;AKB11.51 MVŚ,370c:有餘師說，法界總攝一切法盡.MVŚ,985b:…或說法處攝一切法.WemayalsonotethattheBasicSectionoftheYBŚtooacknowledgesthat“thedharma-dhātuistoberegardedasbeingsingularinthesenseofbeingtheactivitydomainofthemind,orasbeingtwofold,...orasbeingtenfold”.(T30,293c).

52 Ny,344b.53 T26,1027b.54MVŚ,987b.55MVŚ,987b.


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56Ny,447b.57T49,16a.58Ny,350c.59 Ny,398b.Alsocf.MVŚ,367c(種種因義).InSthiramati’scommentaryontheAbhidharma-

samuccaya,dhātuisexplicitlyglossedasbīja(T31,no.1606,704b:一切法種子義).60Ny,633a;TSP,509.61 Cf. Study,73ff.,foragooddiscussionofthisfeatureinthistext.62MVŚ,392c–393a.63MVŚ,711a–b–variousotherexplanationsarealsogiven.64 AKB,4f:sametya saṃbhūya pratyayaiḥ kṛtā iti saṃskṛtāḥ | na hy ekapratyayajanitaṃ kiṃcid

astīti ||65MVŚ,741a.66 MVŚ,263a–c,740c–741a.67Ny,348c.68 Cf.AKB,202.69SPrŚ,863c–864a.70MVŚ,263a,741a.71 MVŚ,263b,741a.72 MVŚ,815c:“Itissaidtobeveiledonaccountofitsobstructingthenoblepathandthepreparatoryefforts(prayoga).”Alsocf.Ny,959c.

73MVŚ,259c–260a.74MVŚ,269c75 Entrance,§4.5.34.4.76 Theravādahasessentiallythesamenotions.Cf. Lamotte,E,inBalasooriya,S.,et. al.,ed.,

Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula(London,1980),127.77 Cf. Entrance,92&note;AKB(E),133,n.19.78 AKB,3:sāsravānāsravā dharmāḥ | saṃskṛtā mārgavarjitāḥ sāsravāḥ | āsravās teṣu yasmāt

samanuśerate || kāmaṃ nirodhamārga-satyālambanā apy āsravā upajāyante na tv anuśerate tatreti na tayoḥ sāsravatvaprasaṅgaḥ ||

79MVŚ,444c–445a.80 Cf. AKB,236.81AKB,18ff.82 DSŚ,498b.83 Cf.MVŚ,550b.84 Cf. AKB,60.85 DKŚ,624b.86 Cf. Study,203.87 JPŚ,933c–938c;MVŚ,188aff.

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3. The Sarvāstivāda School and Its Notion of the Real

3.1. HistoryoftheSarvāstivāda3.2. Sarvāstivādavs.Vibhajyavāda3.3. ProofofthethesisofsarvāstitvaintheVKŚ,MVŚandAKB

3.3.1. ArgumentsintheVKŚ3.3.2. ArgumentsintheMVŚ3.3.3. ArgumentsintheAKB

3.4. Sautrāntikacritiqueoftheepistemologicalargument3.5. Notionofthereal/existent

3.5.1. OpinionsofthevariousancientmastersintheMVŚ3.5.2. Relative/conventionalandabsolutetruthsaspostulatedintheAKB3.5.3. Saṃghabhadra’scharacterizationoftheexistent3.5.3.1. Pastandfuturedharma‑sarenotmerelydesignations(prajñapti)3.5.3.2. Distinctionamongpast,presentandfuturedharma‑sasexistents3.5.3.3. Cognitivedistinctivenessofthereals/existents

3.6. ThevariouscomponentsoftheSarvāstivādaschool

3.1. History of the Sarvāstivāda

Althoughitisdifficulttospeakoftheexactdateofthe‘founding’oftheSarvāstivādaschool,itspresence,aswellasthatofitsrival—theVibhajyavādalineage—inthe timeofEmperorAśokaisbeyonddoubt.SinceAśoka’sreignisaround268–232B.C.E.,thismeansthatatleastbythemiddleofthe3rdcenturyB.C.E.,ithadalreadydevelopedintoadistinctschool.Vasumitra’s*Samayabhedoparacaṇacakra,aSarvāstivādatreatise,placestheschool’sestablishmentatthebeginningofthethirdcenturyaftertheBuddha’sdemise:

TheSthaviravāda remainedunited for a certain periodof time.At thebeginningofthe3rdcentury,therearosesomedisputes,anditsplitintotwoschools:1.theSarvāstivāda,alsocalledHetuvāda;2.theoriginalSthaviravādawhich[then]changeditsnametotheHaimavāda.1

EmperorAśoka’sascendancetothethroneisestablishedasaround270B.C.E.Accordingly,ifwefollowtheSarvāstivādatraditionitselfwhichgivesthisdateas116years(orahundredoddyears)2 aftertheBuddha’sparinirvāṇa,thedategivenby*Samayabhedoparacaṇa-cakra fortheestablishmentofSarvāstivādawouldbearoundthefirstpartof2ndcenturyB.C.E.ThistallieswiththedateofKātyānīputra(ca.150B.C.E.)whoiscreditedbytraditionwiththeeffectivefoundingoftheschool.3Theearliestinscriptionalevidence,however,wastheMathurāLionCapitolwhichdatesfromthebeginningofthefirstcenturyC.E.Thisinscriptionmentionsthegivingofalmsanddonationofmonasteriesby


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thewifeofthemahākṣatrapaRājuvulatotheSarvāstivādacommunity.Hisson,Śoḍāsa, is also recorded as havinggiven lands to twoSarvāstivādinmonks,ĀryaBuddhadevaandBhikṣuBuddhila.4

ItappearsthattheSarvāstivādaaswellasitsrivalcamp,theVibhajyavāda,atfirstmaintaineditspositionastheorthodoxSthaviravāda.Atthisinitialstage,theterm‘Sarvāstivāda’wasperhapsnot specifically insistedupon. InDevaśarman’s/Devakṣema’sVijñānakāya-śāstra (VKŚ),oneofthesevencanonicalSarvāstivādatexts,theauthorestablished—forthefirsttimeinexplicitterms—thesarvāstitva standpointagainsttheVibhajyavādinsrepresentedbyacertainMaudgalyāyana.IfthispersoncouldbeidentifiedwiththeMoggaliputta‑tissawhowassaidtohavepresidedovertheThirdCounciloftheTheravādainAśoka’stimeandwhocompiledtheKathāvatthuppakaraṇa,thentheChinesetraditiontransmittedbyXuanZangthatDevaśarmanlivedwithin100yearsaftertheBuddha’sdemisewould seemcredible.5Thisidentification is temptingwhenwe consider thefact that the controversy that the author dealswith after having establishedhis thesis sarvāstitva againstMaudgalyāyana, corresponds to the veryfirstcontroversytakenupinMoggaliputta‑tissa’sKathāvatthuppakaraṇa,andevensomeofthephrasesinbothtextsonthiscontroversybearmuchresemblance.Thefact,however,thatthistextexhibitshighlydevelopedpolemicsbetrayingconsiderable influencefromtheJPŚhaspreventedYinShunfromacceptingtheabove‑mentioned tradition fromXuanZang;6 YinShunproposed insteadthatitwascomposedintheearlypartofthe1stcenturyC.E.However,thisfactcouldwellhavebeentheresultofsubsequentrevision;itmayalsobeinpartareflectionoftheauthor’sintellectualacumen.LaValléePoussinopinedthatitwascomposedafterthePāliKathāvatthu.7

The Sarvāstivādaremainedthemostpowerfulandinfluentialschoolinnorth‑westernIndiafromaroundthebeginningoftheCommonEratoaboutthe7th centuryC.E.,initiallyestablishedinMathurāandexpandinginthenorthwhereKāśmīrabecameitscenteroforthodoxy.Withitshighlydevelopedabhidharma doctrines, itwas the leadingabhidharma school capable of repudiating theemergingMahāyānaphilosophyaswellasthepro‑MahāyānatenetsupheldbyotherschoolsofNikāya(i.e.,non‑Mahāyāna)Buddhism.Aroundthe6thor7th centuryC.E.,itsleadingpositionseemedtohavebeeneventuallyreplacedbytheSāṃmitīyawhichhadawelldevelopeddoctrineofkarma.8

ItisnoteworthythatintheVKŚ,theSarvāstivādinsnevercallthemselvesassuch.WhenarguingagainsttheVibhajyavādins,theyrefertothemselvesastheYukta‑vādins(應理論者);against thePudgalavādins,astheŚūnyatā‑vādins(性空論者).Itwasperhapslater,inthecourseofdoctrinalconfrontationwithrivalschoolsandbeinghardpressedtoarticulatetheirposition,thattheterm“Sarvāstivāda”camedistinctlytobeinsistedupon.Thetraditionalterm,Yuktavādin/Yuktavāda,continuedtobeemployedfrequentlyintheMVŚ.9Itwasusedby

3. the SārvaStivāda SChool and itS notion of the real

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theorthodoxSarvāstivādinsineventhe5thcenturyC.E.10IntheMVŚ,insuchacontextwheretheSarvāstivādastandpointiscontrastedwiththatofanotherschool,theVibhajyavādinsareoftenridiculedasnotconformingtologicandasbeing“thefruitofnescience(ajñāna),ofdarkness(andha-kāra-phala?),ofignorance(avidyā),ofnotapplyingeffortdiligently”.11

Byaroundtheearlierpartofthe2ndcenturyC.E.,theSarvāstivādinsseemedtohavemoreorlessdeterminedwhattheyconsideredtobedistinctivelyorthodoxSarvāstivādadoctrinesincontradistinctiontotheothercontemporaryschools.ThisisrepresentedbytheencyclopediccompilationoftheAbhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā,the‘GreatCommentary’bytheSarvāstivādaorthodoxyinKāśmīra(seebelow).Subsequently,however,withinthebroadSarvāstivādalineageitself,therestillappeared to bedisagreement concerningmanyof these doctrines.Thisfactisreflectedinthepost‑MVŚworks,suchasthe*Satyasiddhi-śāstra (成實論),the *Abhidharmahṛdaya(Tno.1550)anditscommentaries(Tno.1551,no.1552),theAKBanditscommentaries, theADVandthe*Nyāyānusāra (Ny).Intheintroductorysectionofthe5thcenturyC.E.*Samayapradīpika (顯宗論)(SprŚ),thestaunchVaibhāṣika,Saṃghabhadra,inanattempttoestablishtheBuddha’somniscience,citestheSarvāstivādaversionoftheSaṅgīti-sūtra (集法契經)wheretheBuddhaissupposedtohavepredictedthattherewillbecontentiousviewswithintheBuddhistmovementafterHim.TheseviewsarenottobefoundintheextantChineseĀgamaorPāliversionofthesūtra,buttheyaredoctrinalpositionsconsideredheterodoxbytheVaibhāṣikas,andtheircontrarieswouldipso facto represent theorthodoxSarvāstivādapositions as held at the time.Manyofthesesectarianviews,saidtobepredictedbytheBuddha,aredisputedatlengthinAKBandNy.Theyareenumeratedasfollows:

(1) Itisonlyinthevajropama-samādhithatdefilementscanbeeradicatedallatonce.

(2) Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaandnirvāṇaaretwodistinctentities.(3) Theconditioningsdisjoinedfromthoughtarenotrealentities.(4) Vijñapti karma‑sdonotexist,nottospeakofavijñapti karma‑s.(5) Allrūpa-dharma‑sarecomprisedoftheGreatElements(mahābhūta).(6) Thehomogeneouscause(sabhāga-hetu)consistsintheprecedingbeing

similartothesucceeding.(7) Therūpāyatanacomprisescolor(varṇa-rūpa)alone.(8) ThespraṣṭavyāyatanacomprisestheGreatElementsalone.(9) Onlythetangibleāyatana‑sareobstructive(sapratigha).(10) Thespraṣṭavyāyatanaandthekāyāyatanaareobstructive.(11) Onlythefiveexternalāyatana‑sareobstructive.(12) Itisvisualconsciousnessthatsees.(13) Itistheassemblagethatsees.


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(14)Themano-dhātuandthedharma-dhātumaybebothpermanentandimpermanent.12

(15)Rūpa-dharma‑sdonotperishmomentarily.(16)Thereexistconditioningsdisjoinedfrommindwhichabideforsome

time.(17)Cittaexistsintheideationlessandcessationmeditations.(18)The immediate conditions (samanantara-pratyaya) apply to rūpa-

dharma‑saswell.(19)Norūpa-dharma‑scanbehomogeneouscause.(20)Retribution‑born(vipākaja)rūpacanresumeafterhavingbeencutoff.(21)Prātimokṣa-śīlacanalsobeacquiredbyanimals,preta‑sanddeva‑s.(22)Relinking (pratisaṃdhi, at the timeof rebirth) can takeplaceeven

whenthecittaisundefiled.(23)Allrelinkingisduetocravingandhatred.(24)Restraint(saṃvara)andnon‑restraint(asaṃvara)canbeundertaken

eitherpartiallyorfully.(25)Thegravestevilkarma (ānantarya)canexistamonganimalsandpreta‑s.(26)Defilementscanbeabandonedbyboththeānantarya‑andvimukti-mārga‑s.(27)Allskillfulwith‑outflowprajñāconjoinedwithmentalconsciousness

(manovijñāna-saṃprayuktā kuśala-sāsrava-prajñā)isnotviews(dṛṣṭi).(28)Satkāya-dṛṣṭi andantagrāha-dṛṣṭi are unskillful and take objects

pertainingtootherspheres(anya-dhātv-ālambana).(29)Alldefilementsareunskillful.(30)Thereexistsnopleasurableorneutralsensation.(31)Onlyneutralsensationdoesnotexist.(32)Rūpa‑sexistinārūpya-dhātu.(33)Allthosefallingfromtheideationlessheavenarerebornintheevil

planesofexistence(durgati).(34)Thereisnountimelydeathforanysentientbeing.(35)Alloutflow‑freeprajñāisofthenatureofknowledge(jñāna)andview.(36)[Thedharma‑s]aretobeassertedseparately:pastandfuture[dharma‑s]

donotexist;allexistinthepresent.13

(37)Matterandthoughtcannotbecomeco‑existentcauses(sahabhū-hetu).(38)Atthekalalastageofdevelopmenttheembryoisalreadyinpossession

ofallthematerialfaculties.(39)Allthosewhohaveacquiredthemūrdhan dharma-sarenotsusceptible

torebirthintheevilplanesofexistence.(40) All skillfulandevilkarma-sarecapableofbeing transformedand

ceasing.(41) Theunconditioneddharma‑sdonotexistasrealentities.


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(42) Themundanepathsofpraxisdonoteradicatedefilements.(43) Thevow‑knowledge, the non‑dispute, the non‑obstruction and the

[threefold]doublesamādhicanariseonlyinJambudvīpa.(44) The cittaandcaitta‑scanalsotakenon‑existentobjects(asad-ālambana).

3.2. Sarvāstivāda vs. Vibhajyavāda

Inspiteofvariousdoctrinaldisagreements—someofconsiderableimportance—thevarioussubgroupswithintheSarvāstivādaschoolwereunitedintheircentraltenetofSarvāstivāda.Itseemstohavebeenagenuinebeliefonthepartof the Sarvāstivādathat“sarvam asti”waswhattheBuddhaHimselfhadtaught.Itbecameaproblem—philosophically—onlywhentheycametobequestionedbytheiropponentsastotheexactimplicationoftheirdoctrineofsarvāstitva. Asnotedabove,evenaftertheyhadeventuallyarticulatedthisdoctrinalpositionsufficientlytobeestablishedasadistinctschool,theyseemedtohavecontinuedtoassumethepositionoftheorthodoxSthaviravāda.

Theworkingoutoftheimplicationofthisthesiswasstillvisibleevenaslateasthe timeofNy.Thewholeconfrontationcametobezeroedin/focusedonthedisputebetweenSarvāstivādaversusVibhajyavāda.Wearedealinghere,inthiscontext,withthesetwoopposingthesesandnotwiththeissueofidentificationofthetwobroadsectarianlineages.AsfortheidentityoftheVibhajyavādinsintheMVŚ,YinShunhasmadeanexcellentinvestigation.Accordingtohim:

TheVibhajyavādins in theMahāvibhāṣāwere the continental schoolsgenerally referred to as theVibhajyavāda comprising theMahīśāsaka,theDharmagupta,andtheKāśyapīyawhichprevailedintheKāśmīraregion,particularlywiththeMahīśāsakaasthemainstream.14

IntheAKB,themainopponentsoftheSarvāstivādins,theSautrāntikas,belongingtotheVibhajyavādacamp,proposethattheSarvāstivādinwayofunderstandingsarvāstitva isnot theonlypossibleone. Indeed, theyconsider it tobeabadinterpretationofthenotion.FortheSautrāntikas,onecouldsay‘allexists’onlyinthefollowingmanner:Pastdharma‑shaveexisted;futuredharma‑swillcomeintoexistence;presentdharma‑sareexisting.Alternatively,onecouldalsosay‘allexists’inthesenseinwhichthesūtra15expressesitself:Everythingthatiswithintherangeofperception—withinthe12āyatana‑s(andnothingmore)—canlegitimatelybesaidtoexist.

Inthiswork,theSarvāstivādaisrepresentedbyVasubandhuasdefiningtheirpositionasfollows:

Thosewhohold‘allexists’—thepast,thepresentandthefuture—belongto the Sarvāstivāda.Those,ontheotherhand,whoholdthatsomeexist,viz.,


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thepresentandthepastkarmathathasnotgivenfruitbutnotthosethathavegivenfruitorthefuture,arefollowersoftheVibhajyavāda.16

In Saṃghabhadra’sNy,apost‑AKBpolemicindefenseoftheVaibhāṣikaorthodoxy,anadditionalrequirementforthedefinitionisnoticeable:

It isonlythosewhobelieveintherealexistenceofthethreeperiodsoftime,asdiscussedabove,aswellasofthethreekindsoftheunconditioned,whocanbeconsideredasbelongingtotheSarvāstivāda.17

ThissamerequirementisalsofoundintheADV:18

Sarvāstivādaissocalledbecauseitaccepts[therealityof]thethreeperiodsof time,distinguishedonaccountofactivity,andthethreereals[—thethreeunconditioned]…

TheadditionalrequirementseemstoconfirmoursuggestionthatevenaslateasthetimeofNy,theorthodoxSarvāstivādinswerestillstrugglingtodefinethemselves.Accordingtothe*Samayabhedoparacaṇacakra,mostoftheearlyBuddhistsectshadacceptedthedoctrineofsarvāstitva,eventhoughtheyseemtohavedisputedendlesslyonwhatitreallymeantforthemineachcase.ItseemspossiblethatevenaslateasthetimeoftheAKBandNy,therewerestillsomeBuddhists,bothwithinandwithoutthebroadSarvāstivādalineage—includingsomesectionsoftheSautrāntika‑Dārṣṭāntika—whowouldacceptthedoctrineinarevisedordifferentversionfromthatadoptedbytheorthodoxVaibhāṣikas.ItisperhapsbecauseofthisthatSaṃghabhadrafeltitnecessarytodissociatetheVaibhāṣikasdistinctly fromtheotherswhomhecouldnotacceptas realSarvāstivādinsinanysense.InNy,henamesthemasfollows:

Pudgalavādins, called by him “theSuperimposers orAdditionists(Samāropavādins)” on account of their acceptanceof the reality of thepudgalainadditiontothatofthedharma‑sinthethreetimes;

Vibhajyavādinswhoaccepttheexistenceofonlythepresentandthepastkarmathathasnotgivenfruit;

Kṣaṇikavādinswhoacceptonlytherealityofthe12āyatana‑softhepresentkṣaṇa;

Prajñaptivādinswhodenytherealityofeventhedharma‑softhepresent;

Vaināśikaswhohold thatalldharma‑sarewithoutsvabhāva, likeemptyflowers.

TheSautrāntikas, here referred to as theKṣaṇikavādins, are singledout bySaṃghabhadrawhodeniesthattheyqualifyasSarvāstivādins,fortheirview“differsfromtheVaināśikasbyjustamerekṣaṇa!”19


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3.3. Proof of the thesis of sarvāstitva in the VKŚ, MVŚ and AKB20

3.3.1. Arguments in the VKŚ

IntheVKŚ,theauthorestablishesthethesisoftri‑temporalexistenceonthebasis of four fundamental principles commonly and tacitly assumedby theĀbhidharmikas—partlyontheauthorityofthesūtra‑sandpartlyfromamongacceptedabhidharmatenets:

(i) Twothoughtscannotbeconascent,andathoughtorthought‑concomitantcannotknowitself(cf. infra,§9.4):Itissaidinthesūtrathatapersoncanobservethecravinginhismind,etc.Whenoneismakingtheobservation,theobservingthoughtandthecraving(i.e.,thethoughthavingthecraving)observedcannotbesimultaneous,norcanthepresentthoughtknowitself.Thecravingobservedthenmustbeeitherpastorfuture.Hencepastandfuturedharma‑smustbeexistent.

(ii) Karmaanditsretribution(vipāka)cannotbesimultaneous(cf. infra,§7.3.5):thefactthatakarmawhichhasbecomepastcangiverisetoitsretributionlaterprovestheexistenceoftheformerasapastdharma,i.e.,anexistentinitspastmode.

(iii) TheBuddhahas taught that consciousness necessarily has an object(ālambana):sincewecanhaveconsciousnessofwhatispastandfuture,pastandfuturedharma‑smustbeexistent.21

(iv) One canbe endowedwith (samanvāgata)dharma‑swhichdonot arisepresently: It is taught in the sūtra that someone innirodha-samāpatti whereinnomentalactivityarises isstillendowedwithmentalqualitiessuchasmoderateness inwishes (alpecchatā), shamefulness (lajjā),etc.;likewise,atrainee(śaikṣa)isstillendowedwiththefivespiritualfaculties—faith,vigor,etc.—evenwhenhehasanenwrappedordefiledmind.Accordingly,thosewhicharenotpresentbutcanstillbepossessedmustbeexistingaspastorfuturedharma‑s.22

3.3.2. Arguments in the MVŚ

Theargumentsforthetri‑temporalexistenceofdharma‑sareputforthtorefute“thosewhoaredeludedwithregardtotheintrinsicnatureofthethreetimes(adhvan)—denyingthepastandthefuture,andholdingthatwhatexistsinthepresentaretheunconditioneddharma‑s”.

ThefirstargumentemploystheSarvāstivādanotionofendowment(samanavāgama),a notion that suggests somedoctrinal development:One is ‘endowed’withadharmawhenone,havingacquiredit,continuestopossessit.Whenadharma hasnotbeenacquiredandonecontinuesinthestateofnotpossessingit,thereis


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the‘non-endowment’ofthisdharma. For the Sarvāstivāda,thishumanexperiencepresupposestheexistenceofpastandfuturedharma‑s.Theotherargumentsemploysystematiclogicaldisputationcoupledwithanappealtoscripturalauthority.

a. Ifpastandfuturearenon‑existent,therewouldnotbeendowmentandnon-endowmentofthesedharma‑s,justasthereisnoendowmentandnon-endowmentofasecondhead,athirdhand,etc.,whicharenon‑existent.Sincethereareinfacttheendowmentandnon-endowment,itisknownthatpastandfutureareexistent.

b. Thepersonwhodeniesthepastandthefuturemustsayinwhichtemporalperiodthefruitofapresentretribution‑causeexists—past,presentorfuture.Ifhesays“past”,thenthepastexists;ifhesays“future”,thenthefutureexists;ifhesays“present”,thenitamountstothepropositionthataretributioncauseanditsfruitexistsimultaneously,whichcontradictsscripturalstatements.23Ifhesays“Itsfruitisnotwithinthethreeperiodsof time”,thenheisproposingthatthereisnofruit,sincearetributionfruitisnotunconditioned(asaṃskṛta).Andifthereisnofruit,thentherewouldbenocauseeither.

Likewise,iftheretributionfruitexistsinthepresent,thenhemustsayinwhichtemporalperiodthatcorrespondingcauseoccurs—past,presentorfuture.Ifhesays“past”,thenthepastexists;ifhesays“future”,thenthefutureexists;ifhesays“present”,thenitamountstothepropositionthataretributioncauseanditsfruitexistsimultaneously,whichcontradictsscripturalstatements.Ifhesays“Itscauseisnotwithinthethreeperiodsof time”,thenheisproposingthatthereisnocause,sincearetributioncauseisnotunconditioned(asaṃskṛta).Andifthereisnocause,thentherewouldbenofruiteither.

c. Ifthepastandthefuturewerenon‑existent,thentherewouldnotbethefactsof‘leavinghome’(pravrajyā)andreceiving‘higherordination’,inaccordancewiththestanzabelow:

Ifoneholdsthatthepastdoesnotexist,therewouldnotbepastBuddhas.

IftherewerenopastBuddhas,therewouldnotbeleavingHomeandreceivingHigherOrdination.

d. Ifthepastandthefuturewerenon‑existent,thenitmustbethatSaṅghamembers practice false speechwhile possessingproper knowledge,inaccordancewiththestanzabelow:

If[aSaṅghamember]holdsthatthepastisnon‑existentandyetspeaksofhis[ordination]age,

Hewouldbeincreasing,daybyday,[both]hisproperknowledgeandfalsespeech.


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e. Thenon‑existenceofthepastandfutureimpliesthatthepresentlikewisedoesnotexist,sincethepresentisdesignatedinrelationtothepastandfuture.The three timesnotexisting, theconditionedwouldnotexist.The conditionednotexisting,theunconditionedtoowouldnotexistsincethelatterisestablishedinrelationtotheformer.Theconditionedandtheunconditionedbothnotexisting,thentherewouldnotbeanydharma whatsoever,whichentailsthatthereisnoliberationandnirvāṇa—aseriousfalseview!

3.3.3. Arguments in the AKB

The argument put forth by theSarvāstivāda in theAKB, bywayof bothscripturalauthority(āgama—a. andb.)andlogicalreasoning(yukti—c.andd.),areessentiallysimilar:

a. For,ithasbeensaidbytheBuddha:“Obhikṣu‑s,ifpastrūpadidnotexist,thelearnednobledisciplecouldnothavebecomedisgustedwithregardtothepastrūpa.Itisbecausepastrūpaexiststhatthelearnednobledisciplebecomesdisgustedwithregardtothepastrūpa.Iffuturerūpadidnotexist,thelearnednobledisciplecouldnothavebecomefreefromdelightwithregardtothefuturerūpa. Itisbecausefuturerūpaexiststhat…”24

b. IthasbeensaidbytheBuddha,“Conditionedbythetwo[—senseorganandtheobject—],thereisthearisingofconsciousness…”25

c. Consciousnessariseswhenthereisanobject,notwhenthereisnoobject.Thisisafixedprinciple.Ifpastandfuture[dharma‑s]werenon-existent,therewouldbeaconsciousnesshavinganon-existentobject.Hence,intheabsenceofanobject,consciousnessitselfwouldnotexist.26

d. Ifpast[dharma‑s]werenon‑existent,howcouldtherebeinthefuturethefruitofpureorimpurekarma?Foritisnotthecasethatatthetimeofthearisingofthefruitapresentretribution‑causeexists!27

3.4. Sautrāntika critique of the epistemological argument

Thelogicalargumentforthetworequisitesforthearisingofconsciousness—objectandsensefaculty—isinconformitywithwhattheVaibhāṣikacitesinb.asthescripturalauthority.TheVaibhāṣikainsistsonthesetwofoldrequisites.Accordingly,ifpastandfuturedharma‑sarenon‑existent,thenmentalconsciousnessofthemwouldnotarise,sinceoneoftherequisites(object)islacking.Butthiscontradictsexperience:Wedohavecognition(buddhi)ofthem,whichprovesthattheyarereal.

The Sautrāntikadoesnotacceptthatabuddhimusthaveacorrespondingexistentobject. For him, objects of cognition canbe either existent or non‑existent.


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Butevenwhen anobject is non‑existent, the principle (niyama) of the tworequisites is not violated.SthaviraŚrīlāta, aprominentSautrāntika leader inSaṃghabhadra’stime,explains:

Thisfollowsinaccordancewiththeprincipleofinferringfromasuccessionofcausesandeffects.How?

Itisafterhavinggraspedapresent[object]that[themind]canswiftlyinfertoandfro:Itcaninferthatsuchandsuchaneffectisproducedbyapastcauseofsuchandsuchakind.Thiscauseinturnarosefromsuchandsuchacause,andsoon,correspondinglyuptotheremote[past].Itiscompletelyfromaprocessof inference thatonehas thevividperception[ofapastobject]asifitwerepresent(如現證得).Or,[themind]infersthatsuchandsuchakindofcauseinthepresentmomentcanproducesuchandsuchakindofeffectinthefuture.Thiseffectinturnwillinducethearisingofsuchandsuchaneffect,[inthisway]correspondinglyuptotheremote[future].…

Althoughatthisstagetheobjectdoesnotexist,itdoesnotmeanthatthejñānaiswithoutthetworequisites…Thisisbecausecausesandconditionsexistintheparticularseries,atthetimewhenaparticularknowledgequacause (hetu-jñāna) arises.That is: In thepast there arose such a jñāna;through a causal transmission, a jñāna having such and such a form isproducedinthepresentmoment.Sincethepresentjñānahasthepastjñāna asitscause,thispresentjñānaariseswithanunderstandingthatislikethepreviousone,havingtheverypastobject(viṣaya)asitspresentālambana. However, thatālambana does not exist now.Yet, althoughnon‑existentnow,itneverthelessservesastheālambana.Henceonecannotsay[suchandsuchacognition]isdevoidofthetworequisites.[Thesameappliestothe jñānaofafutureobject].…28

The Sautrāntikaexplainsthathedoesnotinfactobjecttothepropositionof“Allexists”(sarvam asti),provideditisproperlyunderstoodinaccordancewiththe sūtrastatement:

Obrahmins,‘allexists’meansnomorethanthe12āyatana‑s.29

Orrather,oneshouldsay:pastisthatwhichwasexistent;futureisthatwhich,givenitscause,willexist—pastandfuture‘exist’inthissense,notinthesensethatthepresentdharma‑sexistasrealentities.30Thisamountstodefiningthecharacteristicoftheexistent(sallakṣaṇa)as‘havingarisenandnotyetceased’.Saṃghabhadraobjectstosuchanotionofsallakṣaṇawhich,forhim,amountsto the a prioriassumptionthatthepastandthefuturedonotexist:

Theirpropositionisinvalid,forwhathasarisenandnotyetceasedisjustanothernameforthepresent.[And]tosaythatthepresenttimeissallakṣaṇa istosaythatthepastandthefuturearenon‑existent:Oneshouldfurther


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hereinquestion:Whydoessallakṣaṇapertaintothepresentandnottheother[times]?31

3.5. Notion of the real/existent

But justwhat precisely do theSarvāstivādinsmeanwhen they insist thatadharmawhichhasbecomepastoronewhichhasnotyetariseninthepresentisreal/existent?Thearticulatetheoryofsarvāstivādawillbediscussedinchapter5.Herewewillfirstexaminetheirnotionofanexistent,beginningwiththeMVŚ.

3.5.1. Opinions of the various ancient masters in the MVŚ

In the twologicalargumentsabove, thecriterionforreality isclearlycausalefficacy.TheMVŚinformsusofvariousviewsonwhatexistent/real.ThemostnotableandrepresentativeviewoftheSarvāstivādaisthatwhatisrealiswhatabidesuniquelyinitsintrinsicnature:Whatisrealiswhathasasvabhāva.Amongthevarioussynonymsofsvabhāva is thetermavayava, ‘part’.32A‘part’herereferstothesmallestpossibleunitwhichcannotbefurtheranalyzed;itistheultimatereal.Whatevercanbefurtheranalyzedeitherphysicallyormentally—acomposite(e.g.,aperson)—is‘havingapart’(sāvayava);itisarelativereal,superimposedontheultimatereals(e.g.,thefiveskandha‑s).Thisalsomeansthatwhatisrealorwhatexiststrulyiswhatexistsfromthehighestorultimatestandpoint(paramārtha-sat),asopposedtowhatexistsrelatively/conventionally(saṃvṛti-sat).MVŚinformsusofvariousĀbhidharmika notionsoftheexistent:

Regardingtheexistents,somesaytheyareoftwokinds:1.Existentsasrealentities(dravyataḥ sat)—theskandha, āyatana,etc.;2.Existentsasconcepts(prajñaptitaḥ sat)—male,female,etc.

Somesaytheyareofthreekinds:1.Whatexistsrelatively—agiventhingexistsrelativelytothisbutdoesnotexistrelativelytothat;2.Whatexistsbyvirtueofanassemblage—agiventhingexistsherebutdoesnotexistthere;3.Whatexistsatsomegiventime—agiventhingexistsatthistimebutdoesnotexistatanothertime.

Somesaytheyareoffivekinds:1.whatexistsinname[only]—atortoise’shair,ahare’shorn,agarlandofemptyflowers,etc.;2.whatexistsasarealentity(dravyato’sti)—alldharma‑seachofwhichisabidinginitsown‑nature (svabhāva); 3.whatexistsconventionally—avase,garment,vehicle,army,forest,house,etc.;4.whatexistsasanassemblage—apudgalaisdesignatedwithregardtoanassemblageoftheskandha‑s;5.whatexistsrelatively—‘this shore’ [exists relatively to] ‘that shore’,a‘long thing’[existsrelativelyto]a‘shortthing’,etc.33

TheMVŚ alsodistinguishesthatwhichpertainstotherelativetruthandthatwhichpertainstotheabsolutetruth,withregardtothefournobletruths.Itenumerates


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variousopinionsonthis.Thepositionofthecompilersis:theparticularitiesofthefourtruthspertaintotherelativetruth.I.e.,thevariousconventionalthingsreferredto,pertainingtoeachtruth—alltheconventionalthingslike“male”,“female”,“vase”,“garment”etccomeunderthetruthsofunsatisfactorinessandorigin;theBuddhaspeaksofcessationasbeinglike“theothershore”,andthepathasbeinglikearaftorlikealadder,etc,. The16outflow‑freemodesofunderstanding(ākāra)34pertain to theabsolute truth; i.e., thatwhichpertainsto the absolutetrutharetheuniversalprinciplesunderlyingtheconventionalparticularities, directly comprehended (abhi-sam-√i) by theārya‑s— thatwhichisdirectlyseenbythemasbeinguniversallytrue.35 (Cf. supra,§2.3.2).ThisearlynotionintheMVŚoftheabsolutetruthasbeingthatdirectlyrealizedbyanāryaisnoteworthy:itisquiteinkeepingwiththefundamentalsoteriologicalconcernofabhidharma. Saṃghabhadratoo,emphasizesthatitisthecommoncharacteristicsofdharma‑s(the16ākāra‑s)directlyperceivedbytherealization‑knowledgethatconstitute“truedirectperception”(真現量.See§10.8.8)—thattrulypertaintotheabsolutetruth.

ThefollowingdiscussionintheMVŚontherelationshipbetweentheconventionaltruthandtheabsolutetruthshowsthatwhilethesetwotruthsasdiscoursed/utteredbytheBuddhaaretobeupheldasbeingtwoperspectivesofunderstanding,inreality—fromtheontologicalperspective—thereisultimatelyonlyonetruth,the absolutetruth:

Question: Is the fact of conventionality (世俗性; *saṃvṛtitva?) in theconventional[truth]existentfromthestandpointoftheabsolutetruthorisit non-existentfromthestandpointoftheabsolutetruth?….

Answer:Itshouldbesaidthatthefactofconventionalityintheconventional[truth]isexistentfromthestandpointoftheabsolutetruth.Ifthefactofconventionalityintheconventional[truth]is/wouldbenon‑existentfromthestandpointoftheabsolutetruth,thentheBuddha’sdiscourseonthetwotruthswouldbefalse.…

Question:Ifso,thereshouldbeonlyonetruth,theabsolutetruth.

Answer:Thereindeedisonlyonetruth,theabsolutetruth.

Question:Ifso,whyaretwotruthsestablished?

Answer:Thetwotruthsareestablishedintermsofdifferenceinperspective(差別緣;‘differentreasons’),notintermsofrealentities(實事):Intermsofrealentities,thereisonlyonetruth,theabsolutetruth;intermsofdifferenceinperspective,twotypes[oftruth]areestablished.Theabsolutetruthisnotestablishedfromthesameperspectivefromwhichtheconventionaltruthis established.The conventional truth is not established from the sameperspectiveastheabsolutetruth.…


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Question:Isitalsopossibletodesignatetheconventionalandtheabsoluteasbeingeachdistinct,withoutthetwobeingmingled?

Answer:Itcanalsobesodesignated.Howisthis?AccordingtoVenerableVasumitra:Theword(nāma;名)thatrevealsisconventional;thedharma that is revealed is absolute.He states further: thatwhich accordswithconventionalusageisconventional;thatwhichaccordswithwhattheĀryassay isabsolute.According to theBhadanta:Thespeechgenerated fromathoughtthatisnotuntrue,speakingofthingslikesentientbeings,vase,garment,etc.,isconventionaltruth.Thespeechgeneratedfromathoughtthatisnotuntrue,speakingofprinciplessuchasconditionedco‑arising,etc.,isabsolutetruth.…36

3.5.2. Relative/conventional and absolute truths as postulated in the AKB

ThedistinctionbetweenrelativeandabsolutetruthsisexplainedintheAKBasfollows:

That,thecognition(buddhi)ofwhichdoesnotarisewhenitisbrokenintoparts (avayavaśo bhinne), is conventionally existent; for instance, apot.Fortherein,whenitisbrokenintopieces,thecognitionofapotdoesnotarise.Andtherein,whenthe[constituent]dharma‑s[ofathing]arementallyremoved(apohya), thecognitionofitdoesnotarise—that toois tobeunderstoodasaconventionallyexistent; for instancewater.For therein,whenthedharma,rūpa,etc.,areremovedmentally,thecognitionofwaterdoesnotarise.

Aconventionalnotion(saṃvṛti-saṃjñā)ismadewithregardtothoseverythings.Thus,thosesayingthatapotorwaterexistsbyvirtueofconventionspeaktrulyandnotfalsely;thusthisisconventionaltruth(saṃvṛtisatya).37

Absolute truth(paramārthasatya) isother than this.Therein,evenwhen[athing]hasbeenbroken,thecognitionofitdefinitelyarisesandlikewise,evenwhenits[constituent]dharma‑sareremovedmentally—thatis[tobeunderstoodas]anabsoluteexistent(paramārthasat).Forinstancerūpa:for,therein,whenthethingisbrokenintotheatoms(paramāṇuśaḥ),andwhenthe[constituent]dharma‑staste,etc.,havebeenremovedmentally,thecognitionoftheintrinsicnatureofrūpadefinitelyarises.Vedanā,etc.,arealsotobeseeninthesameway.Thisiscalledabsolutetruthastheexistenceisintheabsolutesense(etat paramārthena bhāvāt paramārthasatyamiti).38

Vasubandhualsoinformsusof theviewoftheancientmasters(pūrvācārya)which,likethedistinctionmadebytheMVŚcompilerswithregardtothefournobletruths(§3.5.1),hasanepistemologicalbasis:Absolutetruthisthatwhichaccordswiththemannerinwhichathingisperceivedbysupramundaneknowledge(lokottara-jñāna)or thepropermundaneknowledge(laukikajñāna)acquiredsubsequently (pṛṣtalabhdha) to the supramundane knowledge.Conventionaltruthisthatwhichaccordswiththemannerinwhichathingisperceivedbyany


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other—defiledornon‑defiled—typeofknowledge.39JudgingbyYaśomitra,theseancientmasterswouldseemtobethemastersofmeditation,theYogācāras,whospeakofthreekindsofreals—absolutelyreal,conventionallyrealandrealasathinginitself(dravya-sat).Thelastreferstowhatisrealintermsofbeinganentityandintermsofitsspecificcharacteristic(dravyataḥ sva-lakṣaṇataḥ sad dravya-sad iti).40

Saṃghabhadracommentsontheaboveexposition,andalsoreferstotheMVŚdiscussioncitedabove(§3.5.4):

Justasrūpaetcisbrokenintosmallparts,graduallydisintegratinguptothe atoms, orwhen taste, etc are removedbymeansof a distinguishedunderstanding(viśiṣṭa-prajñā),thatcognition(buddhi)ofrūpaetcexistsasithasalwaysbeen.Likewiseisvedanāetc,which,thoughwithoutsmallerparts,...canbebrokendownthroughunderstandinguptoamoment...thatcognitionofvedanāetcexistsjustasithasalwaysbeen.Thisexiststruly,hencecalledparama-artha(‘absoluteobject’);foritexiststhroughouttimeinitself.Itisfromtheparamārthapointofviewthatrūpaetcaresaidtoexist.Itisreal,notunreal;thisiscalledparamārtha-satya,foritissaidtoexistinaccordancewiththeperspectiveofparamārtha.Hence,allthefournobletruthsaresubsumedasparamārtha,forthecognitionisnotrelinquishedwhenitisbeinganalyzedintosmallerparts.

Theconventionaltruthsare[truths]fromtheperspectiveoftheabsolute(依勝義理),isconventionality(/‘conventionitself’;世俗自體)anexistentoranon‑existent?Ifitisanexistent,thenthereshouldbeonlyonetruth;ifitisanon‑existent,truthshouldnotbetwo‑fold.

Itmustdecidedbesaidtobeexistent,fortheVenerableVasumitrasaysthatconventionaltruthisthewordforanon‑topsy‑turvysignified(artha;義.From§3.5.1above,arthaherereferstothedharma).Thesignifiedthatisrevealedthroughthewordistheparamārtha-satya—wehaveearlieranalyzedwordtobearealentity.

Hasitnotbeensaidthattruthshouldbeone?

Inactualfact,thisshouldbeso,forwhatisemptyfromtheabsoluteperspective(勝義空;*paramārthena śūnya)cannotbecalledtruth.

Thenwhyaretwo[truths]designated?

Itiswithregardtoacertainperspectivewithintheabsolutethattheconventionalisdesignated;itisnotonaccountofadifferenceinsubstance.Why?Wordisbasis for speech, for it is of the nature of beingwhat is propagated inconformitywithconventionalsentiments.Fromthisperspective,itshouldbestatedthus:Whatissaṃvrtiisnecessarilyparamārtha.Therearesomeparmārthawhicharenotsaṃvṛti(/whatisparamārthamaynotbesaṃvṛti)—i.e.theremainingtrulyexistentarthaexcludingonlyword.Ontheverybasisofparamārthabeingexistentartha,fromacertainperspectiveitis


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calledconventionaltruth,andfromacertainperspectiveitiscalledabsolutetruth.That is:what is apprehendedgenerally,without discrimination,asaunifiediscalledconventionaltruth.Whatisapprehendedspecifically,withdiscrimination,be itaspeciesoranentity, iscalledabsolute truth.Forinstance,withinabodyofwith‑outflowthings,theobject(artha;義)apprehendedaseffectiscalledthetruthofunsatisfactoriness;theobjectapprehended as cause is the truth of origin.41Or for instance, [within]abodyofthoughtandthought‑concomitants,somemayconstituteallthesixcausesandthefourconditions(cf.chapters6and7).Accordingly,thereisnocontradictioninthetruthsexpoundedbytheGreatSage(maharṣi;i.e.,theBuddha)—asforinstance,hesaysthatthereisonlyonetruthandnoasecond,orthatthereisonlyonepathandnootherpaths.

Saṃghabhadra’scommentsabovemaybesaidtobemoreexplicitlyaSarvāstivādaperspective.Thewordparama-arthainSanskritcanbeinterpretedas“absolute/highestsense”(takingarthatomean“meaning”),oras“absolute/highestobject”(takingartha tomean “object”). Saṃghabhadra’s explanations conveybothperspectives.Whenhesays thatrūpa,etc, isparama-arthabecause itexiststrulyasithasalwaysbeenasanentity(/initself)throughouttimes—future,presentandpast(“如本恆存”;and“此真實有，故名勝義”)—heisparticularlyemphasizingthenotionof“theabsoluteobject”andthedoctrineoftri‑temporalexistence—adharmaexistingtrulyfromtheabsolute/higheststandpoint,initsnon‑changingintrinsicnature(svabhāva).Whenhesaysthat“whatisemptyfromtheabsoluteperspectivecannotbecalledtruth”,theSarvāstivādastandpointisequallyexplicit:atruthcannotbeanon‑existent(empty);itnecessarilyexiststrulyasanintrinsicnature.

3.5.3. Saṃghabhadra’s characterization of the existent

In his defenseof the existenceof past and futuredharma‑s, Saṃghabhadradevelops theepistemologicalargumentof thereal/existent.At theoutset,hearticulatelydefinesan“existent”:Anexistentisthatwhichiscapableofservingasanobject‑domainforgeneratingacognition.Aconceptualexistent,suchasaperson, is real/existent, albeit relatively,because ithas thefiveaggregates—whichareabsoluteexistents—asitsbasis,andisthuscapablegeneratingthecognitionofapersoninus.Infact,theconceptualizedisnecessarilybasedonsomeexistent(s),absoluteorrelative.Conceptualizationcannotevenoccurwithoutanyexistentcognitiveobject:

Thecharacteristicofarealexistentisthatitservesasanobject‑domainforgeneratingcognition(覺,buddhi).

Thisisdivisibleintotwo:Whatexiststruly(dravyato’sti)andwhatexistsconceptually (prajñaptito’sti), the twobeingdesignatedon the basis ofconventionaltruthandabsolutetruth.If,withregardtoathing,acognition(buddhi)isproducedwithoutdependingonanythingelse,thisthingexists


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truly—e.g.,rūpa, vedanā,etc. If itdependsonother things toproduceacognition,thenitexistsconceptually/relatively—e.g.,avase,army,etc.

Thosethatexisttrulyarefurtherdivisibleintotwo:Thosethathaveonlytheiressentialnatures(svabhāva/svarūpa)andthosethat,[inaddition,]haveactivities(kāritra).Thosethathaveactivitiesareagainoftwotypes:withorwithoutfunction(sāmarthya/vyāpara/śakti)…Thosethatexistrelativelyarealsooftwotypes:havingexistenceonthebasisofsomethingrealoronsomethingrelative,likeavaseandanarmy,respectively.42

3.5.3.1. Past and future dharma-s are not merely designations (prajñapti)

TheVibhajyavādins,ofwhomtheSautrāntikasarevehementrepresentatives,maintainthatonlythepresentisreal;butthetotallyunrealpastandfutureobjectscanalsobecognizedbyconsciousness.Theso‑calledpastandfutureareinfactmerelydesignationsimposedonthepresent.43 Saṃghabhadra repudiatesthis,defendingthethesisoftri‑temporalexistence:

Letusconsiderourpropositionabovethatbothreal[orabsolute]existentsandrelativeexistentscangiverisetocognition.Nowsincepastandfuturecognitiveobjects(ālambana)canalsogiverisetocognition,arethepastandfuture[dharma‑s]realorrelativeexistents?Someassertthattheyaremerelyrelativeexistents.Theirassertionisuntrue,forthefollowingreasons:

[i] Thatonwhichtheunrealdharma‑sarebaseddoesnotexistinthepastandthefuture.Iftheysaythatthepresentconstitutestheirbasis,thisisalsoillogical,fortheyarenotmutuallydependent:Withoutdependingonthepresent,therecanalsoariseconsciousnesseshavingthepastandthefutureasobjects.Ihaveexplainedearlierthatifbuddhiariseswithregardtosomething[whoseexistence]dependsonotherthings,thenthatthinghasarelativeexistence.

[ii] Moreover,itisobservedintheworldthatwhenthatonwhicharelativeexistentdepends is fullyexhausted, [thecognition of] this relativeexistentnolongerarises—…suchasaperson(pudgala),avase,…,etc.Ontheotherhand,itisobservedthatwhenthepresentdharma‑sarecompletelyexhausted,thepastandthefuturecanstillbedesignated(prajñāpyante).…

[iii]Moreover,itisobservedthatthatonwhicharelativelyrealdependsand the relatively real are notmutually exclusive. [Now,]whenconditioneddharma‑sproceedintime,thepastandthefuturedonotco‑exist.Howcanthepastandthefutureberelativelyestablishedonthebasisofthepresent?Hence,thepastandthefuturearenotmererelativeexistents.

[iv]Moreover,ithasneverbeenobservedthatinabefore‑aftersequence,a real can turn into anunreal, and anunreal can turn into a real.


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Thus,[logically,]ifoneholdsthatthefutureisamererelativeexistent,oneshouldconcedethatthepresenttooisunreal.Or,ifoneconcedesthatthepresentexiststruly,oneshouldconcedethatthepasttooisrealandnotunreal.…

[v] Moreover,theunrealcannotbeobjectsofthenoblepaths(ārya-mārga)—relativeexistentssuchastheperson,vase,garment,etc.,arenottheobjects[ofcognition]ofthenoblepaths.Butthenoblepathsdohavethepastandfutureconditioneddharma‑sastheirobjectsaswell.Ifitwereotherwise,thepastandfutureconditioneddharma‑swouldnotbeunderstoodbythereceptivities(kṣānti)andknowledges(jñāna)indirectrealization(abhisamaya).

[vi] Moreover,atthetimeofdirectrealization,ifonedoesnotconcedethatpastandfuturevedanā,etc.,serveasitsobjects,thenthosedharma‑ssuchasvedanā,etc.,withintheperson[i.e.,themeditator]willneverbeobjectsofthedirectrealization,becausetheyholdthatitcannothavepastandfutureobjects,andbecausenotwovedanā‑s,etc.,canarisesimultaneously.Shouldthisbethecase,thenthenoblepathscannotfullyunderstand(pari-jñā)theconditioneddharma‑s—whichcontradicts thesūtrawhichsays:‘Ifonehasnotmastered,hasnotunderstoodevenasingledharma,Isaythatonecannotmakeanendof suffering’ (cf. nāham eka-dharmam apy anabhijñāya aparijñāya duḥkhasyānta-kriyāṃ vadāmi).Hence the noble paths necessarilyhave the past and the future [dharma‑s] as their objects. Just asaconsiderationoftheknowablesprovesthatmerelyrelativelyexistentpastandfuturedharma‑scannotbecomeobjectsofknowledge(jñeya);justso,fromvariousotherconsiderations—oftheabandonablesandtherealizables—onecanprove,ineachcase,thatthepastandthefuturecannotbemererelativeexistents,forunrealdharma‑scannotbeabandoned,etc.

[vii]Moreover,theunreal[whichdependsontherealforitsdesignation]andthereal[onwhichtheunrealisbased]cannotbesaiddefinitelytobeeitheridenticalordifferent….Thepast,futureandpresenttimesbeingdifferentintheirsequentialpositions,howcanonesaythatthetwotimes—pastandfuture—aremerelyrelativeexistentswithouttheirownessentialnaturesandare[mere]designationsonthebasisofthepresent?

Thustheirpropositions,beingcontradictorytologicanddisagreeingwiththeNobleWords,aretotallyunacceptable.44

3.5.3.2. Distinction among past, present and future dharma-s as existents

Saṃghabhadrafurtherexplainsthat,followingtheĀbhidharmikas,thedefiniteexistenceofthepastandthefutureshouldbeproperlyunderstoodasfollows:


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Onaccountofthefactofcausality,andofdefilementandfreedomfromdefilement,theiressentialnaturesbeingnotunreal,theyaresaidtoexisttruly(dravyataḥ sat),[but]notinthesamemannerthatthepresent[dharma‑s]aresaidtoexisttruly:Thepastandthefuturearenotabsolutenon‑existentslikeamare’shorn,anemptyflower,etc.,noraretheymerelyrelativeexistentslikeavase,agarment,anarmy,aforest,achariot,aroom,apudgala,etc.,noraretheyrealexistentsinthemannerofthepresent.Why?Neitherabsolutenon‑existentslikeamare’shornoranemptyflower,etc.,norrelativeexistentslikeavase,agarment,anarmy,aforest,achariot,aroom,apudgala,etc.,canbesaidtohavethenatureofcausality,etc.Moreover,whathasceasedandwhathasnotarisencannotbesaidtohaverealexistenceinthesamemannerasthepresent.

Ifapastorafuturedharmaexiststruly,howcanwetalkaboutitasbeingpastorfuture?Saṃghabhadrareplies:

Ithasbeenuniversallyestablished(prasiddha—establishedforbothpartiesinvolvedinthedebate)thatagivenrealexistentcanhavediversemodesofexistence.TheSarvāstivādincanequallyquestionyou:“Ifboththepastandthefuturearenon‑existent,howcanonesay‘thishasgone’,‘thisistocome’?”Onthebasisofanessentiallyexistentdharma,theAlways‑existschoolcanestablishthevariationinthemodesofexistenceonaccountofthevariationintheessentialnatureandthedifferentcausesandconditions[thatobtain].Forthosewhoassertthatthepastandthefuturearedevoidofessentialnature,theycannotspeakintermsofvariationinessentialnatureandinthecausesandconditions—thepastandthefuturebeingdefinitelynon-existent.Howcantheydistinguishpastandfuturetimes?

3.5.3.3. Cognitive distinctiveness of the reals/existents

In Saṃghabhadra’scharacterizationoftheexistentabove,thereisanemphasisoncognitivedistinctivenesswithregardtoexistentobjects:theeyeseesonlyforms,theearhearsonlysounds,etc.Aparticularformisseeninitsparticularity,aparticularsoundisheardinitsparticularity,etc.Thisfactofdistinctivecognitionineachcaseisduetothedistinctivenessintheobjectitself.Itisamarkoftheobject’sreality.Thefactthatarealobjectcanbecognizedinauniquewayisduetotheefficacyofitsuniqueintrinsiccharacteristic(svalakṣaṇa)whichisintrinsictoitasareal.Anon‑existent,beingwithoutanintrinsiccharacteristic,cannevergiverisetocognition.Inotherwords,thepossibilityofacognitionnecessarilyimpliesthetrueontologicalstatusoftheobjectcognized.Forthisreason,Saṃghabhadra’sargumentmaybecharacterizedasepistemic‑ontologic.Saṃghabhadraelucidatesthisnotionasfollows:

Cognition (buddhi) isvis-à-vis the cognized, for cognition canonlybeaccomplishedwhereacognitiveobjectexists.Thatistosay,acognitionissocalledonlywhenitsobject(viṣaya)canbeapperceived(upa-√labh).


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Iftheapperceiveddoesnotexist,ofwhatisthatwhichapperceives?(I.e.,itisanapperceptionofwhat?).Moreover,theintrinsicnatureofconsciousnessisthediscerningofanobject;iftheobjectofconsciousnessdoesnotexist,whatdoesconsciousnessdiscern?Hence,theconsciousnessofanon-existentobjectconcededbythe[Sautrāntika]oughtnottobecalledconsciousness,sincethereisnothingtodiscern.Anon‑existentisanabsolutenon‑entityandnecessarilywithout(lit.,‘goingbeyond’—越)anintrinsiccharacteristic andcommoncharacteristics(sāmānya-lakṣaṇa),whatisitthatissaidtobetheobjectofcognitionorconsciousness?Shouldonesaythatnon‑existenceitselfistheobjectofconsciousness—no,foraconsciousnessnecessarilyhasanobject.That is:Allmentalelements (citta-caitta-dharma‑s)haveintrinsicandcommoncharacteristicsastheirobjects;itisnotthecasethatanabsolutelynon‑existentdharmaarisesasanobject.45

TheauthoroftheADVexpressesanessentiallysimilarnotion:

Anobjectiveentityhavingauniqueformestablishedbyitsintrinsicnature,whosedistinctivecharacteristicisobservedbyanerror‑freeobservationofdharma‑s,issaidtobeareal/existententity.46

Saṃghabhadrafurtherarticulatesonthereal.Itischaracterizedbyitspossessionofefficacywhichaffectsthewayweperceiveit:

Inour cognitionof rūpa, it isonly if theobjects are trueexistents thattherecomestobethepossibledifferencebetweenacorrectandincorrectcognitiononaccountofthedifferenceinregardtothe[stateof]thefaculty,light,remoteness,nearnessandlocation,etc.47

WemayalsocomparethistothelogicianDharmakīrti’sdefinitionoftheabsolutelyreal:Theobjectofdirectperception(pratyakṣa)istheintrinsiccharacteristic(svalakṣaṇa=particular)—auniqueessence/entity(tattva),thepoint‑instantofefficiencycapableofaffectingoursensibility(artha-kriyā-samartha):

Theobjectofthat[—directperception—]isthespecificcharacteristic.Thatofwhich there isavariation in thecognitive imageonaccountof[its]nearnessorremoteness,isthespecificcharacteristic.Thataloneistheabsolutelyreal,fora[real]entity(vastu)ischaracterizedbyitsefficacyforapurposiveaction.48

3.6. The various components of the Sarvāstivāda school

Inthenarrowersense,asfoundintheMVŚ,theĀbhidharmikasoftenreferto‘theSarvāstivādatheoreticians’.Sometimes,‘Sarvāstivādatheoreticians’isevenusedinspecificreferencetotheKāśmīrianVaibhāṣikas.Thus,whereastheMVŚascribesthepropositionthattherūpa-dharma‑salsohavehomogeneouscauses(sabhāga-hetu. See infra,§6.3.2),to‘themastersofKāśmīra’,49theolderversionofthiswork50ascribesittosimply‘theĀbhidharmikas’(阿毗曇人).51The‘old


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Ābhidharmikas’areoccasionallymentioned.ButiftheĀbhidharmikasconstitutedthemainstreamoftheSarvāstivāda,theydidnotexhaustthetotalityoftheschool.In the timeoftheMVŚ,theearlyDārṣṭāntikaswhowerethesūtradhara‑s,withDharmatrātaandBuddhadevaas themosteminent,alsoconstitutedaschoolofthoughtwithinthefoldoftheSarvāstivāda.EvensubsequenttotheMVŚ,the Dārṣṭāntikaleader,Kumāralāta,whowasinstrumentalintheevolutionofthe Dārṣṭāntika into theSautrāntika,wasknown to subscribe to theviewoftri‑temporalexistence.52

IntheMVŚ,theDārṣṭāntikasareneverreferredtoastheSautrāntikas,althoughbythetimeoftheAKB,thetwoappellationswereseentobeusedinterchangeably.The *Samayabhedoparacaṇa-cakranevermentionstheDārṣṭāntikasasamongtheso‑called18sects,andtheSautrāntikaisnoticeablyenumeratedattheveryendofthelistoftheSthaviravādalineage.ThissuggeststhattheDārṣṭāntikaasaschooloramovementevolvedgraduallyintotheSautrāntika,sometimeafterthecompilationoftheMVŚ.TheearlyDārṣṭāntikamasterswereknownfortheiractiveeffortinpopularizingtheBuddha’steachings,employingpoetryandpossiblyotherliterarydevicesintheworldintheprocess,andwereparticularlyskilledinutilizingsimilesandallegoriesindemonstratingtheBuddhistdoctrines.ItwasmostprobablyforthisreasonthattheycametobeknownastheDārṣṭāntikas.Theywerealsonotedasmeditatorsandproponentsofmeditation.53Atthesametime,weseein theMVŚsomeof theirmasters—suchasDharmatrātaandBuddhadeva—asbeingengagedincontrovertingtheĀbhidharmikadoctrines.Itisthereforeconceivablethat,broadlyspeaking,thereexistedtwosectionsoftheearlyDārṣṭāntikas—onemorepre‑occupiedwithpopularpreachingandmeditation,theotherwithdoctrinaldisputation.ItwasprobablyfromthelattersectionthattheSautrāntikaevolved.Inthisprocessofdisputation,theyalsoseemtohavecontributedtothedevelopmentofBuddhistlogic,astheVaibhāṣikas,themselvesproudofbeinginconformitytologic,spokeoftheSautrāntikasasbeingarrogantintheirlogicalskill(tarkābhimāna).54

ProfessorPrzyluski,however,proposedthatthetwoappellations,DārṣṭāntikaandSautrāntika,referredtothesamegroupofpeople—theformerusedderogativelybytheiropponents,andthelatterusedbytheSautrāntikastorefertothemselves.55 LaValléePoussinendorsesPrzyluski’sview,quotingonepassagefromtheMVŚinwhichtheSarvāstivādinscondemntheDārṣṭāntikasforemployingworldlyexamplestosupporttheirtheoryagainsttheĀbhidharmikaswhosetheoryissaidtobethenobledoctrine(ārya-dharma).56 KatōalsoendorsesPrzyluski’sview.57 However,Przyluski’sconfoundingdṛṣṭawithdṛṣtiinthiscontext,alongwithhisassertionthatBuddhistsūtra‑swereconsideredtobetheBuddha’srevelation,hasbeenconvincinglyrepudiatedbyJayatilleke.58Moreover,wemusttakenoteofthefactthateveninsuchadisputatiouscontext,theSarvāstivādinsreferredto themas “theVenerable/HonorableDārṣṭāntikas (譬喻尊者)59—which ishardlyhumiliating.Dharmatrātawasapparentlysohighlyreveredthathewas


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simplyreferredtoastheBhadanta(大徳).Moreover,theDārṣṭāntikaswerenottheonlyonescondemnedfor“relyingonconventionalparlanceintheworld”(依世俗言論)Others, liketheMahāsāṃghika60andtheVibhajyavādins61 too,werecondemnedinexactlythesameway:

…Ifso,howisthesimilegivenbytheMahāsāṃghikatobeexplained(nīyate)?Answer:Itneednotbeexplained,forthatisnotsubsumedunderthesūtra, vinayaandabhidharma.Moreover,onecannotemployanexample(dṛṣṭānta)visibleintheworldtorepudiatethenobleDharma,forthenobleDharmaandtheconventionalDharmaaredifferent.

Accordingly,insuchacontext,wehaveevidenceonlythattheSarvāstivādinsobjected to themanner inwhichworldly similes are used to controvert theĀbhidharmikadoctrines—whethertheyareusedbytheDārṣṭāntikasorothers.62

Fromthebeginning,divergentviewpointswithin theschoolwere foundandeven tolerated—as long as theydid not directly contravene the thesis ofSarvāstivāda.Totakejustafewexamples:Dharmatrāta,Buddhadeva,VasumitraandGhoṣaka,—thesocalled‘fourgreatĀbhidharmikasoftheSarvāstivāda’—eachofferedadifferentexplanationastohow,giventhetheorythatadharma existsasaneverlastingdravya,thedifferenceinthethreeperiodsoftimecanbeaccountedfor(seeinfra,§5.2).GhoṣakaalsodidnotcompletelygoalongwiththeorthodoxĀbhidharmikasinassertingthatthetotalityoftheabhidharmaisbuddha-vacana.Tohim,“allabhidharmaisexplanationsonthesūtra‑s.Suchandsuchanexpositionismadeonaccountofsuchandsuchasūtra;whateverisnotsaidinthesūtra‑smustberemoved”.63Withregardtothethought‑concomitants,wefindBuddhadeva and theDārṣṭāntikas denying their reality apart fromthought.64 Dharmatrāta held that all thought‑concomitants are subsumableundervolition(cetanā);65whileothersacknowledgedtherealexistenceofthethought‑concomitantsapartfromthought.Withregardtothethreeunconditioned,Buddhadeva66 andothers acknowledged their reality;Dharmatrāta held thatSpace(ākāśa) isunreal,67andtheDārṣṭāntikasdeniedtherealityofallthethree.68

ButsincethecompilationoftheJPŚ,theKāśmīrianSarvāstivādinsupheldthesupremeauthorityoftheJPŚsystemandraisedthisworktothestatusofbeingtheBuddha’swords.69Astimewenton,theyassumedthepositionoforthodoxyandbecame increasinglydogmaticand intolerant towardallotherviewsnotcompatiblewiththeJPŚsystem.PartlytoconsolidatetheirpositionastheorthodoxSarvāstivādins,theyeventuallycompiledtheencyclopedicMVŚwhichpurportstobeacommentaryonJPŚ.Init,besidestheirownviews,thoseofthefollowingSarvāstivādaschoolsofthoughtwerealsocitedandusuallycriticizedandrejected:TheDārṣṭāntikas,thewesternmasters(pāścātya;alsocalled‘theVenerablesofthewest’ 西方尊者;and‘thewesternśramaṇa‑s’),theforeignmasters(bahirdeśaka;also called ‘themasters outsideKaśmīra’, and the ‘Gāndhārianmasters’70).Eventheso‑called‘oldKāśmīrianmasters’71werenotspared.


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SubsequenttothecompilationoftheMVŚ,theorthodoxKāśmīrianswhobasedthemselvesonitwereknownastheVaibhāṣikas.Wemustbearinmind,however,thattheviewsacceptedbytheVaibhāṣikaswerenotnecessarilyproposedbythemselvesforthefirsttime.ManyofthemmusthavebeentheachievementofthegreatSarvāstivādamastersuptothetimeofthecompilationoftheMVŚ.Theterm“Vaibhāṣikas”eventuallycametoconnotetheorthodoxSarvāstivādins,basedmainly—butnotexclusively—inKāśmīra.ItisimportanttorealizethatnotallofthemnecessarilysubscribedtoeachandeveryviewsanctionedbytheMVŚcompilers.Moreover,theevolvingnatureoftheVaibhāṣikaviewsmustberecognizedaswell.

ThisdogmaticismandintoleranceoftheVaibhāṣikasinevitablybroughtaboutareactionfromtheotherSarvāstivādins.Ontheonehand,itresultedinthesplitof the Sarvāstivādaschoolintotwomajorcamps—theeasternonerepresentingtheKāśmīrianschoolandthewesternonerepresentingtheGāndhārianschool—althoughitwouldseemthatnotallKāśmīrianĀbhidharmikaswereasorthodoxordogmaticastheprofessedVaibhāṣikas.Ontheotherhand,itcompelledthesūtra‑centeredDārṣṭāntikastoco‑operatewithotherholdersofheterodoxviews,includingtheMahāyānaŚūnyatāvādins,prevailingaroundthefirstandsecondcenturiesC.E.,andfinallytochangeovertothe‘present‑only‑exist’standpoint.Inthisconnection, itmaybenoted that inhis*Nyāyānusāra,SaṃghabhadrarepeatedlyaccusestheSautrāntikaofsidingwiththefollowersofthe‘sky‑flower’(空花;ākāśa-puṣpa)doctrine—apparentlyreferringtotheŚūnyatā‑vādaprevailingatthetime—inobstinatelydenyingthesvabhāvaofalldharma‑s.72 Itwasinthisprocessthat,asectionamongtheirradicals,theDārṣṭāntika,eventuallyevolvedinto the Sautrāntika.

Althoughtheappellations‘Gāndhārianmasters’,‘westernmasters’and‘foreign masters’maysuggestaconsiderabledifferenceinthegeographicallocationsofthesemasters,inactualfact,theyrefermainlytotheSarvāstivādamasterswestofKāśmīra—thewesternmasters—ofGāndhāraandParthia,withGāndhāraasthecenter.IntheAKB,73 VasubandhuspeaksoftheKāśmīriansandthewesternmasterswheretheMVŚ74has“mastersofthiscountry”(此國諸師)and“foreign masters”(外國諸師),respectively.InmanyplacesintheMVŚ,acertainviewsaidtobeheldbyoneofthesegroupsisalsosaid,inthesamecontextorelsewhere,tobeheldbyanother.75However,wedocomeacrossoneinstance76intheMVŚwhere the ‘foreignmasters’ hold a slightly different view from the ‘westernmasters’.Itiswithregardtothenumberofrūpaheavens:TheVaibhāṣikassay16;77thewesternmasters,17;78 the foreignmasters,whoholdthatthereareninedistinctabodesinrūpadhātu,7918.80Also,wheretheMVŚ81ascribestheviewthatrūpa‑shavenosabhāga-hetuto‘theforeignmasters’,theOldMVŚ82ascribesitto‘theDārṣṭāntikas’.Thismaythensuggestthattheterm“foreignmasters”possiblyhasabroaderconnotationthantheterm“westernmasters”.Wemust,


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ofcourse,alsoallowforthepossibilityofindividualdifferencesinviewsevenamongtheso‑calledwesternmastersorforeignmastersthemselves.

ThewesternmasterstoostudiedJPŚ,althoughwithamorecriticalattitudethantheKāśmīrians.Theytoo,beingSarvāstivādinĀbhidharmikas,werenotreallyopposedtotheKāśmīriansinasectariansense.TheMVŚcompilersheldtheminconsiderableregard,callingthem‘thehonoredonesofthewest’.83 YinShunobservesthat“thedoctrinesofthewesternschoolaremostlytheorthodoxviewsoftheMVŚandwereabsorbedinthiswork.Theviewsofthewesternmasters,foreignmastersandGāndhārianmasterspointedoutspecificallyintheMVŚ,arebutasmallnumberofheterodoxviews.”84

ButtheworkwhichmostdeeplyinfluencedthebasicattitudeofthesewesternmasterswasthePrŚwhoseimportancefortheSarvāstivādinswasnextonlytotheJPŚ.AnewtrendofdevelopmentwasinheritedfromthetraditionofthePrŚ,tendingtowardorganization,theessentialandconciseness.ItisforthisreasonthatmanyviewsfoundinthePrŚ,suchas‘fournon‑definedroots’(avyākṛta-mūla),85 ‘fourmeaningsofanuśaya’,86etc.,wereoftenattributedbytheVaibhāṣikastothewesternorforeignmasters.


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NOTES

1 T49,15b.2 T49,no.2033,20a;no.2031,15a.3 Cf.T45,9b.4 See Lamotte,E,Histoire du bouddhisme indien: des origines à l’ère Śaka(Louvain,1967),

543.5 Tno.1821,8c.6 Study,169f.7 LaValléePoussin(1925b),344f.8 SeeLuCheng,2367ff.9 E.g.,MVŚ,138cff.,169a–171b,222a–222c,308b,etc.10 Cf.Ny,469a.11E.g.,MVŚ,313a,358a,etc.12 意界法界俱常非常。13 無有去來，一切現在；別別而說。14 Study,412.15 Cf. sabba-sutta in Saṃyutta-nikāya.16 AKB,296:ye hi sarvamastīti vadanti atītam anāgataṃ pratyutpannaṃ ca te sarvāstivādāḥ |

ye tu kecid asti yat pratyutpannam adatta-phalaṃ cātītaṃ karma kiṃcin nāsti yad datta-phalam atītam anāgataṃ ceti vibhajya vadanti te vibhajyavādinaḥ |

17Ny,630c.18 ADV,259:icchaty adhva-trayaṃ yasmāt kṛtyataś ca dhruva-trayam | sarvāstivāda ity uktas

tasmād… ||19 Ny,630c–631a.AsimilardistinctionbetweentheSarvāstivādaandotherschoolsisalsomadeintheADV,257f.

20AKB,295f.21Maudgalyāyana,however,maintainsthatonecanbeconsciousofnon‑existentobjects.22VKŚ,531a–537a.23 The DharmapadastanzacorrrespondingtoDhammapada,71,Udānavarga,IX,17andtheChineseversionofUdānavarga(T212),671b,etc.

24 AKB,295:uktaṃ hi bhagavatā’tītaṃ ced bhikṣavo rūpaṃ nābhaviṣyan na śrutavān ārya-śrāvako’tīte rūpe’napekṣo’bhaviṣyat | yasmāttarhyastyatītaṃ rūpaṃ tasmāc chrutāvān ārya-śrāvako’tīte rūpe’napekṣo bhavati | anāgsataṃ ced rūpaṃ nābhaviṣyat na śrutavān ārya-śrāvako’nāgataṃ rūpaṃ nābhyanandiṣyat | yasmāttarhyastyanāgataṃ rūpam… |

25 AKB,295:dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānasyotpāda ityuktam | TherelevantsūtrapassageiscitedinAKB,146:cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam | trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ | sahajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetaneti | Cf.S,ii,72:cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ | tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso | phassapaccayā vedanā | vedanāpaccayā taṇhā | …;M,i,111ff.has,aftervedanā,“yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti | yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi… |”.Only inPeṭakopadesa,89, is thewordsahajātā found:cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ | tattha sahajātā vedanā saññā cetanā phaso manasikāro ete


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te dhammā eka-lakkhaṇā uppāda-lakkhaṇena ||SĀ,72c,87c:緣眼色, 生眼識, 三事和合觸, 俱生受想思).

26 AKB,295:yadi cātītānāgataṃ na syād asadālambanaṃ vijñānaṃ syāt | tato vijñānam eva na syād ālambanābhāvāt |

27 AKB,295f.:yadi cātītaṃ na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmaṇaḥ phalam āyatyāṃ kathaṃ syāt | na hi phalotpattikāle varttamāno vipāka-hetur astīti |

28 Ny,628c–629a.KatōJunfortunatelymisunderstandsthisimportantphrase,phrase 智緣非有, 亦二決定,the‘two’asreferringtothepastandthefuture(KatōJ,op. cit.,289,291).

29 AKB,301:evaṃ tu sādhur bhavati | yathā sūtre sarvam astīty uktaṃ tathā vadati | … “sarvamastīti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānī”ti—cf.S,iv,13;SĀ,91a–b.

30 AKB,299:atītaṃ tu yad bhūtapūrvam | anāgataṃ yatsati hetau bhaviṣyati | evaṃ ca kṛtvā ’stīty ucyate na tu punar dravyataḥ |

31Ny,621c.32MVŚ,4a.33 MVŚ,42a–b.Thisnotionoftherelativelyorconventionallyrealversustheabsolutelyreal continued to be found in the post‑AKBVy: saṃvṛti-sad iti saṃvyavahāreṇa sat | paramārtha-sad iti paramārthena sat | svalakṣaṇena sad ity arthaḥ || (Vy,521).NotethatsaṃvṛticorrespondstoPālisammuti(<√man,changedphonetically(?)to√mu).Intheprocessofsanskritization→sam-vṛti.LaterSanskritgrammarianscametoderiveitfrom√vṛ.AlreadyintheMVŚ(548b),wearetoldthattheGrammarians(śābdika)takethistobefrom√vṛ,‘tocover’:“Thissaṃvṛti-satyaisconcealedbyajñāna,likethatwhichisinsideavesselisconcealed/coveredbythevessel.”TheSanskritBuddhisttraditiongenerallyinterpretsitintermsofsam + vṛt/vṛ.

34 Fourforeachtruth—forduḥkha-satya:duḥkhatā, śūnyatā, anityatā, anātmatā | nairātmya;etc.Seeinfra,§15.2.2.1.

35MVŚ,399c–400a.36 MVŚ,400a–b.37 Cf. Saṃghabhadra’sexplanationthatthetwotruthsarereallytwoaspectsoftheone,absolute,truth,Ny,666aff.

38AKB,334.39 AKB, 334:yathā lokottareṇa jñānena gṛhyate tatpṛṣṭhalabdhena vā laukikena tathā

paramārtha-satyam | yathā anyena tathā saṃvṛti-satyam iti pūrvācāryāḥ |40Vy,542.41 According to theSarvāstivāda, the truth of unsatisfactoriness is thefive aggregatesconstitutingthebodyinitseffectaspect;thetruthoforiginisthesameinitscauseaspect.

42 Ny,621c–622a.Saṃghabhadra’sdefinitionoftherealmaybesaidtobebasedon§3.3.2b & c.

43 Cf.ADV,278 (vide,ADV, Introduction, 125):atra pratyavatiṣṭhante dārṣṭāntikāḥ | na brūmaḥ sarvathā’tītaṃ na vidyate | kiṃ tarhi | dravyātmanā na vidyate, prajñapty-ātmanā tu sad iti.

44 Ny,624cff.45Ny,622b.46 ADV, 264:yasya khalv arthavastunaḥ svabhāvasiddha-svarūpasyā’viparītākārayā

dharmopalakṣaṇayā paricchinnaṃ lakṣaṇam upalakṣyate tat saddravyam ity ucyate


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47Ny,471b.48 Nyāyabindu, 12–15: tasya [pratyakṣasya] viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam | yasyārthasya

saṃnidhānāsaṃnidhābhyāṃ jñānapratibhāsabhedastatsvalakṣaṇam | tadeva paramārthasat | arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvādvastunaḥ || Cf. Saṭīkaṃ Nyāyabinduprakaraṇam,12f.;also cf. Th. Stcherbatsky’stranslationinhisBuddhist LogicII,33ff.

49MVŚ,88a.50OldMVŚ,72c.51 OldMVŚ,72c.52 Cf.ADV,277.53 Cf. Study,365ff.54 SeeSingh,A,The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy – Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti(Delhi,1984),21.Alsocf.Dhammajoti,KL,The Chinese Version of Dharmapāda(Colombo,1995),22ff.

55 Przyluski,J,‘Dārṣṭāntika,SautrāntikaandSarvāstivādin’,intheIHQ,vol.XVI,2,1940,246ff.

56AKB(E),Introduction,36;MVŚ,782b.57 Katō,J,Kyōryōbu no Kenkyū,73f.58 Jayatilleke,KN,Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge(London,1963),381f.59E.g.,MVŚ,105a.60E.g.,MVŚ,43c.61E.g.,MVŚ,312b,357a–b.62 SeeDhammajoti,KL,‘Sarvāstivāda,Dārṣṭāntika,SautrāntikaandYogācāra—SomeReflectionsonTheirInterrelation’.In:JCBSSL,Vol.IV,185ff.

63MVŚ,326b.64MVŚ,8c,661c,730a,etc.65MVŚ,8c.66MVŚ,662a.67MVŚ,388c.68 MVŚ,161a.69 MVŚ,1a.70 OtherschoolsofthoughtoutsidetheSarvāstivādacitedintheMVŚinclude:theVibhajyavāda,Mahāsāṃghika,Dharmagupta,Mahīśāsaka,Kāśyapīya,Vātsīputrīya,Sthaviravāda,etc.Theviewsofthefollowingindividualācārya‑sarealsocited:Buddharakṣa,Jīvala,Ghoṣa‑varman,Kṣemadatta,Vāṣpa,Vāmalabdha,Saṅghavasu,Dharadatta,DharmanandinandPūrṇayaśas.

71 Wealsofindtheappellations‘theoldĀbhidharmikas’and‘theoldforeignmasters’.Inthisconnection,wemustbearinmindthatthedoctrinesoftheVaibhāṣikasandthewesternmasters,etc.,wereconstantlyevolving,andthat,therefore,“MVŚviews”and“Vaibhāṣika”donotalwayshavethesameconnotation.SeealsoEntrance,Introduction,§II.

72E.g.,Ny,432b.73AKB,28.74MVŚ,368a.75SeeexamplesquotedinStudy,306.


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76 Study,307.77AKB,111;Ny,475a.78MVŚ,85b.79MVŚ,784b.80 FromNy,457a,welearnthattheSautrāntikamasterŚrīlātaalsoholdsthatthereare18rūpa heavens.

81 MVŚ,87c.82OldMVŚ,72c.83 Thisregardwasalsogivento‘theVenerableDārṣṭāntikas’(譬喻尊者),althoughnottotheVibhajyavādins.

84 Study,310.85PrŚ,693a;AKB,291f.;ADV,246f.;Ny,618b–c.86 PrŚ,702a.Outofthefourmeaningsgiveninourtext,theVaibhāṣika(MVŚ,257a)givesonlythreeforthemeaningofthetermanuśaya,i.e.,withoutthatofanu-√sañj.Theexplanationintermsoffourmeaningsisattributedtotheforeignmasters(ibid.,257b).


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4. The Abhidharma Treatises of the Sarvāstivāda

4.1. Sevencanonicaltreatises4.1.1. Treatisesoftheearliestperiod

4.1.1.1. Dharmaskandha-śāstra (DSŚ)4.1.1.2. Saṃgītiparyāya-śāstra (SgPŚ)4.1.1.3. Prajñapti-śāstra (PjŚ)

4.1.2. Later,moredevelopedtexts4.1.2.1. Vijñānakāya-śāstra (VKŚ)4.1.2.2. Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra (JPŚ)4.1.2.3. Prakaraṇapāda-śāstra(PrŚ)4.1.2.4. Dhātukāya-śāstra(DKŚ)

4.2. DevelopmentoftheSarvāstivādamanuals4.2.1. Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā (MVŚ)4.2.2. Developmentofthemoreconcisemanuals

4.1. Seven canonical treatises

Thesevenabhidharmaworksthatcametoberecognizedascanonicaltreatisesoftheschoolare:1.Dharmaskandha,2.Saṃgītiparyāya,3.Prajñapti,4.Vijñānakāya,5. Prakaraṇa,6.Dhātukāya,7.Jñānaprasthāna.YaśomitramentionstheJPŚasthebody,inrelationtotheothersixasitsfeet,enumeratinginthefollowingorder:“TheśāstraistheJPŚ;itislikeabodyhavingsixfeet—PrŚ,VKŚ,DSŚ,PjŚ,DKŚ,SgPŚ.”1Inasimilarmanner,PuGuangexplains:

Theearliersixtreatiseshavelessdoctrinaltopics;itistheJPŚthatcontainsthemostextensivedoctrinalperspectives.Accordingly,theabhidharmamastersoflatertimespokeofthesixasthefeetandoftheJPŚasthebody.2

ThetraditionthatsixofthesetextsconstitutedagroupincontrasttotheJPŚ,appearstohaveexistedatleastbyaroundtheearlypartofthe3rdcenturyC.E.,asattestedinthe*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (MPPU):

Question:TheAṣṭagranthaka(=JPŚ),thesix‑memberedabhidharma,etc.,whencewerethey?Answer:IntheBuddha’stime,theDharmawasnon‑erroneous.AftertheBuddha’sdemise,atthetimeofthefirstrecitation(saṅgīti),[theDharma]wasjustaswhentheBuddhawasalive.Inthesubsequentcentury,atthetimeofKingAśoka,…therearosethenamesofthedifferentschools.Henceforth,throughasuccession,itcametothetimeofabrahminreligieuxfromtheclanofKātyāyanīputra.Hewas intelligentandofsharpfacultyandhadreadthewholeTripiṭakaandthescripturesbelongingtoboththeBuddhistandnon‑Buddhisttraditions.DesiringtounderstandtheBuddha’swords,hecomposedtheJñānaprasthānacomprisingeightchapters(grantha).…Subsequently,thedisciplescomposedtheVibhāṣā([Great‑]Commentary)forthesakeofthosewhocouldnotfullyunderstandtheeightchapters.3


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Inadditiontoauthorship,PuGuangfurtherprovidesthesizeandtherelativechronologyoftheseseventreatises:

ŚāriputracomposedtheSaṃgīti-paryāyacomprising12,000verses;theshorterversioncomprised8,000verses.Mahā‑maudgalyāyanacomposedtheDharma-skandha-pāda-śāstra,comprising6,000verses.Mahā‑kātyāyanacomposedthePrajñapti-pāda-śāstra,comprising18,000verses.Theaforementionedthreeśāstra‑swerecomposedintheBuddha’stime.InthemiddleofthefirstcenturyaftertheBuddha’sdemise,DevaśarmancomposedtheVijñānakāya-pāda-śāstra,comprising7,000verses.Comingtothebeginningofthe3rdcentury[aftertheBuddha’sdemise],VasumitracomposedthePrakaraṇa-pāda-śāstra,comprising6,000verses.HefurthercomposedtheDhātu-kāya-pāda-śāstra,whoselongerversioncomprised6,000versesandshorterversioncomprised700verses.4

However,itismorereasonabletounderstandthatthesetextsmusthaveevolvedasseparatetreatises,somebeingrevisedbyseveraleditorsasaresultofmutualinfluence;anditmusthavetakenconsiderabletimefortheschooltofinallyadoptthissetofseventextsastheirdistinctivecanonicalabhidharma.Itispossiblethat thiscanonicalsetcametobefixedsometimeafter theMVŚ,completedaround themiddleof2ndcenturyC.E.ThePjŚwasprobably incorporatedasacanonicaltextaroundthetimeoftheMVŚ(seebelow).Inanycase,theMVŚdoesnotmentionthesetofseven.InspiteofthefactthatitholdstheJPŚasthesupremeauthority,itneverspeaksoftheJPŚasthe‘body’andquotesfromonlyfiveoftheothersixśāstra‑s—exceptfortheDKŚ.ThereferencetotheJPŚasthe‘body’incomparisontotheothersixtreatiseswasprobablytheresultoftheVaibhāṣikabias.TheTibetantraditionenumeratestheseventextsinadifferentorder:1.DSŚ,2.PjŚ,3.DKŚ,4.VKŚ,5.JPŚ,6.PrŚ,7.SgPŚ.5TheMPPUalsospeaksof“thebodyandmeaningofabhidharma”(阿毘曇身及義)asonetypeof abhidharmaandthe“six‑part[abhidharma]”asanother.6Elsewhere,italsomentionstheṣaṭpāda-abhidharma.7

Giventhescarcityofhistoricaldataandthefactthatallseventextsseemtohavebeenrevisedandinterpolatedsubsequenttotheiroriginalcompilation,wemustbe contentwithonly a relative chronology.Mostscholars have attempted toclassifythesetextsintothreeperiods:early,middleandlate;buttheircriteriaaredivergent.

Thus,ErichFrauwallnerclassifiedthePrŚandJPŚasthemostrecentofthethreeperiods.8WhileobservingthatthePrŚisnotasystematiccompilationand“consistsofanumberofsections,allvirtuallyindependentofeachotherandcompleteinthemselves”,hestatedthatitsauthor,Vasumitra,“makesapurelyoutwardattempttouniteinoneworkallthemostimportantachievementsthathadbeenmadeuptohistime”.Andthismusthavebeenhismainreasonforclassifyingitasoneofthetwomostrecentones.However,thisassumptionofallthesectionsasbeingauthoredbyVasumitraaloneisquestionable(seebelow).

4. the abhidharma treatiSeS of the SārvaStivāda

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AstotheJPŚ—astheperceptiveYinShunquiterightlyremarks—itstimeofcompilationcannotbetoolateconsideringthefactthatitwasthistextwhichfundamentallyestablishedthedefinitivedoctrinesoftheSarvāstivādaschool.9

Moreover,thequestionastowhichtext(s)hadbeenborrowedorbeeninfluencedbywhichother text(s)—andalsovis-à-vis twogiven texts,whichhadfirstinfluencedwhich—isdisputable.

Furthermore,wecannotsimplyassumethatatextshowingmoresystematicordevelopeddoctrinesisnecessarilylaterthanonewhichshowsotherwise—thedifferenceasregardscaliberandintellectualgift,personalviews,etc.,oftheauthorsmustbe takenintoconsideration.Anexampleof thedevelopedSarvāstivādatenetsisthethreeasaṃskṛta‑s;yetitisnoteworthythatwhereasallthethreearementionedintheDSŚ,onlytwoarementionedintheJPŚ(seebelow).

Finally,eventhethreetreatises—DSŚ,SgPŚandPjŚ,commonlyheldtobetheearliest—showclearsignsofinfluencefromthePrŚandJPŚintheirextantversions,andtothatextentcannotberegardedastheearliersourcesforthesetwo treatises inpureandsimple terms. It ismore likely that all seven texts,before theirbeingproperly incorporatedas theSarvāstivādacanonical texts,i.e.,‘sarvāstivādized’,hadderivedmaterialfromancientsourcesofabhidharma investigationcommontoallschools.10 Accordingly,theperiodizationoftherelativelymoredevelopedtextsmustinpartremainasubjectiveone.Thisbeingthecase,weprefertoclassifytheseventreatisesmoresimplyintotwobroadgroups:

I. the three textsconcerningwhichwehavemoreobjectivegrounds toclassifythemastheearliest—andthisismoreorlessaconsensusofopinionsamongmostscholars;

II. theothertreatiseswhichexhibitamoredevelopednatureorwhichcanbedeterminedotherwiseasbeingsubsequenttotheearliestthree.

4.1.1. Treatises of the earliest period

Of the seven canonical texts, theDSŚ,SgPŚandPjŚbelong to this period.Theyallexhibitfeaturessimilartothe‘abhidharmic’discoursesinthesūtra-piṭaka(seesupra,§1.1.2),andgenerallyshowlittleorganizationanddoctrinalarticulation.Thereisalsotheabsenceofexplicitdefinitionorestablishmentofthethesisofsarvāstitva.Furthermore,thesethreetextsarenoticeablyattributedbytraditiontotheimmediatedisciplesoftheBuddha.Wemaynoteherethatthe Sarvāstivādatraditionenumeratesthesethreetextsbynametogetheraspartof the abhidharma-piṭaka(seebelow§4.1.1.2).


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4.1.1.1. Dharmaskandha-śāstra (DSŚ)

AccordingtotheChinesetradition,thisśāstra,translatedinfullbyXuanZang(Tno.1537),was authoredbyMaudgalyāyana,but theSanskrit andTibetantraditions11ascribeittoŚāriputra.Sanskritfragmentsexist,totaling22numberedfolios.TheDSŚbeginswithamātṛkā—givenasasummary(uddāna)—ofthetopicstobediscussed.Thesetopicsarethentakenupandcommentedupononebyone,sequentially.Ineachexposition,asūtrapassageprecedestheitem‑wisecommentary.Thefollowingisanexamplefrom“thechapteronthenobletruths”:12

At one time,theBhagavatwasresidinginVārāṇasī(Banāras)attheDeer‑parkofṚṣipatana.Atthattime,theBhagavattoldthebhikṣu‑s:“Thisisthenobletruthofunsatisfactoriness(duḥkha).Ifoneappliesthemindproperlytosuchdharma unheardofbefore,therewilldefinitelyarise[inhim]theeye,knowledge,wisdom(vidyā),discernment(buddhi).Thisisthenobletruthoftheoriginationofunsatisfactorines.…Withregardtothesefournobletruths,becauseIhavemadethethreefoldturningwiththetwelveaspects,….Atthattime,Mahābrahma,havingheardaboutthis,rejoicedinit.…”

HereinitrelatestheeventoftheturrningoftheDharmacakra.ItisthusnamedtheDharmacakrapravartana-sūtra.Atthattime,thefivebhikṣu‑sandthe80,000devaputra‑s,havingheardthediscourse,rejoicedinitandaccepteditwithfaith.

(Immediatelyafterthesūtraquotation,thecommentaryfollows:)

What is thenoble truthofunsatisfactoriness?Birth isunsatisfactory… Inbrief,thewholeofthefiveaggregatesofgraspingisunsatisfactory.

Whatisbirth‑unsatisfactoriness?…

Forwhatreasonisbirthsaidtobeunsatisfactory?…

Whatisold‑age‑unsatisfactoriness?…

(After commentingon eachof the key terms concerning thefirst truthdescribedin thesūtrapassage, itgoesontoexpoundontheother threetruthsinasimilarmanner.)

Thedoctrinaltopicsdiscussedinthe21chaptersofthistextaredivisibleintothefollowingthreesections:

I. 1. śikṣāpada,2.srota-āpattyaṅga,3.avetya-prasāda,4.śrāmaṇya-phala,5. pratipad, 6.ārya-vaṃśa, 7.samyak-pradhāna, 8.ṛddhi-pāda,9.smṛtyupasthāna,10.ārya-satya,11.dhyāna,12.apramāṇa,13.ārūpya,14. samādhi-bhāvanā,15.bodhyaṅga

II. 1. kṣudra-vastuka

III. 1. indriya,2.āyatana,3.skandha,4.bahu-dhātu,5.pratītya-samutpāda

Thefollowingfeaturesarenoticeable:


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(a) Thetopicsdiscussedarethoseconcerningspiritualpraxis(I.)anddoctrinalconceptswhicharetheconcernofthesūtra‑s(III.).Theemphasisonpraxisisdiscerniblefromthefactthatthetreatisebeginswithadiscussiononthepracticeof thefiveprecepts(pañca-śīla)andtenskillfulpathsofaction(kuśala-karmapatha), followedby the factors leading to stream‑entry(srotaāpatti),faith(prasāda),spiritualfruits(śrāmanya-phala),etc.Underthesectiononstream‑entry,itattemptstomapoutthepathofspiritualprogress,andsummarizesasfollows:

[OnemustbeginbyattendingandhonoringtheTrueMen(satpuruṣa).]IfoneisabletoattendandhonortheTrueMen,onecanthenlistentotheTrueDharma.HavinglistenedtotheTrueDharma,oneisthenabletocomprehendproperly(yoniśas)itsprofoundmeaning.Havingproperlycomprehendeditsprofoundmeaning,onecanthenproceedtopracticethedharmānudharma‑s.Havingvigorouslypracticedthedharmānudharma‑s,oneisthenabletoenterintotheperfection(samyaktvāvakrānti),[i.e.,attainstreamentry].13

(b) All commentaries are based on a specific sūtra passage, exhibitingthe vibhaṅga style in the sūtra-piṭaka. (See e.g., quote above).

(c) Itsclassificationofdharma‑sisintermsofāyatana,skandhaand(bahu‑)dhātu,thediscussionofeachofwhichformsaseparatechapter(i.e.,chapter18,19,20).ButitisintheSkandhachapterthatweseetheexplicitenumerationofalltheconditioneddharma‑softheSarvāstivādaunderthefiveskandha‑s,asfollows:

(d)Thereislittleorganizationandsystematizationofitsdiscussions.

(e)Although there is no attempt at establishing the thesis of sarvāstitva,itsimplicationissufficientlyclear—allanalysisisintermsofthepast,thepresent,thefuture.Thus,cakṣur-indriyaisexplainedasthecakṣus“whichhasseen,isseeingandwillseerūpa,andthenon‑participating(tat-sabhāga)cakṣus”;etc.

(f) Itenumeratestheeyeofintermediateexistence(antarā-bhava)—adistinctdoctrineoftheSarvāstivāda.

(g)Initsdiscussiononrūpa,theavijñaptiisnotmentioned.

(h)Some relatively advanceddoctrinal concepts—such as that of the 98anuśaya‑s innovatedby the JPŚ and the classificationofcitta-caitta‑s,viprayukta-saṃskāra‑sandasaṃskṛta‑sfoundinthePrŚ—areincludedinthistext.14Allthethreeasaṃskṛta‑sarementioned.15 Explanationsonthefourśrāmaṇya-phala‑salsoseemtohavebeentakenfromthePjŚ.16

ThesefeaturessuggestthattheDSŚrepresentsthemostarchaictypeofabhidharma of the Sarvāstivāda,stillvisiblyundertheinfluenceoftheabhidharmicsūtra-s.


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Theomissionofavijñapti-rūpasuggeststhatthetextprobablybelongstotheperiodbeforethistopiccametobehotlydebatedamongtheabhidharmaschools.However,(h)suggeststhatthepresentversionmusthavebeenrevisedsubsequentlyundertheinfluenceofthetwomostesteemedcanonicaltexts—JPŚandPrŚ17 —andperhapssomeotherpādatreatisessubsequenttoit.

4.1.1.2. Saṃgītiparyāya-śāstra (SgPŚ)

TheChinesetranslation(Tno.1536)byXuanZanggivesŚāriputraasitsauthor,buttheSanskritandTibetantradition18ascribeittoMahākauṣṭhila.OnlysomefragmentsinSanskritexist.ThetextisacommentaryontheSaṃgīti-sūtra(Tno.9,Dīgha-nikāya,no.33)whichisessentiallyamātṛkāpurportingtocollectscatteredteachingsoftheBuddha,presentedinanenumerativeformat.TheSgPŚfollowsthisformat.Ascommentarialexplanationspresumablymusthaveaccompaniedsuchconcise,enumerateddoctrinaltopicsfromtheBuddha’stime,theSgPŚ—asadirectcommentaryontheSaṃgīti-sūtratowhoseformatitisconfined—canbeconceivedasrepresentingtheresultoftheearliestabhidharmadevelopmentcontemporaneouswiththesūtra-piṭaka. YinShun,onthefollowingthreegrounds,concludesthattheSgPŚmusthavebeencomposedsubsequenttotheDSŚ:19

(i) Therearenumerousplaceswheretheexplanationsareexplicitlysaidtobe “as explained in theDharmaskandha-śāstra”20There are also someexplanations—suchasthatonthethreeakuśala-vitarka‑s21—whichincontentarethesameasthoseintheDSŚ.

(ii) TheSgPŚisbasedontheSaṃgītiparyāya-sūtra of the Dīrghāgama,yetliketheDSŚ,italsoadoptsthedoctrineof62dhātu‑sfoundintheBahudhātuka-sūtra of the Madhyamāgama(T1,no.26).

(iii)This śāstra refers to variant explanations—“some say” (有說),22 “someexplainedthus”(有作是說)23—suggestingthatatthetimeofitscompilation,abhidharmadoctrinesweregraduallyenteringthestageofdivergentviewsdevelopedbythevariousabhidharmaschools.

Onemight also consider the use of dyads and triads and the tetralemmaanalysisasfurthersuggestingarelativelydevelopedabhidharmamethodology.However,suchfeaturesmayalsohavebeenaccruedasaresultofrevisionofthe text over time.Moreover,itistobenotedinthisconnectionthatinspeakingof the mātṛkā (= abhidharma),Saṃghabhadraenumeratesthesethreetextsinthe followingorder:SgPŚ,DSŚ,PjŚ.24Likewise in theMūla-sarvāstivāda-vinaya-kṣudraka-vastuandtheAśokāvadāna(seesupra,§1.1.2.d).ThisorderofenumerationmaywellhintattheSarvāstivādatraditionoftherelativechronologyofthethreetexts.


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4.1.1.3. Prajñapti-śāstra (PjŚ)

PuGuanggroupsthistexttogetherwithSgPŚandDSŚasbeingcompositionsinthetimeoftheBuddha.Heascribesthistext,saidtocomprise18,000stanzas,toMahā‑kātyāyana (see above, § 4.1),25whereas theMPPU, aswell as theSanskritandTibetan,toMahā‑maudgalyāyana.26ThisistheonlycanonicaltextnottranslatedbyXuanZang.TheChinesetranslation(Tno.1538)madeintheearlypartofthe11thcenturybyFa‑hu(Dharmarakṣita)andWei‑jingisapartialone,containingthechapterknownaskāraṇa-prajñapti.

TheChinese translationmentions in an embeddednote that thefirst part isnamedLoka-prajñapti,theoriginalSanskritofwhichisnotextant.27TheMPPUrecordsatraditionthatthethirdpartofthesix‑part(=six‑feet)abhidharma,entitledLoka-prajñapti(=PjŚ),compriseseightchapters.Itseems,therefore,possiblethattheextantTibetanversion,comprisingLoka-prajñapti (‘jig rten bshag pa),Kāraṇa-prajñapti (rgyu gdags pa)andKarma-prajñapti (las gdags pa),28isalsoonlyapartialtranslation.

The Aśokāvadānaexplainsthemātṛkā-piṭaka (= abhidharma-piṭaka)ascomprising:

thefoursmṛtyupasthāna‑s … praṇidhi-jñāna-samādhi,theone‑incremental(*ekottara)dharma‑s,thehundred‑and‑eightdefilements,theexplanation(記)oftheworld,theexplanationofthefetters,theexplanationofkarma,theexplanationsofsamādhi, prajñā,etc.”29

Saṃghabhadragivesasimilardescriptionofmātṛkā:

AstheVenerableMahākāśyapasays:“Whatdoesmātṛkāreferto?Thefoursmṛtyupasthāna‑s, etcup to thenobleeight‑foldpath,…aswell as theSaṅgīti-paryāya,Dharma-skandhaandPrajñapti[-śāstra].Allsuchlikearecollectivelyknownasmātṛkā.”30

Comparing the above twodescriptions and taking into consideration theinformationgatheredfromtheMPPU,YinShunconcludesthatoriginallythePjŚmusthavetakenthefirstchapter—itsmaindoctrinalconcern—asthegeneraltitle,andthatLoka-prajñapti,Kāraṇa-prajñapti, Karma-prajñapti, Saṃyojana-prajñapti, Samādhi-prajñapti andPrajñā-prajñaptimust have constitutedsomeofitseightchaptertitles.31Concerningitsoriginaltitle,itmaybefurthernotedthattheolderChineseversionoftheVibhāṣā(T28,no.1546)quotesthistreatiseas施設世界經 (*Loka-prajñapti-sūtra)twice, 32besidesthetitle施設論 (*Prajãpti-śāstra).33

ThePjŚisquoted135timesintheMVŚ.Thecontentofthesequotationspertainsmostlytocosmologicaldoctrines,supernormalpowersand—particularly—karma doctrines.ThisisinkeepingwiththegeneralcharacteristicsoftheDīrghāgama which,accordingtotheSarvāstivādintradition,ismeantfortheproselytizers34and


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aimsatmeetingtheneedsofthepopularmentality.Somescholarsbelievethatitmostlikelyderiveditssourcesfromtheshi-ji-jing(Tno.30,世記經;‘ExplanationoftheWorld’=Loka-prajñapti?35)oftheDīrghāgamaandtheLi-shi-a-pi-tan-lun (Tno.1644)whichdealwithBuddhistcosmology.YinShun,however,opinesthatitdevelopeditsdoctrinesfromthevariousancientsūtrasourcesdealingwithcosmologicaltopicswhichconstitutedacommondoctrinalconcernamongthevariousBuddhistschoolsatthetime;anddependingontheschool,suchexpositionscametobevariouslycompiled,eitherasasūtraoraśāstra.Hepointsout,forinstance,thattheTheravādatoodiscussessimilarcosmologicaltopicseventhoughitdoesnotpossessasūtracorrespondingtotheChineseshi-ji-jing.36

Itappears that, besides theSarvāstivāda, other schools/lineages such as theVibhajyavādaandVātsīputrīyatooheldthePjŚinhighesteem.ThefollowingdiscussionintheMVŚiscitedbyYinShunasanindicationofthis:37

TheVātsīputrīyas and theVibhajyavādins intend to claim that sound isaretributionfruit(fromkarma).Question:On thebasisofwhatauthority (pramāṇa)do theymakesuchaclaim?Answer:Onthebasisofthenoblewords.AsthePrajñapti-śāstrasays:…Onthebasisofthisexplanation,theyholdthatsoundisaretributionfruit.

TherearealsoplacesintheMVŚwheretheexplanationsgivenbythePjŚwereacceptedwithdifficultyorrejected,whichagainsuggeststhatthetextdidnotbelongexclusivelytotheSarvāstivāda.Onesuchrejectionconcernsthenatureofignorance(avidyā):

The Prajñapti-śāstrastates:“Whatisignorance?Allthepastdefilements.”Itshouldnotstateso.Statingsowouldamounttotheabandoningofintrinsicnature.Rather,itshouldstate:“Whatisignorance?Itisthestageofthepastdefilement.”38

YinShunbelievesthatitwassubsequenttotheMVŚthatthetextcametoberecognizedasoneofthesixpāda-śāstra‑softheSarvāstivādaschool.39

Inbrief,liketheDSŚandtheSgPŚ,thePjŚisalsocharacterizedbyitssimpleandfairlylooselystructuredexpositionbasedonsūtrapassages.This,coupledwiththefactthetraditionsofSarvāstivādatexts(Aśokāvadāna,Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinayaandtheNy)andofXuanZang(throughPuGuang)agreeingroupingthethreetextstogether,suggeststhatthePjŚ,liketheothertwotexts,canbecountedamongtheearlycanonicalAbhhidharmatexts.However,unliketheDSŚandtheSgPŚ,itdoesnotsomuchexegeticallyexpandonthetermsandconceptsofthesūtrapassagesquoted,asutilizingthemasabasisforthediscussiononvariousdoctrinalconcernsthatwerebeingdevelopedatthetime.Aclearexampleof


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thisfeatureisintheKarma-prajñaptiwhichusestheSañcentanīya-sūtraasthebasisfordiscussingthedevelopingkarmadoctrines.40

4.1.2. Later, more developed texts

Incontrasttotheabovethreetreatises,theremainingfourareclearlymoredevelopedin termsof organization anddoctrinal concepts.Moreover, somedivergencenot‑withstanding, theyallcontainsectariandoctrineswhichcanbe regardedasspecificallySarvāstivādin. Inaddition,asregardsauthorship,all traditionsagreeinascribingthemtotheabhidharmamasterssubsequenttotheBuddha’stime.Thefollowingenumerationreflectsonlyaprobablerelativechronologicalofthesefourtreatises.

4.1.2.1. Vijñānakāya-śāstra (VKŚ)

TheChinese translationgives its author as提婆設摩which agreeswith theSanskrit tradition—Devaśarman.41According toPuGuang, helived about100yearsfromtheBuddha’sdemise,whichseemscredible(seesupra,§3.1).Doctrinally,thisisahighlyesteemedSarvāstivādatext,quoted39timesbytheMVŚ.Itisinthistextthat,forthefirsttime,thefundamentalthesisofsarvāstitva wasexplicitlyupheldagainsttheVibhajyavādins.Thewholetextconsistsofsixskandhaka‑s,thediscussionsbeingcenteredaroundthesixconsciousnesses:

I. Maudgalyāyana-skandhaka II. Pudgala-skandhaka:refutationofpudgalavāda III. Hetu-pratyaya-skandhakaIV. Ālambana-pratyaya-skandhakaV. Kṣudraka-(or Saṃkīrṇa‑)pratyaya-skandhakaVI. Samanvāgama-skandhaka

InrepudiatingtheVibhajyavādins’present‑only‑existstandpoint,weseethedistinctemploymentoflogicalapparatussimilartothatfoundinthePāliKathāvatthu.

I. Maudgalyāyana-skandhakaistherefutationofŚramaṇaMaudgalyāyana’sassertionthat“thepastandfuturedonotexist;thepresentandtheunconditionedexist.”Devaśarman’sargumentsherehavebeendiscussedabove(§3.3.1).TheonlyargumentgivenbyMaudgalyāyanainitsdefenseisthattherecanbeathought(citta)withoutanobject,sothatthepastandfuture,thoughnon-existent,canserveasobjectofcognition.42

II. The Pudgala-skandhakarefutesthePudgalavādins(VātsīputrīyaandSāmmitīya)who assert: “In the true and absolute sense thepudgala is perceivable(upalabhyate),realizable(sākṣātkriyate),exists(現有;saṃvidyate/vidyamāna/dṛśyate?)andiswellobserved(等有;saṃdṛśyate?).43Hencethereisdefinitelythe pudgala.”ThisphraseologyiscomparabletothatinKathāvatthuinasimilar


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refutation of thepuggala: sacikaṭṭha-paramaṭṭhena puggalo upalabbhati. Thefollowingisanillustrationoftheauthor’smethodofrefutationwiththefirstpartofhisargument:

1. ThePudgalavādin’spropositionstated:Inthetrueandabsolutesensethepudgalaisperceivable,realizable,existsandiswellobserved.(=p)

2. Śūnyatāvādin(=Sarvāstivādin)seeksconfirmationwithhisopponentastothelatter’sacceptanceofthesūtrastatements:Wouldyousaythatthesūtra hasproperlytaughtthatthefivegati‑s—naraka,etc.—aredefinitivelyestablishedwithoutconfusion,thateachgatiexistsdistinctly?(=s)

3. Pudgalavādin:Yes.

4. Śūnyatāvādinseeksfurtherconfirmation:Wouldyousaythatthereissomeone(i.e.,yourpudgala)whodiesintheinfernalplaneofexistence(naraka-gati)andisrebornintotheplaneofexistenceoftheanimals(tiryag-gati)?(=p1)

5. Pudgalavādin:Yes.

6. Śūnyatāvādin:Recognizeyour defeat (汝聽墮負—cf. Kathāvatthu: ājānāhi niggahaṃ)!For:s ⊃~p 1,andp 1 ⊃~s.

7. Pudgalavādin:Weconfirmp 1.

8. Śūnyatāvādin:Wouldyousaythatitistheverysameperson(彼即是彼;sa eva saḥ)—theonewhodiesandtheonewhoisreborn?(=p 2)

9. Pudgalavādin:No.(~p 2)

10. Śūnyatāvādin:Recognizeyourdefeat!For:p 1 ⊃ p 2;~p 2 ⊃~p 1.

11. Śūnyatāvādin:Would you say that it is a different person ineachcase?

12.Pudgalavādin:Itisdifferent(=p 3)(givenasananticipatedanswer).

13. Śūnyatāvādin:Wouldyousaythattheinfernalbeingisannihilatedandadifferentbeingisbornasananimal?(=p 4)

14. Pudgalavādin:No.(~p 4)

15. Śūnyatāvādin:Recognizeyourdefeat!For:p 3 ⊃ p 4;~p 4 ⊃~p 3.

16.Pudgalavādin:Itisineffableastowhethertheyaredifferentorthesame(= p 5)(givenasananticipatedanswer).

17. Śūnyatāvādin:Wouldyousaythatthesameineffabilityasregardsidentityordifferenceappliestothepersoninyourp1aswell?(=p6)

18.Pudgalavādin:No.(~p6)

19. Śūnyatāvādin:Recognizeyourdefeat!For:p 5 ⊃ p6;~p 6 ⊃~p 5.


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Thewholeargumentcanbesummarizedasfollows:p ⊃ q;~q,therefore~p. Here,p is theopponent’sproposition;q is its logical implicationswhicharecontradictorytoeithersūtrateachingsorlogic.Notethatp2aboveisśāsvata-vādaandthatp3isuccheda-vāda,bothcontradictingtheBuddha’steachings.

Anotherexampleofsuchcontradictoryimplicationisinregardtothequestionwhethertheretributionofpleasurableandunpleasurableexperiencesareself‑caused.TheŚūnyatāvādinarguesthattheopponent’sthesisofarealpersonnecessarilyimplieseitherthattheyareself‑caused(svayaṃ-kṛta)orother‑caused(para-kṛta).Bothoptions,however,areextremesrejectedbythesūtra‑s,oneimplyingśāsvata-vāda,theother,uccheda-vāda.44 The pudgalaisalsorefutedonthegroundthatitisnotamongtheobjectsofcognitionofthesixconsciousnessesastaughtbytheBuddha—rūpa,śabda,etc.Neithercantherebeaseventhconsciousnessofwhichitistheobject.45

III.–V. Skandhaka‑s III toVdealwith theSarvāstivādadoctrineof the fourpratyaya‑sfocusingonthesixconsciousnesses:

III. Hetu-skandhakadiscusseshetu-pratyaya;IV.Ālambana-skandhakadiscussesālambana-pratyaya;V. Saṃkīrṇa-skandhaka discusses samanantara-pratyaya andadhipati-

pratyaya.

VI.The Samanvāgama-skandhaka discusses samanvāgama andasamanvāgama—atopicwhichistogaincentralimportanceintheSarvāstivādasoteriology.

4.1.2.2. Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra (JPŚ)

The fundamental importanceof this treatise is clear from the fact that theSarvāstivāda tradition came to uphold this as the ‘body’ of their canonicalabhidharma,incontrasttothesix‘feet’,althoughthisdoesnotnecessarilyinastraightforwardmannerimplythattheJPŚwasalatercompilationderivingitssourcesfromthe‘feet’texts(seeabove§4.1).Thedefinitive,encyclopedic*Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣāpurportstobeitscommentary.

TwoChinesetranslationsoftheJPŚareextant;onebyXuanZang(Tno.1544)comprising20fascicles,andanearlieronetranslatedin383C.E.bySaṃghadeva,Zhu‑fo‑nienandDharmapriyaunderthetitleof*Aṣṭa-skandhaka‑(/Aṣṭa-granthaka‑)śāstra(Tno.1543)comprising30fascicles.ThistreatiseisunanimouslyascribedbyalltraditionstoKātyāyanīputra.

Astothedateoftheauthor,CollettCoxmentionedtheMPPUassuggestingthathelived100yearsaftertheBuddha.46However,whattheMPPUactuallysaysthereisthat100yearsaftertheBuddha’sdemise,therearosedoctrinaldisputes


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amongthegreatmastersgivingrisetodistinctlynamedschools.“Henceforth,throughasuccession,itcameto[thetimeof]abrahminreligieuxfromtheclanofKātyāyana(=Kātyāyanīputra)…whocomposedtheJñānaprasthāna-sūtra in eight skandhaka‑s”47 (see above§4.1).According to the*Samayabheda-uparacaṇacakra,theSarvāstivādasplitfromtheoriginalSthaviravādalineageat thebeginningof the3rd centuryafter theBuddha (see above). Ifwe takethis to be the timewhen the JPŚ effectively established theSarvāstivāda asadistinctschool,thenthisisalsotheperiodtowhichKātyāyanīputrabelonged.ThetraditionoriginatingfromXuanZangalsoassignedhimtothe3rdcenturyaftertheBuddha.48SodidJiZang’s三論玄義.49WebelieveYinShunisrightthatsincetheJPŚdecisivelyestablishedthefundamentaldoctrinesoftheSarvāstivāda,thedateof its compilationcannotbe too late.XuanZang’s traditionplacingKātyāyanīputrainthe3rdcenturyaftertheBuddhaseemsreasonable,andthiswould—accordingtotheSarvāstivādatradition(seeabove,§3.1)—placehimaround150B.C.E.Paramārtha’sBiography of Vasubandhuplaceshiminthe5th centuryaftertheBuddha’sdemise,50whichseemstobeaconfoundingwiththetimeofthecompilationoftheMVŚ.51

The MVŚexplainsthemeaningofthetitleofthistreatise,givingtwointerpretationsof prasthāna:(i)‘settingout’or‘initiating’or‘startingpoint’,(ii)‘base’or‘foot‑hold’:

Question:Whyisthistreatisecalledjñāna-prasthāna?

Answer: Allknowledgesintheabsolutesense(paramārtha-jñāna)setoutfromhere;thisisthestartingpoint.Henceitiscalledjñāna-prasthāna.

Furthermore,thistreatiseshouldbecalledThe foot-hold of knowledge—alltheknowledgesintheabsolutesensehavethisastheirfoundation;theyareestablishedonthis.HenceitiscalledThe foot-hold of knowledge.

Furthermore,this[treatise]ismostcapableofinitiatingthemightyknowledges;asthemightyknowledgeshavethisastheirobject(ālambana),itiscalledjñāna-prasthāna.

Furthermore, it is called jñāna-prasthāna because, dependingon this,theknowledgesreachtheothershore(i.e.,becomeperfected);thereisnonethatcanmatchthisinsettingforththesva-lakṣaṇaandsāmānya-lakṣaṇa ofalldharma‑s.

Furthermore,itiscalledjñāna-prasthānabecauseallknowledges—whethermundane(laukika)orsupramundane(lokottara)—aredependentonthisastheirorigin;itisthewonderfulgateoftheknowledges.52

Thewhole treatise is divided into eightmajor chapters called skandhaka‑s,eachwith several sections calledāśvāsa 納息—calledvarga (跋渠) in the*Aṣṭa-skandhaka.Eachofthesesectionsismadeupofseveraldoctrinaltopics(章),eachofwhichisthendiscussedintermsofvariousdoctrinalperspectives(門).Thus,thewholetreatiseconsistsof4strata:


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I. doctrinaltopics;II. doctrinalperspectivesintermsofwhichatopicisanalyzed;III.asectioncomprisingthevariousdoctrinaltopics;IV. askandhaka(chapter)comprisingthevarioussections.

Theeightmajorchaptersare:1.Miscellaneous;2.Thefetters;3.Theknowledges;4. Karma;5.TheGreatElements;6.Thefaculties;7.Themeditations;8.Theviews.

Theeightchaptersareasfollows:(1)Saṃkīrṇaka,witheightsections;(2)Saṃyojana,withfoursections;(3)Jñāna,withfivesections;(4)Karman,withfivesections;(5)Mahābhūta,withfoursections;(6)Indriya,withsevensections;(7)Samādhi,withfivesections;(8)Dṛṣṭi,withsixsections.

Astoitsorderofpresentation,whichbeginswiththe‘suprememundanedharma‑s‘(laukikāgra-dharma),i.e.,thefirstsectionoftheSaṃkīrṇaka-skandhaka,theMVŚcitesdivergentinterpretationsgivenbythevariousmasters.Thefirstfewinterpretationsagreethattherewasnoparticularconsiderationoftheorderonthepartoftheauthor.53ThisseemstoechothegeneralviewoftheSarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikas,statedatthebeginningoftheMVŚ,that“oneshouldseekthetruenatureandcharacteristicsofdharma‑swithintheabhidharma, nottheorder[ofpresentation]ortheintroductions(nidāna)”.54

Thedoctrinal topicswhichareenumerated, constitutinganattribute‑mātṛkā,aresaidtobeestablishedwiththesūtra‑sasthebasis,forthetreatiseshavetheexplanationsofthesūtra‑sastheirpurpose.55TheMVŚexplainstherationaleforthissub‑structureofdoctrinaltopicsbeingfollowedbydoctrinalperspectives,asfollows:

Question:Whyarethedoctrinaltopicsfirstsetuphere?

Answer: Inordertoelucidatethedoctrinalperspectives.Ifthedoctrinaltopicsarenotsetup,thedoctrinalperspectivescannotbeelucidated—likeapainternotbeingabletopaintspacewithcolor.…

Moreover,ifthedoctrinaltopicsarenotsetup,itisavoidandnothingcanbeasked—theremustbeabasisonwhichtoaskaquestion.…

Moreover, it is like the case of theBuddha explaining theDharma—firstoutlining,thenexplaining:Hefirstoutlines,“thesixdhātu‑s,thesixspraṣṭavya-āyatana‑s…, these are said to be a sentient being”.Thenhefurtherexplains:“Thesearecalledthesixdhātu‑s…,thesearecalled…”56

Thisexegeticalsub‑structuremaybeillustratedwiththetopicofthe‘suprememundanedharma‑s’.Thisisdiscussedintermsofsevendoctrinalperspectives—eachintheformofaquestion,followedbyanswer(s)andexplanations:


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(1) “Whatarethe‘suprememundanedharma‑s’?”

(2) “Whyaretheycalledthe‘suprememundanedharma‑s’?”

(3) “Are the ‘suprememundanedharma‑s’ to be said to pertain to thesphereofsensuality(kāmadhātu-pratisaṃyukta),tothesphereoffine‑materiality(rūpadhātu-pratisaṃyukta),ortothesphereofimmateriality(ārūpyadhātu-pratisaṃyukta)?”

(4) “Arethe‘suprememundanedharma‑s’tobesaidtobesavitarka-savicāra, avitarka-savicāra or avitarka-avicāra?”

(5) “Arethe‘suprememundanedharma‑s’tobesaidtobeconjoinedwith(saṃprayukta)thesukhendriya,prītīndriya,orupekṣendriya?”

(6) “Are the ‘suprememundanedharma‑s’ to be said to consist of onethoughtmoment(citta)ormanythoughtmoments?”

(7) “Arethe‘suprememundanedharma‑s’tobesaidtobesusceptibletoretrogressionornotsusceptibletoretrogression?”57

Thefivecategoriesofdharma‑srecognizedastheultimaterealsintheSarvāstivādasystem—rūpa,citta, caitasika, citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra,andasaṃskṛta—arealreadyclearlyenumeratedintheJPŚ,58althoughnotyetproperlyschematizedasataxonomicaldoctrineasinthePrŚ:

As to rūpa, there is awholemahābhūta-skandha elaboratelydiscussing themahābhūta‑s and thebhautika-rūpa‑s.There is awhole sectiononavijñapti undertheKarma-skandhaka,withclearnotionsofsaṃvara, asaṃvara, naiva-saṃvara-nāsaṃvara,prātimokṣa-saṃvara,etc.59

Astocitta,variousconsiderationsofitsnaturearemade,someofwhicharelikelytohaveinfluencedtheothercanonicaltreatises,eitherbywayofbeinginheritedorbywayofinfluencingtheirsubsequentstageofrevision.ThefollowingaresomeexamplesfromtheSaṃkīrṇakachapter:

Isthereasingleconsciousnesswhichapprehendsalldharma‑s?No.

Butifthisconsciousnessgenerates[theunderstanding]thatalldharma‑sarewithoutSelf,whatdoes this consciousnessnot cognize? It doesnotcognizeitselfandthosedharma‑sconjoinedwithitandco‑existentwithit.

Aretheretwocitta‑swhicharemutuallyacausetoeachother?No.Becausenotwocitta‑scanarisesimultaneouslyinagivenperson(pudgala)…

Why is it thatno twocitta‑s arise simultaneously in anygivenperson?Because there is no second equal‑immediate condition (see§7.1.2) andbecausethecitta‑sofasentientbeingariseoneafteranother.

But ifnopudgalaexistsand there isnoprecedingcitta thatgoes to thesucceedingcitta,howcanitbepossibleforonetorecollectwhatonehasdonepreviously?Byvirtueoftheforceofrepeatedpractice,asentientbeing


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acquiresaparticularknowledgeofhomogeneitywithregardtoadharma andcomestobeabletoknowinacorrespondingwayinaccordancewithwhathehasexperienced.…60

Astothecaitasika‑s,thetenwhicharelatertobeknownasthemahā-bhūmika‑sareclearlygroupedtogetherinthediscussiononsaṃprayuktaka-hetuasfollows:vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā, sparśa, manaskāra, chanda, adhimokṣa, smṛti, samādhi, prajñā.61

Astothecitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra‑s,thereisthementionofprāpti,thesaṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa‑s,nikāya-sabhāgatā, pṛthagjanatva, jīvitendriya, etc.62Thedistinctionbetweenacquisition/non-acquisition(prāpti/aprāpti) andendowment/non-endowment(samanvāgama/asamanvāgama)ismade—samanvāgamaisthenon‑lossofwhathasbeenacquired(prāpta);asamanvāgamaisthenothavingacquiredorthelossofwhathasbeenacquired.63 (See infra,§11.3.1.1).Asanexample:

Thosewhohavenotcutoff theirrootsofskillfulness(kuśala-mūla)areendowedwiththefive[spiritual]faculties,faith,etc.,andthosewhohavecutofftheirrootsofskillfulnessarenotendowedwiththem.Thosewhohaveacquiredandnot lost the threeoutflow‑free facultiesareendowedwith them; thosewhohavenotyetacquiredorhave lost [them]arenotendowedwiththem.64

Astotheunconditioned dharma‑s,onlypratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaandapratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaarementioned;65 ākāśaisnoteworthilyabsent—possiblysuggestingthattheJPŚwascompiledearlierthanthePrŚinwhichthisthirdasaṃskṛtaisclearlymentionedanddefined.(Seebelow).

An important innovation is the theoryof the six causes— saṃprayuktaka-hetu, sahabhū-hetu, sabhāga-hetu, sarvatraga-hetu, vipāka-hetu, kāraṇa-hetu. (See infra,§6).66Inregardtovipāka-hetu,theauthorsgiveaverycomprehensivedefinition,bringingintoitsscopeallthefiveconditionedskandha‑sconstitutingthefourcategories—rūpa(bodilyandvocalkarma‑s),citta,caitasikaandcitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra.67 (See infra,§6.3.4).

TheJPŚalsodevelopsaveryrigorousmethodology,essentiallybasedoncatechism,ofexhaustivelyanalyzingtheinterrelationshipamongagivengroupofdharma‑s.(See§2.4.4foranillustration).

4.1.2.3. Prakaraṇa-śāstra (PrŚ)

AlltraditionsunanimouslyascribethistexttoVasumitra.BesidesXuanZang’stranslation(Tno.1542;translatedin660C.E.)comprising18fascicles,thereisanearlierChinesetranslationin12fascicles(Tno.1541),madebyGuṇabhadraandBodhiyaśasfrom435–443C.E.Itsfirstchapteronthefiveclassesofdharma‑sseem tohave enjoyed considerablepopularity inChina. Itwas translated as


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anindependenttextbyAnShi‑gaoinonefasciclearound148C.E.(Tno.1557),andlaterintheTangDynastybyFa‑cheng(Tno.1556).Thereisalsoacommentaryonthisfirstchapter,entitled*Pañca-vastuka-vibhāṣā(Tno.1555)ascribedtoDharmatrāta,translatedbyXuanZang.

The PrŚconsistsofeightchapters:

1. ‘Onthefivegroups’(Pañcavastuka)2.‘Ontheknowledges’(Jñāna-nirdeśa)3. ‘Ontheentrances’(Āyatana-nirdeśa)4. ‘Onthesevengroups’(Saptavastuka)5. ‘Ontheproclivities’(Anuśaya-nirdeśa)6.‘Onsubsumption,etc.’(Saṃgrahādi-nirdeśa)7. ‘Thousand‑questions’(Sahasra-praśnaka)8.‘Onascertainment’(Viniścaya-nirdeśa)

FrauwallnerremarksthatthePrŚisacompilationofvirtuallyindependentandself‑contained sections (seeabove,§4.1), althoughhealso takesnoteof the*Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-śāstra (MPPU)which records anopinionwhich—enumeratingthePrŚasthefirstofthe‘sixpart’abhidharma —statesthatofitseightchaptersfourareauthoredbyVasumitraandtheotherfourbyKaśmīrianarhat‑s.68 Frauwallnerconjecturesthatchapters1,2,3and8arelateradditions,while4–7representtheearlierpart.69 YinShun,too,onthebasisofthistraditionintheMPPUandananalysisofitscontents,ascertainsthatthePrŚisindeeddivisibleintothefollowingtwogroups:

I. four chapterswhich are essentially a reworking of ancienttreatises—4,6,7,8;

II. fourchapterswhicharearevisionofancientdoctrineswithinnovations—1,2,3,5.70

Asanexampleofthefirstgroup,letuslookatthe4thchapter,theSaptavastuka. YinShun thinks that the sapta-vastu‑s threedharma‑s, i.e.,skandha, dhātu,and āyatana,andfourdharma‑s,i.e.,vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāraandvijñāna,71 havetheirsourceintheancienttreatises:

The Saptavastuka’senumerationofallthesaṃskṛta-dharma‑sinthefive‑skandha schemeseemstobeaninheritancefromtheDSŚ(seeabove§4.1.1.1).Likewiseitsdiscussionofwhataresubsumed(saṃgṛhīta)andwhatarenot,andalsowhatareconjoined(saṃprayukta)andwhatarenot—allintermsofskandha, dhātu, āyatana—canbeseenasaninheritancefromanancientsourcebasedonthesūtra‑s. In itsdiscussionof thecaitasika-dharma‑s, the followingclassesareenumerated:tenmahā-bhūmika‑s;tenkuśala-mahā-bhūmika‑s;tenkleśa-mahā-bhūmika‑s; tenparītta-kleśa-mahā-bhūmika‑s;fivekleśa‑s;fivesaṃspaṛśa‑s;


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fivedṛṣṭi‑s;fiveindriya‑s,fivedharma‑s—eightclassestotaling65dharma‑s.However, the tenkuśala-mahā-bhūmika‑s are notmentioned in the oldertranslationandcouldhavebeenadded from theMVŚ.72AlthoughYinShunplaces this text under thefirst group, such classification ofmental elementsrepresentsanimportantinnovativestepinpsychologicalanalysis.Accordingtosomescholars,thischapterisareworkingofthefirstpartoftheDhātu-kāya.73 Itsfive‑skandhaschemeofenumerationseemstohavehadsomedefiniteandcontinued influenceon someorthodoxSarvāstivādins evenposterior to theAKB,suchasSkandhilaandtheauthoroftheADV.Bothmasterssubsumedalldharma‑sundertheaṣṭa-padārthascheme—fiveskandha‑scomprisingallthesaṃskṛta-dharma‑splusthreeasaṃskṛta‑s.74

Asanexampleofthesecondgroup,letuslookatthe5thchapter,On the proclivities,whichis themostrigorouschapterof thewhole treatise.Onthebasisof the98proclivitiesestablishedintheJPŚ,itdiscussesthemintermsofsevendoctrinalperspectivesgivenasdyads,triadsandpentads—e.g.:howmanypertaintothekāma-dhātu,torūpa-dhātu,toārūpya-dhātu;howmanyareduḥkha-darśana-heya, samudaya-darśana-heya, nirodha-darśana-heya, mārga-darśana-heya, bhāvanā-heya;etc.Incorporatedinthisarethedefinitionofproclivitiesandthemutualsubsumptionbetweenthe98proclivitiesandthesevenand12proclivities.The98proclivitiesarealsodiscussedintermsofthemodeoftheiradherenceandgrowth(anuśayana)—throughtakinganobject(ālambanataḥ)andthroughconjunction(saṃprayogataḥ).75

Anotherexampleofthereworkingofearlierabhidharmatextsisthe6thchapter,On subsumption, etc. Thischapterbeginsbyenumeratingatotalof182doctrinalperspectives:5ofone‑perspective,103oftwo‑perspectives,31ofthree‑perspectives,21offour‑perspectives,5offive‑perspectives,2ofsix‑perspectives,3ofseven‑perspectives,3ofeight‑perspectives,2ofnine‑perspectives,2often‑perspectives,1ofeleven‑perspectives,1oftwelve‑perspectives,1ofeighteen‑perspectives,1oftwenty‑two‑perspectivesand1ofninety‑eight‑perspectives.Thisisfollowedbyanitem‑wiseexplanation.Theenumerationconstitutesamiscellaneousmātṛkā afterthefashionoftheearlyabhidharma:

Thereare[fivecategoriesofdharma‑scomprisingasingleperspective—]jñeya-dharma‑s,vijñeya-dharma‑s,…

[Thereare103categoriesofdharma‑scomprisingtwoperspectives—]rūpi-dharma‑s,arūpi-dharma‑s;sanirdarśana-dharma‑s,anirdarśana-dharma‑s;sapratigha-dharma‑s,apratigha-dharma‑s;…

[There are 31categories ofdharma‑s comprising three perspectives—]kuśala-dharma‑s,akuśala-dharma‑s,avyākṛta-dharma‑s;śaikṣa-dharma‑s,aśaikṣa-dharma‑s,naiva-śaikṣa-nāśaikṣa-dharma‑s;darśana-heya-dharma‑s,bhāvanā-heya-dharma‑s,aheya-dharma‑s;…76


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AsFrauwallnerpointsout,thisprocedureisthesameasthatinthe3rdand4th chaptersoftheDhammasaṅgaṇī.77Theenumerationshowsthatthetriads(103)anddyads(31),comprisingastheydothelargestnumbersofcategories,providethecoreoftheattribute‑mātṛkā.Anothernoteworthypointisthatamongtheenumerateddoctrinalperspectives,some20pertaintohetu-pratyaya‑s,indicatingtheemergingemphasisbytheearlySarvāstivādinsonthistopic.Thisincludes:citta-hetuka,acittta-hetuka;karma-hetuka, akarma-hetuka; saṃskṛta-hetuka, asaṃskṛta-hetuka; pratītya-samutpanna, apratītya-samutpanna; hetu, na hetu;etc.ThisinheritancefromarchaicabhidharmaisthenappendedwithanewĀbhidharmikaanalysis:Theseenumeratedcategoriesare:(i)subsumedunderhowmanydhātu‑s,āyatana‑sandskandha‑s;(ii)knownbyhowmanyjñāna‑s;(iii)cognizedbyhowmanytypesofvijñāna;(iv)adheredtobyhowmanyanuśaya‑s?

Themost important innovation ismadebyVasumitra in thePañcavastuka (chapter1)whichsystematizesalldharma‑sintofivecategories—rūpa, citta, caitasika, citta-viprayukta-saṃskāraandasaṃskṛta—alreadyestablished inoutlineintheJPŚ(seeabove§4.1.2.2).Thethreeasaṃskṛta‑sarementionedanddefined.78ThisfivefoldclassificationwastobecomethestandardclassificationbylaterSarvāstivādinsinparticularandbythenorthernabhidharmatraditioningeneral.Themannerinwhichthecaitasika-dharma‑sareenumeratedinthischaptersuggestsanimplicittaxonomicalconsiderationinfluencedbythesūtra‑sand represents theearly stageof thedevelopmentof the theoryofcaitasika inwhichnoexplicitgroupingwasdone. (See infra,§9.3.2). Italso initiatedatendencytowardsuccinctnessandorganization(seebelow).

CollettCoxcommentsthat“the*Mahāvibhāṣāoccasionallyoptsforinterpretationofthe Prakaraṇa,whichisdeclaredtobeexplicit,notinneedoffurtherinterpretation(nītārtha),over thatofJñānaprasthāna,whichisdeclaredtobeimplicitandinneedofclarification(neyārtha)”andgivesanexampleinthediscussiononvipāka-hetu.79However,thisdoesnotseemtosufficeasanexampleoftheMVŚ’spreferenceofaninterpretationofthePrŚoverthatoftheJPŚ.Inthoseinstances,theMVŚ is simply stating thedifference in the two interpretationsgiven indifferentperspectives—onefromthenītārtha view‑point,theother,neyārtha. Asamatteroffact,shortlybeforethis,inthesamediscussiononvipāka-hetu,thestatementinthePrŚthat jīvitendriya isakarmicretributionissaidtobeimplicitandbasedonconventionalusage—incontrastwiththatintheJPŚ.80 Nevertheless,itiscertainthatthecompilersoftheMVŚheldthePrŚinhighesteemasadoctrinalauthoritysecondonlytotheJPŚ,quotingitbynamesome100times.ThisfrequencyisnextonlytothatofthePjŚ.However,theesteemaccordedtoatextbytheMVŚcannotbejudgedbythefrequencyofitsquotationalone.InthecaseofthePjŚ,itisquotedmanytimes,partlybecausesuchtopicsasthecosmologyandsupernormalphenomena,etc.,wereareflectionofpopulardemandandconcernatthetime.Moreover,sometimesthePrŚ—andforthatmattertheotherpādatexts—isapparentlyquotedbysomeun‑namedparty


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whichseessomecontradictionbetweentheinterpretationgivenbytheJPŚorcertainmastersontheonehand,andthatofthePrŚontheotherhand.Aswehavementionedjustabove,thePrŚsetsthetrendofdevelopmentinabhidharma towardorganizationandsuccinctness,leadingtothedevelopmentofmanualsculminatingintheAKB.Bothdoctrinallyandintermsofthistendencytowardsuccinctness, thePrŚ is of especial importance for the so‑calledwesternoroutsidemasters.(See§3.6).

ThefollowingstatementsintheMVŚinadiscussionontheordinary‑worldlingnature(pṛthagjanatva)suggestthatevenatthetimeofthecompilationoftheMVŚ,therelativechronologyoftheJPŚandthePrŚhadnotbeenproperlyascertained:

Question:Whyisitthatthisoriginaltreatise(JPŚ)speaksoftheordinary‑worldlingnature,andnottheordinary‑worldlingdharma,whereasthePrŚspeaksoftheordinary‑worldlingdharmaandnottheordinary‑worldlingnature?

Answer:…Theordinary‑worldlingnatureexcels,nottheordinary‑worldlingdharma;thisoriginaltreatisespeaksintermsofthatwhichexcels.Sincethisoriginaltreatisehasalreadyspokenoftheordinary‑worldlingnature,thePrŚdoesnotmentionitagain.Sincethisoriginaltreatisehasnotspokenoftheordinary‑worldlingdharma,thePrŚmentionstheordinary‑worldlingdharma. Thisshowsthatthat[PrŚ]wascomposedlaterthanthis[JPŚ].

According to some: since that [Prakaraṇa] treatise has already spokenoftheordinary‑worldlingdharma,thistreatise(JPŚ)doesnotmentionitagain.Sincethattreatisehasnotspokenoftheordinary‑worldlingnature,thistreatisementionsit.Thisshowsthatthat[PrŚ]wascomposedearlierthanthis[JPŚ].

4.1.2.4. Dhātukāya-śāstra (DKŚ)

Theonly extantChinese translation (Tno.1540) in three fascicles byXuanZangascribesthistoVasumitra.TheSanskritandTibetantradition,however,giveitsauthorasPūrṇa.

TheDKŚconsistsoftwoparts:

(i) Thefirst, calledThe fundamental section (本事分), enumeratesmentalelementswhicharedivisibleinto2groups:

(a) tenmahā-bhūmika‑s—vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā, sparśa, manaskāra, chanda, adhimokṣa/adhimukti, smṛti, samādhi, prajñā;tenkleśa-mahā-bhūmika‑s—āśraddhya, kauśīdya, muṣita-smṛti, vikṣepa, avidyā, asaṃprajanya, ayoniśo-manaskāra, mithyādhimokṣa, auddhatya, pramāda; tenparītta-kleśa-bhūmika‑s—krodha, upanāha, mrakṣa, pradāśa, īrṣyā, mātsarya, māyā, śāṭhya, mada, vihiṃsā;


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(b) sixvijñāna-kāya‑s,sixsparśa-kāya‑s,sixvedanā-kāya‑s,sixsaṃjñā-kāya‑s,sixsaṃcetanā-kāya‑s,sixtṛṣṇā-kāya‑s.

Group(a)pertainstotheclassificationofthecaitasika‑s.ThecorrespondencebetweenthisenumerationandthatintheSaptavastukaofthePrŚhasbeennotedbymany.(Seeabove§4.1.2.3).However,thebeginningpartoftheSaptavastuka—18dhātu‑s,12āyatana‑s,fiveskandha‑s,fiveupādāna-skandha‑s,sixdhātu‑s—isabsentintheDKŚlist.Soarethetenkuśala-mahābhūmika‑s.Asthiscategoryis also absent in theolder translationofPrŚ,YinShun suggests that itwasinsertedfromtheMVŚ.81 TheenumerationintheSaptavastukaofthe18dhātu‑sisobviouslygatheredfromtheancientsūtra‑s.ItsabsenceintheDKŚthereforecouldwellsignalthatthistextischronologicallylaterthanthePrŚ,probablyrepresentingamoreconsciousefforttomoveawayfromthesūtrataxonomy.ThefactthattheDKŚisnotquotedevenonceintheMVŚwhichenumeratestheverysamethreeclassesofmahābhūmika‑s82mightalsosuggestthatitwascomposedaftertheMVŚ.However,itmustalsobenotedthattheclassificationofcaitasika‑sintheMVŚisapparentlymoredeveloped,enumeratingadditionallythe ten kuśala-mahā-bhūmika‑s, thefiveakuśala-mahā-bhūmika‑s, the threenivṛtāvyākṛta-mahā-bhūmika‑s,thetenanivṛtāvyākṛta-mahā-bhūmika‑s.Onthisbasis,YinShunbelievesthatitwascomposedbeforetheMVŚ.83

(ii)ThesecondpartoftheDKŚiscalledAnalysis (*Vibhaṅga).Itanalysesthementalelementsgiveninthefirstpartemployingthetaxonomicaldevicesof(a)conjunction(saṃprayoga)and(b)subsumption(saṃgraha):

(a) Theanalysisofconjunctionisappliedinrelationtothevedanendriya,vijñāna-kāya,āhrikyaandanapatrāpya:howmanyelementsinthelistareconjoinedornotconjoinedwiththesefour?

(b) Theanalysisofsubsumptionisappliedinrelationtothedhātu‑s,āyatana‑sandskandha‑s.Theelements in the list—startingwithvedanāandsaṃjñā—areconsideredinturninthefollowingmanner:underhowmanydhātu‑s,etc.,aretheelementsconjoinedwithonegivenmemberofthelistandnotconjoinedwithanothersubsumed?Thus,thefirstconsiderationisappliedtothoseelementswhichare“conjoinedwithvedanāandnotconjoinedwithsaṃjñā”:

(1) “Thoseconjoinedwithvedanā”—thecitta-caitta-dharma‑s—aresubsumedunder howmanyof the 18dhātu‑s, 12āyatana‑s andfive skandha‑s?Answer:Eightdhātu‑s, twoāyatana‑s and threeskandha‑s.

(2) “Those not conjoinedwith saṃjñā”— saṃjñā itself, rūpa‑s,asaṃskṛta‑sandcitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra‑s—aresubsumedunderhowmanydhātu‑s,āyatana‑sandskandha‑s?Answer:11dhātu‑s,11 āyatana‑sandthreeskandha‑s.


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Next,thesameconsiderationappliedtothosewhichareconjoinedwithsaṃjñā andnotconjoinedwithvedanā.Suchananalysis—calleda“one‑row”(一行)analysis84—operatesasfollows:Given,sayfourmembersA,B,C,D,theanalysisisfirstmadebetweenAandB,thenAandC,thenAandD;nextbetweenBandC,BandD;nextbetweenCandD.

Thesummaryverse(uddāna)at thebeginningofthissecondpartstatesthatthereareinall88ways(門)ofexamining—threewithrespecttoconjunction,85withrespecttosubsumption;85butonly16waysareactuallyshown.

Various scholars have alsonoted theunmistakable relationshipbetween theDKŚandthePāliDhātu-kathā.ThesimilaritiesareparticularlyconspicuousinthesecondpartoftheDKŚ.Frauwallnerobservesthatinmanypoints,thePrŚcorrespondstothePāliDhātu-kathāratherthantotheDKŚ.HesummarizestherelationshipbetweentheDhātu-kathā,theDKŚandtheSaptavastuka of the PrŚasfollows:

Comparedtothe Dhātukāya,thePrakaraṇafurtherdevelopedthedoctrinecontainedinitsfirstpart…Thesecondpartwasleftlargelyunchanged.Bycontrast, the secondpartwas reworked in theDhātukāya, namely,aftertheworkhadbeenincorporatedintothePrakaraṇa.86

However,healsopointsoutanimportantdifference:themātṛkā of the Dhātu-kathā andthatoftheDKŚarecompletelydifferent.Theformerisbasedonthemātṛkā of the Vibhaṅga,whilethelatterisnotamātṛkāoftheearlytype.Thismeansthatthesimilarityobservedinthetwoworkscouldalsosimplybetheresultofemployingthesamemethodofwriting.However,Frauwallnerthinksitmorelikelythatbotharederivedfromacommonancestor.87

4.2. Development of the Sarvāstivāda manuals

4.2.1. Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā (MVŚ)

SubsequenttothedefinitiveestablishmentoftheSarvāstivādaabhidharmadoctrinesbytheJPŚ,therefollowedactiveandcreativestudy,discussion,elaborationandsystematizationofthesedoctrines,theresultofwhichwasthecompilationbytheKāśmīrianSarvāstivādinsoftheMVŚmentionofwhichhasbeenmadeaboveatvariousplaces.XuanZangtellsusthattheMVŚwascompiledattheso‑called‘ThirdCouncil’sponsoredbyKingKaniṣkaofGāndhāra.88HeassertsthesamethingintheepiloguetohistranslationoftheMVŚ.89ButmodernresearchershavenotedthatKaniṣkaisreferredtointheMVŚasapastkingofGāndhāra.90 Their viewisthattheMVŚwascompiledbythefollowersoftheKātyāyanīputratradition.ThisviewissupportedbyastatementintheMPPU.91


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TheMVŚisnowextantinthreeChinesetranslationsonly.Theearliesttranslation(T28,no.1547),nowsurvivingin14fascicles(卷),wasfirstmadein383C.E.bySaṃghabhūti.Saṃghadevarevisedit,producingtheextantversioninaround389C.E.92Thesecondtranslation,originallycomprising100fasciclesbutnowsurvivingin60fascicles,wasmadebyBuddhavarmanfrom425C.E.to427C.E.Thethirdandmostcompleteone,comprising200fascicles,wasmadebyXuanZangfrom656C.E.to659C.E.ThefactthatthecontentsinthecorrespondingsectionsofthesethreeversionsoftendisagreetovaryingdegreessuggeststhattheirSanskritoriginalswereprobablydifferent,andthattheremusthavebeenaprocessofrevisionandemendationsubsequenttotheinitialcompilation,possiblyspanningoveracentury.TheorthodoxKāśmīrianSarvāstivādinswhoupheldthesupremeauthorityoftheMVŚcametobeknownasthe‘Vaibhāṣikas’,anadjectivederivedfromVibhāṣā(seesupra,§3.6).

PurportingtobetheGreatCommentaryontheJPŚ,itstructurallyfollowsthesamesequenceoftheeightmajorchaptersofthelatter(see§4.1.2.2),withanadditionalintroductory chapter. In this giganticwork—encyclopedic in scope—arefoundnotonlytheJPŚviewpointsupheldbyitscompilersasorthodox,butalsotheheterodoxviewsoftheotherSarvāstivādaācārya-s,aswellasthoseheldbyother earlyBuddhist schools and independentmasters.Accordingly, it isaworkofgreatimportance,indispensablefortheunderstandingofnotonlytheorthodoxSarvāstivādadoctrines,butalsoofthehistoricaldevelopmentofallthecontemporaryschools,containingasitdoesawealthofmateriallargelyunavailableelsewhere.Thedoctrinalpositionsandinterpretationsbytheso‑called“fourgreatācārya‑s of theSarvāstivāda”—Vasumitra,Dharmatrāta,Buddhadeva andGhoṣaka—arefrequentlygivensidebyside.Amongthem,thoseofVasumitraaregenerallyupheld asbeing thebest andmost acceptable.93OthermastersmentionedintheMVŚinclude:Pārśva(who,accordingtoXuanZang,initiallyproposedtheprojectofcompilation94),Pūrṇayaśas,Aśvaghoṣa,Śamadatta(寂授),Saṃghavasu,Dharmanandi,Vamalabdha,etc.95

Besidesnewdoctrinalcategoriesanddevelopedarguments,wecanalsoseeintheMVŚtheemploymentofarticulatelogicaltoolsandformat.96EvenabriefsurveyindicatesadefinitelogicalmethodologyemergingonthepartoftheĀbhidharmikasduringthe1stand2ndcenturyC.E.TheconsciouslogicalanalysisofadebatemadebythecompilersmaybesaidtorepresentmoreevolvedandformalizedtechniquesandproceduresofdebatethanwhatisdiscernibleintheearlierabhidharmatextssuchastheVKŚ.Thespecificmentionoflogicaltreatises,somedefinitemethodsof refutation, and the three acceptablepramāṇa‑s (pratyakṣa,anumāna andāptāgama)contrastingwiththepre‑Dignāgalogicaltextswhichacknowledgedvariousandgenerallyagreaternumberofpramāṇa‑s,aretobenoted.Inaddition,thereistherecognition,albeitratherindirect,oftheimportantlogicalfunctionof dṛṣṭānta.Thereisalsoevidenceofaclearunderstandinginthisperiodofthenatureofpratyakṣaandanumāna,despitetheabsenceofanyexplicitdefinition.


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Suchdefinitions,however,neednotbeexpectedinanabhidharmacommentarywhichisnotprimarilyalogicaltreatise.Thelackofindicationoftheknowledgeofsuchimportantconceptsasthetrairūpyadoctrineforavalidreason(hetu),however,suggestspossiblyanearlierstageofdevelopmentinBuddhistlogicthanthatrepresentedinsuchearlytextsastheFang Bian Xing Lun.97

Atseveralplaces,thecompilersanalyzeindetailthedebatesgivenintheJPŚbetweentheVibhajyavādins(Vv)andtheYukta‑vādins(Yv=Sarvāstivādins),endingwiththedeclarationofthelatter’svictory.Wewillillustrateonesuchanalysisbelowontheproposition(p)bytheYvthatcravingfornon‑existence(vibhava-tṛṣṇā = vt)—definedasthecravingfortheimpermanenceofthetriplesphere (traidhātukī anityatā),98 i.e., saṃsāric existence— is abandonable byrepeatedcultivation(bhāvanā-heya = bhā-h)aloneandnotbyinsightintothefournobletruths(darśana-heya):99


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JPŚ Comments by MVŚ

A1.

[Vv:]Doyouassertthatvtisbhā-h,andthatthestream‑entrantshavenotabandonedit(p)?

A1.

QuestionbyVv to confirm theYv’sproposition(p).

[Yv:]Yes. Yvaffirmsindicatingconformityofp to the sūtra.

A2.

[Vv:]Whatdoyouconcede:Doesa stream‑entrantgeneratethethought,“Isn’titblissifI’mannihilated,non-existent,afterdeath?”(q)

[Yv:]No.

A2.

Vvinsertsthisimplication(q)intendedtoshowthatpcontradictsthecorrectdoctrines.

Yvcounteractsthequestion,indicatingnocontradictioninp.

[Vv:]Whydoesn’t a stream‑entrant generate thiscraving?

[Yv:]Becauseheseesthe[true]natureofdharma‑s—he sees the cause‑effect serial continuity of thedharma‑s,hencedoesnotcrave forannihilation…(otherexplanationsgiven).

A3.

[Vv:]Accept our thesis: Ifvt isbhā-h alone andastream‑entranthasnotabandonedthiscraving(i.e.,p),youought to say that he generates such a thought(p ⊃ q). [Conversely,] if he does not generate suchathought,yououghtnottoassertthatvtisbhā-h aloneandastream‑entranthasnotabandonedthiscraving(~q ⊃~p).Suchanassertionisnotlogical(不應理;na yuktam)ineithercase.

A3.

Vvposes2converselyrelatedobjections— thefirst accordswithp but iscontradictorytodoctrine(順宗違義);the second accordswith doctrinebut is contradictory top (順義違宗).Hence conclude: “…not logical ineithercase”.

[Yv:]Our school does not assert that all not yetabandoned[defilements]necessarilyarise;forsomethat are not yet abandoneddonot arise, and somewhichhavebeenabandonedmayarise.Ifitisthecasethatallthosethatarenotyetabandonednecessarilyarise, then therewould be no liberation and exit.Thisisbecausedharma‑sthatarenotyetabandonedareinfinite;ifthey[necessarily]arise,whencantheirarisingbeexhausted?

Yvexplainshisposition(showingthatpisnotcontradicted).


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B1. [Yv:]Doyoualsoassertthatthecravingfortheretribution (vipāka) ofnaraka, tiryañc andpreta isbhā-halone,[and]thatthestream‑entrantshavenotabandonedthiscraving(r)?

Next,Yv counteracts the objectionsusingthesecondmethodofrefutationin the sūtra‑s[mentionedabove].

B1.QuestionbyYvtoconfirmtheVv’sproposition(r).

[Vv:]Yes. AnswerbyVvtoshowthenecessityofthetruthconcerningwhatisasked.

B2.

[Yv:]Whatdoyouconcede:Doesa stream‑entrantgeneratethethought,“IshallbecomethedragonkingortheYamakingandgovernthesentientbeingsinthenarakarealm”(s)?

B2.

Yv inserts this implication intendedto show that r contradicts the correctdoctrines.

[Vv:]No.

[Yv:]Whydoesn’t a stream‑entrant generate thiscraving?

[Vv:]Becausethatgatipertainstothepṛthagjana. An ārya [—asisastream‑entrant]—has[proper]jñāna[anddoesnotaspireforit]…(otherexplanationsgiven).

[Yv:] Is it the case that anārya does not generatecravingforanyofthedurgatiwhatsoever?

[Vv:]Althoughtheārya‑shavenocravingforbeingbornthere,theydohavecravingforobjectsofenjoyment(bhoga)[therein]….[Also,]theygenerateathoughtofcraving(=attachment)onhearingthattheirparent,etc.,fallintosuchdurgati‑s.

Vvcounteractsthequestion,indicatingnocontradictioninr.

B3.

[Yv:]Acceptourthesis:Ifr,thenyououghttosaythathegeneratessuchathought(i.e.,r ⊃ s).[Conversely,]ifhedoesnotgeneratesuchathought,youshouldnotassertr(i.e.,~s ⊃ ~r ).Suchanassertionisnotlogicalineithercase.

B3.

Yvposes two conversely relatedobjections—thefirstaccordswithr but is contradictory to doctrine; thesecond accordswith doctrine but iscontradictorytor.Henceconclude:“…notlogicalineithercase”.

But the JPŚ andMVŚ,magnificent as they are, lack sufficient unity andsystematization as awhole.Besides, theMVŚcontains frequent digressionsfromthemainpointunderdiscussionandthusaddsto thecomplicationandconfusionforbeginners.InfacttheMVŚitself,attheoutset,states:“Oneshouldseek,intheabhidharma,thetruecharacteristicsofdharma‑sandnottheorder[ofpresentation]ortheintroductions(nidāna).Thereisnofaultif[adoctrineispresented]earlierorlater,orwithoutanidāna.”Thisnatureoftheabhidharma


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worksiscontrastedwiththatofthesūtraandthevinayawhicharesaidtobeconcernedwithorderofpresentationandnidānarespectively.100Thus,withinsuchanabhidharmatradition,andfurtherrestrictedbytheabsoluteauthorityoftheformandcontentoftheJPŚ,therewaslittlepossibilityforanymajoradvanceingenuinedoctrinaldevelopmentandespeciallyinthesystematizationoftheSarvāstivādadoctrines.

4.2.2. Development of the more concise manuals

Nevertheless,suchastateofaffairseventuallybroughtaboutasignificantreactionfromsomeofthemoreprogressivedoctorsoftheSarvāstivāda,andthisledtoanewlineofdevelopment.ThesedoctorsdeviatedtovaryingdegreesfromtheKāśmīrianorthodoxy—knownaftertheMVŚastheVaibhāṣika—andbegantocomposemanualsaimedatbeingconcise,lucidandsystematic.

TheearliestofsuchmanualsthatwepossessinChineseistheAmRŚbyacertainGhoṣaka,which effectively serves as an introduction to the JPŚ andMVŚ.ItsChinese translation comprises 16short chapters in two fascicles.There isclearevidencethatwhileAmRŚderivesitsmaterialfromtheJPŚ,MVŚ,PrŚandothersources,itisbasicallyinclinedtowardPrŚandtheGāndhāraschool.101 AsBhadantaGhoṣaka, oneof the “four greatSarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikas”,waspre‑MVŚ,theauthoroftheAmRŚmustbeadifferentGhoṣakawhosedateisprobablynotfarfromthecompletionoftheMVŚ.102Thetitleitself“Amṛta(-rasa)”suggestsalsoapracticalpurport:Attheendofthechapterondhyāna,thereisadescriptionofthemeditationalpractices,withaśucyanusmṛtiandānāpānasmṛti asthefoundation,whicharesaidtoleadto“theendofsuffering”.103Itstatesthat“therearetwopathswhichleadtonirvāṇa—(i)thecontemplationoftheimpurityofthebody;(ii)themindfulnessofbreathing…”104Thus,wemaysaythatthereis,intheAmRŚ,anemphasisontheneedtoreturnfrompurelyscholasticdiscussiontotheaimofrealizingnirvāṇa (amṛta).

AftertheAmRŚ,thisemphasisonpracticeandrealizationseemedtohavebeenlost.But thenewdevelopmentofa liberalattitude inregard to theselectionofmaterialwiththeemphasisonorganizationandconcisenesswascontinuedinaseriesofmanuals,inwhichagivenmanualpartlyinheritedtheformandcontentoftheprecedingoneandreadjusteditwithnewadditionofmaterials.ThefollowingisalistofthesemanualsextantinChinesetranslation:

1. *Abhidharmāmṛta(-rasa)‑śāstra(Tno.1553),byGhoṣaka,2fasc.,translatorunknown.

2. *Abhidharmahṛdaya (Tno.1550) by Dharmaśrī, 4fasc., tr. bySaṅghadeva et. al.

3. *Abhidharmahṛdaya-sūtra (?Tno.1551) byUpaśānta, 2fasc., tr.byNarendrayaśas.


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4. *Abhidharmahṛdayavyākhyā(?Tno.1552),byDharmatrāta,11fasc.,tr.bySanghabhūti.

5. Abhidharmakośa-mūla-kārikā(Tno.1560)byVasubandhu,1fasc.,tr.byXuanZang.

6. Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam(Tno.1558)byVasubandhu,1fasc.,tr.byXuanZang;(thereisalsoanearliertranslationbyParamārtha:Tno.1559).

7. *Abhidharmakośaśāstra-tattvārthā-ṭīkā (Tno.1561)bySthiramati,2fasc.,translatorunknown.

8. *Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra(Tno.1562)bySaṃghabhadra,40fasc.,tr.byXuanZang.

9. *Abhidharma-samayapradīpikā(Tno.1563)bySaṃghabhadra,40fasc.,tr.byXuanZang.

10. *Abhidharmāvatāra (Tno.1554)bySkandhila,2fasc.,tr.byXuanZang.

ThenextmanualtoappearaftertheAmRŚwasthe *AbhidharmahṛdayabyDharmaśrī(orDharmaśreṣṭhī法勝),around200C.E.Itwasbasicallyare‑organizationoftheAmRŚ,withrevisionandaddition.Itschiefcontributionliesinthecompositionofsummaryverses(probablyaddedaftertheoriginalprosetext)whichexpoundthe abhidharmadoctrinessuccinctlyandserveasagreataidtomemorization.Doctrinally,itnotonlysympathizeswiththeGāndhārianviewsandotherheterodoxSarvāstivādinviews,butevenadoptssomeofthoseheldbytheVibhajyavādins.105 Inthisrespect,itmayberegardedasthepredecessoroftheAKB.

As a result of its summaryverses, the *Abhidharmahṛdaya becameverypopular as a beginners’manual and triggeredoff severalworksof asimilarnaturepurportingtobecommentariesonit.Themostimportantoftheseisthe*Abhidharmahṛdayavyākhyā (雜阿毗曇心論) byDharmatrāta,which revisedand supplemented the *Abhidharmahṛdaya,with the intention of bringingthelatterbackinlinewiththeorthodoxVaibhāṣika(Kāśmīrian)viewpoints,whilebeingalsotoleranttowardcertainheterodoxviews.106ThisworkshowsconsiderabledevelopmentintheSarvāstivādadoctrinesandhasattainedgreaterprecisionindefinition.ManyscholarsbelievethatitistheimmediatesourceofthemonumentalAKB.107

TheAKBrepresentstheculminationofthisnewdevelopment.KnowninIndiaalsoas“TheTreatiseofIntelligence”(聰明論),108itexcelsalltheothersinrespecttoorganization,scope,andpresentationofarguments,andisatreasure‑houseofalltheessentialdoctrinesthattheearlyschoolshadhithertodeveloped.BesidesthetwoChinesetranslationslistedabove,theAKBisalsoextantinaTibetantranslationbyJinamitraanddPalbrtsegs,entitledChos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi bshad pa(Pekinged.,no.5591).MostscholarsopinethatVasubandhubaseshisworkonthe*Abhidharma-hṛdaya-vyākhyā (or *Abhidharma-hṛdaya-bhāṣya?;


110

Tno.1552).109Butitisundoubtedlyagreatimprovementintermsofcontentoverthelatter,andVasubandhuwouldhavederiveditsadditionalmaterialfromothermajorabhidharmatreatises,particularlytheMVŚ.TheAKBconsistsofthefollowingninechapters:

1. Dhātu-nirdeśa,2. Indriya-nirdeśa,3. Loka-nirdeśa,4. Karma-nirdeśa,5. Anuśaya-nirdeśa,6. Mārga-pudgala-nirdeśa,7. Jñāna-nirdeśa,8. Samādhi-nirdeśa 9. Pudgala-pratiṣedha-nirdeśa.

However,whereasthefirsteightchapterscontainstanzas(kārikā)onwhichthebhāṣyacomments,the9thchapterispurelyinprose.Moreover,attheendofthe8thchapter,theauthorstates:“ThisabhidharmaestablishedinaccordancewiththeprinciplesofKāśmīrianVaibhāṣikashasforthemostpartbeenexpoundedbyme…”110Accordingly itwould appear that the9thchapterwasoriginallyanindependentworkwhich subsequently came to be appended to theAKB.Inthiswork,VasubandhuprovidesfullopportunityfortheSautrāntikasandotherschoolstoargueagainst theVaibhāṣikas.Hisownstandpoint is,forthemostpart,thatoftheSautrāntika,andheoftengiveslittlechancefortheVaibhāṣikastoanswertheiropponents.Butheattimesdoesnothesitatetoexpresshisownviewswhichhappen to contradict thoseof theSautrāntika.Onewell‑knownexampleofhisdeviationfromthe latter’sposition ishisviewthatāyatana‑stoo,besidesthedhātu-s,arereal—contradictingtheSautrāntikastandthatthedhātu‑salonearereal,nottheskandha‑sortheāyatana‑s.111AnotherexampleiswithregardtotheinterpretationontheBuddha’steachingoftheprincipleofconditionality:“thisbeingthatcomestobe,fromthearisingofthis,thatarises”.SaṃghabhadraremarksthatthemastersoftheSautrāntika‑DārṣṭāntikaschoolgivevariousinterpretationswhicharerefutedbyVasubandhu.112AccordingtoSaṃghabhadra,113 themasterswhose teachingsVasubandhu accepts are theancientmasters(pūrvācārya).Indeed,intheAKB,VasubandhuoftengivesthemthefinalsayinanAbhidharmacontroversy—e.g.,thatonthequestionofthere‑emergenceofthoughtandthought‑concomitantsafterthecessationmeditation(nirodha-samāpatti).

Inreactiontothis,Saṃghabhadraspent12yearsincomposingthe*Nyāyānusāra to disputewiththeKośakāra,levelinghiscriticismschieflyagainstthecontemporarySautrāntika leaderSthaviraŚrīlāta andhis pupilRāma.Saṃghabhadra alsocomposedtheSPrŚ(roughlyhalfthesizeofNyinChinesetranslation)whichconsistsmainlyoftheexpositorypart,sans disputation,oftheNy.Inthiswork,


111

heoccasionallyreplacesormodifiesastanzagivenintheAKBincasehethinksitgoesagainsttheVaibhāṣikatenets.Anexampleofthisisthedefinitionofavijñapti given in the 4thchapter(see infra,§13.4.2).SaṃghabhadraisveryarticulateinhisexpositionofthecontroversialdoctrinesandnotionsoftheVaibhāṣikas,somuchsothatmanyscholarsregardhisinterpretationsas‘neo-Sarvāstivāda’.However,whiletherearecertainlydevelopedinterpretationsandarticulationsinNyandtheSPrŚ, theterm“neo-Sarvāstivāda”, ifappliedinageneralizedmanner,wouldseemratherunjustified.114

ThereisapartiallypreservedSanskritwork,theAbhidharma-dīpa-prabhā-vṛtti (=ADV),115whichisalsoanapologiafortheVaibhāṣikaorthodoxyagainsttheKośakāra.ItsauthorholdsmanyviewsidenticalwiththoseofSaṃghabhadraandisconjecturedbyJainiPStobehispupilVimalamitra.116ProfessorJ.W.deJong,however,haspointedoutthathecouldbetheśāstramasterIśvara.117

Thuswewitnessduring thisperiod themost acutecontroversybetween theSarvāstivādinontheonehandandtheSautrāntikaandothersontheother.Butwithalltheseinvolvedandsubtlecontroversiescomprisingthegreaterpartoftheseworks,theirpragmaticvalueasbeginners’manualsdecreasesdrastically.AsSkandhilaputs it, “thetermsandmeanings in theabhidharma, [are asbewilderingas]a dense forest (gahana)”, andbeginners are apt to feel bewildered and lost.Moreover,suchcontroversiesdidmuchdamagetotheĀbhidharmikatraditionasawhole,especiallyatatimewhenthistraditionwasbeinggreatlythreatenedbythechallengeofboththeSautrāntikasandtheMahāyānists.Itwaswithsuchconsiderationsinmind,andperhapsalsowiththehopeofbringingtogethertheeasternandwesterncampstofacethischallenge,thatSkandhilacomposedhis*Abhidharmāvatāra,aimingatbeginners.Inaschemeofeightpadārtha‑s—fiveskandha‑sandthreeasaṃskṛta‑s—hesuccinctlysummarizespracticallyallthefundamentaldoctrinesoftheSarvāstivāda.Itisnoteworthythatmostofhisdefinitionsonthecitta-caitta‑sandtheviprayukta-saṃskāra‑sarestrikinglysimilartoand,oftenenough,virtuallyidenticalwiththosegivenintheADV.Throughoutthis short treatise, the author showsnohostility towardotherSarvāstivādinviewsdifferingfromhisown,althoughhedoesmakeonecriticalallusiontothe Sautrāntika.118Indeedinmuchofthetreatise,particularlythesectionsonthe viprayukta-saṃskāra‑sandtheasaṃskṛta‑s,wesenseadefiniteconcernoftheauthor todefendtheSarvāstivādaagainst theSautrāntika.Mostprobably,theauthorwasaKāśmīrianVaibhāṣikawhoneverthelesssharescertainviewswiththewestern/foreignmasters.119


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NOTES

1 Vy,9.2 T41,8c.3 T25,70a.4 T41,8b–c.5 Bu‑ston,History of Buddhism.Tr.byObermiller,E(Heidelberg,1931–1932),I;49.6 MPPU,70b.7 MPPU,752b.IfthesepiecesofinformationinMPPUaretobeconsideredasinterpolationsbythetranslator,Kumārajīva,assomescholarsopine(e.g.,Lamotte,E;cf. Lamotte(1970),203f.),thenwemustcountthecolophon—dated379C.E.andappendedtothe24thfascicleoftheoldertranslationoftheJPŚ—astheearliestmentionofthesetofseventexts,withthe*Aṣṭa-skandhaka(=JPŚ)asthebodyandtheothersasthesixfeet.(Tno.1543,887a).

8 Frauwallner,14.9 Study,115.Seebelow.10 See Study,179f.11Vy,19;Bu‑ston,I,49.12DSŚ,479b–482a.13DSŚ,459c14 Cf. Study,125ff.15DSŚ,504c,501a,etc.16See131f.;MVŚ,337c.17 See Study,131f.18Vy,11;Bu‑ston,loc. cit.19 Study,134f.20 SgPŚ, 369c, 370a, 378b, 378c, 384a, 388a, 400b, 430b, 441a — in all,some14occurrences.

21SgPŚ,377b–378a.22SgPŚ,379a,380c,383c,426a,426b,430b,443c.23SgPŚ,387c.24T29,330b.25T41,8b–c.26T25,70a,Vy,11.27T26,514a.28Pekingno.5587–5589.29T50,113c.30Ny,330b.31 Study,138f.32 T28,no.1546,45c,47b.33 T28,137b,137c.


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34 Cf.Dhammajoti,KL, “TheMahāpadāna-suttanta and theBuddha’s spiritual lineage”.In:Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies,vol.I(Colombo,1987),190ff.

35 MPPU,70a, inanote speakshereof theLou-tan-jing,樓炭經.TheSanskrit couldbe*lokotthāna-sūtra or *loka-sthāna-sūtra—cf. the title given inMPPUas分別世處,where處couldpossiblytranslatesthāna.

36 Study,140f.37 Cf.MVŚ,336c–337a,612c.SeeStudy,143.38MVŚ,119a.39 Study,144.40 SeeAohara,N,‘業施設論の構造’(‘ThestructureoftheKarmaprajñapti’).In:Indogaku

Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū,vol.LVII,no.2.March2009,938ff.41Vy,11.42VKŚ,535a.43 諦義勝義,補特伽羅可得可證現有等有;故定有補特伽羅.44VKŚ,542bff.;S,ii,19,23;Kathāvatthu,I,1,212;VII,6,1.45VKŚ,543bf.46Willemen,Cet. al.,Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism,221.47T25,70a.48T51,889c;T41,8c;T,2b.49Tno1852,2b.50Tno2049,189a.51 Cf. Study,115f.52MVŚ,4c.53 MVŚ,5b–7b.Arationalizationoftheorderisattemptedbysomemasterswhoassertthat,inthereverseorder,itfirstdiscussesthepureandthenthedefileddharma‑sofanordinaryworldling(pṛthagjana).Thusitbeginswiththe‘supremeworldlydharm-s’, thecriticalstageatwhichonewilltransitfrombeinganordinaryworldlingtobeinganārya.Thisisarrivedatbyabandoningthedefilements—hencethesecondchapteronthefetters;etc.(MVŚ,7a–b).

54MVŚ,1c.55MVŚ,5b,236b,etc.56 MVŚ,236c–237b.57 JPŚ,318a–c;T26,771b–772b.58E.g.,JPŚ,920c,929a(心心所法色無為心不相應行),998c,etc.59 JPŚ,977b.60 JPŚ,919b.61 JPŚ,920c.62 JPŚ,1008a,926a–b,921c,929a,921c.63E.g.,JPŚ,946c–947a,969a–b;etc.64 JPŚ,947a.65 JPŚ,923b.66 JPŚ,920c.


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67 JPŚ,920c;Study,188.68T20,70a.69 Frauwallner,36.70 Study,150.71 Study,151f.However,itmayalsobenotedthatthistext,havingdefinedalltheelementsintheattribute‑mātṛkā,immediatelyproceedstoaskthefirstquestionconcerningtheirsubsumption (saṃgraha)with respect todhātu,āyatana and skandha, in sevenways.Thus,concerningcakṣur-dhātu:(1)Underhowmanydhātu‑s,āyatana‑sandskandha‑sisitsubsumed?(2)Thedharma‑ssubsumedunderthecakṣur-dhātu—underhowmanydhātu‑s,āyatana‑s

andskandha‑saretheysubsumed?(3)Thedharma‑s not subsumedunder thecakṣur-dhātu—under howmanydhātu‑s,

āyatana‑sandskandha‑saretheysubsumed?(4)Thedharma‑ssubsumed,andthosenotsubsumed,underthecakṣur-dhātu—under

howmanydhātu‑s,āyatana‑sandskandha‑saretheysubsumed?(5)Thedharma‑sotherthanthosesubsumedunderthecakṣur-dhātu—underhowmany

dhātu‑s,āyatana‑sandskandha‑saretheysubsumed?(6)Thedharma‑sotherthanthosenotsubsumedunderthecakṣur-dhātu—underhow

manydhātu‑s,āyatana‑sandskandha‑saretheysubsumed?(7)Thedharma‑sotherthanthosesubsumed,andthosenotsubsumedunderthecakṣur-

dhātu—underhowmanydhātu‑s,āyatana‑sandskandha‑saretheysubsumed?(T26,701cff.)

Couldthisseven‑wayinvestigationwhichcomesatthebeginningofthechapter,bethereasonfornamingthechapterasSaptavastu?

72 Cf. Study,164;seealsoinfra,§9.3.3.73 E.g.,Frauwallner,25f.,33f.FukuharaRoptsfortheviewthatthePrSwasanexpansionandelaborationof theDKŚ [FukuharaR,Ubu Abidatsumaronsho no Hattatsu (Kyoto,1965),129].

74 See Entrance,introduction,3ff.75 See Study,149f.76PrŚ,711b–713c.77 Frauwallner,34.78PrŚ,692c,694a–b(brieflydefined).79Willemen,C,et. al.,op. cit.,214;MVŚ,97b.80MVŚ,96c–97a.81 Study,164.Seealsoinfra,§9.3.3.82 MVŚ,220a.83 Study,165.84 Thisisthesimplestofthefouranalyticalprocedures—一行，歷六，小七，大七 —innovatedintheJPŚ(e.g.,933cff.).Seesupra,§2.4.4.foranillustration.

85DKŚ,616b.86 Frauwallner,26.87 Frauwallner,27f.


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88Tno.2087,886b–887a.89T27,1004a.90MVŚ,593a.91 T25,70a.Foradiscussiononthetraditionalviewsconcerningitsauthorandthedateofcompilation,seeStudy,221ff.Alsocf.FukuharaR,op. cit.,220ff.

92 See Study,205f.93E.g.,seethefourexplanationsofferedbythemonsarvāstitvadiscussedinfra,§5.2.94T51,886c.95 See Study,chapterseven,305ff.,foranexcellentdiscussiononthevariousmastersfiguringintheMVŚ.

96 For the logicalnotions anddisputation in the text,cf.Dhammajoti,KL, ‘Logic in theAbhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā’.In:JCBSSL,vol.II,180ff.Seealsothelogicalargumentsfor sarvāstitvadiscussedinsupra,§3.3.1.

97 Cf.Dhammajoti,op. cit.98 MVŚ,140a;AKB,286.Cf.D,III,216;Visuddhimagga,568,594.99 MVŚ,138c–139c; thewholedebate is furthercontinued ina similarmanneruntil theYuktavādinsarefinallyconsideredashavingfullydefeatedtheVibhajyavādins(140a).Seeothersimilaranalysesin113cf.,169a–171b,222a–222c,612c–613a.

100MVŚ,1c.101 See Study,479–486.102 Study,486.103AmRŚ,975b.104 AmRŚ,loc. cit. Cf.alsotheMVŚ,662c,whichspeaksofthesetwomeditationsas“thetrue

amṛta-dvārafortheentryintothebuddha-dharma”.105 Cf. Study,493ff.106 Cf. Study,520ff.107E.g.,KimuraT,A Study of the Abhidharma Śāstras,(1922),259–324;IAKB,xxx;etc.108AccordingtoPuGuang(T41,1a).109SeeIAKB,xxx.110AKB,459.111AKB,14.112Ny,482c:上座徒黨,有釋 ... 有釋 ... 經主已破。 ... 上座復言 ... 經主難言 ...113Ny,483a:又經主述自軌範師釋 ... 故知經主所稟諸師 ...114 See Entrance,10f.;alsoinfra,§5.115 Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti,criticallyeditedwithnotesandintroductionbyJaini,PS(Patna,1977),2ndedition.

116 Ibid.,132f.Butelsewhere(EnB,vol.1fas.1,57),Jainisays,“WethereforecanascribethisworkeithertoSaṃghabhadra,ortooneofhisdisciples,particularlyVimalamitra”.

117De Jong, JW, “L’Auteur de l’Abhidharmadīpa”, inBuddhist Studies, ed., Schopen,G(Berkeley,1979),116.

118Tno.1554,984b.119Foradiscussionofhisdateandpersonalaffiliation,seeEntrance,50ff.


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117

5. Sarvāstitva and Temporality

5.1. Thebigdebate5.2. Timeandtemporality5.3. ThefourmaintheoriesoftheSarvāstivāda5.4. CommentsonthefourtheoriesandFrauwallner’sobservations5.5. The Vaibhāṣikatheoryofkāritra5.6. Saṃghabhadra’stheory—aninnovation?5.7. Bhāva,svabhāvaandthedharma

5.1. The big debate

TheSarvāstivādin theoryofsarvāstitva isoften interpreted—bothby theirancientopponentsandmanymodernscholars—asafarcryfrommainstreamBuddhism.Forsome,itcomesveryclosetotheSāṃkhyadoctrineofpariṇāma. AmongtheextantSarvāstivādaabhidharmatexts,itisintheVijñānakāya-śāstra thatwefirstcomeacrossacontroversyonit.(InthePāli,itisalreadydebatedelaboratelyintheKathāvatthu).Butitisonlyinthemuchlatertexts,liketheAKBandNy,thatwefindanarticulateddefinitionofferedbytheSarvāstivādathemselves.Allsaidanddone,sarvāstitvamustimplythecontinuousexistenceofanessenceinsomesense.Butjustpreciselyinwhatsense,wassomethingthattheĀbhidharmikaBuddhists—Sarvāstivādinsthemselvesincluded—wereunabletospecify.FortheSarvāstivādins,thefailuretodosoisnottobeconsideredafaultontheirpart.Itisonaccountoftheprofoundnatureofdharma‑swhich,inthefinalanalysis,transcendshumanconceptualization.

Oncethismetaphysicalnotion,howeverelusive,ofanunderlyingessenceofphenomenacametobeemphasized,thedebates—astoitstruthorotherwise,andastoitspreciseimplications—continuedendlessly.ItwastoleavealastinginfluenceonthesubsequentdevelopmentofBuddhistthought.Thus,partlyonaccountofthisinfluence,theVātsīputrīyascametoformulatethedoctrineofthepudgala,andtheMahāyāna(mainlyYogācāra)continuedtospeculate,givingrisetotherichphilosophyofvijñaptimātratāandtathāgata-garbha.Fromthesources thatwehaveexamined,however,one thingseemssufficientlyclear:The svabhāvaofadharma,evenfromtheorthodoxVaibhāṣikastandpoint,isnotasimmutableasisconceivedbymanyscholars.

In thesedebates,we see theĀbhidharmikas— including the self‑professedsūtra‑basedSautrāntikas—utilizinglogicasatooltotheutmost.Attheendoftheday,theVaibhāṣikashadtobecontentwithaformofidentity‑in‑difference(bhedābheda)logic.Inthedepthsoftheirhearts,however,itwouldseemthatitistheirreligiousinsightandintuition—eveniftheyhappentodefyAristotelianlogic—thatmustbeupheldatallcost.


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Inthischapter,wewillattempttoseetheextenttowhichtheVaibhāṣikascanarticulateconceptuallythisdoctrineofsarvāstitva.OurmainprimarysourcesaretheMVŚandSaṃghabhadra’s*Nyāyānusāra.Thelatterrepresentsthemostrigorousdefenseofthethesisandtheformeris,amongotherthings,usefulinhelpingustobetterunderstandthedevelopmentofthisdoctrineintheproperhistoricalperspectiveandtoascertainwhether—asclaimedbymanymodernscholars—Saṃghabhadra’sdefensecanjustifiablybecalled‘neo-Sarvāstivāda’.1

5.2. Time and temporality

WhentheSarvāstivādaassertsthatthethreeperiodsoftimeexist(asti),whatitactuallymeansisthat“dharma‑s”inthethreeperiodsoftimeexist.FortheSarvāstivāda,timeisnoneotherthantheactivityofdharma‑s,andtemporalityissuperimposedbyus on these activities.This is in fact the generalBuddhisttraditionsincetheBuddha’stime.TheMVŚ,however,recordsanexceptionalview,saidtobeheldbythe“Dārṣṭāntika‑Vibhajyavādins”, that impermanentdharma‑scourseinpermanenttime:

The“Dārṣṭāntika‑Vibhajyavādins”(譬喻者分別論師)maintainthattime(adhvan)andtheconditioningforces(saṃskāra)aredistinctentities.Timeisa permanent entity; the conditioning forces are impermanent entities.2 Whentheconditioningforcesarecoursingintime,theyarelikethefruitsinavessel,comingoutfromthisvesselandturningintothatvessel.…Likewisetheconditioningforces:theyenterintothepresenttimefromthefuturetime,andenterintothepasttimefromthepresenttime.

Torepudiatethe“Dārṣṭāntika‑Vibhajyavādins”proposition,itisshown[here]thattimeandtheconditioningforcesarenotdifferentinintrinsicnature.3

Itisnotclearwhethertheterm“Dārṣṭāntika‑Vibhajyavādins”(譬喻者分別論師)intheabovepassage,whichwehaverenderedhereasacompound,standsfor‘theDārṣṭāntikaswhoareVibhajyavādins’,or‘DārṣṭāntikasandVibhajyavādins’,i.e.,as akarmadhāraya (descriptive compound) or advandva (co‑ordinativecompound).YinShuntakesitintheformersense,althoughhethinksthattheDārṣṭāntikasreferredtohereprobablyrepresentonlyasectionof thosewhowerebeginningtomergewiththeVibhajyavādins.4However,wemustnotethatintheoldertranslationoftheMahāvibhāṣā(Tno.1546),thetermhereissimplyDārṣṭāntikas(譬喻者).5Moreimportantly,however,inthiscontext,theVibhāṣā compilersbeginbycitingtheJñānaprasthānathat“therearethree[categories]of dharma‑s,viz,past,presentandfuture”;itisonlyafterquotingtheabovepassagethattheysay:

Furthermore,[anotherreasonwhytheJñānaprasthānapresentsthistopicisthat]therearesome[i.e.,asecondgroupofpeople]whoaredeludedwithregardtotheintrinsicnature(svabhāva)of[thedharma‑s]ofthethreetimes,denyingtheexistenceofthepastandfuture[dharma‑s],andwho

5. SarvāStitva and temPorality

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maintain that the present [dharma‑s] are unconditioned.To repudiatetheirproposition, it is shown [here] that thecharacteristic and intrinsicnaturesofthepastandfuture[dharma‑s]existtruly,andthatthepresent[dharma‑s]areconditioned.Why?Ifthepastandfuture[dharma‑s]werenon-existent…(loc. cit.)

Itis,therefore,clearthatconcerningtheDārṣṭāntikaview,thepointtoberefutedis the independent existenceof time.The impermanenceof the svabhāva of conditioneddharma‑sisnoproblematallfortheSarvāstivādins,theDārṣṭāntikasincluded.Theintrinsicnatureofadharma,althoughexistingthroughouttime(sarvadā asti),isnotpermanent;onlytheunconditioneddharma‑s,transcendingthetemporalprocess,arepermanent(nitya).6Itisonlythesecondgroupofpeople(probablytheMahāsāmghika)whoaretoberefutedconcerningtheunrealityof thetri‑temporaldharma‑s.Thesameviewofthissecondgroupisrefutedelsewhereseveralmoretimes,7andineachcasetheVibhāṣācompilersarguefortherealityofthetri‑temporalexistenceofdharma‑s.InthetwooccurrencesofthisviewintheolderversionoftheVibhāṣā,thecompilers’argumentisalsounambiguouslyagainsttheunrealityofthepastandfuturedharma‑s.

5.3. The four main theories of the Sarvāstivāda

ThemajorquestiontheSarvāstivādinsmustansweris:Giventhethesisthatalldharma‑sinthethreeperiodsoftimeequallyexist,howdotheSarvāstivādinsdifferentiate—howcantheyaccountforourexperienceofthedifference—asregards‘pastdharma‑s’,‘presentdharma‑s’and‘futuredharma‑s’?Eachofthe‘FourGreatĀcārya‑s’oftheSarvāstivādaoffersanexplanation.WenowquotetherelevantpassageintheAbhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā:8

TheVenerableDharmatrāta says that there is change inmodeofbeing(bhāva-anyathātva).TheVenerableGhoṣakasaysthatthereischangeincharacteristic(lakṣaṇa-anyathātva).TheVenerableVasumitrasaysthatthereischangeinstate(avasthā-anyathātva).TheVenerableBuddhadevasaysthatthereischangein[temporal]relativity(anyathā-anyathātva).

The advocate of difference inmodeof being says thatwhendharma‑soperate(pra-√vṛt)intime,theychangeonaccountoftheirmodesofbeing(bhāva);thereisnochangeinsubstance.Thisislikethecaseofbreakingupagoldenvesseltoproduceanotherthing—thereisjustachangeinshape,notinvarṇa-rūpa.Itisalsolikemilk,etc.,turningintocurds,etc.—justthetaste,digestibility,etc.,aregivenup,notthevarṇa-rūpa.Similarly,whendharma‑senterintothepresentfromthefuture,althoughtheygiveuptheirfuturemodeofexistenceandacquiretheirpresentmodeofexistence,theyneitherlosenoracquiretheirsubstantialessence(AKB:dravya-bhāva).Likewise,whentheyenterthepastfromthepresent,althoughtheygiveupthepresentmodeofexistenceandacquirethepastmodeofexistence,theyneithergiveupnoracquiretheirsubstantialnature.


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Theadvocateofdifferenceincharacteristicsaysthatwhendharma‑soperatein time, they changeon account of characteristic (lakṣaṇa); there is nochangeinsubstance.Adharmaineachofthetemporalperiodshasthreetemporalcharacteristics;whenone[temporal]characteristicisconjoined,theothertwoarenotsevered.Thisislikethecaseofamanbeingattachedtooneparticularwoman—heisnotsaidtobedetachedfromotherwomen.Similarly,whendharma‑sabideinthepast,theyarebeingconjoinedwiththepastcharacteristicbutarenotsaidtobeseveredfromthecharacteristicsoftheothertwotemporalcharacteristics.Whentheyabideinthefuture,theyarebeingconjoinedwiththefuturecharacteristicbutarenotsaidtobeseveredfromthecharacteristicsoftheothertwotemporalcharacteristics.Whentheyabideinthepresent,theyarebeingconjoinedwiththepresentcharacteristic,butarenotsaidtobeseveredfromthecharacteristicsoftheothertwotemporalcharacteristics.

Theadvocateofdifference in state says thatwhendharma‑soperate intime, they changeon account of state (avasthā); there is no change insubstance.Thisislikethecaseofmovingatoken[intodifferentpositions].Whenplacedintheposition(avasthā)ofones,itissignifiedasone;placedinthepositionoftens, ten;placedinthepositionofhundreds,hundred.Whilethereischangeinthepositionsintowhichitismoved,thereisnochangeinitssubstance.Similarly,whendharma‑spassthroughthethreetemporalstates,althoughtheyacquirethreedifferentnames,theydonotchangeinsubstance.

In the theoryproposedby thismaster, there is no confusion as regardssubstance,forthethreeperiodsaredifferentiatedonthebasisofactivity(kāritra).

Theadvocateofdifferencein[temporal]relativitysaysthatwhendharma‑soperate in time, they are predicated differently [as future, present, orpast], relative to thatwhichprecedes and thatwhich follows (cf.AKB:pūrvāparamapekṣyānyo’nya ucyate avasthāntarato na dravyāntarataḥ);thereisnochangeinsubstance.Thisislikethecaseofoneandthesamewomanwhoiscalled‘daughter’relativetohermother,and‘mother’relativetoherdaughter.Similarly,dharma‑sarecalled‘past’relativetothesucceedingones,‘future’relativetotheprecedingones,‘present’relativetoboth.

5.4. Comments on the four theories and Frauwallner’s observations

Asregardstheabovefourtheories,ProfessorErichFrauwallnerbelievesthattheirorderofpresentationrepresentstheactualchronologicalorderofthedevelopmentof the theoriesofsarvāstivāda,eachsubsequentoneattempting toavoid themistakesintheearlierexplanation.9HeassertsfurtherthatVasumitra’stheoryasgivenaboveinfactisanequation,onthepartoftheSarvāstivādamasters,oftwooriginallydifferenttheories,bytwodifferentVasumitras:


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TheolderVasumitraproposed,asdidtheotherthreegreatācārya‑smentionedabove,thatdharma‑smigratethroughthedifferentstagesoftime,whichwasverysimilartothesubsequenttheoryofeternaltime(kāla)proposedbycertainDārṣṭāntika‑Vibhajyavādins,10 butwithout the latter’s acknowledgement ofthe eternality of time.When the theoryof eternal timewas introduced intothe Sarvāstivādasystemduetoforeigninfluences,itwassoonrejectedbytheVaibhāṣikaswhothensoughttoexplainthedifferencebetweenthetimessolelyintermsofthekāritra of dharma‑sasproposedbyanotherVasumitra.Theolder“Vasumitra’sdoctrine,whichassumesthemigrationofthingsthroughthestagesof time,is,althoughitdoesnothaveaconceptoftime,closelyrelatedtothedoctrineoftheDārṣṭāntikaandVibhajyavādin,whereasthedoctrineofefficacy,whichdoesnotrecognizestagesoftimeanddeniesmigrationthroughthem,isnolessopposedtoitthantothedoctrineoftheDārṣṭāntika.Indeed,therelationshipbetweenthemisalmostthatofthesisandantithesis.”

5.4.1. AsregardsFrauwallner’sassumptionof thechronologicalorderof thedevelopment of these theories,wemay concede its possibility considering,amongotherthings,theconspicuousfactthatVasumitra’stheory,althoughfullyapprovedandadoptedbytheVaibhāṣika,isnotenumeratedasthefirst.However,weshouldobservethattheearliestextantsourceofthefourtheoriesisprobablythe *Vasumitra-saṃghṛhīta-śāstra11 byacertainVasumitraofca. 1stcenturyC.E.ThisworkpredatestheMVŚandisverylikelytohavebeenconsultedbythecompilersofthelatter.12AccordingtoWatanabeBaiyū,13theauthorofthisworkenumeratesfourtheoriesinthefollowingorder:1.avasthā (起);2.lakṣaṇa (相);3. bhāva (事);4.apekṣā (因緣)—corresponding,thoughinadifferentorder—tothefourtheoriesrelatedbytheMVŚ.Thepassageinquestion(punctuationsours)isasfollows:

….此有為法於三世各有自相,; 得知外相, 以何等故? 或起或不起, 此之謂也, 或作是說: 相有若干. 問: 彼相本無住, 是故彼有相生? 答曰: 本有此相未生…. 或作是說: 事有若干; 此亦如本所說. 或作是說: 因緣或生或不生也…. 或作是說: 三世處或生或不生; 此之謂也. 未來處是謂未來, 過去處是謂過去, 現在處是謂現在.

Unfortunately,itsChinesetranslationbySaṃghabhūti(384C.E.)isnotsufficientlyclearforanabsolutelydefiniteidentificationofthetheoriesbrieflydescribedthereinwith thoseof thefourācārya‑s.Nevertheless, it is fairlyevident thatWatanabehasmisinterpreted thepassage.First, clearly, “或起不起” (“mayormaynotarise”)—identifiedbyWatanabeas thefirst,equating“arise”withavasthā—cannotbeoneofthetheories.Theauthorisjustexplainingherehowwecanexperiencethesaṃskṛta-dharma‑s—howweknowthemasphenomenalexistentsinthedifferenttimes—giventhattheyabideintheirintrinsicnatureinthethreetimes.Theansweristhat“theymayormaynotarise”:Whentheyariseinthepresentmoment,theyarecognizedaspresent;inthepastandfuture


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times,theydonotarise.Immediatelyafterthis,heintroducesthefourtheories(underlinedbyus)withthephrase“此之謂也”(“theexplanationforthisis”).Thissamephraseoccursagainintheelaborationofthe4ththeorywhichisnotaccountedforbyWatanabe.

Judgingbythecontextandstyleofrenderingofthetranslator,webelievethat,veryprobably, the four theories enumeratedherein are, in the order of theirenumeration(“punctuated”bythephrase“或作是說”):(1)lakṣana-anyathātva of Ghoṣaka; (2)bhāva-anyathātva of Dharmatrāta; (3)anyathā-anyathātva of Buddhadeva;(4)avasthā-anyathātva of Vasumitra.14Inanycase,thefirsttheorydoes not seem to be that ofDharmatrāta.This observationwould contradictFrauwallner’sassumptionofthechronologicalorder.ThefactthatallextantaccountssubsequenttotheMVŚagreewiththelatter’sorderofenumerationmaysimplymeanthattheAKBwasinfluencedbytheauthorityoftheMVŚasrepresentativeof the Vaibhāṣikaorthodoxy;andtheNy,ADV,theTattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā(TSP),etc.,inturn,areeithercommentariesontheAKBorwereinfluencedbyit.

ThisalsomeansthatDharmatrāta’stheorywasnotthefirst—andleastsatisfactory—attempt,asFrauwallner’sobservation15 implies. It seemsquiteclear tousthatDharmatrāta,asmuchastheotherthreeācārya‑s,isconcernedtoshowtheintegrityofthedharma’ssvabhāva/dravya,despiteFrauwallner’sassertionthatDharmatrāta’sexplanation“wassoonabandonedbecausenoonewantedtoacceptachangeofthistypeintheessenceofthings”.16 ItisprobablethattherehadbeendifferentVaibhāṣikamasters,respondingvariouslytothefourtheories,althoughallindicationsarethatVasumitra’stheoryintermsofkāritraisthefavoredone.IntheMVŚ,onlyVasumitra’stheoryisfullyapprovedof.Dharmatrāta’stheoryisthelastoftheremainingthreetobecriticized,inthefollowingwords:

What is the so‑calledbhāva apart from the svabhāva of the dharma?Thus,[thistheory]tooisunreasonable.Whensaṃskṛta-dharma‑sarriveatthepresenttimefromthefutureadhvan,theiranteriorbhāvashouldcease;whentheyarriveatthepasttimefromthepresentadhvan,theposteriorbhāvashouldarise:Thereisarisingofthepastandceasingofthefuture—howcanthisaccordwithlogic?

This, however, is unfair; forDharmatrāta,bhāva is notmeant to have anyontologicalstatus.Itisourmentalsuperimpositionontheempiricalaspectofthedharmaasitisexposedtoourexperience:itisasarbitraryasthedesignation—in Vasumitra’stheory—ofthedifferentpositionsintowhichthetokenismoved.

Vasubandhucriticizesthistheoryevenmoreseverely,brandingitaSāṃkhyatheoryof pariṇāma.17However,itisevenmoreunfair,asthetheorydoesnotsuggestaunitaryeternalsubstancethatmanifeststhroughtransformation,astheSāṃkhyatheorydoes.18Asamatteroffact,inthetwooldertranslationsoftheVibhāṣā,nocriticismofDharmatrāta’stheoryistobefoundand,intheoldesttranslation,


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onlyBuddhadeva’stheoryiscriticizedingeneraltermsasbeingthemostconfusingdesignationofadhvan.Moreover,inspiteofthecriticalcommentintheMVŚ,madeinthecontextofcontrastingVasumitra’sexplanationswiththeotherthree,thecompilersoftheMVŚdidnotseemtohavetreatedDharmatrāta’sviewasbeingonapar withthepariṇāmatheoryoftheSāṃkhya.19(Seetranslationofthepassagebelow).

Wewillreturntothisimportantpassagelater.Forthetimebeing,itmaybeobservedthathereDharmatrātaisquotedalongsideVasumitra—whoseviewstheorthodoxcompilersreveremost.Thefactthatboththeirviewsarenotcriticizedimpliesthatthecompilersdonotconsiderthetwointerpretationsofpariṇāmaascontradictory.

Saṃghabhadra20 objects toVasubandhu’s criticismofDharmatrāta’s theory,maintainingthatthistheoryisinpartthesameasVasumitra’s.Asamatteroffact,SaṃghabhadrautilizesthistheoryasanindispensabletoolfortheVaibhāṣikadefense.IntheAKB,theSautrāntikaridiculestheVaibhāṣikapositionthatthesvabhāvaofadharmaexistsatalltimesbutatthesametimeitsbhāvaisnotpermanent.21 Saṃghabhadradefendsthisposition,ratherthanobjectingtoanymisrepresentationoftheVaibhāṣikadoctrineonVasubandhu’spart—ashedoesinmanyotherplaces.ThismaysuggestthatbetweenthetimeoftheMVŚandAKB,Dharmatrāta’sbhāvānyathātva theorycouldhavebeenacceptedby theVaibhāṣikaalongwithVasumitra’stheoryintermsofkāritra. In Saṃghabhadra’sdefense22here,heactuallyutilizesboththeories:

The essential nature of adharma remains eternally; itsbhāva changes:Whenasaṃskṛta-dharmatraversesthroughadhvan,itgivesrisetoitskāritra inaccordancewiththepratyaya‑s,withoutabandoningitssubstantialnature;immediatelyafterthis,thekāritraproducedceases.Henceitissaidthatthesvabhāvaexistseternallyandyetitisnotpermanent,sinceitsbhāvachanges.

Elsewhere,23hestatesinsimilarterms:

Thereisnochangeinessentialnature,butitisnotthecasethatthebhāva of dharma‑sdonotvary.Theessentialnatureandthebhāvaareneitherdifferentnoridentical.Thus, thesvalakṣaṇa (= svabhāva)ofasaṃskṛta-dharma remainsat all times,while its specialkāritra arisesandceases.(Forfurtherdetails,seebelow).

AsevidenceforhisassertionthatthesecondVasumitrawhoproposesthekāritra theory—unliketheearlierVasumitra—doesnotteachmigrationofdharma‑sin time,FrauwallnercitesthefollowingMVŚpassage:

[Questioner:]…ThustheVenerableVasumitrasays:‘Thesaṃskāra‑shavenocoming,nordotheyhavegoing;beingmomentaryinnature,theydonotstayeither.’Now,sincethesaṃskāra‑sdonothaveanycharacteristicsofcomingandgoing,etc.,howisthedifferentiationofthethreeadhvanaḥ tobeestablished?


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Answer:Thedifferentiationofthethreeadhvanaḥisestablishedintermsofkāritra.Itisonthisverybasisthattheyaresaidtohavemigration:Thatis,whenasaṃskṛta-dharmahasnotyetexerciseditskāritra,itissaidtobefuture;whenitisexercisingitskāritra, it issaidtobepresent;whenitskāritrahasceased,itissaidtobepast.…24

ButFrauwallner doesnot account for the sentence: “It is on this verybasisthattheyaresaidtohavemigration.”Inanycase,evenwithoutthissentence(whichdoesnotoccurinthetwooldertranslations),onecannotclaimtohavesufficientreasonhereforassertingthatthissupposedlysecondVasumitradoesnotallowanysenseofmigrationofthedharma.Besides,wemustrememberthatthewholeconcernofalltheseSarvāstivādaācārya‑sispreciselytoaccountforourempiricalexperienceoftheactivitiesofdharma‑s,i.e.,oftheir“passage”in time,giventhattheiressentialidentitiesneverchange.Bythesametoken,thesupposedly“olderVasumitra”toosurelydoesnotpreachmigrationinaliteralsense.Hisexampleofthedifferentdesignationsthatatokenacquiresinaccordancewiththedifferentsignificationsthatoneassignstoagivenposition,clearlyshowsthathisavasthāisintendedtoberelativenotions:Theyaredistinctionsthatwesuperimposeinourperception,eventhough,ofcourse,thisperceptualexperienceisnotwithoutanobjectiveaspectinthecausalprocess:Thedistinctionsaremadepossiblebyvirtueofthekāritra of the dharma.

ThereareotherplacesintheMVŚwhereVasumitraisrepresentedasspeakingintermsofmigration.Thus,onthethreesaṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa‑s,heexplains:

Jāticausesdharma‑stoenterfromthefutureintothepresent…jarāandanityatācausedharma‑stoenterfromthepresentintothepast.25

Elsewhere,thecompilersoftheMVŚ26explainthatonecanequallyspeakofchangeornon‑changeofsaṃskṛta-dharma‑s.Onecansaythattheydonotundergochange—whichentails,amongotherthings,thattheydonot“migrate”—fromthepointofviewthatdharma‑salwaysremainunchangedintheirindividualessentialnature.Onecanalsosaythattheyundergochange,fromthepointofviewthattheyarisewhenpotencyisacquiredandceasewhenpotencyislost.TheMVŚfurtherexplains:

Therearetwokindsofchange—thatofessentialnature,andthatofkāritra. Fromtheview‑pointofessentialnature,oneshouldsaythatsaṃskāra‑sdonotchange,therebeingnovariationintheiressentialnature.Fromthepointof viewofkāritra,oneshouldsaythatsaṃskāra‑sdochange:whenadharma isinthefutureithasnotyetacquireditskāritra;whenitreachesthepresent,itacquiresitskāritra;whenithasenteredintothepast,itskāritrahasalreadyceased;hencethereischange…27

Neitherisitnecessarilytrue,asFrauwallnerclaims,thatBuddhadeva’sexplanation,enumeratedlastintheMVŚ,isasubsequentattempttoavoidthephilosophicaldifficulties entailed in theother three.Thedatesof all fourācārya‑s are stillunsettled,28andFrauwallnerhimselfdoesnotofferanysuggestioninthisregard.


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Furthermore,wedisagreewithFrauwallnerthat“finally,thelasttwoteachers,Vasumitra andBuddhadeva, avoidednot only anything that touchedon theessenceof things itself,butmoreoverderived thedifferenceof things in thedifferentstagesoftimeexclusively from external connections”(italicsours).29 Thecontrastisperhapsoverdone.InBuddhadeva’sexample,thedesignationsof“mother”and“daughter”,whilebeingoursuperimposition,isneverthelessnotpurelysubjective.Weperceiveamotheroradaughterbecauseofthedifferentfunctions—biologicalorotherwise—intherespectivecases.Moreover,theMVŚcompilersthemselvesalsodonotseemtohesitateinexplainingtemporalityintermsofrelativity:

The conditioneddharma‑saredesignatedasbeingfutureinrelationtothepastandthepresent.Theyarenotdesignatedasbeingfutureinrelationtothefuture,forafourthtimeperiod(adhvan)doesnotexist.Theyaredesignatedasbeingpastinrelationtothefutureandthepresent.Theyarenotdesignatedasbeingpastinrelationtothepast,forafourthtimeperioddoesnotexist.Theyaredesignatedasbeingpresentinrelationtothepastandthefuture.Theyarenotdesignatedasbeingpresentinrelationtothepresent,forafourthtimeperioddoesnotexist.…30

InthecaseofGhoṣaka’slakṣaṇānyathātva,asYinShun31haspointedout,histime‑characteristicsarequitecomparablewiththeVaibhāṣikadoctrineofthesaṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa‑s and should, therefore, havebeen acceptable in principleto theVaibhāṣikas.These time‑characteristics are the temporalmodes ofadharma,andinthisrespectsimilartoDharmatrāta’s‘modeofbeing’.Inbothcases,thecharacteristicormodeisneitheridenticalwithnordifferentfromthedharmaitself.Butwhereasamodeofbeingiseithertakenuporrelinquishedasthe dharmacoursesintime,thetime‑characteristicsarealwayswiththedharma entity,thoughoneamongthemcomesintoplayatagiventemporalperiod.IntheSarvāstivādasystem,aconditioneddharmapossessesthethreesaṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa‑sineverymoment,yetitisarguedthatsincetheydonotexercisetheirfunctionallatonce,itdoesnotamounttotheabsurditythatadharmaarises,deterioratesandvanishesatthesametime.Accordingly,Ghoṣaka’stime‑characteristicstooneednotbeconsideredtoresultintemporalconfusion.

Inbrief,wemay conclude from theMVŚaccount that, somedifferences inmattersofdetails andexpressionsnot‑withstanding, all four theories in factagreeonthefollowingpoints:

(1) Thesubstantialnatureofadharmaremainsunchanged.

(2) Temporaldistinctionsaresuperimposedbyusinourexperienceofthedharma‑sappearinginthephenomenalworld.

(3) Allexplainthisdistinctionbymeansofanaspectofthedharmawhichdoesnothaveanyrealityinitselfapartfromthedharma.


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Accordingly,wecanneithergoalongwithFrauwallnerthat“therelationshipbetween[thetwoexplanationsbythetwosupposedlydifferentVasumitras]isalmostthatofthesisandantithesis”;northatthefourtheoriesintheorderandmannerinwhichtheyareenumeratedintheMVŚrepresenttheactualhistoricalsequenceofdevelopmentofthetheoryofsarvāstivāda,onesupercedinganother.

5.5. The Vaibhāṣika theory of kāritra

FollowingVasumitra’s theory, theVaibhāṣikaarguesthatadharma ispresentwhenitexercisesitskāritra,futurewhenitskāritraisnotyetexercised,pastwhen it hasbeenexercised.But this leads to somephilosophicaldifficultiesboth as regards the exact nature andontological status ofkāritra as causalkāritraaswellasitsrelationshipwiththedharmaitself.Manymodernscholarsassertthat,confrontedwiththeSautrāntikacriticism,Saṃghabhadrainnovateda“neo-Vaibhāṣika”doctrineofkāritra.TodeterminetheextenttowhichonecanjustifiablycallSaṃghabhadra’sexplanationsaninnovation,letusbeginbyexaminingwhatheactuallyhastosayinthisregard.BelowwepresentsomeofthemajorpointsofcontroversyinthisconnectionbetweentheVaibhāṣikaandthe Sautrāntika.Thedialoguegivenhereinis,onthewhole,amoreorlessliteraltranslationfrompassagesintheNy:32

Sautrāntika’sobjection:Ifkāritraisthedeterminingcharacteristicforthedifferentiationofpast,presentandfuturedharma‑s,then[youhavesuchproblemsasthefollowing]:

1.Apresent but ‘non‑participating’ eye (tatsabhāga-cakṣus) such asaneyeindarkness,etc.,whichdoesnotexerciseitskāritraofseeing,cannotbecalledpresent.

2.If you say that such an eyenevertheless has thekāritra of bothphala-pratigrahaṇa (acquiring causal efficiency for an effect) andphala-dāna(beingproductiveofaneffect),thenyouhavetoadmitthatapasthomogeneouscause(sabhāga-hetu),etc.,beingcapableofphala-dāna,haskāritra.Thismeansthatitisdemi‑present.

Saṃghabhadra’sreply:Thepotencies(śakti of dharma‑sareoftwokinds,activity(kāritra)andefficacy/function/capability/capacity(sāmarthya/vṛtti/vyāpāra).Itisonlytheactivityofinducingorprojectingadharma’sownfruit(phalākṣepa = phala-pratigrahaṇa/phala-parigrahaṇa)thatiscalledkāritra.Thisdoesnotexhaustthesetofefficacyofagivendharma;italsohasefficaciesthatarenotkāritra.Thus,indarkness,theeye’sefficacyofseeingrūpaisimpairedbydarkness.Butitskāritraofinducingafruitisnotimpaired,sothatevenindarkness,theeyecaninducetheproductionofitself[inthenextmoment].Thiskāritraalwaysexistsinthepresentmoment;foritissolelyonthebasisofkāritrathatthepresentisestablished[i.e.,designated].Those[dharma‑swhichhavearisenand]whosekāritra‑shaveceased,do


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notbecomeasaṃskṛta‑s.33[Asfor]theircapabilitytocontributecausally(能為因性)34tothearisingofadifferententity(於餘性生;dngos po gzhan skyes pa la),thisisnotkāritra,butefficacy,becauseitisonlyatthepresentmoment that adharma can inducea fruit,becauseanasaṃskṛta cannotinduceitsownfruit,andbecauseitisonlytheinducingofadharma’sownfruitthatiscalledkāritra.Thus,thefactthattheSūtrakāra(i.e.,Vasubandhu)inhisexplanationincludestheefficacyofphala-dānaaskāritraaswell,thisisverymuchbecausehehasnotproperlyunderstoodtheabhidharma tenets!For,althoughapastcausecanproduceafruit(phala-dāna),itdoesnothavekāritraandhencethereisnoconfusion(saṃkara)ofthetimes.35

Sautrāntika:Ifadharmaisalwaysexistentinitsessentialnature,itshouldbeabletoexerciseitskāritraatalltimes—whatobstructionistheresothatthisdharma‑substancecanonlyexerciseitskāritraatthepresentandnotothertimes:Therebeingnodifferenceasregardsadharma’sessentialnatureinthethreeperiodsoftime,whatpreventsitfromremaininginoneidenticalempiricalnature/modality/form(bhāva)atalltimes?

Saṃghabhadra:Thereareampleexamplesintheworldwhere,foragivensubstance,thereexistvariousformsormodalities.Thus,therearefeelings(vedanā)whicharepleasant,unpleasantandneutral;fireswhichappearasstraw‑fire,husk‑fire,wood‑fire,etc.

Sautrāntika:[Imayphrasemyobjectionthisway:]Inourschool,weholdthatwhenthenecessaryconditionsobtain,conditioningforcesarisenothavingexistedpreviously.Buttheseconditionsarevariousandattimestheyassembletogetherandatothertimesdonot.Accordingly,dharma‑sdonotkeeparisingeternally.Ontheotherhand,yourschoolconcedesthatconditioningforcesandthevariousconditionsareeverpresentsubstantially.Asyoudonotadmit thatdharma‑scome intoexistencewithoutanypre‑existence,whatcanpreventthemfrombeingalwayspresent?

Saṃghabhadra:Aswehave arguedbefore, an identical substance canmanifestindifferentforms/modes—thispointissufficienttocounteractyourobjection.Shouldyoubeobstinate,letmeaskyouacounter‑question:In your doctrine of santati-pariṇāma (progressive changeof a series),it is conceded that the conditioning forces (saṃskāra) and their causalconditionsbecomedifferentfrommomenttomoment,eventhoughthereisnodifferenceinessentialnaturebetweentheprecedingandthesucceedingones.Now,therebeingnomodification in their causal conditions in thepreceding and succeedingmoments,what prevents them fromarisingidenticalfrommomenttomoment?

Thatis,theconditioningforcesofthepreviousmomentariseatthesametimeastheirconditionsand,withoutdiminutionintheiressentialnature,ceasetogetherwiththeconditions.Itisbytheforceofthiscausethatthefruitisproducedinthesubsequentmoment:Itshouldnotbedifferentinform/speciesfromthepreviouscause,since the twokindsofgenerativeconditions,ofthesamespeciesornotofthesamespecies,arenotdifferentiated


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betweentheprecedingandsucceedingmoments.Whatconditionistherethen that constitutes anobstruction causing themodification in the twomoments?Ifyouassertthatthisissobyvirtueofthenature(dharmatā)ofthe conditioneddharma‑s,thenwhydon’tyouconcedethesamewithregardto the kāritraofadharma?

Sautrāntika:Youconcedethattheconditionsarealwaysexistent.Accordingly,the kāritraproducedshouldalsobealwaysexistent.

Saṃghabhadra:Thisobjectionisnotreasonable.Foreventhoughthereisalwaystheassemblageofconditions,itisobservedthatsometimesafruitdoesnotresultfromtheconditions.Thisislikethecaseof[yourdoctrineof] impregnationorthecaseoftheeye,etc.:Youdonotconcedethatafruitarisesfromacausethathasceased,afteratimeinterval.Thedifferentbīja‑sinducedbyvariouscausesexistatthesametimewithinasantati,andyettheirfruitsdonotco‑ariseatalltimes.…Now,sinceatalltimesallthecausesexist,whatpreventsthevariousfruitsfromco‑arisingalways?…Again,althoughtheconditionsfortheeye,etc.,arealwayspresent,yetvisualconsciousness,etc.,donotalwaysarise.

Sautrāntika:According to our school, a series undergoes a progressivetransformationandcanonlygiverisetoafruitwhensomespecificconditionsobtain.

Saṃghabhadra:Thenyoushouldalsoconcedethesameinthecaseofkāritra. A dharmacanhavethecapacityforinducingorprojecting(ā‑√kṣip)afruitonlyindependenceontheforcesofvariousconditions—whichmaybesimultaneous or otherwise, pertaining to its own species or otherwise.Thiscapacityiscalledkāritra.

Asamatteroffact,Iamnotclearastowhatyoumeanbythetermkāritra in yourobjection. [Letmedefine:]kāritra is the special capacity that isproducedwhen the assemblageof conditions obtains for a given futuredharma.Thatverydharmahavingthekāritraissaidtobepresent.Whenthekāritraceases,itissaidtobepast.Itisnotthecasethatinthepreviousandsubsequentmomentsthereisanydifferenceinthedharma’sessentialnature.

The kāritraofadharmaisneitheridenticalwithitnordifferentfromit.Theformer arises in dependenceon conditions and exists for onlyonemoment(present)whilethelatterpersiststhroughtime.Thisismuchlikethecaseoftheseriesofadharma:Aseriesconsistsofthenon‑interruptedarisingofadharmafrommomenttomoment.Thisseriesisnotdifferentfromthedharmaitself,beingwithoutanessentialnatureotherthanthatof the dharma.Itisalsonotidenticalwiththedharmaitself,lesttherebeaserieswhichconsistsofjustonemoment.Neithercanwesaythatitisnon‑existentsinceitisobservedtoproducesomeeffect.Likewise,thedistinctivekāritraatthepresentmomentisneitherdifferentfromthedharma,asitdoesnothaveanessentialnatureapartfromthedharma,norisitidenticalwiththedharma,astherearetimeswhenonlytheessentialnatureexists


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withoutkāritra.Norcanwesaythatitisnon‑existent,forwhenthekāritra hasarisen,itcanprojectaphala.36Thefollowingstanza[summarizes]this:

The santatihasnodistinctessence,

[But]adistincteffectisconceded;

Kāritraistobeunderstoodlikewise.

Thus,[withit]thetimesareestablished.37

Wecan[also]findexamplesin[thenotionsof]cause‑effectrelationship,ofconjunction,andofthepurityofcitta,etc.Hence,althoughinthepast,presentandfuture,adharma’sessentialnatureisthesame,itsmodesofbeing(bhāva)aredifferent.Accordingly,wehaveestablishedthedistinctionofthethreetimes[onthebasisofkāritra].

WemaysummarizetheimportantpointsmadebySaṃghabhadraintheabovedisputeasfollows:

1. Saṃghabhadraisveryarticulateincontrastingthetermkāritrawiththeothertermsexpressingthevariousothertypesofcausalfunctionsorpotenciesofadharma.These latter terms includevyāpāra, kriyā, vṛtti, sāmarthya, śakti,etc.IntheNy,inasimilarcontrastingcontext,XuanZangalsoveryconsistentlyrenderskāritraaszuo yong (作用)andasdistinctfromgong neng (功能)usedforthetermsdenotingactivitiesotherthankāritra.

It is important to observe, however, that in other contexts, both in theAKB(C)andMVŚ,heisunfortunatelynotsoconsistent.Thus,comparinghisAKB(C)andNywith theAKB,VyandTSP, itcanbeseen thathisrenderingofgong neng corresponds toprabhāva, vṛtti, sāmarthya, śakti,andvyāpāra.ThelastonecanbeadducedfromtheTSP:38 darśanādilakṣaṇo vyāpāraḥ,incomparisonto見色功能intheNy;39andtherestfromtheAKBandAKB(C).However,healsorendersvyāpāraaszuo yong.40Also,intheMVŚ,41wehave “…The tatsabhāga-cakṣus… [at thepresentmoment],althoughwithout thezuo yong of rūpa-darśanādi,definitelyhas thezuo yong of phalākṣepa.”(Notethetwozuo yong).

2. kāritraisdefinedasadharma’scapabilityofinducingtheproductionofitsownnextmoment.Thisiscalledphala-grahaṇa/phalākṣepa.However,elsewhere42 Saṃghabhadraalsoclaimsthatalthoughkāritraisinactualfactconfinedtophalākṣepaalone,sometimeswhentheabhidharma śāstra‑sarereferringtoafunction(e.g.,thatofjāti)thatservesasaproximatecondition,thetermkāritraisalsousedexpediently.43

3. Alldharma‑s at the presentmoment have the activity ofphalākṣepa. Hencekāritrauniquelydefinespresentness,anditisintermsofkāritrathatthedifferentiationofthethreetimescanbeproperlydefined.


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4. This same temporal differentiation can be explained in otherwords:Eachdharma is in a differentavasthā (followingVasumitra) orbhāva (followingDharmatrāta)— future, present or past—dependingon thepresenceorotherwiseofkāritra. For Saṃghabhadra,avasthānyathātvaandbhāvānyathātvaarethesameasfarasthispointisconcerned.

5. A dharmaacquiresitsmodeaspresentwhenthenecessaryassemblageofvariousconditionsobtains—whichmaybesimultaneouswithitsarisingorotherwise,belongingtoitsownseriesorotherwise.44Whenthistakesplace,andonlywhenthistakesplace,itbecomesendowedwithitskāritra. Initspastandfuturemodes,onlyitsintrinsicnatureexists,devoidofkāritra. Nevertheless, it can still contribute causally to the actual productionofsomeotherdharma‑s.Thislatterpotencyisnotcalledanactivitybutratherafunctionorcapacity.

6. kāritra—likewisebhāva—isneitherdifferentfromnorcompletelyidenticalwiththesvabhāva/dravyaofadharma.

Inadditiontowhatcanbegatheredfromtheabovedispute,thereareotherimportantdoctrinalpointsmadebySaṃghabhadraelsewhereinhisexpositionon kāritra.Theseare:

7. AsFrauwallner45haspointedout,Saṃghabhadraexplainsexplicitlykāritra intermsofthetheoryofhetu-pratyaya:

Ifasaṃskṛta dharmaservesasacausefortheprojectionofitsownfruit,itissaidtobe[exercisingits]kāritra.Ifitservesasaconditionassisting[intheproducingofthefruitof]adifferent[series],itissaidtobe[exercisingits]efficacy/function(功能)…Allpresent[dharma‑s]canserveascausefortheprojectionoftheirownfruits.[But]notallpresent[dharma‑s]canserveasauxiliaryconditionsfor[dharma‑s]belongingtoadifferentspecies:The cakṣus indarknessoronewhosefunctionhasbeenimpairedcannotserveasacondition thatassists thearisingofvisualconsciousness.Thekāritra[ofthecakṣus],ontheotherhand,isnotimpairedbydarkness,asitcan,withoutfail,serveasthecausefortheprojectionofthefuturecakṣus. Hence, thereis a differencebetweenkāritra and efficacy.However,withregardtotheproductionofafruitwithintheseriesofitsownspecies,thereisaprojectingpowerwhichmayormaynotbedefinite;itiscalledakāritra aswellasanefficacy.If[apower],withregardtotheproductionofthefruitwithinaseriesofadifferentspecies,canserveonlyasaconditionassistingitsarising—thisisanefficacy,notakāritra.46(Seealsothefollowingpoint).

8. InSaṃghabhadra’skāritra theory, the four saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa‑s alsoplayanimportant role.Hedefines these lakṣaṇa‑s in termsof adharma’ssvaphalākṣepa-kāritra.WemaysaythataccordingtoSaṃghabhadra,thefourlakṣaṇa‑stogethercompletelyensurethatkāritracanariseand,indeed,


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ariseforjustonekṣaṇa.Thisimpliesthattheytoo—togetherwithkāritra—areindispensablefortheestablishmentofthedifferenceofthethreetimes:

Althoughthesaṃskṛta-dharma‑sareassistedbyvariousexternalcausesandconditions,theymustbeassistedinternallybyjāti, sthiti, jarā and anityatāasproximatecauses,beforetheycantraversethroughtime.…47

Efficacy(功能)referstothefunctionofservingasadirectcondition…Theefficacyofjātiisitscapabilitytoserveasthedirect(sākṣāt)condition(親緣)enabling[adharma]togiverisetoitskāritraofprojectingitsownfruit…

Theefficacyofsthiti is itscapabilitytoserveasthedirectconditionenablingadharmatostaytemporarilyandtoprojectitsownfruit…

Theefficacyofjarāisitscapabilitytoserveasthedirectconditionforimpairingadharma’skāritraofprojectingitsownfruit…

Theefficacyofanityatāisitscapabilitytoserveasthedirectconditionfordestroyingadharma’skāritraofprojectingitsownfruit.48

5.6. Saṃghabhadra’s theory — an innovation?

HavingexaminedtheimportantfeaturesofSaṃghabhadra’skāritratheory,wewillnowattempttodetermine—withinthelimitofthedataaccessibletous—theextenttowhichwemayconsideritaninnovation.

CollettCox,49observingthattheMVŚusesthetermzuo yongwhere,inthesamecontext,Saṃghabhadraclearlyusessāmarthya,concludes:

Thiswouldsuggest that the*Mahāvibhāṣādoesnot recognize thecleardistinctionbetweenkāritraandsāmarthyaproposedbySaṃghabhadra.

ButthisconclusionseemstohavebettedtoomuchonXuanZang’sconsistencyin rendering these terms (see §5.5,summary‑point1).Moreover, ifwhatSaṃghabhadraclaimsistruethatthemastersbeforehimsometimesusedthetermkāritraexpediently(seeabove,§5.5,summary‑point2),wemayconsiderthepossibilitythatthetwocontrastingcausalfunctionshadalreadybeentaughtbyatleastsomeoftheSarvāstivādamastersatanearlierstage,eventhoughtheusageofthesetermshadnotbeenstrictlyobserved.Besides,thereareactuallyseveralplacesintheMVŚ50wherezuo yongandgong nengareusedsidebysideinthesamecontext,althoughweoftencannotbetoocertainastothedegreeofcontrastortheexactdistinctionintended.Thus,onthequestionastowhydharma‑sdonotariseandceaseconstantly,therebeingalwaystheassemblageofcausesandconditions—aquestionsimilartooneoftheSautrāntika’sobjectionsintheAKBandNy(seeprecedingsectionabove)—theMVŚcitestheexplanationsgivenbyvariousmasters,andBuddhadeva’sexplanationis:


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Dharma‑sshouldhavetheirzuo yongforarisingandceasingonlyonceineach.Itwouldbeuselessiftheyariserepeatedlyandceaserepeatedly.…

Question:When the causes and conditions assemble for the arisingofdharma‑s,arethegong neng‑smanyorone?…

Answer:Onecansaytheyaremanyorthattheyareone.…Thegong neng ofthecausesandconditionscanbeconsideredasonein‑as‑muchastheytogetherenablethedharma‑stogiverisetotheirzuo yong…51

Anotherinstance,withregardtopastandfutureanuśaya‑s:

Giventhatpastandfutureanuśaya‑shavenozuo yong,howcantheybesaidtoadhereandgrow(anuśerate)?

Answer:Becausetheycangiverisetotheprāpti[ofthepresentanuśaya] whichmanifestsatthepresentmoment.Thisislikethecasethat,althoughfiredoesnotmanifestatthepresentmoment,yetitcangiverisetosmoke.TheVenerableGhoṣaka explains thus: ‘Although theydonot have thezuo yong of grasping theobjects, yet,with regard to theālambana andthe saṃprayukta dharma‑s,theyhavethegong nengofbondagejustlike[whentheyare]present.Hencethese[pastandfuture]anuśaya‑scanbesaidtoadhereandgrow.52

Regardingtherelationshipbetweenthekāritraofadharmaanditssvabhāva,asFrauwallner53hasshown,theMVŚalreadyexplainedinthesamemannerasSaṃghabhadra:“Itcannotbesaidcategoricallythat54theyareidenticalordifferent.”

FrauwallnerrightlyobservesthatthisimportantpassageisnotfoundinthetwoearlierChineseversionsoftheMahāvibhāṣāandisthereforepossiblyalateraddition55—made somewhere after the two earlier recensions. FrauwallnerproposesthatinthefinalstageofdevelopmentofthekāritradoctrinebeforeSaṃghabhadra,kāritracametobeequatedwithbhāva,andSaṃghabhadratookoverfromhere.However,fromSaṃghabhadra’sownexposition,itcanbeseenthattheabsenceorpresenceofkāritrainfactconstitutesadifferentbhāva in eachcase.Noequationisassertedbyhimhere.

Inanotherinstance,theMVŚalsospeaksoftheavasthāandtheessentialnature(體)ofadharmaasbeingneitheridenticalnordifferent:

The avasthāandtheessentialnature[ofafruit]areneitheridenticalnordifferent.Whereas its essential nature exists at all times (sarvadā asti),itsavasthādoesnot(na sarvadā).56

Thedoctrine that thekāritra of phalākṣepa (= phala-pratigrahaṇa) uniquelydefinesthepresentincontradistinctiontothepastandfuturetimesisalsoalreadyfoundintheMVŚ:57


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Question:Atatsabhāga-cakṣus,etc.,atthepresentmomenthavenoactivityofseeing,etc.Theyshouldthereforenotbepresent.Answer:Althoughtheydonothavetheactivitiesofseeing,etc.,theydefinitelyhavethephala-pratigrahaṇa-kāritra,fortheyarethesabhāga-hetu for the futuredharma‑s:allsaṃskṛta-dharma‑satthepresentmomentcanserveashetu for the pratigrahaṇa of niṣyanda-phala.Asthisphala-pratigrahaṇa-kāritraappliestoallthepresentdharma‑s,withoutanyconfusion(saṃkara),itisusedasthebasisfortheestablishmentofthedifferentiationofpast,presentandfuture.

ThisimportantpassagetooismissinginthetwoearlierversionsoftheMahāvibhāṣā andsowaslikewisepossiblyaddedafterthesetwoearlierrecensionsandbeforetheMVŚ.Moreover,thedoctrinethatphala-grahaṇaofallthesixhetu‑sineachcasetakesplacesolelyatthepresentmomentisalsofoundintheMVŚ.58

SaṃghabhadraprotestsveryconfidentlythattheĀbhidharmikasdonotteachthatthe kāritraincludesphaladāna.(Seeabove,§5.5).HealsoprotestssimilarilyelsewherethattheVaibhāṣikanevertaughtthatkāritrahastemporaldistinction.59 Kāritrainfactcomesintobeingnothavingbeen,andvanishesinasinglemomentofthepresent.60AnotherequallyconfidentprotestisthattheSautrāntikabaseshiscriticismonthewrongassumptionthattheVaibhāṣikateachesthatthepastandthefutureexistinthesamemannerasthepresent.Infact,hesays,thisisamisrepresentationoftheVaibhāṣikapositionwhichisthatthedharmaexistswithadifferentbhāvaineachofthethreetimes.(Seeabove,§5.5,summary‑point3).

BasedontherepresentationofVaibhāṣikaviewsbyVasubandhu,Yaśomitra,Śāntarakṣita andKamalaśīla—all notablySautrāntikas or pro‑Sautrāntikas— some scholars seem to claim all too readily that theVaibhāṣika viewsunderwentradicaltransformationunderthepressureoftheSautrāntikacriticism.Whileunderstandablythiscouldwellbetrueinsomecases,wemustnotignoretheseunambiguousandconfidentprotestsbySaṃghabhadrainarrivingatourconclusions.Thus,likeFrauwallner,Tatiaalsoexpoundsthetheoryofsarvāstivāda inamannerthatclearlysuggeststhatkāritraincludedphaladānaandphalākṣepa,a theory thatwas thenrevisedbySaṃghabhadra to includeonly the latter.61 HisexpositionsimilarlysuggeststhattheVaibhāṣikataughtthetemporalityofkāritra.62UnlikethecaseofFrauwallner’s investigation,however,Tatia’salsodoesnothavethemeritofhavingconsultedtheChineseandTibetansources.

Saṃghabhadra’sexplanationofthesaṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa‑sintermsofadharma’sphalākṣepa-kāritra isalreadyattested—onceagain—inthefollowingMVŚpassagewhich,moreover,providesearlyevidencethatthekāritratheoryhasalreadybeenexplicitlylinkedwiththatofcause‑effect:

Bytheforceofsthiti-lakṣaṇa,thesaṃskāra‑s—havingarisen—arecapableofgraspingtheirownfruit(this isphala-grahaṇa = phalākṣepa),andof


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graspingtheālambana.Bytheforceofjarāandanityatā,thereisnofurtheractivityafteronekṣaṇa. If sthiti-lakṣaṇawerenon‑existent,thereshouldnotbethecause‑effectseriesofthesaṃskāra‑s,andthecitta-caitta-dharma‑sshouldnothaveanyālambana.63

Allthistakenintoconsideration,wemustdissentherefromotherswhoarefondoflabelingSaṃghabhadra’sexplanationsonkāritraasaneo-Sarvāstivāda/neo-Vaibhāṣika doctrine.Tous,Saṃghabhadra’s contribution to theSarvāstivādatheoryofkāritra consists essentially in hismore articulate presentation andgreaterconsistencyintheuseof terminologies.Hehasfine‑tunedthetheoryconsiderablybutthisdoesnotamounttoanovelinterpretation,sincepracticallyalltheimportantdoctrinalpropositionshemadeinthisconnectionwerealreadyfoundinthetimeoftheMVŚorearlier.

5.7. Bhāva, svabhāva and the dharma

5.7.1. Wesawabove(§5.3,§5.4)thateachofthefourmaintheoriesstressesthat,throughoutthethreeperiodsoftime,thedravya (= svabhāva)remainsunchanged.Thisissarvāstivāda or sarvāstitvainanutshell:Butjustpreciselywhatismeantby adharma’s intrinsic nature “not changing”?One thing is certain that thetheorydoesnotamounttotheSāṃkhyadoctrineofpariṇāma. Even Vasubandhu,thearch‑criticoftheVaibhāṣika,doesnotallege.

Butthen,theMVŚseemstobeobscureandevencontradictoryattimesonthisfundamentalquestion.Thefollowingpassageisagoodillustration.Ontheonehand,itsaysthattheessentialnaturedoesnotundergochange(seequotationin§5.4above);ontheother,thatwhendharma‑sundergotransformation—andhenceareimpermanent—itistheirveryessentialnaturethatisinvolvedinthetransformation:64

Question:Whyarerūpa‑sandcitta‑s,etc.,impermanent?

Answer:[Since]theyaresubjecttopariṇāmaanddonotremainthesame,howcouldtheybeconsideredtoabidepermanently?

Question:Whenitisheldthattheiressentialnaturesariseandcease,howdoyouknowthatthepariṇāmaisnottheconcealingandmanifesting[oftheseessentialnatures]?

TheVenerableVasumitra explains thus: If theirpariṇāma ismerely onaccountofconcealingandmanifesting,thenababyintheembryowouldhaveitsstagesofchildhood,youth,middleageandoldage,allarisingatonce.Yet[thefactisthat]theyarisesequentially.Thusweknowthatitisnotonaccountoftheconcealingandmanifestingoftheentitiesthemselves(體—svarūpa/svabhāva?)thatthereispariṇāma. …


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The Bhadanta [Dharmatrāta]explains: It is seen in theworld thatwhenconditionsassemble,adharmaarises;whenconditionsarenotinconcord,adharmaisdestroyed.Itisnotthecasethatthatwhichconcealsandmanifestshassuchadifference(viśeṣa).Thusweknowthatthepariṇāmaisnotonaccountoftheconcealingandmanifesting[oftheentityitself].Itisonlyonaccountoftheessentialmode’sarisingandceasing.Furthermore,whenadharma isundergoingpariṇāma, itspreviousandsubsequentmodes(相—ākāra/ākṛti/bhāva?)aredifferentandhencetheentityitselfshouldalsobedifferent,sincethemodeandtheentityitselfarethesame.[Ontheotherhand,] if adharma abidespermanently, then even though there isdifferentiationinstage(avasthā)—thoseofconcealingandmanifesting—thereisnodifferenceinitsmode.Thusweknowthatinthepariṇāma,theentityitselfarisesandceases.

Prima facie, this passagemay seem to utterly contradict the fundamentalSarvāstivāda standpoint that essential natures never change!But it actuallyprovidesuswith important clues for an answer to thequestionwehave justraised—nay,foranunderstandingoftheverytheoryofsarvāstitva:notonlydoesitshowthatthistheorydiffersfromtheSāṃkhyaconceptofpariṇāma,italsospellsoutexplicitlythat,althoughthesvabhāva/dravyaissaidtobesarvadā asti,thisdoesnotentailthatitisimmutableorevenpermanent,foradharma’smodeofexistenceanditsessentialnaturearenotdifferent,sothatwhentheformerisundergoingtransformation,soisitssvabhāva.This,howeverneednotbe—andshouldnotbe—acontradictiontowhattheMVŚsayselsewherethat“fromtheview‑pointofessentialnature,oneshouldsaythatsaṃskāra‑sdonotchange”(seeabove,§5.3).Thesameentity,notadifferentone,remainsthroughoutthetimes.Inthissensethereisnochangeinsvabhāva or svalakṣaṇa65 —noanyathātva of substance.Atthesametime,adharmakeepshavingadifferentmodeofbeingandeachmode is actuallyanew—butnotdifferent in termsof essence—dharma.Inthissensethereischangeortransformationofessentialnature—achange,nevertheless,whichdoesnotentailtheresultofanontologicallydifferentsubstance.To takeDharmatrāta’s examples:When the samepieceof gold istransformedintodifferententities—agoldenbowl,cup,etc.—eachtimeabrandnew‘thing’or‘entity’resultsbuttheessentialnatureofthisselfsamepieceofgoldwhichisinvolvedintheprocessoftransformationremainsthesame,i.e.,thesvabhāva/svalakṣaṇa/svarūpa/dravyaremainsthesameinthisprocessofchange.

Saṃghabhadra’srefutationoftheidentificationofsarvāstitvawiththeSāṃkhyatheoryofpariṇāmaisevenmorearticulate:

[Thisallegation] isuntenable, for [theSāṃkhya]holds that theeffect isnoneotherthanthecausetransformed,andthattheeffectagainwillvanish,turningbackintotheessentialnature.Theessentialnatureofthepast,futureandpresentisoneidenticalsubstance.[Ontheotherhand,]inourschool,thereisnoconfounding(saṃkara)oftimes(adhvan):


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[i] activity (kāritra) exists only in the presentmoment; this [present]position(avasthā)definitelyisnotsubsumablebythe[other]twotimes;

[ii] cause and effect are completely distinct and there is nomutualoperation;

[iii]dharma‑s,oncetheyhaveceased,donotariseagain;[iv]theeffectdoesnotvanishandturnbackintotheessentialnature;[v] causeshavenobeginning;[vi][dharma‑s]areproducedbyvariouscauses,[notbyaunitarycause];[vii]causesandeffectsdonothaveaPerson(puruṣa)asthearbiter.Inthisway,thereareinnumerabledifferences[betweenthetwosystems].66

5.7.2. InregardtotheSarvāstivādapositionthatadharmacanexistindifferentmodeswithout losing its svabhāva, Saṃghabhadra illustrates as follows:The svabhāvaofallvedanā‑sissensation,yetwecanspeakofvarioustypesofsensations—pleasurable,etc.Thevariousorgans—visual,auditory,etc.,withinthesamepersonalseries(santati),arealloftheessentialnatureofprasāda rūpa;yetamongthemtherearedifferentmodesofexistence,i.e.,therearethedifferentfunctionsofseeing,hearing,etc.“Now,herein,itisnotthecasethatsincethefunctionisdifferentfromtheexistence,thattherecanbethedifferenceinthefunctionsofseeing,hearing,etc.Rather,the very function of seeing, etc., is none other than the existence of the eye, etc.Onaccountofthedifferenceinfunction,thereisdefinitelythedifferenceinthemodeofexistence…Sinceitisobservedthattherearedharma‑sthatco‑existasessentialsubstancesandwhoseessentialcharacteristicsdonotdifferbutthat[nevertheless]havedifferentmodesofexistence,weknowthatwhendharma‑straversethethreetimes,theirmodesofexistencevarywhiletheiressentialcharacteristicsdonotchange.”67

LikethecompilersoftheMVŚ,Saṃghabhadraalsoinsistsontheimpermanenceof svabhāva.ButinthelightoftheaboveMVŚpassages,wecannowseethatthisisnotreallythatinnovativeeither.Saṃghabhadraarguesasfolllows:

[Svabhāvaisnotpermanent,for]whateverispermanentdoesnotgothroughtime.Neithershould[theSthaviraŚrīlāta]say‘svabhāvaremainsconstant(性恆住)’,68forweconcedethatthebhāva (有性)ofanexistentinthepast,presentandfuturevaries.69 …[Ourexplanations]alsohaveproperlyrefutedtheobjectionthat[ourtheoryof sarvāstitva]impliesthepermanenceof[adharma’s]essentialnature,for,while the essential nature remains always [the same], itsavasthā differs[inthestagesoftime]sincethereischange.Thisdifferenceofavasthāisproducedonaccountofconditionsandnecessarilystaysnomorethanonekṣaṇa.Accordingly,theessentialnatureofthedharmatooisimpermanent,sinceitisnotdistinctfromthedifference[thatarisesinit].[But]itisonlyinanexistentdharmathatchangescanobtain;therecannotbechangeinanon-existent.Inthisway,therefore,wehaveproperlyestablishedthetimes.70


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OurexaminationaboveleadsustothebeliefthatfortheVaibhāṣikas,thesvabhāva–bhāvarelationshipisnotoneofessenceandattribute/quality—contrarytotherepresentationmadebytheSautrāntikasandsomemodernscholars.ItmaybetruetosaythatSaṃghabhadraclarifiesthispointbetterthantheMVŚcompilers:asvabhāvaalwaysexistsinaspecificbhāva;itcannotbe(√bhū)otherthaninaparticularmodeofbeing(bhāva)whichcanbeinfinitelyvarious71—butthisisnoinnovativeproposition,beingpartofDharmatrāta’sbhāva-anyathātvatheory.Andaccordingly,thetwoareneitheridenticalwithnordifferentfromeachother.

Fromthepointofviewoftheiropponents,however,ifanewbhāvaimpliesanewentity,itshouldfollowthatanontologicallydifferententityresults.TheVaibhāṣikas,whileatthedepthoftheirheartsunafraidoflogicalcontradictionswhenitcomestothefundamentallevelofthings,wouldnotconsiderherethattheirpositionisuntenable.72TheyappealtoafundamentalnotionacceptedbyallBuddhistschools:theidentityindifferenceofaseries(santāna).Thelogicalincongruitywilldissolve—atleastfortheBuddhists—whenadharmaisseenasmanifestingineverrenewingformsconstitutingaseries.Adharma‑series(dharma-santāna)isnotstaticallyidenticalatanytime;yetitretainsanoverallindividualityorintegrity.Itisdynamicallyidentical.Onecannotstepintothesamerivertwice;butatthesametime,oneriverisdistinctfromanother.Andthisdynamicidentityordistinctivenessisbyvirtueofthedharma’ssvabhāva—adharma‑serieshasnosvabhāvaotherthanthatofthedharma (cf. supra,§5.5).Itisinthissensethatthesvabhāvatoomaybesaidtoundergochange—andhencebeimpermanent—eventhoughontologicallyitneverbecomesatotallydifferentsubstance.Asamatteroffact,theidentity‑in‑difference(bhedābheda)relationshipobtainingbetweensvabhāvaandbhāva/kāritra—indeedtheirwholethesisofsarvāstitva—cannevermakesenseif theVaibhāṣikaconceptionofdharma is takenasoneofstaticidentity!FromthestandpointofAristotelianlogic,ofcourse,“nottotallydifferent”hardlysufficestoestablishthatthe“same”dharmacontinuestoexist.Thisisthelimitofthebhedābheda logicviewedfromtheAristotelianstandpoint.

IfthiswayofunderstandingsarvāstitvarepresentsacompromiseontheVaibhāṣikapartontherealityofadharma,itshouldberememberedthatanybhedhābheda relationshipisan“intrinsiccompromise”ofessentialrealityinontologicalterms.ButfromtheVaibhāṣikastandpoint,thisdoesnotsomuchrepresentanintentional,last resort, compromise, as a statement of fact.Both theSautrāntikas and theVaibhāṣikaswouldconsideraseriesasamentalsuperimposition.Butfortheformer,ithasnoontologicalstatuswhatsoever(Saṃghabhadra73pointsouttheirfallacy—seesupra,§5.5).Forthelatter,ithasarelativerealityinasmuchasitisbasedon the ever-existentdharmamanifestinginnewformsfrommomenttomoment.

SaṃghabhadragoessofarastoclaimthatitisinfactonlysarvāstitvasounderstoodthatislogicallycompatiblewiththecentralBuddhistdoctrineofimpermanence:A dharmaundergoestransformationinitsessentialnature,yetwithoutentailingadifferentsubstance.


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[For,]iftheessentialsubstancebecomesdifferent,an[ontologically]distinctdharmawouldresult;thenitoughtnottobeimpermanent,therebeingnotransformationinessenceinvolved.Thatis:ifoneholdsonlythat[adharma] existsinthepresenttimeand[regards]pastorfuture[dharma‑s]asnon‑existent essentially, then it should follow that all saṃskāra-dharma‑sare permanent in nature, there being no transformation involved.…An existentandanon‑existenthave their respectivefixednatures; thereis no transformation [possible]: transformation is not possible becausetheyholdthatonlythemomentarypresentdharma‑sexist.Pastandfuturedharma‑sbeingcompletelywithoutanyessentialnature,howcanonespeakoftransformationofnon‑existentdharma‑s?Thus,oneisunabletosaythatall saṃskāra‑s are impermanent.One cannot argue that transformationconsistsofanon‑existentbeingtransformedintoanexistent,oranexistentintoanon‑existentforexistence(astitva)andnon‑existence(nāstitva)arenotmutuallyaccomplishingintheiressence,sinceanexistentandanon‑existentareessentiallycontradictorytoeachother.…Ifoneconcedesthatpastandfuture[dharma‑s]arebothexistentandnon‑existent,[thenadharma],frombeingnon‑existent in[thesenseof]nothavingyetarisen,canariseandbecomeexistent,and,frombeingexistent[inthesenseof]havingarisen,canceaseandbecomenon‑existent.Thisnon‑existenceinthepastandfutureandtheexistenceinthepresentareinbothcasesnotfixed,sothatthereispossibilityofvariation.Theexistenceinthepastandthefutureisthesameasthatinthepresent;thereisnochangeinalltheperiodsoftime.Itisonaccountofthefactthattheessentialnature[always]existsandthekāritra mayormaynotexist,thatonecanspeakofaconditioned(saṃskṛta)havingdifferenceinstate.Henceitisonlytheschoolwhichassertstheexistence[oftheessentialnature]inthethreeperiodsoftimethatcanspeakofchangewithregardtoagivendharma.74

Theanswertothequestionthatweraisedatthebeginningofthissectionnowemergesmore clearly:When theVaibhāṣika says that there is no change inadharma’ssvabhāva or dravyawhenit“traverses”intime,theymeanthatitsintegrity—itssvalakṣaṇa (= svabhāva)—isuntouched,andtheessentialnaturedoesnotchangefrombeinganexistentintoanon‑existent(sarvadā asti).Itisnotthatthisessentialnatureis—mysteriously,asitwere—totallyuninvolvedinthetemporalprocess:Itissarvadā astiandyetanitya;non‑temporal,i.e.,nottemporalintheusualsenseofthetermandyetnotatemporal,i.e.,nottotallytranscendingthetemporalprocess.Ifthisanswersoundsambiguous,itisonaccountofthefundamentalambiguityorelusivenessthatisnecessarilyimpliedinthebhedābheda relationshipthatobtainsbetweenthesvabhāvaofadharmaontheonehand,anditskāritraandbhāvaontheother.Butthen,fortheVaibhāṣika,and,forthatmatter,forall‘religiousphilosophers’,suchfundamentalambiguity—whollyorpartlyderivedfromalongtraditionofexperienceand/orcontemplation—mustcomefirst,beforelogic,eveniftheĀbhidharmikasatthesametimefindthelogicaltoolsindispensableforthedefenseoftheirreligiousinsightandconvictions.


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NOTES

1 ForthediscussiononthedefinitionofSarvāstivāda,seesupra,§3.2.2 世體是常，行體無常.ButTno.1546hassimply:世是常，行無常.3 MVŚ,393a;also,700a.4 Study,303.5 T26,no.1546,293c.6 T27,1003c–1004a;T29,630b.7 T27,65b,85b,116b,190a,479a,796a–b,919b,919b–c;alsocf.74b.8 MVŚ,396a–b.ForthecorrespondingSanskritpassages,seeAKB,296f.9 Frauwallner,188ff.10 Frauwallnerseemstounderstand,inthiscontext,thattheDārṣṭāntikaandVibhajyavādaweredifferentfromtheSarvāstivāda(op. cit.,191).Butaswehavenotedabove(§5.2),intheolderversionoftheMVŚ,thistheoryissaidtobeheldby“theDārṣṭāntikas”.

11Tno.1549,724b.12 See Study,382ff.13WatanabeBaiyū,Ubu abidatsuma ron no kenkyū(Tokyo,1954),186f.14 YinShun(Study,303)ascribesthesedifferentexplanationstotheiradvocatorssomewhatdifferently.

15 Frauwallner,188f.16 Frauwallner,205f.17AKB,297.18 However,wedofindintheMVŚ(201c–202a)somemasterswhospeakofmilkturningintocurdasanexemplificationoftheSāṃkhyadoctrine.

19MVŚ,1003c–1004a.20Ny,631b.21AKB,298:svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityaśca neṣyate |22Ny,633c.23Ny,632c.24MVŚ,393c.25MVŚ,121b.26MVŚ,200a–b.27MVŚ,loc. cit.28 Inoneplace(Tāranātha,15)thecomparativelylatetraditionofTibetgivesthechronologicalplacing:Dharmatrāta→Vasumitra→Ghoṣaka→Buddhadeva.Inanotherplace(ibid.,103),Dharmatrāta→Ghoṣaka→Vasumitra→Buddhadeva.ButthissecondorderisverylikelyinfluencedbytheorderofenumerationoftheirtheoriesintheMVŚ.YinShun(op. cit.,268,271,274,285)givesthefollowingdates:Dharmatrāta— aroundtheendof2ndcenturyB.C.E.,contemporaryorslightlyearlierthan

Vasumitra;

Buddhadeva— 10B.C.E.–10C.E.,juniorcontemporaryofDharmatrāta;


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Vasumitra — 100B.C.E.,afterKātyāyanīputra (but theMVŚ,231c, isdividedas towhetherhisPrŚprecedestheJPŚorotherwise);

Ghoṣaka — between1stand2ndcenturyC.E.,considerablylaterthanVasumitra.29 Op. cit.,189.30MVŚ,394b.SeealsoStudy,300f.31 Study,297ff.32 Cf.Ny,631c–633b.IhavegivenhereamoreorlessliteraltranslationfromtheChinese,withonlyslightparaphrasing.

33 Cf.Ny,410b:“A[dharma]whosekāritrahasceased,relinquishesonlyitspresentness;the dharma’sessentialnatureremains.”

34 Cf.Tibetanin*Tattvārthā :rgyur gyur pa ‘di dag gi nus pa nyid.35 Cf.Ny,409cf.Wehavetranslatedthispassageveryliterallyinviewofitsimportance.Frauwallnerisnotsureofasentencehere,andaccordinglyhisrenderinginthisplaceseemsunintelligible.Cf.Sthiramati’s*Tattvārthā:gang yang ‘gags pa skyes pa ‘dus byas kyi chos rnams kyi mthu’i khyad par dngos po gzhan skyes pa la rgyur gyur pa ‘di dag gi nus pa nyid bya ba ma yin pa da ltar ba’i gnas skabs kho na ‘phangs pa’i phyir | ‘dus ma byas rnams kyis ‘bras bu ‘phen pa mi ‘thad pa’i phyir ro | ‘bras bu ‘phen pa’i bya ba ma yin no |

36 Cf.TSP,509:na kāritraṃ dharmād anyat, tadvyatirekeṇa svabhāvānupalabdheḥ | nā’pi dharmamātram, svabhāvāstitvepi kadācid abhāvāt | na ca na viśeṣaḥ, kāritrasya prāgabhāvāt |

37 Cf.TSP,loc. cit.:santatikāryaṃ ceṣṭaṃ, na vidyate sāpi santatiḥ kācit | tadvad avagaccha yuktyā kāritreṇā’dhvasaṃsiddham ||

38TSP,506.39Ny,631c.40 Cf.AKB(C),11b:無作用whichtranslatesnirvyāpāraintheAKB,31.41MVŚ,393c—seequotationbelow.42Ny,410a.43 Alsocf.Ny,450b:“…It isnot thecase that therecanbekāritra in thepast[whenthecorrespondingretributionfruitispresentlyarising].Thetermkāritra[whichisemployedinthiscase]isintendedtomeanafunction.”

44Ny,632b.45 Frauwallner,199ff.46 Ny,409cf.(alsocf. ibid.,409a–b,andMVŚ,393cwhichisquotedabove).ContraFrauwallner’stranslationwhichisverymisleading:“Ifthisactsasacause,itproducesitseffect.Ifitactsasacondition,itfostersadifferenceofproperty(bhāva).”(Frauwallner,201)

47 Ny,409a–b48SPrS,809b–c;alsocf.Ny,409a–c.49 ox,C,Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence (Tokyo, 1995),157,n.75.

50 E.g.,MVŚ,105a,113b,200a–b,480a–b.51 MVŚ,105a.52 MVŚ,113a–b.53 Frauwallner,197f.54 Contra Frauwallner:“withanycertaintythat”—whichismisleading.


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55 Frauwallner,199.FrauwallnerconcedesthatitisolderthanVasubandhu.56MVŚ,87b.57 MVŚ,393c–394a.58 MVŚ,108c.Analternativeopinionasregardsthekāraṇa–hetuisalsogivenhere.Thisisrefuted in theNy.TheMVŚ(89b)—aswellas the twoearlier recensions—alreadycontains theVaibhāṣikarule that theremustfirstbephalagrahaṇabefore therecanbephaladāna:Thefruitmustfirstbecausallydeterminedor“effectualized”beforeitcanactuallybeproduced.

59Ny,632b–c;contra Tatia,104.60Ny,631a,635a.61 Tatia,100–102.62 Ibid.,104.63MVŚ,201c.64 MVŚ,1003c–1004a.65 Cf.Ny,632c:“Althoughadharma’sessentialnature remains,whenspecificconditionsobtain,orbyvirtueof thenatureof things (dharmatā), adistinctivekāritra arisesnothavingbeen,andreturnsnowhereafterhavingexisted.Thedharma’sessentialnatureisjustasbefore,itssvalakṣaṇaremainingalways.”

66Ny,635a.67 Ny,625a.68 Accordingtotheimmediatecontext,this性mustbethesameas自性—svabhāva.LaValléePoussin(1936–1937)takesthistobebhāva(“Sarvāstivāda”,84).

69 Ny,630b.70Ny,633a.71Ny,633c.72 IntheAKB,301,VasubandhurepresentstheVaibhāṣikaasfinallyexclaimingthatthenature

of dharma (dharmatā)isprofoundandbeyondintellectualcomprehension.Saṃghabhadra(Ny,634c–635a)protests that this isadistortion:“Thesearenot thewordsof the trueVaibhāṣikas.”HefurtherclaimsthathehasproperlyrefutedalltheobjectionsraisedbyVasubandhu(Ny,635a).

73Ny,633a.74 Ny,410c.


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6. Theory of Causality I The Six Causes

6.1. The6causes(hetu),4conditions(pratyaya)and5fruits(phala)—theircorrelation6.2. SpecialimportanceofthedoctrineofcausalityfortheSarvāstivāda

6.2.1. Dharma‑sascausalforces6.2.2. Dharma‑sasfactorsofphenomenalexistencearisenthroughcauses

6.3. Definitionsofthesixcauses6.3.1. Efficientcause(kāraṇa-hetu)6.3.2. Homogeneouscause(sabhāga-hetu)6.3.3. Universalcause(sarvatraga-hetu)6.3.4. Retributioncause(vipāka-hetu)6.3.5. Co-existentcause(sahabhū-hetu)6.3.6. Conjoinedcause(saṃprayuktaka-hetu)

6.4. Saṃghabhadra’sdefenseofsimultaneouscausation6.5. ExplanationsintheYogācārasystem6.6. Summaryofthenotionoftheco‑existentcausegiveninthevarioussources6.7. Doctrinalimportanceoftheco‑existentcausefortheSarvāstivāda

6.7.1. Co‑existentcauseandSarvāstivādarealism6.7.2. Co‑existentcauseastheonlyvalidparadigmforcausation

6.8. Conclusion

6.1. The 6 causes (hetu), 4 conditions (pratyaya) and 5 fruits (phala) — their correlation

The investigationof causes, conditions and their effects constitutes oneofthe special topics of concernof theĀbhidharmikas (supra, §2.3.5). In theSarvāstivādatheoryofcausality,twodoctrinalschemesareemployed:thatofthefourconditions(pratyaya)andthatofthesixcauses(hetu).Saṃghabhadra1 maintainsthatthedoctrineofthefourconditionsisfoundinthesūtra‑softheirschool.Asforthesixcauses,hesaysthattheywereonceintheirEkottarāgama,althoughnolongerextant.Hequotessūtrapassagestoshowthatindicationsofthesixcausesarescatteredinthevarioussūtra‑s.

Forinstance,whenthesūtrasays,“conditionedbytheeyeandvisualforms,visualconsciousnessarises(cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam)”—suchstatementsareintendedtoindicatethedoctrineofefficientcause(kāraṇa-hetu)whichisestablishedinrespectofthenon‑obstructionofdharma‑sinthearisingof other dharma‑s(諸法於他有能作義,由生無障;jananāvighna-bhāvena).

Whenthesūtrasays,“thecomingtogetherofthethreeiscontact;borntogetheraresensation, ideationandvolition”;etc.—suchstatementsare intended toindicatetheco‑existentcause(sahabhū-hetu)whichisestablishedintherespectofco‑existentdharma‑ssharinganactivitybymutuallyoperatinginconcordance(同作一事,由互隨轉;anyonyānuparivartanaikakṛtyārthena).


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Whenthesūtrasays,“thispersonisendowedwithskillfulaswellasunskillfuldharma‑s ...Andthereistheaccompanyingskillfulrootwhichhasnotbeencutoff(隨俱行善根未斷;anusahagataṃ kuśalamūlam asamucchinnam),duetowhichtherewillariseinhimanotherskillfulrootfromthisskillfulroot.[Inthisway, thisperson in the futurewill be of thenature of purity]”; etc.—suchstatementsareintendedtoindicatethehomogeneouscause(sabhāga-hetu)whichisestablishedamongthepastandpresentdharma‑sinrespectoftheirbringingforththeirownfruits(由牽自果;svaphalanirvartanārthena).

Whenthesūtrasays,“thatwhichonecognizesthatoneunderstands”;etc.—such statements are intended to indicate the conjoined cause (saṃprayukta-hetu)which is established in respect of the conjoined thought and thought‑concomitantssharingthesamecognitiveobjectandactivity(同作一事,共取一境;ek’ālambanakṛtyārthena).

Whenthesūtrasays,“asaresultoffalseview,whateverbodilykarmaofaperson,orwhatevervocalkarma, orwhatevervolition (mentalkarma), orwhateveraspiration,isfromthatview(ofthenatureofthatview);andwhateverconditionings[ofhis]areofthattype.Thesedharma‑sareallconducivetonon‑desirableness,non‑pleasant‑ness,non‑loveliness,non‑agreeableness.[Why?Becausehisview,i.e.,falseview,isevil]”—suchstatementsareintendedtoindicatetheuniversalcause (sarvatraga-hetu)which is established in respect of its generating thecontinuanceofdefileddharma‑sofasimilarordissimilartype.(於同異類諸染污法, 由能引起故;sabhāgavibhāga-kliṣṭadharma-prabandha-janakārthena).

Whenthesūtrasays,“whentheyarearisen(reborn)there,theyexperiencetheretributionof[karma]thathasbeendonehere,whichisskillfulandwith‑outflow,derivedfromcultivation”;etc—suchstatementsareintendedtoindicatetheretributioncause(vipāka-hetu)whichisestablishedinrespectofits(anunskillfuloraskillfulbutwith‑outflowdharma)projectingafruitwhichisdifferentinmoralnature(一切不善善有漏法,由招異類故;visadṛśaphal’ākṣepakatvena).2

TheMVŚ3 likewisestatesthatthesūtra‑sspeakonlyofthefourconditions,notthesixcauses.Butitalsoquotestheopinionsofothermasters—oneidenticalwithSaṃghabhadra’s—whichthecompilersdonotrepudiate.Accordingly,thedoctrineofthefourconditionsmostprobablyprecededthatofthesixcauses.Atanyrate,thelatterarealreadymentionedintheJñānaprasthāna.4Thesixcauses,thefourconditions,andtheircorrespondingfruitsarecorrelatedasfollows:

6. theory of CauSality i - the Six CauSeS

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4 pratyaya-s 6 hetu-s 5 phala-s

sahabhū-hetusaṃprayuktaka-hetusabhāga-hetu

puruṣakāra-phala

vipāka-phala

niṣyanda-phalasarvatraga-hetuhetu-pratyaya

adhipati-phala

samanantara-pratyayaålambana-pratyayaadhipati-pratyaya

{

{

vipāka-hetu

kāraṇa-hetu

visaṃyoga-phala (notafruitofanyofthe6causes)

{

It canbenoticed from theabovechart that thesamanantara-pratyaya and theālambana-pratyayahavenocorrelativesamongthesixcauses.Thissuggeststhatthedoctrineofthefourconditionshasawiderscopethanthatofthesixcauses.

Thisraisesaninterestingquestion:Whatisthedoctrinalneedandsignificanceinthesubsequentelaborationofthehetu-pratyaya (conditionquacause)intothefivecauses?Wewillshowthatthiselaborationserves,ontheonehand,toexplainthedynamicarisingandinteractionofthedistinctdharma‑sthataretotallyunrelatedin their intrinsicnature,and,ontheother,tocorroboratefundamentallytheircentraldoctrineofsarvāstitva.Moreover,inthelattercontext,theco‑existentcauseisdoctrinallyoffundamentalimportancefortheSarvāstivādadoctrineofcausality.Forthisreason,thiscategory,togetherwithitssubset,theconjoinedcause,willbedealtwithincomparativelygreaterdetailsbelow.

6.2. The special importance of the doctrine of causality for the Sarvāstivāda

According toVasumitra’s *Samaya-bhedoparacaṇa-cakra, theSarvāstivādaschoolwasalsoknownastheHetuvāda(‘theschoolthatexpoundsthecauses’).5 Whilenoexplanationwhatsoeverofthislatternameisgiveninthetreatiseitself,wesurmisethatitwasveryprobablyderivedfromthespecialimportancethattheschoolattachestothedoctrineofcauses:Real,existentdharma‑sarerealforces;atthesametime,theirarisingintothephenomenalworld—outoftheirintrinsicnaturesasitwere—istotallydependentonspecificcauses.

6.2.1. Dharma-s as causal forces

Attheoutset,wemustrealizethatfortheSarvāstivāda,causalefficacyisthecentral criterion for the reality/existence (astitva) of adharma.Howdo theSarvāstivādins arrive at a definite list ofdharma‑swhich they claim to bereal/existent throughout the threeperiodsof time?Aswehave seen (§1.2),


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adharma—anultimatereal—isthatwhichsustainsitsuniquecharacteristic.Whensuchauniquecharacteristicisfound,itistobeknownthataspecificoruniqueintrinsicnatureexistscorrespondingly,i.e.,adharmaasarealdistinctentity(dravyāntara)isdiscovered,anditistobeaddedtotherecognizedlistof dharma‑s.

Theexistenceofsuchauniquecharacteristicmaybeperceiveddirectlythroughthesenses,asinthecaseoftheobjectsofthefivesenses.Wheredirectsensoryperceptionisnotpossible,theSarvāstivādinsarguefortheexistenceofadharma fromtheobservationormentalanalysisoftheuniquecausalcontributionthatitmakesintheoccurrenceofagiveneventinspace‑time.Thus,itisargued,thethought‑concomitantsmustexistasrealentities,foreachofthemcontributesuniquelyandnecessarilytoourempiricalexperience:vedanāenablessensation,saṃjñāenablesideation,smṛtienablesrecollection,etc.Likewise,thedisjoinedconditioningsarealsorealentitiesonaccountoftheirbeingrealcausalforces:jāti, sthiti, jarā/anityatā andvyaya are the sine qua non that together causeaconditioneddharmatobemomentary;acquisition(prāpti)isaforce/causeforeffectingthespecificconnectionbetweenadharmaandasentientcontinuum;etc.

A dharmathenisarealonaccountofitbeingarealforce—ofhavingacausalefficacy—inotherwords,onaccountofitbeingacause.Itisforthisreasonthatdharma‑sarealsocalledsaṃskāra‑s—conditioningforces.Failuretoproveanallegedexistent’scausalefficacyistantamounttofailuretoproveitsveryexistence/reality.Accordingly,ifsaṃskāra-dharma‑sareassertedtobeexistenttri‑temporally,theymustbeestablishedasbelongingtoonecategoryoranotherof hetu.TheMVŚ,citingtheauthorityofthePrŚ,statesthatthecausescomprisethetotalityofexistentdharma‑s:

Thecauses,thepathand‘conditionedco‑arising’…completelysubsumethetotalityofthedhātu,āyatanaandskandha dharma‑s.…Thecauses,thepathand‘conditionedco‑arising’allrefertothesixcauses,becausetheyareallsynonymsofhetu.Accordingtosome,thecausesrefertothetotalityofconditioneddharma‑s,asisstatedinthePrŚ:“Whatarethehetu dharma‑s?Alltheconditioneddharma‑s.6

Similarly,therealityofthefourcausalconditionsmustbeupheld.TheDārṣṭāntikamastersintheMVŚdenythem,assertingthattheyarenomorethanconventionaltermsdesignatedbythevariousmasters.Thecompilersrepudiatethisassertion:

Iftheconditions(lit.:thefactoftheconditions,諸緣性;pratyayatā)arenotrealexistents,thenalldharma‑sarenotrealexistents,sincethecausesandconditionssubsumealldharma‑s.7

Inthesametext,aquestionisasked:


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ArethosefourGreatElementswhichhavenotyetarisenalso[mutually]co‑existentcauses?Answer:Theyarealsoco‑existentcausesbecausetheyfallunderthecategoryofcauseandbecausetheyhavethecause‑characteristic(hetu-lakṣaṇa).8

TheMVŚcompilershereendorsetheviewthatalltheGreatElements,whetherarisenornot,arereciprocallyco‑existentcausesandquoteinsupportthePrŚwhichstates“Whatarethedharma‑sarisenthroughcauses?Answer:Allconditioneddharma‑s.”This implies that the causal nature is intrinsic to thedharma‑sthemselves.Inasimilarvein,Saṃghabhadraexplainsthattheretributioncauseexistsinthefutureperiodaswell:

…Althoughthereisnecessarilyabefore‑afterinthecaseofaretributioncause,thiscauseisnotestablishedfromtheview‑pointofthisbefore‑after [sequence]:…A specifickarma cause effects a correspondingretribution—thisnature(lakṣaṇa)canbesaidtoexistinthefutureperiodaswell,andthus[thiscause]canalsobeestablishedinthefutureperiod.However,fromtheview‑pointofthenatureofadharma,onespeaksofthefuture[period]anticipatively:suchacausearisesbeforeandsuchaneffectarisesafter;atthestagewhenthecausehasarisen,theposteriorityoftheeffectcomestobeestablished.Itisonlythenthatonecanspeakofarealbefore‑after.Itisnotthecasethatthereexistsanyrealbefore‑afteratthestagewhen[thedharma‑s]arenotyetarisen.Thatthecausescanbesaidtoexistinthefutureperiodisonaccountofthefactthatthesecausesarenotestablishedindependenceon[their]coursingthroughtime,likethecaseoftheco‑existentandconjoinedcauses,etc.[Thenecessarilyconascentdharma‑sfunctionasco‑existentcausestooneanotherinthefutureperiod,i.e.,atthetimewhentheyareco‑arising].9 (Seealso,infra,§5.5,5).

Likewise,Saṃghabhadraasserts that thenatureofālambana-pratyaya beingobjectsofperceptionisdetermined—eventhoughtheyarenotbeingperceived.10 The ālambana-pratyaya comprises the totality ofdharma‑s—past, present,future,aswellastheasaṃskṛta‑s.11Infact,theSarvāstivādinsarguetheyarerealbecausetheycanfunctionasobjectsforthegenerationofcognition.Indeed,itisthiscausalefficacythatconstitutestheverymarkoftheexistent(sal-lakṣaṇa).12 Allexistentdharma‑shavesuchanefficacy,butonlythepresentdharma‑shavekāritrawhichistheefficacyofprojectingtheirownfruits.(supra,§§3.5.3,5.5)

The sameprinciple applies even in the case of the unconditioneddharma‑s.Although“thewayofestablishingcausesandeffectsamongtheconditionedisnotapplicabletothecaseoftheunconditioned”13in‑as‑muchasthelattertranscendspace‑timeandthereforearenotdirectlyinvolvedinthecause‑effectprocessesinphenomenalexistence,theycan,nevertheless,beregardedascausesinthesensethattheytoofunctionasobjectsofthought.Saṃghabhadraalsoarguesthatthe


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factthatasaint(ārya)inhisdirectrealization(abhisamaya)seestrulyallthefourtruths—includingtheunconditioneddharmacalledcessationthroughdeliberation(pratisamkhyā-nirodha)—provestherealityofthelatter:ithastheefficacyofcausingthearisingofthepractitioner’sprajñāthatperceivesit.14Moreover,theyaredynamicforces.Thus,thecessationthroughdeliberationactstoensurethatthe acquisitionofthedefilementssoabandonedwillabsolutelynolongerbeabletoarise.15 Thecausalefficacyofnirvāṇaisalsoinferablefromthefactthatitcanhaveanimpactonthementalstreamofreceptivebeingssothattheygiverisetodelightinnirvāṇaanddisgusttowardssaṃsāra.16 (See infra,§16.2.1).

6.2.2. Dharma-s as factors of phenomenal existence arisen through causes

Thespecialemphasisonhetuon thepartof theSarvāstivādins isalso tobeunderstoodastheirconcerntoprovetherealitiesofthetri‑temporaldharma‑sbyworkingoutacausaldoctrinethatsufficestoaccountfortheirarisinganddynamicinteractioninphenomenalexistence.Notonlymustdharma‑sasrealexistentsineachcasebecausallyefficacious—hencecalledconditioningforces—aswehaveseenabove,butasphenomenaarisenthroughcauses—hencesaidtobeconditioned—theirarising(andceasing)mustalsoineachcasebecausallyaccountedfor.AsstatedintheAKB:

Thatwhichexistsasarealentitynecessarilyhasacause;oritoughttobeanunconditioned.17

In the Sarvāstivāda perspective, alldharma‑s have been always existing.Asamatteroffact,timeisanabstractiononourpartderivedfromtheiractivities.18 A dharmaexiststhroughouttimeandyetisnotpermanentasit“coursesintime”(adhvan-saṃcāra).ButastheMVŚexplains,“conditioneddharma‑sareweakintheir intrinsicnature,theycanaccomplishtheiractivitiesonlythroughmutualdependence”(cf.infra.§2.4.3.1):

Wedeclarethatthecauseshavetheactivitiesastheirfruits,nottheentitiesinthemselves(svabhāva/dravya).Wefurtherdeclarethattheeffectshavetheactivitiesas theircauses,not theentities in themselves.Theentitiesinthemselvesarewithouttransformationthroughouttime,beingneithercausesnoreffects.19

Moreover,

thetri‑temporaldharma‑sexistthroughouttimeasentitiesinthemselves;thereisneitherincreasenordecrease.Itisonlyonthebasisoftheiractivitiesthattheyaresaidtoexistornotexist[asphenomena].20

But,inturn,theiractivitiesnecessarilydependoncausesandconditions:21


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Beingfeebleintheirintrinsicnatures,theyhavenosovereignty(aiśvarya).Theyaredependentonothers,theyarewithouttheirownactivityandareunabletodoastheywish.22

Indeed,giventheSarvāstivādatheoryoftheuniqueentitiesbeingabsolutelyisolatedfromoneanotherintheirintrinsicnatures,withoutapropertheoryofcausalitywhichcanaccountfor thearisingofanddynamicinterplayamongthem,theSarvāstivādinswouldutterlyfailtopresentanyversionofthecentralBuddhistteachingof‘conditionedco‑arising’.ItmaybenotedinthiscontextthatinhisMūla-madhyamaka-kārikā,Nāgārjunaprovesthenon‑arising(anutpāda)of dharma‑spreciselybyrefutingeachofthefourconditionsacknowledgedbytheSarvāstivādins.

Inbrief,thisaspectofadharma’sveryarisingbeingconditionedbycausesandconditionscanbediscernedintheothermajordoctrinaltermusedtodescribethefactorsofphenomenalexistence—saṃskṛta (seesupra,§2.4.3.1). Ifalldharma‑s cannot arise except throughcauses, then the real existenceof anygiven dharmamustbeaccountedforbyfindingitscausesofonecategoryoranother.Besides,itisonlybyaccountingforitsintrinsiccharacteristic—itsphenomenologically cognizable aspectmanifested through causes— thatitsveryexistenceasarealentitycanbeestablished.Ultimately,theintrinsiccharacteristicandtheintrinsicnatureofadharmaareone.23 Saṃghabhadrainfactarguesfortherealityofnirvāṇaviatheexperiencibilityofitslakṣaṇa:“…the lakṣaṇaisnoneotherthanthedravya.Now,sincenirvāṇahasthelakṣaṇa ofbeingcessation(nirodha),calm(śānta)etc.,itisestablishedthatitexistsasarealentity(dravya)”.24 (See infra,§16.3.1).

6.3. Definitions of the six causes

6.3.1. Efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu)

Thisisthemostcomprehensiveorgenerictypeofcause:Itisanydharmathateitherdirectlyorindirectly—bynothindering—contributestothearisingofanotherdharma.“Aconditioneddharmahasalldharma‑s,exceptingitself,asitsefficientcause,for,asregardsitsarising,[thesedharma‑s]abideinthestateofnon‑obstructiveness.”25TheMVŚexplainsthiscategoryasfollows:

Whatistheefficientcause?Answer:Conditionedby eye and a visible, visual consciousness arises.This visual consciousness has as its efficient cause the eye, the visible,the dharma‑sconjoinedwithit,thedharma‑sco‑existentwithit,aswellas theear,sound,auditoryconsciousness,…thementalorgan(manas),thementalobjects(dharma),mentalconsciousness,[i.e.,]allthedharma‑swhicharematerial,immaterial,visible,invisible,resistant,non‑resistant,


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with‑outflow,outflow‑free,conditioned,unconditioned,etc.—alldharma‑sexcepting itself.…Efficient (kāraṇa)means ‘beingnon‑obstructive’,‘accomplishingsomething’(有所辦).26

Theunconditioneddharma‑sarenoteffectsofanyofthesixcauses,beingoutsidethetemporalprocessaltogether.However,inasmuchastheydonothinderthearisingofotherdharma‑s,theymayberegardedasefficientcauses.Thisposition,however,isrejectedbytheSautrāntikas.27Infact,theSautrāntika‑Dārṣṭāñtikamaster,Śrīlāta,deniestheexistenceoftheefficientcausealtogether.28

6.3.2. Homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu)

Anexemplificationof this cause is thehomogeneous causality inwhich themoralspeciesofthesucceedingeffectisthesameasthatoftheprecedingcause.Thus,intheserialcontinuityofathoughtrepresentedbyc1 → c2 → c3,ifc1 isskillful,itfunctionsasthehomogeneouscausetogeneratec2astheeffect,whichisalsoskillful;c2inturnfunctionsasahomogeneouscausetogeneratec3,whichisagainskillful.AccordingtotheSarvāstivādins,thistypeofcausalityobtains in thecaseofamental series,andamongphysicalmatter.However,boththe‘westernmasters’andtheDārṣṭāntikasdenythatrūpa-dharma‑scanhaveahomogeneouscause.29Thereare,infact,otherdisagreementsamongthevariousSarvāstivādamastersintermsofdetailsconcerningthenatureandscopeofthiscausalcategory.30

TheAKBexplainsthiscauseasfollows:

The similardharma‑s are thehomogeneous causesofdharma‑s similar[tothem],fore.g.,thefiveskandha‑swhichareskillful,are[thehomogeneouscauses]ofthefiveskillfulskandha‑s,amongthemselves.Likewisethedefiledandthenon‑definedfiveskandha‑s,[ineachcase,amongthemselves]…

[But]dharma‑sbelongingtoagivencategory[suchasdefilementsabandonablebyvision(darśanaheya)]31andtoagivenstage[suchasthesensualsphere]are[homogeneouscauses]onlyofthosebelongingtotheirowncategoryandstage.…

[Moreover,only]apreviouslyarisen[similardharma]isthehomogeneouscauseofasubsequent[dharma],arisenornotarisen.Thefuture[dharma‑s]arenothomogeneouscauses.32

Inthiscontext,Vasubandhualsorecordsotherviewsonthenatureandscopeofthiscause:

According to othermasters: [Concerning the non‑defilednon‑definedaggregates—]non‑definedmatter is [the homogeneous cause] of [thenon‑defined]five[skandha‑s];buttheotherfour[skandha‑s]arenot[the


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homogeneouscause]ofmatter.Thisisbecause[thematteraggregate]isinferior[innature33totheotheraggregates].

[Accordingtosomeothermasters:]34Inagivengroup‑homogeneity(i.e.withinthe same sentient being),kalala is [thehomogeneous cause] of the tenstatescomprisingkalala,etc.35 The arbuda[state],etc.,[each]successivelydecreasingbyone,are[thehomogeneouscauseoffromninetoone]of[thestatescomprising]arbuda,etc.[Thisisbecausealaterstatecanserveonlyasacondition(notasacause;cf.§7.2)withregardtotheearlierstates].36

[TheDārṣṭāntikas]37denythatmatteristhehomogeneouscauseofmatter.…38

Saṃghabhadracites,39asscripturalevidenceofthiscause,thefollowingpassages:

“Thispersonisendowedwithskillfulandunskillfuldharma‑s.Itshouldbeknownthatinthispudgala,theskillfuldharma‑svanishandtheunskillfuldharma‑sappear;butthereexistsanaccompanying(隨俱行;anusahagata)skillfulrootwhichhasnotbeencutoff(asumucchinna).Onaccountofitsnothavingbeencutoff,thereisstillthepossibilityofthearisingofanotherrootofskillfulnessfromthisrootofskillfulness.”40

“Theinclinationofabhikṣu’smindistowardsthataboutwhichhefrequentlythinks.” 41

“Withignorance(avidyā)ascause,hegeneratesdefilements;withunderstanding(vidyā)ascause,heisfreedfromthedefilements…”

Havingcitedtheabovepassages,Saṃghabhadrathenexplainsasfollows:

Thepastandpresenthomogeneousdharma‑s,onaccountoftheirinducingtheirownfruits,areestablishedashomogeneouscauses.42

In Saṃghabhadra’scommentaryontheAKBexplanationsthatwehavequotedabove,hedoesnotseemtohaveanyobjectionstoVasubandhu’sexplanations.LikeVasubandhu,healsocitesthesameviewsofthedifferentmastersonthescopeofthiscause.

Infact,herecordstwomore(loc. cit.):

(1) Concerningthenon‑defilednon‑definedfiveskandha‑s,somemastersmaintainthatfivearethefruitsoffour(i.e.,fourarethehomogeneouscauseoffive);[thatis,]matter—beinginferiorinstrength(勢力劣故)—is[only]thehomogeneouscauseofthefourotheraggregates.43

(2) Accordingtosomemasters:matterontheonehand,andthefourotheraggregatesontheother,arenotmutuallyhomogeneouscause.Thisisbecausematteris“inferiorandofadifferentspecies(fromthefourmentalaggregates)”(劣異類故).

ThissuggeststhattherewerevariousinterpretationsintheSarvāstivādasystemonthiscause,whichweremostlytolerated.Oftheseviews,Saṃghabhadrainfact


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criticizesonlythelasttwocitedabove:theonerelatedtotheembryonicseriesandtheDārṣṭāntikaviewthatthereisnohomogeneouscauseamongtherūpa‑s.44

Atthebeginningoftheentirediscussioninthiscontext,hedefinesthiscauseinthefollowingwords:

Thosethatcannourishandproducetheemanation(niṣyanda)fruits,whetherremoteornear,arecalledhomogeneouscauses.Itistobeunderstoodthatthiscauseobtainsinthecaseofsimilardharma‑swithregardtosimilardharma‑s,notwithregardtothoseofadifferentspecies.45

6.3.3. Universal cause (sarvatraga-hetu)

Likethehomogeneouscause,thiscauseaswellgeneratesanemanationfruit.Fromthisperspective, theuniversalcausemaybeconsidered tobeasubsetofthehomogeneouscauses,pertainingtothedefileddharma‑salone.Thereishomogeneitybetweenthiscauseanditseffectintermsofstage(sensesphere,etc.)andofmoralspecies(botharedefiled).

However,asthefollowingpassageshows,itistobemadeacausedistinctfromthehomogeneouscausebecausethereisnonecessaryhomogeneityintermsofcategoryofabandonability46 (nikāya/prakāra—see§12.6.2):

Theuniversaldharma‑sarisenpreviouslyandbelongingtoagivenstagearetheuniversalcausesoflaterdefileddharma‑sbelongingtotheirownstage.…Onaccountoftheirbeingacauseapplicabletoalldefileddharma‑s,theyareestablished[asacause]separatefromthehomogeneouscausesand[also]becausetheyarethecauseof[defileddharma‑s]belongingtoothercategoriesaswell,for,throughtheirpower,defilementsbelongingtocategoriesdifferentfromtheirsareproduced.47

TheMVŚ48enumeratesdifferentopinionsas towhichdefilementsconstitutetheuniversalcauses:

Someholdthatalldefilementsareuniversal.

Someholdthatthedefilementsofthefivecategoriesofabandonabilityarealluniversal.

Someholdthatallthedefilementsabandonablebyvisionintounsatisfactorinessanditsoriginareuniversal.

Someholdthatthedefilementsfoundinallthethreespheresofexistencearealluniversal.

Someholdthatthedefilementscommontoallthefivecategoriesofabandonabilityareuniversal,namely,ignorance, craving,hatredandconceit.

TheDārṣṭāntikasholdthatthetwodefilements,i.e.,ignorance(avidyā)andcraving(tṛṣṇā),areuniversal.Theirexplanationisasfollows:“Therootof


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conditionedco‑arisingissaidtobeuniversal;ignoranceistherootoftheearlierpart(pūrvānta-koṭi)ofconditionedco‑arising,andexistence‑craving(bhava-tṛṣṇā) is the rootof the laterpart (aparānta-koṭi)ofconditionedco‑arising.Thus,theyareuniversal.”

TheVibhajyavādinsholdthatfiveareuniversal:ignorance, craving,view,conceit andthought(citta).

The Vaibhāṣikaviewisthatthreeareuniversal:doubt(vicikitsā),viewandignorance, whichareabandonablebyvisionintounsatisfactoriness,thecauseofunsatisfactoriness,togetherwiththeirconjoinedandco‑existentdharma‑s.49

YinShunsuggeststhatthedoctrineofthefiveuniversalcausesproposedbytheVibhajyavādinscouldbetheforerunneroftheYogācāradoctrineofthemanas vijñāna(the7th consciousness).Thisisbecausetheuniversalcausesareintendedasthecausesthatuniversallygeneratedefilementsandduḥkha.Inthissetoffive,thefourdefilements—ignorance,craving,viewandconceit—constantlyaccompanythought.Thisimpliesthatallbeingsconstantlypossessasubtlethoughtaccompaniedbythefourdefilements,whichiscomingclosetothedoctrineofmanaslaterdevelopedintheYogācāra.50

6.3.4. Retribution cause (vipāka-hetu)

Thisisthekarmiccause.Thatistosay,itleadstoadesirableorundesirablekarmicretribution.TheAKBexplainsthenatureofthiscause:

Theunskillfulandskillfuldharma‑saretheretributioncauses,astheyareofthenatureofretribution.

Whydotheneutraldharma‑snotbringaboutretribution?Becausetheyareweak,likerottenseeds.

Whynottheoutflow‑free[dharma‑s]?Becausetheyarenotmoistenedbycraving,likeunmoistenedintactseeds.

[Whynotthosenotbelongingtoanysphere?]Because,notbelongingtoanysphere,whatkindofsphere‑specific(pratisaṃyukta—bound[toasphere])retributioncouldtheybringabout?51

AccordingtotheDārṣṭāntikasintheMVŚ,“thereisnoretributioncauseapartfromvolition(cetanā),andnoretributionfruitapartfromsensation(vedanā)”.Accordingtoothers,suchastheMahāsāṃghikas,retributioncausesandfruitsareconfinedtothoughtandthethought‑concomitants.Againsttheseopinions,the Sarvāstivāda holds that retribution causes and fruits comprise all fiveskandha‑s,thatis,notonlythoughtandthethought‑concomitantsbutalsothematter accompanying thought (cittānuvartaka-rūpa) and the conditioningsdisjoined from thought— the ideationless attainment (asaṃjñī-samāpatti),


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the cessationattainment(nirodha-samāpatti),allacquisitionswhichareakuśala andkuśala-sāsrava,and theaccompanyingcharacteristicsof theconditioned(saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa‑s)—can constitute retribution causes.52Theretributiverūpa-sarethebodilyandvocalkarma—bothinformative(vijñapti)andnon‑informative(avijñapti)(seeinfra,§13.4).Theideationlessattainmentcaneffectthe asaṃjñika, that is, itcan result inanexistence in the ideationless realm.However,thevitalfaculty(jīvitendriya),thegroup‑homogeneity(nikāya-sabhāga)and thefivematerial faculties pertaining therein are not its retributions, butthoseof thekarma in the fourthdhyāna. Similarly, the cessation attainmentcaneffectthefourskandha‑softhesphereofneitherideation‑nor‑non‑ideation(naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñā-āyatana)—exceptingthevitalfacultyandthegroup‑homogeneitythereinwhichareexclusivelykarmicfruits—asitsretributions.53 Acquisitioncaneffectthefollowingasretributions:(a)matter—visualobjects,sound,smell,taste;(b)thoughtandthought‑concomitants—thethreetypesofsensation(pleasant,unpleasant,neutral;(c)conditioningsdisjoinedfromthought—acquisitionandthefourcharacteristicsoftheconditioned.54

Vipāka-hetu(‘retribution‑cause’)canbetakeneitherasagenitivedeterminativecompound(tatpuruṣa):vipākasya hetuḥ,i.e.,thevipākaistheresultoftheprocessvi‑√pac,orasadescriptivecompound(karmadhāraya):vipāka eva hetuḥ:theretributionitselfisthecause,i.e.,thevipākaisthatwhichisripened(vipacyate).55

AccordingtotheVaibhāṣikas:vi(‘different’)meansvisadṛśa(‘dissimilar’)—avipākaisapāka(‘maturation’)dissimilarfromitscause.Aretributioncauseisneverneutral,whereasitsfruitisalwaysneutral.56 Saṃghabhadraexplainsthatvipākamayrefertoeitherthecauseoreffectaspectoftheprocessofmaturation:

Whatiscalledvipākamayrefertoamaturation(pāka)separatefromthecauseordistinctfromthecause—thesetwo[explanations]pertaintotheeffect[aspect].Orrather,itmayrefertothefactthatthekarmathathasbeendone,onreachingthestageoftheacquisitionofthefruit,canbetransformedintobeingcapableofmaturing—this[explanation]pertainstothecause[aspectoftheprocess].57

6.3.5. Co-existent cause (sahabhū-hetu)

ThisisanewcausalcategoryinnovatedbytheSarvāstivāda.Asweshallsee(§§6.6ff.),itisofcentralimportanceinthecausaltheoryoftheschool.Itbecamean indispensable doctrinal tool for theYogācāra theory of cognition only(vijñaptimātratā)(§6.5).

MVŚ:Question:What is the intrinsic nature of the co‑existent cause?Answer:Alltheconditioneddharma‑s…Question:Whatisthemeaningof‘co‑existent’(sahabhū)?Answer:‘Co‑existent’means[i]’notmutuallyseparated (avinā-bhāva)’, [ii]’sharing the same effect’, [iii]’mutually


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accordantwithoneanother’.Thisco‑existentcauseisdefinitelyfoundinthethreeperiodsoftimesandproducesthevirileeffect(puruṣakāra-phala).58

AKB:The co‑existent [causes] are those that are reciprocally [virile]59 effects…Forexample: thefourGreatElementsareco‑existent [causes]mutuallyamong themselves; soalso, thoughtand thedharma-s thatarethought‑accompaniments(cittānuvarttin);soalsothe[four]characteristicsofthe conditionedandthecharacterized(lakṣya)[conditioneddharma].Inthisway,thewholeoftheconditioned,whereapplicable(i.e.,whereamutualcausal relationshipobtains) are co‑existent causes. (Vasubandhu adds:)Itistobeaddedthatwithoutbeingeffectstoeachother,adharmaistheco‑existentcauseofitssecondarycharacteristics(anulakṣaṇa)butnotviceversa.…[Thecaseoftheco‑existentcause]islikethestayinginpositionofthreesticksthroughtheirmutualstrength/support—thisestablishesthecausalrelationship(hetuphalabhāva)oftheco‑existents.60

Ny:The co-existent [causes] are those that are reciprocally virile effects,on account of the fact that they can arise byvirtue ofmutual support… For example: the four Great Elements are co-existent cause mutually among themselves,…foritisonlywhenthefourdifferentkindsofGreatElementsassembletogetherthattheycanbeefficaciousinproducingthederivedmatter(upādāya rūpa);so also thought and the dharma-s which are thought-accompaniments; so also the [four] characteristics of the conditioned and the characterized [conditioned dharma]. In this way, the whole of the conditioned, where applicable (i.e., where a mutual causal relationship obtains) are co-existent causes. (Theitalicizedwordsare thosealsofoundin theAKB).Herein,thescopeofthecharacteristicsofthecauses[asdescribedbyVasubandhu] is toonarrow— the thought‑accompaniments and thecharacteristics[oftheconditioned]should ineachcasebementionedasco‑existentcausesamongstthemselves.Thus,heshouldnothavesaidthatonlythosethatarereciprocally theeffectofoneanotherareco‑existentcauses.Adharma and its secondary characteristics are not reciprocallyeffects,yetitisa[co‑existent‑]causeofthelatter[althoughthelatterarenotitsco‑existentcause].…Therefore,thecharacteristics[ofthiscause]shouldbeexplainedthus:Thoseconditioneddharma‑sthatsharethesameeffectcan[also]beconsideredasco‑existentcauses;thereisnofault[inexplainingthus],asitissoexplainedinthefundamentaltreatises(mūla-śāstra)…61

Avatāra:Theconditioneddharma‑sthatarefruitsofoneanotherorthattogetherbringaboutacommonfruitarenamedco‑existentcauses.62

6.3.6. Conjoined cause (saṃprayuktaka-hetu)

Thiscausepertainstothedomainofthecitta-caitta-dharma‑s.Essentially,itmaybeconsideredtobeasubsetoftheco‑existentcause.

MVŚ:Question:Whataretheconjoinedcauses?Answer:Dharma‑sthatarethoughtandthought‑concomitants.…Question:Whyarethoughtandthe


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thought‑concomitantsmutuallyconjoinedcausestooneanother?Answer:Becausetheyarereciprocallycauses,arisenthroughtheirmutualstrength,mutually induced,mutually nourished,mutually strengthened,mutuallydependent.Thisisliketwobundlesofstrawwhichstayinpositionthroughmutualdependence.[Likewise,]whenmanyropesarecombined,ahugelogcanbedragged;andmanypeoplecancrossabigriverbyjoininghandstogether.Becauseconditioneddharma‑sareweakintheirintrinsicnature,theycanaccomplishtheiractivitiesonlythroughmutualdependence.Ifweweretoasksensation:‘Withoutideation,canyou[alone]sense/experienceanobject?’Theanswerwouldbe:‘No.’Thesamequestions[andanswers]applytotheotherthoughtsandthoughtconcomitantsaswell.63

AKB:Thethoughtandthought‑concomitantswhosesupportingbasisisthesameareconjoinedcausestooneanother…Thus,thesupportingbasisofvisualconsciousness,whichisthevisualfacultyofagivenmoment,istheverysamesupportingbasisofthe[thought‑concomitants,i.e.,]sensation,etc.,conjoinedwithit…64

Ny:This [conjoined] cause is establishedbecause thought and thoughtconcomitants,beingconjoined,accomplishthesamedeedbygraspingthesameobject.65

Avatāra:Thethoughtandthought‑concomitantsthataremutuallyconjoinedwithoneanotherandthatapprehendacommonobjectarecalledconjoinedcauses.66

6.3.6.1. The distinction between the conjoined and co-existent causes

MVŚ:Question:What is the differencebetween the conjoined and theco‑existentcauses?Somesaythatthereisnodifference,asinone[andthesame]moment,thesensationandideation,etc.,arebothtypesofcauses.Therefore, in thisregard,oneshouldsaythus:Whicheverareconjoinedcausesarealsoco‑existentcauses;someco‑existentcausesexistwhicharenotconjoinedcauses,viz.,thedisjoinedco‑existentcauses.Thustherearedifferencesbetweenthetwocauses…[Theirdifferences]:conjoinedcauseshavethesenseofcompanionship;co‑existentcauseshavethesenseofhavingacommonfruit.Thefirstmeanshavingthesamesupportingbasis,modeofunderstandingandobject.Thesecondmeanshavingthesameproduction(jāti),deterioration(jarā),duration(sthiti),impermanence(anityatā),fruit,emanation andretribution.Thefirstislikeholdingastick;thesecondislikeperforminganactionhavingheldthestick.Thefirstislike[agroupofpeople]joininghandstogether;thesecondislikecrossingatorrenthavingheldhandstogether.Thefirstmeansmutuallyaccordantwithoneanother;thesecondmeansnotbeingmutuallyapart.67

AKB:Whateverisaconjoinedcauseisalsoaco‑existentcause.Inwhatsensethenisitaco‑existentcauseandinwhatsenseisitaconjoinedcause?Itisaco‑existentcauseinthesenseofreciprocallybeingeffects,likethe


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caseoffellowmerchantstraversingaroadthroughtheirmutualstrength.Itisaconjoinedcauseinthesenseofconjunctionintermsofthefivefoldequality,68likethecaseoftheseverymerchantsbeingengagedinthesameactivitiesofeatinganddrinking,etc.;evenifoneislacking,theyarenotconjoinedtogether.69

Ny:Whatisthedifferencebetweenthesetwocauses,i.e.,theco‑existentandtheconjoined?Tobeginwith,dharma‑sthatareconjoinedcausesarealsoco‑existentcauses.Thereexistdharma‑sthatareco‑existentcausesbutnotconjoinedcauses—viz.,the[thought‑]accompanyingmatter;jāti,etc.;theGreatElements.Ifaconjoinedcauseisalsoaco‑existentcause,what,inthiscase,isthedifferenceinsignificancebetweenthesetwocauses?Itisnotthecasethattheconjoinedcausesarenoneotherthantheco‑existentcauses, for these twocausesdiffer in theirsignificance.However, in thecasewhereoneandthesamedharmaisaconjoinedcause aswellasaco‑existentcause,thisisthedifferenceinsignificance: conjoinedcauses signify‘notmutually apart’; co‑existent causes signify ‘having the same fruit’.Again,havingthesameproduction(jāti),duration(sthiti),etc.,byvirtueofthemutualstrength—theseareco‑existentcauses;graspingthesameobjectbyvirtueofthemutualstrength—theseareconjoinedcauses.Accordingtosomemasters:Onaccountofthemeaningofbeingreciprocallyfruits,theco‑existentcausesareestablished;thisislikethecaseoffellowmerchantswho,mutuallysupported,traverseariskyroadtogether.Onaccountofthemeaningofthefivefoldequality,theconjoinedcauseisestablished;thisislikethosesamefellowmerchantshavingthesameexperience,sameactivitiesofeating,etc.Herein,theyarenotconjoinedevenwhenoneismissing,andthusisthefactoftheirbeingreciprocallycausesuniversallyestablished.70

Avatāra:Thedistinctionbetweentheconjoinedcauseandtheco‑existentcause [maybe illustrated] by the example of a caravanofmerchants:Themerchants,byrenderingmutualassistancetooneanother,areabletopassthroughariskyroad—thisisco‑existentcause.Theyconsumethesamefoodanddrinks—thisisconjoinedcause.71

6.4. Saṃghabhadra’s defense of simultaneous causation

Ofallthesixcauses,theco‑existentcauseisthemostcontroversial.Thecaseof this co‑existent cause is the co‑existent causalitywhichbest exemplifieswhatwemaycall,forwantofabetterEnglishterm,‘simultaneouscausality’(seebelow,§§6.7.1,6.7.2).Saṃghabhadradefendsatgreatlengththedoctrineofsimultaneouscausation,asrepresentedbythiscause,againsttheSautrāntika,72 givingseveralexplanationswhicharemorearticulatecomparativelytothosefound in theearlier texts.Anadditional simileof the lamp in relation to itslightisalsogivenasanillustrationofthiscategory.73Hebeginshisarguments


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withanexaminationofthenatureofcausality,invokingtheBuddha’ssuccinctstatementoftheprincipleofconditionality:

Thisbeing,thatcomestobe.Fromthearisingofthis,thatarises(asmin satī’daṃ bhavati / asyo’tpādād idam utpadyate).

Saṃghabhadraexplains:

Contrarytothisarenon‑existence,non‑arising.Thisisthegeneralcharacteristicofcausality.In[theBuddha’sstatementabove],thefirst[sentence]illustratesthe case of the conascent (sahaja, sahajāta) cause; the second furtherillustratesthatofthepreviously‑arisen(agraja,pūrvaja)cause.

Ininsistingthattheco‑existentcauseshouldalsoincludethemeaningof‘sharingthesameeffect’besidesthatof‘beingmutuallyeffects’,SaṃghabhadrareallyhasdonenomorethantokeepinlinewiththeMVŚorthodoxy(cf.secondmeaningin§6.3.5).Skandhila’s *Abhidharmāvatāra, another post‑AKBVaibhāṣika/Sarvāstivādawork,alsomentionsthesetwomeaningsexplicitly:

The conditioneddharma‑swhich are effects of one another orwhichtogetherbringaboutacommoneffectarenamedco‑existentcauses—e.g.,theGreatElements;the[conditioneddharma‑swhichare]characterizedand the [four] conditioned characteristics; the thought and the thought‑accompaniments.Theseare[ineachcaseco‑existentcauses]foroneanother.74

Saṃghabhadrafurtherarticulatesthatinfactthereareonlythreesituationswheresuchasimultaneouscausalityobtains:

Wedonotconcede thatcause‑effect relationshipobtainsreciprocally inallcasesoftheconascent:…Itobtainsonly[i]amongthosethatsharethesameeffect;or[ii]thatarereciprocallyeffects;or[iii]wherebytheforceofthis,thatdharmacanarise.Suchconascent[dharma‑s]haveacause‑effectrelationship,[i.e.,areco‑existentcauses].75

Thethirdcaseisconsistentwiththedefinitionofthevirileeffect—theeffectcorrespondingtotheco‑existentcause(seeinfra,§7.3.2.1).Moregenerally:

…whateverarenecessarilyconascent,arenecessarilycauseonetoanother.…although[dharma‑s]mayshare thesamecauseofarising, those thatarenotreciprocallycausetooneanotherdonotnecessarilyarisetogether.[Conversely,]thosethatarenecessarilyconascentdefinitelyarisewithoneanotherasreciprocalcauses[exercisingtheircausalfunctionsatthetimeoftheirarising].Accordingly,theconascentcauses(includingco‑existentandconjoinedcauses)areuniversallyestablished.76

This propositionmaybe seen as corresponding to the sense of necessaryinseparabilityofdharma‑swhicharereciprocallyco‑existentcausesgivenintheMVŚ(supra,§6.3.5).Thiscriterion,saidtobelaiddownbytheancient


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logicians,representingtheprincipleofinductivereasoning,isalsoinvokedbytheVaibhāṣikasintheAKBintheirdisputewiththeSautrāntikas:

For,accordingtotheLogicians,thisisthecharacteristicofacause‑effect[relationship]:WhenAexists ordoesnot exist,Bnecessarily exists ordoesnotexist;thenAisthecauseandBtheeffect(etad dhi hetuhetumato lakṣaṇam ācakṣate haitukāḥ / yasya bhāvābhāvayoḥ yasya bhāvābhāvau niyamataḥ sa hetur itaro hetumān iti /).Nowinthecaseoftheco‑existentdharma‑s,whenoneexists,allexist;whenonedoesnotexist,alldonotexist.Thus,theyareinamutualcause‑effectrelationship.77

6.5. Explanations in the Yogācāra system

ItisinterestingtonotethatwhereastheSautrāntika—oneoftheprecursorsoftheMahāyānaYogācāra—vehementlyrefutedtheVaibhāṣikadoctrineoftheco‑existentcauses,theYogācāratakesitovertogetherwithitssubset,theconjoinedcause,withouthesitation(seebelow,§6.7.2).Thus,theAbhidharma-samuccaya of Asaṅga(traditionallytheolderbrotheroftheauthoroftheAKB)includesthenotionunderpratyaya‑swhichfunctionbywayofassistance/companionship(sahāyataḥ)andofcommonaction(saṃpratpattitaḥ):78

How[arepratyaya‑s]byreasonofcompanionship?Thosedharma‑sthatarise in co‑existence (sahābhāvena) notwith anyoneof them lacking(nānyatamavaikalyena), such as theElements (bhūta) and those derivedfromtheElements(bhautika).Howaretheybyreasonofcommonaction?Thosedharma‑sthat,beinginco‑existence,acttogether(saṃpratipadyante)ontheobject.

Sthiramati79commentsasfollows:

ThefourGreatElementsandrūpa‑s,etc.,derivedfromtheElementsexistwherepossible,butnotnecessarilyinallconglomerations.Thus,where[suchaconglomeration]exists,itarisesasawholewithout[themembers]beingseparatedfromoneanother.Bywayof thenecessityofcompanionship,the co‑existent cause is established.Thementionof theElements andthosederivedfromtheElementsistobeunderstoodasamereexample;thoughtandthethought‑concomitants[arealsotobesubsumedunderthiscategory]onaccountofthenecessityoftheirmutualinseparability.

[Question:]Ifso,thereoughtnottobetheseparateestablishmentoftheconjoinedcausesincethoughtandthethought‑concomitantsareincludedundertheco‑existentcauses.

[Answer:]Althoughthisisso,nevertheless[itisseparatelyestablished]onaccountofadifferentsignification:Thosedharma‑sthatactonanobject[necessarily] in co‑existence andnotwith anyonemember lacking areestablishedasconjoinedcausesbyreasonoftheircommonaction—not


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merelyonaccountoftheirco‑existence—asinthecaseofthoughtandthethought‑concomitants.

In the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha,Asaṅgaexplainstheālaya-vijñānaandthebīja beingmutuallyinasimultaneouscausalrelationship,givingthesameexamplesastheVaibhāṣikas.80FortheYogācāra,simultaneouscausationiscausalityinthetruesense:

The ālaya-vijñānaandthosedefileddharma‑saresimultaneouslycausetoeachother.Howcan[suchasimultaneouscausation]beobserved?Thisislikethesimultaneousarisingofaflameandtheburningofthewickbeingmutually[caused].Itisalsolikereed‑bundleswhich,mutuallysupportingoneanother,[standup]simultaneouslywithoutcollapsing.Theprinciplehereinofmutualcausationistobeunderstoodlikewise.Justastheālaya-vijñānaservesasthecauseforthedefileddharma‑s,thosedefileddharma‑slikewiseserveasthecausefortheālaya-vijñāna.Itisonlyonsuchabasis[ofsimultaneouscausation]thatthehetu-pratyaya‑sareestablished,for[apartfromthis],theotherhetu-pratyaya‑sarenotapperceived(na upalabhyante).

Intheircommentariesontheabovepassage,bothVasubandhu81andAsvabhāva82 stateexplicitlythatthissimultaneouscausationreferstotheco‑existentcause.IntheChineseversionoftheVijñaptimātratā-siddhi,83Dharmapālaalsoquotesthesamepassageinsupportofhisviewthattherearealsobīja‑swhicharenewlyengenderedbytherepeatedperfuming(vāsanā)oftheactualdharma.Thesametext,84againusingthesamesimiles,remarksfurther:

The perfuming engenders thebīja; thebīja gives rise tomanifestation(samudācāra),[namely,theactualdharma]—inthemannerthataco‑existentcauseproduces a virile fruit.The anteriorbīja successively engendersaposteriorbījaofthesamespecies—inthemannerthatahomogeneouscauseinducesanemanationfruit.Thesetwotypes[ofcausalprocesses]constitutecausality(hetu-pratyayatā).Apartfromthese,otherdharma‑sarenot hetu-pratyaya‑s:Iftheyhappentobecalledhetu-pratyaya‑s,oneshouldunderstandthemasmetaphoricalexpressions.

6.6. Summary of the notion of the co-existent cause given in the various sources

Thedefinitionsandexamplesgivenintheabovesources(§6.3.5–6.3.6.1)arenotalwaysentirelydistinct.Somearemoreorlessidentical,andsometimeswhatonesourcegivesasexamplesoftheco‑existentcause,anotherwouldincludeundertheconjoinedcause.Thevarietyinthesedescriptionssuggeststhattherehadbeen some effort on the part of theSarvāstivādins to integrate variousexplanationspasseddownintheirtraditionovertime.Ontheotherhand,thenearidenticaldefinitionsseeninmanycases,fromsourcesstretchingoverseveral


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centuries(fromtheMVŚtoNy),alsoindicatethatthenotionsoftheco‑existentandconjoinedcausesmusthavebeenfairlywelldelineatedandunderstoodintheirtradition.Wemaybroadlyclassifythesedefinitionsordescriptionsoftheessentialcharacteristicsofco‑existent/conjoinedcausesintothree:

(1) In the sense that the conascentdharma‑s are reciprocally causes,reciprocally(virile)effects,85mutuallyinduced,arisenthroughmutualstrength, necessarily conascent, etc.Thevery existence of one isnecessarilydependentontheother.

(2) Inthesensethattheconascentdharma‑saremutuallydependentandsuitablycoordinatedandstrengthenedtogiverisetoacommoneffectoraccomplishacommoncausaleventsimultaneoustothem.

(3) Inthesensethatbetweenthetwoconascentdharma‑s,oneisarisennecessarily throughthestrengthof theother.Necessarilyconascentdharma‑sfunctionasco‑existentcausesatthetimeofthearisingofthe dharma,i.e.,inthefutureperiod.Thus,“allconditioneddharma‑shaveproduction(jāti)[—whichexercisesitsfunctionatthetimewhenadharmaisarising],etc.,astheirco‑existentcauses”.86

Theformertwosensesmaybesaidtobemorespecifictothiscausalcategory,attestedinallthesourceswehaveexamined.Thethird,amoregeneralsense,islogicallydeducedandmadeexplicitbySaṃghabhadra.

TheYogācārinsinheritedthedoctrineofsimultaneouscausation,eventhough,holdingthestandpointof‘presentonlyexist’astheydo—asopposedtothetri‑temporalexistence—theymustrelegatethefunctioningofthiscausalprincipleexclusivelytothepresentperiodoftime.

6.7. The doctrinal importance of the co-existent cause for the Sarvāstivāda

6.7.1. The co-existent cause and Sarvāstivāda realism

Thedoctrine of simultaneous causation lends support to theSarvāstivādadoctrine of direct perceptionwhich, in turn, again reinforced their doctrineofpluralisticrealism.ThisisincontrasttotheSautrāntikatheoryofindirectperceptionwhicheventuallypavesthewayfortheidealisticYogācāratheoryof vijñaptimātratā.FortheSarvāstivādins,onecanbeabsolutelycertainabouttheexistenceofexternalobjectsbecauseourfivesensesdirectlyperceivethem.Thus,withinasinglemomentofvisualperception,thevisualfaculty,theobjectandthecorrespondingvisualconsciousnessallarisesimultaneously.Allthreefunctionasco‑existentcauses.Thisis,infact,oneofSaṃghabhadra’sargumentsfortheco‑existentcause:


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Itcontradictstheprincipleof‘conditionedco‑arising’[toholdthattherearenoconascentcauses].Thusthesūtrasays,‘Conditionedbythevisualfaculty and thevisual object, there arises visual consciousness.’ [If thevisual faculty, the visual object and the visual consciousnesswerenotsimultaneous,] then thevisual facultyandvisualobjectproduced in theprecedingmomentoughtnottobethesupportingbasisandtheperceptualobject,[respectively,]forthevisualconsciousnessofthesucceedingmoment,since, [in that case, thelatter] exists and [the former are] non‑existent.Onecannotcallanabsolutenon‑existent(atyantābhāva)asupportingbasisoraperceptualobject.Thesamewouldapplyhere:Atthetimewhenthevisualconsciousnessarises,thevisualfacultyandthevisualobjecthavealreadyceased.Thiswouldmeanthatwithoutanyconditionsassisting,thevisualconsciousnessarisesbyitself!Thisisduetothefactthatnon‑existentdharma‑scannotserveassupportingbasis,andthatvisualconsciousnesscantakeonlyapresentobject.Ifthevisualfaculty,thevisualobjectandthevisualconsciousnessdonotarisesimultaneously,itwouldentailthatthevisualfacultyandvisualobjectsdonotserveasconditionsforvisualconsciousness.Or,theauditoryfacultyandsound,etc.,wouldalsoserveasconditionsforvisualconsciousness,beingequallyunrelatedtovisualconsciousness.87

Butmoreimportantly,thisdoctrineisindispensableforthefundamentalthesisofsarvāstitva.Ofthefourmajorargumentsputforwardforthethesis—(a)uktatvāt,(b)dvayāt,(c)sadviṣayāt,(d)phalāt88—thefirstissimplyaninferencefromtheBuddha’smentionofpastandfutureobjects.(c)and(d)aretheonlytwologicalarguments(yuktitaḥ),and(b)essentiallyhasthesamestressas(c),supportedbytheBuddha’sownstatement.(c)arguesthatsincetheobjectofanyperceptionmustbeexistent,thefactthatthemindcanthinkofpastandfutureobjectsthenproves the reality/existenceofpastand futuredharma‑s. (d)argues thatpastdharma‑smustexist sinceapastkarma iscausallyefficacious ingeneratingapresentvipāka.Nowitmustbenotedthatthesetwologicalargumentscannotstandunlessthesimultaneouscausality—inthesensethatthecauseandtheeffectmustbeexistentatthesametime—asexemplifiedbythesahabhū-hetuisconceded:Bothrequirethatthecauseandtheeffectexistsimultaneously.Butitshouldbeborneinmindthat,intheSarvāstivāda,“existingsimultaneously”doesnotnecessarilymean“arisingsimultaneously”.Whenthecauseandtheeffectdoarisesimultaneously—i.e.,co‑exist(saha-bhū)inthepresentmoment—wehavethecaseofthesahabhū-hetu(see§6.7.2).

6.7.2. The co-existent cause as the only valid paradigm for causation

In Saṃghabhadra’sargumentabove,thevisualorganandobject(causes)mustbeconascentwiththevisualperception(effect).Anon‑existentcausecannotbeefficacious.Inthiscase,allthethreemustexistatthepresentmoment.


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Ingeneral,ifAcausesB,bothAandBmustbeexistentatthesametime—althoughtheymaybelongtodifferenttimeperiodswithrespecttotheirowntemporalframeofreference.Thatis:Amaybepastorpresentorfuture,andBmayalsobepastorpresentorfuture—but they must co-exist, although not necessarily be conascent.ToborrowDharmatrāta’sterminology,theyarebothexistent,butnotnecessarilyofthesame‘modeofexistence’(bhāva);orinGhoṣaka’sterminology,theydonotnecessarilyhavethesame‘time‑characteristic’(cf.§5.2).WhereAandBarenecessarilyconascent,i.e.,bothexistingatthesamepresent moment,wehavethecategoryknownastheco‑existentcause.Infact,intheSarvāstivādaconception,alldharma‑sintheiressentialnaturehavealwaysbeenexistent;itisonlyamatterofinducingtheirarisingthroughcausesandconditions.ThisisthefundamentalprincipleunderliningtheSarvāstivādadoctrineofcausality(§6.2.2).Pastandfuturedharma‑sarealsoendowedwithefficaciesincludingthatofactuallygivinganeffect,althoughitisonlyapresentdharmathathaskāritra—theefficacyofestablishingthespecificcausalrelationshipwiththedharmatobeproducedasitseffect.

Wesawabovethatinarguingthattheretributionfruitexistsinthefutureperiodaswell,Saṃghabhadrastatesthattheestablishmentofdharma‑sascausesisnotdependentontheir‘coursingintime’,givingtheexamplesoftheco‑existentandconjoinedcauses(supra,§6.2.1).Inthatcontext,aquestionisraised:“Isitnotthecasethattheestablishmentoftheco‑existentcauseisrelativetothemiddletimeperiod(adhvan)[i.e.,thepresentperiod]?”Inthefollowingreply,Saṃghabhadramakesanimportantclarificationonthenotionoftheco‑existentcause:

Thisobjectionisunreasonable,for[suchanestablishment]isanimplicitone (neyārtha)—[properlyspeaking,]theco‑existentcausesaresocalledonaccountoftheirexistingatthesametime(俱時有故);themeaningisthattheyarereciprocallycauseandeffect.89

Now,sincefortheSarvāstivādinsboththecauseandtheeffectnecessarilyexistsimultaneously,Saṃghabhadra’sexplanationhereamountstostatingthatinthefinal analysis, the co‑existent cause is simply aspecial caseof simultaneouscausationobtainingamongthenecessarilyconascentdharma‑s.Theco‑existentcausethenactuallyexemplifiesthegeneralcaseofsimultaneouscausationinwhichadistinctAgeneratesadistinctB—bothexistingsimultaneously.Thisfactcanalsobeseeninthedefinitionofthevirileeffect,theeffectoftheco‑existentcause,whichisessentiallyageneralstatementofcausality:

That[conditioneddharma (B)],whichisbornfromtheforceofanother(A),isthefruit[ofthatforce(A)—afruit]bornofavirileaction.90

ItisnowonderthattheVaibhāṣikasexertedgreateffortindefendingthevalidityofthiscausalcategory.Failureinthisrespectistantamounttofailureinestablishing


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the Sarvāstivādadoctrineofcausalityasawhole—which,inanimportantway,istantamounttofailureinestablishingthethesisofsarvāstitva.

Thecaseofahomogeneouscausegeneratinganemanationfruitasitsownnextmomentofexistenceisanexception,asitinvolvesnottwoontologicallydistinctentitiesbutsimplythearisingofagivenentityitselfinthenextmomentofitsseries.

TheYogācāranotonlyacceptstheSarvāstivādapositionasregardscausation,butismoreexplicitinstatingthatthereisnootherrealcausalityoutsidethatrepresentedbytheco‑existentandconjoinedcauses.

6.8. Conclusion

The SarvāstivādaisalsoknownastheHetuvādaprobablyowingtotheirspecialconcernwiththetheoryofcausality.Ontheonehand,realentities(dharma‑s)—the unconditionedbeingnoexception—mustbeshowntobecausalforces.Ontheother,thearisingofanddynamicinterplayamongtheconditioneddharma‑sinphenomenalexistencemustbeaccountedforbyanarticulatetheoryofcauses.

Itispossiblethatthesix‑hetudoctrinewasarticulatedinadditiontotheearlierfour‑pratyayadoctrinemainlybecauseoftheneedtohighlighttheco‑existentcausewhichexemplifiestheschool’sfundamentalprincipleofcausalitythatcauseandeffectnecessarilyexistsimultaneously,eventhoughtheirmodes(bhāva)ofexistencemaydiffer—eitherpast,presentorfuture.Moreover,itcorroboratesimportantlythethesisofsarvāstitva.

Inthemorespecificornarrowersense,theco‑existentcausalrelationshipobtainswheredharma‑sareeitherreciprocallycauseandeffecttooneanotherortogetherbringaboutacommoneffect.Moregenerally,allnecessarilyconascentdharma‑sareco‑existentcauses.For theYogācārinswhohold the‘presentonlyexists’standpoint,thiscausalcategorybecomesallthemoreimportantfortheirtheoryof perfuming.Accordingly,thesahabhūhetu-puruṣakāraphalacausationcametobemoreexplicitlyemphasizedbythemascausalitypar excellence.


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NOTES

1 Ny,416b–c.2 Yaśomitra(Vy,188f)citestheseassertionsofSaṃghabhadrawithoutmentioninghisname,butattributingthemtotheVaibhāṣikas.

3 MVŚ,79a–c.4 T26,773a,920c–921a.5 T49,15b.6 MVŚ,979c.7 MVŚ,680c.8 MVŚ,82a.9 Ny,444a–444b.10 Ny,448b.11 Ny,447b.12Ny,621c–622a.13Ny,429a.14Ny,432a.15 Cf.TA(U‑J),vol.I,219.16Ny,431c.17 SeeAKB(C),T29,152c.ThecontexthereistherefutationofrealityofthepudgalaproposedbytheVātsīputrīya.

18MVŚ,393c.19 Ibid.,105c.20 Ibid.,396a.21 Ibid.,108c.22 Ibid.,283b.23MVŚ,196c.24Ny,432b.25 AKB,82:saṃskṛtasya hi dharmasya svabhāvavarjyāḥ sarvadharmāḥ kāraṇahetuḥ | utpādaṃ

prati (noteerrorinPradhan’stext) avighnabhāvāvasthānāt ||26 MVŚ,104a.Saṃghabhadra(Ny,416c)quotesthesamesūtrapassageheretoshowthat

the kāraṇa-hetuistaughtbytheBuddhainthesūtra.27 Cf.AKB,91.28Ny,442a–b.29MVŚ,682c—noreasongivenforthedenial.30SeeAKB,85.31Forthefivecategoriesofdefilements,seeinfra,§12.6.2.32 AKB, 85: sadṛśā dharmāḥ sadṛśānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ sabhāgahetus tadyathā kuśalāḥ

pañcaskandhāḥ kuśalānām anyonyaṃ… | svanikāyabhuvaḥ svo nikāyo bhūśca eṣāṃ ta ime svanikāyabhuvaḥ … pūrvotpannāḥ paścimānām utpannānutpannānāṃ sabhāgahetuḥ / anāgatā naiva sabhāgahetuḥ|


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33FollowingSaṃghabhadra(Ny,422a).34FollowingSaṃghbadra(Ny,422a):有餘師言…35 Thetenstatesinthedevelopmentstartingfromtheembryotothepost‑embryoexistenceare:kalala,arbuda,peśin,ghana,praśākhā,bāla,kumāra,yuvan,madhyaandvṛddha. (AKB,130)

36ThisreasonisgiveninNy,422a.37Ny,422a.38AKB,85.39Ny,416c.40 This passage is quoted inAKB(F), vol. I, 245, n.4.LaValléePoussin alsogives thecorrespondingPāliversion:Aṅguttara,iii,315.Seetr.,in§6.1,ofthesamepassageinNy,416.

41 於彼彼多隨尋伺，即於彼彼心多趣入 … Cf.M,i,115:yaṃ yad eva … bhikkhu bahulaṃ anuvitakketi anuvicāreti tathā tathā nati hoti cetaso…

42Ny,416c.43ThisviewisnotgiveninAKB,butitisrecordedinAKB(C)44Ny,422a.45Ny,422a.46 AKB,65:yadi sarvatragahetor api samānaṃ phalaṃ kasmān na sabhāgahetor eveṣyate |

yasmāt bhūmitaḥ kliṣṭatayā cāsya sādṛśyaṃ na tu prakārataḥ |47 AKB, 89: svabhūmikāḥ pūrvotpannāḥ sarvatragā dharmāḥ paścimānāṃ kliṣṭānāṃ

dharmāṇaṃ sarvatraga-hetuḥ | … kliṣṭadharma-sāmānyakāraṇatvenāyaṃ sabhāgahetuḥ pṛthak vyavasthāpyate | nikāyāntarīyāṇām api hetutvād eṣāṃ hi prabhāveṇānyanaikāyikā api kleśā upajāyante |

48MVŚ,90c.49 Cf.alsoNy,416c.50 ISVm,106f.51 AKB,89:akuśalāḥ kuśalāsravāśca dharmā vipākahetuḥ | vipākadharmatvāt | kasmādavyākṛtā

dharmāḥ vipākaṃ na nirvarttayanti | durbalatvāt | pūtibījavat | kasmānnānāsravāḥ | tṛṣṇānabhiṣyanditatvāt | anabhiṣyanitasārabījavat | apratisaṃyuktā hi kiṃ pratisaṃyuktaṃ vipākam abhinirvarttayeyuḥ |Alsocf.MVŚ,98b‑c.

52MVŚ,96a–c.53Alsocf.MVŚ,615a–b.54MVŚ,97a,263c;forthemeaningofsavipāka,seeMVŚ,98c.55Ny,427b.56AKB,89;MVŚ,264b,741c,etc.57Ny,427b.58 MVŚ,85b.59 In XuanZang’stranslationofboththeAKB(T29,30b)andNy,thewordpuruṣakāra-

phalaisfound.Paramārtha’stranslation(T29,188b)agreeswiththeSanskritwhichhasonlyphala.

60 AKB,83–85: sahabhūr ye mithaḥphalāḥ | …yathā … catvāri mahābhūtāny anyonyaṃ sahabhūhetuḥ | cittaṃ cittānuvarttināṃ dharmāṇāṃ te’pi tasya | saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni


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lakṣyasya so’pi teṣām | evaṃ kṛtvā sarvameva saṃskṛtaṃ sahabhūhetur yathāyogam | vināpi cānyonyaphalatvena dharmo’nulakṣaṇānāṃ sahabhūhetur na tāni tasyety upasaṃkhyātavyam … tridaṇḍānyonyabalāvasthānavat … sahabhuvāṃ hetuphalabhāvaḥ sidhyati ||

61Ny,417c.62 Entrance,121,§5x.1.2.63MVŚ,80a–b.64 AKB,88:saṃāna āśrayo yeṣāṃ te cittacaittāḥ anyonyaṃ saṃprayuktaka hetuḥ | … tadyathā

ya eva cakṣurindriyakṣaṇaś cakṣurvijñānasyāśrayaḥ sa eva tatsaṃprayuktānāṃ vedanādīnām eva … ||

65 Ibid.,416c.66 Entrance,121.67MVŚ,88b.68 Thefivefoldsamenessorequality(pañcadhā samatā)—forthementalconstituentstobesaidtobeinconjunction—are:1.theymustbesupportedbythesamesenseorgan(āśraya-samatā);2.theymusttakethesameobject(ālambana-samatā);3.theymusthavethesamemodeofactivity(ākāra-samatā);4.theymustbesimultaneous(kāla-samatā);5.theymustineachcasebeofasingularsubstance(dravya-samatā):inonecittaisconjoinedone vedanā,one saṃjñā,etc.(cf.AKB,62;alsocf. Entrance,81,andnote301).

69 AKB,88:yaḥ saṃprayuktakahetuḥ sahabhūheturapi saḥ | atha kenārthena sahabhūhetuḥkenasaṃprayuktakahetuḥ | anyonyaphalārthenasahabhūhetuḥ | sahasārthikānyonyabalamārgaprayoṇ(g)avat | pañcabhiḥsamatābhiḥsaṃprayoārthenasaṃprayuktakahetuḥ | teṣām eva sārthikānāṃ samānānnapānādiparibhogakriyāprayogavat | ekenāpi hi vinā sarveṇa na saṃprayujyante ||

70Ny,425c.71 Entrance,121.72Ny,417c–421c.73 Wehavediscussed the controversy inNy in detail in “TheSarvāstivādaDoctrine ofSimultaneousCausality”(NumataYehanLectureonBuddhistThoughts,UniversityofCalgary,2000.ThiswasalsosubsequentlypublishedinJournal of Buddhist Studies,Vol.I,Colombo,2003,17ff.).InthislecturewehavegivenadetailedrefutationofKennethK.Tanaka’sclaimthatthesahabhū-hetudoesnotconstituteacaseofcausationandthatit“isnotresponsiblefortheproductionofdharmas” (cf.KennethK.Tanaka,“SimultaneousRelation(Sahabhū-hetu):AStudyinBuddhistTheoryofCausation”,inJournal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies,Vol.8,No.1,91–111).

74 Cf. Entrance,121.75 Ny,419c.76Ny,420b.77AKB,84.78 Abhidharma-samuccaya,ed.Pradhan,P(Santiniketan,1950),28f.79 Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya,ed.Tatia,N(Patna,1976),37.AccordingtotheTibetantradition (Tāranātha), Sthiramati studied both theAbhidharmakośa-bhāṣya and theAbhidharma-samuccayaunderVasubandhu.

80Tno.1594,134c.81Tno.1597,328b.


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82Tno.1598,388b.83Tno.1585,8c.84 Ibid.,10a.85AKB,96;alsoseeVy,225.86MVŚ,82a–82b.87 Ibid.,420c–421a.88AKB,295f.;alsocf. supra,§3.3.1.89Ny,444b.90 AKB,96.Saṃghabhadra(Ny,436a)comments“Herein,puruṣa-kāra, puruṣa-bala, puruṣa-

sāmarthya, puruṣa-śakti—allthesehavethesamemeaning:Astheefficacies(gong-neng)of dharma‑sarelikevirileactions,theycalledvirileaction(puruṣakāra);justasastrongmaniscalledalionbecauseheislikealion.”

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7. Theory of Causality II The Four Conditions and the Five Fruits

7.1. Doctrineofthefourconditions(pratyaya)7.1.1. Conditionquacause(hetu-pratyaya)7.1.2. Equal‑immediatecondition(samanantara-pratyaya)7.1.3. Conditionquaobject(ālambana-pratyaya)7.1.4. Conditionofdominance(adhipati-pratyaya)7.1.5. Asingledharmamayfunctionasallfourconditions

7.2. Differencesbetweenacauseandacondition7.3. Fivefruits(phala)

7.3.1. Disconnectionfruit(visaṃyoga-phala)7.3.2. Manlyorvirilefruit(puruṣakāra-phala)7.3.2.1. Definitionofvirilefruits7.3.2.2. Fourtypesofvirilefruits7.3.2.3. Virileactionreferstotheefficacy(功能)ofadharma7.3.2.4. Examplesofvirilefruits

7.3.3. Fruitofdominance(adhipati-phala)7.3.4. Emanationfruit(niṣyanda-phala)7.3.5. Retributionfruit(vipāka-phala)

7.4. The‘grasping’and‘giving’ofafruit

7.1. Doctrine of the four conditions (pratyaya)

Aswehavenoted above (supra, §6.1), the doctrine of the four conditionsprecededthatofthesixcauses.TheSarvāstivādaassertsthattheformerweretaughtbytheBuddhainthesūtra-piṭaka. Saṃghabhadrastatesthattheefficaciesoftheconditionsareinfactinfinite,forthearisingofdharma‑sdependsontheassemblageofnumerousconditions,butthattheBuddhamentionedonlyfourinbrief.1AmongtheextantSarvāstivādatexts,itisinDevaśarman’sVijñānakāya (ca. 1stC.E.) thatwefirst come across an elaborative expositionof the fourconditions.2InatypicallyAbhidharmicmanner,theconditionsarediscussedinrelationtothesixconsciousnesses:

Thereisthegroup(kāya)ofsixconsciousnesses:visual,auditory,olfactory,gustatory, bodily andmental consciousnesses.Visual consciousness hasfourconditions:1.conditionquacause(hetu-pratyaya),2.equal‑immediatecondition (samanantara-pratyaya), 3.conditionquaobject (ālambana-pratyaya),4.conditionofdominance(adhipati-pratyaya).

Whichare[its]conditionsquacause?Thosedharma‑sthatareco‑existentandconjoinedwithit.


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Whichare[its]equal‑immediateconditions?Thosethoughtandthought‑concomitantdharma‑simmediatelyafter(samanantaram)whichsuchavisualconsciousnesshasarisen(utpanna)[or]willarise(utpatsyate).

Whatare[its]conditionsquaobjects?Allthevisibles.

Whatare[its]conditionsofdominance?Allthedharma‑sotherthanitself.

These are said to be the four conditions for visual consciousness.…

Whoseconditionquacauseissuchavisualconsciousness?Thosedharma‑sthatareco‑existentandwhichareconjoinedwithit.

Whoseequal‑immediatecondition[isit]?Thosethoughtandthought‑concomitantdharma‑sthathavearisenorwillariseimmediatelyafterthevisualconsciousness.

Whoseconditionquaobject[isit]?Thosethoughtandthought‑concomitantsthattakethis[visualconsciousness]asobject.

Whoseconditionofdominance[isit]?Alldharma‑sotherthanitself.

Justasinthecaseofvisualconsciousness,likewisearethoseofauditory,olfactory,gustatory,bodilyandmentalconsciousnesses.3

The following is another example from the textwhichbetter illustrates itsmethodofexhaustiveinvestigation.Thediscussion,underthesectionontheconditionquaobject,pertainstothepossibletypesoftemporalobjectthatavisualconsciousnesscantake:

Thereisthegroup(kāya)ofsixconsciousnesses:visual,auditory,olfactory,gustatory,bodilyandmentalconsciousnesses.Thisgroupofsixconsciousnessesiseitherpast,presentorfuture.

Inthecaseofpastvisualconsciousnesses:

Arethereanythattakeapast,butnotafutureorpresentobject?Arethereanythattakeafuture,butnotapastorpresentobject?Arethereanythattakeapresent,butnotapastorfutureobject?Arethereanythattakeapastorapresent,butnotafutureobject?Arethereanythattakeafutureorapresent,butnotapastobject?Arethereanythattakeapastorafuture,butnotapresentobject?Arethereanythattakeapastorafutureorapresentobject?

Asinthecaseofpastvisualconsciousnesses,thesame[analysisistobeapplied]inthecasesoffutureandpresentvisualconsciousnesses.

Asinthecaseofvisualconsciousness,thesame[analysisistobeapplied]inthoseofauditory,olfactory,gustatory,bodilyandmentalconsciousnesses.

Allpastvisualconsciousnessestakepastobjects;theotheralternatives(pāda)arenotavailable.

7. theory of CauSality ii - the four ConditionS and the five fruitS

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Afuturevisualconsciousnessmaytakeapast,futureorpresentobject.

All present visual consciousnesses take present objects; the otheralternativesarenotavailable.

Asinthecaseofvisualconsciousness,thesameappliesinthoseofauditory,olfactory,gustatory,bodilyandmentalconsciousnesses.

Allpast,futureandpresentmentalconsciousnessesshouldbesaidtotakealldharma‑sasobjects.4

NotallSarvāstivādins,however,wouldrecognizetherealityoftheconditions.TheMVŚinformsusthattheearlyDārṣṭāntikasandothers5denytheirreality.TheBhadānta too declares that they are unreal, beingnothingmore thanterminologiesconceptuallydesignatedbytheAbhidharmamasters.TheMVŚcompilersdefendtheĀbhidharmikaposition:

Ifitisheldthattheconditionsaredevoidofreality,thenitwouldimplythatalldharma‑saredevoidofreality,sinceallfourconditionscompletelysubsumealldharma‑s:Theconditionquacausesubsumesallconditioneddharma‑s; theequal‑immediatecondition subsumesallpast andpresentdharma‑sotherthantheverylastthoughtandthought‑concomitantdharma‑softhepastandpresentarhat‑s.Theconditionquaobjectandtheconditionofdominance[each]subsumesthetotalityofdharma‑s.…

Moreover, if theconditionsareunreal innature, therewouldnotbe thepossibilityoftransformingthethreegradesofwisdom.Theinferiorgradeofwisdomwillpermanentlybeinferior;themediumgradepermanentlymedium;thesuperiorgradepermanentlysuperior.Butthefactisthatwisdomcanchangefrombeinginferiortobeingmedium,frombeingmediumtobeingsuperior.Accordingly,theconditionsmustexistasrealentities,fortheyareefficacious[inbringingaboutthesechanges].…6

Inregard to themutualsubsumption(saṃgraha)betweenthecausesandtheconditions,theMVŚmentionstwoopinions:

Question:Do the causes subsume the conditions, or do the conditionssubsumethecauses?

Answer:Theymutuallysubsumeeachother,accordinglyasthecasemaybe:Thefirstfivecausesconstitute theconditionquacause; theefficientcauseconstitutestheotherthreeconditions.

According to some:theconditionssubsumethecauses,butthecausesdonotsubsumetheconditions:Thefirstfivecausesconstituteconditionquacause;theefficientcauseconstitutestheconditionofdominance;theimmediateconditionandtheconditionquaobjectarenotsubsumedbyanycause.7

Inregardtothearisingandceasingofadharma, for the SarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikas,bothrequirecausesandconditions.ThisisincontrasttotheDārṣṭāntikaview


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thatonlyarising,butnotceasing,requirescausesandconditions.8ButsincetheSarvāstivādaholdsthatalldharma-s—causesandconditionsincluded—areeverpresent,whydodharma‑snotariseandceaseincessantly?TheMVŚrecordsseveralresponsestothisquestion:

TheVenerableVasumitraexplains thus:“Adharma arisesasa resultofhavingassembledwithoneproduction(i.e.,thedisjointconditioningjāti;see§11.3.5);itceasesasaresultofhavingassembledwithoneimpermanence(i.e.,thedisjointconditioninganityatā/vyaya;see§11.3.5).[Eachdharma] not assemblingwith twoormore production and impermanence, howcandharma‑s arise and cease incessantly?”He further explains thus:“Havingarisenasaresultofbeingassembledwithcausesandconditions,beingsubmergedbyacontinuousseriesofmomentsthatfollowitisunabletore‑arise.Itislikethecaseofapersonwho,havingfallenfromacliff,isfurtherbeingcontinuouslysubmergedbythemudfallingfromabove.At the time,hecannotevenmove,nottospeakofgettingup."

The Bhadantasays:"theassembledcausesandconditionsbeingtemporary,howcandharma‑sariseandceaseincessantly?"

VenerableBuddhadevaexplainsthus:“Theactivityofarisingandceasingofadharmaoughttooccuronlyonceineachcase.Ifadharmaarisesagainandagain,orceasesagainandagain,thenitwouldnotbehavingactivity.Hence,dharma‑sdonotariseandceaseincessantly.”9

Thefirstexplanationabove,byVasumitra,representstheVaibhāṣikaview:Inthearisingofadharma, thedisjointconditioning jātimustexerciseitsfunction.Atthesametime,itisequallyemphasizedthattheabilityofjātiinproducingadharmacanbeexercisedonlywhenanassemblageofcausesandconditions,requiredforthearisingofathedharma,obtains.10

TheMVŚcontainsvariousotherdiscussionsonthefourconditions.Thefollowingaretwomoreexamples:

Question:Ofthesefourconditions,whicharesuperior,whichareinferior?

Answer:Accordingtosome:theconditionquacauseissuperior,theothersareinferior,foritiswhenthereisanincreaseincausethatarisingorceasingoccurs.

According to some:theequal‑immediateconditionissuperior,theothersareinferior,foritcangivewaytothegatewayofthenoblepath.

According to some:theconditionquacauseissuperior,theothersareinferior,foritisthesupportforthe[arisingof]thoughtandthought‑concomitants.

According to some:theconditionofdominanceissuperior,theothersareinferior,foritdoesnothinderthearisingandceasingofdharma‑s.

The correct position (如是說者):Allaresuperior,allareinferior,fortheefficaciesaredistinctive….


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Question:Followingthedeficiencyofwhichconditiondoesparinirvāṇa occur?

Answer:According to some: following thatof theconditionquacause,for thecycleofsaṃsāra isonaccountof theforceof theconditionquacause;saṃsāraisabandonedwhentheconditionquacauseisabandoned.

According to some:followingthatoftheequal‑immediatecondition,forparinirvāṇaoccursuponthediscontinuationofthelastthoughtofanarhat.

According to some:followingthatoftheconditionquaobject,forparinirvāṇa occurswhen the jñeya‑s (theobjectsofknowledge)donotgenerate thesubsequentthoughtandthought‑concomitantdharma‑s.

According to some:followingthatoftheconditionofdominance;forafterthelastthoughtofanarhat,thereisthecompleteextinctionwithouttherebeinganynon‑hindrance.

The correct position:parinirvāṇaoccursfollowingthedeficiencyofthefourconditions,foratthetimeofparinirvāṇa,thearhatattainsparinirvāṇa without thedharma‑s subsumableas the fourconditionsexercisinganyactivitywithregardtohisserialcontinuity(santati).11

7.1.1. Condition qua cause (hetu-pratyaya)

Thisistheconditioninitscapacityasdirectcauseintheproductionofaneffect—itisthecausefunctioningasthecondition.Intheexampleofthegrowthofafruitplant:theconditionquacauseiscomparabletotheseed.However,itisacommontenetofallschoolsofBuddhismthatnothingisproducedbyasinglecause(§2.4.3.1),12eventhoughintheanalysisofthecausalcomplex,themaincausecanbesingledout.Ofthesixcauses,allexcepttheefficientcauseareconditionsquacause.13Strictlyspeaking,however,someoftheefficientcausesshouldalsocomeunderthiscategoryiftheymakesomepositivecontributioninthecausalprocess.Aswehaveseenabove,thisconditionsubsumesallthecausesexcepttheefficientcause.Itcomprisesthetotalityofconditioneddharma‑s.14

7.1.2. Equal-immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya)

A citta or caittaservesasaconditionforthearisingofthesucceedingcitta or caitta:Itbothgiveswaytoandinducesthearisingofthenextcitta-caitta in the series.TheAKBexplainsasfollows:

Withtheexceptionofthefinal[citta-caitta‑s]ofanarhat,thecitta-caitta‑sthathavearisenaretheequal‑immediateconditions.Thisconditionisequalaswellasimmediate,hence‘equal‑immediatecondition’…Whyarethelastcitta-caitta‑sofanarhatnotequal‑immediateconditions?Becausethereisnocontinuationofanothercitta[fromthem,i.e.,theycannot‘dragout’orinduceasubsequentfruitowingtothedeficiencyinthenecessaryconditionsatthattime].15


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AccordingtotheDārṣṭāntikas, thiscategoryalsoobtainsamongthematerialdharma‑s,sincetheprincipleofthearisingofthesubsequentupontheceasingoftheprecedentalsoapplies—aprecedingseedgivesrisetoasubsequentsprout;aflowergivesrisetoafruit;etc.16SthaviraŚrīlāta,aSautrāntikaleaderalsoholdsasimilarview.17TheSarvāstivādins,however,maintainthatthishomogeneouscausalitydoesnotapplytothedomainofmatter,sincethereisnoequalityorsamenessintheserialcontinuityofmatter.AccordingtotheAKB,theBhadantaconcursonthispointwiththeSarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikas.18“Ifadharmaisconjoined (saṃprayuktaka), has a supportingbasis (sāśraya), has amodeofactivity (sākāra), is alertive (ābhogātmaka) andhas anobject (sālambana),thenitcanbeestablishedasanequal‑immediatecondition.Thisisnotthecasewithmaterialdharma‑s.”19 Moreover,Saṃghabhadra insists20 that thenotionofanequal‑immediateconditionnecessarilyentailsthatasubsequentthoughtmomentcanonlyariseuponthecessationoftheprecedingthoughtmomentwhichthereby‘makesroom’forthearisingoftheformer.21 Vasumitracharacterizesthisconditionasfollows:(i)givingway,(ii)beingsuccessive,(iii)givingactivity,(iv)capableofgeneratingathought,(v)capableofinducingathought,(vi)capableofalertingathought,(v)capableofenablingtheserialcontinuityofathought.The viewoftheĀbhidharmikasisgivenintheMVŚasfollows:

Thecharacteristicoftheequal‑immediateconditionconsistsofitsenablingofthe dharma‑sthatarehavinguniqueself‑characteristicstoariseimmediately.The dharma‑shavinguniqueself‑characteristicsarethecaitta‑s,i.e.,vedanā,saṃjñā,etc.,andcitta.Theirself‑characteristicsaredifferentindividually;whentheyco‑arise,therecannotbetwo[instancesofthemineachcase].22

7.1.3. Condition qua object (ālambana-pratyaya)

AccordingtotheSarvāstivāda,cognitioniscognitionofanobject:Acognitioncannotarisebyitself,withouttakinganobject.Infact,theverypossibilityofacognitionpresupposesareal/existentasitsobject.(Seesupra,§3.5.3.3).Inthissense,theobjectservesasaconditionforthecognition.Asthoughtcantakeanyobject—themindcanthinkofanything—alldharma‑s,i.e.,saṃskṛta or asaṃskṛta,past,presentorfuture,canbecomeconditionquaobjects.Thus,“Alldharma‑sareobjects[i.e.,conditionsquaobjects],accordinglyasthecaseapplies:Thevisiblesaretheobjectsofvisualconsciousnessanditsconcomitants.Sounds,ofauditoryconsciousness,[etc.,]…”23 Saṃghabhadra,speakinglikewise,furtherexplainswhythetotalityofdharma‑sarecalledconditionsquaobject:

The conditionquaobjectisnoneotherthanthetotalityofdharma‑s.Outsidethecognitiveobjectsofthoughtandthought‑concomitants,thereisdefinitelynoother dharmathatcanbeapperceived(upa‑√labh).Thatistosay,thetotalityof dharma‑siscalledconditionquaobjectbecausethoughtandthought‑concomitantsholdonto (ā‑√lamb) themfor theirarising.Becausethese


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verycognitiveobjectsserveastheconditionfortheirgeneration,theyarecalledconditionsquaobject.24

Thatthenatureofālambana-pratyaya‑sbeingobjectsofperceptionisdetermined—evenwhentheyarenotbeingperceived(seesupra,§6.2.1)—maybeconsideredasadefiniteassertionofobjectiverealismonthepartoftheSarvāstivādins.

7.1.4. Condition of dominance (adhipati-pratyaya)

Thisisthemostcomprehensiveorgenericcondition,correspondingtoefficientcause: It iswhatever serves as a condition, either in the sense of directlycontributingtothearisingofadharma,orindirectlythroughnothinderingitsarising.Fromthelatterperspective,theunconditioneddharma‑s—althoughtranscendingspaceandtimealtogether—arealsosaidtoserveasconditionsofdominance. (Seebelow,§7.3.1;cf. infra, §16.5.1).TheAKBexplains themeaningoftheterm:

The conditionofdominanceisnoneotherthantheefficientcause.Thisconditionisdominant[havingthebroadestscope],hence‘conditionofdominance’.…Orrather,[itissocalled]becauseitistheconditionforthepredominant[numberofdharma‑s]:Alldharma‑sareconditionsofdominanceofallthesaṃskṛta‑s,withtheexceptionofthemselves.25

7.1.5. A single dharma may function as all four conditions

TheMVŚ26explains that thedistinct functionsof thefourconditionsmaybefoundinagivendharma:

Athoughtorthought‑concomitantofagivenmomentprojectsthearisingofasimilarthoughtorthought‑concomitant—[thisis]conditionquacause.

This same thought or thought‑concomitant givesway to the thought orthought‑concomitantof thenextmomentso that itcanarise—[this is]equal‑immediatecondition.

Thisveryonecanserveastheobjectofcognitionforthethoughtorthought‑concomitantofthenextmoment—[thisis]conditionquaobject.

This veryonedoes not obstruct the arisingof the thought or thought‑concomitantofthenextmoment—[thisis]conditionofdominance.

Inthiscase,theconditionquacauseisliketheseed‑dharma.Theequal‑immediateconditionislikeadharmathatgivesway(開導;‘giveswayandguides’).The conditionquaobject is like adharmawalking‑stick that supports.The conditionofdominanceislikeadharmathatisnon‑obstructive.


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7.2. Differences between a cause and a condition

The two terms, cause and condition,wereusedmoreor less synonymouslyin the sūtra-piṭaka.EvenintheearlycanonicaltreatisesoftheSarvāstivāda,thedistinctionwasnotarticulated.IntheMVŚ,however,wecomeacrossvariouswell‑defineddistinctionsbetweenthetwo:

Whatarethedifferencesbetweenacauseandacondition?AccordingtoVenerableVasumitra:There is nodifference—a cause is a condition,acondition isacause…He furtherexplains: Ifwhen thisexisting thatexists,thenthisisthecauseaswellastheconditionofthat…

Inaddition:[whatpertainsto]thesamespeciesisacause;whatpertainstoadifferentspeciesisacondition,e.g.,firetofire,wheattowheat.

Inaddition:whatisproximateisacause;whatisremoteisacondition.

Inaddition:whatisuniqueisacause;whatiscommonisacondition.…

Inaddition:whatproducesisacause;whatsubsidiarilyproduces(隨能生)isacondition.

Inaddition:whatfostersitsownseriesisacause;whatfostersanother’sseriesisacondition.…

(Alsocf. opinionofapare in theMVŚ,663b: “Adhipati-pratyaya‑s areeitherdirectorindirect,closeorremote,unitedornotunited,arisinghereor arising in another.Those that are direct, close, united, arisinghere,arecalledhetu‑s.Those that are indirect, remote, not united, arising inanother,arecalledpratyaya‑s.”)

Thus,weknowthatalthoughacauseandaconditiondonotdifferinrespectofsubstance,thereisadifferenceinsignificance:acausesignifieswhatisproximate,aconditionsignifieswhatisremote.27

Saṃghabhadraexplainsthatinthecaseofbothinternalandexternaldharma‑s—suchasthefetalstagesandthestagesofplantgrowth,respectively—causesandconditionscanbedifferentiated.Asregardsthefetalstage:kalala(firstfetalstage),assistedbyvijñāna (= pratisandhi-citta)initscapacityasacause,producesthesubsequentstages,arbuda(secondstage),etc.Althoughitisnotthecasethatarbuda,etc.,arenotdependentonvijñāna,thelatterisnotthecauseonaccountofwhichtheformerareproduced,forthetwocausalseries—thatofvijñānaandthatofarbuda,etc.—aredifferent.“Butitisnotthatthisvijñānadoesnotserveasthepredominantcondition for arbuda,etc.,for[theprincipleofconditionalityapplieshere—]thisbeing,thatexists;thisnotbeing,thatdoesnotexist.”28

Other distinctions are alsomentioned in theNy, apparently acceptable toSaṃghabhadra:


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Acauseisthatwhichgenerates,aconditionisthatwhichfosters;theformerislikethebirth‑mother,thelatter,thefostermother.

Further,aconditionisthatonaccountoftheassistanceofwhichacausecangenerateandwhichfosterstheseriesthusgenerated.Forthisreason,somesaythatacauseissingular,aconditionismultiple—likethecaseoftheseedincontrasttothemanure,etc.

Further,acauseisunsharedinitsfunction,aconditionshareswithotherdharma‑s—likeinthecaseofvisualperception,theeyeincontrasttothevisualobject.

Further,thattheactivityofwhichpertainstoitsowndomain(作自事)isacause,thattheactivityofwhichpertainstoothers’domainisacondition—likethecaseoftheseedincontrasttothemanure,etc.

Further, thatwhichinducesthearisingisacause, thatwhichsustainsisacondition—likethecaseoftheflowerandthestalk.

Furtherthatwhichisnearisacause,thatwhichisremoteisacondition.

Furtherwhatproducesisacause,whataccomplishesisacondition.29

7.3. Five fruits (phala)

The Sarvāstivādaacknowledgesfivefruits:1.disconnectionfruit(visaṃyoga-phala),2.virilefruit(puruṣakāra-phala),3.fruitofdominance(adhipati-phala),4.uniform‑emanationfruit(niṣyanda-phala),5.retributionfruit(vipāka-phala).30

7.3.1. Disconnection fruit (visaṃyoga-phala)

Disconnectionmeansdisconnectionfromdefilements.Thisfruitreferstothecessationthroughdeliberation(pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha).However,thisisnotinthesensethattheunconditionedpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (= nirvāṇa),transcendingtemporalityasitdoes,canbeproducedasaneffectthroughaspace‑timecausalprocess.Itiscalleda‘fruit’ofdisconnectiononlybecauseitisacquiredasaresultoffollowingthenoblepath—thepathdoesnotfunctionasacauseassuch,producingitastheeffect;itonlyinducesthearisingoftheacquisition(prāpti)ofit.TheAKBexplains:

Onlythesaṃskṛta-dharma-shavecausesandfruits,anasaṃskṛtadoesnothavethem.Why?Becauseofthenon‑existence[init]ofthenatureofthesixfoldcausesandofthefivefoldfruits.Why is the [ānantarya-mārga]notconceded tobe theefficientcauseofdisconnection?Becauseitisestablished[asacause]onaccountofitsbeingunobstructivetoarising,andanasaṃskṛtahasnoarising.


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Ofwhatthenisitafruit?Howisitafruitofthepath?[Itisconsideredafruitofthepath]becauseitsacquisitionisthroughtheforceofthe[path].31 (Seebelow,§7.3.2.2;cf. infra,§16.3.2).

AsSaṃghabhadraputsit,itisonlyinaspecialsense—inconformitywiththesūtrausageofśrāmāṇya-phalaandwithconventionalusage—thatonecanspeakofthepratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaasafruit,withoutimplyingthatitiscausallyproduced;andasa“conditionquaobject”(ālambana-pratyaya),e.g.,asanobjectofthoughtofayogi,andadhipati-pratyaya,makinganindirectcontributionbymerelynotobstructing.Infact,“thewayofestablishingcausesandeffectsamongthe saṃskṛta‑s isnotapplicable to thecaseof theasaṃskṛta-s.Accordingly,apratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaisacausewhichiswithoutaneffect,andaneffectwhichiswithoutacause.”32

7.3.2. Manly or virile fruit (puruṣakāra-phala)

7.3.2.1. Definition of virile fruit

Thisfruithasaratherwidescope.Butitisparticularlycorrelatedtotheco‑existentcauseandtheconjoinedcause.TheAKBexplainswhyitistermed‘virile’:

Theco‑existentandconjoinedcauseshavethevirilefruit.Asthe[action]isnotseparatefromtheveryperson[whodoesit],thevirileactionisthepersonhimself.Itsfruitisavirilefruit.Whatisthisso‑calledvirileaction?Thatwhichistheactivity(kāritra)ofadharma;[socalled]becauseitislikeavirileaction.33

Also:

That[conditioneddharma],whichisbornfromtheforceofwhich,isthefruit[ofthatforce—afruit]bornofavirileaction.34

7.3.2.2. Four types of virile fruits

Saṃghabhadradistinguishesfourtypesofvirilefruits:

(1) conascent—producedbyvirtueofthedharma‑sbeingsimultaneouslycausestooneanother;

(2) immediate—produced in the subsequentmomentbyvirtueof theprecedingthoughtasthecause,e.g.,theduḥkha-dharmajñāna,producedbythelaukikāgra-dharma‑s;

(3) separatedintime—producedmediatelybyvirtueofsuccessivecausesinaseries,e.g.,acropproducedbyafarmeretc.;

(4) notproduced.


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Thefourthtypereferstonirvāṇa,

becauseitisacquired,[notproduced,]bytheforceofanānantarya-mārga.

[Objection:]Sincethisisnotproduced,howcanonecallitavirilefruitproducedbyvirtueofthat?

[Answer:]Itisobservedthatathingacquiredisalsosaidtobeproduced.Thus,itissaid‘Iproducedwealth’,meaning‘Iacquiredwealth’.

Whenanānantarya-mārga[—themomentofreceptivity(kṣānti)inwhichdefilementsarebeingabandonedunhindered—]removestheanuśaya-s,thecorrespondingpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑sarerealized[inthenextmomentofdefiniteknowledge(jñāna),calledvimukti-mārga,inwhichthecorrespondingprāpti-s ofvisaṃyoga arise].Thesepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-s are calleddisconnectionfruitsaswellasvirilefruits.

Whenanānantarya-mārgadoesnotremoveanuśaya‑s,thecorrespondingpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑s previously realized are realized again.Suchpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑s are not disconnection fruits; they are onlyvirilefruits:

Thatis,whenonewhohasnotbeendetachedfromanycravingpertainingto the sphere of sensuality, enters into thedarśana-mārga, hisduḥkha-dharma-jñāna-kṣānti removes tenanuśaya‑s, and the [corresponding]pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-s are realized.Suchpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑s arecalleddisconnectionfruitsaswellasvirilefruits.

Whenonewhohasbeendetachedfromallcravingspertainingtothesphereofsensualityentersthedarśana-mārga,hisduḥkha-dharma-jñāna-kṣānti doesnot remove theanuśaya‑s [involved], and the [corresponding] oldpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑sarerealized[again].Suchpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑sarenotdisconnectionfruitssincetherealreadyhasbeenthedisconnection;theyarevirilefruitsforbyvirtueofthisreceptivity,otheracquisitions[ofthesepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑sarearisen],andtheyarerealizedagain.

Whenonewhohasbeenpartlydetachedfromthecravingspertainingtothesphereofsensualityentersthedarśana-mārga,hisduḥkha-dharma-jñāna-kṣāntiremovessome,butnotothers,amongthetenanuśaya‑s.Amongthepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑srealized,somearenew,othersareold,andtheyarerespectivelynamedasthetwofruitsortheonefruit.35

7.3.2.3. Virile action refers to the efficacy (功能) of a dharma

Saṃghabhadra objects toVasubandhu’s referring tokāritra aspuruṣakāra:Theimplicationofthisusageistheproposition—whichhesaysVasubandhushouldhavemade—that“itiscalledavirilefruitbecausethey(theco‑existentcauses)togetherdragoutacommonfruit”.ThisobjectionarisesonaccountoftheVaibhāṣika


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definitionofkāritraasphala-ākarṣaṇa(?)orphala-ākṣepa,i.e.,thedraggingoutorprojecting/inducingafruit,asopposedtotheactual‘giving’(phala-dāna)orproducingafruit.(Seebelow,§7.4).Thiswouldnotbeappropriateinthecontextofthepresentdiscussionofwhatcausesproducewhatfruits.

Saṃghabhadrafurtherassertsthatsuchapropositionwouldentailthat“therecanonly be virile fruits either immediately (anantaram) or sometime after thecauses.Theydonotexistamongtheconascent.Itisnotpossiblethat,amongtheconascent,allofthemtogetheracquireacommonvirilefruitfor[adharma] itselfdoesnotarisebyvirtueofitself.Norcanwesaythateachinducesitsfruitseparatelylest[theverydefinitionbecontradicted]thattheco‑existentcausesdonotsharethesamefruit.”Hethenexplains:

Herein,puruṣa-kāra, puruṣa-bala, puruṣa-sāmarthya (士能),puruṣa-śakti (士之勢分)—allthesehavethesamemeaning:Astheefficacies (功能)ofdharma‑sarelikevirileactions,theyarecalledvirileaction(puruṣakāra);justasastrongmaniscalledalionbecauseheislikealion.36

7.3.2.4. Examples of virile fruits

TheAKBgivesthefollowingasexamplesofvirilefruits:Thefirstdhyānaisthevirilefruitofacittawhichpreparesit.Acittacapableofmagicaltransformation(nirmāṇa-citta)isthevirilefruitofapurecittainadhyāna. An outflow‑freedharma,e.g.,duḥkhe dharmajñāna-kṣānti,canbethevirilefruitofadharma withoutflow,e.g.,thelaukikāgra-dharma‑s.37

7.3.3. Fruit of dominance (adhipati-phala)

Thisisthemostgenerictypeoffruit,correlatedtothemostgenerictypeofcause,theefficientcause.IntermsofthekarmadoctrineoftheSarvāstivāda,thefruitscommonlysharedbyacollectionofbeingsbyvirtueoftheircollectivekarma‑sbelongtothiscategory.Thus,thewholeuniversewithallitsplanets,mountainsandoceans,etc.,istheresult—thefruitofdominance—ofthecollectivekarma‑softhetotalityofbeingsinhabitingtherein.(Seebelow,§7.3.5;cf. infra,§14.8).

AKBexplainsthisfruitasfollows:

[Thefruitofdominance]isafruitbornofthedominanceofthe[efficientcause].

[Theefficient cause] is establishedmerelyonaccountof itsbeingnon‑obstructive—whatdominancedoesithave?Thisfactitself[constitutesthedominance].

Moreover,theefficientcausealsohasthenatureofacontributiveefficacy.Thus,[inthissense,] thetenāyatana‑s[havedominance]withregardtothefivesensoryconsciousnesses;the[collective]karma,withregardtothe


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physicalworld.Theauditoryorgan,etc.,alsohavean[indirect]dominance,throughasuccession,withregardtothearisingofvisualconsciousness,forhavingheard,thereis,inaperson,thearisingofthedesiretosee.Othersimilarcasesofthistypeofdominancearetobeunderstoodaccordingly.38

Aswehaveseenabove,thevirilefruitalsohasaverybroadconnotation.Howdoesitdifferfromthefruitofdominance?TheMVŚexplains:

Question:What is the differencebetween a virile fruit and a fruit ofdominance?

Answer:Thatwhichisacquiredthroughtheexerciseofaneffortisavirilefruit.Thatwhich isacquiredonaccountofnon‑obstruction isafruitofdominance…Moreover,wealthisavirilefruitinrespectofthedoer,andafruitofdominanceinrespectoftheenjoyer.Thusthefruits[ofaplant]arebothvirilefruitsandfruitsofdominanceinrespectoftheplanter;[but]onlyfruitsofdominanceinrespectoftheenjoyer…39

Thus,sincethefactorofnon‑obstructioncontributestothearisingofanyfruit,thescopeofthefruitofdominanceisnecessarilybroaderthanthatofthevirilefruit.40

Themoralimplicationoftheresultofanactofnon‑obstructionisalsotakenupintheMVŚ.Thequestionisposedastowhy,whensomeonekillsapersonothersentientbeingsarenotguiltyofthisactofkilling—giventhattheyallhavenotobstructedthekilling,thusfunctioningastheefficientcause?Theansweristhatthekillerisfullyengagedinthewholecourseofkilling:hegeneratesanevilintentionandengageshimselfinthepreparatoryefforttokillandalsobringsaboutthecompletionoftheresult;othersentientbeingshavenotdoneso.Anotherquestionconcernsthenotionofcollectivekarma:

Question:Externalwealth (財物;bhoga) is generatedby the collectivekarma(asfruitofdominance)ofallsentientbeings,whyisitthatathieftransgressesagainstonly theownerof thewealthandnotagainstother[sentientbeings]?

Answer:Theownerofthewealthkeepsandprotectshiswealth;theothersdonotdoso…Moreover,theownerofthewealththinksofthewealthasbelongingtohimself,andthethiefthinksofhimselfastheownerofthewealth;[othersdonotdoso].Thus,[thethief]transgressesagainstonlythe[owner]andnotothers.Moreover,thetransgressionisagainsthimforwhomthewealthisbothavirilefruitandafruitofdominance;forothersentientbeings,thewealthisafruitofdominanceandnotavirilefruit.41


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7.3.4. Emanation fruit (niṣyanda-phala)

TheSanskritwordniṣyanda (ni-√syand) literallymeans ‘flowing forth,issuing’.Thenotionisthatofafruitissuedfromacauseofasimilarnature.XuanZang’stranslationof等流(‘equal‑flowing’)isinterpretive,butjustifiableandmeaningful (see above, §7.1.2 for the explanationof its correspondingcondition, i.e., samanantara-pratyaya, as ‘equal and immediate’).Avatāra(T)defines it thus: rgyu dang ‘dra ba’i chos ni rgyu mthun pa shes bya‘o /—“Adharmawhich is similar to the cause is said to be ‘cause‑conforming’.”This fruit is correlated to the homogeneous cause and the universal cause.TheAKBexplainswhy the latter is to be distinguished from the former:

Thatdharmawhichissimilartothecauseisanemanationfruit,forinstance,[thosefruitssimilarto]thehomogeneousanduniversalcauses.

Iftheuniversal[cause]alsohasthesamefruit,whyisitnotconcededtobe[afruit]ofthehomogeneouscause,[i.e.,whynotcallauniversalcause‘ahomogeneouscause’]?Becauseitssimilarityisintermsofstage(bhūmi)andthenatureofbeingdefiled,butnotofcategory[ofabandonables].42

7.3.5. Retribution fruit (vipāka-phala)

Thisfruit,pertaining tosentientbeings(sattvākhya)only,correlateswith theretributioncause.Thecausalrelationshipbetweenthisfruitanditscausepertainstothedomainofkarmawhichistwofold,personalandcollective.Personalkarma resultsinanindividualretribution.Collectivekarma‑sareactionsdonecollectivelybyagroupofbeings, resulting incollectiveexperiences. (See infra,§14.8).Thus, the physicalworld— thebhājana-loka— inhabitedby livingbeingsis theresultof themoralactionsof the totalityofbeings.However, it isnotnamedaretribution,which,bydefinition,isuniquetotheindividual.Instead,suchacollectiveresultisconsideredasafruitofdominance.

Beingaresultofaprocessofmaturation(vi-√pac;pacmeaningcook/mature),aretributionfruitisneithersimultaneouswithitscausenorproducedimmediately.The Samabhedoparacaṇacakra,however,recordsaviewoftheMahāsāṃghikathat“karmaandvipākacanarisesimultaneously”.43

Theretributioncausedependsonthedevelopmentormaturationoftheseriesfortherealizationofitsfruit.44Itsmoralnatureisindefinableasbeingeitherkuśala or akuśala,i.e.,itisnon‑defined(avyākṛta).Moreover,itisdescribedas‘non‑veiled/non‑covered’(anivṛta),sinceitdoesnotconstituteahindrancetothenoblepath.(Seesupra,§2.4.3.2.1).

TheAKBexplainsasfollows:

… retribution/maturation is a non‑veiled‑non‑defineddharma,…pertainingtosentientbeings,arisingsubsequenttoa[morally]defined


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[dharma—itscause],forwithrespecttotheretribution,askillfuloranunskillfuldharma [as itscause] is[morally]definedonaccountof itsdefinability.Theretributionisthatwhicharisesfromitsubsequently,notsimultaneously,notimmediately.Thisisthecharacteristicofaretribution.

Whyisanon‑sentientthingbornofkarmanot[considered]aretribution?Becauseofitsbeingcommon—for,anotherpersonalsoissimilarlyabletopartakeofit.[Bydefinition,]however,aretributionisunique[tothepersononaccountofwhosekarmaitistheresult],foritisnotthecasethat anotherpersonexperiences the retributionof thekarma of someotherperson.

Whydoesanotherpersonexperienceafruitofdominance[whichisalsobornofkarma]?Becauseitisbroughtintobeingbyacollectivekarma.45

7.4. The ‘grasping’ and ‘giving’ of a fruit

AccordingtotheSarvāstivāda,acausalprocessresultingintheactualizationofitseffectinvolvesthefollowingtwosteps:46

(i) First,theremustbethe‘graspingofafruit’(phala-grahaṇa/phala-pratigrahaṇa).Thisstepproperlydeterminesthattheparticularcauseiscausallyrelatedtoitscorrespondingeffect.Saṃghabhadraexplainsthat‘graspingofafruit’means‘inducing/projecting(ā-√kṣip)ofthefruit’.47Yaśomitraalsoexplainssimilarly:

By‘[thecauses]grasp’ismeant‘theyproject’.Itmeansthattheyabideinthestateofbeingacause.48

(ii)Whentheeffectso‑determinedactuallyarises,i.e.,ismadetoenterintothepresent,itiscalledthe‘givingofthefruit’(phala-dāna)bythecause.

Allthesixcausesgrasptheirfruitsinthepresentmoment.Itisthiscausalfunctionofgraspingafruit,occurringonlyinthepresentmoment,thatiscalledtheactivity(kāritra)ofadharma.49FortheVaibhāṣikas,thisactivityofdharmaofgraspingorprojectingitsownfruit—causingthearisingofitsfollowingmomentinitsserialcontinuity—uniquelydefinesitspresentness.(Seesupra,§5.5).

Asforthegivingoffruit:twocauses—theco‑existentandtheconjoinedcauses—givetheirfruitsonlyintheirpresentmoment.Thehomogeneousanduniversalcausesgivetheirfruitsbothintheirpresentmomentandwhentheyarepast.Theretributioncausegivesitsfruitwhenithasbecomepast.50Itcannotdosoinitspresentmomentortheimmediatelysubsequentmoment,astheprocessofmaturationrequiresatimelapse.(Seeabove,§7.3.5).


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NOTES

1 Ny,445b.2 VKŚ,547bff.Seealsosupra,§4.1.2.1.3 T26,547b–c.4 T26,559b.5 MVŚ,47b,283a–b,680b,680c,975a,982b.6 MVŚ,283b.7 MVŚ,79a–b;sameasthatintheAKB;cf.chartin§6.1.8 MVŚ,105a–b.9 MVŚ,105a.10Ny,411a;AKB,ii,stanza46d.11MVŚ,703b.12 The same emphasis is also present in theTheravādaAbhidhamma.Cf.Vism,XVII:

paccaya-sāmaggiṃ paṭicca samaṃ phalānam uppādo |13AKB,98:kāraṇa-hetu-varjāḥ pañca hetavo hetu-pratyayaḥ |14PrŚ,719a.15 AKB,98:arhataḥ paścimānapāsyotpannāś cittacaittāḥ samanantarapratyayaḥ | samaśca ayam

anantaraśca pratyaya iti samanantara-pratyayaḥ | … kasmād arhataś caramāś cittacaittā na samanantarapratyayaḥ / anyacittāsaṃbandhanāt || Cf.MVŚ,50a;Ny,443b–c.

16Ny,445b.17Ny,447a.18AKB,98.19 MVŚ,52a.Otherreasonsgivenbyvariousmastersfordenyingtheexistenceofsamanantara-

pratyaya‑samongmatterarealsogiven.20SimilarlyintheMVŚ,51a–b.21Ny,445b.22MVŚ,50b.Characterizationsbyothermastersarealsogiventherein.23 AKB,100:ālambanaṃ sarvadharmāḥ [62c]|yathā‑yogaṃcakṣur‑vijñānasyasasaṃprayogasyarūpam|śrotra‑vijñānasyaśabdaḥ…|

24Ny,447b.25 AKB, 100:ya eva kāraṇa-hetuḥ sa evādhipatipratyayaḥ | adhiko’yaṃ pratyaya ity

adhipatipratyayaḥ | … adhikasya vā pratyayaḥ | sarvaḥ sarvasya saṃskṛtasya svabhāvavarjyasya ||26MVŚ,109a.27MVŚ,109b–c.28Ny,409a.29Ny,449c–450a.30MVŚ,79a,108c.31 AKB,91:saṃskṛtasyaiva dharmasya hetuphale bhavataḥ | nāsaṃskṛtasya te ||55d||


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kiṃ kāraṇam | ṣaḍvidha-hetv-asaṃbhavāt pañcavidha-phalāsaṃbhavāc ca | kasmāt mārgo visaṃyogasya kāraṇa-hetur neṣyate | yasmāt sa utpādāvighna-bhāvena vyavasthāpito na cāsaṃskṛtam utpattimat | kasyedānīṃ tatphalaṃ kathaṃ vā mārgasya phalam | tadbalena prāpteḥ |

32Ny,429a;cf. infra,§16.3.33 AKB,95: sahabhū-saṃprayuktaka-hetvoḥ puruṣakāra-phalam | puruṣabhāvāyatirekāt

puruṣakāraḥ puruṣa eva/ tasya phalaṃ pauruṣam | ko ‘yaṃ puruṣakāro nāma | yasya dharmasya yat kāritram | puruṣakāra iva hi puruṣakāraḥ |

34 AKB,96:yadbalājjāyate yattatphalaṃ puruṣakārajam | SeeVy,225: yad-balāj jāyate iti vistaraḥ | yasya balaṃ yad-balam iti ṣaṣthī-samāsaḥ | yasya balāj jāyate yat saṃskṛtaṃ tat phalaṃ tasya puruṣakārajam | puruṣakāraj jātaṃ puruṣakārajaṃ puruṣakāra-phalam ity arthaḥ ||

35Ny,437a.36Ny,436a.37AKB,97.38 AKB,94:tasyādhipatijaṃ phalam | anāvaraṇabhāvamātreṇa avasthitasya kim ādhipatyam |

etadeva | aṅgībhāvo’pi cāsti kāraṇahetos tadyathā “pañcasu vijñānakāyeṣu daśānām āyatanānāṃ bhājanaloke ca karmāṇām | śrotrādīnām apy asti cakṣurvijñānotpattau pāraṃparyeṇa ādhipatyam | śrutvā draṣṭukāmatotpatter” ity evamādi yojyam ||

39MVŚ,106c.40MVŚ,630b.41MVŚ,106c.42 AKB,95: hetor yaḥ sadṛśo dharmaḥ sa niṣyanda-phalam | tadyathā sabhāga-sarvatraga-hetvoḥ |

yadi sarvatraga-hetor api samānaṃ phalaṃ yasmān na sabhāga-hetor eveṣyate | yasmāt bhūmitaḥ kliṣṭatayā cāsya sādṛśyaṃ na tu prakārataḥ | yasya tu prakārato ‘pi sādṛśyaṃ so ‘bhyupagamyata eva sabhāga-hetuḥ ||

43T49,15c.44AKB,90.45 AKB,95:anivṛtāvyakṛto … dharmaḥ vipākaḥ … sattvākhyo vyākṛtodbhavaḥ [57b]| kuśalākuśalaṃ hi vipākaṃ prati vyākaraṇād vyākṛtam | tasmād ya uttarakālaṃ bhavati na

saha nāntaraṃ sa vipākaḥ | etad vipākasya lakṣaṇam | kasmād asattvākhyo’rthaḥ karmajo na vipākaḥ | sādhāraṇatvāt | anyo’pi hi tat tathaiva paribhoktuṃ samarthaḥ | asādharaṇas tu vipākaḥ | na hy anyakṛtasya karmaṇo’nyo vipākaṃ pratisaṃvedayate | adhipati-phalaṃ kasmāt pratisaṃvedayate | sādhāraṇa-karma-saṃbhūtatvāt ||

46 Cf.MVŚ,98b.47Ny,437c.48Vy,226.49Ny,437c.50 MVŚ,108c;AKB,96f.;Ny,437c–438a—SaṃghabhadrahererejectsanopinionrecordedintheMVŚ(loc. cit.)thatforthekāraṇa-hetu‑s,boththeirgraspingandgivingoffruitscanbeinthepresentmomentorwhentheyarepast.


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8. The Category of Matter (rūpa)

8.1. Generalnatureanddefinitionofrūpa8.1.1. Delimitationofthedomainofrūpa8.1.2. Definitionbythetermrūpaṇā/rūpaṇa8.1.2.1. Rūpaṇā/rūpaṇainterpretedasobstructivenessorresistance

8.1.3. Resistanceandvisibilityhighlightedasthetwodistinctivequalities8.1.4. Specialtypesofmatter

8.2. Primaryandderivedmatter8.2.1. Explanationofthetermmahābhūta8.2.2. GreatElementsasdhātu‑s8.2.3. InseparabilityoftheGreatElements8.2.4. Dependenceofupādāya-rūpaontheGreatElements

8.3. ‘Atomic’theory8.3.1. Descriptivedefinitionofan‘atom’8.3.2. Atomsofcolorandshape8.3.3. Anaggregateofsimilaratomsasarealentity8.3.4. Theoctadastheminimalmoleculethatarises8.3.5. Problemsconnectedwiththenotionofatom8.3.5.1. Definitionbyrūpaṇā/rūpaṇa8.3.5.2. Are there intervening spaces between the atoms or do they touch

oneanother?

8.1. General nature and definition of rūpa

Thetermrūpamayberenderedasmatter.Attheearlystageofabhidharma study,theredidnotseemtobemuchattemptataformaldefinitionofrūpa.Thisismostprobablyduetothefactthatrūpaisoneofthemostmatter‑of‑factexistentsinthehumanexperience.Therewaslittleneedtoelaborateonwhatrūpawas.However, thefundamentalconcernofabhidharmabeingthe investigationofself‑characteristicandintrinsicnatureoftheultimatereals(supra,§2.3.2.1),itwasinevitablethattheĀbhidharmikaseventuallycametoseekanarticulatedefinitionofthiscategory.

8.1.1. Delimitation of the domain of rūpa

Thedefinitionofrūpainthesenseofmatterisoftengiveninthesūtramerelyin the formof delimiting the domainof all that comesunder this category.Thispracticeisinheritedbytheabhidharmatreatises.Thus,inexplainingrūpa-skandha,theMVŚquotestwosuchsūtradefinitions:

Question:Whatisrūpa-skandha?Answer:Asit issaid in thesūtra, ‘Allrūpa‑s[comprise] thefourGreatElementsandthosederivedfromtheGreatElements.’Anothersūtrasays,


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‘Whatisrūpa-skandha?Allthoserūpa‑s—past,future,present,internal,external,coarse,fine,inferior,superior,distant,near—allthesegroupedtogetherintooneheapiscalledtherūpa-skandha.’

Inaddition,however,theMVŚheregivesitsĀbhidharmikadefinitionasfollows:

TheĀbhidharmikassaythus:“Whatisrūpa-skandha?Theten[itemsinthe]rūpa-āyatanaandtherūpasubsumedunderthedharmāyatana.”1

The‘rūpasubsumedunderthedharmāyatana’isaspecialtypeofrūpathatisnon‑obstructiveandinvisible(supra,§2.4.1.3.1,infra,§13.7).NotallSarvāstivādamasters,however,acceptsuchaspeciesofmatter(infra,§13.4.2.1).

8.1.2. Definition by the term rūpaṇā/rūpaṇa

However,therearealsomorearticulatedefinitions.TheAKBdefinesrūpabythetermrūpaṇa/rūpaṇā—whichXuanZangrendersas‘change‑obstruction’變礙—understoodinthesenseofbeingsubjecttodeteriorationordisintegration.Fortheverbform,rūpayati/rūpyate,healsooccasionallyrendersas變壞(‘deteriorate’).Thetermisevidentlylinkedetymologicallytotheroot√rup(connectedto√lup)—‘disturb’,‘violate’,‘break’.Butrūpaṇāisalsooftenimplicitlylinkedto√rūp,adenominativerootfromthenounrūpa,inwhichcaserūpaṇāmeansnomorethan‘thenatureofbeingrūpa’.Whatthisnatureactuallyis,isthenfurtherarticulated.

Initsdefinition,theAKBquotesinsupporttheSaṃyuktāgama:2

It is repeatedlymolested/broken, therefore,Obhikṣu‑s, it is called therūpa-upādāna-skandha.Bywhatisitmolested/broken?Touchedbyeventhe contactofthehand,itismolested/broken.3

TheChineseversionoftheSĀ4reads:

Thatwhichissusceptibleofbeingobstructedanddecomposed(若可礙可分)iscalledrūpa-upādāna-skandha.Itisobstructedbythefingers.Itistouchedbythehand,orstone,orstick,orknife,orcoldness,orheat,orthirst,orhunger,orinsectssuchasmosquitoes,orwindorrain—thisiscalledresistancebytouch.Thus,resistanceis[thecharacteristic]oftherūpa-upādana-skandha.5

Itisnoteworthythat,intheSaṃyukta-sūtraquotedabove,theoft‑givendefinitionof rūpaasthatwhichissubjecttoresistance(pratighāta)anddecomposition/disintegrationwasalreadyfound(seebelow).TheAKB(loc. cit.)furtherquotesthefollowingstanzafromtheArthavargīya6 toexplainthat‘isbroken’means‘isoppressed/molested/disturbed’(rūpyate bādhyata ityarthaḥ):

If,whendesireisborninonewhoseekssensualpleasure,thosesensualpleasures donot abound, he is disturbed/molested (rūpyate) like beingpiercedbyanarrow.

8. the Category of matter (rūPa)

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Andwhatoppression(bādhanā)doesrūpahave?[Anoppression]whichisofthenatureofchangeinarising.7

Yaśomitraobservesthatthisquestion‑and‑answerisinanticipationofthequestion:“Buthowisrūpaoppressed?”—sincerūpaisunlikeapleasure‑seekinghuman:

Thusitsays,‘whichisofthenatureofchangeinarising’.Thismeans:‘whichisofthenatureofbeingdisfigured’(vikriyotpādanā).8

Thisapparently‘subjective’meaningisdistinctlyconveyedinXuanZang’stranslationofbothrūpyateandbādhyateinthiscontextas惱壞,‘vexed(/molested)‑broken’9,andYaśomitrahereclearlyseekstoexplainawayitssubjectiveimplication.

However,onemayunderstandthisastheĀbhidharmikaattempttorelaterūpyate tothesubjectivesenseencounteredinthesūtra‑s:Thissubjectivesensebecomesunderstoodtorefertothehumanexperienceofrūpa:Therūpathatarisesisthatwhichisexperiencedbythehuman.Sinceitisofthenatureofbeingsubjecttoresistanceandimpermanent,itismutatedordisfiguredasitarises—visiblysoincontrasttootherdharma‑s—andthereforeitisultimatelydisturbingtotheexperiencer.InSaṃghabhadra’swords,thischaracteristicofrūpamaybestatedasthatofbeingthecauseofunpleasantsensation(duḥkhavedanā-hetu):

Herein,why ismatter‑aggregate calledmatter?First of all, theSugata’snoble teachingstates thatmatter issocalledonaccountof thefact thatitchangesanddeteriorates.Themeaningofthisstatementisasfollows:becauseitisthecauseofunpleasantsensation,becauseitisobstructive,becauseitissubjecttobeingtransformed,itissaidtochange‑deteriorate.Onaccountofchange‑deterioration,itiscalledmatter.‘Itisthecauseofunpleasantsensation’—thismeansthatmatterchangesanddeteriorates,andcangenerateunpleasantsensation,asissaidintheArthavargīya:…10

8.1.2.1. Rūpaṇā/rūpaṇa interpreted as obstructiveness or resistance

TheAKB11 informsus that someĀbhidharmikamasters interpretrūpaṇāaspratighāta,‘resistance’,whichmeans“thehindrancetothearisingofanotherthinginitsownlocation”.12TheMVŚ13quotestheSarvāstivādaācārya Vasumitra’sexplanationofwhatconstitutesthecharacteristicsofthingshavingthenatureorqualityofrūpa (有色相):

Thosehaving(i)thenatureofgradualaccumulation,(ii)thenatureofgradualdisintegration, (iii)cognizable form‑substance, (iv)cognizable location,(v)cognizablesize,(vi)cognizableobstruction,(vii)cognizableoffensiveness(apakāra),(viii)cognizablediminutionordamage,(ix)cognizableaddition,(x)thenatureofthethreekindsofrūpa—visibleandobstructive,invisibleandobstructive,invisibleandnon‑obstructive,(xi)thenatureofbeingbroughthereandtakenawaythere,(xii)thenatureofchange‑obstruction(rūpaṇā).


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Thischaracterizationamountstoanelaborationonrūpaṇā.Thecharacteristicgivenin(x)ismostprobablyduetotheconsiderationoftheSarvāstivādatenetof the non‑informativematter(avijñapti)—invisibleandnon‑obstructive—asrealentity.Inbrief,fourdistinctivefeaturesofrūpastandout:(a)accumulative,(b)occupyingspace—obstructive,(c)visible,(d)susceptibletomutability.

8.1.3. Resistance and visibility highlighted as the two distinctive qualities

Vasumitra’scharacterizationabovecaninfactbefurthernarroweddowntotwo:visibilityandresistance,forthesusceptibilitytoaccumulation,diminutionandadditionmaybeseenasderivablefromthenatureofrūpaaspossessingmass—afactwhichinturnmaybecharacterizedasresistance.ItappearsthattheĀbhidharmikasgraduallycametostressprimarilytheseverytwoqualitiesofvisibility(sa-nidarśanatva)andresistance(sa-pratighātatva).Thesusceptibilitytomutabilitydidnotcometobestressedprobablybecauseitisacharacteristicnotconfinedtorūpaalone—allconditioneddharma‑sareimpermanentandsubjecttochange.

Saṃghabhadrahighlightsthemasconstitutingthedistinctivenatureofrūpa:Outofthetenitemssubsumedunderrūpa-āyatana,thefirstoneonlyisgiventhenamerūpaassuchonaccountofthesetwoqualitiesmostdistinctiveofrūpa:

Onaccountofitbeingobstructive,itdeterioratesassoonasitistouchedbythehand,etc.,andonaccountofitbeingvisible,onecanindicateitasbeinglocateddifferently—here,there.14

ThesetwoqualitiesarefurtherelaboratedbySaṃghabhadra:

(i) Onbeingvisibleor‘with‑seeing’:Thisisintwosenses:1.Matterisnecessarilyco‑existentwithseeing(darśana), hence said to be visible (‘with‑seeing’, sanidarśana),for matterandtheeyearisesimultaneously;thisislike[thesenseof]‘withcompanion’.2.Matterhasindicatability,hencesaidtobevisible,foritcanbedifferentlyindicatedasbeinghereorbeingthere;15thisislike[thesenseof]‘with‑object’(sa-ālambana).16

(ii) Onbeingresistantor‘with‑resistance’:Resistancemeansobstruction.‘Thishastheobstructionbythat’(i.e.,thisisobstructedbythat),henceitissaidtobe‘with‑resistance’.Obstruction(pratighāta)isthreefold:obstructionquahindrance(āvaraṇa-pratighāta),obstructionquaobjectdomain(viṣaya-pratighāta)andobstructionquacognitiveobject(ālambana-pratighāta).17

Anobjectdomain(viṣaya)istobedistinguishedfromacognitiveobject(ālambana):A dharma,y,istheobjectdomainofanotherdharma,x,ifxexercisesitsefficacy(seeing,etc.)iny.Ontheotherhand,acognitiveobjectisadharmagraspedby


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athoughtorthought‑concomitant,(i.e.,whenthecognitiveobjectisgrasped,aconsciousness is generated correspondingly to it).18Accordingly,whereasthoughtandthought‑concomitantshavebothanobjectdomainandacognitiveobject,thesensefacultieshaveonlyobjectdomains.

Oftheaforementionedthreefoldobstruction,itistheobstructionquahindrancethatisspecificallyreferredtoasacharacteristicofmatter.Thesethreetypesofobstructionareexplainedasfollows:

(1) Obstruction qua hindrance:Whenonematerialdharma occupiesalocation,anothermaterialdharmacannotariseinthesamespace.Twomaterialdharma‑saremutuallyresistantorobstructiveinthissensetoeachother.

(2) Obstructionquaobjectdomain:Whenasensefaculty(e.g.,theeye)meetswith itscorrespondingobjectdomain (e.g.,avisible)and itsefficacy(e.g.,seeing)isexercised,thenitissaidtobeobstructedbythatobjectdomaininasmuchasitssphereofvisionisatthattimeconfinedtothatobject.AnexampleiscitedfromthePjŚ:theeyeofafishisobstructedbyencounteringavisibleinwater,notonland;theeyeofahumanisobstructedbyavisibleonland,notinwater.

(3) Obstructionquacognitiveobject:Whenthoughtandthought‑concomitantsaresoobstructedby—confinedto—theircognitiveobjects.19

LikeSaṃghabhadra,Yaśomitrahighlightstoo“thenatureofrūpawhichistheindicatabilityoflocation:‘Itishere,there’.”20 Saṃghabhadraarguesthatvisibilityas an intrinsic characteristicof the categoryof rūpamust apply to even thesmallestunit—anatom.For,otherwise,itwillforfeititsveryintrinsicnatureasrūpa.(Seebelow,§8.3.3).

Elsewhere,Saṃghabhadra alsogives three defining characteristics of rūpa:(i)indicatability of location, (ii)susceptibility to deterioration throughobstructivecontact,(iii) rūpabydesignation.Thethirdcharacteristicpertainstothenon‑informativemattersubsumedunderthedharmāyatanaratherthantherūpāyatana.“Theyarecalledrūpabywayofdesignation(prajñapti)intermsof rūpa:Itisnotthecasethattheycanbedesignatedapartfromthebodilyandvocal[karma‑s]whicharerūpainnatureandfromwhichtheyaregenerated,forinthesphereofimmateriality,thisdesignationdoesnotexist.”21

8.1.4. Special types of matter

Obviously,thethirdcharacteristicgivenbySaṃghabhadraaboveisintendedtosubsumethenon‑informationkarmaasaspecialtypeofmatterinspiteofitsbeingdevoidofthefirsttwocharacteristics(i.e.,visibilityandresistance).


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Besidesthenon‑informationmatterwhichisunlikeothermatterthatweencounterin phenomenal existence, theSarvāstivāda concedes other types of specialmatter,suchasthatinthefine‑materialsphereandthatoftheintermediatebeings(antarābhava);thesekindsofmatteraresaidtobetransparent(accha).Infact,onereasonthatthefacultyofsuffering(duḥkhendriya)isabsentinthebeingsofthefine‑materialsphereisthattheirbodies(āśraya)areconstitutedbytransparentmatter22onaccountofwhichtheyarenotsubjecttobeinginjured.Wehavealsoseenabovethatthesensefacultiesaresaidtocompriseverysubtleandperspicuous(prasāda)kindsofmatter(cf.§2.4.1.3.2)whicharesuprasensible(atīndriya),andtheiratoms,beingtransparentlikecrystal,aremutuallynon‑obstructive.23 TheMVŚhasasimilar,butmoreillustrativedescription:

Becausetheyaretransparent/clearinnature,theydonotmutuallyobstructone another.That is to say, for such typeof derived clearmatter, evenwhenalargenumberofthemareaccumulatedtogether,thereisnomutualobstruction.Itislikethewaterinanautumnpond;onaccountofitsclarity,evenaneedlethatisdroppedintoitcanbevisible.24

Saṃghabhadraquotesthemeditators’assertionthatthematterseeninameditationisaspecialtypeofderivedmatter:

Allthehermitage‑dwellers(āraṇyaka)assertthus:“Thebluecolour,etc.,seeninmeditationarevisible(sanidarśana)matter.”Itcannotbeassertedthatthismatterisofthenatureofadifferentmodeofthematterthathasbeenpreviously experiencedbyvisual consciousness.For, itmanifestsclearlyinthemeditation.ThismatterquaobjectinmeditationisderivedfromtheGreatElementsgeneratedinmeditation.Itislucidandclear,andisnon‑obstructive,likethespaceelementmatter.25

8.2. Primary and derived matter

Among the various definitions of amaterial (rūpin)dharma in theMVŚ,thefollowinginvolvesthenotionsofthe‘GreatElements’and‘matterderivedfromtheGreatElements’:

ThatdharmawhoseintrinsicnatureconsistsofthefourGreatElementsorofthatwhichisderivedfromthefourGreatElementsiscalledamaterialdharma.ThatdharmawhoseintrinsicnaturedoesnotconsistofthefourGreatElementsorofthatwhichisderivedfromthefourGreatElementsiscalledanon‑materialdharma.

Furthermore, thatdharmawhichhas theGreatElements as its cause(mahābhūta-hetuka) andwhose intrinsic nature consists of the derivedmatteriscalledamaterialdharma.ThatdharmawhichdoesnothavetheGreatElementsasitscauseandwhoseintrinsicnaturedoesnotconsistofthe derivedmatteriscalledanon‑materialdharma.26


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In SarvāstivādaAbhidharma, the totalityofrūpa-dharma‑scomprises (i)theprimarymattercomprisingthefourGreatElements(mahābhūta;‘GreatReals’)—Earth (pṛthivī),Water (ap),Fire (tejas),Air (vāyu); (ii)11derivedmatter(upādāya-rūpa/bhautika)27—fivesense‑faculties(indriya),fivecorrespondingobjects (artha/viṣaya) andnon‑informationmatter (avijñapti-rūpa).The fourGreatElements are also subsumedunder the objects of touch (spraṣṭavya)togetherwith other derived tangibles, because their functions canonly beexperiencedthroughtouch.Theyhavethespecificnature(svabhāva)ofsolidity(khara),humidity(sneha),heat(uṣṇatā)andmobility(īraṇā),respectively,andperformthefunctionsofsupporting(dhṛti),cohesion(saṃgraha),maturation(pakti) and extension (vyūha), respectively.TheSarvāstivāda acknowledgesatotalof11tangibles.Theothersevenare:smoothness(ślakśṇatva),coarseness(karkaśatva),heaviness(gurutva),lightness(laghutva),coldness(śīta),hunger(jighatsā)andthirst(pipāsā).

However,amongthe‘fourgreatācārya‑s’oftheSarvāstivādalineage,Buddhadevaholdsthatrūpacomprisesthemahābhūta‑salone;theso‑calledderivedrūpa‑sarejustspecifictypesofmahābhūta‑s(mahābhūta-viśeṣa).Hisconclusionissaidtohavebeenbasedoncertainsūtrastatementswhichspeak,forinstance,ofthesoliditywithinthefleshyeyeastheinternalEarthElement,themobilitywithinitastheinternalWindElement,etc.28

Dharmatrāta,whileacceptingthederivedrūpa‑sasrealentitiesdistinctfromtheGreatElements,deniestheexistenceofthecategoryofderivedmatterknownas“mattersubsumedunderthedharmāyatana”—whichamountstothedenialofthenon‑informationmatter.HefurtherholdsthattheGreatElementsalonearethetangibles;therearenoderivedtangibles.29

Saṃghabhadra informsus that theSthaviraŚrīlāta alsodenies the existenceof the derived tangibles. For him they are nothingmore than the specificconfigurationoftheGreatElements.Thus,heargues,theso‑calledcoldnessissimplyadesignationforthestatewhereintheHeatElementbecomeslessornotpredominant.Likewise,heavinessorlightnessissimplyadesignationofthefactthatthereexistsabiggerorsmallerquantityoftheGreatElementswithinagivenformofmatter.Heoffersanotherreasonforhisdenial:theseso‑calledderivedtangiblesarealsocognizablebyoureyes.Thatistosay:oureyesgrasp,accordinglyasthecasemaybe,theshape,quantity,colororappearanceoftheGreatElements.Theycanalsocognizethingswhicharesmoothorcoarse.30

8.2.1. Explanation of the term mahābhūta

TheMVŚremarksthatthecompoundmahābhūtaistobetakenasadescriptivecompound(karmadhāraya samāsa),asinthecaseofmahābhūmi,andmahā-rājan, etc.: theyarebothmahā andbhūta, hencenamedmahābhūta.31 The Avatāra explains:


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Thesentenceitalicizedabove,potentiallyveryinformativeintermsofdoctrine,is, however, not found in theTibetanversionofAvatāra.33 In the Vaibhāṣikadoctrine,allconditioneddharma‑shavethiscapability,anditisbyvirtueofthiscapability,technicallycalledkāritra,thataconditioneddharmaisdistinguishableasbeingpresent,asopposedtobeingpastorfuture(seesupra,§5.4).Accordingtothisexplanation,Spaceisnotabhūtaonaccountofitsnon‑productivity.Thisisbecause, for theSarvāstivāda,Space is anunconditionedwhich transcendscausalityinspace‑time.That‘Space’(虛空)intheabovepassagereferstotheunconditionedākāśaisclearfromthefactthattheSarvāstivādinĀbhidharmikassharplydistinguish this fromākāśa-dhātu (空界)which is rūpa in nature.34 In this samecontext,Vasumitra’s explanation is thatākāśa is notoneof themahābhūta‑sbecause it isdevoidof theircharacteristics: increase,decrease;harm,benefit;gainingstrength,waning—allcharacteristicsoftheconditioned.The Bhadanta’sexplanation35maybecomparedtothatgivenbythecompilersoftheMVŚthemselves:

Bhadanta: Compilers:

Space,althoughbeinggreat,isnotbhūta initsnatureasit isnon‑productive.The other saṃskṛta dharma‑s[—otherthan themahābhūta‑s—] althoughcapableofbeingconsideredasbhūta,arenotgreatintheirnatureastheircharacteristicsarenotcommon[toallmaterialdharma-s].Thus,Spaceisnotclassifiedasmahābhūta.36

Quest ion: Why are o therdharma‑s not calledmahābhūta‑s?Answer:Becausetheothersdonothavesuchcharacteristicsasthemahābhūta‑s.That is: because the unconditioneddharma‑saregreatbutnotbhūta;theother conditioneddharma‑sarebhūta butarenotgreat.Accordingly,thesefouralonereceivethenamemahābhūta‑s.37

ItcanbeseenthatinBhadanta’sexplanation,Spaceisclearlycontrastedwiththeconditioneddharma‑s;andthecomparisonwiththecompilers’ownexplanationbearsoutthatSpace,inalltheseexplanations,referstotheunconditionedākāśa. Accordingly, it canbe concluded thatbhūtam, in the compoundmahābhūta, referstothereals—thecausallyproductive—inthedomainoftheconditioned.Amongthese,onlythosefourrealsarethe‘GreatReals’becausetheyaloneformtheindispensablebasisforthearisingofallthederivedrūpa‑s.Orrather,asthecompilershereexplain:

Bhūtasignifiesthatwhichcandecreaseorincrease,harmorbenefit,whicharisesandceases.Mahāsignifiesthatwhosesubstance,characteristics,shapeandquantitypervadeeverywhere,accomplishinggreataction.

Question:Howdothesefouraccomplishgreatwork?

Answer:Thegreatworkconsistsintheirbeingthesupportingbasesforthegreatmassesofderivedmatter,causingthemtodisintegrateortobeformed.(loc. cit.)


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8.2.2. Great Elements as dhātu-s

TheGreatElementsarealsocalleddhātu‑sinthesenseoftheultimatesourceofgenesis.Saṃghabhadraexplains thesignificanceof the termdhātu in thiscontext,givingmorethanonesenseofbhūta:

[Question:]ForwhatreasonsaretheseGreatElementsnameddhātu?

[Answer:]Becausetheyaretheplaceoforiginofallrūpa-dharma‑s.Itisalso from theGreatElements [themselves] that theGreatElements areproduced.Intheworld,theplacesoforiginarecalleddhātu‑s;asforinstance,theminesofgold,etc.,aresaidtobethedhātu‑sofgold,etc.Or,becausetheyaretheplaceoforiginofvarioustypesofunsatisfactoriness(duḥkha),theyaresaidtobedhātu;exampleasbefore.Accordingtosome:theyarenameddhātu because they sustain (√dhṛ) the self‑characteristics of theGreatElementsandsecondarymatter.38

8.2.3. Inseparability of the Great Elements

ThefourGreatElementsexistinseparablyfromoneanother,beingco‑existentcauses(sahabhū-hetu)onetoanother.Nevertheless,rūpa-dharma‑saremanifestedandexperiencedindiverseformsbecauseofthedifferenceinintensityorsubstanceofoneormoreofthefourElements.TheMVŚcomments:39

Question:Fromthepredominanceofwhatistheresmoothness,etc.,uptothirst?

Some say:Smoothness, etc., [in each case,] is not due to the one‑sidedpredominanceof[any]mahābhūta.Itisonlyowingtothemahābhūta‑sbeingofdifferentnaturethattheeffectofsmoothness,etc.,uptothirstisproduced.

Othermasters say:From the predominance ofWater andFire, thereis smoothness. From the predominance ofEarth andWind, there iscoarseness.FromthepredominanceofFireandWind,thereislightness.FromthepredominanceofEarthandWaterthereisheaviness…FromthepredominanceofWaterandWind,thereiscoldness.FromthepredominanceofWind,thereishunger—becauseofthepredominanceofWind,thereisagitationcausingthedissipationoffood,inducingthehunger‑tangible;thedesireforfoodisthusproduced.FromthepredominanceofFire,thereisthirst—becauseofthepredominanceofFire,thereisoppressionfromheatingup,causingthedissipationofwhathasbeendrunkandinducingthethirst‑tangible;thedesirefordrinkisthusproduced.

ButwhiletheMVŚheredoesnotcommentclearlywhichofthetwoviews—predominanceofsubstance,predominanceofeffect—representstheorthodoxVaibhāṣikastandpoint,Saṃghabhadra40criticizestheKośakāraforgivingthelatterviewastheVaibhāṣikaview.AccordingtoSaṃghabhadra,theorthodoxVaibhāṣikaviewisthatofpredominanceofsubstance.


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Elsewhere,theMVŚ41explicitlyaffirmsthatinagivenmassofrūpa,therecanbeaquantitativedifferenceinthemahābhūta‑swithoutcontradictingtheprincipleoftheirinseparability:

Question:Dothemahābhūta‑sincreaseordecreaseinsubstance(i.e.,varyquantitatively)?…There isa fault ineithercase—if they increaseordecrease,howcantheybeinseparable?For,ifinasolidsubstancetherearemoreatomsofEarth(pṛthivī-paramāṇu)andfewerofWater,FireandAir,theEarthatomsquantitativelyintermingledwithWateretc.,[accordinglyasthecasemaybe,]wouldbeseparatedfromtheotherElements.[Ontheotherhand,]ifthereisnoincreaseordecrease,substanceslikewater,stones,etc.,oughtnottodifferinbeingsolid,soft,etc.

Answer:One should say that there is increaseordecrease in substanceamongthemahābhūta‑s.…Althoughthereisanincreaseordecrease,theyarenotseparated,becausetogethertheyperformafunctionbymutuallysupportingoneanother.Thus,inasolidsubstance,wherethenumberofEarthatomsisgreaterthanthoseofWater,FireandAir,theEarthatomsareincapableofperformingtheirfunctionsinisolationfromWater,etc.…Itislikethecaseofmanyvillagesinwhichthereisacollectivemanagement;thereisadifferenceinthenumberofvillagers[amongthevillages],yet[thevillagersareineachcase]mutuallydependentandcannotbeseparated.

ItisthereforeclearthatinseparabilitydoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthefourGreatElementsarejuxtaposed.Itmeansthatthefouralwaysco‑existandarefunctionallyinterdependent.TheyarewhattheSarvāstivādinscallco‑existentcausestooneanother.Theirinseparabilitycanbeinferredfromtheirspecificcharacteristic and activity that canbe observed in allmaterial aggregates.Thus, in an aggregate offluid, besides theobvious specific characteristic oftheWaterElement, theremust alsobe theEarthElementwithoutwhich icecannotresultwhentheweatherisextremelycold,norcanashipbesupported;theremustbetheFireElementwithoutwhichthefluidwouldneverbecomewarm; theremustbe theWindElementwithoutwhich itwouldnevermove.Thus,theSarvāstivādamaintainsthatdespitetheirdivergentcharacteristics,thefourGreatElementsalwaysarisetogether:

Question:The fourGreatElements beingopposed in their respectivecharacteristic,howcantheyarisesimultaneouslyunseparated?

[Answer:]TheVenerableVasumitraexplainsthus:…itisnotthecasethatwhataredifferentincharacteristicsarenecessarilyopposedtooneanother.Thosewhich,whiledifferingincharacteristicsarenotmutuallyopposed,mayarisetogetherwithoutbeingseparated,justlikethefourGreatElementsandsmell,taste,touch,andcolorssuchasblue,yellowetc.42

AccordingtotheSautrāntikamaster,Śrīlāta,however:


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TheGreatElementsandthederivedmatteraremostlyunseparated.Buttherearealsosomewhichareseparated,suchasthelightofthesun,themoon,alampandagem,aswellasthefragrance,etc.,thatdriftsapartfromtheflowers.43

8.2.4. Dependence of upādāya-rūpa on the Great Elements

All rūpa‑s, except for the non‑informativematter, are the fruits of karmicretribution.Although the so‑called derived rūpa‑s are already existing asontologicalentities,theirarisingandfunctioningaredependent(upādāya)ontheGreatElements.Inthissense,thelatteraresaidtobetheircause:OnesetofthefourGreatElementsservesasthecauseofanatom(paramāṇu)ofthederivedrūpainafivefoldmanner.TheMVŚ44 explainsthesenseofthisdependence:

Question:Isitinthesenseof[havingthemahābhūta‑sas]cause,orinthesenseof[havingthemas]conditions?…

Answer: It should be said thus: it is in the sense of [havingthemas]cause.

Question:These[mahābhūta‑s],withregardtothederivedmatter,donothave[thefunctionsof]anyofthefivecauses[besidesbeingefficientcause],sothenhowaretheythecause?

Answer:Although[themeaningof]anyofthefivecauses,i.e.,homogeneouscause,etc., is lacking, [themahābhūta‑s]arecause infiveother senses:i.e.,(i)generatingcause(janana-hetu),(ii)reliancecause(niśraya-hetu),(iii)supportivecause(pratiṣṭhā-hetu),(iv)maintainingcause(upastambha-hetu),(v)developmentcause(upabṛṃhaṇa-hetu).

TheAKB,45explaininginthesamemanner,defineseachofthesefivecauses:(i)becausethederivedrūpa‑sarisefromthem,likeachildfromtheparents;(ii)becausetheyareinfluencedbythem,likeapupilunderateacher;(iii)becausetheyaresupportedbythem;(iv)becausetheyaretheircauseofnon‑interruption;(v)becausetheyaretheircauseofdevelopment.Saṃghabhadraelaboratesfurther:

Although[thederivedmatter]arisessimultaneously[withtheGreatElements],thesenseofcausationisapplicableherebecauseitoperatesinaccompanimentwith(anu‑√vṛt)[—i.e.,itarisesandceaseseverymomenttogetherwith—theGreatElements];thisislikethecaseofasproutproducingitsshadow,oralampilluminatinglight.46

[Asamatteroffact,]althoughdharma‑sarenotnon‑existentsincetheyalreadyexistintheirnature,theirefficaciesareaccomplishedinnecessarydependenceonthepowerofcausesandconditions.Forinstance,itisnotthatthederivedmatterhasnotbeenexistentasentities,buttheirefficaciesareaccomplishedinnecessarydependenceontheGreatElementsascause.47


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TheMVŚenumeratesvariousdifferencesbetweentheGreatElementsandthederivedmatter:

The Ābhidharmika says: theGreatElements are invisible (anidarśana),the derivedmattervisible(sanidarśana)orinvisible.

TheGreatElementsareresistant(sapratigha), the derivedmatterresistantornon‑resistant.

TheGreatElementsarewith‑outflow,thederivedmatterwith‑outfloworoutflow‑free.

TheGreatElementsarenon‑defined,thederivedmatterareskillful,unskillful,or non‑defined.

TheGreatElementspertaintothesensesphere(kāmadhātu-pratisaṃyukta),the derivedmatterpertainstothesensesphere,thefine‑materialspheredoesnotpertaintoanysphere(apratisaṃyukta).

TheGreatElementsareofthenatureofbeingneither‑trainee‑nor‑non‑trainee(naivaśaikṣa-nāśaikṣa), the derivedmatter is of the nature of trainee,non‑traineeorneither‑trainee‑nor‑non‑trainee.

TheGreatElementsareabandonablethroughcultivation(bhāvanāheya),the derivedmatterisabandonablethroughcultivationornottobeabandoned(aheya).

TheGreatElementsaresubsumedunderthetruthsofunsatisfactorinessandtheorigin. The derivedmatterissubsumedunderthetruthsofunsatisfactoriness,theoriginandthepath.

TheGreatElementsarewithoutretribution(avipāka),thederivedmatteriswith‑retribution(savipāka)orwithoutvipāka.

TheGreatElementsarenon‑defiled(akliṣṭa),thederivedmatterisdefiledornon‑defiled.

TheGreatElementsarenotkarma,thederivedmattermayormaynotbekarma.

Thus,thecharacteristicsoftheGreatElementsdifferininnumerablewaysfromthoseofthederivedmatter.48

8.3. ‘Atomic’ theory

UnlikethedoctrineoftheGreatElements,theBuddhistatomictheoryisnotdiscernible in thesūtra‑s.It likelywastakenoverfromoutsidetheBuddhistschools—probablyfromtheVaiśeṣika.However,noBuddhists—includingthe SarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikas—wouldconceiveofatomsasbeingeternallyimmutable or permanent.Certain heretics (tīrthakāra) hold that the atoms,beingeternalandimmutable,remainwhentheuniversedissolves.Incontrast,theSarvāstivādinsteachthatwhentheuniverseisdestroyedbythethreegreat


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calamities—throughfire,waterandwind—notevenoneatomcanremain.49 Atomsareinfactmomentary(seeVasumitra’sopinionbelow,§8.3.5.2).Theyarenot permanent (nitya) on account of their coursing through time.Only theasaṃskṛta-dharma‑sarepermanent,beingbeyondspaceandtime.Atleastbythe timeoftheMVŚ,theBuddhistĀbhidharmikashadalreadyarticulatedthetheorytoalargeextentintheirownway.Inaddition,Buddhists—includingtheĀbhidharmikas—donotadmitofanynotionofqualityinherentinasubstance.Thequality defines theontological status of a real. For theĀbhidharmikas,auniquequalityisinfacttherealexistentitself.

Thetermthatwehaveroughlyrenderedas‘atom’herecorrespondstoparamāṇu. However,attheoutset,itshouldbeborneinmindthattheVaibhāṣikanotionof paramāṇuisnotentirelythesameasthenotionofatominmodernphysics(seebelow,§8.3.4).

The Vaibhāṣikaconcedesthatanatomasthesmallestunitofmatterisknownthroughmentalanalysis.Thisiscalledthe‘conceptualatom’(假極微;*prajñapti-paramāṇu). It is from thisperspective thatonecould speakofparamāṇu ascorresponding to thenotionof ‘atom’.Nevertheless, thisdoesnotmean thatatomsexistonlyasconcept.Theconceptualisalwaysbasedontheultimatelyreal,andthisultimatelyrealatomistheintrinsiccharacteristicofmatter(thevisibles,etc.).Whileasingleparamāṇucannotbedirectlyobserved,aphysicalassemblage(和集;he ji)ofthemisknownthroughdirectperception(pratyakṣa).50

8.3.1. Descriptive definition of an ‘atom’

TheMVŚgivesadescriptivedefinitionofan‘atom’asfollows:

Anatom(paramāṇu)isthesmallestrūpa.Itcannotbecut,broken,penetrated;itcannotbetakenup,abandoned,riddenon,steppedon,struckordragged.Itisneitherlongnorshort,squarenorround,regularnorirregular,convexnorconcave.Ithasnosmallerparts;itcannotbedecomposed,cannotbeseen,heard,smelled,touched.Itisthusthattheparamāṇuissaidtobethefinest(sarva-sūkṣma)ofallrūpa‑s.

Sevenoftheseparamāṇu‑sconstituteanaṇu—thefinestamongallrūpa‑sperceivable by the eye andvisual consciousness. [However,] this [aṇu] canbeseenbyonlythreetypesofeyes:1.Thedivineeye(divya-cakṣus),2.theeyeofaUniversalMonarch(cakravartin),3.theeyeofabodhisattva in hislastbirth.Sevenaṇu‑sconstituteatāmra-rajas. … Seven tāmra-rajas‑sconstituteanap-rajas … Seven ap-rajas‑sconstituteaśaśa-rajas;…Sevenśaśa-rajas‑sconstituteaneḍaka-rajas … Seven eḍaka-rajas‑sconstituteago-rajas … Seven go-rajas‑sconstituteavātāyana-rajas…[inthisway,thewholephysicaluniverseiscomposed].51


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ThisdoctrineofthesevenfoldincrementalatomicagglomerationisalsofoundintheAKBwhichlikewisestatesclearlythat“sevenparamāṇu‑sconstituteanaṇu (sapta paramāṇavo ‘ṇuḥ).

AndNy.52 Saṃghabhadradefinestheatommoresuccinctly:

Thefinestpartinaresistantmatterwhichcannotbefurtherdividediscalledaparamāṇu.Thatis,thisparamāṇucannotbefurtherdividedintomany[parts]bymeansofanothermatter[or]theintellect(buddhi).Thisisthensaidtobethe‘ultimatelysmall’(parama-aṇu)amongmatter.Astherecanbenofurtherpart,itiscalledthe‘ultimatelysmall’.Inthesameway,akṣaṇa isthesmallest[unit]oftime;itcannotbefurtheranalyzedintohalfkṣaṇa‑s.Amultitudeofsuchparamāṇu‑sthataremutuallycombinedandnecessarilyinseparableiscalledan“aggregate‑atom”(saṃghāta-paramāṇu).53

FromSaṃghabhadra’sexplanationabove,wecanthereforespeakoftwotypesof paramāṇu‑s: 1.paramāṇu in theproper senseof the term— the smallestconceivable buildingblockofmatter.This is also calleddravya-paramāṇu. 2. saṃghāta-paramāṇu in the sense of amolecule— the smallest unit ofmatterthatcanactuallyoccurinthephenomenalworld.(Seebelow,§8.3.4).Saṃghabhadrafurthersays:

The size of an atomcan alsobe illustratedby examples.But it is notexplainedbecauseitisknownonlybytheBuddha.However,inordertodefineanaraṇya (‘forestdwelling’,‘hermitage’),the[Sarvāstivāda]Vinaya saysonlythatanagglomerationofsevenatomsiscalledanaṇu,etc.…

8.3.2. Atoms of color and shape

Rūpa,inthesenseofvisibleobjects,istwofold,namely,color(varṇa)andshape(saṃsthāna).Correspondingtothesetwo,thereareindividualatomsofcolors(suchasblue,etc.)andshapes(suchaslongetc.)eventhoughtheyarenotdirectlyperceivablebytheeyeandvisualconsciousness.TheSarvāstivādaarguesthatiftherewerenoindividualatomsofcolorandshape,anagglomerationofatomswouldnot, forinstance, becomegreenor long.54 The Sautrāntika, however,acceptstherealityofcoloratomsonly.Forthem,theso‑calledshapeatomsaresimplythecoloratomsarrangedinvariousways.

8.3.3. An aggregate of similar atoms as a real entity

Itisnotonlythattheordinaryhumaneyedoesnotperceivetheindividualatomswhich therefore individuallycannotserveas theobjectofvisualperception,butalsoanindividualatomcannotserveasthesupportingbasis(āśraya)forvisualconsciousness:


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Thefiveconsciousnesses,visual,etc.,haveanagglomeration[ofatoms]astheirsupportingbasisandtakeanagglomeration[ofatoms]asobject.Theyhavetheresistant(sapratigha)as theirbasisandtaketheresistantasanobject.Theyhaveacombinationastheirsupportingbasisandtakeacombinationasanobject.55

Butdoesthismeanthattheāyatana‑sareunreal,orthat—asclaimedbytheSautrāntika—directperception is impossible?TheSarvāstivādaanswers toboththesequestionsareadefinite“No.”Althoughanindividualatomistoofeebletofunctionasavisualfaculty,anagglomerationofatomsofthesamekindwill,intheircollectiveandaccumulativecapacity,functionassuch.56Likewise,asSaṃghabhadraargues,althoughintheMVŚthehumaneyeissaidtobeunabletoperceiveanatom,57itdoesnotmeanthatanatomisinvisibleinitsintrinsicnature.Itsimplymeansthatitsvisibilityisvirtuallynil.Anagglomerationofrūpa atomscomestobedirectlyperceivable.58Thepointhereisthatanagglomerationofatomsofthesametype(和集)isalsoareal.Thisisincontrasttoaunificationofatoms(和合)—orforthatmattervariousotherdharma‑s—ofdiversespecies.Thusrūpaasavisualobjectisreal,i.e.,trulyexistent(dravyato’sti),whereasacombinationofthefivedifferentskandha‑s,imaginedtobea‘person’,isunreal.

8.3.4. The octad as the minimal molecule that arises

ItisapparentlyaftertheperiodoftheMVŚthattheSarvāstivādinsarticulatedadoctrine that, in thephysical order, aminimumof eight substances (aṣṭa-dravyaka)—constitutingthesubtlestaggregate,“aggregate‑atom”(saṃghāta-paramāṇu)—arenecessarilyconascent(八事俱生) inthesensualitysphere:thefourGreatElements,plusvisible,smell,tasteandtouch.This“aggregate‑atom”maybecomparedtothenotionofamolecule,incontrastto“substance‑atom”(dravya-paramāṇu),anindividualatomasarealentityinitself.But,accordingtotheAKB,itissufficientlyclearthatthis“octadmolecule”doesnotreallymeanamoleculecomprisingeightindividualatoms.Itrepresentsthesmallestunitofmatterthatcanbecognizedbyus.

Theoctadmoleculeisthecaseofanagglomerationintothecompositionofwhichsoundandthesensefacultydonotenter.Wheresoundisproduced,i.e.,entersintothecompositionoftheaggregate,onehasanonadmolecule.Amongthesensefaculties,thebodilyfaculty(kāyendriya)isanonadcomprisingthebasiceight,plusaparamāṇu of kāyendriya.Thisisbecausenosensefacultycanarisealonewithouttheperson’sbodilyfaculty.59ThisdoctrinewasnotarticulatedintheMVŚ,althoughinapassagethereinstatingthepossibilityoftheconascenceofthefourGreatElementsandsmell,taste,touchandvisible(seeabove,§8.2.3),onemightseethegermofthenotion.


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IntheAKB,Vasubandhuexpressesthisrequirementinthefollowingline:

kāme ‘ṣṭadravyako ‘śabdaḥ paramāṇur anindriyaḥ |60 (“Inthesensualitysphere,aparamāṇuwhichiswithoutsoundandsensefaculty,consistsofeightsubstances.”)

Intheprose,heexplainsthatwhatiscalledparamāṇu(inthesingular)inthestanzaisthesubtlestmaterialaggregate(rūpa- paramāṇu)thatcouldbecognized.61 Thatis,paramāṇuheredoesnotrefertoanindividualatomorsubstance‑atomas the smallestunitofmatter in itself,but toanaggregate‑atom (saṃghāta-paramāṇu)thatcanactuallybefoundinexistence.62 In XuanZang’stranslationhere,heactuallygives微聚,‘aggregateofthefine[st]’inthestanza,ashedoesintheproseexplanation.

Saṃghabhadra’sexplanationissimilar,andXuanZang’stranslationonceagaintriestoshowthesenseofsaṃghāta-paramāṇuinthewordparamāṇuinthestanza:

Amongtheresistantmatter,theultimatelyfinestpartwhichcannotbesubjecttofurtherdivisioniscalledaparamāṇu (極微).…Suchparamāṇu-s,63 whenmutuallycombinedandnecessarilyunseparated,aresaidtobeasaṃghāta-paramāṇu (微聚).This, inthesensualitysphere,wheresoundandsensefacultyareabsent,arisesasconstitutedofeightsubstances.64

Yaśomitra likewiseexplains thatadravya-paramāṇu is thedravya that is thesmallest unit of rūpa, and that by thewordparamāṇu, the stanza refers toanaggregate‑atom.65Thiswouldmeanthatthesmallestunitofmatterthatcanactuallyariseintheempiricalworldconsistsofeightdravya‑s,ofwhichfouraretheGreatElements.Inaccordancewiththenotionthatanaggregateofrealsubstancesofthesamespeciesisalsoareal(§8.3.3),suchanaggregate‑atomisalsoarealexistentintheabsolutesense(paramārtha-sat).66

Theauthorof theADViscriticalofVasubandhu’sinterpretationof thewordparamāṇuinthestanza.Hegivesthefollowingdifferentstanza:

saptadravyāvinirbhāgī paramāṇur bahirgataḥ |kāmeṣv ekādhikaḥ kāye dvyadhikaś cakṣurādiṣu ||(A paramāṇu comprising sevennon‑separable substances ismanifestedexternallyAmongthoseinthesensuality[sphere];inthecaseofabodilyfacultyitcomprisesonemore;twomore,inthecaseofthevisualfaculty,etc.)

Inhisprosecommentary,heexplainsthewordparamāṇuinthestanzaasactuallydesignatingthesubtlestultimatedivisionofamaterialaggregateinphenomenalexistence, i.e., the substance‑atomwhich ariseswith a groupof sevenothersubstances:


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Thesubtlest/finestwhichistheultimatedivisionoftheagglomerationofgraspingofthematerialforces(rūpasaṃskāropādānasaṃcaya-bhedaparyantaḥ)isdesignatedasa“paramāṇu”.Butitisnotseparablewithsevensubstances.Itoperateswithoutbeingseparatedfromfour[Great]Elementsandthreederivedmatter,orfromthree[Great]Elementsandfourderivedmatter.That[paramāṇu]istheeighth. [Thisshouldbethemeaningofaparamāṇu comprisingeightsubstances(aṣṭadravyakaḥ … paramāṇuḥ)]

The author of the [Abhidharma]-kośa, however, says that [theword]“paramāṇu”meansthesubtlestmaterialaggregate.Hethereforemusttell[us]anothermatterwhichisotherthantheaggregate.Ifthatdoesnotexist,theaggregatetoodoesnotexist.Hence,itisprovedthatthesubtlestreferstoamaterialparamāṇu. (rūpa-paramāṇu)67

However, as criticizedby their opponents, theVaibhāṣikas’ use of the termdravya here is ambiguous:Does it refer to an absolute real as an individualentityinitself,possessinganintrinsiccharacteristic,orasāyatana(i.e.,rūpaasrūpāyatana,etc.)eachpossessingadistinctivecommoncharacteristicapplicabletothetypeasawhole(e.g.,allvisiblesarerūpa‑sasatype—anāyatana)?68 The Vaibhāṣikaansweristhatthetermisusedinbothsenses:thefourGreatElementsasfourdravya‑sinthesenseofindividualentities;thefourderivedmatterasfourcategoriesofāyatana‑s.

Saṃghabhadra’scommentarycontainsthefollowingresponsetotheopponents’criticism:

Astotheassertionthatthereisafallacywhethertheword“substance”isinthesenseofsubstanceasanentityorinthesenseofāyatana;intheformercasethe[number“eight”]istoosmall,andinthelatter,toobig—thereis[infact]nofallacy,because[inthisdoctrine]thesupportingbasis(āśraya;i.e.,theGreatElements)aredravya‑sinthesenseofindividualsubstancesandthesupported(āśrita;i.e.,thederivedmatters]aredravya‑sinthesenseofāyatana.

Thereisalsonofallacy[oftherebeingmorethaneight]if[“substance”]istakenexclusivelyinthesenseofindividualsubstance.For,inthiscontext,thenecessarilyco‑existentsarereferredto;thesubstancessuchasmatterasshape(saṃsthāna-rūpa)donotnecessarilyexistsincetheydonotexistinlight,etc.

It can alsobe taken exclusively in the senseof substancequaāyatana. Nevertheless,topreventthenumerousfalseassertions,theGreatElementsarereferredtoseparately—falseassertionssuchasthattheGreatElementsandderivedmattersarenotdistinctintheirnatureasexistents…

As to the assertion that eachderivedmatter qua effect is derived fromaseparate [set of]GreatElements, andhence [the number] should begreater—thisreasoningisinvalid,for[here]wearespeakingof[theGreat


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Elementsassubstances]intermsoftheirtype(jāti)[:eachofthemremainsasaspecifictype(svajāti)].69

Fromtheabovediscussions,itisclearthatintheatomictheoryoftheVaibhāṣikas,therearetwotypesofatomsasindividualsubstances,thoseoftheGreatElementsand those of the derivedmatters.That theGreatElements too, like derivedmatters,areindividualatomsisclearfromboththeVaibhāṣikaexplanationthat“substance”(dravya)asappliedtotheminthegroupofeightparamāṇu‑sreferstosubstanceinitspropersense,i.e.individualsubstanceseachhavingauniqueindividualintrinsiccharacteristic(dravya-svalakṣaṇa).Thisisincontrasttothesenseofsubstanceasappliedtothefourderivedmatter:dravyaintheircasereferstoaspeciesasrealexistent,eachhavingauniquespeciescharacteristic,visualform,etc.(āyatana-svalakṣaṇa.Forthedistinctionbetweenthetwotypesofcharacteristics,cf. supra,§2.3.2.1).ThisisequallyclearfromSaṃghabhadra’sresponsetotheopponents,particularlythattheeightsubstancescanalsoeachbeconsideredasanindividualsubstance.ProbablyfromaroundthetimeoftheMVŚ,theoriginaldisparityresultingfromtherelativelylaterintroductionofthe atomictheoryintotheSarvāstivādadoctrineofmatterhadmadeitnecessaryfortheSarvāstivādinstoreworkonthedoctrine.OneresultwasthattheGreatElementshadlatercometoberegardedasparamāṇu‑s.But,thisishardlytosuggestthattheyhadsincebeenfullysuccessfulinovercomingalltheincongruitiesandproblemsinvolved.

8.3.5. Problems connected with the notion of atom

Wemay see the divergence of interpretations concerning the termaṣṭa-dravyaka as betraying the problem that had arisen from theway inwhichtheĀbhidharmikas attempted, rather unsuccessfully—evenby the timeofSaṃghabhadra—tosynthesizetwodoctrinespertainingtomatter—thatofthemahābhūta‑swhichhadanancientrootinthesūtra-piṭaka,andthatofatomscomingsubsequentlyfromoutsidetheBuddhisttradition.Itwouldseemthatatfirstthefourmahābhūta‑swereconceivedofasbeingmaterialqualities—EarthElementissolidity,etc.Theyarerealentitiesquamaterialqualities.Butwhenthe atomictheorywasintroducedintotheabhidharmasystem,thenotionthatmatterwasconstitutedofatomsandthatmahābhūta‑sexistedasatomscametobedeveloped.Thisledtoacontradictionthatseemedtohavebeenquietlyleftunsettled:Ontheonehand,theatomictheoryrequiresthatatomsaregroupedas septuplets fromwhichmatter is derived.The smallestmolecule, anaṇu,or saṃghāta-paramāṇu,consistingofjustsevenparamāṇu‑s,isthesmallestunitof matterthatisperceivable—andeventhennotbyanordinaryhumanbeing(seeabove,§8.3.1).Ontheotherhand,anewdoctrinewasthenarticulatedthatamoleculethatcanariseintheempiricalworldconsistsofaminimumofeightsubstances.Takingbothdoctrinesintoconsideration,onecommentarialopinion,infact,arrivesat1,379asthenumberofatomsthatconstituteamoleculeof


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avisible!70Thecontradiction,however,wouldnothavenecessarilyarisenifthemahābhūta‑swereconceivedofasdravya‑sinthesenseofrealmaterialqualities—realforces—ratherthanatoms.

Apart fromthis, theverynotionofanatombeing theultimately indivisible,impenetrableunitofmatterdevoidofextensiongivesrisetoconceptualdifficulties.Thefollowingareamongsomeofthecontroversies.

8.3.5.1. The definition by rūpaṇā/rūpaṇa

Thedefiningcharacteristicsofrūpadonotexistinalldharma‑sclassifiedbythe Sarvāstivādaasrūpa.TheMVŚ:71

Question:Iftohavethecharacteristicofrūpaṇāistohavethecharacteristicof pratighāta (變礙),72thenthepastandfuture[dharma‑s],theatomsandavijñaptioughtnottohavethecharacteristicofrūpasincetheyhavenorūpaṇā.Andiftheydonothavethecharacteristicofrūpa,theyoughtnottoberūpa in their intrinsicnature.

Answer:They are also rūpa‑s since they acquire the characteristic ofrūpaṇā:althoughapastrūpaisatthepresentmomentwithoutresistance,ithashadresistance;althoughafuturerūpaisatthepresentmomentwithoutresistance,itwillhaveresistance;althougheachindividualatomiswithoutresistance,anaggregateof themhasresistance;althoughanavijñapti iswithoutresistance,itssupportingbasis(āśraya)—namelythefourGreatElements—hasresistance.

8.3.5.2. Are there intervening spaces between the atoms or do they touch one another?73

Iftwoatomstouchoneanother,theydosoeitheratapointofcontactorintheirtotality.Ineithercase,thereisaproblem:Theformerimpliesthatanatomhaspartsorextension.Thelatterwouldresultintwoormoreatomscoalescingintoasingleunit—infact,thewholephysicaluniverse,inthiscase,oughttobethesizeofasingleatom.Ontheotherhand,iftheydonottouchoneanotheratall,anagglomerationofatomswouldfallintopieceswhenstruck.Besides,howdoesoneexplain thepossibilityof soundbeingproducedwhen two rūpa‑s strikeagainsteachother?

The Vaibhāṣikapositionisthatatomsdonottouch.ItissolelybytheforceoftheWindElementthatatomsareheldtogether.Theproductionofsound,infact,ispossiblepreciselybecauseatomsdonottouch—forotherwisetheywouldmergewiththehand,etc.,thatstrikes,and,therebeingnospaceinbetween,howcansoundbeproduced?


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Vasumitra explains that atoms cannot touchone another because they aremomentary—thepossibilityoftouchwouldimplythatanatomcanendureformorethanonemoment.74

BhadantaDharmatrātaexplainsthatatomsaremetaphoricallysaidtotouchoneanotherwhentheyarejuxtaposedwithoutaninterval(nirantara).

Vasubandhuapprovesof thisexplanation, for if thereshouldbeany intervalbetweenatoms,whatpreventsotheratomsfromgettingintoit?Thiswouldthencontradictthenotionthatatomsareimpenetrable.75

Saṃghabhadra76alsoapprovesofDharmatrāta’sexplanation.Butthisword,nir-antara,hesays,cannotmeanliterallythatthereisabsolutelynointervalbetweentwoatoms,forinthatcasehowaretheynotintouch?“Theprefixnissignifies‘certitude’: therecertainly isan interval; justasnirdahatimeans‘itcertainlyburns’.Or,nissignifies‘absence’:thereinexistsnothingofthesizeofanatomthatintervenes.WhenatomsoftheGreatElementswhicharenir-antarainthiswayariseclosetooneanother,onesaysthattheytouchmetaphorically.”

The Vaibhāṣikapositionisalogicalconsequenceofthedoctrinethatanatomhasnospatialextension,andyetisaggregatedwithsixotheratomsinthesixdirections(seeabove§8.3.1)—north,east,south,west,aboveandbelow—withthegivenatomatthecentre.Thismayimplythatanatomhasatleastsixsides—apoint seizeduponby theVijñānavādins in their refutationof theĀbhidharmikanotionofatom.77Toavoidthisfallacy,atomsmustbethoughtofasbeingaggregatedinsuchawaythatinbetweentheatomstheremustbegapswhicharelessthanthesizeofasingleatom.

In theMVŚ, there isasimilarconsiderationas towhether therearegaps inanaggregateoftheGreatElements.Ineithercase,thereisafallacy:Iftherearegaps,howcantheGreatElementsbeunseparated?Iftherearenogaps,whydotheynotcoalesceintoaunity?Twoopinionsarerecorded:1.Therearegapsoccupiedbythespaceelement(ākāśa-dhātu).Nevertheless,thefourElementsaresaidtobeunseparatedbecause“thespaceelementscanconcealthemselvessothatthesubstancesareseentobeunseparated”.2.TheGreatElementsarejuxtaposedwithout any interveninggaps.Nevertheless, theydonot coalesce into one,“inthe samemanner that among the skandha, āyatana, dhātu, and the threeperiodsoftime,inspiteoftherebeingnogapinbetween,they[ineachcase]donotcoalesceintoone.Moreover,theGreatElements,etc.,areeachdistinctintheir intrinsicnatureandfunctions,hencetheydonotcoalesceintoone.”78 The absenceofcommentbythecompilersoftheMVŚheresuggeststhattheearlierSarvāstivādinswereasyetundecidedonthisissue.


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NOTES

1 MVŚ, 383a.The second sūtra passage is also quoted inAKB,13:yad kiṃcid rūpam atītānāgata-pratyutpannam ādhyātmikaṃ bāhyaṃ vā audārikaṃ vā sūkṣmaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā praṇītaṃ vā yad vā dūre yad vā antike tat sarvam aikadhyam abhisaṃkṣipya rūpa-skandha iti saṃkhyāṃ gacchati |

2 Cf.T2,11b.3 AKB,9:rūpyate rūpyata iti bhikṣavas tasmād rūpopādānaskandha ity ucyate | kena rūpyate |

pāṇisparśenāpi spṛṣṭo rūpyate |4 T2,loc. cit.5 Cf.S,iii,86.6 Cf.Tno.198,4,175c;Suttanipāta,IV,Aṭṭhakavagga 1.2.7 AKB,9.8 Vy,34.9 See Entrance,137n.69,n.70.10Ny,337b.11AKB,loc. cit.12Vy,34:svadeśe parasyotpatti-pratibandhaḥ |13MVŚ,389c–390a.14Ny,346b.15 Cf.AKB,19:sa hi śakyate nidarśayitum idam ihāmutra iti |16Ny,348a.17Ny,348a.18 Cf.AKB,19:yasmin yasya kāritram sa tasya viṣayaḥ | yac cittacaittair gṛhyate tad ālambanam | XuanZangtranslateskāritrahereasgong neng (功能),efficacy,whichisalsotherenderinginNyinthiscontext.

19AKB,19f.;Ny,348a–b.20Vy,51:idam ihāmutreti deśa-nidarśana-rūpaṇāt |21Ny,540a22AKB,46:duḥkhendriyaṃ nasty āśrayasyācchatvād… |23 Cf.AKB,5f.,33:na cānyo’nyam āvṛṇvanti sphaṭikavad acchatvāt|Thisstatementoccursinthedescriptionofatomsofthevisualfaculty.TheSĀ,91c,however,describesthesensoryfacultiesasbeing“invisibleandobstructive”(不可見、有對).Ifthisisnotatextualerror,itmayreflectanearlierstageofdevelopmentintheSarvāstivādaconceptionofthistypeof rūpa.

24MVŚ,63a25 Ny,346b.26MVŚ,389c.27MVŚ,661c.28MVŚ,661c–662a29 MVŚ,661c,662b.


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30 ForŚrīlāta’sdenialofthederivedtangiblesandSaṃghabhadra’srefutation,seeNy,352cff.31MVŚ,663a32 Cf.Ny,336b:“…ThereareonlyfourGreatElements,nomore,noless.TheVaibhāṣikasaysthus:Ifless[thanfour],therewillbeinaptitude;ifmore[thanfour],itwillservenopurpose.Thus,thereareonlyfour,likethelegsofacouch.”TheMVŚ,663arecordsthesameexplanation,attributedto‘certainmasters’.

33 See Entrance,130f.,n.18.34MVŚ,388b;cf. infra §16.5.1.35 However, theBhadanta also seems to havedenied the reality of unconditionedākāśa (MVŚ,949c).TheBhadantaintheMVŚisoftenregardedbyscholarstorefertoBhadantaDharmatrāta.However,itiswellknownthatwhereXuanZang’sversionoftheMVŚgives‘Bhadanta’,theearliertranslation(Tno.1546)gives‘Venerable‘Bhadanta’(尊者婆檀陀)or ‘VenerableBuddhadeva’ (尊者浮陀提婆, 尊者佛陀提婆).Moreover,wenowalsoknowthatwheretheAKB(13)hassimply‘Bhadanta’,XuanZangintheAKB(C)inserts‘Dharmatrāta’(法救).YaśomitrainthatcontextobjectstoBhagavadviśeṣa’sidentificationof BhadantawithDharmatrātaandassertsthatintheMVŚ,theonereferredtosimplyas‘theBhadanta’isadifferentmasterinclinedtowardthephilosophyoftheSautrāntika(sautrāntika-darśanāvalambin),whereas the one explicitly named as ‘Dharmatrāta’ isaSarvāstivādamaster(Vy,44).Hence,therestillseemstobemuchconfusionyettobeclearedupintheidentificationof“theBhadanta”intheMVŚ.

36MVŚ,662b–c.SeealsoNy,336a.37MVŚ,663a.38Ny,335c.39MVŚ,665a.40Ny,355b.41MVŚ,682c–683a.42MVŚ,683b.43Ny,373a.44MVŚ,663a.45AKB,102f.46Ny,452a.47Ny,440a.48MVŚ,665a.49AKB,189;alsocf. MVŚ,691a–b.50Ny,522a.51 MVŚ,702a–b.52 AKB, 176: rūpasyāpacīyamānasya paryantaḥ paramāṇuḥ | … etat paramāṇvādikaṃ

saptaguṇottaraṃ veditavyam | sapta paramāṇavo ‘ṇuḥ / saptāṇavo loharajaḥ | tāni saptābrajas tāni sapta… | Also,Ny,521c.

53 Ny,383c;SPrŚ,799a.54 MVŚ,64a–b.55 MVŚ,63c.56 Cf.asimilarargumentbyVasubandhufortherealityoftheāyatanaintheAKB.


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57 MVŚ,702a.58 Alsocf.AKB,189:paramāṇvatīndriye ‘pi samastānāṃ pratyakṣatvam.59 AKB,52f.60 AKB,52.61 sarvasūkṣmo hi rūpa-saṃghātaḥ paramāṇur(AKB(C):微聚) ity ucyate | yato nānyataro

vijñāyeta |62 SeeVy,123. 63 Nyhas微herewhichcouldcorrespondtoaṇuratherthanparamāṇu.64 Ny,383c.65 Vy, 123:Vy, 123: sarva-sūkṣmo rūpa-saṃghātaḥ paramāṇur iti saṃghāta-paramāṇur

na dravya-paramāṇuḥ | yatra hi pūrvāpara-bhāgo nāsti | tat sarva-rūpāpacitaṃ dravyaṃ dravya-paramāṇur itīṣyate | tasmād viśinaṣṭi ‘saṃghātaḥ paramāṇur’ iti |

66 Contra Katō,156.67 ADV,65:sarvasūkṣmaḥ khalu rūpasaṃskāropādānasaṃcaya-bhedaparyantaḥ paramāṇur

iti prajñapyate | sa tu saptadravyāvinirbhāgī | caturbhir bhūtais tribhiś copādāyarūpais tribhir vā bhūtaiś caturbhiś copādāyarūpair avinirbhāgavarty asāv aṣṭama iti | kośakāras tv āha sarvasūkṣmo rūpa-saṃghātaḥ paramā(ṇur) iti | tena saṃghātavyatiriktaṃ rūpam anyad vaktavyam | yadi nāsti saṃghāto ‘pi nāsti | ataḥ siddhaṃ sarvasūkṣaṃ rūpa-paramāṇur iti ||

68 Ny,383c–384a.Seealso,Vy,125:yad dravyaṃ yasya svalakṣaṇam asti | tad dravyaṃ gṛhyate| … āyatanam api hi dravyam iti śakyate vaktuṃ sāmānya-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa-sadbhāvāt |

69 ThesamecriticismandVaibhāṣikaresponseasinAKB,53f:evam api bhūyāṃsi bhūta-dravyāṇi bhavanty upādāyarūpāṇāṃ pratyekaṃ bhūtacatuṣkāśritatvāt | atra punar jāti-dravyaṃ gṛhyate | bhūtacatuṣkāntarāṇāṃ svajātyanatikramāt |

70 SeeAKB(F),vol.1,148f.,note1.71 MVŚ,389c–390a.72 XuanZangsometimesusesthissamerenderingforrūpaṇā.73 MVŚ,683c;AKB,32f.;Ny,372aff.74 MVŚ,683c–684a.75 AKB,33.76 Ny,373b.77 Viṃś,7.78 MVŚ,683c–684a.


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9. The Categories of Thought and Thought-concomitants (citta-caitta)

9.1. Definitionsof thought (citta), mind (manas) and consciousness (vijñāna)9.2. Thought‑concomitants(caitta/caitasika)9.3. Developmentofthetheoryofcaitasika

9.3.1. Referencetocetasika/caitasika in the nikāya/āgama9.3.2. Developmentintheearlyabhidharma texts9.3.3. Furtherdevelopmentinthelaterabhidharmatexts9.3.4. ClassiclistintheAKB9.3.4.1. Thetenuniversalthought‑concomitants(mahābhūmika-dharma)9.3.4.2. Theindeterminatethought‑concomitants(aniyata-dharma)9.3.4.3. Defilementsofrestrictedscope(parītta-kleśa-bhūmika-dharma)

9.4. Sarvāstivādadoctrineofconjunction(saṃprayoga)9.5. DārṣṭāntikaandSautrāntikaDoctrineofsuccessivearising9.6. Differenceinfunctionalitybetweencittaandcaitta‑s9.7. Differencebetweenthefirstfiveandthesixthconsciousnesses9.8. Originalnatureofthought

9.1. Definitions of thought (citta), mind (manas) and consciousness (vijñāna)

AbhidharmaBuddhismissometimesconsideredasaformofdepthpsychologyonaccountofitsuniquelydetailedanalysisofthenatureandfunctionofthemind.ThisisinkeepingwiththeemphasisofthesupremacyofthemindintheBuddha’steachings—bondageinandliberationfromsaṃsāraareallfundamentallyonaccountofourmind.

In contrast toYogācāra idealism,AbhidharmaBuddhism, asmuch as earlyBuddhism,1referstothesamementalrealitybythethreesynonymoustermscitta,manasandvijñāna.2However,whereastheBuddhaexplicitlystatedthatthemindor consciousnessisnomorethananempiricalorfunctionalrealitythatresultsfromanassemblageofconditions,3 the SarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikasheldthatitisarealentity(sad-dravya).Thesethreetermsaredistinguishedonlyintermsofthedifferentfunctionalaspectsofthemindthattheyrepresent:Themindistermedcittabecauseitaccumulates,manasbecauseitthinks,vijñānabecauseitcognizes.4TheAKB5recordsanotherdistinction:cittabecauseitisaccumulatedwiththepureandimpureelements;manasbecauseitfunctionsasthesupportingbasis(tadevāśrayabhūta—i.e.,ofthecittathatsucceedsit);vijñānabecauseitissupported(āśritabhūta—i.e.,bymanasforitsarising).Thisamountstosayingthatthecittathatarisesatthepresentmomentisvijñāna.


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TheMVŚ6discussesthevariousdistinctions:

Question:Whatisthedifferencebetweenthethree—citta, manas, vijñāna —mentionedinthesūtra?

[Answer:]Thereistheexplanationthatthereisnodifference—cittaisnoneotherthanmanas,manasisnoneotherthanvijñāna,for,althoughthethree wordsaredifferent,thereisnodifferenceinmeaning…

Thereisalsotheexplanationthatthethree…arealsodifferentiated:thatis,thenamesthemselvesaredifferent…

Furthermore,thereisadifferencewithrespecttotime(adhvan):whatispastiscalledmanas;whatisfutureiscalledcitta;whatispresentiscalledvijñāna.

Furthermore,thereisadifferencewithrespecttodesignation(prajñapti):cittaisdesignatedamongthedhātu‑s;manas,amongtheāyatana‑s;vijñāna amongtheskandha‑s.

Furthermore, there isadifference in termsofsignification(artha):citta signifies ‘clan’ (gotra);manas, ‘gatewayofarising’ (āya-dvāra),vijñāna,‘agglomeration’.

Furthermore,thereisadifferenceintermsofaction(kriyā):thatofcittaisfar‑going(dūragama)…;manas,fore‑running(pūrvaṅgama)…;vijñāna,birth‑relinking(saṃdhāna/pratisaṃdhi)…7

Further,theactivityofcittaisbeingvariegated(citra)…;manas,goingtowards(歸趣;gati(?))…;vijñāna,cognition(vi‑√jñā)…

Furthermore,theactivityofcittaisincreasingornourishing(滋長;saṃcitatva);manas,thinking;vijñāna,cognizing.8

According toVenerableParśva: the activity ofcitta is increasing andsevering;manas,thinkingandcontemplating,vijñāna,distinguishingandcomprehending.Herein,it istobeunderstoodthatwhatincreasesisthewith‑outflowcitta,whatseversistheoutflow‑freecitta;whatthinksisthewith‑outflowmanas,whatcontemplatesistheoutflow‑freemanas;whatdistinguishesisthewith‑outflowvijñāna,whatcomprehendsistheoutflow‑free vijñāna.

9.2. Thought-concomitants (caitta/caitasika)

Cittacanneverarisebyitself.Itisalwaysconascentwithcertainmentalfactorsorconcomitantsknownascaitta‑sorcaitasika‑seachofwhichisadistinctrealentitymakingauniquecontributiontotheperceptualprocess.Whatthismeansinsimpletermsisthatathoughtthatarisesisalwaysonewithaspecificcontentandnature;e.g.,oneofdoubtwhichisunskillful,etc.,characterizedbythecaitta‑s.Theessentialsubstancethatremainsifweabstracttheparticularizedcontentisthe citta.Likewise,thesecaitta‑s—calledtheconjoinedconditionings(citta-

9. the CategorieS of thought and thought-ConComitantS

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saṃprayukta-saṃskārāḥ)—arealsoalwaysconascentwiththecittaandsomeother caitta‑s.Accordingly,cittaandcaitta‑sareinareciprocalcausalrelationship—theyaremutuallyconjoinedcauses(saṃprayuktaka-hetu),anexemplificationoftheco‑existentcause(sahabhū-hetu).

9.3. Development of the theory of caitasika

9.3.1. Reference to cetasika/caitasika in the nikāya/āgama

In the sūtra-piṭaka,thetermcaitasika(Pāli:cetasika)occurssimplyasanadjective:‘mental’,‘pertainingtothemind’.Thisisusedincontrasttokāyikawhichmeans‘bodily’or‘physical’.9Thereisthereforenoindicationoftheabhidharmictheoryof caitasika in sūtra-s.Theearliestoccurrenceofthetermcitta-cetasikaistobefoundinPaṭisambhidāmagga,10atextwhich,althoughincludedintheKhuddaka-nikāya,iswellknownforitsabhidhammicaffiliationbothinrespectofstyleandcontent.IntheMilindapañha,11aworkaroundthelatterpartofthe2ndcenturyB.C.E.(includedbytheBurmesetraditionintheKhuddaka-nikāya),Nāgasenaexplainsnāma—asopposedtorūpa—asthecitta-cetasikā dhammā.Nevertheless,thePāliAnupada-sutta(nocorrespondenceintheChineseāgama)enumerates—inthecontextofthemeditativeexperience—thefollowingdhamma‑swhichmostlikelyserveasasourceforthelaterAbhidharmiccategoryofcetasika/caitasika:vitakka, vicāra, pīti, sukha, cittekaggatā, phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā, chanda, adhimokkha, viriya, sati, upekkhāandmanasikāra.

Thereis,however,anoccurrenceintheCitta-saṃyutta12inwhichthetermisusedtoreferto‘mentalconditionings’(citta-saṃkhārā):BhikkhuKāmabhūexplainstothehouseholderCittathatsaññāandvedanāarecetasika‑sandboundupwithcitta (citta-paṭibaddha)whichcouldsuggestthatthetwodhamma‑sareinsomesensedistinct fromcitta,althoughnotnecessarilyhaving thesame technicalconnotationasintheabhidhamma/abhidharmaterminology.ItisworthofnotethatthecorrespondingChineseversion13herelikewisespeaksofsaṃjñāandcetanāasmentalconditionings;theyare“caitasika‑s,basedoncitta,connectedwithcitta”(想思是心數法,依於心,屬於心).ExactlythesamedescriptionintheformofDhammadinnā’sexplanationtoVisākhaisalsofoundintheCuḷa-vedalla-sutta.14.

9.3.2. Development in the early abhidharma texts

Attheoutset,itmustbeborneinmindthatcertaindevelopedfeatures—inthiscasepertaining tocaitasika—found in theextantversions (inXuanZang’stranslation)ofanearliertextcouldwellbealaterinterpolationormodificationonthebasisofatextortextspost‑datingit.Inthedecidedlyearliercanonicalabhidharmatexts—DSŚ,SgPŚ,PjŚ—wherecaitasikaisclearlyreferredtoasmentalfactors,theirenumerationischaracterizedbyalackofsystematization.


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Thus,intheDSŚ15alargenumberofcaitta‑saresimplyenumeratedtogetheras“dharma‑s”—apparentlywithoutanytaxonomicalconsideration—tobeabandonedcompletely(atyantaṃ prahātavya):

At one time, theBhagavatwas staying at theAnāthapiṇḍadaārāma, inJetavanainŚrāvasti.Atthattime,theBhagavattoldthebhikṣu‑s:‘Ifyoucouldcompletelyabandononedharma,Iassureyouthatyouwouldacquirenon‑return(anāgāmitva).Onedharma—thatisrāga—whoevercanabandonit completely, I assureyou thathewoulddefinitelyacquireanāgāmitva. Likewise:dveṣa, moha, krodha, upanāha, mrakṣa, pradāsa, īrṣyā, mātsarya, māyā, śāṭhya, āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, māna, atimāna, mānātimāna, asmimāna, abhimāna, ūnamāna, mithyāmāna, mada, pramāda,…’

Thenfollowsthecommentarialexplanationoneachoftheitems:“Whatisrāga?Itistherāga,saṃrāgawithregardtothesensualobject…”IntermsofthelatersystematizationinVasubandhu’sPañcaskandhaprakaraṇa,16 rāga, dveṣa/pratigha, moha/avidyāandmānawouldcomeunderthecategorykleśa,andtheunderlineditemsunderupakleśa.

In the Pañcavastuka of Vasumitra’sPrŚ,17while there is as yet no explicitclassification,themannerinwhichtheitemsarespecificallyenumeratedundercaitasika-dharma‑ssuggestsanimplicittaxonomicalconsiderationinfluencedbythesūtra‑s(intheorderasinthetext):

vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā, sparśa, manaskāra, chanda, adhimokṣa, smṛti, samādhi, prajñā;

śraddhā, vīrya;vitarka, vicāra; apramāda, pramāda;the kuśala-mūla‑s,theakuśala-mūla‑s,theavyākṛta-mūla-s;allthesaṃyojana‑s,bandhana‑s,anuśaya‑s,upakleśa‑s,paryavasthāna‑s;allthatarejñāna‑s,allthataredṛṣṭi‑s,allthatareabhisamaya‑s;andtheotherdharma‑softhiskindconjoinedwithcitta.

Thisenumerationrepresentstheearlystageofthedevelopmentofthetheoryofcaitasikainwhichnoexplicitgroupingwasdone.However,asnotedbyYinShun:18

(i) Thefirsttenitemslatercametobeclassifiedasthetenmahābhūmika‑s.Thesewere already enumerated as a group exemplifying thesaṃprayuktaka-hetuintheJPŚ.19

(ii) Śraddhāandvīryafollowsmṛti,samādhiandprajñāasthepañcendriya‑smentionedinthesūtra,andvitarkaandvicāraareamongtheimportantdhyāna-aṅga‑s—allbeingcaitta‑sdiscussedintheancientdoctrineofspiritualpraxis.


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(iii) Therestareenumeratedascontrastbetweenthekuśalaandtheakuśala caitta‑s.

(iv) Thekleśa‑s tobeabandonedaresummarizedassaṃyojana‑s,etc.,mentionedinthesūtra;theprajñā‑stobecultivatedaresummarizedas“allthatarejñāna‑s…”.

9.3.3. Further development in the later abhidharma texts

ItwasprobablyintheDhātukāya-śāstrathatthecaitta‑swereexplicitlyclassified—forthefirsttime—intoeightclassestotaling55dharma‑s.20ThistextiscloselyrelatedtotheSaptavastuka whichcouldhavebeenaversionofitthatlatercametobeincorporatedintothePrŚ.21 The Saptavastukagivesthesameclassification,with the additionof tenmore itemsgroupedunderkuśala-mahābhūmika‑s.YinShunbelievesthatthisnewclasswastakenoverfromtheMVŚ.22 In the MVŚweseethedevelopmentintosevenclassestotaling58dharma‑sasfollows:

I. mahābhūmika 10 II. kleśa-mahābhūmika 10 III. parītta-kleśa-bhūmika 10 IV. kuśala-mahābhūmika 10 V. akuśala-mahābhūmika 5 VI. nivṛtāvyākṛta-mahābhūmika 3VII. anivṛtāvyākṛta-mahābhūmika 10

But there are some repetitions.Thus,avidyā is enumerated in II,VandVI;avidyā,styānaandauddhatyainVandVI;alltheteninIarerepeatedinVII.ThecompilersoftheMVŚexplainthattherepetitionsareintentional—forthesakeofemphasis.Thus,whereas“āhrīkyaandanapatrāpyaareacquiredonlyinalltheakuśala-citta,hencecalledakuśala-mahābhūmika-dharma‑s;styānaandauddhatya,subsumedunderkleśaandparyavasthāna,areconjoinedwithallakuśala-citta‑sand,atthesametime,stronglyobstructśamathaandvipaśyanā;hencetheyarerepeatedundertheakuśala-bhūmika.[Likewise,]avidyā,subsumedasoneofthe anuśaya‑s,isconjoinedwithallakuśala-citta‑s;henceitisrepeatedintheakuśala-bhūmika.”Ifweomittheserepetitions,thetotalcomesto43.

TheMVŚ23explainseachclassasfollows:

I. Theuniversaldharma‑s(mahābhūmika):dharma‑swhichexistinalltypesofcitta—whetherkliṣṭa or akliṣṭa;sāsrava or anāsrava;kuśala,akuśala or avyākṛta;boundtothethreespheresofexistenceornotbound toanysphere;pertaining to the trainee (śaikṣa), to thenon‑trainee(aśaikṣa)ortoneither;abandonablebyvision(darśana-heya),bycultivation(bhāvanā-heya)ornottobeabandoned(aheya);inthemind‑ground(mano-bhūmi)orinthefirstfivegroupsofconsciousness.


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II. Theuniversaldharma‑sofdefilement(kleśa-mahābhūmika):dharma‑swhichexistinalldefiledcitta‑s—whetherakuśala or avyākṛta;boundtoanysphereofexistence;abandonablebyvisionorcultivation;inthemind‑groundorthefirstfivegroupsofconsciousness.

III. Thedefilementsofrestrictedscope(parītta-kleśa-bhūmika):dharma‑swhichexistonlyinasmallnumberofdefiledcitta‑s,areabandonablebycultivationandexistinonlythemind‑ground;“whenonearisesthereisnecessarilynotasecondone,beingmutuallyopposed”.

IV. Theuniversal skillfuldharma‑s (kuśala-mahābhūmika):dharma‑swhichexistinallkuśala-citta‑s.

V. Theuniversalunskillfuldharma‑s(akuśala-mahābhūmika):dharma‑swhichexistinallakuśala-citta‑s.

VI. Theuniversalveiled‑non‑defineddharma‑s(nivṛta-avyākṛta-mahābhūmika):dharma‑swhichexistinallnivṛta-avyākṛta-citta‑s—cittaconjoinedwiththesatkāyadṛṣṭiandantagrahadṛṣṭipertainingtothekāmāvacara;citta conjoinedwith all the defilements pertaining to the rūpa- or ārūpya-dhātu;allnivṛta-avyākṛta-citta‑sexistinginthemind‑groundorthefirstfivegroupsofconsciousness.

VII. Theuniversal non‑veiled‑non‑defineddharma‑s (anivṛta-avyākṛta-mahābhūmika):dharma‑swhichexistinallanivṛta-avyākṛta-citta‑s—whetherboundtokāma-, rūpa- or ārūpya-dhātu;inthemind‑groundor thefirstfivegroupsof consciousness;whether retribution‑born(vipākaja),pertainingtodeportment(airyapathika),pertainingtoartsandcrafts(śailpa-sthānika)orsupernormalpower(lit.‘fruitofhigherknowledge’,abhijñā-phala = nairmāṇika). (Forthese four types ofdharma,seealso§2.4.3.2.3)

9.3.4. Classic list in the AKB

TheAKBenumeratesatotalof46caitta‑sdifferentiatedintosixclassesintheSarvāstivādasystem:

I. mahābhūmikā dharmāḥ 10II. kuśala-mahābhūmikā dharmāḥ 10III. kleśa-mahābhūmikā dharmāḥ 6 IV. akuśala-mahābhūmikā dharmāḥ 2 V. parītta-kleśa-bhūmikā dharmā 10VI. aniyatā dharmāḥ(indeterminatedharma‑s) 8

(Seechartin§2.4.2fortheitemslistedundereachclass).


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This classification representsmoreor less the classicone adhered toby theSarvāstivādins, although slight variants are to benoted.Thus, thepostAKBAvatāra,apparentlyinheritingthetraditionofthePrŚ,enumeratesthecaitta‑sundervedanā,saṃjñāandcitta-saṃprayukta-saṃskāra,inconformitywiththefive‑skandhataxonomy.24

Below,wewilldiscussonly themahābhūmika-dharma‑sonaccountof theirimportanceasuniversals.However,weshallalsomakesomecommentsontheparītta-kleśa-bhūmika-dharma‑sandtheaniyata-dharma‑sonaccountoftheirrelativeobscurenature.Thedefinitionsofthecaitta‑sgivenintheAvatāraaremoreorlessidenticalwiththosegivenintheADVwhoseauthorisanavowedVaibhāṣika,andthereaderisreferredtothisworkfortherestofthecaitta‑s.25

9.3.4.1. The ten universal thought-concomitants (mahābhūmika-dharma)26

Thewordbhūmiisexplainedas“thesphereofmovement”(gati-viṣaya).Thesphereofmovementofadharmaisthebhūmitowhichitbelongs(yo hi yasya gati-viṣayaḥ sa tasya bhūmir ity ucyate).Thetencaitta‑stobeenumeratedbelowarecalled“greatbhūmi”dharma‑sbecausetheyarealwaysconascentwithanycitta.Thatis,theyalwaysexistineverymomentofthought.Theyarethedistinctforceswhichtogethermakepossibletheoperationofconsciousness.However,withintheearlySarvāstivādalineageitself,theacceptanceofthedoctrineofthemahābhūmika‑sisfarfrombeingunanimous.InthetimeofSaṃghabhadra,theSautrāntikaleaderŚrīlātaassertsthatthereareonlythreemahābhūmikadharma‑s—vedanā,saṃjñā andcetanā.(Seebelow,§9.5).

9.3.4.1.1. Sensation (vedanā) is that forcewhich contributes to thementalability of sensationor feeling. It is the threefold experience (anubhāva) ofpleasurable,unpleasurableandneutralfeelingsproducedbydifferentpsycho‑physicalstates(kāyacitta-avasthāviśeṣa)bornofthecomingtogetherofanobject(whichis,respectively,desirable,undesirableorneutral),thesensefacultyandthecorrespondingconsciousness.Itisthatwhichcausestheconsciousnessofanunenlightenedbeingtobealwaystaintedwithcraving.27

9.3.4.1.2. Volition (cetanā)—Thatwhichcausesthemindtobekarmicallycreative(citta-abhisaṃskāra).Itisthementalkarma. The Avatāra28 describesitthus:“Itmovesforth(pra-√syand)thethought.”Saṃghabhadra’sdefinition29runs:“cetanāisthatwhichcausescittatodokuśala,akuśalaandavyākṛta[karma],resulting in good, bad andneutral [vipāka].On account of the existenceofcetanā,thecittahastheactivityofmovingforthwithregardtotheobject.Itislikeamagnet,owingtotheforceofwhichironcanmoveforth.”


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9.3.4.1.3. Ideation (saṃjñā)

Thiscontributestothementalabilitytoformdefiniteideasorconcepts.Itisthatwhichgraspsthemarks—‘male’,‘female’,etc.—ofanobject(viṣaya-nimittodgraha).Saṃghabhadra30definesitthus:“Thatwhichcausesthedeterminationandgraspingof the diverse forms (nimitta) ofmale, female, etc., is namedideation.”ThedefinitionintheAvatāra31 says:“Withregardtomatter likeblue,yellow,…,dharma‑ssuchasmalesandfemales,etc.—itcomprehendsthem,[ineachcase,]byconceptuallycombiningtogether(eka‑√jñā)theirappearances(nimitta),names(nāma)andthesignified(artha).Itisthecauseofreasoning(vitarka)andinvestigation(vicāra).”32

9.3.4.1.4. Predilection/inclination (chanda)

This is the desire for action (kartu-kāmatā).TheAvatāra33 says: “Itaccordswith vigor (vīrya), [arising from the thought]: ‘Iwillmake such and suchanndertaking.’”34Thus,predilectionordesireinthisgeneralsenseisindispensablefortheundertakingofanyaction—skillfulorunskillful.Thedesirefortheacquisitionofskillfuldharma‑s,calledkuśala-dharma-cchanda,isencouragedinthespiritualpractitionersandisspecificallydistinguishedfromdesireinthebadsenseofgreed(rāga)orcraving(tṛṣṇā).35

9.3.4.1.5. Contact (sparśa)

Thisisthecontactbornofthecomingtogetherofthesensefaculty,theobjectandtheconsciousness(indriya-viṣaya-vijñāna-sannipātajā spṛṣṭiḥ);itisalsobyvirtueofthisdharmathatthethreeareincontact.“Ithasthecharacteristicofenliveningthecaitasika-dharma‑s.”36

TheearlySarvāstivādinDārṣṭāntikasdenytherealityofcontact,citingthesūtra passagewhichspeaksofthecomingtogetherofthethree—thevisualfaculty,thevisibleandthevisualconsciousness—ascontact.SoalsotheSautrāntikaŚrīlāta.37TheMVŚcompilersarguethatcontactisnotthemeremeetingofthesethree.Theyinfactserveastheconditionsforthearisingofarealentitycalledcontact.Withouttheoperationofthisrealforce,thefactofcontactamongthethreewouldbeimpossible.38

9.3.4.1.6. Understanding (prajñā)

This,definedastheinvestigationofdharma‑s(dharma-pravicaya),isoneofthemostimportantcaitta‑s.FortheĀbhidharmikas,“apartfromdharma-pravicaya (= prajñā),thereisnopropermeansfortheappeasementofdefilementsonaccountofwhichtheworldwandersintheoceanofexistence”.39Initspureform,itisabhidharma per se.40Thespecificunderstandingthatoperatesinthediscernment


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ofthefournobletruthsinthecourseofspiritualprogressiscalleddiscriminativedeliberation(/consideration) (pratisaṃkhyā).41 It is through this thatabsolutecessationofadefilement,andfinallynirvāṇa (= pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha),isacquired.In other words,whenfullyperfected,prajñāistheperfectwisdomofaBuddha.However,initsgeneralfunctioning,itmaybepureorimpure,rightorerroneous.Thus,allviews,bothrightorfalse,areprajñā in their essentialnature.Likewise,asaṃprajanya42andakliṣṭa-ajñāna (§10.4)43arealsoprajñā. Prajñāisinfactthe sine qua nonfortheelementofunderstandinginanyperceptualprocess.Saṃghabhadraexplainsthat,amongthevariouscaitta‑sconjoinedwithacitta,itisprajñāalonethathasthefunctionofbeingaware.44Itplaysapredominantroleinpoweringthementalcapacityofconceptualdiscrimination.Thedefinitionin the Avatāra45istypicallyabhidharmicinemphasis:

Understandingistheinvestigation(pravicaya)ofdharma‑s.Itistheexamination(upalakṣaṇa),asthecasemaybe,ofthefollowingeightkindsofdharma‑s:inclusion(saṃgraha),conjunction(saṃprayoga),endowment(samanvāgama),causes(hetu),conditions(pratyaya),fruitions(phala),specific‑characteristic(sva-lakṣaṇa),common‑characteristic(sāmānya-lakṣaṇa).46

9.3.4.1.7. Mindfulness (smṛti)

Thisenablesthemindtorememberclearlytheobject(cittasyārthābhilapanā),tobemindfulofwhathasbeendone,whatisbeingdoneandwhatwillbedone.47 Theoperationofthiscaittabecomesparticularlyimportantinthepracticeofmeditation.Likeprajñā, it tooplaysan important role in the functioningofconceptualdiscrimination(Seeinfra,§11).

9.3.4.1.8. Mental application (manaskāra)

This alerts (ā‑√bhuj) thecitta anddirects it toward the object (āvarjayati).The Avatāra says:“It isalsotheholdinginmind(samanvāhāra)ofanobjectwhichhasearlierbeenexperienced(pūrvānubhūta).”48ThistermisalsooftenusedintheAbhidharmainthesenseofmeditationorcontemplation;anditwouldseemthatthishadbeensobeforeitcametobeformallyclassifiedasathought‑concomitant.Acontemplationontherealnatureofthingsiscalleda“mentalapplication to the real” (tattva-manaskāra). In contrast, a contemplation thatinvolvesvisualizationiscalleda“mentalapplicationtoresolve”(adhimokṣa/adhimukti-manaskāra).Inthefollowingclassificationofthreetypesofmentalapplication,thefirsttwopertaintothereal,thethird,toresolve:

(1) Mentalapplicationtointrinsicnature(svalakṣaṇa-manaskāra)—suchasthecontemplationthatrūpaischaracterizedbythesusceptibilityofchangeandobstruction;vedanāischaracterizedbyexperience;etc.;


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(2) Mental application to common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa-manaskāra)— such as the contemplationon the sixteenmodesofactivities (ākāra) in theprocessof thedirect realizationof the fournobletruths(satyābhisamaya.See§11,§16.2.2.1);

(3) Mentalapplicationtoresolve/determination(adhimukti-manaskāra)—suchasthemeditationalpracticesofthecontemplationontheimpureandmindfulnessofbreathing,etc.(Seebelow)

According to the opinionof theMVŚcompilers, a noble path (ārya-mārga;i.e.,aspiritualattainment)mayoccurimmediatelyafteranyofthesethreetypesof mentalapplication,and,conversely,anyofthesethreemayoccurimmediatelyafteranoblepathārya-mārga.49Inotherwords,anyofthesethreetypesofmentalapplicationcanbringabouttruespiritualinsight.

9.3.4.1.9. Determination (adhimokṣa/adhimukti)

Thisisaveryimportantmentalforce,particularlyinmeditativepraxisandtheprocessleadingtoliberation.Inits“ordinary”functionintheprocessofcognition,itcontributestomakingourmindtobedetermined/ascertainedwithregardtotheobjectbeingcognized.TheAvatāradefinesthus:

Itistheaffirmation(avadhāraṇa)withregardtoanobject,i.e.,itenablesonetobefreefromdiffidencewithregardtoanobjectbeingperceived(cittasya viṣayāpatisaṃkoca). 50

ThisAbhidharmadefinitionofadhimokṣa/adhimuktiisinheritedbytheYogācāra.Sthiramati’scommentaryonthePañcaskandha-prakaraṇabringsoutthesameessentialmeaningmoreelaborately:

‘[With regard to] the ascertainedobject’means:with regard to thefiveaggregates,etc.InaccordancewiththeBuddha’ssayingthat“rūpaislikefoam,vedanāislikeabubble,saṃjñāislikeamirage.saṃskāra‑sarelikeabananatree,vijñānaislikeanillusoryobject”51 —theyareaccordinglyascertained.Orrather, inaccordancewiththeintrinsicnaturebelongingto theparticulardharma‑s,oneaccordinglygives rise to ascertainment.Themeaningofascertainment isaffirmation(印持 = 印可;avadhāraṇa).Ithasthefunctionof[enablingthemind]not tobemisled(/influenced)byothers. 52

SaṃghabhadramentionsthefollowingopinionofcertainSarvāstivādamasters:

adhimeansdominanceorsovereignty(增勝),mokṣameansliberation(解脱).This[thought‑concomitant]enablesthemindtooperatefreely,unobstructed,withregardtotheobject;likeadhiśīla,etc. 53


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9.3.4.1.9.1. Different nuances of adhimokṣa

Adhimokṣaisperhapsoneofthemostproblematictermstotranslate.Consideringthevariousdescriptionsgivenintheseabhidharmatexts,however,itseemstoinclude thefollowingconnotations(someofwhichareprobablynotentirelydistinctfromothers):

(i) affirmation/commitment/acceptance/approval;(ii) decisiveness/determination/resolve;(iii)conviction/faith;(iv) liking/inclination;(v) mentalfreedomresultingfromtheeradicationofindecision;(vi)mentalfreedomresultingfromdetachment.

Itmaybenotedthatthistermseemstobearsomesimilaritiesparticularlywithśraddhāandchanda.Saṃghabhadra54explainstherelationshipamongthethree:“śraddhāisthatwhichservesasthebasis(āśraya)forchandaandanaidforadhimokṣa.”TheMVŚ55speaksoffaithasbeingoftwomodesofactivityorforms:faithintheformofacceptance/affirmation(信可),andfaithintheformofliking/inclination(信樂).Asregardsadhimokṣaasliberationfromdefilement(vi),theMVŚexplainsthat

withregardtoalldharma‑s,therearetwotypesofliberation:one,unconditioned,viz.,pratisaṃkyā-nirodha;two,conditioned,viz.,adhimokṣa.

[Theconditionedadhimokṣaisonlysovereigntyoveranobject,notdisjunction(visaṃyoga; i.e., notpratisaṃkyā-nirodha).]56This [adhimokṣa] is againtwo‑fold:1.defiled,viz.,improper(mithyā)adhimokṣa;2.non‑defiled,viz.,proper(samyañc)adhimokṣa.

This[latter]isagaintwo‑fold:one,with‑outflow,viz.,thoseconjoinedwiththecontemplationoftheimpureandmindfulnessofbreathing;two,outflow‑free,viz.,thoseconjoinedwithduḥkha-dharma-jñāna-kṣānti (see§16),etc.57

TheMVŚalso distinguishes between rightadhimokṣa and rightvimokṣa:Theformeristhecause,thelatteristhefruit.Further,theformerpertainstothestageofpreparation(prayoga),thelatter,thestageofperfection.58Insuchcontexts,thebasicmeaningofadhimokṣaisundoubtedlyfreedomorliberation.

Itisthankstothismentalforcethatthemeditatorisabletopractisethevisualizationoftheimpure(aśubhā),visualizingthedifferentstagesofthedecompositionofacorpse,etc.Likewisehemustrelyonthisforcetopractiseotherimportantmeditationssuchasthefourimmeasurables(apramāṇa),visualizingtheradiationof loving‑kindness, etc asfinally pervading thewhole realmof beings; etc.Althoughitcannotdirectlyabandondefilements,ithelpsanordinaryworldlingtobeabletosuppressthem.Andsinceamentalapplicationtodeterminationcan


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leadtoamentalapplicationtothereal,thedefilementscometobeabandonedmediately.59Moreover,althoughtheliberationquaadhimokṣa (i.e. adhimokṣa in itsintrinsicnature)isaconditionedone,itformsthebasisforthepractitionertofinally progress towards the acquisitionof the unconditioned liberation(whichispratisaṃkhyā-nirodhainitsintrinsicnature).Infact,itisstressedthat“evenifapractitionerhasvigorouslycultivatedthetworequisitesofśamathaandvipaśyanāatthepreparatorystage,unlesshegeneratesadhimokṣaandbecomesresolvedtowardstheattainmentofNirvāṇa,hewillnevertoabletoabandondefilementsandacquireliberationofthemind.”60

9.3.4.1.10. Concentration (samādhi)

Concentration,definedas“theone‑pointednessofthemind”,61enablesthecitta toremainfocusedonanobject.TheAvatāradescribesitthus:

Itcontrolsthemonkey‑likecittasothatitcanoperate(vartate)onasingleobject.TheVaibhāṣikasaysthus:“Justasasnakethatisconfinedinabamboo.pipedoesnotmoveinacrookedmanner,citta,whenconcentrated(samāhita),proceedsupright. 62

Concentrationmaybeeitherdefiledornon‑defiled;intheformercase,itisalsonameddispersion(散亂;vikṣepa).63Withinthesinglemomentinthecognitiveprocess, thereisalwaystheabidingofthemindontheobject, thankstothisforcecalledconcentration.Butwhenthethoughthappenstobeconjoinedwithconcomitant,distraction(auddhatya),itismadetofluctuatewithregardtotheobjectwithinaseriesofmoments.Thisiscalleddispersion,thoughinitsintrinsicnatureitisalsononeotherthanthesamedharma,concentration.64

9.3.4.2. The indeterminate thought-concomitants (aniyata-dharma)

Among the extantabhidharma texts, theAKBwas apparently thefirst tomake an explicitmentionof this class. In stanza23c–dof chapter II of theAKB,65 Vasubandhustatesthat“thecaitta‑sareoffivetypes,inrespectofthedivisionintothemahābhūmi[-ka],etc.”Butattheendofthedefinitionsofallthe caitta‑softhefiveclasses,heremarksthat“therearealsoother[caitta‑s]whichareindeterminate(aniyata)—reasoning(vitarka),investigation(vicāra),regret (kaukṛtya),sleep(middha),etc.” 66ThisclassseemstobeacceptabletotheVaibhāṣikas;Saṃghabhadra,forone,mentionsitinthesameway.67

Yaśomitraexplainsthattheyreferto“thosewhichsometimesexistinaskillful,sometimesinanunskillful,sometimesinanon‑definedthought.68Thus,regretcanariseineitheraskillful orunskillfulthought:Intheformercase,oneregretsnothavingdoneagoodactionorhavingcommittedabadaction.Inthelattercase,oneregretsnothavingdoneabadactionorhavingaccomplishedagoodaction.69Likewise,sleepisunskillfulifitisindulgedinunnecessarily,butskillfulwhenthebodyneedstoberefreshed.


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Yaśomitrafurtherremarksthatbytheword“etc.”inVasubandhu’sprosecommentary,thefollowingaretobeincluded:(i)secondarydefilements(upakleśa)suchasdisgust(arati),yawning(vijṛmbhikā),exhaustion(tandrī),unevenconsumptionoffood(bhakte asamatā)(thesefourtogetherwithmentalsunken‑ness(cetaso līnatva) occur in theAKBas thefivenourishments (āhāra) of torpor‑sleep(styāna-middha));70and(ii)defilementssuchasgreed(rāga),etc.“These[thought‑concomitants],greed,etc.,areindeterminatewithregardto[theirinclusionin]anyofthefiveclasses:Theyarenotmahābhūmika‑sbecausetheyarenotfoundinallcasesofmind;notkuśala-mahābhūmika‑sbecausetheyarenotconnectedwithskillfulness(kuśalatva-ayogāt);notkleśa-mahābhūmika‑sbecausetheyarenotfoundinallcasesofdefiledthought—forgreeddoesnotexistinamindconjoinedwithhostility(sa-pratighe cetasi)nordoeshostilityexistinamindconjoinedwithgreed.(sarāge cetasi)”71

Hefurtherquotesastanzabyācārya Vasumitrawhichstatesthateightaniyata dharma‑sarerecognized—vitarka, vicāra, kaukṛtya, middha, pratigha, sakti (= rāga),mānaandvicikitsā.ItistobenotedthatPuGuanglaterfollowedthistraditionandexplainedthattheword“etc.”intheAKBstanzasubsumesgreed,hostility,conceitanddoubt.72

However,Yaśomitrahereobjects to thenumberofeight, for“whyareview(dṛṣṭi),etc.,notconcededasindeterminateaswell—sincefalseviewdoesnotariseinathoughtconjoinedwitheitherhostilityordoubt?”73

9.3.4.3. Defilements of restricted scope (parītta-kleśa-bhūmika-dharma)

This classwas probablyfirst enumerated in theSaptavastuka of thePrŚ.74 Thetendefilementsinthisclassare:1.anger(krodha),2.enmity(upanāha),3. concealment (mrakṣa)), 4. depravedopinionatedness (pradāśa/pradāsa),5.dissimulation(śāṭhya),6.deceptiveness(māyā),7.pride(mada),8.avarice (mātsarya),9.jealousy(īrṣyā),10.harmfulness(vihiṃsā).

TheMVŚexplainswhytherearecalleddefilementsofrestrictedscope:

Thosedharma‑s[ofdefilement]whichobtaininsome[butnotall]defiledthoughts are calleddharma‑s of defilement of restricted scope.That is:theseven—anger,[enmity,depravedopinionatedness,concealment,avarice,jealousy andharmfulness]—are exclusively unskillful; dissimulation,deceptivenessandpridemaybeeitherunskillfulornon‑defined.Moreover,theseven,anger,etc.,pertainonlytothesensualitysphere;dissimulationanddeceptivenesspertain to the sensuality sphere and thefirstdhyāna;pridepertaintoallthreespheres.Moreover,thesetenareabandonablebycultivationonlyandpertainexclusivelytothementalstage(mano-bhūmi).Whenoneofthemarises, thereisdefinitelynoanother.Beingmutuallycontradictory[amongoneanotherinnature],theyarecalleddharma‑sofdefilementofrestrictedscope.75


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Alldefilementsariseonaccountofignorance,thesesocalledrestricteddefilementsarenoexception.IntheAKB,Vasubandhu’sexplanationbringsouttheirrelationtoignorance:

Becausethesedefilementsofrestrictedscopeareconjoinedonlywiththeignorancewhich isabanonablebycultivationandwhichpertains to thementalstage.76

Yaśomitracommentsonthis:

Restrictedmeans little/minor (alpaka).What is that?Mere‑ignorance(avidyā-mātra); this means solely avidyā (avidyaiva kevalā).‘Withthatmere‑ignorance’means‘notwithotherdefilements,greed,etc’.77

ThereisacontroversyintheMVŚastowhethertheignorancewhicharisestogetherwiththeserestricteddefilementsarethe“conjoinedignorance”(saṃprayukta-avidyā)—ignorancealwaysarisinginconjunctionwithotherdefilements—orthe“independentignorance”(āveṇikī avidyā)whicharisesthroughitsownstrength.(Seeinfra,§12.6.1.1.1).78Thecompilers’positionisthattheignorancearisingthroughthestrengthofanyofthesedefilementsisnottobecalledtheindependentignorance.Ontheotherhand,thereisanotheropinionwhichassertsthatthisistheindependentignoranceabandonablebycultivation.

BoththeseopinionsamongtheearlySarvāstivādamastersappeartohavebeentransmittedtolatertimes.Inthiscontext,wemaynotePuGuang’sfollowingcommentswhichclearlyindicatehisknowledgeoftheexistenceofthesetwopositions:

(I) Theindependentignoranceinsuchcasesofthoughtissocalledbecauseitisnotconjoinedwithotherdefilements—boththefundamentalonessuchasgreed,etc,andthesecondarydefilementssuchasanger,etc,andalsotheindeterminateonessuchasregret(kaukṛtya)—andarisesthrough itsownstrength. It is abandonablebyvision [into the fourtruths]only.

(II)The independent ignorance includes those ignoranceswhicharenotconjoinedwiththefundamentaldefilementssuchasgreed,etc,aswellasthoseignorancesconjoinedwithanger,etc.,andregret,etc.

PuGuangremarksthatthepositionoftheAKB,asreflectedinthisdiscussionofthedefilementsofrestrictedscope,isthesameasthatoftheMVŚ.Saṃghabhadra,whoallowstheignorancereferredtoheretobecalled“independent”,sharesthesecondviewabove.79


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9.4. Sarvāstivāda doctrine of conjunction (saṃprayoga)

Thedoctrine that thecitta andcaitta‑s always arise andoperate in union isexpressedby the notion of conjunction (saṃprayoga).However, theearlySarvāstivādaācārya‑s interpreted this notion differently.80For Vasumitra,saṃprayogameansmutuallygivingrisetoeachotherandhavingthesamebasis(āśraya).ForDharmatrāta,itiscompanionshiporassociation.Thevijñānaandcaitta‑saresaṃprayuktaonlyiftheymutuallyaccommodateeachother,co‑ariseandtakethesameobject.ForGhoṣaka,itreferstothesameness(samatā)ofthecittaandthecaitta‑swithregardtobasis,object(ālambana),modeofactivity(ākāra),andaction(kriyā).

Eventually,afivefoldequalityorsameness(pañcadhā samatā)amongthecitta andcaitta‑scametobeacceptedasthestandardrequirementsforthenotionofconjunction:81

I. Samebasis:boththecittaandcaitta‑smustbesupportedbythesamebasis(āśraya),i.e.,thesenseorgan.

II. Sameobject(ālambana):theymusthavethesameobject.

III. Samemodeofactivity(ākāra):themodeofapprehendingtheperceptmustbethesame;thus,ifthecittaapprehendsgreennessthecaitta‑stooapprehendlikewise.(Seealso§10.8forafurtherdiscussiononākāra.)

IV. Sametime(kāla):theymustbeconascent.

V. Samesubstance(dravya):inagivencittathereisconjoinedonlyonevedanā(eitherpleasurable,unpleasurableorneutral),onesaṃjñā (either theideaof‘small’or‘big’,or‘male’or‘female’,etc.),etc.

Astowhetheracittacanbeconjoinedwithanothercitta,theVaibhāṣikaanswersinthenegative:“Acittamaybeconjoinedwiththecaitta‑s;thecaitta‑smayalsobeconjoinedwith[other]caitta‑s;thecaitta‑sagainmaybeconjoinedwithacitta. Therecanbenoconjunction(saṃprayoga)betweenonecittaandanother,asnotwocitta‑sco‑arisewithinone[andthesame]person.”82

9.5. Dārṣṭāntika and Sautrāntika Doctrine of successive arising

However,itistobenotedthatinspiteofthequestionableattribution83of the meaningof ‘companionship’ toDharmatrāta, he, in reality— togetherwithotherearlyDārṣṭāntikas—assertsthatthecitta-caitta‑sarisesuccessivelyandnotsimultaneously,likeagroupofmerchantswhopassthroughanarrowroadonebyone.84Forthem,saṃprayogameansnotsimultaneousassociationbuttheassociationor‘companionship’oftwomentaldharma‑soneimmediatelyfollowingtheotherwithoutanythingelseinbetweenthesuccessivearisingofthetwo.85


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Thus,intheearlyDārṣṭāntikaperspective,whenacittaissaidtobeconjoinedwith acaitta—say sukhā vedanā—what itmeans is that the thought thatarisesatthisgivenmomentisoneofpleasurablefeeling.Aso‑calledcaittaisnotarealmentalentitydistinctfromthecitta;itissimplyaspecificstateormodeoffunctioningoftheminditself.Thisispreciselythedefinitiongivenby‘someothermasters’(unnamed)intheAKB.86Theseareinfactthefollowersof the DārṣṭāntikamasterBuddhadevawhoseview,asgivenintheMVŚ,87isthatthereisnocaittaapartfromthecitta.ThisargumentofBuddhadevaisalsorecordedintheADV.88

Dharmatrāta states that “thecitta-caitta‑s are [but] the specificmodes ofcetanā (cetanā-viśeṣa)”.89Thismeans thatwhatever onemay choose to callit—citta or caitta— themind arises specifically;mental activity as suchbeingcharacterizedbycetanā—‘consciousness’,‘understanding’.Asamatteroffact,citta (> caitta),cetas (> caitasika)andcetanāareallderivedfromthesameroot√cit,and cetanā, inamoregeneralsense(thanthatof‘volition’),canmean‘understanding’,‘consciousness’,etc.,thusreferringtomentalactivityinageneralsense.Understoodinthisway,then,Dharmatrāta’sviewisnotsomuchdifferentfromBuddhadeva’s.TheonlysignificantdifferenceseemstobethatwhereasBuddhadevawouldabsolutelynotallowanyrealitystatusofthecaitta‑sapart fromcitta itself,Dharmatrātawouldviewthecaitta‑sasbeingdistinguishablefrom(hencenotexactlyidenticalwith)thecitta/vijñānainasmuchastheybelongtothedifferentstagesofmentalactivitysubsequenttotheinitialarisingofconsciousness.

AmodificationofDharmatrāta’sdoctrineisrecordedintheAKB:

According to some, sensation [arises] subsequently to contact (sparśa).First, thereare thesensefacultyand theobject, then theconsciousness.Thecomingtogetherofthesethreeiscontact.Fromcontactasthecondition,sensation[arises]subsequentlyinthethirdmoment.90

This doctrine is ascribedby the commentarial tradition toŚrīlāta.91TheNyexplainshisdoctrine(quotedas“theSthavira”intheNy)asfollows:

Thereareonlythreecaitta‑s[i.e.,vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā].92

The saṃskāra-skandhacomprisescetanāalone—thesaṃskāra‑s,manaskāra,etc.,allhavecetanāastheirintrinsicnature.93

Śrīlātaclaimsthathebaseshimselfonthesūtrapassagewhichsays:

Conditionedby the eye and the visibles, visual consciousness arises.Thecomingtogetherofthethreeiscontact(regardedasanotherdistinctrealcaittabytheSarvāstivāda).Borntogetherarevedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā.94


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The Vaibhāṣikacapitalizesonthephrase‘borntogether’(sahajāta)insupportoftheirdoctrineofsimultaneousarisingofthoughtandthought‑concomitants.The Sautrāntika,althoughequallyleaningonthisscripturalpassagefortheircaittadoctrine,interprets‘borntogether’differently:

‘Borntogether’doesnotmean‘borntogetherwithcontact’.…Thisword‘together’hasalsobeenobservedtomean‘immediatelyafter’(samanantaram).95

That ‘arising together’ canbe taken tomean ‘arisingone immediately afteranother’,remindsusofthenotionofsaṃprayogaadvocatedbyDharmatrātaandothersintheMVŚ.(Seeabove).

ThePāli96versioncorrespondingtotheabove‑quotedsūtrapassagedoesnotcontainthetermsahajāta (cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ / tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso / phassa-paccayā vedanā / vedanā-paccayā taṇhā / ayaṃ kho bhikkhave dukkhassa samudayo /).ThiswouldlendsupporttothesequentialmodeloftheDārṣṭāntika‑Sautrāntika:vijñāṇa→ vedanā → saṃjñā → cetanā. ItisapparentlyonthisbasisthatŚrīlātaacknowledgesonlythethreecaitta‑smentionedinthesūtraandregardsalltheso‑calledcaitta‑sotherthanvedanā andsaṃjñāasmerelycetanā-viśeṣa.

The *Satyasiddhi-śāstra (SatŚ) too apparently inherits the earlyDārṣṭāntikastandpoint and repudiates theSarvāstivāda doctrines of distinctcaitta‑s andsaṃprayoga:

Vedanā, saṃjñā and saṃskāra, etc., are the various namesof thecitta. Forinstance,[inthesūtra,]oneandthesamesmṛtihasfivedifferentnames:smṛty-upasthāna,smṛtīndriya,smṛti-bala,smṛti-bodhyaṅgaandsamyak-smṛti;likewiseforvīrya,etc.…Thus,thesamecitta,atdifferenttimes,receivesdifferentnames.Accordingly,weknowthat[thecaitta‑s]arenoneotherthanthecitta…97

Therearenoconjoineddharma‑s.Why?Because,therebeingnocaitta‑s,withwhatisthecittaconjoined?Furthermore,thedifferentcharacteristics,sensation,etc.,cannotbesimultaneous.Furthermore,causeandeffectdonotco‑exist:Consciousnessisthecauseofideationandotherdharma‑s,andthesedharma‑sshouldnotexistsimultaneously.Hence,weknowthatthereisnosaṃprayoga.98

9.6. Difference in functionality between citta and caitta-s

Withthedevelopmentofthedoctrineofthecaitta‑sasentitiesdistinctfrombutconascentwiththecitta,thefunctionaldistinctionsbetweenthetwocametobearticulated.Citta or vijñāna is thegeneraldiscernmentorapprehensionwithrespecttoeachindividualobject.99Thisdiscernmentisthemeregraspingoftheobjectitself,withoutapprehendinganyofitsparticularities.Acaitta,ontheother


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hand,apprehendstheparticularitiesoftheobject.100Thus,inavisualperception,the citta,i.e.,visualconsciousnessinthiscase,canonlyapprehendablueobject.Itisonlyinconjunctionwiththecaittacalledsaṃjñā,whosefunctionitistocategorize,andprajñāwhosefunctionitistodiscriminativelyconceptualize,thatthemindapprehendsspecifically:“Thisisblue.”

TheAKBdefinesconsciousnessasfollows:

Consciousnessisthecognitionrelativetoeach[object](vijñānaṃ prativijñaptiḥ).Thecognition(vijñapti),apperception(upalabdhi),relativetoeachobject,iscalledtheconsciousness‑aggregate.101

Onthis,Saṃghabhadracomments:

‘Consciousnessiscognition‘inthesensethatitgraspsthecharacteristicofanobjectinageneralmanner.‘Cognitionrelativetoeachobject’meansthateach[typeofconsciousness—visual,etc.—]graspsinageneralmannertheobjectspecifictoit[—rūpa,etc.].Thatis,althoughnumerousobjects—rūpa,etc.—arepresent,visualconsciousnessgraspsonlyrūpa,notśabda,etc.;onlyblue,etc.,not‘Itisblue’,etc.,or‘Itisagreeable,notagreeable’,etc.,or‘amale,afemale’,etc.,or‘ahuman,apost’,etc.,or‘Itisagain,loss’,etc.Thesameappliestotheothertypesofconsciousnesseachofwhichgraspsitsspecificobjectinageneralmanner.102

The dharmabeingcognizedservesasaconditionquaobject,ālambana-pratyaya. Thatis,itistheindispensableconditionforthegenerationofthatconsciousnesswhichariseswithanimage(pratibimba;gzugs brnyan),asinthecaseofasensoryperception,orwithamodeofunderstanding(ākāra),asinthecaseofamentalcognition(see§7.1.3,§10.7).TheMVŚ103comparesthispratyayatothingsofthenatureofsupporting,suchasawalkingstick.

TheADVexplains thatwhile thecitta is conascentwith thecaitta‑s, it isdistinguishable as the chief substance (pradhāna-dravya) inasmuch as it isthe cittathatgraspsthemereobject.Thespecificspertainingtotheobjectsoapprehendedaregraspedsimultaneously104byacaitta—saṃjñāideates,smṛti recollects,prajñāexamines,etc.Theimplicationisthatwithouttheraworgeneralgraspingoftheobjecttobeginwith,therecannotbethespecificfunctioningofthecaitta‑s.Accordingly,thecaitta‑sarefunctionallysubordinatetoanddependenton the cittawhichislikethegovernor(rāja-sthānīya)inrelationtothegoverned.Itisbythecittathatthefundamentalessenceofabeing(mūla-sattva-dravya)isdesignated.105Thatthecittaisthechiefisalsotobeunderstoodfromthefactthattheunenlightenedareattachedtoit—nottothecaitta‑s—astheĀtman.

Moreover,whenapersonisliberated,onespeaksonlyofthecittabeingliberatedeventhoughitisatthatmomentbeingaccompaniedbycaitta‑sanddharma‑sbelongingtootherskandha‑s.Thisisonceagainbecausetheseaccompanying


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dharma‑sarealldependentonthecitta,and,whenthecittaispure,theotherskandha‑s too are likewise pure.106TheADV further invokes the scripturalauthority:Itissaidinthesūtrathatbeingsaredefiledorpurifiedonaccountofthe defilementandpurificationofthecitta.107

AccordingtoXuanZang’sdisciple,108therewerefourancientschoolsorviewsonthefunctionalrelationshipbetweenthecittaandthecaitta‑s:

I. The cittaapprehendsthegeneralcharacteristic—rūpa,śabda,etc.—andacaittaapprehendsthespecificcharacteristicinkeepingwithitsfunctionalnature—agreeable,disagreeable,etc.;for,withregardtoagivensubstance,therecannotbemorethanoneapprehensionalfunctionatonetime.

II. The functionproper to thecitta is the apprehension (正取) of thegeneralcharacteristic;itcanalsoapprehendthespecificcharacteristics.The caitta‑s each apprehend their corresponding characteristic butcannotapprehendthegeneralcharacteristics.Thisisbecausethecitta hasgreaterstrengthbut thecaitta isweak, therefore thecaitta canperformonlyonefunction.

III. The caitta‑seachcanproperlyapprehendtheirowncharacteristicsandat thesame timesecondarilyapprehend thegeneralcharacteristics.The cittacanonlyapprehendthegeneralcharacteristicsbutnotthespecificcharacteristics.Thisisbecausethecittaislikethe‘king’inrelation to thecaitta‑s:where thecitta operates, it, being theking,isnecessarilyfollowedbythecaitta‑swhichareitssubordinates—i.e.,thecaitta‑salsodowhatthekingdoes.However,wherethecaitta‑sgo,thecittadoesnot—thekingdoesnotfollowthesubordinates.

IV. Bothcittaandcaitta‑sapprehendboththegeneralandspecificcharacteristics.But thecitta primarily apprehends the general characteristics andsecondarilyapprehendsthespecificcharacteristics;whereasthecaitta primarilyapprehendsthespecificcharacteristicinkeepingwithitsownnatureandalsosecondarilyapprehendsthegeneralcharacteristicsandthespecificcharacteristicspropertoothercaitta‑s.

9.7. Difference between the first five and the sixth consciousnesses

Althoughallsixconsciousnessesareequallyconsciousnessinnatureandareequallydependentontheobjectandthesenseorganintheirarising,theydifferinthewaytheygraspobjects.Firstly,mentalconsciousnesscangraspobjectspertaining to the threeperiodsof time. In termsofspeciesofobjects, itcangraspalldharma‑s,conditionedandunconditioned.Incontrast,thefivesensoryconsciousnessescangrasponlythepresentobjectsandonlythosespecifictothem,i.e.,visualconsciousnesscangrasponlyrūpa,etc.


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AnotherimportantdifferenceisstatedintheMVŚasfollows:

Thefive sensory consciousness are exclusivelywithout discrimination(vikalpa).Thesixthconsciousnessmayormaynothavediscrimination:Whenitoccursinmeditation,itisalwayswithoutdiscrimination.Ifitisnotinmeditation,therecanbediscrimination,fordiscriminationintheformofexaminationoccursuniversallywithnon‑concentrated(asamāhita)mentalconsciousness.109

Thisdifferenceinvolvesthenotionofthethreetypesofdiscrimination:110

1. Svabhāva-vikalpa—discriminationwhich is in the very nature ofconsciousnessitself.Itisvitarkaandvicāra—orvitarkaaccordingtoSaṃghabhadra.111

2. Anusmaraṇa-vikalpa—discriminationintheformofrecollection.Itisthe smṛtiassociatedwithmentalconsciousness.

3. Abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa—discrimination in the formof examination.Itisthenon‑concentratedprajñāpertainingtothementalsphere(mano-bhūmi).

Thefirstfiveconsciousnessescanhaveonlysvabhāva-vikalpa.Althoughtheyarealsoalwaysassociatedwithsmṛtiandprajñā,theirfunctionsofrecollectionanddiscrimination, respectively, are feeble therein.112Accordingly, althoughtheycandiscriminate inageneralmanner theobjectproper to theirspecificdomain—visualconsciousnesscanknowarūpa,say,abluecolor—itcannotknow“Thisisblue”.113Incontrast,mentalconsciousnesscanhaveallthethreetypesofdistinctionalfunctions.Sthiramatiexplainsthattheprajñāconjoinedwithasensoryconsciousnessisnotnamedaabhinirūpaṇā-vikalpaonaccountofthefactthatitdoesnottakenameasitsobject.114

Onaccountofitssuperimpositionalfunction,mentalconsciousnessplaysthekeyroleinthesaṃsāraprocessofdefilingandpurification.TheMVŚ115speaksofsixeventsuniquelydistinguishingmentalconsciousnessfromthefirstfiveconsciousnesses: 1.spiritual retrogression, 2.detachment fromdefilements,3.death,4.birth,5.thecuttingoffoftheskillfulroots,6.therelinkingwiththeskillfulrootswhichhavebeencutoff.

Astowhether,likementalconsciousness,thesensoryconsciousnessestoocanprojectkarma,variousopinionsarerecordedintheMVŚ:

Herein, therearetwokindsoforigination(samutthāna):originationquacause(hetu-samutthāna)andthemoment‑origination([tat]kṣaṇa-samutthāna,i.e.,origination at the verymoment of the action).Theoriginationquacauseisthe[initial]propellingthought(pravartakaṃ cittam).Themoment‑originationisthesubsequentpropellingcause(anuvartakaṃ cittam).


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Question:Are thefive sensory consciousnesses also capable of servingas both types of origination and project bodily and vocalkarma‑s?

Oneopinion:Thefivesensoryconsciousnessescannotprojectbodilyandvocalkarma‑sbecausementalconsciousnessalonecanserveasthe[initial]propeller and subsequentpropeller, causing thekarma to come into thepresence.Thefive sensoryconsciousnesses cannot serveas the [initial]propeller and subsequentpropeller, causing thekarma to come into thepresence.…

Anotheropinion:Thefivesensoryconsciousnessescanalsoprojectbodilyandvocalkarma‑sbecausementalconsciousnesscanserveasthe[initial]propellerandsubsequentpropeller;thefivesensoryconsciousnessescannotserveasthe[initial]propeller,butcanserveasthesubsequentpropeller.…

According to theVenerableSaṅghavasu (僧伽伐蘇):Thefive sensoryconsciousnessescanalsoprojectbodilyandvocalkarma‑s,servingastheoriginationquacauseandthemoment‑origination.…

Thecorrectopinion(如是説者):Thefivesensoryconsciousnessescannotserveastheoriginationquacausetoprojectbodilyandvocalkarma‑sbecausementalconsciousnesscanserveasthe[initial]propellerandsubsequentpropellerforbodilyandvocalkarma‑s;thefivesensoryconsciousnessescanserveonlyasthesubsequentpropeller,butnotthe[initial]propeller.116

However,Saṃghabhadraarguesthatthesensoryconsciousnessescanbeskillful,unskillful andnon‑defined (i.e., are not exclusively non‑defined).They canthereforealsogeneratedefilements:

[Asensoryconsciousness,]althoughstayingforonethoughtmomentintheobject(viṣaya),iscapableofgraspingmarks(nimitta);theyarethereforemorally definable.Thus, the sūtra says: “Having seen rūpa‑swith theeyes,hedoesnotgraspthemarks[or]thesubsidiarymarks(anuvyañjana)(sa cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā na nimitta-grāhī bhavati / nānuvyañjana-grāhī).”117 Becausethevisibleobjectsaregraspedbytwoconsciousnesses,thereisfirstthearisingofvisualconsciousnessthatgraspsthemarksofrūpa,thenthearisingofmentalconsciousnessthatgraspsitssubsidiarymarks.Thus,the sūtraintendstoshowthatbecausevisualconsciousnesscangraspmarks,itcanalsogeneratedefilements.

But if so,why ismental consciousness alone said to be discriminative(vikalpaka)?

Itshouldbeunderstoodthatitisonlyonaccountoftheforceofdiscriminationthattherecometobethevariousfaults.…Thesensoryconsciousnesses[aresaid to bewithout discrimination in the sense that theyhavenodiscriminationintheformofexaminationandrecollection];butitisalwaysconjoinedwiththeintrinsicdiscrimination….


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Sentientbeingsareofdifferentnatures;somewithfeebledefilements,otherswithstrongdefilements.Forthosewithfeebledefilements,theremustfirstbethegenerationoffalsediscrimination(虚妄分別;abhūta-parikalpa)beforeadefilementcancomeintoplay(sam-ud-ā-√car).Forthosewithstrongdefilements,withoutdependingonvikalpa,adefilementarisesassoonasitaccordswiththeobject.Accordingly,therearecaseswhereadefiledmentalconsciousnessfirstarises,andothercaseswhereanothertypeofdefiledconsciousnessfirstarises…Thus,thefivesensoryconsciousnessesareofallthethreemoralnatures.118

9.8. Original nature of thought

Thequestionoftheoriginalnatureofthecittawasoneofthemajorcontroversiesin AbhidharmaBuddhism.Onemajordoctrineisthatitisoriginallyorintrinsicallypure.Thisdoctrineseemstohavebeenoriginallyconnectedwithmeditationalpractice,forinthecontextofthethree‑foldtraining,śīla-samādhi-prajñā,samādhi isalsooftengiveninthesūtraascitta.Thisisbecausemeditationalpracticeisseenasaprocessofremovingthementalhindrancessothatprajñācan,asitwere,shineforthunobstructed.Thisseemstohaveinspiredthedoctrineoftheoriginalpurenatureofcitta.119

The Theravāda,whichholdsthisdoctrinalposition,isapparentlyinspiredbythefollowingpassageintheAṅguttara-nikāya:

Thismind,Obhikkhu‑s, is luminous (pabhassara).But it is defiledbyadventitiousdefilements(āgantuka upakkilesa).Theuninstructedworldlingdoesnotunderstandthisasitreallyis;thereforeforhimthereisnomentaldevelopment.Thismind,Obhikkhu‑s, is luminous, and it is freed fromadventitiousdefilements.Theinstructedworldlingunderstandsthisasitreallyis;thereforeforhimthereismentaldevelopment.120

ThePālicommentaryidentifiescittainthiscontextasthebhavaṅga-citta—thecitta in its intrinsic, neutral state (non‑arising)—and interprets “luminous”as“pure/clean”(pabhassaran ti paṇḍaraṃ parisuddhaṃ).121Mentaldefilementandliberationdonotpertaintothebhavaṅga-cittabuttothephenomenalcitta thatarisesfromthebhavaṅga-cittaatthestageofjavana,i.e.,thestageofkarmicvolition,skillfulorunskillful.

The *Śāriputrābhidharmaalsocitesaverysimilarpassageastheabove‑quotedAṅguttarapassage.122

FromtheSamayabhedoparacana-cakra,welearnthattheMahāsāṃghikatooholdsthesamethesis.123 The Lakṣaṇānusāra (隨相論)explainsasfollows:

AstheMahāsāṃghikasays:‘Thenatureofthemindofbeingsisoriginallypure;itisdefiledbyadventitiousdusts(眾生心性本淨，客塵所污).Pure—


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that is, the three roots of skillfulness.Beings frombeginningless timepossessadventitiousdusts—thatis,defilements.Thedefilementsarethedefilementsofanuśaya,etc.Thedefilementsofanuśayaarethethreerootsofunskillfulness.124

The Mahāsāṃghikaexplainsthatboththerootsofskillfulnessandunskillfulnessare not conjoinedwith thought— they are potentialities of skillfulness andunskillfulness.(Notethatthisschoolhasonlykuśalaandakuśala;noneutraldharma‑s).Theideaisthattheunskillfuldefilementsandthought‑concomitantscanberemoved;themindincorrespondencewiththeskillfulpotentialissaidtobe“theoriginallypurenatureofthemind”.

In theMVŚ, it is also recorded that theVibhajyavādins toohold asimilarview:

Someholdthatthenatureofthoughtisoriginallypure,liketheVibhajyavādins.Theysaythatthenatureofthoughtisoriginallypure.Onaccountofbeingdefiledbyadventitiousdefilements,ithasanimpureappearance.…Theysaythattheessentialnatureofthoughtdoesnotdifferwhetheritisdefiledorundefiled.Thatis,whentheconjoineddefilementhasnotbeenabandoned,it is called a defiled thought;when the conjoineddefilement has beenabandoned,itiscalledanundefiledthought.Justasacoppervessel,whenthetainthasnotbeenremoved,iscalledataintedvessel,etc.;whenthetainthasbeenremoved,ataintlessvessel,etc.Thesameistrueforthought.125

TheNyrecordstheVibhajyavādaviewasfollows:

TheVibhajyvādinsassertthus:Itisonlythethoughthavinggreed(sarāga-citta)thatnowgetsliberated,likeavesselhavingbecomingfreedfromthetaintsubsequently.Itislikeacrystalthatshowsdifferentcolorsaccordingtothespecificcolorofitssupportingbasis,adifferentcolorarises.Likewise,whenthepurethoughtisdefiledbygreed,etc.,itiscalled[athought]havinggreed,etc.Subsequentlyitagainbecomesliberated.Thenoblescripturesalsosaythatthenatureofthoughtisoriginallypureandattimesisdefiledbyadventitiousdefilements.126

TheMVŚ(110a)alsoinformsthat“thosewhoholdtheviewofasinglethoughtseries”(一心相續論者)alsomaintainthatthenatureofthoughtremainsthesamewhetherdefiledornot,andgivesthesimilesofwashingacloth,refininggold,etc.,whicharealsofoundintheAṅguttara nikāya.(A,III,100):

Someholdthatthereisonlytheonecitta,likethosewhoholdthesingleserialcontinuityofcitta.Theyassertthus:Whetherathoughtiswithproclivities(sānuśaya)orwithoutproclivities,itsnatureisnotdifferent.Whenthenoblepatharises,itisopposedtothedefilement,nottothenatureofcitta;it[arises]inordertocounteractthedefilements,notcitta.Thisislikethecaseofwashingclothes,polishingamirror,orrefininggold,etc.;whatitisopposedtoarethe taints, etc.,not theclothes,etc.Likewise thenoblepath.…Although


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adifferenceexistsatdifferenttimesastowhetherthereistaintornotaint,etc.,thereisnodifferenceintermsofnature.Likewisethecaseofcitta.

Saṃghabhadra(Ny,733a‑b)rejectsthepositionsoftheMahāsāṃghikaandtheVibhājyavādins.Heproposesthatthesūtrastatementscitedbythemmustbeproperly interpreted.He explains theSarvāstivādaposition thus:whencitta abidesinits intrinsicnature, i.e., theneutralnature, it isnecessarilypure—essentiallyagreeingwith theTheravādacommentarial tradition.Butwhen itabidesinadventitiousnature,itcanbedefiled:

Iftheyassertthatcitta haspurityasitsnature,andsubsequentlyturnsintobeingdefiledatthestageofbeingconjoinedwithdefilements,thenitshouldhavelostitsintrinsicnature(svabhāva).Sinceithaslostitsintrinsicnature,itshouldnotbecalledcitta.Thus,itshouldbeassertedthatcittaispureinitsoriginalnatureandis,attimes,defiledbyadventitiousdefilements.Iftheykeeptheirfoolishfaithanddarenottodenythatthisissūtra,theyshouldknowthatthissūtra contradictsreasoningandisthusanimplicitteaching.… The sūtra…sayssowiththeimplicitreferencetotheoriginal(prakṛti)andadventitious(āgantuka)nature[ofcitta].Thatis,cittainitsoriginalnatureisnecessarilypure.Acittainitsadventitiousnaturemaybedefiled.Citta in itsoriginalnature is theneutralcittawhicharises freely,beingneithersorrowfulnorjoyful.Thedifferentspeciesofsentientbeingsmostlyabideinthiscitta,foritcanexistinallsituations.Thiscittaisnecessarilypure,beingundefiled.

The cittainitsadventitiousnaturereferstotheothercitta‑s.Itisnotthecasethatsentientbeingsmostlyabideinit.All[typesofcitta]maynotobtaininsomesituations,becausethosewhohavecutofftheirrootsofskillfulnessnecessarilydonothaveskillfulthoughts,becauseatthenon‑trainee(arhat)stagethereisnecessarilynodefiled[citta],andbecausethiscittamaybedefiledandnotalwayspure.Asitissaid:Theriverwaterisintrinsicallyclear;therearetimeswhenitbecomesturbidonaccountoftheadventitiousmud.Inthesameway,itisonlywithreferencetoacittainitsserialcontinuitythatonespeaksofitasbeingpurewhenitabidesinitsoriginalnature;whenitabidesintheadventitiousnature,itisconcededtobetemporarilydefiled.127

Whenthiscittadoesnotariseinconjunctionwithdefilements,itisliberated.Thus,contrarytotheVibhajyavāda,thelustful(sa-rāga)cittacannotbeliberated.

Inasimilarmanner,theSatŚspeaksoftheBuddha’steachinginthisregardasbeinganexpedientteaching:

Itisnotthatthenatureofcittaisnotoriginallypureandbecomesimpureonaccountoftheadventitiousdefilements.ItisjustthattheBuddha,forthesakeofthosewhothinkthatcittaiseternal,speaksofitasbecomingimpurewhendefiledbyadventitiousdefilements.Again,forthesakeofthoselazybeingswho,onhearingthatcittaisoriginallyimpure,thinkofitsnatureasbeingunalterableandthusdonotgeneratepurecitta‑s,Hespeaksofitasbeingoriginallypure.128


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NOTES

1 Cf.S,ii,95.2 PrŚ,692b;MVŚ,371a–b;etc.AKB,61:cittaṃ mano ‘tha vijñānam ekārtham | Alsocf.

Entrance,120.3 M,i,257:aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavo.4 AKB,61:cinotīti cittam | manuta iti manaḥ | vijānātīti vijñānam |5 AKB,loc. cit.6 MVŚ,371a–b.7 Cf.DhsA,112,onthedescriptiononcitta.8 Cf.explanationinAKBcitedabove.9 Cf.D,ii,306;M,iii,287–8;etc.10 Paṭisambhidāmagga,84.11 Milindapañha,49.12S,iv,293.13T2,150b.14M,i,301;alsocf. Paṭisambhidhāmagga,I,187.15DSŚ,494c.16T1612,848a.17PrŚ,692c–694a.18 Study,159.19T26,920c.20T26,614b.21T26,689bf.;cf. Study,162ff.22 Study,164;MVŚ,220a–b.23MVŚ,220b–c.24 Cf. Entrance,27ff.25 Entrance,83ff.26AKB,54ff.27 Cf.ADV,II,69:vedanā sukhādistrividho’nubhavaḥ | trividhaṃ saṃveditam iti paryāyaḥ |

iṣṭāniṣṭobhayaviparīta-visayendriyavijñāna-sannipātajā dharma-yoniḥ kāya-cittāvasthā-viśeṣaḥ prahlādyupatāpī tadubhayaviparītaś ca tṛṣṇāhetur vedanety ucyate | Alsocf. Entrance,79.

28 Entrance,81.29Ny,384b.30Ny,loc. cit.31 Entrance,80.32 Cf.ADVII,69:nimitta-nāmārthaikyajñā saṃjñā vitarka-yoniḥ | Alsocf.AKB,10:yāvan

nīla-pītadīrgha-hrasva-strī-puruṣa-mitrāmitra-sukha-duḥkhādi-nimittodgrahaṇam asau saṃjñā-skandhaḥ |


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33 Entrance,82.34 Cf.ADV,69:chandaḥ kartukāmatā vīryāṅgabhūtaḥ |AlsoSiddhi(C), 28a: “What is

chanda?Ithasasitsnaturetheaspirationforadesiredobject;anditservesasthebasisfor vīrya.”

35 Cf.AKB,289.36 Avatāra—cf. Entrance, 82.Also,ADV,69:viṣayendriyavijñāna sannipātajā cittasya

viṣayaspṛṣṭiḥ caitasikadharmo jīvanalakṣaṇaḥ sparśaḥ |37Ny,384b.38MVŚ,760a.39AKB,2.40AKB,loc. cit.;cf.§1.2.41 AKB, 4yaḥ sāsravair dharmair visaṃyogaḥ pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaḥ | duḥkhādīnām

āryasatyānaṃ pratisaṃkhyānaṃ pratisaṃkhyā prajñā-viśesas tena prāpyo nirodhaḥ pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaḥ |

42MVŚ,220a.43Ny,502a.SeeDhammajoti,KL(1998a),89ff.44Ny,396a.45 Entrance,83.46 Cf.ADV,70:dhiḥ prajñā dharma-saṃgrahādy-upalakṣaṇa-svabhāvā |47 Cf.ADV,69;Entrance,83.AKB,54:smṛtir ālambana-asaṃpramoṣaḥ |48 Entrance, 83.Cf.ADV (90):cittasyābhogo manaskāraḥ pūrvānubhūtādisamanvāhāra-

svarūpaḥ |AlsoVy,127f.:manaskāraś cetasa ābhoga iti. ālambane cetasa āvarjanam. avadhāraṇam ity arthaḥ | Siddhi(S) gives a similar definition,with an elaborationonavadhāraṇa—directing citta again and againon the sameobject:manaskāraścetasa ābhogaḥ | ābhujanamābhogaḥ | ālambane yena cittamabhimukhīkriyate | sa punarālambane citta-dhāraṇakarmā | cittadhāraṇaṃ punas tatraivālambane punaḥ punaś cittasyāvarjanam… Asm6:manaskāraḥ katamaḥ | cetasa ābhogaḥ | ālambana-citta-dhāraṇakarmakaḥ |

49MVŚ,53a–b,422c–423a.50 Entrance,83.51 Cf. Khandha Samyutta, Pupphavagga, sutta no. 3.52Tno.1613,851c.53Ny,384b.54Ny,391a.55MVŚ,26a.56MVŚ,172b.57MVŚ,147a,172b,524c,757c,etc.58MVŚ,487b.59 Cf.MVŚ,35c–36a;etc.60MVŚ,148b.61AKB,54:samādhiś cittasyaikāgratā.62 Entrance,83.63MVŚ,221a.


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64MVŚ,574b.65AKB,45.66AKB,57.67Ny,392a.68Vy,132.69 Cf.AKB,58.70AKB,318.71 Vy,132.Alsocf.MVŚ,243b,on themutualexclusivenessof the two.Seealso, infra,§12.6.1.1.

72T41,78b.73Vy, loc. cit.HecitesheretheAKBstanza,II,#29:āveṇikatve tv akuśale dṛṣṭi-yukte ca

viṃsatiḥ | kleśaiś caturbhiḥ krodh’ādyaiḥ kaukṛtyenaikaviñśatiḥ||(AKB,58)74However,theSaptavastukaandtheDKŚcouldhavebothbeenbasedonacommonoriginal.SeeYinShun,Study,165.

75MVŚ,220b.76 AKB, 57: ta ime par¥tta-kleßa-bhËmikå avidyå-måtreˆa bhåvanå-heyena manobhËmikenaiva

ca saµprayogåt |77 Vy, 132.78Seealso,Dhammajoti,KL(2009b:55ff).79 T41, no.1821, 80a. Also see Saµghabhadra’s statement in Ny, 392c (cited by Pu Guang in

this context): 是故惡作是不善者，唯無明俱，容在不共。忿等亦爾。80MVŚ,79c–81b,270a–b.81 Cf.AKB,62;MVŚ,80c.82 Ibid.,79c,270a.83 Cf. Study,255ff.84MVŚ,79c,270a,493c,745a,etc.85 Asm(33f.)enumeratessixtypesofsaṃprayoga:

1. saṃprayogaintermsofnon‑separation(avinirbhāga-saṃprayoga),2. saṃprayogaintermsofbeingmixed(miśrībhāva-saṃprayoga),3. saṃprayogaintermsofconglomeration(samavadhāna-saṃprayoga),4. saṃprayogaintermsofco‑existence(sahabhāva-saṃprayoga),5. saṃprayogaintermsofexecutionofduty(kṛtyānusthāna-saṃprayoga),6. saṃprayogaintermsofconcurrence(saṃpratipatti-saṃprayoga).

Among them, only the sixth type refers to the concurrenceof thought and thought‑concomitantswithregardtothesameobject(cittacaitasikānām ekasminn ālambane’nyonyaṃ saṃpratipattiḥ).Thefifthclearlyadmitsofthesenseofcompanionshipandco‑operationwhichdonotnecessarilydemandtheconditionofsimultaneity.(SeealsoAsmB,47).

86AKB,440:avasthāviśeṣohināmacetasaścaitasikobhavati|87MVŚ,661c.88 ADV,76:kathaṃ puṇa(na)r idaṃ vijñāyate cittād arthāntarabhūtāś caitasikāḥ | cittam

eva hi tadvedanādināmabhirvyapadiśyata ity evaṃ ceṣyamāne buddhasūtram anulomitaṃ


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bhavati | yad uktaṃ bhagavatā — “ṣaḍdhātur ayaṃ bhikṣavaḥ puruṣapudgalaḥ” ity atra vijñānadhātur evoktaḥ | tasmān nārthāntarabhūtāś caitasikā iti bhadantabuddhadevaḥ |

89MVŚ,8c.90 AKB,145:sparśād uttarakālaṃ vedanety apare | indriyārthau hi pūrvānto vijñānam | so’sau

trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ sparśapratyayāt paścād vedanā tṛtīye kṣaṇa iti |91 Vy,307:sparśad uttarakālaṃ vedanety apar iti bhadānta-śrīlātaḥ |;Ny,387c;Pūrṇavardhana,

Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā-lakṣaṇānusāriṇī, Pekingno.5594,Vol.17, 232, 336a:gzhan dag na re reg ba’i og tu tshor ba ‘byung ste zhe zer ba ni slob dpon dpal len te |; etc.

92Ny,388b.93Ny,339b.94 Cf.AKB,146:cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam | trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ

sparśaḥ sahajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetaneti |Alsocf.SĀ,72c,87c.95AKB,146.96S,ii,72.97T32,274c.98T32,276b.99 AKB,11:viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ prati vijñaptir upalabdhir vijñāna-skandha ity ucyate |100 Vy,38:upalabdhir vastu-mātra-grahaṇaṃ vedanādayas tu caitasā viśeṣā viśeṣa-grahaṇa-

rūpāḥ | Alsocf. Entrance,120f.101AKB,11:vijñānaṃ prativijñaptiḥ(16a)| viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ prati vijñaptir upalabdhir vijñāna-skandha ity ucyate |102Ny,342a.103MVŚ,109a,284a,285b;etc.104 See Saṃghabhadra’sargumentinNy,395b.105 Cf. Entrance,120.106MVŚ,141b–c;Ny,345b(Saṃghabhadracitessūtra‑swhichstressconsciousness/thoughtasthechiefessenceofabeing).

107ADV, 78:vastūpalabdhi-mātraṃ hi cittaṃ tenopalabdhe vastuni saṃjñāsmaraṇe lakṣaṇānusmaraṇābhinirūpaṇādayo viśeṣāḥ saṃjñā-prajñā-smṛty-ādibhir gṛhyante … ātmābhiniveśād rājasthānīyatvāc ca | … uktaṃ hi bhagavatā citta-saṃkleśāt sattvāḥ saṃkliṣyante | citta-vyavadāna-hetor viśudhyante |

108T41,26a–b.109MVŚ,374b.110MVŚ,219b;AKB,22.111Ny,350b.112Ny,loc. cit.113 See supra§9.6.114ZW,236.115MVŚ,315b.116MVŚ,610a.117ThissūtrastatementisalsocitedinVy(81)inthe“whatsees”debate.118T29,349a.


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119SeeSĀ,T2,341c;Pāli,A,iii,100.Cf. YinShun,A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha(Taipei,1982),67ff.

120A,i,10.121 Manorathapūraṇī,I,60.122T28,697b.123T50,15b–c.124T32,163b.125MVŚ,140b–c.126Ny,733a.127Ny,733b.128T32,258b.


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10. Theories of Knowledge

10.1. Sarvāstivādarealism:Fromepistemologytoontology10.1.1. A real existent is established through experience (mundaneor supramundane)10.1.2. Realismexpressedinthedoctrineofdefilements10.1.3. Realismexpressedinthedoctrineofsensoryperception10.1.4. Dharma‑sasknowables(jñeya)

10.2.Variousmodesofoperationofprajñā10.2.1. Understanding(prajñā)10.2.2.Knowledge(jñāna)10.2.3.Receptivity(kṣānti)10.2.4.View(dṛṣṭi)10.2.5.Correlationbetweenunderstanding,viewandknowledge(andreceptivity)

10.3.Reflexiveknowledgeandomniscience(sarvajñā)10.4. PrajñāoftheBuddhaandthetwoyāna‑s

10.4.1. Inferior prajñāofthetwoyāna‑sowingtovāsanāandakliṣṭājñāna10.4.2.Examplesoftheinferiorityofthetwoyāna‑s’prajñā10.4.3. Kleśa-āvaraṇa,jñeya-āvaraṇa,vimokṣa-āvaraṇaandakliṣṭa-ajñāna10.4.4. Saṃghabhadra’sdistinctions:kliṣṭa‑andakliṣṭa-ajñāna,andvāsanā

10.5. Instrumentofperception10.5.1. Fourviewson“whatsees?”10.5.2.The“eyesees”viewoftheVaibhāṣika10.5.3. The SautrāntikapositionandSaṃghabhadra’sdefenceoftheVaibhāṣikaposition10.5.4.Roleofconsciousnessinperception

10.6. ImportantSarvāstivādathought‑concomitantsinvolvedindiscriminativecognition10.7. Ontologicalstatusoftheobjectsofknowledge

10.7.1. DebateintheNyontheontologicalstatusoftheobject10.8.Directperception,ākāra,sākāra-vijñānavāda, nirākāra-vijñānavādaandtheSarvāstivāda

10.8.1 Thenotionofākāra in the SautrāntikaandtheSarvāstivāda10.8.2 Severalākāraonagivenālambana10.8.3.The16ākāra‑sasprajñāandnot‘images/aspects’ofobjects10.8.4.Ākāraaspratyakṣa-jñāna10.8.5.TheSarvāstivādadoctrineofsensoryperceptionisnirākāra-vijñānavāda10.8.6.ThetwoaspectsofthenotionofākāraaccordingtoPuGuang10.8.7.Thenotionofsākāraasanattributeofcitta-caitta-s10.8.8.Yogicdirectperceptionofsāmānya-lakṣaṇaasaformofsākāra-jñāna10.8.9.Summary

10.1. Sarvāstivāda realism: From epistemology to ontology

Intheprecedingchapters(particularlychapters2,3,6,7and9)wehavealreadydiscussedsomeaspectsoftheSarvāstivādatheoryofknowledge.Inthischapter,wewilloffersomeelaborationsonwhatwehavediscussedearlierandalsoaddotherimportantepistemologicaldoctrinesthatwehavenotcoveredsofar.


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10.1.1. A real existent is established through experience (mundane or supramundane)

LikeallotherformsofBuddhism,SarvāstivādaAbhidharmaisprimarilyconcernedwiththeproblemofknowledge:Giventhatweareboundtosaṃsārathroughignorance(avidyā),howcanweovercomethe topsy‑turvywayofcognizingthings(viparyāsa)andacquiretheliberatinginsight(prajñā)whichseesthingstrulyastheyare(yathābhūtam)?Withthiscentralsoteriologicalconcernandstarting fromanepistemological investigation, the school arrives at a listofroughly75types of ultimate reals knownasdharma‑s.Thiscentral concernandfundamentalmethodologyofinvestigationaresummarilyreflectedinwhattheschoolunderscoresasAbhidharmaintheabsolutesense:i.e.,pureprajñā definedasdharma-pravicaya (supra,§§1.2,1.3).

A dharma—whether,physical,mental,neitherphysicalnormental,orevenunconditioned—isauniqueforce,possessingaunique,intrinsiccharacteristic,thathasimpactonthehumanexperience,anditisdiscoveredbyavalidmeansof knowledge(pramāṇa),eitherdirectperception(includingspiritualrealization)or inferencehavingitsultimatebasisondirectexperience(cf. supra,§6.2.1)Theabsoluterealityofnirvāṇaisestablishableeventhoughitisanunconditioned,foranāryacanexperienceitdirectly,anditmoreoverhasimpactonourthinkingand aspiration (cf. infra, §16.2.1, point 6).TheSarvāstivāda investigationintotheabsoluterealleadstotheconclusionthatitistheuniversalprinciplesdirectlyrealizedbytheārya‑sthatconstituteabsolutetruth(seesupra,§3.5.1).Ametaphysicalnotion, like theSelf (ātman)or thePerson (pudgala), isnotacceptablefortheSarvāstivādaasanultimaterealpreciselybecauseitcannotbecognizedbyanymeansofcognitionorbeexperiencedthroughthespiritualinsightoftheārya‑s.1

10.1.2. Realism expressed in the doctrine of defilements

In the Sarvāstivādaexplanationofthecognitiveprocess,itistheexternalobjectthataffectsthemannerofourcognition.Theforceoftheobjectdomainisoneofthethreeconditionsthatcangeneratedefilements,theothertwobeingthecauseandthepreparatoryeffort(prayoga).2ArguingagainsttheDārṣṭāntikastancethattheobjectdomainsareunrealbecausepleasureanddispleasureareallonlyduetotheforceofmentaldiscrimination,Saṃghabhadrastates:

Theadvocatesoflogic(Yuktavādins=Sarvāstivādins)assertthus:“Allobjectdomainsarereal.”…Itisobservedthatwithregardtotheobjects,defilementsarisedifferently.…Because,althoughthereisnodifferenceintermsofthecauseandthepreparatoryeffort,themanifestationofdefilementisobservedtobedifferent,wethereforeknowthattheobjectdomainsarenotunrealentities—thedifferenceresultsfromtheforceoftheobjectdomain.3

10. theorieS of knowledge

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Inthefollowingdiscussiononthenatureoftheobjectsofdefilement,theSarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikas’ stanceof realism is once again clearly contrastedwith theidealisticpredilectionoftheDārṣṭāntikas:

TheĀbhidharmikasstate:“Theobjectofbondage(saṃyoga-vastu)isreal,thefetterwhichbindsisalsoreal.ThePersonisunreal.”

TheVātsīputrīyaasserts:“Theobjectofbondageisreal,thefetterwhichbindsisalsoreal.ThePersonisalsoreal.”

TheDārṣṭāntikasassert:“Thefetterwhichbindsisreal,theobjectofbondageisunreal.ThePersonisalsounreal.”4

10.1.3. Realism expressed in the doctrine of sensory perception

TheexternalworldisperceiveddirectlybyoursensesinspiteoftheAbhidharmadoctrineofthemomentarinessofallconditioneddharma‑s,thankstothefactof co‑existent causality (supra, §6.7). In an experience of direct perception(pratyakṣa),whethersensoryormental,theperceptualobjectastheālambana-pratyaya (supra, §7.1.3) is actually the object out there existing at the verymomentof thearisingof thecorrespondingconsciousness.It isarealentity,justasasingleatomisareal.

Saṃghabhadraarguesthatasensoryconsciousnessnecessarilytakesaphysicalassemblageoragglomerationofatoms(he ji 和集;*saṃcaya,*saṃghāta,5 *samasta)asitsobject.Whatisdirectlyperceivedisjusttheseatomsassembledtogetherinacertainmanner,notaconceptualizedobjectsuchasajug,etc.Thejugper se isneverperceivedbythevisualconsciousness;onlytherūpaasagglomeratedatomsofcolorandshapes.Thisisdirectperceptionwhichperceivesonlytheintrinsiccharacteristic(svalakṣaṇa),i.e.,theentityinitself.Itisthesucceedingmental consciousness,with its judgmentalor investigative (abhirūpaṇā) andconceptualizing capability andusingnames, that it can cognize its commoncharacteristicanddetermines that theobject isa ‘jug’.At thisstage, it isnomoreanexperienceofdirectperceptionbutaninference.(Seealsosupra,§9.7).FromtheSarvāstivādaperspective,ifwecannotperceivetheexternalobjectattheverymomentwhenitisexisting,thendirectperceptionisimpossible,whichimpliesthatinferencetooisimpossible—and,finally,notrueknowledgeoftheexternalisatallpossible.

SaṃghabhadrarejectsŚrīlāta’stheorythattheobjectofvisualperceptionisaunifiedcomplex(he he 和合;6 *sāmagrī,*saṃghāta)ofatoms.Hemaintainsthatevenanindividualatomisinactualfactvisible,eventhoughitsvisibilityisalmostnilonaccountofitsbeingverysubtleforvisualconsciousness,whichcangrasponlyagrossobject(取境麤故).Infact,itisconcededthateachindividualatom,initsownright,actuallyservesasaperceptualobjectorasupportingbasis.HearguesthatsuchasuperimposedunityasproposedbyŚrīlātacanonlybegraspedby


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investigativeconceptualization(abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa).Asensoryconsciousness,lackingthiscapacityasitdoes,cantakeonlyanexistent—notaconceptualizedunity—asitsobject.7Hefurtherexplainsthataunifiedcomplexobtainswherespeechoperates,asaresultofthearisingofanappellation(adhivacana)withregardtoamultiplicityofdharma‑s.8Itisonaccountofitsnon‑discriminativenaturethatvisualconsciousnessisincapableofdiscerningtheextremelysubtleformofanatom;onlythoseendowedwiththepowerofexcellentwisdomcandoso. Inanycase,he says,atomsarealways foundassembledand thusarevisible9 (cf. supra,§8.3).

WhiletheMVŚcertainlystatesthatanatom“cannotbeseenbytheeye”,10italsoexplains,muchlikeSaṃghabhadra,thatthisisnotinthesenseofanobjectnotbeingoftheintrinsicnatureofanobject.Thus,withregardtoanatomofcolororshape,theMVŚsays:

Thereexists[anatom(paramāṇu)ofgreen];itisjustthatitisnotgraspedbyvisualconsciousness.Ifasingleatomisnotgreen,anaccumulationofnumerousatomscannotbegreen;likewiseforyellow,etc.….

Thereexists[anatomofalongshape,etc.];itisjustthatitisnotgraspedbyvisualconsciousness.Ifasingleatomisnotlong,etc.,inshape,anaccumulationofnumerousatomscannotbelong,etc.,inshape.

Furthermore, thereexistrūpa‑s thatarenotvisibleonaccountofbeingextremelyfine,notonaccountofbeingnon‑objects(aviṣaya).11

Elsewhere, someSārvāstivādamasters likewise state that an atom, asmuchas amaterial aggregate, necessarily possesses the same fundamentalcharacteristic:

Ifasingleatomdoesnothavethecharacteristic(lakṣaṇa)ofthematerialaggregate(rūpa-skandha),thenevenanagglomeration(聚集—thesetwoChinesecharactersverylikelytranslatethesameSanskritoriginalfor和集)ofnumerous[atoms]shouldalsonotbeanaggregate(skandha).12

ThesestatementsmusthaveformedthebasisofSaṃghabhadra’sexplanations,andwemustthereforebecautiousnottotoohastilyproclaimasneo-Sarvāstivādahisdoctrinesoftheidenticalintrinsicnatureofanatomaswellasagrossmatter,orofan“agglomerationofatoms”being theperceptualobjectsofasensoryconsciousness.

10.1.4. Dharma-s as knowables (jñeya)

WemaysaythatfromtheperiodofAbhidharmaBuddhismonwards,thequestionofwhatconstitutestheknowables(jñeya)becomesanincreasinglyimportanttopicofinvestigationamongtheBuddhistschools.InthecaseofSarvāstivāda,aswehaveseenabove,alldharma‑s,intheproperAbhidharmicsenseoftheterm,exist


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andconstituteobjectsofcognition(vijñeya)andknowledge,thecognizablesandtheknowables.ThePrŚexplainswhattheseknowablesandcognizablesreferto:

Whatare theknowabledharma‑s?Alldharma‑sareknown through theknowledges (jñāna) in accordancewith the [specific] objects (隨其事,*yathā-vastu).How,moreover,isthat?Theknowledgeofunsatisfactoriness(duḥkha-jñāna)knowsunsatisfactoriness.Theknowledgeoforiginknowsorigin. The knowledgeofcessationknowscessation.Theknowledgeofthepathknowsthepath.Thereisalsotheskillfulconventionalknowledge(saṃvṛti-jñāna)thatknowsunsatisfactoriness,origin,cessation,thepath,aswellasSpaceandcessationindependentofdeliberation(apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha).Henceitissaidthatalldharma‑sareknownthroughtheknowledgesinaccordancewiththe[specific]objects.Theseareknownastheknowabledharma‑s.

Whatarethecognizabledharma‑s?Alldharma‑sarecognizedthroughtheconsciousnessesinaccordancewiththe[specific]objects.How,moreover,isthat?Visualconsciousnesscognizesthevisibles.Auditoryconsciousnesscognizessounds.Olfactoryconsciousnesscognizessmells.Gustatoryconsciousnesscognizestastes.Bodilyconsciousnesscognizestangibles.Mentalconsciousnesscognizesdharma‑s;theeye,thevisiblesandvisualconsciousness;theear,soundsandauditoryconsciousness;thenose,smellsandolfactoryconsciousness;thetongue,tastesandgustatoryconsciousness;thebody,tangiblesandbodilyconsciousness.Themind,dharma‑sandmentalconsciousness.Henceitissaidthatalldharma‑sarecognizedthroughtheconsciousnessesinaccordancewiththe[specific]objects.Theseareknownasthecognizabledharma‑s.13

On“inaccordancewiththe[specific]objects”,theMVŚcommentsthatitmeans:inaccordancewiththe(sphere)ofactivity(gocara?),withtheobjectdomain(viṣaya),withthecognitiveobject(ālambana).14

NotallthemastersintheMVŚ,Sarvāstivādinsincluded,wouldagreewiththeorthodoxSarvāstivādaposition.Someholdthat“thereareknowledgesthatdonottakeobjectdomainsastheircognitiveobjects,andthereareobjectdomainsthatarenotthecognitiveobjectsofknowledge”.15Othersassertthat“thereareknowledgesthatdonotknowwhatistobeknown,andthereareobjectdomainsto be known that are not knowable byknowledge”.16TheVenerablePārśvaexplainsinthisway:

Knowledgeissocalledbecauseitknows.

A dharmawhichisanobjectof[cognitive]activity,acognitiveobjectorobjectdomainthatisapprehendediscalledaknowable.

Knowledgeand theknowableareestablished inmutual relation toeachother;hencethereisnoknowledgethatdoesnotknowtheknowable,noristhereanyknowablethatisnotknownbyaknowledge.17


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InthecaseoftheSarvāstivādaorthodoxy,theverypossibilityofacognitionnecessarilyimpliesthetrueontologicalstatusoftheobjectcognized(seealso,§3.5.3.3).Alldharma‑sarecognizablemeansalldharma‑sexisttruly.ElsewheretheMVŚstateslikewise:thescopeofwhataretobefullypenetratedandfullyknownisthetotalityofdharma‑swhichareallrealexistents.18Inarguingfortheabsoluterealityofpastandfuturedharma‑s,Saṃghabhadrastates:

Justasaconsiderationoftheknowablesprovesthatmerelyrelativelyexistentpast and futuredharma‑s cannot becomeobjects of knowledge (jñeya),justso,fromvariousotherconsiderations—oftheabandonablesandtherealizables—onecanprove,ineachcase,thatthepastandthefuturecannotbemererelativeexistents,forunrealdharma‑scannotbeabandoned,etc.19

The very notion ofdharma‑s being jñeya‑s spells out the fundamentallyepistemological approachof theSarvāstivāda orthodoxy in theirdharma-pravicaya. Saṃghabhadrapowerfullyunderscoresthisapproachinhisdefinitionofanexistent(sat):

The characteristic of the existent (sallakṣaṇa) consists in it beingcapableof servingasanobjectdomaingeneratingcognition (buddhi).20

Inbrief:allultimatereals—dharma‑s—areknowable,cognizable.Therecanbenoexceptiontothis.Andtheseknowables,cognizables,havetheirobjectiveexistencewhichaffectsourperceptionofnotonlythephenomenalworld,butalsothedomainoftheunconditioned.Thisisthentrulyanontologicalcommitmentderivedfromanepistemologicalconsideration.

10.2. Various modes of operation of prajñā

In the Sarvāstivādasystem,knowledge(jñāna),view(dṛṣṭi),receptivity(kṣānti)andotherrelatedterminologiesareusedveryarticulately,eventhoughtheyallhaveunderstanding(prajñā)astheirintrinsicnature.Inotherwords,prajñāasthefacultyofunderstandinghasdifferentmodesofoperationaccordingtowhichitreceivesthedifferentappellations—knowledge,view,etc.Moreover,unlikeinotherschoolssuchastheTheravāda,prajñāmaybeskillful,unskillful,properorright (samyañc),falseorwrong(mithyā),with‑outfloworoutflow‑free;etc.Atthehighestlevel,prajñārepresentstheBuddha’sperfectwisdom.

With regard to investigative conceptualization (abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa), it isparticularly theaspectof judgmental investigationofprajñā, representedbysaṃtīraṇa,thatcharacterizesitsfunction.Inthisconnection,wemaynotethatin the Dharma-saṃgraha,21thethreetypesofconceptualizations(cf.§9.7)aregiven asanusmaraṇa-, saṃtīraṇa- and sahaja-;with saṃtīraṇa- obviouslycorresponding toabhinirūpaṇā.Whenunderstandingdisplays its judgmentalnature,samtīraṇatva,itiscalledaview.22


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Prajñācanalsofunctioninothermodes,resultinginreceptivity(kṣānti)andknowledge (jñāna).TheMVŚdiscusses thevariousmodalities ofprajñā in detail,showingtheirinterrelationintheformofacatuṣkoṭi.23Thesedescriptionsprovideconsiderableamountofinformation,bothpositiveandnegative,ontheVaibhāṣikaepistemologicaldoctrines.

10.2.1. Understanding

Asone of the ten universal thought‑concomitants in theVaibhāṣikasystem, it necessarily arises in anymental state. It is usually defined as the“discernment/examinationofdharma‑s (dharma-pravicaya)”.24 TheMVŚ,25 besidesgivingtheusualdescriptionthatitis“discernmentofdharma-s”andthatitisfoundinallmentalstates,alsodefinesitasthesetofunderstandingconjoinedwithallthesixformsofconsciousness.(Seealso,supra,§9.3.4.1.6).

10.2.2. Knowledge

IntheMVŚ,itisrecordedthatsomeholdknowledge(jnāna)tobenoneotherthanconsciousness(vijñāna):

Therearesomewhoholdthatvijñānaisjustjnāna;onlythat[theformer]islongerbyonesyllable,vi‑(i.e.,theprefixtojñāna).26

For the Sarvāstivāda,however,knowledgeisnotsynonymouswithconsciousness(vijñāna).Whereastheformerisathought‑concomitant,thelatteristhoughtitself.Moreover,thereindeedcanbeconsciousnesswithoutknowledgeinthepropersense.Thedistinguishingcharacteristicofknowledgeisthatitisanunderstandingthatisdecisiveordefinite(niścita).27SomeSarvāstivādamastersrequirethatknowledgerepeatedlydiscerns (數數抉擇) thecognitiveobject. It is for thisreason that thewith‑outflowunderstandings are calledknowledges becausetheyhavebeenrepeatedlydiscerningtheircognitiveobjectsfrombeginninglesstime.Asfor theoutflow‑freeunderstandings, thosewhichrepeatedlydiscernarecalledknowledges;buttheoutflow‑freereceptivitieswithregardtothefournobletruthsarenotcalledknowledgesonaccountoftheirnothavingmadeanyrepeateddiscernment.Knowledgeisalsosaidtobethatwhichrealizes(sākṣāt-√kṛ)andcomprehends—realizingthefourtruths;comprehendingone’sownandothers’continua(santati).28

Atotaloftenknowledgesaregenerallyenumeratedintheirtexts:

1. Dharma-knowledge(dharma-jñāna)The knowledgethatrealizesthetruthpertainingtothenatureofdharma‑s—thattheyareunsatisfactory,etc.Inthesaṃsāricfaringofthepractitioner,


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thisknowledgearisesforthefirsttimeinthesecondmomentofhisentryinto the directrealization(abhisamaya)intothefournobletruths.Thatis,whenhegainsspiritualinsightintothetruthofunsatisfactorinesspertainingtothesensesphere.Inthefirstmomentthatprecedes,hehasacquiredthereceptivity(kṣānti)tothisknowledge;i.e.,theabilitytocompletelyacceptthetrutheventhoughitsknowledgeproperisnotyetacquired.Followingthismoment,thisknowledgereferstotheknowledgeofthedharma‑sthatarisesbytakingthefourtruthspertainingtothesensesphereasobject(cf. infra,§15.3).

2.Subsequent‑knowledge(anvaya-jñāna)Thisknowledge issocalledbecause itarisessubsequently to thedharma‑knowledge,andissimilartothelatter,thoughgeneratedbytakingthefourtruthspertainingtothetwohigherspheres(rūpa‑andārūpya-dhātu‑s)asobject.

3.Knowledgeofunsatisfactoriness(duḥkha-jñāna)Thisarises in theprocessof thedirectrealizationby taking the truthofunsatisfactoriness as object. It is the counteragent for the defilementspertainingtothistruth.

4.Knowledgeoforigin(samudaya-jñāna)Thisarisesintheprocessofthedirectrealizationbytakingthetruthoforiginasobject.Itisthecounteragentforthedefilementspertainingtothistruth.

5.Knowledgeofcessation(nirodha-jñāna)Thisarises in theprocessof thedirectrealizationby taking the truthofcessationasobject.Itisthecounteragentforthedefilementspertainingtothistruth.

6.Knowledgeofthepath(mārga-jñāna)Thisarisesintheprocessofthedirectrealizationbytakingthetruthofthepathasobject.Itisthecounteragentforthedefilementspertainingtothistruth.

7.Conventional‑knowledge(saṃvṛti-jñāna)Thisistheknowledgethatarisestakingconventionalobjects.Itisthereforeawith‑outflowknowledgeatthestagewhenthepractitionerhasnotabandonedthedefilements.Foursubdivisionsareenumerated:i. innateknowledge(upapatti-pratilambhika);ii. knowledgederivedfromlisteningtotheteachings(śruta-maya);iii. knowledgederivedfromreflection(cintā-maya);iv. knowledgederivedfromcultivation(bhāvanā-maya).

8. Knowledgeofthethoughtsofanother(paracitta-jñāna)


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Thisknowledgeknowsthethoughtandthought‑concomitantsofanotherbeing.Itariseswiththesupportofthedharma-knowledge,thesubsequentknowledge, theknowledgeof thepathand theconventionalknowledge.Accordingly,itmaybeeitheroutflow‑freeorwith‑outflow.

Itdoesnotarisewith thesupportof the truthsofunsatisfactorinessandoriginbecauseanoutflow‑freeonedoesnotknowwith‑outflowthoughts.Itdoesnotarisewiththesupportofthetruthofcessationbecausethelatterisunconditioned.

Therearelimitationstothisknowledge:oneatalowerstage(bhūmi)doesnotknowathoughtofahigherstage.Onebelongingtoaweakerfacultydoesnotknowthemindofahigherfaculty(e.g.,onebelongingtoaśraddhādhimukta doesnotknowthethoughtsofadṛṣṭi-prāpta—see§15.3.2).Onebelongingtoalowerspiritualfruitiondoesnotknowthe thoughtsofahigherone.Sincethisknowledgetakesapresentthoughtasobject,itcannotknowthepastandfuturethoughtsofanother.Finally,onesubsumedunderdharma-knowledgedoesnotknowasubsequentknowledge;onesubsumedundersubsequentknowledgedoesnotknowadharma-knowledge.

9.Knowledgeofexhaustion(kṣaya-jñāna)Thisknowledgearisesinanon‑trainee(i.e.,anarhat)whohasabandonedtheninth(final)gradeofthedefilementsabandonablebycultivation(bhāvanā-heya)atthestageofexistence‑peak(bhavāgra).Itisanoutflow‑freeknowledgeconascentwiththeacquisition(prāpti)oftheexhaustionofoutflows(āsrava-kṣaya),intheformofthecertainty(niścaya):“unsatisfactorinesshasbeenfullyknownbyme(duḥkhaṃ me parijñātam),theoriginhasbeenabandoned(samudayaḥ prahīṇaḥ),cessationhasbeenrealized(nirodhaḥ sākṣātkṛtaḥ),thepathhasbeencultivated(mārgo bhāvitaḥ)”.

10.Knowledgeofnon‑arising(anutpāda-jñāna)29

‘Non‑arising’ refers to the acquisitionof the cessation independent ofdeliberationoftheefficaciesofknowing,abandoning,realizingandcultivatingwithregardtothefourtruths.Theoutflow‑freeknowledgethatknowsthisnon‑arising,conascentwiththeacquisitionofthesaidcessationindependentofdeliberation,iscalledtheknowledgeofnon‑arising.Itarisesintheform:“unsatisfactorinesshasbeenfullyknownbyme;itisnottobeknownanymore(duḥkhaṃ me parijñātaṃ na punaḥ parijñeyam);…thepathhasbeencultivatedbyme,itisnottobecultivatedanymore(mārgo bhāvito na punar bhāvitavyaḥ).”Itarisesonlyinanarhatofsharpfaculty(tīkṣṇendriya)whoisnotsusceptibletoretrogression(aparihāṇa-dharman).

The knowledgeofexhaustionandtheknowledgeofnon‑arisingtogetherconstitutewhatiscalledenlightenmentorawakening(bodhi).


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ThecategoryofknowledgeisdescribedintheMVŚasthesetofallunderstandingconjoinedwiththefirstfiveformsofsensoryconsciousness,aswellasalltheunderstandingconjoinedwithmentalconsciousnessexceptingthepurereceptivity(anāsrava-kṣānti).30Thelatterisexceptedbecauseitrepresentsonlyapreliminarystageofreceptivity,butnotfinal,thoroughanddecisiveknowledge,asregardsthefournobletruths.Here,welearnthatknowledgemustbefull,ultimate,thoroughknowing.Vasumitraoffersasimilarview.TheBhadanta(Dharmatrāta)requiresthat“itisonlythethoroughseeingofathingthatcanbequalifiedasknowledge,whileVāṣpa says that knowledge is derived through repeated examination.Theseācārya-s’ explanations are apparently uncontestedby the compilers.31

10.2.3. Receptivity

Thisrepresentsthestageofunderstandingthatprecedesknowledgeinthepropersense.Atthisstage,oneseesafactoradoctrineforthefirsttimeandiscapableofbeingreceptivetoiteventhoughonehasnotquiteexperienceditdirectlyyet.Thus,atthisstageofunderstanding,thereisstillthepossibilityofdoubt.Intheprocessofdirectrealization,itarisesatthemomentoftheunhinderedpath(ānantarya-mārga)atwhichthedefilementisbeingabandoned.Thecorrespondingknowledgeproperarises in thesucceedingmomentof thepathof liberation(vimukti-mārga).(Alsocf.§11.3.1).

The followingdiscussionhighlights thedifferencesbetween receptivity andknowledge:

Question:Why are the outflow‑free receptivities not knowledges?

Answer:Becausetheyhavenothadrepeatedexaminationonthedomainwhichisseen.Thatis:Frombeginninglesstime,[thepractitioner]hasnotseenthefournobletruthswiththeoutflow‑freetrueinsight;althoughhesees[them]nowforthefirsttime,hehasnotrepeatedtheobservation.Thus,[thisinsight]isnotcalledaknowledge.Foraknowledgeisaccomplishedonlywhenahomogeneousinsightrepeatstheobservation.32

10.2.4. View

TheMVŚstates,asdoestheAKB,thatonlytheeyeandtheunderstandingwhichisofthenatureofjudgmentordecision,areviews.Theycomprisetheeye,thefivefalseviews,theworldlyrightviewandtheviewsofthetraineesandnon‑trainees.For the Sarvāstivāda,itistheeyethatsees;notconsciousness,asheldbytheVijñānavādins.33Itisthereforeincludedasaviewonaccountofitsfunctionofseeing(ālocana)inspiteofitsbeingnon‑epistemic.Aview—otherthanthecaseoftheeye—isdefinedasthatwhichhasthenatureofjudgmentordecision(saṃtīrakatva),which is also part ofVasumitra’s definitionwhich requires


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judgmentandinvestigation.34Elsewhere,35fourcharacteristicsofviewaregiven—seeing,judging,firmattachment,andpenetratingintotheobjectsofperception.

10.2.5. Correlation between understanding, view and knowledge (and receptivity)

Theinter‑relationshipoftheaforementionedcategoriescanbesummarizedasfollows:

1. Someviews arenot knowledges—viz., visual faculty and thepurereceptivity.

2.Someknowledgesarenotviews—viz.,theunderstandingconjoinedwiththegroupofthefirstfiveformsofsensoryconsciousness(pañca-vijñānakāya-samprayukta-prajñā);knowledgesofexhaustion(kṣaya-jñāna)andnon‑arising(anutpāda-jñāna);allimpureunderstandingconjoinedwithmentalconsciousness(sāsrava-mano-vijñāna-samprayukta-prajñā),exceptingthefivefalseviews(mithyā-dṛṣṭi)andtheworldlyrightviews(laukikī samyak-dṛṣṭi).

3. Someviewsarealsoknowledges—viz.,thefivefalseviews;theworldlyright view; all pure understanding, excepting the pure receptivity,theknowledgesofexhaustionandofnon‑arising.

4. Someviewsarenotunderstanding—viz.,thevisualfaculty.

5. Someunderstandingarenotviews—viz.,theunderstandingconjoinedwiththegroupofthefirstfiveformsofsensoryconsciousness;theknowledgesofexhaustionandofnon‑arising;allimpureunderstandingconjoinedwithmentalconsciousness,exceptingthefivefalseviewsandtheworldlyrightviews.

6. Someviews are also understanding—viz., all pure understandingexceptingtheknowledgesofexhaustionandofnon‑arising,thefivefalseviews,andtheworldlyrightview.

7. Allknowledgesarealsounderstanding.

8. Someunderstandingarenotknowledges—viz., thepurereceptivity(forithas insight intothefour truthsfor thefirst time,andthereforecannotmakedecisivejudgment).

Thisinter‑relationshipmaybediagrammatically(nottothescale)representedasfollows:


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pvksp,kj,aj,

mostmvsp

5views,lsdsomepureprajñā

purereceptivity

eye

understanding

knowledge

view

DiagramTextAbbreviations

pvksp=pañcavijñānakāya-samprayukta-prajñākj=kṣaya-jñānaaj=anutpāda-jñānamvsp=manovijñāna-samprayukta-prajñālsd=laukikī samyag-dṛṣṭi

Thesedistinctionsclarifythattheeyeisnotamemberofthesetofunderstandingand thereforenotknowledge, a subsetofunderstanding.On theotherhand,the understandingconjoinedwiththefirstfiveformsofsensoryconsciousnessallfallwithinthesetofknowledge.Thatis,thenecessaryconditionforknowledgeis understanding, defined as having the discerning/discriminationofmentalobjectsasitsnature.Butthisconditionisnotsufficient.Understandingbecomesknowledgeonlywhenitisfull,final,anddecisive.SucharequirementintheVaibhāṣikanotionofknowledgemayseemmoredemandingthanthatinourordinaryusageoftheterm.ThesedistinctionsandexplanationsintheMVŚ,togetherwiththeothersourcesgivenabove,makeitabundantlyclearthatfortheVaibhāṣika,visualconsciousness,butnottheeyeasseeing(i.e.,theseeingbytheeye)isepistemic.Inotherwords,themereseeingbytheeyeisnon‑epistemic,whereasvisualconsciousnessis“consciousseeing”andepistemic.

10.3. Reflexive knowledge and omniscience (sarvajñā)

Reflexiveknowledgereferstothedoctrinethatathoughtorthoughtconcomitantdharma, in knowing adharma, alsoknows itself.Thisdoctrine seems tobeconnectedwith that of omniscience, and these twodoctrines are thereforediscussedtogetherhere.36

The SamayabhedoparacaṇamentionsthattheMahāsāṃghikaholdsthefollowingBuddhologicaldoctrine:


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[TheBuddha,] in a singlemoment of thought, cognizes alldharma‑s.Withtheprajñāconjoinedwiththesinglemomentofthought,Heknowsalldharma‑s.37

Thismeansthat,fortheMahāsāṃghika,bothcognitionandknowledgeofalldharma‑s—includingthoughtandtheknowledgeitself—withinasinglemomentispossible.SuchapositionisunacceptabletotheSarvāstivādawhichholdsthatanintrinsicnature(i.e.,adharmainitself)cannotknowitself.Moregenerally,anintrinsicnaturecannotexerciseanyefficacyonitself.

In SarvāstivādaAbhidharma,theJPŚalreadyaddressesthisissue:

Question:Isthereasingleknowledgethatknowsalldharma‑s?

Answer:No.

Question: If this knowledge generates [the understanding] that alldharma‑s arewithout theSelf,what does this knowledgenot know?

Answer:Itdoesnotknowitself(lit:theintrinsicnature)andthedharma‑sthatareconjoinedorco‑existentwithit.

Question:Aretheretwothoughtsthataremutuallycausetoeachother?

Answer:No.Why?Becausethereisnopudgalawhogeneratestwothoughtssimultaneously—i.e.,notbefore,notafter.…38

TheMVŚ39citestheabovepassageandelaborates:

[Thisdiscussion]isforthepurposeofrefutingthetenetsofothersandelucidatingthoseofourown.Therearesomewhoholdthatthecitta-caitta-dharma‑scancognizetheirownintrinsicnatures(i.e.,themselves),liketheMahāsāṃghikawhichasserts:“Becauseknowledge,etc.,hascognitionasitsintrinsicnature,itcancognizebothitselfandothers.Thisisjustlikethecaseofalamp;because ithas illuminationas its intrinsicnature, it can illuminatebothitselfandothers.”

Therearesome,liketheDharmaguptakawhichholdsthatthecitta-caitta-dharma‑scancognizewhatareconjoinedwiththem.Itassertsthus:“Prajñā cancognizethesensationconjoinedwithit.”

Therearesome,liketheMahīśāsaka,whichholdsthatthecitta-caitta-dharma‑scancognizewhatareco‑existentwiththem.Itassertsthus:“Therearetwotypesofprajñāwhicharisesimultaneously:oneisconjoined[withthought],theothernotconjoined.Theconjoinedprajñāknowstheunconjoinedone;theunconjoinedprajñāknowstheconjoinedone.”

Therearesome, like theVātsīputrīya,whichholds that thepudgalacancognizedharma‑s.Itassertsthus:“Itisthepudgalathatknowsdharma‑s,not knowledge(jñāna)…”


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TheMVŚcomments that in the JPŚpassage cited above, thequestions areposedby theVibhajyavādins and the answers are thoseof theYuktavādins(i.e.,Sarvāstivādins)andthengoesontoelaboratefurther:

Ifthequestionisposed:…”[Amongthetenknowledges,]isthereonethatknowsalldharma‑s?”Theansweris:“Yes.Theconventionalknowledge.”

Ifwith regard to this conventional knowledge, the question is posed:“Isthereacase thatwithin twomoments [of thought], alldharma‑sareknown?”Theansweris:“Yes.Inthefirstmoment,thisknowledgeknowsall[thedharma‑s]exceptingitselfandthosethatareconjoinedorco‑existentwithit.Inthesecondmoment,italsoknows[whathasexisted]inthefirstmoment,[namely]itselfaswellasthosedharma‑sthatwereconjoinedorco‑existentwithit.”…

Question:Whyisitthatanintrinsicnaturedoesnotknowitself?

Answer:Lesttherebethefaultoftherebeingnodifferencebetweencauseandeffect,betweenthatwhichdoesandthatwhichisdone,betweentheaccomplisherandtheaccomplished,betweentheprojectorandtheprojected,betweentheproducerandtheproduced,betweentheattributeandtheattributed,betweenthepropellerandthepropelled,betweenthecharacteristicsandthecharacterized,betweenthecognizerandthecognized.…

Dharma‑sdonotrelatetothemselves.Theycanonlyserveasconditionsforothers(lit.forother‑natures,parabhāva).Accordingly,anintrinsicnaturedoesnotknowitself.40

Inasimilarcontextofdiscussingomniscience,Saṃghabhadrarefutesthedoctrineof reflexiveknowledge(withoutattributingittoanyschool),specificallyobjectingtothesimileofalamp’sabilitytoilluminateitselfandotherthingssimultaneously:

This isbecausea lamp’s illuminationasanentity in itself (燈之照體) isnotanabsoluteexistent(不成實;*apariniṣpanna).Whatiscalledalampis a specific agglomerationof visiblematter (顯色聚差別;varṇarūpa-saṃghāta-viśeṣa).Whatiscalledilluminationisthecausegeneratingvisualconsciousness.Asitisopposedtodarkness,itissaidtodestroythecausehinderingavase,etc..Bytheilluminationofavase,etc.,ismeantthefactthatthevase,etc.,becomecognizableonaccountofthepresenceofthis[illumination].Apartfrommetaphoricalexpressions,thereisnoilluminationasarealexistentwhichilluminatesitself…

Moreover,ifbyconcedingthatalampisthatwhichilluminates,onethenconcedesthatitilluminatesitselfaswellasothers;inthesameway,oneought to concede that becausedarkness is a hindrance, it is capable ofhinderingitselfandothers;becausefireburns, itburnsitselfandothers.Sincethelattercasesarenottrue,howcanitbetrueinthecaseofalamp?


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Itmightbearguedthatalamphasthepowerofdestroyingthehindranceto[both]thevaseandthelamp,andofilluminatingboththevaseandthelamp,hencebothshouldbesaidtobeilluminated.Thisalsoisnotlogical,sincedarknessiscombinedwithavaseandnotcombinedwithalamp.Thatis,Whendarknessiscombinedwithavase,onecanspeakofitshinderingthevase;althoughthevaseispresentatthismoment,itscognitiondoesnotarise,andonethussaysthatdarknesshindersthecognitionof thevase.Whenthelamparisesanddarknessisceased,thevaseisrevealedanditscognitionisgenerated.Forthisreason,theworldspeaksofthelamphavingthe functionofilluminatingthevase.Therehasneverbeenanoccasionwhendarknessiscombinedwithalamp,lesttherebethefallacythatthemutuallycontradictoryarenotmutuallycounteracting.41Hence,onecannotsaythatdarknesshindersalamp.Sincethereisnolampwhichdoesnotgeneratecognition,onealsocannotsaythatdarknessisahindrancetocognition;thereforealthoughasalamparisesitdispelsdarkness,onecannotsaythatitisilluminatedlikethevaseis.Moreover,isthereanyreasontomaintainthatthecognitivefunctionofknowledgeisexclusivelylikealamp’silluminationandnotlikethecuttingofaknife?Thatis,isthereanyreasoningtobefoundforonetomaintainthatknowledgeisdestinedtobeanalogoustoalampandnottoaknife,etc.Hencethereislittlestrengthincitingtheanalogyofalampasproof.42

ItisthereforeclearthatreflexiveknowledgeisimpossiblefortheSarvāstivāda.Omniscienceispossible;butitcannotbeachievedwithinasinglemoment.

InlaterIndiantreatises,theSautrāntikasaredescribedasholdingtheviewofreflexiveknowledge,denotedbythetermsvasaṃvedana/svasaṃvitti(also,ātmasaṃvedana)whichmeans‘self‑awareness’.43IntheMVŚ,aswehaveseen,thedoctrineisattributed to theMahāsāṃghikas, butnot to theDārṣṭāntikaswhowere theforerunnersoftheSautrāntikas.IntheNy,althoughthereisnoexplicitattributionofsuchatheoryunderthistermtotheSautrāntika‑Dārṣṭāntikas,inadiscussiononthelatter’sdoctrineofdirectperception,itismentionedthattheyassertthesimultaneousoccurrenceofanubhava-pratyakṣaandbuddhi-pratyakṣa.Thatistosay,onehasawarenessofwhatoneisdirectlysensing:“Onehastheawarenessof adirect perception (現量覺; *pratyakṣa-buddhi)with regard toone’sownsensation.”44Thisisclearlyadoctrineofreflexiveawareness.Śrīlātaarguestherethatunlessthisfactisaccepted,wewillnotbeabletoaccountforthesenseofvividness—asdemandedbyexperienceofdirectperception—inthesubsequentmomentwhenoneiscompletelyconvincedthat“thisisdirectlyperceivedbyme”(idaṃ me pratyakṣam iti)(seebelow,§10.8).


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10.4. Prajñā of the Buddha and the two yāna-s

10.4.1. Inferior prajñā of the two yāna-s owing to vāsanā and akliṣṭājñāna

In the Mūlapariyāya-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, both anarahant and theBuddhaaresaidtoknoweachobjectofcognitiontrulyasitis,andarethereforeentirelyfreefromanywrongconception.Butwhereasthearahantisdescribedas “knowingperfectly” (pariññātaṃ), theBuddha is described as “knowingperfectlytotheend”(pariññātantaṃ),45 whichclearlyindicatesaquantitativedifferencebetweenthewisdomofanarhantandtheBuddha.Onthisdifference,thePālicommentaryexplains:

WhereasthereisnodifferencebetweenBuddha‑sandsāvaka‑sasregardstheabandoningofdefilementsbythe[four]paths,thereisadifferenceasregardsperfectunderstanding(pariññā).46

ThismeansthatalthoughbothanarahantandtheBuddhaarefullyliberatedthroughhaving removed all defilements, it is really only in the case of theBuddhathatwisdom(paññā) isperfected.Suchanexplanation,givenin the5th–6th centuryPāli commentary, represents a consciousworkingout of themuch earlier feeling, on the part of the ancientBuddhists probably goingbacktotheBuddha’stime,ofthesuperiorityoftheBuddha’ssupremewisdomover thatof the ‘two‑yānā‑s’,namely, thearhat‑sand thepratyeka-buddha‑s.

InthePālisub‑commentaries(ṭīkā),itisexplicitlystatedthattheBuddhaaloneisomniscient—notthearhant‑sorthepaccekabuddha‑s.ForitisonlytheBuddhawhocancompletelyabandonthedefilements(kilesa)togetherwiththeirtraces(vāsanā);47andthiseffects—indeeditis—theabandoningofallhindrancestoknowledge,or,moreliterally,hindrancestotheknowables(ñeyyāvaraṇa).48AsinthecaseofSarvāstivādaAbhidharma(§10.1.4), theseknowablesareequatedwithalldhamma‑s.49Whenthiscognitivehindranceisremoved,omniscience(sabbaññutā)isattained.

WhenweexaminetheliteratureofthenorthernBuddhists,wefindverysimilar(andinmanywaysmoreelaborate)ramificationsofthesenotions,throughtheAbhidharmatextstotheMahāyānascriptures,where—theirintra‑diversitiesindoctrinesnot‑withstanding—theinferiorityofanarhat’sprajñā,insharpcontrasttotheBuddha’sperfectwisdom,isconsistentlyexploitedtotheutmost.50

10.4.2. Examples of the inferiority of the two yāna-s’ prajñā

TheMVŚ, althoughofferingnodefinitionon the twokey concepts, traces(vāsanā)51 and non‑defiled ignorance (akliṣṭājñāna), provides sufficientdescriptionscontrastingtheprajñāoftheBuddhawiththatofthetwoyāna‑s,andanumberofconcreteexamples.Forinstance,ittellsusthatevenŚāriputra,the śrāvakaforemostinwisdom,isunabletoknowwhathappensinveryremote


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timesandplaces.OnlytheBuddhacanknowtheinfinitevarietiesofnamesofthings;notthetwoyāna-s.52WhileboththeBuddhaandŚāriputracancorrectlyunderstandallthatissubsumableunderthe12āyatana‑s,theBuddhahasbothomniscience(sarvajñā/sarvajñatā)and‘wisdomofallmodes’(sarva-ākāra-jñāna/sarvathā-jñāna),andknowsthemwithregardtoboththeircommonandintrinsiccharacteristics.Śāriputrahasonlysarvajñāwhichknowsonlytheircommoncharacteristics.53ABuddha’sknowledgeknowsboththeintrinsicandcommoncharacteristicsofallthethreepaths—theBuddha’s,theprivatelyenlightenedBuddha’s (pratyekabuddha) and the śrāvaka’s (i.e.,‘disciple’, referring in thiscontextmainlytoanarhat).AprivatelyenlightenedBuddha’sknowledgeknowstheintrinsicandcommoncharacteristicsofthepathsoftheprivatelyenlightenedBuddhaandtheśrāvaka;withregardtotheBuddha’spath,heknowsonlythecommoncharacteristic,nottheintrinsiccharacteristic.Aśrāvaka’sknowledgeknowstheintrinsicandcommoncharacteristicsoftheśrāvaka’spath;withregardtotheBuddha’sandtheprivatelyenlightenedpaths,heknowsonlythecommoncharacteristic,nottheintrinsiccharacteristic.54

Asupreme‑perfectBuddha(anuttara-samyak-sambuddha)alone,asaresultofhavingabsolutelyabandonedalldefiled(kliṣṭa)andnon‑defiled(akliṣṭa)ignorance(ajñāna),understandsallknowables,bothconventionalandabsolute.55Healone,havingabsolutelyabandonedbothtypesofignorance,understandsthediversenaturesoftheinfinitenumberofbeings(i.e.,theirintrinsiccharacteristics—alltheirparticularities)andcanbenefitthemaccordingly.56 No śrāvakaorprivatelyenlightenedBuddhaisabletoknoweventhenamesofthevariousmeditationalattainments(samāpatti)thattheBuddhaentersinto.Nośrāvakacanknowthesamāpattithatapratyekabuddhaentersinto.Thesamāpatti‑sthatŚāriputraentersintoarenotknownbyotherśrāvaka‑s.Thesamāpatti‑sthatMahāMaudgalyāyanaentersintoareknownonlytoŚāriputra,butnottoanyotherśrāvaka.57

TheAKB58givesessentiallyverysimilardescriptions.ItexplainsthattheBuddhaaloneiscalledsarvathā-sarvahatāndhakāra,“hewhohasdestroyedalldarknessineveryway”.For,byvirtueoftheacquisitionoftheantidotetoajñāna,Hehasabsolutelydestroyedajñānawithregardtoallknowablesineveryway,sothatitcannotariseanymore.59 The pratyekabuddha‑sandśrāvaka‑shavealsodestroyeddarknesswithregardtoallthings(sarvatra),astheyhaveremovedthedefileddelusion(kliṣṭa-saṃmoha = kliṣṭa-ajñāna),buttheyhavenotdestroyeditineveryway(sarvathā),becausetheyhavenotremovedtheakliṣṭa-ajñāna.Accordingly,theystillhavethisakliṣṭa-ajñānawithregardtothingsfarremoteintimeandspace,totheinfinitecategoriesofthings,andtotheuniquespiritualqualitiesoftheBuddha(āveṇika-buddhadharma).60

ThesedescriptionsareofageneralnatureandwethereforedonotgainanyfurtherinformationontheconceptthanwhatwehavealreadyseenintheMVŚ.However,wemaynotethatherethedistinctionbetweentheBuddhaandthe


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twoyāna‑sisentirelybasedonwhetherornottheakliṣṭa-ajñānaisabsolutely(atyantam)abandoned.Nomentionismadeofvāsanā.

TheVy,61commentingonthisAKBpassage,statesexplicitlythat“abandoningthe ajñānaabsolutely”meansthatthereisnofurthermanifestation(samudācāra)ofthem.Thismeansthattheajñānathatcanstillmanifestinthecaseofthepratyekabuddhaandśrāvakaistheakliṣṭa-ajñāna.For,liketheBuddha,theyhavealreadyabsolutelyabandonedthedefiledtype.

TheVy62alsoofferssomeconcreteexampleswhich, like those in theMVŚ,includeajñānawithregardtomundanethingsaswellasspiritualqualities:

(1) Ajñānawithregardtothingsfarremoteinspace—Maudgalyāyanacannotknow thathismother is in the fardistantMārīcī lokadhātu. Thetwoyāna‑sinfactcannotknowvisiblemattercomposedofatomswhichareextremelydistant,orinvisible,non‑materialthingsbelongingtofarawayplacesonaccountoftheirbeingmanyworldsystemsaway.

(2) Ajñānawithregardtothingsoreventsextremelydistant intime—Śāriputrafailstoperceivethespiritualpotentialofaseekerforordination,whichhastobepointedoutbytheBuddha.

(3) Ajñānawith regard to the infinitedivisionsof things.Thisrefers tothingsdifficulttoperceive,suchasthedivisionsofspheres,planesofexistence,typesofbirth(yoni)andrebirth(upapatti).“For,ithasbeensaid,the[generative]cause—inallitsvariousaspects—forevenasinglepeacockfeatherisnottobeknownbythosewithoutsarvajña. Thisisbecausesuchknowledge[ofathinginallitsmodes/aspects]isthepoweroftheOmniscientOne.”63

(4) AjñānawithregardtotheBuddha’squalities(the18āveṇika dharma‑s,etc.),onaccountoftheirbeingextremelysubtleandprofoundinnature(svabhāva-parama-sūkṣmagambhīratvāt)—ŚāriputradoesnotknowtheTathāgata’sfivefoldoutflow‑freeskandha‑s(śīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti, vimukti-jñāna-darśana).

10.4.3. Kleśa-āvaraṇa,jñeya-āvaraṇa, vimokṣa-āvaraṇa and akliṣṭa-ajñāna

In thedefinitionofvāsanāgivenby the5thcenturyC.E.Dhammapāla inhisUdānaṭṭhakathā, vāsanāissaidtoceasebytheabandoningofñeyyāvaraṇa.64 Inthenortherntradition,thetermjñeya-āvaraṇa,sidebysidewithkleśa-āvaraṇa,isalreadyattested—albeitonlyonce—intheMVŚ:65

All four [properabandonments (samyak-prahāṇa)]have themeaningofabandonment (prahāṇa):The former two abandon thekleśa-āvaraṇa. Thelattertwoabandonthejñeya-āvaraṇa;for,whentheskillfuldharma‑sarepracticed,ajñānaisabandoned.


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Thecontext suggests that spiritualpractice aimsat abandoning the two‑foldhindrances: hindranceof defilements (kleśa-āvaraṇa) andhindranceof theknowables (jñeya-āvaraṇa).These removed, spiritual perfection is achieved.Thetermjñeya-āvaraṇaclearlyindicatesitscognitivesignificance:TheBuddha’somniscienceisachievedwhenthishindranceisovercome,andthishindranceisconstitutedofakliṣṭa-ajñāna.IntheterminologyoftheVaibhāṣika,theakliṣṭa-ajñānaisinfacttheintrinsicnature(svabhāva)ofjñeya-āvaraṇa.

In addition tokleśa-āvaraṇa, the hindrance that prevents thearhat‑s andpratyekabuddha‑sfromachievingspiritualperfectionlikethatofthesupreme‑perfectBuddhaisalsoreferredtoasthe‘liberation‑hindrance’(vimokṣa-āvaraṇa).TheMVŚ66explainswhy,whenthe‘liberation‑hindrance’isabandonedonthecessation‑attainment(nirodha-samāpatti),oneissaidtohave“welldonewhatistobedone”:

Question:Whyisitthatwhenoneacquirestheknowledgeofexhaustion,oneissaidtohavewelldonewhatistobedone?

Answer:Somesaythatthenatureoftheliberation‑hindranceisaninferiorajñāna (下無智).…[They]explainthatwhentheBhagavatacquiredtheknowledgeof exhaustion, he had already abandoned allajñāna‑s andproducedthejñānawhichcounteractsthem.ForthisreasonHeissaidtohaveabandonedtheliberation‑hindrance.

Saṃghabhadrainsiststhatthisliberation‑hindrancemustbearealentity—anditisnoneotherthantheakliṣṭa-ajñāna:

What is this so called nature of liberation‑hindrance?Anarhat, havingliberatedhiscitta,seeksfurtherliberation,inordertobeliberatedfromthe[liberation‑]hindrance:Intheliberationswhicharehindered,thereexistsaninferior ajñānawhichisnon‑defilednon‑definedandofthenatureofhinderingliberation.Thisisthenatureoftheliberation‑hindrance.Whenoneacquiresdetachmentfromaparticularsphere(dhātu),onehasabandoneditwithoutanyremainder,andliberationarises.However,itisonlywhenitnolongerisactive(sam-ud-ā-√car)thatoneissaidtohavebeenliberatedfromit.…

[This]explanationisavalidone.Becausetheremustnecessarilybesome[real]dharmawhoseforceiscapableofhinderingonefrombeingateasewithregardtothemeditation.Otherwise,whyishenotateasewithregardtothemeditation?67

10.4.4. Saṃghabhadra’s distinctions: kliṣṭa- and akliṣṭa-ajñāna, and vāsanā

ItisintheNy68thatwefindarticulateddistinctionsbetweenkliṣṭa- andakliṣṭa-ajñānaon theonehand,and thatbetweenakliṣṭa-ajñāna andvāsanā on the other. Saṃghabhadradistinguishesthetwotypesof ajñāna—kliṣṭaandakliṣṭa —asfollows:


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(a) That,onaccountofwhichthefoolishandthewisearedifferentiated,iskliṣṭājñāna. That, on account ofwhich the foolish excels thewisewith regard to certain objects of perception, isakliṣṭājñāna.

(b) Furthermore, that, having abandonedwhich, there exists nodifferencebetweentheBuddhaandthetwoyāna-s, is thefirst type(kliṣṭājñāna).That, having been abandonedwhich, there existsadifference— inrespect of re‑arising (samudācāra) or otherwise—between theBuddha and the two yāna‑s, isakliṣṭājñāna.

(c) Furthermore,thatonaccountofwhichoneisdeludedwithregardtotheintrinsiccharacteristicandcommoncharacteristicofthingsiskliṣṭājñāna. Thatonaccountofwhichonedoesnotknowtrulythetaste,force,maturity,virtues,magnitude,quantity,place,time,similarities,differences,etc.,of dharma‑s,isakliṣṭājñāna.Thisveryakliṣṭājñānaiscalledvāsanā. …

Saṃghabhadraclarifiesthatakliṣṭājñānaisaninferiororbluntprajñā,oneoftherecognizeduniversalcaitta‑sintheSarvāstivādaschemeofclassification.Hisexplanations69areasfollows:

The understanding(prajñā)whichdoesnotstrivediligentlytounderstandthetaste,force,maturity,etc.,[ofdharma‑s],co‑existingwithdharma‑sofothernatures,servesasthecauseforthearisingofasubsequentsimilarunderstanding.This understanding again does not strive diligently tounderstand,becomingthecauseforthearisingofanotherunderstandingwhichdoesnotstrivediligentlytounderstand.Suchasuccessivecause‑effect series frombeginningless timegives rise to a tendency, acquiredthroughpractice.Thus, it is this inferiorknowledge (jñāna)— induced[throughasuccession]bypreviousknowledgeswhichrepeatedlybecomeaccustomedtobeingincapableofunderstandingtheobjects’taste,etc.—thatiscalledakliṣṭājñāna.Thoseverycitta-caitta‑sconascentwithitareknowncollectivelyasvāsanā.

Accordingtohimthen,akliṣṭa-ajñānaandvāsanāarenotexactlyoneandthesamething,althoughtheyareintrinsicallyconnected,beingconascent.Moreover,itisclearinhisexplanationthatvāsanā,beingthecollectivenameforagroupof citta-caitta‑s—i.e.,thewholementalmake‑upinwhichakliṣṭa-ajñānaisaconascentmember—isamereconceptandnotadistinct,realentity.

10.5. Instrument of perception

10.5.1. Four views on “what sees?”

ThequestionofwhatactuallyconstitutestheinstrumentthroughwhichwecometoacquireknowledgeoftheexternalworldisoneoftheimportantepistemologicalissuesamongtheAbhidharmaschools.Asregardstheproblem:“Whatsees?”,


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theMVŚ70informsusthatinadditiontotheVaibhāṣika’sownview,therearethreeothers,whichareallrefuted:

Therearesomewhoholdthatvisualconsciousnesssees, likeVenerableDharmatrāta.Therearesomewhoholdthat the‘understanding’conjoinedwithvisualconsciousnesssees,likeVenerableGhoṣaka.Therearesomewhoholdthatthecomplex(sāmagrī)[ofcitta-caitta]71sees,liketheDārṣṭāntika…Now, if visual consciousness sees, then consciousness shouldhave thecharacteristicofseeing;sinceconsciousnessdoesnothavethischaracteristic,thepropositionisnotacceptable.If the understandingconjoinedwithvisualconsciousnesssees,theunderstandingconjoinedwith auditory consciousness should also hear sound; sinceunderstandingdoesnothavethischaracteristicofhearing,thepropositionisnotacceptable.If it is thecomplexthatseesvisibleforms, it followsthatweshouldbeable toseeformsatall times,sinceacomplexalwaysexists;hencethispropositiontooisunacceptable.

Thiscontroversy,inamoreelaboratedform,isalsofoundinthePVV(=Pañcavastuka-vibhāṣā)72byacertainDharmatrāta,ca. 4thcenturyC.E.Here,allfourdivergentviews(i.e.,includingtheVaibhāṣikaview)arealsoenumeratedandthenrefuted,byacertaindisputant.Anotherworkof thisDharmatrāta, the*Abhidharma-hṛdaya-vyākhyā(Tno.1552)containsanevenmoreelaborateaccountofthecontroversy,thefirstpartofwhichisverysimilartothatinthePVV.Vasubandhu(known to have substantially basedhisAKBon thiswork andDharmaśrī’s*Abhidharma-hṛdaya,ofwhichthisworkisacommentary/revision),theauthoroftheADVaswellasSaṃghabhadraseemmostlikelytohaveconsultedthistextintheiraccountsonthiscontroversy.TheADVdiffersfromthePañcavastuka mainlywithregardtothenotionof“thecomplexwhichisgivenasthatoftheeye,etc.”(cakṣurādisāmagrī paśyati).73

10.5.2. The “eye sees” view of the Vaibhāṣika

Thevarioussources74allexplainthattheVaibhāṣikaconsiderstheeyeasaviewinthesenseofseeing/perceiving,ālocanārthena.Thisisunliketheotherviewssubsumedunderprajñāwhichareviewsonaccountoftheirjudgmentalnature.75 AccordingtotheVaibhāṣika,themere‑seeingbytheeyeis,strictlyspeaking,non‑epistemic,sincetheproperoperationofprajñāisnotinvolved—whichistosay,inthisinstantaneousprocessthereisnoelementof‘understanding’,properlyspeaking.Thisistobecontrastedwiththefunctionofcognizingbythesimultaneouslyarisingvisualconsciousnessandthediscriminativefunctionofthementalcognition(mano-vijñāna)inducedinthesubsequentmoment.


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Inthecontextofexplainingwhythefivesensefacultiesarecalledthus—thatis,ineachcasean“indriya”whichissaidtodenoteādhipatya,“supremacy/dominance”—VasubandhuintheAKBdifferentiates theVaibhāṣikaandtheSautrāntikaviews:AccordingtotheVaibhāṣika,theeyeisanindriyabecauseitexercisesdominanceintheseeingofvisualforms,whereasfortheSautrāntika,thedominanceiswith regard to the apperceptionof its specificobject (svārthopalabdhi).76

As far as the statement in theSautrāntikaproposition—“dominance in theperceivingof its specific object”— is concerned, the author of theADVmaybejustifiedinremarkingthatitisnotanydifferentfromtheVaibhāṣikaview.77However, the different senses ascribed to the statement underscoretheirfundamentallydifferentviewsasregardstheperceptualprocess.FortheSautrāntika, itmeans that the dominance iswith regard to consciousness(vijñāne tu tayor ādhipatyam),fortheperceiving—asfarasonecanspeakofa“perceivingagent”inarelativesense—isperformedbyvisualconsciousness,notbythevisualfaculty.Thereisinfactno“seeingofavisualform”or“hearingofasound”apartfromconsciousness:78Therecanbenoseeingofformapartfromgrasping (grahaṇa), andgrasping is noneother than consciousness.79 In other words, in‑as‑muchastheeyehasdominanceinthearisingofvisualconsciousness,onecouldspeakofits“seeingofavisualform”.Butthisshouldreallymean the“perceivingofavisual formbyconsciousness”.Andas theDīpa‑kāra(=authoroftheADV)noteselsewhere,themereseeing(ālocana)bytheeyeisvastlydifferentfromtheapperceiving(upalabdhi)byconsciousness.80

IntheNy,Saṃghabhadraarguesvehementlythatitisabsolutelynecessaryforthefunctionofseeingvisibleformstobelonguniquelytothevisualorgan.Itisinfact,forthatmatter,absolutelynecessarythateachdharma,inthecomplexprocessofdependentorigination,isabletoexerciseitsspecificfunction.HerewecanbetterappreciatewhySaṃghabhadrainsistsatsuchgreatlengththatitistheeyethatsees.Thisabsolutenecessity,ofcourse,stemsfromthecentralVaibhāṣikaconceptionthatinthepersistenceofalldharma‑sinthethreeperiodsoftime,eachandeverydharma isadistinctdharmabyvirtueofitsspecificnatureandfunction.ThustheMVŚsays:

Question:Howarethe12āyatana‑stobeestablished?

Answer:On thebasis of the difference as regards intrinsic nature andactivity. Althoughthe12āyatana‑sallpertaintotheonepersonalexistence,their12speciesofintrinsicnaturesandactivitiesaredifferent;theyarenotmutuallycommingled.81

Now,iftheeyedoesnothaveaspecificfunction—theonlyoneofseeingvisibleforms—asmentionedinthesūtra(atleastsofromtheVaibhāṣikaviewpoint)andconfirmedinexperienceoftheworld—theeyeasanāyatanaorauniquerūpa dharmawillfailtobeestablished.Bythesametoken,thespecificnatureand functionof consciousnessmust be established anddistinguished from


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thoseoftheeye.Theconditioned(saṃskṛta)dharma-s,however,aresaidtobe“feebleintheirsvabhāva,notfree,dependentonothers,notcapableofexercisingtheirfunctionsbythemselves,andunabletoaccordwiththeirownwishes”.82 TheVaibhāṣikasbelievethattheycanremainasgoodBuddhistsbyexplainingthecausalityofthefunctionsofdharma‑sinaccordancewiththeBuddha’steachingof conditionedco‑arising.Buttheirtheoryofsarvāstitvalogicallyrequiresthateachfunctiontoomustnotonlybelonguniquelytoagivendharma,itmustalsopersistintimetogetherwiththedharma.Unlikethedharma’ssubstance,itcanbebroughtintooperationwiththehelpofcausesandconditions,butitisnotanythingnewthatcomesintoexistence.

ItisinaccordancewithsuchaVaibhāṣikadoctrinethatSaṃghabhadrapersistentlyseekstoestablishthattheseeingbytheeyemustproperlybelongtotheeye(andhearingofsoundmustbelongtotheear,etc.),eventhoughatthesametimeitsexerciseneedstheassistanceofvisualconsciousnessasasupportingcondition.

10.5.3. The Sautrāntika position and Saṃghabhadra’s defence of the Vaibhāṣika position

TowardtheendofthedebateintheAKB,theSautrāntikaridiculesthedebatersfortheirattemptto“devouremptyspace”:

Areyounotdevouringemptyspacehere!Conditionedbythevisualorganandvisibleobjects,visualconsciousnessarises.Therein,whatisitthatsees,andwhatisitthatisseen?Itisreallydevoidofanyfunction(nirvyāpāra)—amereplayofdharma‑sascauseandeffect.Therein,inconformitywiththewishofworldlyconventionalusage,itissaidfigurativelythat“theeyesees”,“consciousnesscognizes”.But[thewiseones]shouldnotbeattachedtosuchfigurativeusageshere.For,theBhagavathassaid,“Oneshouldnotobstinatelyclingtoregionalusages,norshouldone[unnecessarily]rushtowards(/clashwith)worldlynotions.”83

Saṃghabhadraretortsthatit isinfacttheSautrāntikawhois“tryingtograbemptyspace”!HearguesthattheBuddhistprincipleofconditionedco‑arisingwillinfactcollapsealtogetheriftherealityoftheindividuallyspecificfunctionsof the dharma‑s—suchastheseeingofvisiblesbytheeye—isdenied.

SaṃghabhadrafurtherclaimsthattheSautrāntikahasmisunderstoodwhattheBuddhameanswhenHeurgesus“nottoobstinatelyclingtoregionallinguisticusagesnortorushtowardsworldlynotions”.HearguesthatwhentheBuddha’sadviceisappliedinthecontextoftheirdebate,itmeansthattherealityofthecollectivemustbedenied—thisaccordswithabsolutetruth—butnot thatof the individualdharma’s functionparticipating in the collective, complexprocessofconditionedco‑arising.Denialofthelatteramountstoadenialofthepossibilityofdependentoriginationin toto. The Vaibhāṣikapositioninthis


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debate,heconcludes,isinfactfoundedinaccordancewiththisreasoningandstandsfirmlyonbothconventionalandabsolutetruths:FollowingtheBuddha’sadvice,inassertingthat“theeyesees”,itdoesnotunnecessarilyclashwiththeconventionalpointofview.Byestablishingthattheeye—ratherthanafictitiouscollectiveagentsuchastheSoul—hastheunique,intrinsicfunctionofseeing,itconformstotheabsolutetruththatwhileacollectionofdharma‑sassuchisunreal,realdharma‑sindeedexist,eachbeinguniquelydefinedbyitsspecificcharacteristicandfunction.84

10.5.4. Role of consciousness in perception

Saṃghabhadra articulates that consciousness is the cause for seeing, nottheveryentitythatsees:

Theeye,sustainedbytheforceofconsciousness,givesrisetoitsspecificactivity.Thisislikethearisingofthespecificactivityoffirewiththesupportoftheforceoffuel.

In fact, if the activity of seeingvisible forms is adharma producedbyconsciousness,thenthisactivityoughttoarise[even]whenseparatedfromthevisualorgan.Theconascentmahā-bhūta‑s,nourishedbyconsciousness,arecausedtoproducethespecificorgancapableofseeingvisibleforms.Therefore,itiswrongtosaythatitisthesupportingconsciousnessthatsees.

Willanywiseonesay:“Whatevercausesandconditionsgiverisetocognition,theresultingcognitionisnoneotherthanthoseverycausesandconditions”?Consciousnessisthecause,nottheessence,ofseeing.85

That is, in the simultaneous cause‑effect relationshipwhichobtainswhenvisualconsciousness,theeye,andothernecessaryconditionsflashforththeirindividualfunctionsinco‑ordinationtogiverisetotheseeingofavisibleform,visualconsciousnessisacause,notaneffect(seeing).ThisisincontrasttotheSautrāntikaviewthatvisualconsciousness—whichistheseeingoftheobject—isaneffectthatisproducedinthemomentsubsequenttothatwhentheeye,thevisibleform,etc.,werepresent.

In termsof intrinsic efficacy, theVaibhāṣikamaintains thatwhereas the eyesees,consciousnesscognizes(vijānāti).But,whatexactlydoesconsciousnessdointheperceptualprocess?IntheAKB,Vasubandhudiscussesthisquestion:

Itissaidinthesūtra,‘consciousnesscognizes’.Hereinwhatdoesconsciousnessdo?Itdoesnothing…Althoughdoingnothing,consciousnessissaidtocognizebecauseoftheobtainingofitselfresembling[theobject](sādṛśenātma-lābhād akurvad api kiṃcit)— [i.e.,with theobject as its supportingcondition,itsimplyarisesasaneffectresemblingtheobject].Whatisitsresemblance


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[withtheobject]?Thisconsistsinhavingtheformoraspectofthat[object](tadākāratā).86

Giventhepropercontext—especiallyVasubandhu’susageofthetermākāra (equatedwith the resemblanceof theobject) here— this doctrine, as somescholarslikeLaValléePoussin87assert,canbeconsideredaSautrāntikaone.Nevertheless, even theVaibhāṣikawouldhavenoobjection to the statementthat consciousness in thisprocessdoesnothing inparticular.Saṃghabhadratooacceptsthatitisonlywithregardtothespecificnatureofdharmathatonespeaks inconventional termsofanagent,soas torefute theviewthatapartfromconsciousnessthereexistsarealagentwhichisconscious;consciousnessactuallydoesnothingintheperceptualprocess:

Inwhat other situations does one see the reference of an agent asaconventionalexpression(prajñapti)tonothingmorethanthenatureofadharma?Oneseesintheworldthatpeoplespeakofashadowasthatwhichmoves.Inthiscasethereisnomovement;butwhenitarisesinadifferentplaceinthefollowingmoment(anantaram),itissaidtomove.Thesameistrueforthecaseofconsciousness;whenitarisesseriallywithregardtoadifferentobject, it issaidtobethatwhichcognizes—i.e.,itcognizesthe object—even though there [really] is no action [on its part].88

10.6. Important Sarvāstivāda thought-concomitants involved in discriminative cognition

InaccordancewiththeSarvāstivādadoctrineofthemahābhūmika caitta‑s,allthe ten caitta‑ssonamedareimportantinanyprocessofcognitionthatismadepossiblethankstotheircollectivecontribution.However,someamongthem,whenfunctioningprominently,bringaboutthementalcapacityofconceptualdiscriminationandhencethepossibilityofinferentialknowledge.Inasensoryperceptionwhichisthebare,genericawarenessofthesensedata,theirfunctioningisnotprominent.Thesethoughtconcomitantsare,inparticular,prajñā,smṛtiandalsosaṃjñāandthetwoaniyata caitta‑s,vitarkaandvicāra. Prajñāandsaṃjñā are in fact respectively themainpower supply for examination/deliberation(abhinirūpaṇā)andrecollection(anusmaraṇa),respectively—thetwosine qua nonforadiscriminativecognition(vikalpa)(§9.7).Saṃghabhadraexplainswhymentalconsciousness,incontrasttoasensoryperception,canhavethecapacityofdiscriminative(vikalpaka)conceptualization:

Ifaconsciousnesscan,withinasinglemoment,graspobjectsbelongingtonumerousspeciesandcan,withregardtoonegivenperceptualobject,generateastreamofthoughts—aconsciousnessofsuchanatureissaidtobediscriminative.Thefivegroupsofvijñāna,ontheotherhand,grasponlypresentobjects.Notwomoments[ofthought]havethesameperceptualobject,forwhenthepreviousgraspingofaperceptualobjecthasceased,


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therecannotbethearisingofarepeatedgrasping[ofthesameobject]bythe consciousnessinthesecondmoment.Mentalconsciousnesscantakeobjectsbelonging to the threeperiodsof time. [In thiscase,]adharma,althoughhavingceased,canstillbeitsobject,andastreamofthoughtscanbegeneratedwithregardtothesameobject.Forthesereasons,onlythis[consciousness] is said to be discriminative.However, since thefivevijñāna-kāya‑sarealwaysconjoinedwithsvabhāva-vikalpa,theyarealsodiscriminative.Thesūtra‑sspeakofthemasbeingnon‑discriminative[only]inthesenseofbeingwithoutanusmaraṇa‑andabhirūpaṇa-vikalpa‑s.89

Theinvolvementoftheabove‑enumeratedcaitta‑smaybesummarizedthus:90 saṃjñāisthecauseofvitarka,andvitarkaisinturnthecauseforthearisingofasensoryconsciousness.Atthisstage,thereisasimpleinquiryorsearchingonthemereobjectgrasped,intheform“whatisit?”Bothschools,SarvāstivādaandSautrāntika,wouldagreethatsomekindofinarticulatementalinquiryisinvolvedhere.

The Sarvāstivāda perspectivemaybe understood to conceive of this asacontributioncomingfromtheconascentthought‑concomitants,saṃjñā,prajñā andsmṛti—alloperatingweakly—andvitarka. For the Sautrāntika,itisthethoughtitselfoperatinginitsgrossstate,representedbyvitarka,whichmakestheinquiryintheformofaninarticulatemurmur.Atthesametime,asensoryconsciousnessissaidtobedistinguishedfrommentalconsciousnessbyitslackof abinirūpaṇā-vikalpaonaccountofitsnottakingname(nāma)asisobject.Thismustthenmeanthat,fortheSarvāstivāda,inasensoryperceptionthe“windof saṃjñā”(saṃjñāpavana)isstrongenoughonlyforarudimentarydetermination,inagenericmanner,oftheobjectasathinginitself,butnotforconceptualizationbasedonjudgmentandassociation.Thesamemustbesaidofthecontributionfromprajñā,smṛtiandvitarka. Vitarka,althoughnotsubsumedasauniversalthought‑concomitant,isnonethelessalwayspresentatthearisingofasensoryperception.Itisinfactconsideredthelatter’scause,evidentlyinthesensethatitmakesthemaincontributioninsucharudimentarydiscriminationasregardstheobject’sappearance(nimitta)thatconstitutesthegraspingofanobjectbyasensoryconsciousness.91Atthestageofconceptualdiscriminationinamentalcognitionwithwhichvicāraaccords,the“windofsaṃjñā”issufficientlystrong,andprajñāandsmṛtioperateprominently.92

10.7. Ontological status of the objects of knowledge

WehaveseenabovethatalreadyintheVKŚ,MaudgalyāyanarepresentstheVibhajyavādastancethattherecanbeconsciousnessthattakesanon-existentobject(§4.1.2.1).Likewise,theDārṣṭāntikasintheMVŚmaintainthattheobjectsofdefilementsareunreal(§10.1).Moregenerally,theearlyDārṣṭāntikasaswellastheSautrāntika‑DārṣṭāntikasintheAKB,etc.,holdthatnon‑existentobjectscanalsogiverisetocognition.93


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Incontrast,fortheVaibhāṣika,allobjectdomains arerealexistents;for“whateverdoesnotfalloutsidetheobject‑domainof[sensory]consciousnesses,visual,etc.,existstruly”.94“Whateverisconceptuallyrealcanonlybetheobjectdomainofmental consciousness.”95 In theVKŚ, themain epistemological argumentadvanced for the central thesis of the tri‑temporal existenceofdharma‑s isthat,inconformitywiththeBuddha’steaching,consciousnessnecessarilyhasaperceptualobject;thefactthatwecanbeconsciousofpastandfutureobjectsprovesthattheseobjectsexisttruly.96TheAKBinheritsthisasoneofthefourmajorargumentsforsarvāstitva (supra,§3.3.2).

Saṃghabhadrastatessuccinctlythat“thecharacteristicofanexistent(sal-lakṣaṇa)isthatitcanserveasanobjectproducingcognition(buddhi)”.Accordingly,anobjectof knowledgeisnecessarilyexistent,eventhoughitmayexisttruly(dravyato ‘sti)orconceptually(prajñaptito ‘sti).97(Seealso§3.5.3ff.).Statedotherwise,thepossibilityofknowinganobjectnecessarilyimpliesthetrueontologicalstatusoftheobject.

10.7.1. Debate in the Ny on the ontological status of the object

IntheNy,thereisalengthydebatebetweentheVaibhāṣikasandtheSautrāntikasontheissue.TheSautrāntikas,representedbyŚrīlāta,enumeratethefollowingcaseswhichtheyclaimtorepresentexamplesofperceptionofnon‑existentobjects:98

(a) Theopticalillusionofafire‑wheel(alāta-cakra)resultingfromawhirlingfirebrand.

(b) Thecognitionofthenon‑existentSelf(ātman).

(c) Themeditational experiences, such as the all‑pervasiveness ofameditationalobject(theso‑called‘baseofentirety’,kṛtsnāyatana),e.g.,a primary color, that results from resolutemental application(adhimukti-manaskāra).

(d) Theview(dṛṣṭi)thathasnon‑existenceasitsobject,asmentionedinthe sūtra.99

(e) Theawarenessof thenon‑existenceofcertainmentalstatessuchascraving,asspokeninthesūtra.

(f) Objectsinadream.

(g) Theopticalillusionofadouble‑moon,etc.,resultingfromophthalmicdisease.

(h) Knowingsomethingthatisnon‑existent.

(i) Thecognitionthattakesasitsobjectthepriornon‑existence(prāg-abhāva)ofasound.


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AsageneralreplytotheSautrāntikaclaim,Saṃghabhadrainvokesthescripturalauthoritythateachofthesixcasesofcognition—visual,etc.,uptomental—necessarilyhastworequisites:thesensefacultyandthecorrespondingobject.Thereisnotaseventhtypeofcognitionthatisgeneratedapartfromtheobject,sothatonecancallitacognitionofnon-existentobject.Infact,ifthiscouldbethecase,thenablindpersonoughttobeabletoseeasmuchasonepossessingeyes,therebeingnospecificallyrequisiteconditionsthatdistinguishthetwocases.Besides,non‑existentdharma‑scannotbesubsumedunderanyofthesixtypesofobjectstaughtinthesūtra‑s.AlltheVaibhāṣikaargumentsherearebasedonthemainpremise—whichwehaveseenabove—thatwhatevercanserveasaperceptualobjectproducingacognitionisanexistent,althoughitmayberealintheabsolutesenseorintherelativesenseasamentalconstructionorconcept.Whatisnon‑existentintheconstructionnecessarilyhasasitsbasissomethingreal. It is this latterbasis thatconstitutes theactualobjectof theperception.Anabsolutenon‑existent(atyantam asad)hasnofunctionwhatsoeverandhencecanneverengenderaconsciousness.Thus,inthecaseoftheperceptionoftheunrealpudgala,theperceptualobjectisnotthepudgalawhichissuperimposed,but thefive skandha‑swhich are real existents.The illusoryperceptionofadouble‑moonhasasitsobjectthesinglemoon;etc.Inthesameway,dreams,illusion,areactuallyrecollectionsofrealentitiespreviouslyexperienced—justthattheelementofimaginationsetsin,resultinginthesuperimpositionontheserealentitiesundercertaininfluencessuchasmentalsluggishness,etc.Likewise,theimaginationofafictitiousthingsuchasthetortoise’shair(kaurmasya roman)andahare’shorn(śaśa-śṛṅga)becomepossiblebecausetherabbit,thehorn,etc.,havebeenexperiencedbefore.Eveninthecaseofnegations,theirperceptiondoesnotarisehavingabsolutenon‑existentsasobjects.Thus,theperceptionofwhatweordinarilyregardasapureabstraction,suchas‘non‑existence’,toohasarealobject:theexpression(abhidhāna)itself,whichfortheVaibhāṣikaisreal,beingword(nāma)whichisaviprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma.Whentheknowledgetakingthisasitsobjectarises,itknowsthatthenegateddoesnotexist.Inthecasewhereoneperceivesanegationsuchas‘non‑brahmin’(abrāhmaṇa),theknowledge ariseswith the expression and the expressed (abhidheya) as itsobjects;theexpressionitselfnegatesbrāhmaṇa,operatingwithregardtowhatisexpressedbyit—kṣatriya:

Whenthisknowledgefirstarises,bytakingmerelytheexpressionasitsobject,itknowsthatthenegated[i.e.,brāhmaṇa,]doesnotexist.Whenitarises subsequently, itmayalso take the expressed [i.e.,kṣatriya,] as itsobjectandknowsthatwhatisnegateddoesnotexistinthat.100


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10.8. Direct perception, ākāra, sākāra-vijñānavāda, nirākāra-vijñānavāda and the Sarvāstivāda

IncontrasttotheSautrāntikaandYogācāra,theSarvāstivādatheoryofknowledgeisdescribedintheSanskrittexts101asnir-ākāra-(vi)jñānavāda:thetheorythattheexternalobjectisdirectlyperceivedwithouttheneedofanyrepresentationalformin the consciousness.However,accordingtothetraditionpasseddownbyXuanZang,102amongallthenorthernBuddhistschoolsitisonlytheSāṃmitīyathatreallyholdssuchatheory,sincethisschoolassertsthatonlymentaldharma‑saremomentary;externalthingscanlastlongerthanonemoment.Allotherschools,includingtheSarvāstivāda,wouldthereforehavetobeincludedinthecampofsākāra-vijñānavāda.WeknowofcoursethattheTheravādaschooltooholdsthatarūpalasts16moments(citta-khaṇa‑s)longerthanacitta,sothatdirectperceptioninthetruesensebecomespossible.103Theconfusionbetweenthesetwotraditionalsourcescanonlybeclearedbyexaminingthenotionofākāra explaineddifferentlyintheseschools.

10.8.1. The notion of ākāra in the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda

The Sautrāntikastanceisthattheākāracorrespondsexactlytotheexternalobject.Itallowsnopossibilityofacognitiveerrorinagenuinepratyakṣaexperience.However,thisākāraisaresemblance(sadṛśā)constructedbythemind.

InthecaseoftheSarvāstivādatradition,attheoutsetwenotetheinformationprovidedby theMVŚ thatvariousĀbhidharmikamasters—mostprobablySarvāstivādins—givevariousinterpretationstoākāra:

Question:Whatistheintrinsicnatureoftheso‑calledākāra?

Answer:Itsintrinsicnatureisprajñā.Hereinitshouldbeunderstoodthus:

(i) prajñāisākāra;itisalsowhatcognizeswithaform(ākārayati)andwhatiscognizedwithaform(ākāryate);

(ii) thecitta-caitta-dharma‑s conjoined (saṃprayukta)withprajñā,whilenotbeingākāra,arewhatcognizewithaformaswellaswhatarecognizedwithaform;

(iii) thoseviprayukta-saṃskāra‑sandotherexistent(sat)dharma‑s,whilebeingneitherākāranorwhatcognizewithaform,arewhatarecognizedwithaform.

Accordingtosome:Whatiscalledākārahascollectivelyallcitta-caitta-dharma‑sasitsintrinsicnature.Thistheorywouldimplythatallcitta-caitta‑sareākāra,andwhatcognizewithaform(ākārayati)andwhatarecognizedwithanākāra.Alltheotherdharma‑s,whilebeingneitherākāranorwhatcognizewithanākāra,arewhatarecognizedwithanākāra.


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According to someothers:What is calledākārahasalldharma‑sas itsintrinsicnature.Thistheorywouldimplythattheconjoineddharma‑sareākāra,aswellaswhatcognizewithaformandwhatarecognizedwithanākāra.Thedisjoineddharma‑s,whilebeingākāraaswellaswhatarecognizedwithanākāra,arenotwhatcognizewithanākāra.

Comment: It shouldbe said thatwhat is calledākāra hasprajñā as itsintrinsicnature,asgiveninthefirstexplanation….

Question:Whatisthemeaningofākāra?

Answer:Ākārameanstheoperationinthemannerofexamination/discernment(簡擇而轉;pra-vi-√ci)withregardtothenatureoftheobject.104

From this, it is clear that the orthodoxSarvāstivādaview is thatprajñā isākāra, explainedas the functionof “operating investigativelywith regard totheobject”.Thisisessentiallythesameasthedefinitiongivenforprajñāas“the investigationofdharma‑s” (dharma-pravicaya).105Butthis investigativeoperationmaybecorrectorincorrect,skillful(kuśala)orunskillful(akuśala),sharp(tīkṣṇa)orblunt(mṛdu),with‑outflow(sāsrava)oroutflow‑free(anāsrava).Thus,whenonecommitsthecognitiveerrorofmistakingaropeforasnakeoranaggregateoffiveskandha‑sforapudgala,itisacaseof“theākārabeingtopsy‑turvy”(viparīta);theālambanaisexistentandnotillusory—theropeor the skandha‑s.106 Inbrief,asstatedbySaṃghabhadra:“Onlyadiscriminative(sa-vikalpaka)consciousnessiscapableofgraspingthespecificcharacteristicoftheobject[intheform]:‘itisblue,notgreen’,etc.”.107Accordingly,intheSarvāstivāda epistemology, theoperationofākāra pertains to thedomainofmentalconsciousness,nottothatofasensoryconsciousnesswhereprajñācannotproperlyfunction(seesupra,§9.7).Moreover,itmayormaynotcorrespondexactlytotheactualformoftheexternalobject.

10.8.2. Several ākāra-s on a given ālambana

That,accordingtotheSarvāstivāda,withregardtooneandthesameperceptualobjecttherecanbevariousākāra‑s,isclearlybroughtoutinaconsiderationintheMVŚonthequestion:“Ifoneleavesbehindanākāra,doesonealso[leavebehind]theperceptualobject(ālambana)?”Theanswertothisisgivenasafour‑foldalternative(catuṣkoṭi):

(I) There is a casewhere one leaves behind theākāra but not theperceptualobject:viz.,apersoncontemplatesagivencharacteristicwithagivenākāra;withoutabandoningthischaracteristic,hefurtherhasanotherākāra—e.g.:he takes therūpa-skandha ashisobjectandhas theākāra of impermanence, immediately after that, theākāraofunsatisfactorinessoftherūpa-skandhaarisesbeforehim…


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(II) There isacasewhereone leavesbehind theperceptualobjectbutnot the ākāra:viz.,apersoncontemplatesagivencharacteristicwithagivenākāra;withthissameākāra,hefurthercontemplatesanothercharacteristic—e.g.:hetakestherūpa-skandha ashisobjectandhasthe ākāraofimpermanence;immediatelyafterthathetakesthevedanā-skandhaasobjectandtheākāraofimpermanencearisesbeforehim…

(III) Thereisacasewhereoneleavesbehindtheākāraaswellastheperceptualobject:viz.,apersoncontemplatesagivencharacteristicwithagivenākāra,hefurthercontemplatesanothercharacteristicwithanotherākāra —e.g.:hetakestherūpa-skandha ashisobjectandhastheākāra of impermanence;immediatelyafterthathetakesthevedanā-skandhaasobjectandtheākāraofunsatisfactorinessarisesbeforehim…

(IV) There isacasewhereone leavesbehindneither theākāra nor the perceptualobject:viz.,apersoncontemplatesagivencharacteristicwithagivenākāra,andcontinuestodosoforsometime—e.g.:hetakesthe rūpa-skandha ashisobjectandhastheākāraofimpermanenceinaserialcontinuityforsometime.108

10.8.3. The 16 ākāra-s as prajñā and not ‘images/aspects’ of objects

Theabovepassagealsoindicatesthepossibilityofsimultaneouslyhavingoneandthesameākārawithregardtomanyandevenalldharma‑s,exceptingtheknowledgeitselfatthatgivenmoment,itsconjunctsandco‑existents,aswhenonecontemplatesthatalldharma‑saredevoidofaSelf,etc.109Infact,theonlycasewheretheākāraofanobjectcorrespondsexactlytotheactualnatureoftheobjectiswhentheyogiacquirestheprajñāquatrueinsightinthedirectrealization(abhisamaya)intothenobletruths—heseesconditionedthingstrulyastheyare,intheiraspectsofbeingunsatisfactory,impermanent,etc.Thecontemplatingyogicanseeseveralaspectspertainingtoagivenobject,eachwithadistinctandunconfoundedākāra—i.e.,prajñā.Thus:

Withregardtoeachwith‑outflowobject(sāsrava-vastu),iftheknowledgeoperates bywayof the fourākāra‑s, [understanding it] asduḥkha, etc.,itreceives the nameduḥkha-jñāna. If the knowledgeoperates bywayof the fourākāra‑s, [understanding it] assamudaya, etc., it receives thenamesamudaya-jñāna.Hencetheākāra‑softheduḥkha‑andsamudaya-jñāna‑sarenotmixed(雜;miśra),whiletheālambana‑saremixed…110

This is clearly a case ofmental exertion—mental applicationwith regardto the commoncharacteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-manaskāra).111 It is for thisreason that the 16ākāra‑s of the four noble truths—duḥkhatā, etc.—asdirectperceptionoftheyogiaresaidtobeprajñā—theoutflow‑freeorpureprajñā.112Theyclearlydonotrefertoimagesor‘aspects’oftheobjects,butarein theactivesenseof themental functionofunderstanding.Thesecommon‑characteristics(sāmānya-lakṣaṇa)aretheuniversalprinciplesofalldharma‑s


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intuitedby spiritual insightpertaining to theabsolute truth,113 notuniversalsabstractly constructed by themind as in the case ofmental inference.

10.8.4. Ākāra-s as pratyakṣa-jñāna.

The spiritual insight acquired in the process of direct realization is calleda dharma-knowledge (dharma-jñāna)where it pertains to the sense‑sphereandasubsequent‑knowledge(anvaya-jñāna)whereitpertainstothetwoupperspheres.Bothareknowledgesquadirectperception(pratyakṣa-jñāna).

Saṃghabhadrainsiststhattheterm anvayadoesnotimplythatthesubsequent‑knowledgesareanumāna,sinceinthesūtrabothknowledgesareequallyspokenofascapableofseeingtrulyduḥkha,etc.Moreover,theārya-jñāna‑scannotbeinferentialinnature,andnoobjectpertainingtotheārya-satya‑scanberealizedbyaninferentialknowledge.Hefurtherarguesthatifthesubsequent‑knowledgesareinferential, thentherewouldnotbeeventhedharma‑knowledgeshavingnirodha as object, since anirodha is always non‑empirical (adṛśya).Butitisfromthepointofviewof indriyāśrita‑andanubhava-pratyakṣa (see infra,§10.8.8)thattheobjectsofsubsequent‑knowledgesaresaidtobenon‑empirical.Andinthatcasethereoughtnottobeeventhedharma‑knowledgesofnirodha sinceanirodhacannotbeanobjectforthesetwopratyakṣa‑s.Fromthepointof viewofbuddhi-pratyakṣa (seeinfra,§10.8.8),however,itisnottruethattheobjectsofsubsequent‑knowledgesarethoseofinferentialknowledges.“Hence,alldeterminationofthingstrulyastheyare(實義決擇;*tattvārtha-viniścaya),properlyaccomplished(如理所引;*yoga-vihita),arepratyakṣa-jñāna‑s.”114

10.8.5. The Sarvāstivāda doctrine of sensory perception is nirākāra-jñānavāda

Accordingly,fromtheSarvāstivādaperspective,asensoryperceptionisdefinitelywithoutanākāra.ItisforthissamereasonthattheMVŚstatesthattheprajñā conjoinedwiththefivetypesofsensoryconsciousnessisnotdṛṣṭialthoughitisalsoaknowledge(jñāna):

(1) it does not have a keenor sharp (tīkṣṇa,paṭu)modeof activity(ākāra) and cannot penetrate deeply into the perceptual object;

(2) itcannotdiscriminate;

(3) itcanhaveonlythesvalakṣaṇabutnotthesāmānya-lakṣaṇa, asitsperceptualobject;

(4) ithasonlypresentobjects,whereasaviewcanhavedharma‑sofallthethreetemporalperiods,aswellastheunconditioned,asobjects;

(5) aviewcangraspanobjectrepeatedly,butthisprajñācanonlygraspanobjectinasinglemoment;

(6) unlikeaview,itcannotcogitateandexamineaperceptualobject.115


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TheseexplanationsareessentiallyagooddescriptionoftheSarvāstivādanotionofsensorydirectperception.Wemaynotehereonceagaintheunambiguousnotion thatwhereprajñā operates,ākāra does not denote the ‘exact image/representation’oftheālambana.

The conclusion therefore is that, as far as sensoryperception is concerned,the XuanZangtraditionisnotquitejustifiedingroupingtheSarvāstivādatheoryundersa-ākāra-jñānavāda.Itis,properlyspeaking,nirākāra-jñānavāda.

10.8.6. The two aspects of the notion of ākāra according to Pu Guang

However,PuGuangdoesspeakoftwoaspectsofthenotionofākāra:Accordingto him, this notion connotes both a ‘comprehending activity’ (行解) andarepresentationalimage(影像;ābhāsa,pratibimba):

‘Comprehendingactivity’ refers to thedifference in thecomprehendingactivityofthecitta-caitta‑swhentheygrasp[respectively]thegenericandspecificcharacteristicspertainingtoanobject.Itreferstothedifferenceintheactivitiesofthecittaandthecaitta‑s.Thiscomprehendingactivitymaygenerateacorrectorwrongcomprehensionwithregardtotheobject…Ākārareferstothefactthatthecitta-caitta‑sareclearbynature;assoonastheyareconfrontedwithanobject,animagearises[inthem]spontaneouslywithouttheneedofanymentalapplication—justasimagesappearinginaclearpondormirror.…Ifoneusestheterm‘comprehendingactivity’,onlythedifferenceintheactivitiesofthecitta,etc.,isreferredto.Ifoneusesthetermākāra,itreferstotwotypes[ofākāra]:(1)ākārainthesenseofanimage,(2)ākārainthesenseofacomprehendingactivity…

Question:Withreferencetowhichofthetwo—themodeofunderstandingor the ākāra[inthesenseofanimage]—isitsaidthat[thecitta-caitta‑s]havethesameākāra (sākāra)?116

Explanation: It iswith reference toākāra that theyaresaid tohave thesameākāra. The citta-caitta-dharma‑s are clear bynature; as soon astheyareconfrontedwithacertainobject,itsformappearsspontaneously.Astheyequallyhave this form, theyaresaid to ‘have thesameākāra’.Thus,theAbhidharmāvatāra,initssecondfascicle,says:

Just as visual consciousness, etc., are producedwith eyes, etc., as theirsupport,manifestingwith an imageof the object (義影像; *arthasya pratinidhi, *arthābhāsā), the visible, etc., and [thus] comprehend theirrespectiveobjects.117

Accordingly,itisonlyfromthepointofviewofākāra[astheimageoftheobject]thattheyaresaidtobehavingthesameākāra …

Question:Fromthepointofviewofwhichofthetwo—thecomprehendingactivityortheākāra[inthesenseofanimage]—istheperceiversocalled?


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Explanation:Fromthepointofviewofthelatter,nottheformer:Whenthecitta,etc.,isconfrontedwiththeobject,animageappears;inthissense[thecitta,etc.,]iscalledtheperceiverandtheobjectistheperceived.Thisisbecause,whenthecitta-caittaperceiveanobject,theydonotdosolikealamp‑flameradiatingitsraytoreachanobjectorlikeapairofpincersgraspinganobject.118Itisfromtheperspectiveofthemanifestationoftheimagethattheperceiverandtheperceivedaresocalled.119

PuGuang’sexplanationaboveshowsthatXuanZang’straditiondescribestheSarvāstivādatheoryassākārabecause(i)theconjoinedcitta-caitta‑saresaidtohavethesameākārathatPuGuangtakesinthesenseoftheobject’simage;and(ii)theschoolspeaksofasensoryconsciousnessarisingwithanimageoftheobject.But,aswehaveobserved,unliketheSautrāntika,theSarvāstivādaconsistentlyequatesākāra withprajñā,sothatonlyPuGuang’sinterpretationof ākāra as ‘comprehending activity’maybe acceptable, even thoughat thesametime,hisexpositionoftheSarvāstivādatheoryhereisotherwisebasicallycorrect.Moreover,itmustbenotedthattheChineseAbhidharmāvatārapassagecitedbyhimusestheword‘image’(影像)whichclearlymeansanimage,andnot‘modeofactivity’(行相)whichisXuanZang’susualrenderingforākāra. In the correspondingexamplegivenintheADV(109)too,thewordusedispratinidhi insteadofākāra.SincebothtextsareauthoredbyorthodoxVaibhāṣikamasters,itseemssafeenoughtosurmisethatintheSarvāstivādaepistemologicaltheory,theimage arising in the sensory consciousness is not anākāra—amentalconstructionbyprajñā—butanimageessentiallybelongingtotheobject,notthemind.AndasPuGuangsays,itarisesspontaneouslylikeareflectioninamirror:Thereflectiondoesnotbelongtothemirrorwhichisalwaysclearbynature.

PuGuang’sdiscussiononthemeaningofsākāraabovereferstotheSarvāstivādatenetthattheconjoinedcitta-caitta‑sareallsākāra—havingthesameākāra (seeabove).Inanothercontext,allmentaldharma‑sarealsodescribedassākāra,‘withanākāra’.Butwhatthistermmeansinthiscontextbecomescontroversial.

10.8.7. The notion of sākāra as an attribute of citta-caitta-s

VasubandhuraisesthequestionintheAKBthatsincethecaitta prajñāitselfisākāra,sākārainthiscontextwouldimplythatprajñā,asamentaldharma,isconjoinedwithanotherprajñā,whichisagainsttheĀbhidharmikatenet.120 Heproposestoavoidthisapparentcontradictionbydefiningākāraasthe‘object‑grasping‑mode(ālambana-grahaṇa-prakāra)ofallthecitta-caitta‑s’.121Inthisway,prajñātooasacaittacanbesaidtobe‘withanākāra’.YaśomitrastatesthatthisisaSautrāntikadefinition.However,ifthesenseofcompoundmeansa‘modeofunderstanding’intheperceptualprocessandnotanimage,thenitisessentiallySarvāstivādaratherthanSautrāntika.Moreover,itisnoteworthythatVasubandhuheredoesnotcontesttheMVŚstatementthatākāraisprajñāand,


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infact,proceedstoconcludewiththesamethreefoldclassificationofdharma‑s(ākāra,ākārayati,ākāryate)thatwehaveseenintheMVŚpassagequotedabove.Thisis,however,nottosaythatVasubandhu’sdefinitionofākāraisidenticalwiththatoftheSarvāstivāda.ItisforthisreasonthatSaṃghabhadraobjectstoit,demandingfromVasubandhumorearticulationonhisdefinition:

Herein,theSūtrakāraaffiliateshimselfwithanotherschoolandassertsthus:‘What is calledākāra is the object‑grasping‑modeof thecitta-caitta‑s’.Thisdoesnotnecessarilyconformtologic.Itmustbeconsideredwhatismeantbythe‘object‑grasping‑mode’:

Ifitreferstothedifferentmodes/speciesoftheformoftheobject,thenthenotion thatall [citta-caitta‑s]canassume the image‑form(能像) [oftheobject]cannotbeestablishedatall,foranobjecthasvariousforms,skillful,permanent,etc.Orrather,therūpa-dharma‑saretobesubsumedunderākāra,sincerūpa-dharma‑scanalsoassumetheimagesoftheformsofothers.

Ifitreferstotheabilitytograspthespecificcharacteristicoftheobject,then ākāraoughtnottobepossibleforthefive[sensory]consciousnesses,sincetheyarenotcapableofgraspingthespecificcharacteristicoftheobject—sinceonlyadiscriminative(sa-vikalpaka)consciousnessiscapableofgraspingthespecificcharacteristicoftheobject[intheform]:‘itisblue,notgreen’,etc.However,thisisnotwhatisconceded[byhisdefinition].Hence[hisdefinition]islogicallyinvalid.122

Saṃghabhadra’sobjectionsconfirmoursurmiseabovethat,fortheSarvāstivāda,ākāradoesnotmeanthespecificformorimageoftheobject.Itreferstotheoperationofprajñāatthestageofmentalconsciousnessandisnotapplicableinthecaseofasensoryperception.AftercriticisingVasubandhu’sdefinition,SaṃghabhadrathenproceedstoclaimthattheSarvāstivādaexplanationisthecorrectone:

1. The prajñāwhichoperatesinvestigativelywithregardtotheobjectissaidtobetheākāra.

2. Allcitta-caitta-dharma‑s, includingprajñā, are said tobe ‘those thatcognizewith a form’,which is synonymouswith ‘those that graspobjects’—prajñāinvestigatestheobject,vedanāfeelsit,saṃjñāgraspsitsappearance,vijñānabecomesconsciousofit,etc.123

3. Alldharma‑s,realorunreal,areequallysaidtobe‘thosethatarecognizedwithaform’.

In other words,thisexplanationleadstothesamethreefoldclassificationasgivenintheMVŚwhichSaṃghabhadra,infact,spellsoutexplicitlyinconclusion.124


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10.8.8. Yogic direct perception of sāmānya-lakṣaṇa as a form of sākāra-jñāna

ButalthoughtheVaibhāṣikadoctrineofsensoryperceptioncanlegitimatelybelabelledasaformofnirākāra-jñānavāda,wehaveseenabovethatthepratyakṣa of theyogiissaidtoperceivesāmānya-lakṣaṇa.ThisperspectiveisalsodiscerniblefromthethreetypesofpratyakṣaenumeratedbySaṃghabhadra:

1. thatwhichisdependentonthesensefaculty(依根現量;indriyāśrita-pratyakṣa);

2. thatwhichisexperience(領納現量;anubhava-pratyakṣa);3. thatwhichisdiscernment(覺了現量;*buddhi-pratyakṣa).

Thefirstreferstothedirectgrasping(pratyakṣaṃ √grah?),supportedbythefivesensefaculties,ofthefivetypesofexternalobjects,rūpa,etc.Thesecondreferstothecomingintothepresentofthecitta-caitta-dharma‑s,vedanā,saṃjñā,etc.Thethirdreferstothedirectrealization(sākṣāt-√kṛ)ofthespecificorcommoncharacteristic(sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa)—accordinglyasthecasemaybe—ofdharma‑s.125

Fromthis,itisclearthatitisthevisualconsciousness,notthemereseeingbytheeye,thatisindriya-pratyakṣa.

Thesecondtypeofpratyakṣa is intrinsicallylinkedwiththefirst in‑as‑muchasthesecaitta‑sbecomepresentatthefirstmomentoftheperceptualprocesstogetherwithvisualconsciousness,sensingandcategorizing(albeitweakly),etc.,ontheverysameobjectthatisbeinggraspedgenericallybyvisualconsciousness.

The third type ismental consciousness that follows immediately from thefirstmoment.Itcanstillbeconsideredatypeofdirectperceptionsinceit isaclearvividperceptiondirectlyinducedbytheimmediatelyprecedingsensoryperception.126 Saṃghabhadra’s articulation, that the *buddhi-pratyakṣa is thedirectrealizationofeithersvalakṣaṇa or sāmānya-lakṣaṇaaccordinglyasthecasemaybe,canbecomprehendedasfollows:Aslongasthecontributionfromthe conascentcaitta‑s is stillweak, it too, like thepreceding consciousness,canonlyapprehendthemereobject,e.g.,abluecolor;itisthereforeagraspingof svalakṣaṇa.Butwhenthecontributionisstrongenoughanditcanapprehend,usingname,“itisblue”,etc.,itisapprehendinguniversals—e.g.,sāmānya-lakṣaṇa (see§9.7).Thisis,then,notacaseofpratyakṣa. The modeofactivity(ākāra = prajñā) that functionsat this timecanbeerroneous.However, in thecaseof spiritual realization— ‘realization‑knowledge’ (證智; pratyakṣa-buddhi,*pratyakṣa-jñāna, adhigama-jñāna)—themeditatorapprehendsdirectly,trulyastheyare,theuniversalcharacteristicsofalldharma‑s.Themodesofactivityinthiscasediffernotintheslightestfromthetruenatureofthedharma‑sbeingexamined.Thisisacaseofdirectseeingordirectperceptionpar excellence (真現量;*bhūta-pratyakṣa,*tattva-pratyakṣa)127—withoutanyconceptualization,


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eventhoughsāmānya-lakṣaṇaisinvolved.ForthisreasontheSarvāstivādaidentifiesthe 16 ākāra‑spertainingtothefournobletruthswithprajñā—operatingasspiritualinsight.TheMVŚstatesthat“outsidethe16ākāra‑s,thereisnootheroutflow‑freeprajñā”.“Theprajñā‑snotsubsumedunderthe16ākāra‑smostlydiscernsvalakṣaṇa‑s;theprajñā‑ssubsumedunderthe16ākāra‑sdiscernonlysāmānya-lakṣaṇa‑s.”128

Saṃghabhadraarguesthatsahabhū causalityobtainsinasensoryperception;thesensoryfacultyandtheobjectasthecausesandthesensoryconsciousnessastheeffectallariseinthesamefirstmoment.Moreover,vedanā,theinstrumentalforceforanubhava,129mustbe‘conjoinedwith’consciousness—whichentailsnotonlysimultaneity,butalsothatbothtakethesameobject,etc.130Infact,asensoryconsciousnessnecessarilyhasapresentperceptualobject,oritwillnotbepossibleforonetohavethepratyakṣaexperience.For,withregardtowhatispersonallysensed,oneexperiencesitanddiscernsitatdifferenttimes.Thatis,theanubhava-pratyakṣaandbuddhi-pratyakṣaarenotsimultaneous.Discernmentoccursatthestateofrecollection,takingtheexperience—thevedanā—thathasjustceasedasitsobject.Accordingly,“asensation—pleasurable,etc.—mustfirstbeexperiencedbytheanubhava-pratyakṣabeforeapratyakṣadiscernmentcanarisehavingitasitsperceptualobject.Likewise,anexternalobjectmustfirstbeexperiencedbyindriyāśrita-pratyakṣabeforeapratyakṣadiscernmentcanarisehavingitastheperceptualobject,byvirtueofthethrustofpresentness.”131Thisisconsistentwiththe Sarvāstivādaviewthatthecitta-caitta-dharma‑scannotdiscernthemselvesor thoseconjoinedorcoexistwith them. (Seeabove,§10.4).SaṃghabhadraarguesthatsincetheSautrāntikamaintainsthatonaccountofcausationbeingsuccessive,anexternalobjectintheprecedingmomenthasnotbeenexperienceddirectly(pratyakṣam),therecanbenopossibilityofasubsequentdiscernmentthatisofthenatureofpratyakṣa132—havingthethrustofvividnessandimmediacy.

The Sautrāntika,ontheotherhand,arguesthatnotmererecollection,butratherthe simultaneityof the experiencing (anubhava) and thediscerning (buddhi)mustbeadmitted toaccount for suchanexperience.133That is,unlessone isself‑awareofwhatoneispresentlycognizingorknowing—i.e.,unlesswhatistermedsva-saṃvedana134inlaterBuddhistlogicaltextsisafact—onecannotinthesubsequentmomentrecollectasapratyakṣa understandinginthemanner:“Ihaveexperiencedsuchapleasureorpain.”135

10.8.9. Summary

Itstheoryofsimultaneouscausalitynotwithstanding,theSarvāstivādaschool,too,holdsthatsensoryperceptionasapratyakṣaexperienceisfullyaccomplishedonlyinthesecondmomentonrecollection.Thereasoningisthattheexternalobjectmustfirstbeexperiencedbytheindriyāśrita-pratyakṣabeforeabuddhi —i.e.,thebuddhi-pratyakṣa—havingthatpratyakṣaasitsālambanacanarise.


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BoththeVaibhāṣikaandtheSautrāntikaseektoaccountforthesenseofvividnessandimmediacynecessarilyentailedinapratyakṣaexperience,albeitviasomewhatdifferentmechanism:Theformerreliesontheprincipleofsimultaneouscausalityintheperceptualactandontheconascenceofthesensoryconsciousnesswith vedanā and the othermahābhūmika-citta-caitta‑s.The latter,while rejectingsimultaneous causality,maintain that in thepratyakṣa act, the experiencing(anubhava) and thediscerning (buddhi) are necessarily simultaneous— theperceptualactisintrinsicallyself‑aware.

The Sarvāstivādaschool,initsvarioustexts,consistentlyequatesākārawithprajñā,bothbeingdefinedastheinvestigativeoperationwithregardtotheperceptualobject.(However,thesenseofākāra in the notion of sākāraasanattributeofthecitta-caitta-dharma‑sistreateddifferently.)ThisisincontrasttotheSautrāntikaandYogācāraforwhomākāraconnotesbothanimage/representationandamentalunderstandingarisinginthemind—withthedifferencethattheSautrāntikawouldregarditasacorrespondenttoanexternalexistent.Tothisextent,therefore,itisinappropriatetodescribetheSarvāstivādatheoryofsensoryperception—saidtobenon‑discriminativeonaccountoftheweakfunctioningofprajñā therein —assākāra-jñānavāda.Ontheotherhand,wemustnotethatthepratyakṣa of theyogiissaidtoperceivesāmānya-lakṣaṇa.Thisperspectiveisalsodiscerniblefromtheexplanationofbuddhi-pratyakṣa.Thisisthecaseofsatyābhisamaya,inwhich the outflow‑freeākāra‑s perceivedby the yogi are not conceptualunderstanding.Theycorrespondtrulyandexactlytothesāmānya-lakṣaṇa‑sasuniversalprinciplespertainingtotheabsolutetruth(paramārtha).Thisperceptionisthereforealsoapratyakṣaexperience;infact,pratyakṣa par excellence—andin‑as‑much as it involvesākāra‑s, is describable as a formof sākāra-jñāna. Prajñāatthisstageistrulynon‑discriminative/non‑superimposing,althoughnotintheVijñānavādinsenseoftranscendingthe‘subject‑object’dichotomy.ThisSarvāstivādanotionthatapractitionerendowedwithtruespiritualinsightperceivesrealitythroughākāra‑smightwellhaveinfluencedthosemembersamongthelatter‑dayYogācārinswhooptfortheviewthatevenforthosewhohaveacquiredthenon‑discriminativeinsight(nirvikalpaka-jñāna)too,knowledgeissākāra.136


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NOTES

1 Cf.AKB,461: kathaṃ punar idaṃ gamyate skandhasaṃtāna evedam ātmābhidhānaṃ vartate nānyasminn abhidheya iti | pratyakṣānumānābhāvāt | ye hi dharmāḥ santi teṣāṃ pratyakṣam upalabdhir bhavaty asaty antarāye |

2 MVŚ,313c,989c.3 Ny,639b.4 MVŚ,288a.5 Forthepossibilityofthiscorrespondence,seeAKB,176.6 Cf. Viṃśikā vijñapti-mātra-siddhi inLevi,S(ed.) Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Deux Traities de

Vasbandhu(Paris,1925),6,stanza11:na ca te saṃhatāḥ…7 Ny,351a–b.8 T29,788c.9 Ny,350c–351c.10MVŚ,702a.11MVŚ,64a–b.12MVŚ,384a.13T26,713c.14MVŚ,980b.15MVŚ,228b–c.16MVŚ,558b.17MVŚ,558b.18MVŚ,976c:所通達所遍知言是實有法.19Ny,625a.20Ny,621c:為境生覺是真有相.21Müller,M,ed.,Dharma-saṃgraha(Oxford,1885),§135.22 Cf.AKB,29;Vy,80.23MVŚ,489bff.24AKB, 54:matiḥ prajñā dharmapravicayaḥ.ADV, 70:dhiḥ prajñā dharma-

saṃgrahādyupalakṣaṇasvabhāvā.SimilarinPrakaraṇa-śāstra(T.1542),Saṅgītiparyāya-śāstra (T.1536),etc.

25MVŚ,490b.26MVŚ,44a.27MVŚ,547b.28MVŚ,547c.29 Cf.MVŚ,546bff.;AKB,394;ADV,373.TheMVŚjustifies theenumerationofeightknowledges (withoutkṣaya‑ andanutpāda‑) in the JPŚ as conforming to the sūtra-s.Seealso,Entrance,102,andnote443.

30MVŚ,490b.31MVŚ,490b–c.32MVŚ,229a.


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33 ‘Vijñānavādins’heredoesnotnecessarilyrefertotheYogācāra.Itreferstoallthosewhoholdthatitisvijñānathatsees.

34MVŚ,490c–491a.35MVŚ,744a.36 Intheearlydiscourses,theBuddha’swisdom(prajñā)ismainlydescribedastherealizationofthetruthofconditionedco‑arising(e.g.,M,i,167;Vin,i,4f.).Thisisfurtherelaboratedasthethreefoldknowledge(trividyā):1.knowledgeofformerbirths(pūrvanivāsānusmṛti-jñāna),2.knowledgeofthedisappearanceandreappearanceofbeings(cyutyupapāda-jñāna),3.knowledgeoftheexhaustionoftheoutflows(āsravakṣaya-jñāna).Wefurtherseetheenumerationofthesix‑foldhigherknowledges(ṣaḍabhijñā)whichaddsthreemoretothislist:4.psychicpower(ṛddhy-abhijñā),5.divineear(divya-śrota)and6.knowledgeofthethoughtsofanother(paracitta-jñāna).

37Tno.2031,15c.38 JPŚ,919b.Notethat‘cause’isusedinthestrictSarvāstivādasenseasanefficacypertainingtothesame(here,theperson’sown)serialcontinuity.

39MVŚ,42c–43a.40 Somemastersprovidetheexamplesofafinger‑tipnottouchingitself,aknifenotcuttingitself,etc.(MVŚ,43a).Seealso,Ny,742a–b,whereSaṃghabhadrastatesthattheĀbhidharmikastakeasapremisethatintrinsicnaturesdonottakethemselvesastheirālambana‑s.Theydonotrelatetothemselves.

41 勿不(互)相違無相治失. 不mustbeanerrorfor 互.Cf.T27,683b:諸有異相而互相違, 必無一時不相離起; 如薪與火 … 藥病明闇;T27,274b‑c:明與無明互相違故 … 如燈與闇更互相違;etc.

42Ny,742b.43E.g.,Candrakīrti’sMadhyamakāvatāra,167;alsoseeLaValléePoussin(1925),182,n.2.44Ny,374c.45M,I.6.46MA,52:buddhānañhi sāvakehi saddhiṃ kinñcāpi tena tena maggena kilesappahāne viseso

natthi, pariññāya pana atthi. 47 na hi bhagavantaṃ ṭhapetvā aññe saha vāsanāya kilese pahatuṃ sakkonti Visuddhimagga-

mahāṭīkā,1.219;Sāratthadīpanī-ṭīkā1.217.48 Sīlakkhandavagga-abhinavaṭīkā 1.4: savāsanappahānañhi kilesānaṃ ñeyyāvaraṇap-

pahānanti49 Dhammasaṅgaṇi-anuṭīkā, vīsatigāthāvaṇṇaṇā: dhamma-saddena ñeyyā visesitabbā …

ñeyya-saddena dhammā visesitā…50Thediscussionundersection§10.4istakenfrommypaperentitled:‘TheDefectsintheArhat’sEnlightenment—Hisakliṣṭājñānaandvāsanā’ in Bukkyo Kenkyu,vol.XXVII(Hamamatsu,1998),65–98.

51Forafurtherdiscussiononvāsanā,seeinfra,§12.10.52MVŚ,74a.53MVŚ,382c–383a.54MVŚ,516a.55MVŚ,887b.56MVŚ,887b.


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57MVŚ,821.58AKB,1.59 Loc. cit.:tac(i.e.,ajñānam)ca bhagavato buddhasya pratipakṣalābhenātyantaṃ sarvathā

sarvatra jñeye punaranutpattidharmatvād dhatam |60AKB,loc. cit.:eṣāṃ buddhadharmeṣv ativiprakṛṣṭadeśakāleṣv artheṣu cānanta-prabhedeṣu

bhavaty evākliṣṭam ajñānam |61Vy,4.62Vy,5.63 tathā hi āha: sarv’ākāraṃ kāraṇam ekasya mayūra-candrakasyāpi nāsarvajñair jñeyaṃ,

sarvajña-balaṃ hi taj-jñānaṃ. AlsoquotedinAKB,474.64UdA,194:kā panāyaṃ vāsanā nāma? yaṃ kilesarahitassāpi santāne appahīnakilesānaṃ

samācārasadisasamācārahetubhūtaṃ, anādikālabhāvitehi kilesehi āhitaṃ sāmatthiya-mattaṃ, tathārūpā adhimuttîti vadanti. taṃ panetaṃ abhinīhārasampattiyā ñeyyāvaraṇap-pahānavasena yattha kilesā pahīnā, tattha bhagavato santāne natthi. yattha pana tathā kilesā na pahīnā tattha sāvakānaṃ paccekabuddhānañca santāne atthi, tato tathāgatova anāvaraṇañāṇadassano.

65MVŚ,724b.66MVŚ,780b.67Ny,724b.68Ny,501c–502a.69Ny,502a.70MVŚ,61c.71 Cf.Pañcavastuka‑vibhāṣāquotedbelow.72Tno.1555,991b–c.73ADV,31f.74AKB,30;ADV,32;Vy,80;Ny,363c.75 Cf.Vy,80:rūpālocanārtheneti cakṣur na saṃtīrakatvena dṛṣṭi … prajñā saṃtīrakatveneti

darśitaṃ bhavati.76AKB,39.77ADV,47.78AKB,39:nāpi vijñānād rūpadarśanaṃ śabdaśravaṇaṃ vā ‘sti |79Vy,96:nāpi vijñānād anyad rūpa-darśanaṃ śabda-śravaṇaṃ vā ‘stīti | na rūpa-darśana-

śabda-śravaṇaṃ grahaṇa-vyatiriktaṃ vicāryamānaṃ labhyate | grahaṇaṃ ca vijñānam eveti nānyad bhavati |

80ADV,32: caksuḥ paśyati vijñānaṃ vijānāti svagocaram | ālocanopalabdhitvādviśeṣaḥ sumahāṃstayoḥ ||

81MVŚ,378c–379a.82 Ibid.,283b.83AKB,31.Inthelastsentence,nābhidhāvetcouldalsoberenderedas‘not[unnecessarily]contravene(/findfaultswith)’.ThePāli(M,139,Araṇavibhaṅga-sutta)has:janpadaniruttiṃ nābhiveseyya samaññaṃ nātidhāveyyāti |


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Cf.YBŚ (T30,826b): “Ifone states that all conditioningscomprisemerecauses andeffectsatalltimes,absolutelywithoutanyexperienceroragent,thenthisistobeknownasśūnyatāfromthestandpointofabsolutetruth.”

84Ny,367c–368a.ForacompleteaccountofthewholedebatebasedonAKB,VyandNy,seePerception,69ff.

85 Ibid.,364b.86AKB,473f.87 Siddhi(F),445.88Ny,342a;SPrŚ,783c.Alsocf. Siddhi(C),T31,39c:識生時無實作用 ….89T29,349a.90Formoredetails,seePerception,chapter6.91 Saṃghabhadra(Ny,349a)stressesthatitisbecauseavisualconsciousnessisalsocapableofgraspingtheappearanceofarūpathatitisalsocapableofgeneratingdefilements.

92 Cf.ADV,81:kaḥ punarayaṃ vitarkaḥ ko vā vicāraḥ | vitarko nāma cittaudāryalakṣaṇaḥ saṃkalpadvitīyanāmā viṣayanimittaprakāravikalpī saṃjñāpavanoddhatavṛttiḥ audārikapañcavijñānakāyapravṛttihetuḥ | vicārastu cittasaukṣmyalakṣaṇo manovijñāna-pravṛttyanukūlaḥ | Also,similardefinitionsonthetwocaitta-sinAbhidharmāvatāra(seeEntrance,83).

93MVŚ,288a–b,228b.ForafullerdiscussionofthisstanceoftheSautrāntika‑Dārṣṭāntikas,seePerception,44ff.

94Ny,472b.Forthisreason,Saṃghabhadra(loc. cit.)arguesthatsincereflectionsinthemirrorcanbeseen,theyexisttruly.

95Ny,536a.96VKŚ,535aff.97Ny,621c–622a.Seealsothedefinitiongivenin*Satya-siddhi-śāstra:“Themarkoftheexistentconsistsinthefactthatitiswherecognitionoperates”(T32,254a:知所行處，名曰有相).

98Ny,622aff.Alsocf.ADV,271ff.;*Satyasiddhi-śāstra,T32,254aff.99 The 幻網經 (Māyā‑jāla‑sūtra) corresponding to theBrahma-jāla-sūtra of theDīrgha‑āgama.

100Ny,624a.101E.g.,SDS,46,368–371,whichclassifiestheBuddhistschoolsintermsofākāravāda.102 Cf. PuGuang’scommentaryonAKB,T41,27a;KueiJi’scommentaryon Siddhi(C),T43,269c,318a;etc.

103 Cf. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha,IV,8.104MVŚ,408c–409a.105 Cf.AKB,54:matiḥ prajñā dharma-pravicayaḥ |ADV,70: dhiḥ prajñā dharma-saṃgrahādy-

upalakṣaṇa-svabhāvā |;etc.106MVŚ,36a;Ny,623b.107Ny,741b.Seealsoinfra.108MVŚ,929a.109 Cf.MVŚ,45c,whichstatesexplicitlythattheākāraofthisformisprajñā.TheMVŚ(42c,43a)explainsthatwithintwomoments,onecancometoacquiresuchaknowledgewithregardtothetotalityofdharma‑s.


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110Therearefourākāra‑sforeachtruth:Forduḥkha-satya—duḥkhatā,śūnyatā,anityatā,nairātmya;etc.SeeAKB,343(seealso,infra,§15.2.2.1).

111MVŚ,53a.Cf.AKB,108.112 Cf.AKB,399:kāśmīrāṇāṃ tāvat nāmalaḥ ṣoḍaśabhyo ‘nya ākāraḥ nāsty anāsravākāraḥ ṣoḍaśākāra-nirmuktaḥ | For the Vaibhāṣika tenet that the 16 ākāra-s

are prajñā,seealsoAKB,401.113MVŚ,399c–400a.114Ny,735c.Saṃghabhadraarguesagainstanopinionheldbycertainmastersthatanvaya (

類)heremeanscomparison(比類):thecomparisonoffactsnotdirectlyperceivedwiththosethataredirectlyperceived.Itreceivesthenameanvaya-jñānaasitissubsumedunderinference(anumāna).

Vy,542,explainstad-anvayaastad-dhetuka—havingthedharma-jñānaascause—thusdissentingfromtheVaibhāṣikaview.

SatŚ,245,toorejectstheSarvāstivādadefinitionaboveanddeclareshisadherencetothesūtrawhengivingthesameopinionthus:“Theknowledgeofthepresentdharmaisnameddharma-jñāna.Asitissaidinthesūtra,theBuddhatoldĀnanda,‘Withregardtothesedharma-s,seethus,knowthus,penetratethus.Knowthepastandfuture[dharma]alsothus.Theknowledgeoftheremaining—i.e.,thepastandfuture—dharma-sisnamedanvaya-jñāna. … Dharma-jñānaispratyakṣa-jñāna (現智).Followingthisdharma-jñāna onedeliberatesandknowsinferentially—thisiscalledanvaya-jñāna.”

115MVŚ,490c.116 The Vaibhāṣika tenet is thatcittaandcaitta‑sco‑arisenecessarily.Theyaresaid tobeconjoined(saṃprayukta).

117T28,no.1554,987c.TibetanversionofAbhidharmāvatāra: shes pa bzhin du don gyi tshul gyi gnas lta bu’i rnam par rang gi don khong du chud par byed pa |—“Justlikejñānawhichcausestheunderstandingofsvārtha (svārtha-pratyāyana)intheformofarepresentationof the artha.”Cf.ADV,109:jñānavat | tadyathā jñānaṃ cakṣurādīn hetūnapekṣyārthaṃ vibhāvayati |; also, 111: jñānavat | tadyathā jñānaṃ cakṣurādīn hetūnapekṣyārthaṃ vibhāvayati |

118 PuGuangseemstohavetakenthesetwoexamplesillustratingthatconsciousnesssimplyariseswithanimageoftheperceptualobjectfromSiddhi(C)—cf. Siddhi(C),93c;T43(KueiJi’scommentaryonSiddhi(C)),493c–494a.

119T41,26b–c.120 Cf.MVŚ,79c.121 Cf.AKB,401:prajñākāraḥ | evaṃ tarhi prajñā sākārā na bhaviṣyati | prajñāntarāsaṃ[pra]yogāt | evaṃ tu yuktaṃ syāt |

sarveṣāṃ citta-caittānām ālambana-grahaṇa-prakāra iti | 122Ny,741b.123 SaṃghabhadradoesseemtoacknowledgethatsākārainthiscontextneedsinterpretationtoavoidthedifficultypointedoutbyVasubandhuandheproposesafewofthem(Ny,741a–b).Besidestheonehegivesintheconclusionhere,anotheronegivenbefore‑handisthatthecitta-caitta‑sareallsaidtobesākārabecausetheyequally—i.e.,simultaneously—withākāra (= prajñā)operateontheobject.Thisiscomparedtothetermsāsrava:Anobjectbeingequaltotheāsravaissaidtobe‘withāsrava’inthesensethatitrequiresthesamecounteractiveagent(pratipakṣa)astheāsravaitself.


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124 Loc. cit. 125T29,736a.126 Cf. PuGuang’sexplanationinT41,135b.127 Saṃghabhadra(Ny,684a)speaksoftheinsightarisinginsatyābhisamayaasthe真現量

證智.128MVŚ,217a.129 Cf.AKB,229:Onemakingpresentafeelingissaidtoexperienceit—saṃmukhīkurvaṃs

tu tāṃ vedayata ity ucyate |130Thetwoinconjunctionsatisfyingthefive‑foldequality(samatā):āśraya,ālambana,ākāra,

kāla,dravya(seeAKB,62).Inthiscaseofasensoryperceptionofcourse,theākāradoesnot functionprominently.

131Ny,374c.132Ny,374c–375a.133Ny,374c.134Candrakīrti criticizes this as aSautrāntika doctrine. SeeLaValléePoussin (ed.),

Madhyamakāvatāra167f.135Ny,574c.136ThediscussionontheSarvāstivādanotionofākāraanddirectperceptionisextractedfrommyarticle,‘ĀkāraandDirectPerception:VaibhāṣikaversusSautrāntika’,inMori,Sodo,ed.,Bukkyō Kenkyū(Hamamatsu,2007),vol.XXXV,1ff.

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11. The Category of the Conditionings

Disjoined from Thought(citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra)

11.1. Doctrinalevolutionofthecategory11.2.Definitionofconditioningsdisjoinedfromthoughtinthelatertexts11.3. ClassiclistintheAKB

11.3.1. Acquisition(prāpti)andnon-acquisition(aprāpti)11.3.1.1. Acquisition,obtainment (pratilambha/lābha)andendowment(samanvāgama)11.3.1.2.Temporaldistinctionsofacquisitionandnon-acquisition11.3.1.3.Acquisitionandspiritualpraxis

11.3.2.Group‑homogeneity(nikāya-sabhāga,sabhāgatā)11.3.3.Ideationlessattainment,cessationattainmentandideationlessness11.3.4.Vitalfaculty(jīvitendriya)11.3.5.Thefourcharacteristicsoftheconditioned(saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa)11.3.5.1. Operationofthecharacteristicsatdifferentphasesofthedharma’sarising11.3.5.2.Secondarycharacteristics(anulakṣaṇa)

11.3.6.Word‑group(nāma-kāya),phrase‑group(pada-kāya)andsyllable‑group(vyañjana-kāya)

11.3.6.1 Word(nāma)andthenatureofthe“Buddha‑word”(buddha-vacana)11.3.6.2 Furtherinvestigationintothenatureandfunctionofnāma

11.1. Doctrinal evolution of the category

IncomparisonwiththeSarvāstivādaandothernorthernschools,thedoctrinaldevelopmentinthePālicanonicalabhidhammatextsismorearchaicand,inaway,morefaithfultothedoctrinesofthesutta‑s.Thus,withregardtotheconditioneddhamma‑s,theTheravādinĀbhidhammikaswentnofurtherthanthedualismofmindandmatter.The Northerncanonicalabhidharma texts,ontheotherhand,madedistinctadvance,formulatingnewdoctrinalcategoriesnottraceabletotheBuddha’steachings.Onesuchimportantadvancementwasthecategoryknownascitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra—“conditionings(forces)disjoinedfromthought”.Insomecasesatleast,theymaybeconsideredaslawsofnature.Inthedoctrinallyfullyarticulatedform,theyarerealentitieswhichareneithermentalnormaterialinnature,whichyetcanoperateonbothdomains.Whatismore,althoughthemselvesconditioned,twoofthem—acquisitionandnon-acquisition—canoperateoneventheunconditioneddharma‑s.

This category seems to have evolved in the process of theĀbhidharmikaanalysis of the intrinsic characteristic ofdharma‑s. Themethodology ofsubsumption/inclusion(supra,§4)wasapplied toalldharma‑s inrespectofthetaxonomicaldoublet—“citta-saṃprayukta”and“notcitta-saṃprayukta”:


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dharma‑sthatareconjoinedwiththemindandthosethatarenot.Alreadyinthe *Śāriputrābhidharma—oneoftheoldestextantnorthernabhidharmatexts,knowntohavebeenbaseduponbyseveralschoolsbelongingtheSthaviravādalineage—adistinctionwasmadebetweenthesetwoclassesofdharma‑swhichweresaidtoconstitutethedharmāyatana:

Dharmāyatanaistheonedivisibleintotwoportions—[dharma‑s]whichareeitherconjoinedwiththoughtordisjoinedfromthought(citta-viprayukta).

Whatisthe[portionofthe]dharmāyatanathatisconjoinedwiththought?Thosepertainingtothedharmāyatanawhicharethought‑concomitants—sensation,ideation,etc.,uptothedefilements(kleśa).

Whatisthe[portionofthe]dharmāyatanathatisnotconjoinedwiththought?Thosepertainingtothedharmāyatanawhicharenotthought‑concomitants—production(jāti),etc.,upto[theattainment]whichisneitherideationnor non-ideation.1

Wemaynote that this taxonomical doublet is actually one of themātṛkā‑s foundinmanyearlyabhidharma.Itemslikeproduction,etc.,whichlatercametobe included in thedeveloped listofconditioningsdisjoinedfromthought, were enumerated among those that are not “conjoinedwith thought (citta-saṃprayukta)”.Theywere still not explicitlynamedelsewhere;on thebasisof thisdoublet,*Śāriputrābhidharmaclassifies thefiveaggregates (skandha)intothosethatare(i)conjoinedwiththought,(ii)notconjoinedwiththought,(iii)neithersaidtobeconjoinedwiththoughtornotconjoinedwiththought,(iv)partlyconjoinedwiththought andpartlynotconjoinedwiththought:

Ofthefiveaggregates,howmanyareconjoinedwiththought,howmanyarenotconjoinedwiththought?

Twoareconjoinedwiththought.Oneisnotconjoinedwiththought.Oneisnotsaidtobeeitherconjoinedwiththoughtornotconjoinedwiththought.Onecontainstwoportions:eitherconjoinedwiththoughtornotconjoinedwiththought.

Whatarethetwothatareconjoinedwiththought?Thesensation‑aggregateandideation‑aggregate…

Whatistheonethatisnotconjoinedwiththought?Thematter‑aggregate …

Whatistheonethatisnotsaidtobeconjoinedwiththought ornotconjoinedwiththought?Theconsciousness‑aggregate …

Whatistheonethatisoftwoportions—eitherconjoinedwiththoughtornotconjoinedwiththought?Theconditioning‑aggregate…

Whatis[theportionofthe]conditioning‑aggregatewhichisnotconjoinedwith thought?That [portionof the]conditioning‑aggregatewhich isnot

11. the Category of ConditioningS diSjoined from thought

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thought‑concomitants—production,etc.,up to thecessation‑attainment(nirodha-samāpatti).2

However, the *Śāriputrābhidharma speaks only negatively of conditioningswhichare“notconjoinedwiththought”,andnotpositivelyofacategoryknownas"conditioningsdisjoinedfromthought”.Thiskindofbroadconnotationgiventotheterm“dharma‑swhicharenotconjoinedwiththought”isfoundeveninthelatertextswhereinconditioningsdisjoinedfromthoughtasatechnicalcategoryisknowntohavebeenestablished.Thus,inthePrŚwefind:

Whatarethedharma‑sdisjoinedfromthought (citta-viprayukta-dharma)?Theyarethedharma‑swhicharenotthought‑concomitants…,i.e.,matter(rūpa),theunconditioned(asaṃskṛta),andtheconditioningsdisjoinedfromthought (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra).3

ItwasprobablyintheJPŚthatforthefirsttimewesawtheexplicitestablishmentbytheSarvāstivādinsofthiscategory.4Thus,onthetopicofretributioncause(vipāka-hetu),theJPŚspeaksof“rūpa,citta,caitasika-dharma‑s,citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra”.5 It alsoexplains that themental seriesof a sentientbeing in thenon‑material sphere proceeds (√vṛt)with “vital faculty, group‑homogeneityandothersuchconditioningsdisjoinedfromthoughtasitsbasis”.InVasumitra’sPañcavastuka,6thetotalityofdharma‑sareexplicitlyclassifiedintofivecategories:

Therearefive[categoriesof]dharma‑s:—(1)rūpa,(2)citta,(3)caitasika,(4)citta-viprayukta-saṃskāraand(5)asaṃskṛta. …

Whataretheconditioningsdisjoinedfromthought?Thosedharma‑sthatarenotconjoinedwiththought(citta-saṃprayukta).

Nowwhat are these?Prāpti, asaṃjñi-samāpatti, nirodha-samāpatti, āsaṃjñika, jīvitendriya, nikāya-sabhāga, *upadhi(/*sthāna)-pratilambha (依得),*vastu-pratilambha (事得),*āyatana-pratilambha (處得),jāti, sthiti, jarā, anityatā, nāma-kāya, pada-kāya,vyañjana-kāya;andallothersuchdharma‑swhicharenotcitta-saṃprayukta.Theyarecollectivelyknownas“conditioningsdisjoinedfromthought”.

ApartfromtheiroccurrenceinthePrŚ,thethreeitemsabove,*upadhi(/*sthāna)-pratilambha,*vastu-pratilambhaand*āyatana-pratilambha,alsorepeatedlyoccurintheearliertexts,DSŚandSgPŚ,aswellasintheAmRŚ,amongdharma‑ssuchasgroup‑homogeneityandvitalforcewhichweknowareexplicitlyenumeratedintherelativelylatercanonicalAbhidharmatextsasdisjoinedconditionings.ThePrŚglossesthemasfollows:

What is *upadhi(/*sthāna)-pratilambha?This is the obtaining of theabode/locationofsupport(所依處).Whatis*vastu-pratilambha?Itisthe


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obtainmentof theaggregates (skandha).What is*āyatana-pratilambha?Itistheobtainmentoftheinternalandexternalāyatana‑s.7

WecancomparethisglosswiththatintheAmRŚwhichgivesthefirstitemas處得,'obtainmentofabode/location'(*sthāna-pratilambha?):

*Sthāna-pratilambhaistheobtainmentofthegoingtoadifferentlocation/place(方土).Vastu-pratilambha is the[obtainmentof] theconditionings(saṃskāra)which aremiscellaneous things.Āyatana-pratilambha is theobtainmentoftheinternalandexternalāyatana‑s.8

Comparingthese twodescriptions,wecansee that theydifferbasicallywithregardtothefirstitem.Theformergivesbasis(依),andglossesitas“theabode/locationofsupport”;thelattergivesabode/location.Accordingly,the依得 in thePrŚandtheSgPŚcouldalsopossiblybe*sthāna-pratilambha.IntheVKŚ,thefirstitemis處得(‘obtainmentofabode/location’),andthethirdis生長處得 (‘obtainmentofplaceofarising’).Itmaybenotedthat“placeofarising/growth”isanAbhidharmaglossforāyatana.9ThefollowingtableprovidesexamplesoftheoccurrenceofthesethreeitemstogetherwiththeircontextsinthecanonicaltextsandtheAmRŚ:


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DSŚ SgPŚ VKŚ AmRŚ

Whatisthedharmāyatana?…Thus,allpast,futureandpresentdharma‑sarecalleddharmāyatana …Now,whatarethey?Sensation,…;allthefetters,…;alltheknowledges…;acquisition,…vitalfaculty,group‑homogeneity,*upadhi(/*sthāna‑)pratilambha (依得),*vastu-pratilambhaand*āyatana-pratilamabha…(T26,500c).

Whatismeantby“old‑age‑and‑deathhasbirthascondition”?Itmeans:differentbeings…appearamongthecorrespondinggroupsofbeings;thereinarisethe*skandha-pratilambha,*dhātu-pratilambha,*āyatana-pratilambha;theskandha‑sarebornandthevital facultyarises.(T26,513a)

Whatisa“Good‑lookingdeity” (sudṛśa-deva)?This[deity]isinthecompanyoftheGood‑lookingdeities,whoareofthesamekind,havethesamegroup‑homogeneity;their*upadhi(/*sthāna‑)pratilambha (依得),*vastu-pratilambha and*āyatana-pratilamabhaareallthesame.(T26,427a;etc.)

Thosewhohavecutofftheskillfulroots[asaresultofcommittingthefivemortaltransgressions(ānantarya)cometoberebornamongthosewith]evilgroup‑homogeneity,*sthāna-pratilambha (處得),*vastu-pratilambha andabodeofarising(生長處得,*āyatana-pratilamabha)...(T26,586b,etc.)

Whatarethedisjoineddharma‑s?The17dharma‑s,acquisition,etc.:1. endowment(成就),2.ideationless‑attainment,…6.homogeneity,7.*sthāna-pratilambha (處得),8.*vastu-pratilambha (物得),9.*āyatana-pratilambha (入得),…

Noticeably,intextslaterthantheJPŚ,thesethreeitemsdisappearfromtheamongdisjoined forces. 10Thismaybedue to the fact thatby this time,acquisitionhadcometoassumetheroleoftheforceresponsiblefortheacquisitionofany dharmabyasentientbeing.Whenthishappened,theroleofobtainmentplayedbytheabovethreeitemsbecamesuperfluous.

However, itmust be noted that from the beginning, evenwithin the broadSarvāstivāda tradition itself, thisnewlyarticulateddoctrinalcategoryknownas“conditioningsdisjoinedfromthought”hadnotbeenunanimouslyaccepted,eitherasregardstheirreality(asadravyahavingasvabhāva)orasregardstheirtotalnumber.Thus,intheMVŚ,wefindthatBhadantaDharmatrāta11　andtheearlyDārṣṭāntikamasters12 denytherealityofthewholeviprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha. Buddhadeva considers all conditioned dharma‑s to be subsumableundereithertheGreatElements(asinthecaseoftherūpa)orthought(asinthecaseofthementalfactors),which,ofcourse,istantamounttothedenialofanysuchcategoryas“dharma‑sdisjoinedfromthought”whichareconjoined


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neitherwithmatternorthought.Yetheseemstoconcedearelativerealitytoatleastsomeofthem,suchasacquisition,13 vitalfacultyandgroup‑homogeneity.14

IntheJPŚ,wefindneithercleardefinitionsnoradefinitelistofthem,butonlyscattereddescriptionsofnikāya-sabhāgatā,jīvitendriya,jāti, sthiti, jarā, anityatā, pṛthagjanatva15andprāpti.16InboththeDSŚandthePrŚ,wefind16enumerated,andintheAmRŚ,17.ItseemsnotuntiltheAbhidharmahṛdaya thatthenumbercametobemoreorlessfixedat14.TheAKBtooenumerates14,asdoesthePrŚwhose list differs from theAKBoneonly in replacingnon-acquisitionwithpṛthagjanatva.Significantly,theAvatāragivesthesame14asintheAKB,althoughinadifferentorder.

Butthenumberofthesedisjoinedconditioningsseemsnevertohavebecomeabsolutelyfixedat14intheSarvāstivādatradition.17 Vasubandhuenumeratesthe14inaverse,18endingwithca iti.Yaśomitracomments:

Thewordca[intheverse]isforthepurposeofindicatingthosedisjoined[conditionings]ofasimilartypethathavenotbeen[explicitly]mentioned,for saṃghabheda,etc.,areconcededas[dharma‑s]disjoinedfromthoughtexistingasrealentities.Thisisbecauseofthementionintheśāstra “andalsothose[disjoinedconditionings]ofasimilartype”(seePrŚquotedabove).19

Saṃghabhadra,commentingon‑ādayaś cetiinthesamecontext,says:

-ādayaismeanttoincludethephrase‑group(pada-kāya)andthesyllable‑group(vyañjana-kāya) aswellasharmony/congruence(和合性;sāmagrī);ca iti indicates thedharma‑sspeculatedbyotherswhicharenoneotherthanthoseofthepreviously[mentioned]categories:Therearesomewhospeculatethat,apartfromacquisition,etc.,thereexistsuch[intrinsic]naturesastheaggregate‑acquisition(蘊得;*skandha-prāpti),etc.20

TheMVŚ,aswellasNy,mentionsnon‑harmony/incongruence(asāmagrī)asaconditioningdisjoinedfromthought,andstatesthatitisaforcewhichoperatestocauseschismintheSaṅgha (saṅgha-bheda)hasthisasitsintrinsicnature.21 Therearealsocertainotherforcesofoperationwhich,intheopinionoftheMVŚcompilers,aresubsumable—inageneralsense—under“otherdharma‑sofsuchtypeswhichare[citta-]viprayukta” (此即攝在, 復有所餘如是類法不相應中).Theseincludemūrdha-patitatva—aforcewhichcausesthefallingfromthespiritualattainmentcalledmūrdhan;parihāṇi—retrogressionfromspiritualattainment;andthe“natureofanordinaryworldling”—aforceobstructingtheendowmentof theārya-dharma‑s, thus renderingone anordinaryworldling.However,itisstatedexplicitlythattheyhavecertaindharma‑srecognizedinthe Sarvāstivādaschemeofclassificationastheirintrinsicnatures.Thus,justassaṃghabhedaisasāmagrīinitsintrinsicnature,mūrdha-patitatva, parihāṇiandpṛthagjanatvahavenon-endowment(asamanvāgama = aprāpti)astheirintrinsicnature.22Accordingly,theyareacknowledged,notsomuchasrealentitiesdistinctfrom thosedharma‑s said to be their intrinsic nature, butsimply as distinct


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modesofoperationof the latter.This ismuch like thecase thatknowledge,receptivity,viewandnon‑defiledignorancearealldistinctmodesofoperationofunderstanding(prajñā)whichconstitutestheirintrinsicnatureineachcase.Theyareassuchnotspecificallyenumeratedasdistinctdharma‑s(apartfromprajñā)intheSarvāstivādaschemeofclassification.Itis,however,tobenotedthatinsomeSarvāstivādaabhidharmatextssuchastheAbhidharmahṛdaya (AH),23 the Abhidharmahṛdaya Sūtra (*AHS)24 and theAbhidharmahṛdayavyākhyā,25 pṛthagjanatvaisenumeratedinplaceofnon‑acquisitionunderthecategoryofconditioningsdisjoinedfromthought.Thisisprobablyonaccountofitsimportancein the Sarvāstivādadoctrineofspiritualprogress.TheAmRŚenumerates"thenatureofanordinaryworldling"(pṛthagjanatva;凡夫性;)attheendofitslist.26 TheMVŚrecordsthat,accordingtosomemasters,thereisinasentientbeingacertainmark(相 nimitta?)ofthenatureofdisjoinedconditioning.WhentheBuddhacontemplatesit,Heisabletoknowthespecificpastkarmiccauseandfutureconsequenceofthatbeing.ItisnotclearastowhetherthecompilersoftheMVŚacceptsuchadharma ofdisjointconditioning,sincetheirrejectionofthisviewisfromtheperspectivethattheBuddhadoesnotrequireanyinferentialmeanstohavesuchaknowledge.27

TheADVspeaksof13initsverse28although,initsprosecommentary,itactuallyexplains the same14 in the sameorder as in theAKB.Allthese post‑AKBsourcesindicatethattheĀbhidharmikasofthisperioddidnotfullyagreeastotheexactnumberofdharma‑stobeincludedunderthecategoryofconditioningsdisjoinedfromthought.Indeed,thisistheperiodwhen,challengedbyseverecriticismfromtheSautrāntikas,particularlywithregardtotherealityofthesedisjoined conditionings, theSarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikas felt tremendouspressuretogivecleardefinitionsandproofsofthesedharma‑sasrealentities.ThelargerpartofthecontroversiesintheAKBisinfactconcernedwiththis.ThreatenedbytheseriousobjectionsposedbyVasubandhuinhisAKB,theNy,theSPrŚandtheADVbecameallthemoredeterminedtodefendtheirpositionagainsttheSautrāntikas.Saṃghabhadradevotesmuchspaceinbothhisworks,invokingscripturalauthorityandapplyinglogicalarguments,toestablishingtheirreality.TheauthoroftheADVisjustasdeterminedandemphaticinthisregard,explicitlydeclaringhisintentiontoprovetheirintrinsicnatures.29SkandhilatooinhisAvatāra,whichisalsopost‑AKB,inspiteofhisavowedintentiontosteerawayfromcontroversies,cannothelpsharingthesameconcern—anditwouldseem—tothesamedegree.

11.2. Definition of conditionings disjoined from thought in the later texts

Itwasinthepost‑AKBmanualsthatwefindarticulatedefinitionsofthecategoryitselfandoftheitemsenumeratedunderthecategory.Saṃghabhadra30explains


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that the three components (citta‑,viprayukta‑, ‑saṃskāra) together uniquelydefinecitta-viprayukta-saṃskāraasadistinctdoctrinalcategoryinthefivefoldcategoryclassificationofdharma‑s:

citta—tosignifythatlikecitta,thesedharma‑sarenotrūpa;

viprayukta— tosignifythatthecaitta‑s,althoughalsonotofthenatureofrūpa,aretobeexcludedastheyaresaṃprayukta;

saṃskāra— tosignifythattheasaṃskṛta‑s,althoughnotofthenatureofrūpaandnotsaṃprayuktawithcitta,arealsotobeexcluded.

Yaśomitra,inasimilarmanner,inexplainingthedoctrinalsignificanceofeachofthecomponentsoftheterm,differentiatesthiscategoryfromtheotherfour:

“Disjoinedfromthought”(citta-viprayukta)—theword“thought”isforthepurposeofshowingthattheybelongtothesametypeasthought:thismeansthatlikethought,theyaredisjoinedfromthought.Andwhatistheirsamenessintypewiththought?Inasmuchastheyarenotmaterial(arūpin);for rūpa,inspiteofthenatureofbeingdisjoined[fromthought],doesnotobtainthenameinrespectofthenatureofbeingdisjoined(viprayukta)ontheveryaccountofitbeingmaterial.Or,theirsamenessintypewiththoughtconsistsintheirbeingofthenatureofnāmainrespecttothenāma-rūpa [distinction].

Thethought‑concomitantsarealsoofthesametypeasthought,buttheyareconjoined(saṃprayukta)withthoughtinrespecttotheobject;theword“disjoined” is for thepurposeofdistinguishing them[fromthe thought‑concomitants].

Theunconditioned[dharma‑s]arealsoofthesametypeasthe[disjoinedconditionings]inrespecttotheirnottakinganyobjects(anālambanatvena);theword“conditionings”isforthepurposeofexcludingthe[unconditionedwhich,beingunconditioned,arenotconditionings].31

11.3. Classic list in the AKB

The14enumeratedintheAKBare:

1. acquisition (prāpti),2. non-acquisition(aprāpti),3. group‑homogeneity (nikāya-sabhāga),4. ideationlessness (āsaṃjñika),5. ideationlessattainment (asaṃjñi-samāpatti),6. cessationattainment(nirodha-samāpatti),7. vitalfaculty (jīvitendriya),8. production‑characteristic (jāti-lakṣaṇa),


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9. duration‑characteristic (sthiti-lakṣaṇa),10. deterioration‑characteristic (jarā-lakṣaṇa),11. impermanence‑characteristic (anityatā-lakṣaṇa),12. word‑group (nāma-kāya),13. phrase‑group (pada-kāya),14. syllable‑group (vyañjana-kāya).

Amongthese,acquisition,non-acquisitionandthefourcharacteristicsmaybesaidtobetheonesmostimportantdoctrinally.Accordingly,weshalldevotemorespacetothemintheexplanationsthatfollow:32

11.3.1. Acquisition (prāpti) and non-acquisition (aprāpti)

Acquisitionisperhapsthemostimportantdisjoinedconditionings,andthisfactseemstobereflectedbyitsleadingpositioninthelist.Itisaforcethatlinksadharmatoaparticularserialcontinuity(santati/santāna),i.e.,theindividual.Non-acquisitionisanotherrealentitywhosefunctionandnaturearejustopposedtothoseofacquisition:Itactstoensurethatagivendharmaisdelinkedfromtheindividualserialcontinuity.

Asanillustration:whenapersonhasjealousyinhim,itisbecause,giventherequiredassemblageofconditions for inducing thearisingof thisdharma,jealousy,aforcecalledacquisitionisalsoinducedtoariseatthesametime,byvirtue ofwhich the jealousy comes to be linked to him.This force ofacquisitionwillcontinuetolinkthejealousytohimfrommomenttomoment—evenatthosetimeswhenhismindisnotoccupiedwiththisdefilementbutwithaskillfulornon‑definedthought—arisingandceasinginaserialcontinuityofitsown. Itisonlywhenheisabletodevelopasufficientlystronginsightasthecounteragentthatitcomestobedelinkedfromhim:Atthismoment,therearisesanotheracquisitionofanotherdharma,theacquisitionofthecessation(nirodha)ofthisdefilement;andatthesametime,thenon-acquisition ofthisdefilementisalsoinducedtoarise,effectingthedelinking.Thecessationandthenon-acquisition togetherensurethatthedefilementwillnotariseinhimanymore.

TheADV,theAvatāraandtheNydefineacquisitionasthatwhichenablesustoaffirmthatanindividualisinpossessionofaparticulardharma. The Avatāra:

Acquisition is thecause (kāraṇa) thatpermits theaffirmation: ‘one is inpossessionof a certaindharma’ (dharmavat).There are three kinds ofdharma‑s:pure(śubha),impure(aśubha)andnon‑defined(avyākṛta).…Onewhopossesses[anyof]thesedharma‑sissaidtobe‘inpossessionofthatdharma’.Thecauseofcertaintyforsuchanassertionisnamedacquisition(prāpti),obtainment(lābha,pratilābha)andendowment(samanvāgama).33


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The case of acquisition exemplifies the doctrinal versatility of the disjoinedconditionings.Beingaforcewhichisneithermaterialnormentalitself,itcanactonbothtypesofdharma‑s—andinthecaseofacquisition,evenontheunconditioned.AsthefollowingexplanationintheMVŚshows,theparticularspeciestowhichaacquisitionbelongswilldependonthedharmathatisbeingacquired,andmaybeidenticalwithordifferentfromthatofthedharma:

Question:Whyisitthatthespeciesoftheacquisitionmaybeeitheridenticalwithordifferentfromthatofthedharmaacquired(prāpta)?

Answer: There are three types of acquisition: 1.the acquisition ofaconditioneddharma;2.theacquisitionofacessationthroughdeliberation;3. the acquisitionofacessationindependentofdeliberation.

(1) Theparticularspeciesoftheacquisitionofaconditioneddharmaisspecifiedaccordingtothatofthedharmaacquired.Thisisbecausea conditioneddharma possesses its activity that projects its ownacquisition.

(2) The particular species of the acquisition of a cessation throughdeliberationisspecifiedaccordingtothatofthepaththroughwhich[thecessation]isrealized(sākṣāt-√kṛ).Thisisbecauseacessationthroughdeliberation,[beinganunconditioneddharma,]doesnotpossessitsownactivity.Itsacquisitionisprojectedthroughtheforceofthepathatthetimewhen[thepractitioner]isseekingitsrealization.

(3) Theparticularspeciesoftheacquisitionofacessationindependentofdeliberationisspecifiedaccordingtothe[practitioner’s]ownsupportingbasis(āśraya).Thisisbecauseacessationindependentofdeliberationdoesnotpossessitsownactivitythatprojectsitsownacquisition,anditisnotsoughtthroughapath;itisindependenceon[thepractitioner’s]vitalfacultyandgroup‑homogeneityalonethatitsacquisitionarises.34

The strength of the acquisition can also vary.Along the different stages ofspiritualprogressofthepractitioner,thestrengthoftheacquisitionofaparticularcessationofadefilementcancometobeincreased,eventhoughthepractitionerdoesnotneedtore‑abandonthesamedefilement.Atsomecriticaljunctures,asingleacquisitioncanbestrongenoughtoeffectthecollectiveabandonmentofalargegroupofdefilements.

For instance:at the16thmoment—themomentfollowingtheendof the15moments of direct realization (abhisamaya)— thepractitioner acquires thefruitofstreamentry(srotaāpatti),therearisesanacquisitionofthecollectiveabandonment of all the defilements to be abandonedby the path of vision(darśanamārga-praheya).

Asanotherexample:whenthepractitionerabandonsthelastgrade(thelower‑lower grade) of defilement to be abandonedby cultivation (bhāvanā-heya),


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pertaining to the neither‑ideation‑nor‑non‑ideation sphere, he is completelyliberatedfromallthehindrancespertainingtothetriplespheresandthefivecategoriesofabandonability.Atthisverymoment,theacquisitionarisinginhimeffectsthecollectiveacquisitionofalltheunconditioneddharma‑s.35

Saṃghabhadra explains the function of acquisition in the distinctivelyĀbhidharmikamanner:36

…Sincebīja('seed')[asmaintainedbytheSautrāntika]doesnotexist,weknowthattheacquisitionasacknowledged[byus]definitelypossessesa[distinct] functionas it is thecausebyvirtueofwhichadharmawhichhasbeen acquired is not lost, and as it is themarkerof theknowledge(jñāna-cihna) that “this belongs to that person” (idam asyeti). Since its[distinct]functionisestablished,weknowthatitexistsasadistinctentity.Thus,boththeessentialnatureandfunctionoftheacknowledgedacquisitionareuniversallyestablished(prasiddha).

Hisdefinition,quotedintheVy,37thusemphasizestwoaspectsofitsfunctionwhichuniquelyqualifyitasanontologicalentity:(1)acquisition—orratheritsseries—continuestobindanacquireddharmatotheindividual;(2)itmakespossible theknowledge that agivendharma belongs to thisperson, andnotanother.Together,thesetwoaspectshelptoaccountforthefactthat,giventheSarvāstivādaschemeofdistinctontologicalentities(dharma)perpetuallyexistingin their intrinsicnaturethroughouttimeandneitherdecreasingnorincreasing,thesamecategoryofdharma—e.g.,greedorfaithorunderstanding—canbesaidtobeuniquelyexperiencedorrealizedbyagivenindividual.

TheaboveexplanationgivenbytheSarvāstivādaspellsouttheimportantrolethatacquisitionplaysinspiritualattainments.IntheSarvāstivādaperspective,therelationshipbetweenatranscendentalabsoluteandtheempiricaliseffectedbyacquisitionwhichisarealforceexistinginitsownright.Onthepathofspiritualprogress,whenoneabandons (pra-√hā)adefilement, twofinalmomentsareinvolved:Inthefirstmoment,knownastheunhinderedpath(ānantarya-mārga),the acquisitionofthedefilementissevered.Inthesecondmoment,knownaspathofliberation(vimukti-mārga),theacquisitionofthecorrespondingcessationthroughdeliberation(pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha)arises,andthepractitionerissaidtohaverealizedthecessation(cf. infra,§12.9.2,§16.2.2).

Acquisition, in its articulate sense as one of the disjoined conditionings atasomewhatlaterstage—asopposedtotheearlystagewhenitwasusedina general sense—mayhaveoriginated out of a pragmatic concern of theSarvāstivādins:Itseemstohaveoriginallyreferredtotheacquisitionofārya-dharma‑s,onthebasisofwhichanāryacanbeproperlydistinguishedfromanordinaryworldling.ThisstageofdevelopmentmayhavetakenplaceshortlyafterthecompilationoftheJPŚandbeforetheMVŚ.Theargumentthattheunreality


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of endowment(=acquisition)entailstheindistinguishabilityofanāryaandanordinaryworldlingisalreadyfoundintheMVŚ.38However,eveninthelaterabhidharmatextsliketheAKB,theADV,theNyandtheAvatāra,wecanstillsense thiscentralconcernwhichformsthechiefargumentfor thenecessaryexistenceofacquisitionasarealentity.Thus,theAvatāragivesthefollowingastheonlylogicalargument:

If acquisitionwerenon‑existent,whendefilementslikegreed,etc.,arise,thetrainee(śaikṣa),beingwithoutanoutflow‑freethought,oughtnottobeanārya.[Likewise,]whenanordinaryworldlinggivesrisetoaskillfulornon‑definedthought,heoughttobeatthatmomentregardedasonewhoisdetached(vītarāga).Moreover,therebeingnoacquisitionofnirvāṇaforanāryaandanordinaryworldling,bothofthemwouldbesimilartoeachotherand,therefore,bothoughttobecalledanordinaryworldlingoranārya.39

Thatatthestageofitsdogmaticfinalizationasaconditioningdisjoinedfromthought, acquisition has to dowith spiritual attainment, can also be seenin the notion of non-acquisition.This is said to be opposite to acquisition;andpṛthagjanatva isdefinedas thenon-acquisitionofārya-dharma‑s. In thislatterdefinition,theVaibhāṣikastypicallyallowedthemselvestobedictatedbythedogmaoftheJPŚ.Thisistosuchanextentthattheyhadconsistentlyanddogmaticallytoexplaintheirassertionofnon-acquisitionbeingneveroutflow‑freeassimplyaVaibhāṣikapostulate—onethatisacorollaryoftheJPŚdefinition.

11.3.1.1. Acquisition, obtainment (pratilambha/lābha) and endowment (samanvāgama)

Itwasatarelativelylaterstagethatacquisitioncametobedefinedgenerallyasthe dharmathateffectstherelationofanydharmatoalivingbeing(santāna).Atthisstage,twomoreterms,obtainment (pratilambha/lābha)andendowment(samanvāgama),thencametobedistinguishedintheexplanationofacquisition. However, it is tobenoted thateven in thepost‑AKBmanuals, theyarestillregardedassynonymsofacquisition,eventhoughtheyareatthesametimeusedtodesignatetwodifferentcasesofthelatter,asisclearfromtheabovequotationfromtheAvatāra.TheADVtooclearlystates:“Whatiscalled‘acquisition’issynonymouslycalled‘endowment’,‘obtainment’” (prāptir nāma samanvāgamo lābha iti paryāyaḥ).Ifthisistobeconsideredanambiguity,itisalreadysointheMVŚ:Infascicle15740ofthiswork,itquotesthePrajñapti-śāstratoshowthatacquisition,obtainment andendowment aresynonyms“differinginsoundbutnotinmeaning”.41Butinfascicle16242ofthesamework,sevendifferencesbetweenacquisitionandendowmentareenumerated:

[I] Somesay:thenamesthemselvesaredifferent:onenamedacquisition,the other endowment.


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[II] Somesay:theacquisitionofwhathasnotbeenacquiredisnamedacquisition; the acquisitionofwhat has alreadybeen acquired isendowment.

[III] Somesay:theacquisitionattheveryfirstinstanceisnamedacquisition;thesubsequentrepeatedacquisitionisnamedendowment.

[IV] Somesay:theendowment(sam-anu-ā-√gam)ofwhathasnotbeenpreviouslyendowedisnamedacquisition;theendowmentofwhathasalreadybeenendowedisnamedendowment.

[V] Somesay:whatdidnotpreviouslybelongtoone,nowbelongstoone—thisisnamedacquisition;whathasalreadybelongedtoonenow[continuesto]belongtoone—thisisnamedendowment.

[VI] Somesay:theacquisitionatthefirstinstanceisnamedacquisition;thenon‑interruptionofwhat has alreadybeen acquired is namedendowment.

[VII] Somesay:theinitialobtainmentisnamedacquisition;thenot‑losingofwhat has alreadybeen acquired is named endowment.Hence,whereasacquisitionappliestothefirstmoment,endowmentappliestoboththefirstandsubsequentmoments.

FromthesedifferentopinionsrecordedintheMVŚ,twobasicformsofdistinctionbetweenacquisitionandendowmentarediscernible: thefirst isbasedonthestage—firstmomentorsubsequently—atwhichagivendharmacomestobeacquiredbytheindividual;thesecondfocusesontheacquireddharmaitself—whetheritisacquiredorpossessedbytheindividualforthefirsttime,orwhetheritisre‑acquiredorbeingcontinuouslypossessedsubsequently.

Vasubandhu’sdistinctionbetweenobtainmentandendowmentintheAKBisbasedon[VI]and[VII]andessentiallyfollowsthefirstforminasmuchastheformerissaidtorefertothefirstmomentofobtainment,whetherornotthegivendharma isacquiredfortheveryfirsttimeorre‑obtainedafterhavingbeenlost:

Acquisitionisoftwotypes:theobtainment(lābha = pratilambha)ofwhathasnotbeenacquiredorofwhathasbeenlost[andre‑acquired],andtheendowmentwithwhat has alreadybeenobtained. It is established thatnon-acquisitionistheopposite.43

Saṃghabhadra’sdistinction,incontrast,isbasedon[II],andessentiallyfollowsthesecondform:

Althoughacquisition,obtainmentandendowmenthavethesamemeaning,thesedifferentnamesaregivenfromdifferentperspectives.Therearetwotypesofacquisition:thatofwhathasnotbeenpreviouslyacquiredandthatofwhathasalreadybeenpreviouslyacquired.Theacquisitionofwhathasnotbeenacquirediscalledobtainment.Theacquisitionofwhathasbeenacquiredpreviouslyiscalledendowment.


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Non-acquisitionistobeunderstoodasoppositetothis:thatofwhathasnotbeenpreviouslyacquiredandthatofwhathasbeenacquiredandlost.The non-acquisitionofwhathasnotbeenpreviously acquired is callednon-obtainment(apratilambha).Thenon-acquisitionofwhathasbeenlostiscallednon-endowment(asamanvāgama).Thus,thenatureofanordinaryworldling is called the non‑obtainment of theārya-dharma‑s [since anordinaryworldlinghasneveryetacquiredanyārya-dharma].44

11.3.1.2. Temporal distinctions of acquisition and non-acquisition

An acquisitionmayarisesimultaneously(sahaja)withtheacquireddharma;thisiscomparabletoashadowthatfollowsthefigure.Itmayariseprior(agraja)to the dharmatobeacquiredbyanindividualseries;thisiscomparabletotheheadbull(vṛṣabha)thatleadstheherd,sinceitconducestothearisingofthedharma.Itmayalsoarisesubsequent(paścātkālaja)totheacquireddharma;thisiscomparabletoacalfthatfollowsthemother,sinceitremainsaftertheacquireddharmahasceased.

The Avatāragivesexamplesofeachkind:

Thefirstkindofacquisitionismostlylikethatofthenon‑veiled‑non‑defineddharma‑s.

Thesecondkindismostlylikethatoftheskillfuldharma‑softhesensesphereatthemomentwhenonewhohas‘fallen’fromahigherstageandisabouttobereborn(pratisaṃdhi)inthesphereofsensuality.

The thirdkind ismostly like thatof theunderstanding(prajñā)derivedfromlistening(śrutamayī),fromreflection(cintāmayī),etc.,excludingthesimultaneousacquisitions.

Here, abrief commentary (vibhāṣā) [as towhichdharma‑s havewhichkindsofacquisition]isinorder:

The skillful and unskillfulmatter belonging to the sense sphere havesimultaneousandposterior,butnotanterior,acquisition.

Allnon‑veiled‑non‑defineddharma‑sandveiled‑non‑definedinformativematter(nivṛtāvyākṛta-vijñapti-rūpa)haveonlysimultaneousacquisitionsexcludingthesupernormalfacultiesofvisionandaudition(cakṣurabhijñā,śrotābhijñā)andthetransformation‑thought(nirmāṇa-citta)[which,beingstrong(balavat)andachievedthroughaspecialeffort(prayogaviśeṣa),canhaveallthreekindsofacquisition],andexcludingasmallpartamongtheartsandcrafts(śailpa-sthānika)anddeportment(airyāpathika)whichhavebeenintenselypracticed.Theydonothaveanteriorandposterioracquisitiononaccountoftheirfeebleness(durbalatvāt).

Allremainingdharma‑scanhavetheposterior,anteriorandsimultaneousacquisition.45


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ThefollowingdiscussionintheMVŚonthefettersoffersanotherillustrationofthethreetypesofacquisition:

Thosefettersthatarepresent—dotheybindnow?

Answer:Thosefettersthatarepresent,theybindnow.Thatis,thepresentfettersnecessarilyhavepresentacquisition‑s.Thisislikethecaseofashapeanditsshadow:theshadowisnecessarilyco‑existent[withtheshape].

Therearefettersthatbindnow,buttheyarenotpresent.Thatis,fettersthatarepastorfuturewhichbindnow:thepastorfuturefettershavepresentacquisition.Thepast fettersare like thebull that leads theacquisition‑s[whicharelikethecalves].Thefuturefettersarelikethecalvesthatgobehind theacquisitions.Because their acquisitionsarepresent, theyaresaidtobindnow.46

Thetemporaldistinctionsofacquisitionandnon-acquisitionarealsomadefromtheobserver’sperspective,andinthiswaydharma‑softhethreeperiodsoftimecanineachcasehavethreevarietiesofacquisition—past,presentandfuture.Thisgives rise toa totalofninepossiblevarieties:Thus,adharmawhich ispastfromtheobserver’sperspectivecanhaveanacquisitionwhich—fromthedharma’sownperspective—maybepast,presentorfuture,sincetheacquisitionmaybeprior to, simultaneouswithorsubsequent to it.Thesameapplies toapresentandfuturedharma.However,notalldharma‑scanhavethethreefold—prior‑simultaneous‑subsequent—acquisitions.Thus, the acquisitions ofsomenon‑veiled‑non‑defineddharma‑s—e.g.,thosethatareretribution‑born(vipākaja)andmatter—canonlybesimultaneous:Anindividualdoesnotacquirethesedharma‑spriororsubsequenttotheirarising.Thisissaidtobeduetotheweaknessofthesedharma‑sonaccountoftheirnotbeingaresultofaneffort.47

Moreover,theacquisitionsoftheunconditioneddharma‑salsocannotbesubjectedtothisthreefolddistinctionsincetheytranscendthetemporalprocessaltogether.

As fornon-acquisition, only the past and futuredharma‑s can havenon-acquisitionswhicharepast,presentorfuture.Dharma‑sthatarepresentfromtheindividual’sperspectivecanonlybepastorfuture.Thatis,therecanbenonon-acquisitionthatissimultaneouswiththedharmawhichispresentlybeingacquiredby the individual—adharma that ispresentlybeing linked to theindividualisnotatthesametimebeingdelinked.

11.3.1.3. Acquisition and spiritual praxis

The Ābhidharmika recognitionof thedoctrinal importanceof acquisition isdiscernibleinthefactthatitappearsattheverytopofthevariouslists—ofboththeabhidharmaschoolsandtheYogācāra—subsequenttothestagewhenthecategoryofconditioningsdisjoinedfromthoughthadbeenfullyarticulateddoctrinally.FortheSarvāstivādainparticular,giventheirtheoryoftri‑temporal


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existence,acquisitionhadbecomeasine qua nonforthemechanismofdefilementaswellaspurification.Adefilementasarealdharmaexistsalways(sarvadā asti);itcannotbedestroyed.Butitslinkagewiththepractitionereffectedbythecorrespondingacquisitioncanbeseveredbyinterruptingtheacquisition‑series.Likewise,apuredharma canonlycome tobepossessedby thepractitionerthrough the operation of anacquisition that effects the linkage (infra, §12).Acquisition,althoughconditionedinitselfbutneithermentalnormaterialinnature,infactplaystheindispensableroleofrelatingtheunconditionedtotheconditioned.Itisthesine qua nonforperson’sexperienceofnirvāṇa.Moreover,nirvāṇabecomesauniquepersonalspiritualexperienceonlybyvirtueoftheacquisitionthatlinksthenirvāṇatohim(infra,§16).

11.3.2. Group-homogeneity (nikāya-sabhāga, sabhāgatā)

Thisisaforcewhichcausesthemutualsimilarityamongsentientbeings.Thisisapplicableonlytosentientbeingsandwhatpertainstosentientbeings.TheAKB,theNyandtheSPrŚspeakofsattva-sabhāgatāanddharma-sabhāgatā.Theformeroperatesonsentientbeings.Thelatteroperatesonthedharma‑spertainingtosentientbeings,distinguishingthemastheskandha,āyatanaanddhātuwhichconstitutethebasisofthesattva-sabhāgatā.

Thereisnosuchforceoperatingamongnon‑sentientthings.48 SaṃghabhadraherepointsoutthattheBuddhahasneverspokenofsuchanon‑sentienthomogeneity.Thereasonis,accordingtohim,thatamongnon‑sentientthings,suchasgrassandtrees,therearenosuchmutualsimilaritieswithregardtofunctionalitiesandinclinationsasinthecaseofsentientbeings.Moreover,itisbecauseofsentientbeingsthatgrass,etc.,cometobeproduced.Furthermore,thisdharmaisgeneratedonlyonaccountofpreviouskarmaandpresentactiveeffort(prayatna),andboththesefactorsarenotfoundamongthenon‑sentient.49

BoththeADV50andtheNy51informusthatnikāya-sabhāgatāisthetermusedinthe Sarvāstivādacanonicalabhidharmatexts.Saṃghabhadradefinesitasfollows:52

Thereisadistinctentitycalledsabhāgatā.Itisthemutualsimilarity(sādṛśya)amongsentientbeings.Thecauseofsimilarity(sābhāgya-kāraṇa)amongvarious species of sentient beings born in the sameplaneof existence(gati),withregardtothebody(śarīra),shape(saṃsthana),the[specific]functionalitiesofthefaculties(indriya),andfood(āhāra),etc.,aswellasthecausefortheirmutuallysimilarinclinations(ruci),iscallednikāya-sabhāga.

Saṃghabhadrafurtherstresses thatkarmaalonecannotfullydeterminesuchsimilarities:

Justaskarma,thecittaandtheGreatElementsareallthecausefortheclearmatter(rūpa-prasāda)[ofwhichthesenseorgansareconstituted],thusthebodyandshape,etc.,arenotcausedbykarmaalone,foritisobservedthat


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thebodiesandshapes[ofsentientbeings]areresultsprojected(ā-√kṣip)bymutuallysimilarkarma,[andyet]thereexistdifferenceswithregardtothefaculties,functionalitiesandfood,etc.Ifonesaysthatsuchdifferencesresultfromthoseinthecompletingkarma‑s(paripūraka-karma),itisnotreasonable, for there canbebodies and shapeswhich are projectedbysimilarprojectingkarma (ākṣepaka-karma);itisonaccountoftherebeingdifferenceinthegroup‑homogeneitythatthefunctionalitiesbecomedifferent.Ifthebodiesandshapes,etc.,arenomorethantheresultofkarma,thenitwouldnotbepossible[forbeings]toabandonorperformanyfunctioninaccordancewiththeirinclination.Herein,sa(homogeneity)becauseofthemutualsimilaritiesinphysicalappearances,functionalitiesandinclination;bhāgameanscause(nimitta).Thereisadistinctrealentitythatisthecauseofthishomogeneity,henceitisnamedsabhāga.

In the Sarvāstivādadoctrineofkarma,one’sexistenceisdeterminedbytwotypesof karma.(1)Theprojectingkarmawhichresultsinone’sbeingborninaparticularplaneofexistence(infra,§13).Thisexistenceisdesignatedprincipallybyone’snikāya-sabhāgasince“itisonlywhenoneacquiresthenikāya-sabhāgathatoneissaidtobeborn”.53(2)Amultiplicityofcompletingkarma‑swhichtogetherdetermine the particularities of the existence so projected.Nikāya-sabhāga inactingalongwiththecompletingkarma‑stoworkouttheseparticularities,contributestothesimilaritiessodescribedamongmembersofthesamespecies.

TheAKB,ADVandAvatāradividenikāya-sabhāgaintothegeneral(abhinna)andspecific(bhinna)types.TheAvatāra:54

Thegroup‑homogeneity is the cause for the similarities in striving andinclinationamongsentientbeings(sattvānāmekārtharuciḥ sādṛśyahetubhūta).Thisissubdividedintotwo:(i)non‑differentiated[orgeneral](abhinna),and(ii)differentiated[orparticular](bhinna).

Inthefirstcase,allsentientbeingsequallyhaveself‑attachment(ātmasneha),aresimilarlynourishedbyfood,andhavesimilarinclinations(rati)—thiscause of sameness (sāmya) is named the [general] group‑homogeneity.Each[sentientbeing]haswithinhimhisowngroup‑homogeneity.

Inthesecondcase,sentientbeingsmaybelongtodifferentspheres,stages,planesofexistence,births,caste(jāti);theymaybemale,female,upāsaka,bhikṣu,trainee,non‑trainee,etc.Withineachbeing[ofagivencategory],there is adharmawhich is the distinguishing cause (pratiniyama-hetu)forthesimilarityinstrivingandinclination[amongmembersofthesamecategory].Thisisnamedthegroup‑homogeneity.Ifthiswerenon‑existent,therewouldbeconfusioninall theconventionalusages(lokavyavahāra)suchasārya,non‑ārya,etc.55


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11.3.3. Ideationless attainment, cessation attainment and ideationlessness

Thewordsamāpatti (< sam-ā-√pad)meansattainment.InBuddhism,itmeans,inparticular,theattainmentofameditativestate.Fortheabhidharmascholiasts,it connotes an attainment inwhich there is complete evenness inmind andbody—a connotation supposedly conveyedby the prefix sam taken in thesenseofsamatā(‘evenness’,‘equality’).XuanZang’srenderingofthistermas等至 (‘equal‑attainment’/‘equanimity‑attainment’) aswell as定 (‘equipoise’,‘evenness’, ‘stableness’), and theTibetan snyoms par ‘jug pa, ‘entering intoevenness/equanimity’,reflectthisconnotation.Theideationlessattainmentandcessationattainmentaretwomeditativeattainmentsinwhichthereiscompletelynomentalactivityatall.Butjustasnirvāṇaisnotamerestateofabsenceofduḥkhabutapositiveentitycapableofabsolutelyhinderingthefurtherarisingofalldefilements(infra,§16),likewisethesetwoattainmentstooarerealentities.

The ideationless attainment (asaṃjñi-samāpatti) is soughtbyanordinaryworldlingwho falsely conceives of the state of extinctionof all ideation asliberationandofthisattainmentasitsmeans.Heentersintothisbyfirstresolvingtoextinguishallideations.Saṃghabhadraexplainsthatitiscalledthus“becauseitisonaccountofbeingdisgustedwithideationsthatoneentersintothissamāpatti. The pṛthagjana‑sarenotcapableofbeingdisgustedwithsensations(vedanā),foritisonaccountofbeingattachedtosensationsthattheyenterintosamāpatti‑s.”56

Thisattainmentissubsumedunderthefourthdhyāna:

Whenonehasbeendetachedwithregardtothethirdbutnottothefourthdhyāna, there isadisjoineddharma,named the ideationlessattainment,[whichcancause]thecessationofthethoughtandthought‑concomitantsofoneinthestageofthefourthdhyāna.57

The cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti),alsocalledtheattainmentofthecessationofsensationandideation(saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha-samāpatti),belongstothestageofexistence‑peak(bhavāgra);thatisthestageofthefourthārūpya,the neither-ideation‑nor‑non‑ideation attainment (naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñā-samapatti),whichisthehigheststageofsaṃsāricexistence:

Whenonehasbeendetachedwith regard to theabodeofno‑thing‑ness(ākiṃcanyāyatana), there is a disjoineddharma [which can cause] thecessationofthethoughtandthought‑concomitantsofonein[thestageof]the existence‑peak.Asitcausestheeven(sama)continuationoftheGreatElements,itisnamedthecessation‑attainment.58

An āryawhoseekstoabideintranquilityandloathesdistractioncanenterintoit.Hedoessobyfirstapplyinghismindtothethoughtofappeasement,resolvingtoextinguishboth ideationand sensation.59 In fact, anordinaryworldling isincapableofthisattainment,sinceheisincapableoftranscendingthedefilements


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pertainingtothestageofexistence‑peak,whichareabandonablebyvision.60 Notallārya‑s,however,canacquirethisattainmentatthetimeofacquiringtheexistence‑peak—ithastobeacquiredthrougheffort(prayoga).“ItisonlyinthecaseofaBuddhaBhagavat[—whoisabsolutelyfreefromallhindrancesofmeditativeattainment(samāpatty-āvaraṇa-vimukta)61—]thatitsobtainmentissaidtobeby[themerefactof]detachment:Attheverymomentofobtainingthe knowledgeofexhaustion(kṣaya-jñāna),Heisalreadycapableofproducingthisattainmentatwill—thequalities(guṇa)ofaBuddhaarenotthroughanyexertion;theyappearbeforeHimassoonasHedesiresthem—itis[inthissense]thatHeissaidtohaveobtainedit.”62

The ideationlessness (āsaṃjñika) is the rebirth state of ideationlessnesswhich is the retribution fruit of the ideationless attainment.Like the latter,it isnotamerestatebutareal forcecapableofcausing thecessationof thethought and thought‑concomitants of thoseborn among thedeitieswho areideationlessbeings(asaṃjñi-sattva).Ittemporarily(kālāntaraṃ)preventsthearisingofallmentalactivities,likeadamwhichpreventstheflowofariver(nadītoyasaṃnirodhavat).63However, the ideationlessattainmenthasonly theideationlessnessandmatterofthosebeingsasitsretribution.Theirhomogeneityandvitalfacultyareretributedbythefourthdhyāna,whereinthoughtexists,andtheremainingaggregates(skandha)areretributedbyboththisattainmentandthefourthdhyāna.64TheseideationlessbeingsdwellintheIdeationlessHeavenwhichisanelevatedabodeintheGreat‑fruit(bṛhatphala)Heavenwithinthefourthdhyāna.65Whenmentationarisesanewinthem,theyfall(cyavante)fromtheirabodeandarenecessarilyreborninthesphereofsensuality,forthosewhoaretobebornintheIdeationlessHeavennecessarilypossessakarmaretributableinthesphereofsensualityintheexistenceafterthenext(aparaparyāya-vedanīya),justasthosewhoaretobebornintheUttarakurunecessarilypossessakarma thatwillleadtorebirthinaheavenlyplaneofexistence.66

11.3.4. Vital faculty (jīvitendriya)

Theword ‘faculty’ (indriya) is said to denote sovereignty or dominance(ādhipatya).67 The Sarvāstivādaacknowledges22faculties.68TheMVŚexplainsthatthedominanceofthevitalfacultyconsistsin(i)enablingonetoassertthatabeingisinpossessionofthefaculties(sa-indriya),(ii)sustainingthefaculties.69 Theformerimpliesthatsentienceisdefinedbythepresenceofthevitalfaculty;thelatter,thatitisthesine qua nonforbeingaliveasopposedtobeingdead.“Abodypossessingthefacultieslives”(sendriyaḥ kāyo jīvati).70Thuspresenceofthevitalfacultysufficientlydefinesalivingsentientbeing.TheMVŚmakesthecleardistinction:

Dharma‑spossessingthefaculty[—sentient—]anddharma‑sdevoidofthefaculties[—non‑sentient—]aredifferent.71


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ThisBuddhistviewiscontrastedwiththeJainadoctrinethatexternalthings—water,plants,etc.,—arealsosentient,asthevitalfacultyexistsinall,i.e.,internalandexternal.72

The definition given in the canonicalabhidharma texts is a simple one.Thus,thePrŚ:

Whatisthevitalfaculty?Thelifeprinciple(āyus)inthethreespheres.73

TheMVŚquotesand follows thisdefinition.74However,wecan seealreadyin this text the doctrine of this category in the process of development andelaborationontheonehand,andcertaincontroversiesrelatingtoitontheother.First, inspiteofitsadoptionofthedefinitionfromthePrŚ,theMVŚquotesvarious opinions distinguishing thevital faculty conditioning (jīvitendriya-saṃskāra)andthelifeprincipleconditioning(āyuḥsaṃskāra),withoutmakinganycomment.75Explainingthepossibilityofanarhat’sabilitytowillfullyprolongorshortenhislife,itrecordsanopinionby‘some’thatsuchapossibilityisbyvirtueofanarhat’smasteryoverthepowerofsamādhi.Withthis,hetransformsthemomentum for the duration (sthitikālāvedha) of themahābhūta‑s of thefacultiesandprojects,throughhispowerofsamādhi,anewmomentumforthesame.Thisamountstosayingthatthevitalfacultyisameredesignationofthesaidmomentum.ThecompilersoftheMVŚrejectsthisexplanationandstatesthatthevitalfacultyexistsasadistinctentitywhichisnotofthenatureofthemahābhūta‑softhefaculties.76Althoughitselfneithermaterialnormental,thevitalfacultycanoperate(vṛt)witheitherasitssupportingbasis.Thequestionisaskedastowhysomeoneborninthesphereofsensualitycangiverisetothe cessationattainment,butnotsomeoneintheimmaterialsphere.TheMVŚanswersasfollows:

The vital faculty operateswith twodharma‑s as its supporting basis:1. matter,2.thought.Thismeditationisdevoidofthought,havingarisenbythecuttingoffofthoughts.

Whensomeoneborninthesphereofsensualitygivesrisetothismeditation,thevitalfacultyoperateswithmatterasitssupportingbasiseventhoughthoughtshavebeencutoff.

Whensomeonebornintheimmaterialspheregivesrisetothismeditation,thevitalfacultyoperateswiththoughtasitssupportingbasiseventhoughmatterhasbeencutoff.

[However,]ifsomeoneborn[intheimmaterialsphere]weretogiverisetothismeditation—therebeingneithermatternorthought—thevitalfacultywouldbeinterruptedintheabsenceofasupportingbasis.Thepersonshouldthenbesaidtobedeadandnotinthestateofmeditation.77


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TheseearlydoctrinalramificationsandcontroversiespertainingtothecategoryarecontinuedinlatertextssuchastheAKB,theNy78andtheAvatāra.IntheAKB,VasubandhugivesaSautrāntikanotionofthevitalfaculty—similartotheonegivenby‘some’intheMVŚquotedabove:Itisnotadistinctentity(dravyāntara),butsimply“themomentumofthedurationofthegroup‑homogeneity,[projected]bythekarmainthethreespheresofexistence”.79 Saṃghabhadrareactstothis:

Thatthelifeprincipleexistsasarealentityhasbeenprovedinthesectiondealingwiththefaculties.80Here,wewillmerelyquestiontheKośakārathus:Where there are not thefive internal rūpāyatana‑s, projected bykarma, theremaysometimesnotbe thesixthāyatana,manas,projectedbykarma[whichismorallynon‑defined(avyākṛta)]—thatis,inthecasewheresomeoneforalongtimecontinuouslygivesrisetoakliṣṭa vijñāna,or kuśala-sāsrava or anāsrava vijñāna—thereisnomomentum(āvedha)whichisaretributionprojectedbykarma;whatistheretobecalledthelifeprinciple? If there is in thiscaseakarmic retributionwhichalwaysexistsuninterruptedfromthemomentofconceptionuntildeath,thenwemaysaythatthereisamomentumcalledvitalfacultyprojectedbykarma,byvirtueofwhichabeingcontinuestoexistduringadeterminedperiodoftime.Butsucharetributionforceisnotfoundinthiscase.Howthencanwesaythatthevitalfacultyexistsherein?Thisbeingthecase,whatdharmaisreferredtoasthemomentumforthedurationprojectedbykarma?Therebeingno[such]momentumforthedurationprojected,towhomthendoesthespecifiedseriesbelong?Therebeingnosuchspecifiedseries,inwhatsensecanitbeclaimedthatthelifeprincipleisthatwhichenduresforaslongasitissodetermined[bythekarma]toendure.…

Hencethelifeprinciplewhichexistsasadistinctentity,capableofsupportingwarmth(ūṣman)andconsciousness, iscalled thevital faculty.Thisvitalfacultydoesnotoperatewithonlythebodyasitssupportingbasis,sincethevitalfacultyexistsintheimmaterialsphere.Nordoesitoperatewithonlythoughtasitssupportingbasis,sincethevitalfacultyalsoexistsinonewhoisinthestatedevoidofthought.Ifso,withwhatasthesupportingbasisdoesthevitalfacultyoperate?Itsoperationhastheprojectingkarmainapreviouslifeandthegroup‑homogeneityofthepresentlifeasitssupportingbasis.81

Skandhila and the author of theADV likewise react to the Sautrāntikainterpretation,definingandarguinginvirtuallyidenticalterms:

A[realentity]projectedbypreviouskarma,servingasthecausefortheuninterruptedseriesofthesixentrances(āyatana)[ofthehumanpersonality],andformingthebasisforthedesignation(prajñapti)ofthefourbirthsandthefiveplanesofexistences—this isnamedthevitalfaculty.It isalsocalledthelifeprinciple(āyus)…Apartfromthevitalfaculty,therecouldbenootherdharmaofthenatureofafaculty,foundinallthethreespheres(traidhātukavyāpin),continuinguninterruptedforagivenperiodofexistence


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andformingthebasisforthedesignationofthefourbirthsandthefiveplanesofexistence.82

11.3.5. The four characteristics of the conditioned (saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa)

Thesefourcharacteristics—sometimescalledtheprimarycharacteristics—areintrinsictoaconditioneddharma,operatingonitsothatitarisesonlytocease.A dharmapossessingthesefourcharacteristicsissaidtobeaconditioneddharma. TheVaibhāṣikasmaintain that there are fourof themeven though the sūtra speaksofonlythree.83Theapparentdiscrepancyisexplainedawayasfollows:Durationisthecharacteristicwhichsupportstheconditioneddharma‑smakingthemstayandtowhichbeingseasilygetattached.Thisisincontrasttotheotherthreecharacteristicswhichcausethetransitorinessoftheconditioneddharma‑s,helping them traverse through the three periods of time.Thus, inorder thatbeingsmaygetdisgustedwiththeconditioned,theBuddhadoesnotenumeratedurationseparately.Thetwocharacteristics,durationandchange,arespokenoftogetherasone,“justasŚrī[thegoddessofprosperity]andKālakarṇī[thegoddessofbadluck]”.84

(i) Theproduction-characteristic (jāti-lakṣaṇa)enablesadharmatoarise.The Avatāraexplainsthat“thecausesofproductionofdharma‑saretwofold:(i)internaland(ii)external.Theformeristheproduction‑characteristicandthelattercomprisesthesixcausesorthefourconditions.”85

Saṃghabhadradefinesproduction‑characteristicasfollows:

Herein,productionisadistinctdharmawhichisthedominantcauseofnon‑obstructionatthestageofarisingoftheconditionings;foritinducesthem,enablingthemtoarise.‘Inducingthem’referstothefactthatatthe timeoftheirarising,thisdharmaservesastheirdominantcondition.Whileallarisingoftheconditionediscalledproduction(jāti),thisname,production,isgivensolelyfromthepointofviewofitsbeingthedominantcauseofnon‑obstructionatthestageofthearisingoftheconditionings.86

The production‑characteristicoperatesonthedharmathatisabouttoarise,i.e.,whenitisinthefutureperiod.Butitcannotoperatealone;87anditisforthisreasonthatthefuturedharma‑sdonotallariseatonce.Saṃghabhadraelaboratesonthis:

The production‑characteristicservesastheconascentproximatecause(āsanna-kāraṇa) and produces the produced, i.e., the conditioneddharma‑s.But [theirproduction isnotbroughtaboutbyproduction‑characteristic alone]; thismust be assistedby the assemblageof thepreviouscausesoftheirownspeciesaswellasotherexternalconditions.Thisisjustlikethecaseofaseedandearthservingasdistinctivecauseandconditions(hetupratyaya-viśeṣa),[together]assistingtheproductionofsprout,etc.88


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(ii) Theduration-characteristic (sthiti-lakṣaṇa) is the internal cause ofadharmawhichenablesittostaytemporarily.Itis“adistinctdharmawhichis the dominant cause of non‑obstruction for the conditioned [dharma] thathasbeenproducedbutnotyetdestroyed,toproject itsownfruit”.89 Thismeansthatdurationisanecessaryand,infact,thedominantconditionforaconditioneddharmatoexerciseitskāritra,definedbytheVaibhāṣikaasthe activityforprojectingadharma’sownemanationfruit(niṣyanda-phala).90 Thischaracteristicdoesnotmakeadharmastaylong,asitoperatesatthetimewhenthedharmaisdisappearing:

[Theconditionings]cannotbesaidtostayatthetimewhentheyhavedisappearedorwhentheyarebeingproduced,as[atthesetimes]theyarewithoutkāritra.… . It is only at the timeof disappearing thatthe conditionings possess the activity of projecting fruit (kāritra of phalākṣepa).91

(iii)Thedeterioration (/decay)-characteristic (jarā/anyathātva-lakṣaṇa)isthedistinctinternalforceofadharmawhichimpairs(vi-√han)itsactivityofprojectingfruit,renderingitincapableoffurtherprojectinganotherdistinctfruit.Itis“thecausefortheconditionedtobedifferentinthesubsequent[moment]fromtheprevious[moment],initscontinuationasaseries”.92Itisarguedthatwithouttheoperationofthisforceaconditioneddharmawillkeeponprojectingonedistinctfruitafteranotherad infinitum.Andifthiswouldbethecase,itoughtnottobemomentary(kṣaṇika)innature,asweexperienceit.93

(iv)The impermanence(/disappearance)-characteristic (anityatā/vyaya-lakṣaṇa)isthatinternalforcethatcausesapresentdharmawhoseactivityhasbeenimpairedbythedeterioration‑characteristic,toenterintothepast.In other words,itmakesthedharmaimpermanent.

11.3.5.1. Operation of the characteristics at different phases of the dharma’s arising

IntheMVŚ,theDārṣṭāntikasholdthatthethreecharacteristicsrepresentthreedifferentstagesoftheexistenceofadharma:

There are some, such as theDārṣṭāntikas,who hold that the threecharacteristics of the conditioned do not pertain to a singlemoment.Theyassert:“Iftherearethethreecharacteristicswithinasinglemoment,thenadharmawouldbeproduced,deteriorateandvanishatoneandthesametime.Butthisisnotreasonable,fortheyaremutuallycontradictory.Itshouldbestatedthus:productionreferstotheinitialarisingofadharma;impermanencereferstoitsfinaldisappearance;deteriorationreferstothematuration[process]inbetween.94


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In theAKB, theSautrāntikas argue in a rather similarmanner.Theyassertthatthesefourcharacteristicsareidenticalinsubstancewiththeconditioneddharma‑stheycharacterize.For,iftheyexistasrealentitiesapartfromthelatter,thenaconditioneddharma shouldall,at thesame time,bearising,staying,deterioratingandceasing.95

The VaibhāṣikarepliesthatinfactthisSautrāntikapropositionwouldentailthat,justasthecharacterizedandthecharacteristicsareidentical,thecharacteristicsthemselves should alsonot bemutually different. Ifso,dharma‑s shouldbeproducedwhentheyareactuallydisappearing,andshouldbedisappearingwhentheyarebeingproduced.Orrather,theyareneverproducedatall.96

SaṃghabhadraexplainsthatthesimultaneousexistenceofthecharacteristicsdoesnotresultinthefallacypointedoutbytheSautrāntika‑Dārṣṭāntikas:

Thefourcharacteristicsexercisetheiractivitiesatdifferentstages(avasthā):At the timewhenadharmaisarising,thejāti-lakṣaṇaexercisesitsactivity.When[thisdharma]hasreachedthestageofhavingarisen,thethree—sthiti,jarāandvyaya—exercisetheirrespectiveactivitiesatthesametime.Thus,thefourcharacteristicsexercisetheiractivitiesatdifferenttimesandthereisnofallacythatoneandthesamedharmaarises,stays,deterioratesandceasesatthesametime.97

11.3.5.2. Secondary characteristics (anulakṣaṇa)

These four primary characteristics, themselves being conditioned just asthe dharma‑s they characterize, possess four secondary characteristics(anulakṣaṇa),viz.:production‑production(jāti-jāti),duration‑duration(sthiti-sthiti)deterioration‑deterioration(jarā-jarā)andimpermanence‑impermanence(anityatā-anityatā).This,however,doesnotleadtoaninfiniteregression.Eachofthefourprimarycharacteristicscharacterizeseightdharma‑s,buteachofthesecondarycharacteristicscancharacterizeonlyonedharma.Asamatteroffact,whenadharmaisproduced,ninedharma‑sco‑arise—thedharmaitself,thefourprimarycharacteristicsandthefoursecondarycharacteristics.Theprimarycharacteristic,production,producestheothereightdharma‑s,excludingitself.Thesecondarycharacteristic,production‑production,producesonlytheprimaryproduction,owingtoitsweaknesscomparedtotheprimaryproduction.Thesameappliestoeachoftheotherprimarycharacteristics,ontheonehand,andthethreecorrespondingsecondarycharacteristicsontheother.98TheMVŚgivesastraightforwardexplanationastowhyeachanulakṣaṇacanoperateononedharma only (i.e., aprimarycharacteristic),whereaseachmūla-lakṣaṇa canoperateontheeightdharma‑s:“Itissobyvirtueoftheverynatureofdharma‑s(dharmatā).”99AccordingtoSaṃghabhadra,thisis“becauseoftheirdifferenceinefficacy”(vṛtti/vyāpāra/sāmarthya).100


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11.3.6. Word-group (nāma-kāya), phrase-group (pada-kāya) and syllable-group (vyañjana-kāya)

In the Sarvāstivādaconception,thesethreecategories—whicharesynonymsrespectivelyforname(saṃjñā),sentence(vākya)andphoneme(akṣara)101　—arerealforcesthatoperateonwords,phrasesandsyllablesrespectively,makingmeaningfulhumancommunicationpossible.Thefactthatthesethreearelistedat theveryendof the listofviprayukta-saṃskāra‑smaysuggest theirbeingarticulatedandincorporatedintothelistatarelativelylatestage.ThedevelopmentofthisSarvāstivādindoctrineseemstohavebeeninfluencedbythecontemporaryMīmāṃsakasandtheGrammarians(Vaiyākaraṇa).102However,inthisprocess,theSarvāstivādinsconsciouslysteerclearoftheGrammariannotionoftheeternalsound,retainingthedistinctiveBuddhistemphasisofimpermanence.

11.3.6.1 Word (nāma) and the nature of Buddha-word (buddha-vacana)

AsPSJainihasobserved,thisVaibhāṣikadoctrinecanbetracedprimarilytotheirspeculationonthenatureofbuddha-vacana(‘Budha‑word’,‘WordsoftheBuddha’).103YaśomitraquotesthefollowingpassagesfromtheJPŚonthenatureof buddha-vacana:

Whatisbuddha-vacana?ThatwhichistheTathāgata’sspeech,words,talk,voice,explanation,vocal‑path,vocalsound,vocalaction,vocalexpression(vāgvijñapti)…

What is thisdharmawhichhas justbeen spokenof asbuddha-vacana?Thesequential arrangement, sequential establishment and sequentialcombinationofthenāma-kāya,pada-kāyaandvyañjana-kāya.104

TheMVŚexplainsthemotivesforthetwopassages:Thefirstisgiveninordertopreventmisconceptionofbuddha-vacana (buddha-vacana-saṃjñā)withregardtowhatisinfactnotbuddha-vacana,andtoshowthatwhatisspokenbytheBuddhaistruebuddha-vacana.105Elaboratingonthisfirstpassage,thecompilersoftheMVŚstatethatbuddha-vacanahasvocalinformation(vāg-vijñapti)asitsnature.Thesecondpassagequotedissaidtobeintendedtoshownotthenature,butthefunctionofbuddha-vacana.TheMVŚalsomentionsheretheopinionofsomewhoassertthatbuddha-vacanahasnāma,etc.,asitsnature.Thecompilersdonotrejectthisview;instead,theyinterpretitasreferringtovocalspeechasthesuccessivecause—speech(vāk)givesrisetonāma;nāmamanifeststheartha.However,properlyspeaking,ithasvāg-vijñaptiasitsnature.106

Thus,intheMVŚweseetwoviewsacceptabletotheorthodoxSarvāstivādins,althoughthefirstisthepreferredone.ThesametwoviewsarealsogivenintheAKB.There,Vasubandhusaysthatthosewhotakespeechasthenatureofbuddha-vacanasubsumetheBuddha’sdharma-skandha‑sundertherūpa-skandha;


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whereasthosewhotakenāmaasitsnaturesubsumethemunderthesaṃskāra-skandha.107AccordingtoYaśomitraalso,theĀbhidharmikasacceptbothviews.108 TheauthoroftheADValsoseemstoacceptbothviews;ashequotesanāgama passagewhichsaysthatwhentheBuddhawasalive,thebuddha-vacanawasofthenatureofbothvākandnāma,andafterHisParinirvāṇa,itisofthenatureofnāmaonly.109CollettCox,however,assertsthat“Yaśomitra’sinterpretationofthepositionoftheĀbhidharmikasconflictswiththatofferedbythe*Mahāvibhāṣā andSaṃghabhadra.ForthesetworepresentativesoftheKāśmīraSarvāstivāda‑Vaibhāṣikas,theintrinsicnatureoftheBuddha’steachingisspeech…”110But,aswehaveseen,thecompilersoftheMVŚactuallyacceptbothinterpretations.AstoSaṃghabhadra’spositioninthisregard,whatheactuallysaysisasfollows:

Someassertthatbuddha-vacanahasvākasitssvabhāva.Theyassertthatthe dharma-skandha‑sareallsubsumedundertherūpa-skandha,forvacana hasśabdaasitssvabhāva.

Some assert thatbuddha-vacana hasnāma as its svabhāva. They assertthatthedharma-skandha‑sareallsubsumedunderthesaṃskāra-skandha,for nāmaisofthenatureofa viprayukta-saṃskāra.[Now,]vākandvacana beingsynonyms,vacanamaybeconcededtobevāk;[but]nāmaandvāk aredistinctentities,sohowis the[buddha-]vacana nāma?Theyexplainthus:Theremustbenāmaforittobecalledvacana;hencethenatureofbuddha-vacanaisnoneotherthannāma.Why?Itiscalledbuddha-vacana becauseitconveysthearthatruly;nāmacanconveyartha;hencevacana isnāma.Accordingly,buddha-vacanadefinitelyhasnāmaasitssvabhāva.111

ItisclearfromtheabovepassagethatSaṃghabhadradoesnotparticularlyholdthatbuddha-vacanaisspeechinnaturenordoesheobjecttoeitherofthetwoviews.

11.3.6.2 Further investigation into the nature and function of nāma

Theconsiderationof thenatureofnāma, etc., in theMVŚhasalreadygonebeyondthepreoccupationwiththenatureofbuddha-vacana.Onadiscussionon“thegroupofmultiplewords”(bahu-nāma-kāya)intheJPŚ,theMVŚ112givesvariousviewsonitsmotives.Theseinclude:

(i) This discussion purports to analyze themeaning of the sūtra‑s.“Thus,thesūtrasays,‘Obhikṣu‑s,fromthetimewhentheTathāgatasappear in theworld, thenāma-pada-vyañjana-kāya‑s appear in theworld.’113Althoughitsaysthus,itdoesnotanalyzewhatthenāma-pada-vyañjana-kāya‑s are, this discussionhere intends to analyzethem.”


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(ii) Itpurportstodispeldoubtsinthosewhomightthinkthatwhiletheauthorisskilledinmeaning—therebeingtheanalysisofvariousmeaningsinthetreatise—hemightnotbeskilledinliteraryexpression.

(iii) ItisinordertorefutetheDārṣṭāntikasandothers,andtheŚābdikas—theformerdenytherealityofthethreecategories,thelatterholdthatthethreehaveśabdaastheirintrinsicnature.Theauthorintendstoshowthatnāma-kāya,etc.,arerealdharma‑s,subsumedundertheaggregateofdisjoinedconditionings(viprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha).

(iv‑vi)……

(vii) Itpurportstoelucidatethenatureofdefilementandpurification—thenāma-kāya,etc.,istherootofthatwhichelucidatesthesetwo.

FromthewaytheMVŚcitesthesūtrapassagewhichwequotedintheaboveparagraph,itisclearthattheSarvāstivādinsconsidernāma,etc.,asimpersonal,objectiveforces.ThissamepassageisalsocitedbySkandhilaandtheauthoroftheADV.Thelatter,infact,statesthatthenāma-kāya,etc.,whichconveysthedhātu,āyatanaandskandha‑sis apuruṣeya —notcreatedbyanyindividual.114

Skandhilaargues for theSarvāstivādaposition thatvocal sound (vāk-śabda)doesnotdirectlyconveytheobject‑referent(artha):

Lest it be thatwhenone utters theword (nāma) ‘fire’, one’smouth isimmediatelyburnt.115 Wordslike‘fire’,etc.,mustrelyonspeechfortheirproduction.Fromthewords,‘fire’,etc.,theobject‑referents,i.e.,fire,etc.,arethenconveyed.

Hefurtherexplainsthat

by‘conveying’ismeantproducinginothersacomprehension(buddhi)oftheobject‑referenttobeillumined(dyotita).Itdoesnotmeanthat[theword]uniteswiththeobject‑referent.116

The author of theADVexplains in a very similarmanner, summarizingasfollows:

Avocalsoundoperatesontheword;thewordexpressestheobject‑referent(vāṅ nāmni pravartate|nāmārthaṃ dyotayati).117

Bothmasterssimilarlycomparethistotheperceptualprocess:

Justasvisualconsciousness,etc.,areproducedwitheye,etc.,astheirsupport,manifestingwith an imageof the object (jñānavad arthasya pratinidhi-


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sthānīyāḥ),thevisible,etc.,and[thus]comprehendtheirrespectiveobjects.Thesameappliestowords,etc.118(Seealso§10.8.2).

TheSautrāntikasmaintainthatnāmaisnoneotherthanśabda.Onthispremise,it is argued that vocal sound cannot producenāmawhich, according to theSarvāstivādins,isaunitary,distinct,meaning‑conveyingentity:sounds,beingrūpa andhence resistant, cannotbecollocated; theymustarise serially. It isunreasonable tosay that the lastmomentofavocalsoundseriescreates thenāma, for in that case, the last soundalonewould suffice for the conveyingof theobject‑referent.Thesamedifficultiesarepresent if theSarvāstivādinsshouldarguethatvocalsoundproducesthevyañjanawhichinturnproducesthemeaning‑conveyingnāma.119Inreply,Saṃghabhadrafirstarguesfornāma beingdistinctfromsound:

Sometimesonegetsthesoundbutnotthephoneme;sometimesonegetsthephonemebutnotthesound.Henceweknowthattheydifferinsubstance.

Thefirstcaseisthatofhearingthesoundandnotcomprehendingtheartha:It isobservedthatsomepeoplelistentoothers’wordsvaguelyandthenask,“whatdidyousay?”Itisallbecausetheyhavenotcomprehendedthesyllablesuttered.Howthencanoneassertthatthesyllablesarenotdifferentfromthesound?

Thesecondcaseisthatofcomprehendingthearthawithouthearingthesound:Itisobservedthatsomepeople,withouthearingtheactualwordsspokenbyothers,knowwhattheyaresayingbywatchingthemovementoftheirlips,etc.Thisisallbecausetheyhavecomprehendedthesyllablesuttered.Thisprovesthatthesyllablesmustbedifferentfromthesounds.

Again,itisobservedintheworldthatpeoplerecitemantrasilently,henceweknowthatthesyllablesofamantradifferfromthesoundofthemantra.

Againitisobservedintheworldthatoftwodebaterswhosearticulationofthe soundissimilar,onelosesandtheotherwins.Thiscauseoflosingandwinningmustexistseparatelyfromthesound.

Again as the object‑domains (viṣaya) of the ‘unhinderedknowledgeofdharma-s’(dharma-pratisaṃvid)and‘unhinderedknowledgeofetymologicalinterpretation’ (nirukti-pratisaṃvid)120 are different,we know that thephonemesaredistinctfromsound.

Hence,[wemayconcludefromallthisthat]soundismerelythearticulationofalanguage,anditsformisnotdifferentiated.Theinflectionthereinmustbemade independenceonka, ca, ṭa, ta, pa,etc.Thephonememustbeutteredbymeansofvocalsound.Whenthephonemesarejoinedtogether,nāmaisproduced.Nāmahavingbeenproduced,itcanilluminatetheartha. Hence,weassertthefollowing[causal]sequence:vocalsoundgivesrisetonāma;nāmailluminatesartha.Therefore,itisuniversallyestablishedthat


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nāmaisdifferentfromśabda.Itshouldbeunderstoodherethatśabdaisthatwhichuttersandakṣara isthatwhichisuttered;arthaisneither.Thustheyareestablishedwithoutconfusion.121

As to theSautrāntika argument that sound arises serially andhence cannotcreateaunitarymeaning‑conveyingnāma,Saṃghabhadraturnstheopponents’argumentagainstthemselves:GiventheirVibhajyavādastandpoint,themeaningofawordcannotbeconveyedbyavocalsoundseries:

Theobjection[oftheopponentinfact]harmshisowntenet:“Givenhisassertionthatpastandfuture[dharma‑s]aredevoidofintrinsicnature,and[thefact]thatprecedingandsucceedingmomentsofsounddonotariseatonce,howcanthevyañjana,thenāma,thepadacometobeaccomplished?”Iftheprecedingmomentscontributetothesucceedingonessuccessively,sothatthelastmomentaccomplishes[theproductionof]thevyañjana,nāma andpada,[respectively],thenoneoughttobeabletounderstandtheartha bylisteningmerelytothelast[sound].

Moreover,thepastandthefuturebeingnon‑existent,thereisnosuccessivecontribution—since there is always only the single [present] thoughtmoment, how can there be successive contribution?There being nosuccessivecontribution,theprecedingandsucceedingmomentsaremutuallyalike.Thelastthoughtmoment,beingliketheinitialone,shouldnotbeabletoconvey[theartha];andonelisteningtothelast[sound]asif[listeningto]theinitialone,shouldnotbeabletounderstandtheartha.

Hence,hisassertionthatsoundcomestobeabletoconveytheartha[through]thesuccessivecontributionoftheprecedingtothesucceedingmoments,cannotbeestablished.122

Skandhilagivestwosuccinctreasonsforthelogicalnecessityofestablishingtheontologicalstatusofthethreecategories:

Assoundisresistantand,astheeternalsoundfalselyheldbythegrammarians(vaiyākaraṇena parikalpita)cannotbeestablishedlogically, therecannotbeanydharma[suchassound],apartfromthesethree—words,phrasesandsyllables—whicharecapableofconveyingacorrespondingobject‑referent.123

ThedisproofofsoundasbeingpermanentisapopularthemeinBuddhistlogicaltextswhichhardlyneedsmentioning.ThefirstreasonthatsoundisresistantshouldalsobeclearfromSaṃghabhadra’sargumentsabove:beingresistantrūpa,soundsmustariseinaseries,andthisentailsalltheunacceptablelogicalconsequenceasarguedbySaṃghabhadra.Moreover,forthesamereason,therecannotbearealcollocationofsounds inasinglemoment thatcanconstituteaunitary,discretedharmacallednāmacapableoftheuniquefunctionofconveyinganobject‑referent.AstheauthoroftheADVputsit,theycannotstandinunitylike


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abundleofbalbaja (/valvaja)grasspossessingthecollectivestrengthcontributedfromtheco‑existentstrands.124 For the Sarvāstivāda,sincenāmaisnotamentaldharma—asagreeduponevenbytheopponents—norcanitbearūpa or apermanentasaṃskṛta,asarealforceitmustexistasadisjoinedconditioning.


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NOTES

1 T26,528c.2 T26,547b.3 PrŚ,714a.4 Cf. Study,157.5 T26,920c.6 Ca.100B.C.E.;T26,692b.7 T26,694a.8 T28,978c.9 Cf.MVŚ,379a;AKB,13:nirvacanaṃ tu cittacaittānām āyaṃ tanvantīty āyatanāni |10 KusunkiKōshōdiscussesthesethreeitemsofobtainmentinconnectionwiththedoctrinaldevelopmentofnon-acquisitionandthenatureofanordinaryworldling.Cf.KusunkiKōshō,‘『發智論』『婆沙論』における得の展開について’. In: Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū,Dec,2007,vol.56,no.1,361.

11 MVŚ,730b12 MVŚ,198b.13 Cf.MVŚ,316b.14 Cf.MVŚ,97a.15 JPŚ,929a.16 JPŚ,1008a–b.17 In theYogācāraworks around this period (i.e.,4th and 5th centuries),wefind23 in

Abhidharma-samuccayaand24(withtheadditionofasāmagrī)inTno.1614.18 AKB,35–36a.19 Vy, 142: ca-śabda evaṃjātīyakānukta-viprayukta-pradarśanārthaḥ | saṃghabheda-

prabhṛtayo hi dravyataś citta-viprayuktā iṣyante iti ye ‘py evaṃjātīyakā iti śāstre ‘py uktatvāt |20 Ny,396c.21 MVŚ,313b,602b;Ny,587b.22 MVŚ,27c,313a,231b.23 T28no.1550,830c.24 T28no.1551,866a.25 T28no.1552,943b.26 T28,970a.27 MVŚ,51b.28 ADV,85: prāptyādayastu saṃskārā viprayuktāstrayodaśa |29 ADV,loc. cit.30 Ny,396c.31 Vy,142f.:cittaviprayuktā iti citta-grahaṇam citta-samānajātīya-pradarśanārtham | cittam iva

cittena ca viprayuktā ity arthaḥ | kiṃ ca teṣāṃ samānajātīyatam | yadarūpino ‘mī bhavanti | rūpitvād eva hi viprayuktve’pi rūpaṃ na viprayuktve nāma labhate | yad vā’mīṣām nāma-


316

rūpam iti nāmatvam tat teṣām cittena samānajātīyatvaṃ caittā api cittena tulyajātiyāḥ | te tu cittena sahā’lambane samprayuktās tad-viseṣaṇārthaṃ viprayuktagrahaṇam | asaṃskṛtam api tat-samāna-jātīyam | anālambanatveneti tat-parihārārthaṃ saṃskāra-grahaṇam |

32 AKB,62:

viprayuktāstu saṃskārāḥ prāptyaprāptī sabhāgatā |āsaṁjñikaṃ samāpattī jīvitaṃ lakṣaṇāni ca || 35 ||nāmakāyādayaśceti

33 Cf. Entrance,108.ADV,87:prāpt(i)rnāma samanvāgamo lābha iti paryāyaḥ… | ‘dharmavattā vyavasthitiḥ’ | dharmāḥ khalu tridhā kuśa[lāḥ] …

34 MVŚ,801a.35 Cf.MVŚ,141b.36 Ny,398b.37 Vy,148:idam asyeti jñāna-cihnaṃ pratilābdha-dharmāvipraṇāśa-kāraṇaṃ ca prāptirity

ācārya-saṃghabhadraḥ.38 MVŚ,796c.39 See Entrance,108.40 MVŚ,797a.41 MVŚ,797a.42 MVŚ,823a.43 AKB,62:dvividhā hi prāptir aprāptavihīnasya ca lābhaḥ pratilabdhena ca samanvāgamaḥ |

viparyayād aprāptir iti siddham |44 Ny,396c.45 Entrance, 109f.Alsocf.MVŚ, 311cwhichgives the following as the example of the

paścātkālaja-prāpti:thosefetterswhichalthoughhavingbeenconnected(saṃyukta)arenotpast,i.e.,thosefutureandpresentfetterswhoseprāpti‑sarepast.

46 MVŚ,312a–b.47 Vy,152:anabhisaṃskāravattvād durbalatvam |48 SPrŚ,805c;cf.AKB,68.49 Ny,400b.50 ADV,89:nikāya-sabhāga ity asya śāstra-saṃjñā |51 Ny,400a.52 Ny,loc.cit.53 Ny,585b.54 Entrance,115f.55 Cf.averysimilarpassageinADV,89:sabhāgatā nāma dravyam | sattvānām ekārtha-ruciḥ

sādṛśyahetubhūtam | nikāya-sabhāga ity asya śāstra-saṃjñā | sā punar abhinnā bhinnā ca /abhinnā sarva-sattvānāṃ sattva-sabhāgatā | sā pratisattvaṃ sarveṣvātma-snehāhāra-rati-sāmyāt | bhinnā punas teṣām eva sattvānāṃ dhātu-bhūmi-gati-yoni-jāti-strī-puruṣopāsaka-bhikṣu-śaikṣāsaikṣādīnām ekārtha-rucitva-bheda-pratiniyama-hetuḥ | tasyāṃ khalv asatyāṃ sarvāryānārya-lokavyavahāra-saṃkara-doṣaḥ prasajyeta |


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Cf.asimilardefinitionofSaṃghabhadraquotedintheVy,159:śarīrendriya-saṃsthāna-ceṣṭāhārādi-sābhāgya-kāraṇam anyonyābhir abhisambandha-nimittaṃ ca sabhāgatety ācārya-saṃghabhadraḥ |AlsogiveninNy,400a:sa(homogeneity),becauseofthemutualsimilaritiesinphysicalappearances,functions(oftheindriya)anddesire;bhāgameanscause(nimitta).Thereisadistinctrealentitywhichisthecauseofthishomogeneity,henceitisnamedsabhāga.

Cf.alsoAKB,67.AKB(loc.cit.)alsospeaksofdharma-sabhāgatāwhichdoesnotseemtooccurinanyotherextantSarvāstivādaśāstraexceptNy,400bandSPrŚ,805c.

56 Ny,401a.57 Entrance,112.58 Entrance,112.MVŚ,775b:“Whyisthisnirodhacalledasamāpatti?Itiscalledasamāpatti because,withregardtothenirodha dharma‑s,thereisnoobstruction,norejection;oneexperiencesitatwillandpersonallyrealizesit.ForthisreasontheBhagavathassaidthat[whereas]nirodhaismomentary,samāpattiiscontinuous.Question:Asamāpattiisthatwhichcausesthethoughttobeeven(sama).Butinthiscasethereisnomentation(acitta),howcanitbenamedasamāpatti?Answer:Therearetwokindsofsamāpatti:(I)thatwhichcausesthethoughttobeeven,(II)thatwhichcausesthemahābhūta‑stobeeven.Althoughtheasaṃjñi‑andnirodha-samāpatti interrupt the even‑nessofmind, causing it not to continue, they induce theeven‑nessofmahābhūta‑s,causingthemtomanifest.Hencetheyarecalledsamāpatti‑s.”

59 Ny,401b,403a;MVŚ,776a.60 Ny,401c;MVŚ,780a.Skandhilaexplainsthatanāryaentersintoit“inordertodwellinblissinthepresentlife”(dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukha-vihārārtham)andthatapṛthagjanacannotenterintoitonaccountofhisdreadofitasannihilation(Entrance,113).Saṃghabhadraascribesthisviewto“somemaster”,andrejectsit.(Ny,loc. cit.).

61 Ny,402a.62 Entrance,114;Ny,401c–402a;cf.MVŚ,780b.63 AKB,68;Ny,400c;Entrance,113.64 Ny,400c;MVŚ,615a.65 Cf.MVŚ,784b.66 Ny,400c;Entrance,113,ADV,91.67 AKB, 38:kaḥ punar indriyārthaḥ | idi paramaiśvarye | tasya indantīti indriyāṇi | ata

ādhipatyārtha indriyārthaḥ |MVŚ,730c,explainsthewordineightsensesofwhichthefirstisādhipatya.

68 MVŚ,728c;AKB,40.69 MVŚ,731b.Anotherviewgivesfouraspectsofitsdominance:(i)inconnectingupwiththe

nikāya-sabhāga,(ii)insustainingthenikāya-sabhāga, (iii)infosteringthenikāya-sabhāga,(iv)inenablingthenikāya-sabhāga tocontinueuninterrupted.

70 AKB,243.71 MVŚ,635a.72 MVŚ,729a.73 PrŚ,694a,723a.74 MVŚ,657c,732b.


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75 MVŚ,657c.76 MVŚ,657b.77 MVŚ,779b.78 Ny,404b–c.79 AKB,74:na hi nāstīti brūmo na tu dravyāntaram | kiṃ tarhi | traidhātukena karmaṇā

nikāya-sabhāgasya sthiti-kālāvedhaḥ |80 Ny,377c.81 Ny,404c.82 For the full translation of these passages inAvatāra, seeEntrance, 113f.Cf. almostidentical description inADV, 97:uktaṃ hy abhidharme — “jīvitendriyaṃ katamat | traidhādhukam āyuḥ” iti | tat punaḥ ‘gati-prajñapty-upādānaṃ’ vipākaja-svabhāvatvāt | uktaṃ hi sūtre- “nirvṛtte vipāke nāraka iti samkhyāṃ gacchati | evaṃ yāvan naivasaṃjñā-nāsamjñāyatanopagasaṃkhyāṃ gacchati” iti | na cānyad indriyaṃ vipākajaṃ traidhātukavyāpy asti yajjanmaprabandhā’vicchedena vartamānaṃ gati-prajñapty-upādānaṃ syāt, anyatra jīvitendriyāt |

83 Cf.SĀ,12,21;A,i,152.84 Cf. Entrance,§4.6.11.b.Cf.ADV,104f.:…etāny eva vineyaprayojanavaśāt sūtre sthity-

anyathātvam ekīkṛtya trīṇy uktāni |… tato bhagavatā ‘nyathātvākhyayā jarayā sahoktā śrīr iva kālakarṇyānubaddhā saṃvegānukūlā bhaviṣytīty eṣo‘rtha-[vi] ṣayo dṛśyate tasmāc catvāri | Alsocf.AKB,75;MVŚ,201a–c.

85 Entrance,136.86 Ny,405c.

MVŚ(202c–203a):“Question:Whenthesaṃskṛta-dharma‑sarise,dotheyariseonaccountofthefactthattheyareinthemselvesofthenatureofarising(體是生法故生),oronaccountofbeingjoinedwithjāti-lakṣaṇa?Answer:…Theyariseonaccountofthefactthattheyareinthemselvesofthenatureofarising…But,althoughtheyareinthemselvesofthenatureofarising,theycannotarisewithoutbeing joinedwith jāti-lakṣaṇa. … At the timeof their arising, jāti-lakṣaṇa istheirdominantcauseofproduction.Justasadestructibledharmaisdestroyedbyacauseofdestructionandanabandonabledharmaisabandonedbyacauseofabandonment,aproducibledharmaisproducedbyjāti-lakṣaṇa.”

87 Cf.AKB,79:nahi vinā hetupratyaya-sāmagryā jātir janikā bhavati |88 Ny,411a.89 Ny, 405c.Cf.MVŚ, 201c: “By the force of the sthiti-lakṣaṇa, the saṃskāra‑s, havingarisen,arecapableofgraspingtheirownfruitandofgraspingtheālambana.Bytheforceof jarāandanityatā,thereisnomoreactivityafteronekṣaṇa. If the sthiti-lakṣaṇawerenon-existent,thereoughtnottobethecause‑effectseriesofthesaṃskāra‑s,andthecitta-caitta dharma‑soughtnothaveanyālambana.”

90 Ny,409c,etc.91 Ny, 411c.Cf.ADV, 105:yadi hi dharmasya sthitir na syāt, tasyātmany avasthitasya

hetvākhyaḥ śakti-prabhāva-viśeṣo na syāt | anityatāgra[sta]sya ca notpakti-śaktir ityataś ca kriyāṃ na kuryāt | kriyā’bhāvāt phalābhāvaḥ syāt | phalārthaścāyamārambhaḥ | tasmād āstikair nāstika-pakṣaṃ vikṣipya sthitiḥ pratigṛhyata iti siddham ||

92 Ny,405c.


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93 Cf. Entrance,§4.6.10.94 MVŚ,200a.95 Cf.AKB,78.96 Cf. Entrance,117f.97 SPrŚ,810a–b.SeealsoMVŚ,200a.98 Cf.AKB,76;Entrance,117.99 MVŚ,200c–201a.100Ny,406a–b.101AKB,80;Entrance,118.102SeeJaini,PS,‘TheVaibhāṣikaTheoryofWordsandMeanings’,inJaini,PS,ed.,Collected

Papers on Buddhist Studies(Delhi,2001),201ff.;especially211ff.103Jaini,PS,op. cit., 202.104Vy,52:tathā hi jñanaprasthāna uktam | katamad buddha-vacanam | tathāgatasya yā vāg

vacanaṃ vyāhāro gīr niruktir vāk-patho vāg-ghoṣo vāk-karma vāg-vijñaptiḥ | …. punas tatraivānantaram uktaṃ buddha-vacanaṃ nāma ka eṣa dharmaḥ | nāma-kāya-pada-kāya-vyañjana-kāyānāṃ yā anupūrva-racanā anupūva-sthāpanā anupūrva-samāyoga iti | See JPŚ,981a–b.

105MVŚ,658c,659c.106MVŚ,659b.107AKB,17.108Vy,52.109ADV,11.110 Cox(1995),162f.111Ny,346c.112MVŚ,69c–70a.113 CfADV,113:uktaṃ hi bhagavatā | “tathāgatānām utpādān nāma-pada-vyañjana-kāyānām

utpādo bhavati” | … ye hy apauruṣeyā dhātv-āyatana-skandhādy-avadyotakās te prathamaṃ buddha-viṣayā eva |; Entrance,119.

114Seepreviousnote.115 Cf.MVŚ,73a.116 See Entrance,119.117Alsocf.AKB,80;Ny,413c.118 See Entrance,119.Cf.ADV,108f.:

vākchabdādhīnajanmānaḥ svārthapratyāyanakriyāḥ | saṃjñādyaparanāmānastrayo nāmādayaḥ smṛtāḥ ||

viprayuktāḥ khalu nāmādayaḥ saṃskāra-skhanda-saṃgṛhītāḥ | vāk tu rūpa-skhandha-saṃgṛhītā vāg gīr niruktir ity arthaḥ | te ca tad-adhīnotpattayo nirukty-adhīnārtha-pravṛttayaś ca jñānavad arthasya pratinidhi-sthānīyāḥ | nirukti[ḥ] nāma saṃjñā | nārthānām ekasaṃjñatvāt | yathā tu cakṣur-vijñāna-kāyādayaḥ pañca-rūpādy-āyattavṛttayaḥ, tadvat te’pi ‘vākchabdādhīnajanmānaḥ’ | ataścoktam — “vāṅ nāmni pravartate, nāmārthaṃ dyotayati |”


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iti. Ibid., 111: jñānavat | tad-yathā jñānaṃ cakṣurādīn hetūn apekṣyārthaṃ vibhāvayati, tadvan nāmādayo’pi ghoṣādīn hetūn apekṣyārthaṃ pratyāyayanti |

119 Cf.AKB,81.120 Cf.AKB,418f.121Ny,413c.122Ny,415b.123 Entrance,119.124ADV,110.122Ny,415b.123 Entrance,119.124ADV,110.

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12. Defilements

12.1. Thegoalofspiritualpraxisandtheabandonmentofdefilement12.2. Kleśaandanuśayaasthegenerictermsfordefilement

12.2.1. Kleśa (< √kliś; ‘afflict’,‘molest’)12.2.2. Anuśaya

12.3.Otherdoctrinaltermsdenotingdefilements12.4.Defilementsastherootofexistence12.5. Ābhidharmikainvestigationofdefilements12.6.Classificationofdefilements

12.6.1. Fundamentaldefilements12.6.1.1. Theunskillfulroots(akuśala-mūla)

12.6.1.1.1.Thetwotypesofignorance12.6.2. Someimportantclassifications

12.6.2.1. Darśana-heya and bhāvanā-heya kleśa12.6.2.2.Universal(sarvatraga)andnon‑universal(asarvatraga)defilements12.6.2.3.Defilementsthattakeoutflow‑freeobjects(anāsravālambana)andthosethat

takewith‑outflowobjects(sāsravālambana)12.7. Relationshipbetweendefilementsandthemind12.8.Operationofthedefilements

12.8.1. Howadefilementarises12.8.2. Howadefilement‘adheresandgrows’(anu-√śī)12.8.2.1. Vasumitra’selaboration12.8.2.2.ElaborationintheNy

12.9.Abandonmentofdefilements12.9.1. Meaningof‘abandonment’12.9.2. Roleofacquisitionintheabandonmentofdefilements12.9.2.1.Anabandonmentisdoneonceforall

12.9.3. Abandonmentbythemundanepath12.9.3.1.Unhinderedpathsandpathsofliberationofaworldlingandanārya

12.9.4. Varioussynonymsintheprocessofgradualabandonment12.9.5. Methodsofabandonment12.9.6. Adefilementisabandonedthroughseparationfromitsobject

12.10.Traces(vāsanā)ofthedefilementsanddistinctionbetweenthewisdomofaBuddhaandofanarhat 12.10.1. Distinctionbetweendefilementsandtheirtraces(vāsanā)12.10.2. Examplesofvāsanā intheMVŚ12.10.3. DescriptionintheAKBandtheVy12.10.4. Vāsanāandthetwotypesofajñāna in the Sarvāstivāda12.10.5. Vāsanā,non‑defiledignoranceandperfectwisdom12.10.6. Saṃghabhadra’sexplanationofvāsanā

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12.1. The goal of spiritual praxis and the abandonment of defilement

ItissometimesstatedthatthegoalofBuddhismismoralperfection—astatewhere all defilements are removed and complete purity is attained. In theBuddha’s own discourses, the knowledge of the destruction of the outflows(āsravakṣaya-jñāna)ishighlightedasauniqueattributeofanarhat,somuchsothatthetermkṣīṇa-āsrava—‘onewhohasexhaustedtheoutflows’—cametobeusedasanepithetforanarhat.ThisfactissometimescitedasevidencethatforEarlyBuddhism,thefinalgoalisthedestructionofalldefilements.ItisfurtherarguedthattheĀbhidharmikatraditionfollowsthistradition.1However,itmustbeborneinmindthattheBuddhahimselfstatedmostunambiguouslythatallhis teachings have but one goal, the goal of liberation from or cessation ofduḥkha. Statements such as: “citta is liberated from the outflows”2 is to beunderstoodasemphasizingthementalfreedomfromduḥkhaintheabsenceofthedisturbancesfromthedefilements.Thesignificanceofdefilementcanbeseen in theBuddhistemphasisof themeaningof ‘defilement’or ‘impurities’as indicated in theSanskritwordkleśawhich primarilymeans ‘disturbance’or ‘molest’ (seebelow):kleśa‑sare tobepurgedorabandonedas impuritiesbecause theyafflictourmind.Apart from this,moralpurityhasno intrinsicvalueinitselfforBuddhism.Theabandonmentofdefilements,alongwiththetranscendence ofkarma, serves as themeans—not the end—of spiritualperfection.Inanycase,nirvāṇa,thesummun bonumofBuddhism,isstatedbytheĀbhidharmikasastheabsolutecessationofallduḥkha‑spertainingtothethreespheresofexistence.3Asamatteroffact,itismorecorrecttosaythatfortheĀbhidharmikastoo,prajñā (= dharma-pravicaya)isthesuprememeansfortheendingofduḥkha‑s.ThefirstchapteroftheAKBstatesthisexplicitly:Beings wander in saṃsāra — hence experience duḥkha — on account oftheirdefilements.Abhidharma,whichinthehighestsenseisequatedwiththepureprajñā, constitutes theonlymeans for the appeasementofdefilements.Thisofcoursespellsout,atthesametime,theĀbhidharmikaemphasisontheinvestigationofdefilements.

The Ābhidharmikaemphasisonthenecessarydependenceoninsightfortheovercomingofdefilementsisalsounderscoredintheirnotionoftwotypesofcompleteknowledge(parijñā)whichtheyclaimisateachinginthesūtra‑s—notonlyisthemeansoftheabandonmentemphasizedascompleteknowledgebuttheresult,i.e.,theabandonmentitself,too,iscalledcompleteknowledge(seealso,§12.10.5):4

The sūtra‑s say that there are two types of complete knowledge:[1]completeknowledgequaknowledge(jñāna-parijñā)and[2]completeknowledgequaabandonment(prahāṇa-parijñā).…

[1]Whatiscompleteknowledgequaknowledge?Theknowledges(jñāna),seeing(darśana),wisdom(vidyā),discernment(buddhi),directrealization

12. defilementS

323

(abhisamaya)— these are called completeknowledgesquaknowledge.…Knowledge is thuscalledbecause it counteracts ignorance (ajñāna).Seeingisthuscalledbecauseitcounteractswrongviews.Wisdomisthuscalled because it counteracts nescience (avidyā). Discernment is thuscalledbecauseitcounteractswrongdiscernment.Directrealizationisthuscalledbecauseitcounteractswrongdirectrealization.…

[2]What is complete knowledge qua abandonment? It is the absoluteabandonment (atyanta-prahāṇa) of greed, the absolute abandonment ofhatredanddelusion,theabsoluteabandonmentofalldefilements.…

Question:Completeknowledgeisthuscalledbecauseitknowsthecognitiveobjectcompletely.Anabandonmentdoesnothaveacognitiveobjectandthefunctionofknowingcompleting.Whyisitcalledacompleteknowledge?

Answer:Because theabandonment is theresultofknowledge, it isalsocalledacompleteknowledge.…Whatiscalledcompleteknowledgequaknowledgehasknowledgeasitsintrinsicnature.Whatiscalledcompleteknowledgequaabandonmenthasabandonmentasitsintrinsicnature.5

The complete knowledge qua abandonment is subdivided into nine types:sixabandonablebyvisionandthreeabandonablebycultivation:6

1. abandonmentofthedefilementsabandonablebyvisionintothetruthsofunsatisfactorinessandorigin,pertainingtothesensesphere;

2. abandonmentofthedefilementsabandonablebyvisionintothetruthofcessation,pertainingtothesensesphere;

3. abandonmentofthedefilementsabandonablebyvisionintothetruthofthepath,pertainingtothesensesphere;

4. abandonmentofthedefilementsabandonablebyvisionintothetruthsofunsatisfactorinessandorigin,pertainingtothetwohigherspheres;

5. abandonmentofthedefilementsabandonablebyvisionintothetruthofcessation,pertainingtothetwohigherspheres;

6.abandonmentofthedefilementsabandonablebyvisionintothetruthofthepath,pertainingtothetwohigherspheres;

7. abandonmentofalldefilementsabandonablebycultivationpertainingto the sense sphere, called ‘the five fetters pertaining to the lowerportion’(§12.3.1);

8.abandonmentofalldefilementsabandonablebycultivationpertainingto thefine‑material sphere, called ‘complete knowledgewhich is theexhaustionofthegreedformatter’(rūparāgakṣaya-parijñā);

9. abandonmentofalldefilementsabandonablebycultivationpertainingto thenon‑material sphere, called ‘complete knowledgewhich is the

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completeendofallfetters’(sarvasaṃyojana-paryādāna-parijñā).

Therationalefortheabovenine‑folddivisionisasfollows:

(a) Under the defilements abandonable by vision, those connected withthetruthsofunsatisfactorinessandoriginaregroupedascompleteknowledgebecause under these two truths, there are universal defilements (§12.6.2.2).Evenwhen one has abandoned the universal defilements under the truth ofunsatisfactoriness,onestillcannotbefreedfrombondageaslongasonehasnotalsoabandonedtheuniversaldefilementsunderthetruthoforigin.Henceonlythecompleteabandonmentofalldefilementsunderbothtruthscanqualifyasa‘completeknowledge’.

(b)A complete knowledge is established separately for the abandonmentof thedefilementsconnectedwith the truthofcessationand the truthof thepath,becausethepractitionerhasalreadyabandonedtheuniversaldefilementsearlierwhencontemplatingthetruthsofunsatisfactorinessandorigin.

(c)Withregardtothedefilementspertainingtothetwohigherspheres,thoseabandonablebyvisionaregroupedtogetherasasinglecompleteknowledgebecausethecounteractingpathisthesameforthetwohigherspheres;inthecaseofdefilementsabandonablebycultivation,onecompleteknowledgeeachisestablishedforthetwohigherspheresbecausethecounteractingpathsaredifferentforthetwohigherspheres.

12.2. Kleśa and anuśaya as the generic terms for defilement

Many terms are used to denote defilements, characterizing their differentfunctionalities and scopeof operation.The twomost generic terms, used asequivalentsintheSarvāstivādasystem,arekleśaandanuśaya.

12.2.1. Kleśa (< √kliś ‘afflict’, ‘molest’)

Thistermisunderstoodinthesenseof‘defilement’orimpurity.IntheBuddhistusage, the corresponding past participle, kliṣṭa, means ‘defiled’, ‘soiled’.However,theprimaryetymologicalsenseof‘molest’or‘bevexed’isfoundintheearlytreatises7andcontinuestobeemphasizedeveninthelateabhidharma treatises.Thus,theAvatāradefinesthetermasfollows:

Defilements(kleśa)arethusnamedbecausetheyperturbandafflict(煩亂逼惱;kliśnantīti kleśāḥ)thepsycho‑physicalseries.(Avatāra(T):de dag ni lus dang sems kyi rgyud nyon mongs par byed pas nyon mongs pa rnams zhes bya ste/)8

Theoccurrenceofthistermisrareinthesūtra-piṭaka.Itsusewashistoricallyprecededbythatofupakleśa,althoughsubsequentlythelattergenerallycame

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tobeunderstoodas‘secondarydefilements’—thosewhichproceedfromkleśa. Atthislaterstage,itisexplainedthattheupakleśa‑sarealsothekleśa,buttheyadditionally includeotherdefilementswhicharenotcalledkleśa.9Examplesofthesesecondarydefilementsaremoralimmodesty,avariceandrestlessnesswhicharesaidtobeemanations(niṣyanda)fromgreed(rāga).10

TheAKB enumerates a total of 19 secondary defilements— non‑diligence(pramāda), slackness (kauśīdya), faithlessness (āśraddhya), torpor (styāna),restlessness (auddhatya), immodesty (āhrīkya), shamelessness (anapatrāpya),anger (krodha), enmity (upanāha), dissimulation (śāṭhya), jealousy (īrṣya),depravity(pradāśa),concealment(mrakṣa),avarice(mātsarya),deceptiveness(māyā), pride (mada), harmfulness (vihiṃsā), remorse (kaukṛtya) anddrowsiness (middha). An examination of the defilements listed under the75dharma‑sin§2.4.2willshowthatthese19secondarydefilementscompriseallthedefileddharma‑sandtwooftheindeterminate(aniyata)dharma‑s,butexcludetheprimarydefilements.Thelatter,representedbythetermskleśaandanuśaya,aresix:greed(rāga),hostility(pratigha),conceit(māna),ignorance(avidyā),views(dṛṣṭi)anddoubt(vicikitsā)(seebelow,§12.6.1).Thismeansthatthetotalityofdefilementscanbeconsideredascomprisingtheprimaryandsecondarykleśa‑s.

12.2.2. Anuśaya

Etymologically,anuśayaisderivedfromanu + √śī(‘liedown’,‘sleep’).IntheSarvāstivādinexplanation,however,thechiefmeaningis‘toadhereandgrowconcordantly [with theobject]’.Theprefixanu connotes the tenacity of thedefilement.Thesenseofśīisnottakentoconveythenotionoflatencyasinthecaseofsomeotherschoolsbutratherthatofsubtlety.Ananuśayaisthatwhichhasordoesanuśayana,i.e.,thefunctionofgrowingorintensifyinginaccordwithanimpureobject.Forexample,greed,whenitarisestakingawith‑outflow(sāsrava)object,itbecomesintensifiedasadefilementofthatnature;theobjectinthiscaseconducestosuchanintensification.IntheAKB,followingthePrŚ,11 thefollowingfourmeaningsofanuśayaareattributedbytheSarvāstivāda:

1. aṇu:meaning‘fine’,‘subtle’—Apseudoetymologicalinterpretationoftheprefixanu—stressingthedifficultyindetectingthearisingofthedefilementswhicharesubtleinnature.

2. anu + √bandh(‘bind’)—They‘bindalongwith’(anu-√bandh),i.e.,theyproceed together with the psycho‑physical series (saṃtati), ‘like theimageofabirdmovinginthesky(khacara)beingfollowedbyafishmovinginwater(jalacara)’.12“Itisextremelydifficulttobeseparatedfrom them…According to some: this means that their acquisitionsalwaysfollowalong.”13

3. anu + √gam or anu + √saj(Tibetanrjes ‘brelsuggestsanu-√saj)—They

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followalongoradhere ‘like theoil in sesameseedsor thegrease inamorselof food’.14 Vasubandhuexplains in the senseofanu + √saj:“theyadherethroughadhesionoftheir acquisitions”.15 Saṃghabhadra:from beginningless time, one is followed along by the acquisitionsarisinginone’sserialcontinuity.16

4. anu + √śī —Theygroworbecomeintensifiedinaccordwith(anu-√śī):They become nourished from (a)the objects they take (ālambanato ‘nuśerate) and from (b)the thought concomitants with which theyare conjoined (samprayogato’nuśerate).17 Saṃghabhadra explains thatthe firstway(a) is like the case of an enemy seeking aweak point;thesecondway(b) is like thecaseof aheatedball thatheatsup thewater.Likeafostermotherwhocausesthegrowthofaninfant,boththeobjecttakenandtheconjoinedmentaldharmacausetheseriesofthedefilementtogrowandaccumulate.18

Out of the four senses given above, theMVŚgives only three, i.e.,withoutthatofanu-√gam.Itattributestheexplanationintermsofthefoursensestotheforeignmasters.19

12.3. Other doctrinal terms denoting defilements

Apart fromkleśa andanuśaya, othermajordoctrinal termsused todescribedefilementsare:1.fetter(saṃyojana);2.bondage(bandhana);3.envelopment(paryavasthāna);4.outflow(āsrava);5.flood(ogha);6.yoke(yoga);7.clinging(upādāna);8.corporealtie(kāya-grantha);9.hindrance(nivaraṇa).

12.3.1. Fetter— TheMVŚ gives threemeanings of saṃyojana: ‘binding’,‘unionwithduḥkha’, and ‘mixingwithpoison’.Thefirstmeaning is said tobe derived from the sūtra.20　 The second, because the fetters of the sphereof sensuality unite beingswithduḥkha in that sphere; likewise for those ofthe fine‑material and immaterial spheres. The third, because the ārya‑s aredisgustedwitheventhebeststatesofbirthandwiththewith‑outflowdhyāna‑s,aswithexcellentfoodmixedwithpoison.21

There are nine fetters: lust (anunaya), hostility, conceit, ignorance, views,irrational adherence (parāmarśa), doubt, jealousy and avarice.22 There isalso thedoctrineof the‘fivefetterspertaining to the lowerportion’ (pañca-avarabhāgīya)— to the sphereof sensuality;and the ‘five fetterspertainingto the higher portion’ (pañca-ūrdhvabhāgīya) — to the fine‑material andimmaterialspheres.Theformercomprise:Self‑view(satkāya-dṛṣṭi),irrationaladherence to abstentions and vows (śīla-vrata-parāmarśa), doubt, sensual‑desire (kāmacchanda),malice (vyāpāda). TheMVŚ explains that these fivearethuscalledbecausethey“manifestinthelowersphere,areabandonedinthe lower sphere, re‑link (prati-sam-√dhā) birth in the lower sphere, grasp

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emanation and retributive fruits in the lower sphere”.23 The latter comprise:greed (rāga) arisen from the fine‑material sphere, greed arisen from theimmaterialsphere,restlessness,conceitandignorance.24

12.3.2. Bondage—Asisclearfromthefirstmeaninggivento‘fetter’above,the nine fetters are also to be known as bondages. TheAvatāra, apparentlyfollowingthePrŚ,25statesexplicitlythatthisisthecase.It,however,alsogivesthreebondagesmentionedinthesūtra:(i)thegreed‑bondage(rāga-bandhana)whichcomprisesallgreed,withthesamecharacterizationasforthelust‑fetter;(ii)thehatred‑bondage(dveṣa-bandhana),whichcomprisesallhatred,withthesamecharacterizationasforthehostility‑fetter;and(iii)thedelusion‑bondage(moha-bandhana),whichcomprisesalldelusion,withthesamecharacterizationasfortheignorancefetter.26Thistermstressestheaspectofdefilementwhichis thebindingofbeings to the triplespheresofexistence(seebelow§12.4,the 15th function of anuśaya). Saṃghabhadra defines bondage as thatwhichbinds,“thatis,itpreventsonefromgoingtowardsdetachment”.27

12.3.3. Envelopment — The Vaibhāṣika enumerates the following as tenenvelopments: 1.torpor, 2.drowsiness, 3.restlessness, 4.remorse, 5.jealousy,6.avarice,7.immodesty,8.shamelessness,9.anger,10.concealment.ThePrŚ28 enumeratesonlythefirsteight.Thesearecalled‘envelopments’astheyenvelopone’spsycho‑physicalseries.29 Saṃghabhadra:“thesetenbindsentientbeingsandplacethemintheprisonofsaṃsāra,hencetheyarecalledenvelopments.Orrather,thesetenserveasthecausesgivingrisetovariousevilactions,sothat[beings]areretainedintheevilplanesofexistence(durgati).”30

12.3.4. Outflow—This is an important term; all conditioneddharma‑s aresubsumableasbeingeitherwithorwithoutoutflows(seesupra,§2).Therearethree kinds of outflows: sensuality‑outflow (kāmāsrava), existence‑outflow(bhavāsrava) and ignorance‑outflow (avidyāsrava). Both the AKB and theAvatāragive threeetymologies forāsrava: (i)theykeep (āsayanti)beings inthethreespheresofexistence;(ii)theycausebeingstoflowaround(āsravanti)between the highest state of existence (bhavāgra) and the lowest, theAvicihell;31 (iii)they incessantlydischarge (kṣar) inexhaustible impurities throughthesixwound‑likeentrances—thesixsensefaculties—ofbeings(ṣadbhir āyatanavraṇāiḥ).32 VasubandhufavorstheSautrāntikaexplanation:“Theyareāsrava‑sbecausebythemthementalseriesflowsintotheobjects.”33TheMVŚgivesthefollowingsixmeanings:

(i) keep/detain—theykeepbeingsinthethreespheresofexistence;

(ii) moistenorsoak—justaswhenseedsaresoakedinawetvessel,theygiverisetosprouts,likewisethekarma‑seeds,whensoakedinthe kleśa‑vessel,giverisetofutureexistences;

(iii) discharge or ooze— just aswater oozes froma spring, andmilk

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fromthebreast,likewisetheāsrava‑soozefromthesixwoundsofbeings;

(iv) confine—justaswhenconfinedbyothers,oneisunabletotraveleverywhereatwill,likewisebeingsareconfinedbykleśa‑stomovearoundthevariousdhātu‑s,gati‑s,andyoni‑s,andareunabletomovefreelytowardthenirvāṇa-dhātu;

(v) bewitch—justaswhenoneisbewitchedbyaspirit,onesayswhatshouldnotbesaid,doeswhatshouldnotbedone,andthinkswhatshould not be thought, likewise beings, bewitched by the kleśa‑s, giverisetoevilcorporeal,vocalandmentalacts;

(vi) intoxicate — just as when one has consumed too much alcoholderivedfromroots,stems,branches,leaves,flowers,fruits,etc.,onedoesnotknowwhatshouldorshouldnotbedone,oneisimmodest(ahrī),shameless(anatrāpa),topsy‑turvy,andindulgent.

TheŚabdavādinsexplainthatāmeans‘fromhereuptothere’,sravameans‘flowing’.Thekleśa‑sarecalledāsravabecausetheycarrybeingsadriftinsaṃsārauptobhavāgra.34

12.3.5. Flood—Therearefourfloods:sensuality‑flood(kāmaugha),existence‑flood(bhavaugha),view‑flood(dṛṣṭyogha)andignorance‑flood(avidyaugha).TheMVŚgivesthreemeanings:thekleśa‑s,etc.,arecalledoghabecausetheycausebeingstorevolveinsaṃsāraby(i)driftingthemabout,(ii)torrentiallypouringontothem,(iii)submergingthem(intheoceanofsaṃsāra).35

12.3.6. Yoke—Thesamefourgivenasfloodsarealsocalledyokes,becausethey join (śleṣayanti)36 or yoke (yojayanti)37 beings onto various forms ofduḥkha.38

12.3.7. Clinging—Therearefourclingings:sensuality‑clinging(kāmopādāna),view‑clinging (dṛṣṭy-upādāna), clinging to abstentions and vows (śīla-vratopādāna), and Soul‑theory‑clinging (ātmavādopādāna). The Avatāra givesthreemeaningsoftheterm:(i)‘fuel’(indhana)—becauseitenablesthefireofkarma tocontinueblazingandgrowing;(ii)‘forcefulness’(paṭutva)—becausetheir modeofactivity(ākāra)isveryforcefulorsharp;39(iii)‘envelopment’—just as a silk‑wormwithin a cocoon envelops itself to death, likewise beings,envelopedbythefourclingings,goaroundinsaṃsāralosingtheirwisdom‑life.40

12.3.8. Corporeal tie—ThistopicisnotdiscussedintheAKB.TheAvatāra enumeratesfourofthem:bodilytieofcovetousness(abhidhyā-kāyagrantha),bodilytieofmalice(vyāpāda-kāyagrantha),bodilytieofirrationaladherenceto abstentions and vows (śīlavrataparāmarśa-kāyagrantha), and bodily tieof dogmatism (idaṃsatyābhiniveśa-kāyagrantha). Skandhila explains that“theyarecalledkāyagranthabecausetheyvariouslytiearoundsentientbeings.

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The meaning is the complete entrapping of the [psycho‑physical] complex(kāya) of beings.”41 TheMVŚ enumerates the following four: the bodily tieof (i)sensual‑desire (kāmacchanda), (ii)malice (vyāpāda), (iii)irrationaladherencetoabstentionsandvows,(iv)theattachment‘thisisreal’;andgivestwomeaningsof grantha:(a)corporealbondage(kāya-bandhana),(b)rebirth‑linking(pratisaṃdhi).42

12.3.9. Hindrance—Therearefivehindrances:(i)sensual‑desire,(ii)malice,(iii)torpor‑drowsiness(styāna-middha),(iv)restlessness‑remorse(auddhatya-kaukṛtya),and(v)doubt.Thesearefoundinthesphereofsensualityalone,astheyarepurelyunskillful.43 The Avatāraexplainsthattheyarecalledhindrancesbecausetheyconstitutetheobstaclesfor thenoblepath,fordetachment,andfor the rootsof skillfulnesswhicharepreparatory (prāyogika) for the two.44 TheMVŚgivesthefollowingsixmeaningsfornivaraṇa:obstructing,covering,breaking,ruining,(causing)tofall,(causing)toliedown.45Itenumeratesthesamefivehindrances,butstatesthatignoranceconstitutesthesixth:

…outsidethesefivenivaraṇa‑s,thereisasixth,i.e.,avidyā-nivaraṇa,…[But]althoughavidyānuśayaisalsoanivaraṇa,itisnotmentionedamongthefivenivaraṇa‑sowingtoitsheaviness;theBhagavathasdesignateditseparatelyasthesixthnivaraṇa:avidyāismentionedseparatelybecauseit isheavycomparedto thepreviousfivenivaraṇa‑swhichareofequalstrength.46

12.4. Defilements as the root of existence

In the abhidharma scheme of explanation, duḥkha results from karma, andkarma arises from defilements. The AKB47 declares that without the latter,karma‑sareincapableofproducingnewexistences.Accordingly,theyaretherootofexistence(mūlaṃ bhavasya).Fromanotherperspective,alldefilementsariseonaccountof ignorance,and it is for this reason that itconstitutes thefirstlink(nidāna)inthetwelvefoldformulaofconditionedco‑arising(pratītya-samutpāda),even thoughthere isnonotionof theFirstCause inBuddhism.(See infra,§13).Accordingly,ignoranceisalsodeclaredtobetherootofallexistences.48

Inthiscontext,tenfunctionsthatadefilementperformsarelisted.Saṃghabhadraaddssixmore:

Whyaretheanuśaya‑scapableofservingastherootofexistence?

Thisisbecause,whenadefilementisarising,itperforms16functions:

1. Itmakesfirmitsroot,thecounteragent(pratipakṣa)beingdistant.Therootofadefilementisitsacquisition.

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2. It generates a weightiness of one’s basis, for it brings aboutaninaptitudeinone’sbasisforactions(āśraya-dauṣṭhulyaṃ janayaty akarmaṇyat’āpādanāt).

3. Itestablishesaseries(saṃtatim avasthāpayati),foritenablesitselftobeproducedcontinuously.

4. Itaccommodatesitsfield(kṣetram āpādayati),foritmakesthebasis[—theperson—]conducivetoitsabiding.

5. Itloathesvirtues,foritsnatureisopposedtothevirtues(guṇān dveṣṭi tad-virodhitvāt).

6. Itservesastheseatofreproach,foritprojectsbodily,vocalandmentalkarma‑swhicharereproachedbythewise(apavādānām āspadī-karoti vidvad-vigarhita-kāya-karmotthāpanāt).

7. Itengendersapoisonousemanation(niṣyanda),foritengendersthesecondary defilements (upakleśa) which are like [— of a similarnatureto—]itself.

8. Itblocksthepathofliberation,foritabandonsdrawingneartothosewhoteachthetruedoctrine.49

9. Itleadstokarma-bhava (karmabhavam abhinirharati),foritinducesthe karmafornewexistence.

10.Itgathersupitsownrequisites(sva-saṃbhāraṃ parigṛhṇāti),[i.e.,itsowncauses,]foritrepeatedlygathersupandgivesrisetoimpropermentalapplication(ayoniśomanaskāra).

11.It deludes one as regards the object of consciousness (ālambane saṃmohayati),foritharmstheproperunderstandingoftheperson.

12. Itplantstheseedsofsufferings,foritcangenerateallformsofsufferingin saṃsāra (vividhānārtha-bījaṃ ropayati sarva-saṃsāra-vyasanānāṃ tat-prabhavatvāt).

13. Itconductsthestreamofconsciousness(vijñānasroto namayati),foritinducesconsciousnessontheobjectsofrebirth.

14. Itmakesonegoastrayfromwhatpertainstothegood(kuśalapakṣād vyutkramayati),foritcausesthefallingawayofthegooddharma‑s.

15. It amplifies its significance as bondage through preventingthe surmounting of the sphere and stage to which it belongs(bandhanārthaṃ spharati dhātvanatikrama-yogena), for it nourishesthedefiledspheres.

16. Itbringstogethertheundesirableoftheworldintheformofādhipatya-phala,for,byvirtueofthis,therecomestobethedeteriorationoftheexternalthings(ādhipatya-phalena lokasyāniṣṭam upasaṃharati tad-vegena bāhya-bhāva-vikār’āpatteḥ /).50

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12.5. Ābhidharmika investigation of defilements

If anuśaya‑s,therootofexistence,mustbeeliminated,howshouldoneproceedtodo so?TheĀbhidharmika startingpoint isdharma-pravicaya, a thoroughinvestigation into their nature. Saṃghabhadra enumerates the followingas among the essential taxonomical topics — representing the differentperspectives—forthisexamination:

1. Whether a given anuśaya is to be abandoned by insight (darśana-praheya)orbycultivation(bhāvanā-praheya).

2. Whetheritpertainstoonecategory(prakāra)ofabandonability,ortwo,orthree,orfour,orallfive—abandonablebyvisioninto(i)duḥkha,(ii)originofduḥkha,(iii)cessationofduḥkha,(iv)themārgaleadingto the cessation,and(v)bythepathofcultivation.

3. Whetheritisauniversal(sarvatraga)ornon‑universaldefilement.

4. Whether it is universal with respect to its own sphere or to otherspheres.

5. Whetherit takesobjectswhicharewith‑outflow(sāsrava-ālambana)or outflow‑free(anāsrava).

6. Whether it takes objects which are conditioned (saṃskṛta) orunconditioned(asaṃskṛta).

7. Howdoesitarise?[Threepossiblecauses—infra,§12.8.1].

8. How does it grow concordantly with the object (anuśerate)?[Twopossibleways—§12.8.2].

9. Whetheritisabandonedbyfullyknowingtheobject(pari-√jñā)orbyabandoningtheobject.

10.Whether it is abandoned by the absolute destruction of itsaccompanimentsoronaccountofthepurificationoftheseries(santati)thatconstitutesthepractitioner.

11.Whetheritisconjoinedornotconjoinedwithaparticularcaitta.

12.Whether,afterhavingabandonedit,oneisstillliableornotliabletoretrogression.

13.Whetheritgivesrisetoanundesirableretribution(aniṣṭa-vipāka)oriscompletelywithoutanyretribution.

14.Whether it is an equal‑immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya)foraparticularcaittaoritsobject.

15.Whether or not it is abandoned as a result of its object beingabandoned.

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16.Whether,althoughitisabandonedintermsofitsintrinsicnature,oneisstillboundtoitonaccountofitsobject.

17.Whetheritisadefilementthatcannotexistinthestagesofconcentration(samāhita-bhūmi).

18.Whetheritisadefilementthatcannotbeeliminatedbyamundanepathofcounteraction.

19.Whetheritpertainstothegroupofmentalconsciousness(manovijñāna-kāya)aloneortoallsixgroupsofconsciousnesses.

20.Whetherornotitcanserveastheoriginatingcause(samutthāna-hetu)forbodilyandvocalkarma.

21.Whetheritcancausethecuttingoftherootsofskillfulness.

22.Whether it can cause the relinking with the roots of skillfulness[whichhavebeencut].

23.Whetherornotitisofthenatureofspeculation(dṛṣṭi-svabhāva).

24.Whetheritisabandonedonlywhenallitsninegradesareabandonedorwhenonlyonegradeisabandoned.

25.Whetheritisabandonableeitherwhenonegradeisabandonedorwhenallninegradesareabandoned.

26.Whetheritcomestobeendowed(samanvāgata)byanindividualonaccountofaparticulardharma.

27.Whether it does not come to be endowed (asamanvāgata) byanindividualonaccountofaparticulardharma.

28.Whetheritcomestobeconjoined(saṃprayukta)ornotconjoinedonaccountofaparticulardharma.

29.Whetherthereisapossibilityofitsmanifestationinaparticularstage.

30.Whether,althoughnotyetabandoned,itdoesnotmanifestitsactivity.

31.Whetheritisabandonedinthesphereofsensuality(kāma-dhātu)aloneorintheupperspheresaswell.

32.Whetherornotthereistheendowmentofthisasafruit.

33.Whetherornotitsharesthesamecounteragentwithanotherdefilement.

Insummary,Saṃghabhadrastates:

Itisafterhavingproperlyunderstoodthenatureoftheanuśaya‑sinthiswaythatonecandecisivelyeliminatethem.51

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12.6. Classification of defilements

12.6.1. Fundamental defilements

Thefundamentaldefilementsaresixinnumber(seeAbelow).However,rāgaisdivisible into kāma-rāga, i.e.,greed with regard to the sphere of sensuality(kāmadhātu),andbhava-rāga,i.e.,greedforthesubtlerformsofexistenceinthe rūpa‑andārūpya-dhātu,givingatotalofseven(seeBbelow).Inthethirdclassification(seeCbelow),rāgaistakenasone,anddṛṣṭi isdividedintofiveforms,givingatotaloften.

Among the views, satkāya-dṛṣṭi is the false view that the five skandha‑s ofgraspingconstitutingthepersonistherealSelf.TheVaibhāṣikaexplainssat to mean ‘real/existent’, and kāya, ‘accumulation’. Satkāya-dṛṣṭi, therefore,referstotheviewofarealSelfsuperimposedontheimpermanentskandha‑s.Properlyspeaking,itistheviewwhichfalselybelievesintheSelfaswellasthatwhichpertainstotheSelf.Vasubandhu,however,presentstheSautrāntikaviewwhichinterpretssatas‘perish’;accordingly,thisviewisthefalsebeliefwith regard to the ‘perishing accumulation’ (ātma-dṛṣṭir ātmīya-dṛṣṭir vā satkāya-dṛṣṭiḥ / sīdatīti sat / cayaḥ kāyaḥ saṃgāthaḥ skandha ityarthaḥ /— AKB,281). The Tibetan rendering as ‘jig tshogs la lta ba reflects thisinterpretation.

Onewhoharbors thesatkāya-ḍṛṣṭieither thinksof thesuperimposedSelfasbeingeternalor as susceptible tocompletedestructionatdeath— theviewhavingthesetwoextremes(anta)asobjectsiscalledantagrāha-dṛṣṭi.Thisview,therefore, presupposes the satkāya-ḍṛṣṭi. These two views, satkāya-dṛṣṭi andantagrāha-dṛṣṭi,arenotclassifiedasbeingunskillful,butasveiled‑nondefined.(cf. supra,§2.4.3.2.3).Theyareinfactalsofoundinthetwoupperspheresofexistence.

Mithyā-dṛṣṭiisthefalseviewwhichdeniescausalefficacy,thefournobletruths,etc.Thisisanimportantdefilement,foritaloneisresponsibleforthecuttingoftherootsofskillfulness(kuśalamūla-samuccheda).52

Dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa is the attachment to or esteeming of one’s own views asbeingtrueandsuperiorwhen,infact,theyarenot.Inparticular,itreferstotheobstinateattachmenttothepreviousthreeviews.

Thefifth,śīla-vrata-parāmarśa,istheviewexpressedasirrationalattachmentto religious vows and observances by the heretics who undertake them asmeansforpurificationandliberation.AnexampleofthisisthebeliefthatbyimmersingoneselfintheGanges,onewillbecleansedofallsins.

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(A) 6 kinds (B) 7 kinds (C) 10 kinds

1. rāga—greed 1. kāmarāga—sensualgreed 1. rāga

2. bhavarāga—existence‑greed

2. pratigha—hostility 3. pratigha 2. pratigha

3. avidyā— ignorance 4. avidyā 3. avidyā

4. māna—conceit 5. māna 4. māna

5. vicikitsā—doubt 6. vicikitsā 5. vicikitsā

6. dṛṣṭi —view 7. dṛṣṭi 6. satkāyadṛṣti

7. antagrāhadṛṣṭi

8. mithyādṛṣti

9. dṛṣti-parāmarśa

10. śīla-vrata-parāmarśa

12.6.1.1. The three unskillful roots (akuśala-mūla)

Fromoneperspective,amongthesixfundamentaldefilementsin(A),greed,hostilityandignorancemaybesaidtobethemostfundamental.Thesethree,since the time of the sūtra, have been referred to as the “unskillful roots”.“Root” is explained as “cause”:53 All unskillful mental states spring fromthem.Wemust, of course, here also bear inmind theAbhidharmadoctrinethat greed and hostility aremutually exclusive. “Unskillful” is explained asthat“which isnotpeacefulandsecure”(akṣema;不安隱).54Hostilityhere isinterchangeablewithhatred(dveṣa),asalsogreedwithcovetousness(lobha),andignorancewithdelusion(moha).Suchfluidityinterminologies—whichisstillobservedintheAKBandsubsequenttexts—isprobablyduetothefactthatthevariousnamesofsomeoftheseimportantthought‑concomitantshavebeensomentionedalreadyinthesūtra‑s.

Greed refers exclusively to attachment to objects of the sensuality sphere,despitethefactthereexistsgreedforexistence(bhava-rāga)inthetwoupperspheres.55Thereasonisthatalldefilementsintheupperspheresarenotunskillful,butveiled‑nondefined.Hatredreferstothevariousintentionstoharmsentientbeings.Thistooisconfinedtothesensualitysphere.Inthiscontextofthethreeunskillfulroots,theSgPŚdefinesdelusionasthenon‑cognizanceorignoranceof theverybeginning(pūrvānta,pūrvānta-koṭi)and theveryend(aparānta,aparānta-koṭi)ofsaṃsāra,ofkarmaanditsretribution,ofcauseanddharma‑sgenerated by cause, of the Triple Gem (tri-ratna) of the four noble truths,ofskillfulandunskillfuldharma‑s,etc.Itisnoteworthythatinthisdescription,ignorance isnot specifiedasexclusivelyorprimarily thenon‑cognizanceofthefourtruths.56Inthelatertexts,however,itcametobeemphasizedprimarilyas the ignoranceof the four truths.Moreover, the later texts also refined itsdefinition tospecificallyexclude the ignorancesconjoinedwithsatkāya-dṛṣṭi andantagraha-dṛṣṭi57—again,forthereasonthattheyareveiled‑nondefined.(Seeabove).58

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A question is raised as to why the strong grade of false view, which isresponsible for thecuttingoffof theskillful roots, isnotmadeanunskillfulroot. In response theMVŚoffersnumerousreasonswhy the threealonearedesignatedasunskillfulroots.Amongthem,oneisthat,forthecuttingoffofskillfulness,theyarepredominantatthestageofpreparationaswellasthestagewhentheskillfulrootsareactuallybeingcutoff.Ontheotherhand,falseviewispredominantonlyatthestageofthecuttingoff,notatthepreparatorystage.Indeed, for the purification (viśuddhi) and pollution (saṃkleśa) of both theinternalandtheexternal,itisdifficultatthestageofpreparationandeasyatthestagefinalachievement.Anotherreason:intheprocessofcuttingofftheskillfulroots,thesethreeareboththeinitialpropeller(pravartka)andthesubsequentpropeller(/sustainer;anuvartka),falseviewisonlythesubsequentpropeller.Other reasons include: it is through the force of these three that false viewbecomescapableofcuttingofftheskillfulroots;whenthesethreeareexhausted,karmaisexhausted;theyconstitutethehindranceofdefilements(kleśāvaraṇa);itisonaccountofthesethreethatthetenunskillfulpathsofkarma (akuśala-karma-patha)aregenerated;etc.(Thelastfewreasonsalsoexplainwhyotherimportantdefilementsarenotdesignatedasunskillfulroots).59

MVŚ explains the interrelation among the three roots. Because of thedifferent modes of activity associated with greed and hatred, there do notarisesimultaneously.This is in fact the rationale for the laterSarvāstivādinsto include the two among the indeterminate thought‑concomitants (supra,§9.3.4.2).Delusion,howeverisalwayspresent:

Ifgreedarisesinathoughtthereisnohatred;ifhatredarisesinathought,there is no greed. Delusion, [however,] necessarily exists in these two[typesof]thought.Why?Themodesofactivitiespertainingtogreedandhatred aremutually contradictory; anddelusion is not so.Themodeofactivitypertainingtogreedisjoyousness(saumanasya),thattohatredisdejectedness(daurmanasya);themodeofactivitypertainingtoignoranceiscontradictorytoneither.Moreover,whengreedarises,thebodygrows(/increases), being benefited; when hatred arises, the body diminishes (/decreases),beingdamaged.Delusioniscontradictorytoneither.…60

12.6.1.1.1. The two types of ignorance

Outofthethree,ignorancecandefinitelyclaimsprimacy,sinceinBuddhism,itisrootcauseforalldefilements,includinggreedandhatred.IntheAbhidharmaexposition on Conditioned Co‑arising (pratītya-samutpāda), ignorance isthe collective name standing for all the defilements in the past existencewhichgive rise to theconditionings in thepresentexistence (“Conditioningshave ignorance as their [causal] conditions”, avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārāḥ).Infact, “alldefilements can project karma; being the cause of karma, theyare [collectively] called ignorance.”61However, the Sarvāstivādins insist that

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ignoranceisnotmerelytheabsenceofcognizance(vidyā),akindofbadprajñā. Itisadistinctdharma,arealexistent,characterizedbynon‑cognizance(ajñāna)and a disinclination to understand.Saṃghabhadra describes its characteristicthus:

There isadistinctdharmawhichharmsthecapabilityofunderstanding(prajñā).Itisthecauseoftopsy‑turvyviewsandobstructstheexaminationofmeritsandfaults.Withregardtodharma‑stobeknown(jñeya-dharma)itoperatesinthemodeofdisinclination,veilingthethoughtandthought‑concomitants.Thisisignorance.62

SincetheVKŚ,ignorancehasbeenspokenofasbeingoftwotypes:1.“Conjoinedignorance” (saṃprayuktā avidyā) — the ignorance that necessarily arisestogetherwith—andthroughthestrengthof—someotherdefilements;infactit cannot arise independently. 2. “Independent ignorance” (āveṇikī avidyā)which,foritsarising,doesnotneedthesupportofanyoftheotherproclivities.TherehasbeenacontroversyamongtheSarvāstivādamasterssincethetimeoftheMVŚastoitsexactnature,particularlyasregardswhetheritisabandonablebyvisiononly,oralso tobeabandonedbycultivation.Thecompilersof theMVŚareinclinedtowardstheformerposition,butapparentlyalsotoleratethelatter.Therehasalsobeenacontroversyastowhethertheignorancethatariseswith a defilement of restricted scope (parītta-kleśa-bhūmika-dharma— cf. supra,§9.3.4.3)canqualifyasan“independentignorance”.63

12.6.2. Some important classifications

Ofthevariouswaysofclassificatorytopicsmentionedabove(§12.5),themoreimportant ones are: (i)darśana-heya‑ and bhāvanā-heya; (ii)sarvatraga andasarvatraga; (iii)sāsrava-ālambana and anāsrava-ālambana; (iv)the fivecategories(nikāya)ofabandonables—(1–4)byinsightintoduḥkha,samudaya,nirodha,mārga,and(5)bybhāvanā(cultivation).

12.6.2.1. Darśana-heya and bhāvanā-heya kleśa

Whenthecognitiveobject (ālambana)ofadefilementcanbeabandonedbythemere insight into the four truths (satyānāṃ darśana-mātreṇa prahāṇāt),thatdefilementissaidtobeone‘abandonableby(thepathof)vision’(darśana-mārga-praheya).64 Otherwise, it belongs to the category called ‘abandonableby (the path of) cultivation’ (bhāvanā-mārga-heya), that is, by repeatedpractice.Ofthetotaloftendefilements,thefiveviewsanddoubtsarecognitiveinnature;theyarethusabandonedonceproperinsightisgained.Ontheotherhand,rāga,pratigha,mānaandavidyāpartakeofbothcognitiveandaffectivenature;thustheirmanifestationsarenotentirelyabandonablebyvisionalone.Hencethesefourintheiraffectiveaspectshavetobefurthercounteractedbythepathofrepeatedpracticeorcultivation.

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(a) Darśanamārga-praheya (abandonable by the path of vision)

Darśanamārgareferstothestageof15thought‑momentsofdirectrealization(abhisamaya)intothefournobletruths,attheendofwhich—i.e.,inthe16th moment—onebecomesasrotaāpanna.Duringthese15moments,atotalof88defilementsareabandonedbyinsightintothefournobletruths,asshownbelow:

In the sphere of sensuality:

Defilements I. duḥkha-darśana-heya

II. samudaya-darśana-heya

III. nirodha-darśana-heya

IV.mārga-darśana-heya

1. rāga

2. pratigha

3. māna

4. avidyā

5. vicikitsā

6. satkāyadṛṣṭi

7. mithyādṛṣṭi

8. antagrāhadṛṣṭi

9. dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa-d.

10. śīla-vrata-p.-d.

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

-

✓

-

✓

-

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

-

✓

-

✓

-

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

-

✓

-

✓

✓

10 7 7 8

(Abbreviation:d = dṛṣṭi)

Atotalof10+7+7+8=32kleśa‑spertainingtothesphereofsensualityareabandoned.

Notethatsatkāyadṛṣṭiandantagrāha-dṛṣṭiareabsentundersamudaya.Thisisbecausesatkāyadṛṣṭiariseswithregardtothefive‑skandhacomplexconstitutingthe human individual.That is, it arises on account of not understanding theduḥkha-satyawhich,fortheSarvāstivādins,isthefiveskandha‑sofgraspingintheirfruitaspect.65

Since the arising of antagrāha-dṛṣṭi is dependent on satkāya-dṛṣṭi, it too isconfinedunderduḥkha-satya.

Śīlavrata-parāmarśaisalsoanerroneousviewregardingthepsycho‑physicalcomplex—thetypeofview,forinstance,whichinclinesonetotorturethebodyormind—henceitisincludedunderduḥkha-satya.Sinceitisalsothetypeofviewwhichmistakesirrationalextremeasceticismasthepathofpurification,italsoariseswithregardtothepath,henceitissubsumableundermārga-satya aswell.

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In the two upper spheres:

In the fine‑material sphere, the same scheme applies as in the sphere ofsensuality,butexcludingpratigha,because inboth the twohigherspheresofmeditationalexperiencethemindisfreefrompratigha,inallfourcategoriesofabandonables.Thus,atotalof9+6+6+7=28defilementsareabandonedin the rūpadhātu.

Thesameappliestothecaseoftheimmaterialsphere,givingagainatotalof28defilementswhichareabandoned.

Thisishow88(=32+28+28)defilementscometobeabandonedinthethreespheresofexistencebythedarśana-mārga.

(b) Bhāvanāmārga-praheya (abandonable by the path of cultivation)

While thepathofvision lasts foronly15consecutivemoments, thepathofcultivationmay lastawhole life timeorevenmore.Theśrota-āpanna saintnow embarks on a journey of repeated cultivation (bhāvanā) to elevate hisinsight (prajñā) for the purpose of counteracting the defilements that stillremain. Bhāvanā means more than just ‘meditation’. However it is clearthat themost fundamental part of the bhāvanā-mārga is indeedmeditation.Thus, bhāvanāmayī prajñā is also known as samādhija-prajñā — insightor understanding born ofmeditation.Although in a broader sense, samādhi connotes the perfect integration of all psychic energies, the main methodemployed to achieve that is still meditation. Therefore meditation is givenaprominent role. Hencewecan see an emphasis on meditation consistentinallBuddhist traditions.TheSarvāstivādins in factassert that theBuddha’sperfectwisdom—incontrasttothatofanarhat—consistsinthecompleteandabsoluteeradicationofalldefilementsalongwiththeirsubtletraces(vāsanā),and this happens only when the practitioner finally attains the vajropama-samādhi,whosestrength (concentration) iscomparable to thatofadiamondthatcutsthrougheverythingbutcannotbecutbyanything.

Thereareatotaloftendefilementsabandonedbythepathofcultivation.Theseareinnateandarereallyconstitutedbyfourofthefundamentaldefilements—rāga,pratigha,mānaandavidyā.Thesetendefilementsareintrinsicallymuchmoretenaciousandresilientthanthecognitivelysuperimposedonesabandonedin the darśana-mārga,andthereforepersistenteffortsbycultivationareneededforthemtobeabandoned.Fourpertaintothesphereofsensualityandthreetoeachofthetwoupperspheres:

kāmadhātu: rāga + pratigha + avidyā + māna = 4rūpadhātu: rāga + avidyā + māna = 3ārūpyadhātu: rāga + avidyā + māna = 3

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12.6.2.2. Universal (sarvatraga) and non-universal (asarvatraga) defilements

Thisdistinctionisapplicabletothedefilementssubsumedunderthefournobletruths. Amongthe98anuśaya‑s,11aresaidtobe‘universal’,astheycanmoveinallthefivecategories(nikāya)ofabandonablespertainingtotheirownsphere(dhātu).

According toSaṃghabhadra, thismeans that: (i)theycan takeasobjectsalldharma‑sbelongingtothefivecategoriesintheirowndhātu,(ii)theyoperateasanuśaya (anuśerate—haveanuśayana)withregardtoallofthem,and(iii)serveasthecausefortheproductionofdefileddharma‑sinallfivecategories.66

There are 11, pertaining to the duḥkha‑ and samudaya-satya‑s: seven underduḥkha-darśana-heya — satkāyadṛṣṭi, antagrāha-dṛṣṭi, mithyā-dṛṣṭi, dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa, śīlavrata-parāmarśa,vicikitsā andavidyā; fourundersamudaya-darśana-heya—mithyādṛṣṭi, dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa,vicikitsāandavidyā. Nine of them—exceptingsatkāyadṛṣṭiandantagrāha-dṛṣṭi—areuniversalsalsointheotherspheres(visabhāga-dhātu-sarvatraga).Thatis,theycanalsobearonanuppersphere.Satkāyadṛṣṭiandantagrāhadṛṣṭiaresabhāga-dhātu-sarvartraga,i.e.,theyareuniversalonlyintheirownsphere.

Alltheremaininganuśaya‑sarenon‑universal.

12.6.2.3. Defilements that take outflow-free objects (anāsravālambana) and those that take with-outflow objects (sāsravālambana)

Thedefilementsabandonablebyvisionintocessationandthepathareclassifiableas (i)those taking outflow‑free objects, and (ii)those taking with‑outflowobjects. The former comprisemithyā-dṛṣṭi, vicikitsā and avidyā. The lattercomprisetherestofthenirodha-darśana-praheyaandmārga-darśana-praheya defilements.The formerdonot haveanuśayanawith regard to their objectswhich, being outflow‑free, are not favorable to anuśayana. The latter haveanuśayana onlywith regard todharma‑sof theirowncategory in theirownspherebywayoftakingobjects(ālambanataḥ).

12.7. Relationship between defilements and the mind

VariouscontroversiesariseamongthedifferentAbhidharmaschoolsasregardsthenatureofthedefilements.Amongthese,twoareprominent:

(1) Aretheyconjoinedwith(saṃprayukta)ordisjoinedfrom(viprayukta)thought?

(2) Can a distinction be made between defilements in the latent,potentialformandthemanifestedform?

Thesetwoissuesareinsomewayconnected.

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As regards the first, if defilements are by nature disjoined from the mind,howaretheyaffectthemind?Ontheotherhand,iftheyareconjoinedwiththemind,howcantherebeliberationfromthematall?

AlreadyintheMVŚ,thesetwocontroversiesarerecorded,andtherewecanalsodiscernaverydeveloped,articulateunderstandingofanuśaya.Welearnthatthe‘abrupt‑abandonment śramaṇa‑s’(頓斷沙門)holdthat“whenthevajropama-samādhi manifests, all the darśana-heya and bhāvanā-heya defilementspertainingtothethreespheresofexistenceareabandonedatonce.Atallthestagespriortothis,therecanbeonlythesuppressionoftheparyavasthāna-s;the anuśaya‑sarenotyetcapableofbeingabandoned.”67In thisproposition,thereseemstobeanimplicitdistinctionbetweenparyavasthānaandanuśaya.

The same distinction is also implied in the Bhadanta’s view that ordinaryworldlings cannot abandon anuśaya‑s; they can only suppress theparyavasthāna‑s.68 Thisdistinction becomes explicit in another discussioncenteredonthepossibilityoftheretrogressionofan arhat:

TheVibhajyavādinsfurthersaythat anuśayaisthe bīja of paryavasthāna. The anuśaya is cittaviprayukta in its intrinsic nature. Theparyavasthāna is cittasaṃprayukta in its intrinsic nature. Paryavasthāna arises fromanuśaya. Retrogression results from the manifestation (saṃmukhībhāva)of paryavasthāna. The arhat‑s have already abandoned the anuśaya‑s;the paryavasthāna‑snotarising,howcananarhatretrogress?Hencethey(theVibhajyavādins)assertthatitislogicalthatthereisnoretrogression.69

Thefollowingpointscanbegleanedfromtheabovepassage:

1. Thereisadefinitecontrastbetweenanuśayaandparyavasthāna on the partofsomeĀbhidharmikas—inthiscasetheVibhajyavādins.

2. An anuśaya is assertedhere tobe the seedofparyavasthāna—seedsinthesenseofpotentialitiesarenotreal,existententities,hencearenotconjoinedwiththemind.70Theimplicationinthiscontextisthatanuśaya issosubtle that it, in its latentstate,hasnotconjoinedwiththemind;but,initsactivestate,i.e.,asparyavasthāna,itconjoinswiththemind.

3. TheVibhajyavādin point of view is that:When there is noanuśaya thereisnoparyavasthāna.Whenthereisnoparyavasthāna,thereisnoretrogression.

In the AKB and the Ny, we see that the Dārṣṭāntika‑Sautrāntikas advocateadoctrinalpositionsimilartothatoftheVibhajyavādinscitedabove,withtheonlydifference that theanuśaya, in theformofseeds,arepotentialitiesand,therefore,cannotbesaidtobeeitherconjoinedwithordisjoinedfromthought.IntheAKB,thecontroversy,betweentheVaibhāṣikaandtheSautrāntika,ontherelationshipbetweenanuśaya andparyavasthāna, takes the formofadebate

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onhowthecompoundkāmarāga-anuśaya(‘sensual‑greed‑proclivity’ofwhichsensualgreedisthefirstcomponent,proclivity,thesecond)istobeinterpreted:Isitadeterminativecompound(tatpuruṣa)meaning‘theanuśaya of kāmarāga’astheSautrāntikaholds,oradescriptivecompound(karmadhāraya)meaning‘theanuśayaiskāmarāgaitself’astheVaibhāṣikaholds?TheVaibhāṣikaoptsfor the second interpretationwhich accordswith their tenet that there is nosuchthingasalatentdefilement—defilementandanuśayaarejustsynonyms.Vasubandhu,however,supportstheSautrāntikaview:

[The interpretation] according to the Sautrāntikas is good. Butwhat is[the interpretation] of the Sautrāntikas? It is: kāmarāga-anuśaya meansthe‘anuśaya of kāmarāga’.And theanuśaya,notbeingadistinctentity(dravyāntara),[i.e.,arealexistent,]isneitherconjoinedwithnordisjoinedfrom [thought]. For, when asleep, the defilement is called anuśaya;whenawakened,itiscalledparyavasthāna.Butwhatisitssleepingstate(prasupti)? The continuity of its non‑manifested seed‑state.What is itsawakening(prabodha)?Thestatewhenitismanifested.…71

SomescholarsclaimthatthisDārṣṭāntika‑SautrāntikatheoryexpoundedintheAKBhasitssourceintheYogācārabhūmi-śāstra (YBŚ).However,weknowthat Aśvaghoṣa, a typical Dārṣṭāntika master72 already cited in the MVŚ,andKumāralāta,aDārṣṭāntikaleaderofca.late2ndorearly3rdcenturyC.E.,alreadyheldsomeformoftheseedtheory.73AndsincetheseearlyDārṣṭāntikaswere the precursors of the Sautrāntikas, there is no need to assume thatVasubandhuhadtoborrowhisaccountfromtheYBŚ.

Thestandpointofthevariousschoolsastowhethertheanuśaya‑sarecittaviprayukta or cittasaṃprayuktamaybesummarizedinthefollowingchart.74

neither cittasaṃprayukta nor viprayuktaSautrāntika(AKB,ADV)

bothcittasaṃprayuktaandviprayuktaVātsīputrīya(Ny,599b)

cittasaṃprayukta

* Śāriputrābhidharma(Tno.1548,526c)

SarvāstivādaOrthodox (Vaibhāṣika)

Dharmatrāta(MVÍ)

* Satyasiddhiśāstra (SatŚ)

Vibhajyavāda(Ny,599b)

Mahāsāṃghika(KvuX,1)

cittaviprayukta75

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12.8. Operation of the defilements

In the Sarvāstivāda,anuśayaismerelyasynonymfordefilementandtheconceptoflatencyisnotaccepted.Thatis,anuśayaandparyavasthānaaresynonymous.The termanuśaya is simply taken todenote the subtletyand tenacityof thedefilements.76

12.8.1. How a defilement arises

TheMVŚinformsusthat,accordingtosomeheretics,thearisingofadefilementis purely due to external stimuli— when the object exists, the defilementarises;whentheformerisdestroyed,thelatterdoesnotarise.TheSarvāstivādadisagreesandproposesthreereasonsforthearisingofdefilements:77

1.Onaccountofacause(hetu-balena)Thisreferstothefactthattheanuśaya‑sinone’ssaṃtānahavenotbeencompletely known and abandoned (aprahīṇa-aparijñāta) — becausetheircounteragentshavenotarisen,hencetheycanarisewhentherightconditionsassemble.

2.Onaccountoftheobject(viṣaya-balena)Thisreferstotheexternalstimuliconducivetodefilementscomingintothefieldofone’sexperience(pratyupasthita,ābhāsagata)—asinthecaseofanarhatsusceptibletoretrogression.78

3.Onaccountofpreparatoryeffort(prayoga-balena)This refers specifically to improper mental application (ayoniśo-manaskāra).

ElsewhereintheMVŚ,Vasumitraexplainsthatdefilementscanariseevenforsomeone dwelling in a hermitage (araṇya). In this case, there is no influencefromexternalobject,buttherearetheforcesofthecause—theyetunabandonedanuśaya—andimpropermentalapplicationwithinthehermit.Ontheotherhand,evenwhen in thepresenceof the cause and theobject‑stimulus, onemaynotgeneratedefilementonaccountoftheabsenceofimpropermentalapplication.79

12.8.2. How a defilement ‘adheres and grows’ (anu-√śī)

AccordingtotheKaśmīrianmasters,therearetwowaysbywhichadefilementgrows/increases concordantly (anuśete), i.e., obtains a footing and growth(pratiṣṭhāṃ labhate,puṣṭiṃ labhate):

(I) by way of taking an object (ālambanatas):Onaccountoftakingawith‑outflowobject. “[The defilement] grows as a result of its attachment to theparticular mode of activity (ākāra) arisen in respect to the object.” When

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theobject is outflow‑free, anuśayana does not take place because it is notfavorabletothegrowthofthedefilementandhencethereisnobindingtherein.

(II) by way of conjunction with a mental dharma (saṃprayogatas): The defilement‘adheresandgrows’inconcordancewiththedharmawithwhichitisconjoined,makingthedharmahavethesamefaultasitself.Thus,inthecaseofarāgaconjoinedwithapleasurablesensation,thelatterfuelstheintensityoftheformerandtheformeralsocomestohavetheaspectofgreed;asaresult,thewholementalcomplex(citta-caitta‑s)becomesoneofgreed,i.e.,agreedymind.

Accordingto theWesternmasters, thefirstmodeofanuśayana isbywayofbondage,thelatterbywayofcompanionship.80

12.8.2.1. Vasumitra’s elaboration

In the same context, Vasumitra elaborates on this notion of ‘adhering andgrowing’:

1. Becauseoffallingintoanevilstateofmind—justlikeamemberofagroupcommitsanevilandcausesothersinthegrouptofallintothesamestateofmind.Inthesameway,whenoneanuśayaarises,itcausesthewholecitta-caittacomplextobedefiled.[Influenceaspect]

2. Becauseitisliketheheatingoffire,e.g.,ahotpieceofironisputintoavesselofwater—bothwaterandvesselbecomehot.Inthesameway,thewhole citta-caitta complex becomes ‘heated up’ by theanuśaya. [Contaminationaspect]

3. Becauseitislikesmoke,etc.—whenagarmentistaintedbysmokeanddust,etc.,thewholegarmentbecomesdirty.[Contaminationaspect]

4. Because of it being reproachable— e.g., when one member of thesaṅghacommitsanoffence,thewholesaṅghaisreproached.Likewise,the presence of a singleanuśaya renders thewholementalmake‑upreproachable.

The above constitute four reasons why one can speak of a defilement’sadheringandgrowingbywayofconjunction.Thesamealsoapplytothecaseof anuśayanabywayoftakinganobject:Thatis,whereanobjectcausesanincreasewithregardtothesefouraspects,onesaysthatthedefilementadheresandgrowstherein.

12.8.2.2. Elaboration in the Ny

Concerning“anuśayanabywayoftakinganobject”,Saṃghabhadraexplainsthis to mean that “the anuśaya adheres along and grows (隨住增長) in the (sāsrava)dharma,i.e.,itbindsconcordantlyandincreasesstagnationtherein”.81

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This is like the adherenceofdustonawetgarment (ārdra iva paṭe rajāṃsi saṃsthātum [utsahante]), or the growth of seeds in an irrigated field. Theanuśaya‑sthattaketheanāsrava dharma‑s—nirvāṇaorthepath—orahighersphere(thantheone towhich theybelong)asobjects,donotoperate in thismode,becausetheseobjectsarenotappropriatedastheSelforwhatpertainstotheSelfeitherthroughSelf‑view(ātmaḍṛṣṭi)orcraving(tṛṣṇā).Asamatterof fact, thewish for theattainmentof thepuredharma‑sorahighersphereisnot agreedas suchbut apredilectionor aspiration for thegood (kuśala-dharma-chanda).Besides,thepureobjectsaswellasthedharma‑sbelongingtoahighersphereareinnatureopposedtotheanuśaya‑sthattakethemasobjects,andhencenotsupportiveoftheirgrowth.Assuch,theanuśaya‑scannotfindafootinginthem,justasthesoleofafootcannotstaywhenplacedonaheatedrock.82

The “anuśayana by way of conjunction” is elaborated as a threefoldoperation:83

1. inducingtheacquisition[ofthedefilements];

2.obstructingthethoughtseries(citta-santati);

3. servingasthehomogeneouscausefortheemanationofthesubsequentmomentintheseries.

Saṃghabhadra also quotes the examples given by the pūrvācārya‑s for thephenomenaofanuśayana:84

(i) saṃprayogatas — Just as in an agglomeration of filth comprisingexcreta,water,mud,etc.,thewaterandmud,etc.,becomefilthyasaresultoftheexcreta;byvirtueofthewaterandmud,etc.,thefilthinessoftheexcretatoobecomesmore intense.Throughmutualsupport,bothbecomeextremelyloathsome.Likewise, in amental agglomeration conjoinedwith defilements,the citta-caitta‑scometobedefiledbyvirtueofthedefilements;thelattertoo,byvirtueof the former,becomemore intense.Throughmutualsupportbothbecome corrupted. The corruption gradually increasing in the series of thisagglomeration,theaccompanimentssuchasjāti,etc.,alsocometobedefiled.

(ii) ālambanatas — Just as in a filthy place, the pigs and dogs sportingandsleeping thereinarebesmearedbyexcretabecomingall themorefilthy;atthesame time, due to the pigs and dogs, this filthy place becomes evenmorefilthy.Likewise,awithout‑flow(sāsrava)objectbelongingtoitsspheremanifestsitsnatureasbeingwith‑outflowthroughtheforceofthedefilementthattakesitasitsobject;atthesametime,thisobjectiscapableofoperatinginaccordwiththeforceofthedefilementtocausethegradualintensificationofthreegrades(strong‑strong,etc.)ofstrengthofthisdefilement.

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(iii)Thenon‑operationofanuśayanawithregardtoanoutflow‑freeobject—this is like thecaseofaslipperyandspotlesslycleanmanwhoaccidentallyfallsintoanagglomerationoffilth.Althoughincontactwiththeexcreta,thereisnoincrementoffilthonhispart.Atthesametimethismanisincapableofincreasingthefilthofthatagglomerationoffilth.Likewise,althoughdharma‑swhichareoutflow‑freeorwhichbelongtoadifferentspheremayattimesbetakenasobjectsbydefilements,thereisnomutualsupportfortheincrementofoutflowstherein.Itisonlybywayofconjunctionthattherecanbeanuśayana withregardtosuchobjects.

A further illustration, said to be by “some other” (apare), is also given:Justas,whenwine ismixedwithpoison, its strength increases; at the sametime,thepowerofthepoisonisalsoenhanced.Likewise,whenadefilementtakesawith‑outflowobject,theefficaciesofbothcometobeenhancedthroughmutualsupport.Ontheotherhand,whenaneffectivemedicineisplacedinsideapoison,itcausesthediminutionalone—notenhancement—oftheefficacyofthepoison.Likewiseistheeffectofanoutflow‑freeobjectforadefilement.Accordingly, although falseview (mithyā-dṛṣṭi)may arisewhen anoutflow‑free dharmaistakenasanobject,thisfalseviewdoesnothavethestrengthtocutofftherootsofskillfulness.85

12.9. Abandonment of defilements

12.9.1. Meaning of ‘abandonment’

FortheSarvāstivādins,defilementscannotbe‘destroyed’inanontologicalsensesince,likeallotherdharma‑s,theirsvabhāva‑sexistperpetually.Abandonmentinthepropersensemeanstheseveringoftheacquisitionlinkingthedefilementtotheindividualseries.TheMVŚstatesthatevenpastandfutureanuśaya‑saresaidtohavethefunctionofanuśayana,inasmuchasthey,althoughwithoutanypresentactivity,cangiverisetotheiracquisitionsthatariseinthepresent,justasanextinguishedfirecangiverisetosmokeeventhoughitnolongerarisesinthepresent.86Thereforetheytoomustbeabandoned.Suchananuśayana,ofcourse,does not entail ‘adherence and growth’— a sense apparently articulated ina relatively later stage, despite the fact thatXuanZang uses here the samestandardrenderingof‘sui zeng 隨增’.

12.9.2. Role of acquisition in the abandonment of defilements

Whatever the original signification of acquisitionmight have been,when itcame to be articulated as a citta-viprayukta saṃskāra, it became, for theSarvāstivādasystem,a sine qua nonforthemechanismofdefilementaswellaspurification.Oneisdefiledbyadefilementwhenitarisesinoneselfandcomestobeconnectedwithone’sseriesbyaconascentacquisition.Whenboththis

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defilementand theacquisitioncome tocease—becomepast—in thenextmomentonecontinuestobedefiledonaccountofone’scontinuousconnectionwith this defilement which, although past, is still existent, effected by thehomogeneous series of acquisition (a niṣyanda) perpetuated by the originalacquisition.Whenoneisfinallyfreedfromthisdefilement,it isnotthatonehasmadeitextinct—thesvabhāva‑sofalldharma‑scanneverbedestroyed.Itisonlythatitslinkage—acquisition—withoneselfcomestobesevered.Thisoccurs when the counteracting path— i.e., the ārya prajñā— arises.TheMVŚexplainstheroleofacquisitionintheabandonmentofdefilementsasfollows:

Whenanarhat abandons thedefilements, it isnot thathe renders themtotallynon‑existent,forthe[intrinsic]naturesofpastandfuturedefilementscontinuetoexistasrealities.Intheseries[ofthepractitioner],whenthepathcontradictorytothedefilementhasnotappeared(saṃmukhī-√bhū),heissaidtohavenotyetabandonedthedefilement.Whenintheseries,the path contradictory to the defilement has appeared, he abandons theacquisitionofthesaṃyogaandrealizestheacquisitionofvisaṃyoga,andis[accordingly] not endowedwith thedefilement; he is then said to haveabandoned the defilement. It should be explained thus: the cultivationofthenoblepathisanextra‑ordinaryevent[inthat],althoughitenablesanarhattoabandonadefilement,itdoesnotcauseittobenon‑existent.Forthisreason,theVenerableGhoṣakasays:‘Whenadefilementdoesnotoperateintheperson,itissaidtohavebeenabandoned[bytheperson].Itisnotthat[thisabandonment]causesittobetotallynon‑existent.’87

Also:88

Itisnotthecasethatwhenthenoblepathsarearisen,theycutoff(abandon)thedefilementslikeaknifecuttingoffathing,[or]likeastonegrindingincense.Rather,whenthenoblepathsappear,theycausethecessationofthe samanvāgama- prāpti(i.e.,prāptiquasamanvāgama)ofthedefilementsand the arising of the asamanvāgama-prāpti (i.e., the asamanvāgama whichisaprāpti)ofthosedefilements.Atthattime,oneissaidtohavecutoff/abandonedthedefilements.

Indeed,withouttheinterventionofacquisitionwhichisinnaturedissociatedfromthecitta-caitta‑s,itbecomesimpossibleforacounteragent(pratipakṣa)toexerciseitsfunctiononadefilementsincethetwoareopposedintheirmoralnature.Forthesamereason,itisequallyimpossibleforfalseview(mithyā-dṛṣṭi)tobringabout thecuttingoffof the skillful roots (kuśalamūla-samuccheda),thetwobeingunabletointeractdirectly,asexplainedinthefollowingpassage:89

Question:Whatisthemeaningofthecuttingoffoftheskillfulroots?Answer:Itisnotlikethecase,intheworld,ofanaxe,etc.,cuttingatree,for mithyā-dṛṣṭi and the kuśala do not mutually come into contact [—

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thetwobeingmentalentitiesofopposednature].Rather,whenmithyā-dṛṣṭi appearsin[aperson’s]series,itcausesthecessationofthesamanvāgama-prāpti of the skillful roots and the arisingof theirasamanvāgama-prāpti —thisiswhatiscalled‘cuttingoff’.Iftheacquisitionoftheskillfulrootsarenon‑existent,atthattimetheskillfulrootsaresaidtohavebeencutoff.

Moreprecisely,inabandoningadefilement,theceasingoftheacquisitionofthisdefilementisfollowedbythearisingoftheacquisitionofthedisconnection(visaṃyoga-prāpti)with thatdefilementaswellas the nonacquisitionof thesamedefilement; the latter isas importantas theformersince itensures thedisconnectionwiththatdefilement.Thenecessaryco‑operationofacquisitionandnonacquisitioninthisprocessiscomparedtothetwosuccessiveactionscontributingtothedefiniteremovalofathieffromthehouse—thethrowingoutofthethiefimmediatelyfollowedbytheshuttingofthedoor.90Twomomentsare therefore necessary in the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of the abandoning ofadefilement:

Thefirst,knownas theānantarya-mārga, is the receptivity thatactually‘cutsoff’orabandonsthedefilement.The second, known as the vimukti-mārga, is knowledge proper whichinducestheacquisitionofthefruitofdisconnection—i.e.,inthismoment,theactualcessation(pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha)ofthedefilementisrealizedoracquired(prāpta).

TheMVŚ91 argues that ifasamanvāgama (= aprāpti)were not a real entity(butmerely a name as some masters assert), the cutting/abandoning ofdefilementscannotbespokenof(lit:conceptualized;prajñapyate):

For, when the noble paths arise, they do not cut off (or abandon) thedefilements in themanner that a knife cuts off a thing or that a stonegrinds athing. They merely cut off the acquisition of connection(saṃyoga)[withthedefilements]andrealize(sākṣāt-√kṛ) theacquisitionofdisconnection,causingthearisingoftheasamanvāgama (= aprāpti)ofthedefilements.Thisiswhatisknownasthecuttingoffofdefilements.

12.9.2.1. An abandonment is done once for all

Onceaparticularcounteractingpath—mundaneorsupramundane—abandonsagivendefilement,itisdoneonceandforall.Thereisnopartialabandoning,andtheabandonmentisnotrepeated.92However,theacquisitionofdisjunction(visaṃyoga-prāpti)—i.e.,thepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha—fromthedefilementcantakeplacerepeatedly.93Thisofcoursedoesnotentailthatanirodha,whichisunconditioned,canchangequalitatively;onlythatthepractitioner’sattainmentofitcanbefirmerandfirmerordeeperanddeeperasheprogresses,orthattheacquisitionoftheabandonmentischangedfromonewhichiswith‑outflowtoonewhichisoutflow‑free.

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Theafore‑mentionedprincipleissummarizedinthefollowinglineofastanzaintheAKB:

Destruction [of a defilement] is at once.The obtainment of disjunctionfromthemisagainandagain.(sakṛt kṣayaḥ visaṃyogalābhas teṣāṃ punaḥ punaḥ)(AKB,v,63ab)94

Saṃghabhadraexplains:95

Asaresultofacquiringtheunhinderedpath(ānantarya-mārga)pertainingto them, the defilements to be abandoned are completely abandoned atonce. Apart from [the case of] retrogression, there can be no furtherabandonment subsequently. Once [a defilement] has been abandoned,anyfurtherabandonmentbecomesfutile.

[Ontheotherhand,]althoughtheacquireddisjunctiondoesnotbecomeprogressively superior following the paths [of advancement, viśeṣa-mārga],neverthelessasthepathsadvance,therecanbethefurtherarisingof the acquisitionwhichissuperior.Astheacquisitionofdisjunctionisincludedinthepath,whenthepathisrelinquishedoracquired,ittoocomestoberelinquishedoracquired.Thus it is that therecanbe therepeatedacquisitionofthedisjunctions.

12.9.3. Abandonment by the mundane path

The view of the ‘abrupt‑abandonment śramaṇa-s’ quoted above (§12.7)implies that there isnopossibilityofanordinaryworldlingabandoninganydefilement.TheDārṣṭāntikasintheMVŚcategoricallyassertthatthisisinfactthecase.Inhisspiritualstruggle,aworldlingcanonlytemporarilysuppresshisactiveparyavasthāna‑s;thelatentdefilementshavenotbeenabandonedinanabsolutemanner(atyantam):bymeansofthemundanepathshehangsontothefirstdhyāna,awayfromtheattachmenttothesphereofsensuality.Inthisway,graduallyhehangsonuptothenaiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana,awayfromtheattachmenttotheākiṃcanyāyatanawhencehecannotgetaway—therebeingnoupperstagetohangonto.Thisiscomparedtoaninsect(oraman)climbingupaplant:ithangsontoanupperpartleavingbehindthelowerpart;butwhenitreachesthehighestpoint,itnecessarilyretrogressesasthereisnothinghigheruptohangonto.96Amongthosewhoholdsuchaposition,someparticularlyemphasizetheabruptabandonmentofalldefilements:

Somemaintain thatalldefilementsareabandonedabruptly,and there isno gradual abandonment. They assert that all defilements are abruptlyabandoned when the Diamond‑like meditation (vajropama-samādhi)ismanifested.On account of the fact that thismeditation abandons alldefilements,itiscalledtheDiamond‑likemeditation;for,itislikediamondwhichiscapableofbreakingiron,stones,teeth,bones,pearls,jade,gems

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(maṇi),etc.Althoughtheyconcede that therearefourfruitsofspiritualattainment (śrāmaṇya-phala), [they maintain that] the abandonment ofdefilementsrequirestheDiamond‑likemeditation.

Question:Ifthefirstthreefruitscannotabandondefilements,whatistheuseofdesignatingthemas[fruitsofspiritualattainment]?

Their answer: The first three fruits are capable of suppressing thedefilements, inducingthemanifestationof theDiamond‑likemeditation;it is only then that the [defilements] come to be absolutely abandoned(atyantaṃ prahīyante).Thus,theyarenotfutile…

Torefutetheirintention,itisshownthattherearetwotypesofcounteractionfordefilements—thetwopaths,thatofvisionandthatofcultivation,aredifferent.Eitherofthem,whenbeingmanifested,iscapableofabsolutelyabandoning[defilements].97

For thesemasterswhodenythepossibilityofrealabandonment throughthemundane path, therefore, there is in fact no distinction betweendefilementsabandonable by vision and those abandonable by cultivation. Obviously,oneimportantpremiseforthispositionisthatrealabandonmentcanonlybeachievedthroughtheoutflow‑freeunderstanding,andthisarisesonlyinanārya whenthetruthsaredirectlyrealized.

As opposed to the Dārṣṭāntikas, however, the Sarvāstivādins maintain thatamundanepath (laukika-mārga)entailingawith‑outflowunderstanding isalsocapableofcounteractingdefilementsofbothtypes,thoseabandonablebyvisionand those abandonable by cultivation. Such counteractions actually constituteabandonmentseventhoughtheireffectsaresusceptibletobeinglost.Asamatteroffact,evenanāryamayoccasionallymakeuseofsuchapath.98Accordingly,when a pṛthagjana becomes an ārya, he does not need to again abandon thesame defilements that he has earlier abandoned by the mundane path. Thus,ifapractitionerhasabandonedsufficientcategoriesofdefilementsbythemundanepathspriortoenteringthedarśana-mārga,hecanskipthestageofstream‑entry(srotaāpatti)andplungedirectlyintothatofeithersakṛdāgāmin or anāgāmin.99

But there is some limitation: A pṛthagjana can abandon the defilementsabandonable by vision and abandonable by cultivation pertaining to all thestagesfromthesensualitysphereuptothesphereofnothingness(ākiṃcanya-āyatana)only,butnot thosepertaining to the sphereofneither‑ideation‑nor‑nonideation (naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñā-āyatanana = bhavāgra) which arecompletely abandoned only when the vajropama-samādhi is produced.100 Moreover,evenifaworldlingcanabandonallthedefilementsthatcanpossiblybeabandonedbyamundanepathofcultivation,hestillremainsaworldling.Hemust enter into the path of vision— into direct realization— in ordertobecomeanārya. In other words,themundanepathofcultivationcanonly

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becomeeffectivethroughthepathofvision:Hedoesnothavetoabandonthesamedefilementsagain;butthedisjunctionsfromthesedefilementsthathehasacquiredbythemundanepathmustbere‑acquiredbymeansoftheoutflow‑freeknowledgesindirectrealization.Putdifferently:althoughthroughthemundanepathhehasalreadyacquiredtheacquisitionswhicharewith‑outflow,hemustacquireanewtheoutflow‑freeacquisitionsofthedisjunctions.101

TheAKBstatesthatallbeings,ārya‑sandpṛṭhagjana‑salike,areendowedwith(samanvāgata) the pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑s, excepting thosewho are sakala-bandhana-ādikṣaཇastha‑s and the sakala-bandhana-pṛthagjana‑s.102 This isanotherexpressionofthetenetthatevenapṛthagjanacanacquirethecessationofdefilements.Asakala-bandhana-ādikṣaṇastha is anāryawhohasnotyetabandonedanydefilement—andhenceisstill‘boundwithallbondages’—atthefirstmoment(duḥkhe dharma-jñāna-kṣānti)ofhisenteringthepathofvision;103asakala-bandhana-pṛthagjanaisaworldlingwhohasnotabandonedanyoftheninecategoriesofdefilementspertainingtothesphereofsensualitybymeansofthemundanepath.

In making upward progress by means of the mundane path, an ordinaryworldlinggeneratessixmodesofactivities:

Inthemundaneunhinderedpaths,hereflectsonthelowerstagesasbeing

1. coarse(audārika),or2.unsatisfactory(duḥkhila),or3. likeathickwall(sthūlabhittika).

Inthepathsofliberation,heseesthehigherstagesasbeing

1. calm(śānta),or2.excellent(praṇīta),or3. exit (niḥsaraṇa).

Saṃghabhadraelaboratesonthis:

Itisonlyintermsofpossibilitythatitissaidthatineachofthetwopathsthreemodesofactivityaregenerated.Itisnotthatinallcases,asentientbeing at the time of detachment (vairāgya) generates three modes ofactivityinboththeunhinderedpathandthepathofliberation.

In the lower stages: there is much restlessness (auddhatya) and littlecalm;hence“coarse”. Inspiteofgreateffort to temporarilyweaken theforceofrestlessness,oneisstillunabletoinducethearisingofwonderfulpleasure, hence “unsatisfactory”. There is an extremely great numberof misfortunes qua obstructions capable of hindering the efficacy ofseeingthedirectionofexit,hence“[obstructionlike]athickwall”.Inthehigherstages:withoutone’sstriving,restlessnessisfeeble,hence“calm”.

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Withoutmakingeffortandrestlessnessbeingfeeble,superiorpleasureisinduced,hence“excellent”.Oneisabletohavedecisivevisionofallthemisfortunesinthelowerstageinwhichone’sthoughtdoesnotdelightandwhichoneisabletotranscend,hence“exit”.104

Inthisway,bybecomingdisgustedwithalowersphereandfindingdelightinanuppersphere, theordinaryworldlingabandons thedefilementspertainingtotheformerandmovesuptothelatter.105Thismethodofpractice,however,entailsthathecannotabandonthedefilementspertainingtothehigheststage,existence‑peak,forthereisnostagehigherthanittocontrastwithinordertogeneratedisgust.Accordingly,tocompletehisjourney,hemustrelyfinallyonthe outflow‑freeknowledgearisingindirectrealization.106

12.9.3.1. Unhindered paths and paths of liberation of a worldling and an ārya

In theabandonmentofadefilement, twostages,called“paths”are involved:the“unhinderedpath”(ānantarya-mārga),followedbythe“pathofliberation”(vimukti-mārga). (See infra, § 15.4). This applies to both the supramundanepathaswellthemundanepath.VariousviewsarefoundintheMVŚconcerningthedifferencesintheabandonmentofdefilementsbyanordinaryworldlingsandanārya:

Question:Whenaworldlingandanāryagaindetachmentfromtheninegradesofdefilementofacertainstage,byhowmanyunhinderedpathsandpathsofliberationdotheyacquirethedetachment?

According to some: A worldling is detached from the nine grades ofdefilementbyonlythreeunhinderedpathsandthreepathsofliberation.That is: he is detached from the three higher grades of defilement bythe lowergradeof theunhinderedpathand thepathof liberation;he isdetachedfromthethreemiddlegradesofdefilementbythemiddlegradeof the unhinderedpathandthepathofliberation;heisdetachedfromthethree lowergradesofdefilementby thehighergradeof theunhinderedpathandthepathofliberation.Thesameappliesinthecaseofanārya.

Accordingtoothermasters:Aworldlingisdetachedfromtheninegradesofdefilements all at oncebyonegradeof theunhinderedpath and thepath of liberation.Anārya is detached gradually from the nine gradesofdefilementsbyninegradesof theunhinderedpaths and thepathsofliberation.Why?Thepathofaworldlingisblunt,andcannotdifferentiatethecognizableandabandonablesintoninegrades.Thus,heabandonsthemallatoncebyonegradeofthepath.Thepathofanāryaissharpandcanproperlydifferentiate thecognizableandabandonables intoninegrades.Thus,heabandonsthemgraduallybyninegradesofthepath.

Comment:Theyshouldnotexplainthus.Iftheyexplainthusinordertoshowthataworldlingisinferiortoanārya,theywillendupshowingthe

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opposite—anārya isinferiortoaworldling.Ifaworldlingisdetachedfrom the nine grades of defilement by a single grade of the path, andanārya is detached from the nine grades of defilement by nine gradesof thepath, is itnot thatanārya is inferior toaworldling?This is likethecasethatonewho,havingtakenalotofpoisons,canvomitthemallout by taking just alittlemedicine— is it notwonderful? It should beexplainedthus:whetheraworldlingoranārya,heisdetachedfromninegradesofdefilementbyninegradesoftheunhinderedpathsandthepathsofliberation.

Question:Ifso,whatisthedifferencebetweenthecaseofaworldlingandthatofanārya?

Answer: In the case of a worldling, by means of nine grades of theunhindered paths and the paths of liberation, he bundles together thefetters to be abandoned by insight and by cultivation into nine grades.Like thewayof cuttinggrass, thedifferentgrades are abandonedall atonce. In thecaseofanārya,bymeansofasingleunhinderedpathanda single path of liberation, he abandons the nine grades of defilementsabandonable by vision all at once; bymeans of nine unhindered pathsand nine paths of liberation, he abandons gradually the nine grades ofdefilementabandonablebycultivation.Thisisthedifferencebetweenthecaseofaworldlingandthatofanārya.107

The Sarvāstivāda also explains the difference in terms of abandonment bymeansofreceptivityandbymeansofknowledge.Adefilementabandonedbymeansofreceptivityisoneabandonablebyvision(darśana-heya);adefilementabandonedbymeansofknowledgeisoneabandonablebycultivation(bhāvanā-heya).108 In the case of an ārya’s abandonment through the supramundanepath—when he is in the path of vision— the defilement abandonable byvisionisabandonedbytheoutflow‑freereceptivityintheprecedingmoment.Thesucceeding moment of the path of liberation serves to ensure that theabandoneddefilementwillnotre‑arise.(Seealso,infra,§15.4)Inthiscase,thereisnoretrogression.When,subsequenttothepathofvision,heusesknowledgetoabandonadefilementabandonablebycultivation,suchanabandonmentmayormaynotberetrogressible.Inthecaseofanordinaryworldling,hecanonlymakeuseof themundanepathofcultivationtoabandonadefilement,usingawith‑outflowknowledge;suchanabandonmentisretrogressible.109

12.9.4. Various synonyms in the process of gradual abandonment

There are as many abandonments as there are with‑outflow objects,110 and complete freedom from duḥkha must be gained by gradually andsystematically abandoning thedefilements and realizing the correspondingcessation (nirodha). Repudiating the view of the “abrupt‑abandonmentśramaṇa‑s”(頓斷沙門)whoholdtheviewthattheśrāmaṇya-phalaisacquiredby “abrupt awakening” (頓覺), theMVŚ states that “there are 89 different

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stagesintheabandonmentofthedefilements,forinallthesestagesthereistherealizationofnirodha”.111Dependingonthespecificstageofprogressatwhichacorrespondingamountofdefilementsisabandoned:

The abandonment in its intrinsic nature [is given various names]— ‘abandonment’ (prahāṇa), ‘disjunction’ (visaṃyoga), ‘cessation’(nirodha), ‘truth’ (satya), ‘complete knowledge’ (parijñā), ‘fruit of thespiritual life’ (śrāmaṇya-phala), ‘sphere of nirvāṇa with a remnant ofsubstratum’(sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu),and‘sphereofnirvāṇawithouta remnant of substratum’ (nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu). These eighttypes[ofsynonyms]mayormaynotapplyinfullinthedifferentstages.Thus,when the receptivity to the knowledge ofdharmawith regard toduḥkha (duḥkhe dharma-jñāna-kṣānti) ceases and the knowledge ofdharmawithregardtoduḥkhaarises,thatabandonmentacquirediscalled‘abandonment’,‘disjunction’,‘cessation’,‘truth’;[but] it isnotyetcalled‘complete knowledge’, not yet called ‘fruit of the spiritual life’, not yetcalled ‘sphere of nirvāṇa with a remnant of substratum’, notyet called‘sphere of nirvāṇa without a remnant of substratum’…. [In this way,finally,]when[thepractitioner]isdissociatedfromtheninth[—final—]grade of bond, the vajropama-samādhi (inwhichwhatever defilementsremaining are eradicated without any trace) having ceased and theanutpāda-jñāna having first arisen, that abandonment [of defilement]acquired receives [allthe names except] ‘sphere of nirvāṇa withoutaremnantofsubstratum’…Whentheskandha‑s,āyatana‑sanddhātu‑sofanarhatceaseandcontinuenofurther,andhehasenteredintothe‘sphereof nirvāṇawithoutaremnantofsubstratum’,[theabandonmentreceivesallthenamesexcept]‘sphereofnirvāṇawitharemnantofsubstratum’.112 (Cf. infra,§16.2).

12.9.5. Methods of abandonment

Although it is often stated that a defilement is abandoned by a completeknowledgeof itsobject, this isnot theonlymethod toabandondefilements.The Sarvāstivādaspeaksof the followingfourmethods—thefirst three for thedefilementswhicharedarśana-heya;thelast,forthosewhicharebhāvanā-heya:113

I ālambana-parijñāna:Completeunderstandingofthenatureoftheobjectdue to which the defilement arises. This is applicable to the followingdefilements:(a)thoseunderduḥkha‑andsamudaya-satyathataresabhāga-dhātv-ālambana (= sabhāga-dhātu-sarvatraga); (b)those under nirodha- and mārga-satya that are anāsrava-ālambana — namely mithyā-dṛṣṭi,vicikitsāandavidyā.114

Thus, for example, greed under duḥkha-satya, with regard to a beautifulobject: one must have complete knowledge of the aspects pertaining toduḥkha-satya—duḥkha,anitya,etc.—inordertoabandonit.Asanotherexample: doubt, undernirodha-satya, with regard to nirvāṇa: when all

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theaspectspertainingtonirodha-satya—nirodha,śānta,etc.—arefullyunderstood,doubtisremoved.

II tadālambana-saṃkṣaya:Thedestructionofadefilementwhichistheobjectofanotherdefilementalongwiththedestructionofthelatter(thesubject).Thisisapplicabletothedefilementsunderduḥkha‑andsamudaya-satya‑s,which are visabhāga-dhātv-ālambana (= visabhāga-dhātu-sarvatraga).Theseare objects of the defilements that are sabhāga-dhātv-ālambana. Whenthe latter are destroyed, they are also destroyed. Saṃghabhadraexplainsasfollows:

Thisreferstothevisabhāga-dhātvālambanadefilementspertainingtothesphereofsensuality.For,thesabhāga-dhātv-ālambanadefilementspertainingtothesphereofsensualitywhichareduḥkha‑andsamudaya-darśana-heyatakethemasobjects—thesedefilementsserveastheirsupport; when the support is abandoned, they are also abandonedaccordingly.Itislikeaweakpatientwhostandswiththehelpofsomesupport; when the support is removed, he falls down accordingly.Howcan [these sabhāga-dhātv-ālambana defilements] serve as theirsupport?Becausethesecanserveastheircauses.115

III ālambana-prahāṇa:Theabandonmentofadefilementthattakesasobjectanotherdefilementbyabandoningthelatter—theobject.Thisisappliedto the sāsrava-ālambana defilements which are nirodha‑ and mārga-darśana-heya.These take thedefilementswhichareanāsrava-ālambana (i.e.,mithyā-dṛṣṭi,vicikitsā,avidyā)asobject.“Thisislikeaweakpatientwhowalkswiththehelpofastick;whenhisstickistakenaway,hefallsdownaccordingly.”116Example:Whendoubt(vicikitsā)withregardtothepathistheobjectofśīlavrata-parāmarśa—whenthedoubtisremoved,the irrationalattachment to ritesandobservanceswillalsovanishalongwithit.

IV pratipakṣodaya: The abandonment of a defilement on account of thearisingofitscounteragent.Thisisspecificallyappliedtothedefilementsthatarebhāvanā-heya.

When one grade of a counteragent (e.g.,weak‑weak) opposed to onegradeofdefilement(e.g.,strong‑strong)arises,thatgradeofdefilementisabandoned.However,asSaṃghabhadraexplains,117itisalsoapplicabletothe darśana-heyadefilementssincetheirabandonmenttooresultsfromthearisingoftheircounteragents.Counteractionisfourfold:118

(i) A counteragent resulting in abandonment (prahāṇa-pratipakṣa).Thatis,acounteractingpathwhichdirectlyabandonstheacquisitionsofthedefilements.Thisistheunhinderedpath(ānantarya-mārga).

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(ii)Acounteragentthateffectsthemaintenance(ādhāra-pratipakṣa)oftheabandoningsoobtained.Thatis,thenoblepathwhichfirstarisestogetherwith the acquisition of abandonment. This is the path of liberation(vimukti-mārga). By virtue of the fact that such a path maintainsthe acquisition of abandonment (i.e.,the abandonment acquired ismaintained;tatprāpitaṃ prahāṇam ādhāryate),theacquisitionsofthedefilementsbecomeincapableofarisingfurther.

(iii)A counteragent that results in distancing (dūrībhāva-pratipakṣa).Thatis, this counteractive pathwhich causes the acquisition of thedefilement that has been cut, to be more distant (chinna-prāpti-dūrīkaraṇāt), i.e., to be removed. This is the path of distinction(viśeṣa-mārga), thus calledbecause it is the path arisen subsequent—asanadvancement—tothepathofliberation.Eventhejāti,etc.,whichareconascentwithitsacquisitionalsoreceivethename‘paths’,astheycausetheincreaseintheseriesofthoseacquisitionsthatareopposedtotheacquisitionsofthedefilements.

(iv) A counteragent that finds disgust (vidūṣaṇā-pratipakṣa). That is,thepathbywhichthepractitioner—seeing,fromvariousperspectives,thefaultsinwhicheversphereandstagewherethecounteragentarises—generatesdeepdisgust.Thisis,inthemain,thepreparatorypath(prayoga-mārga).119

Vasubandhuhereproposesthefollowingorderasthecorrectone:120

(i) vidūṣaṇā-pratipakṣaconstitutesthepreparatorypath(prayoga-mārga);(ii)prahāṇa-pratipakṣa constitutes the whole of the unhindered path

(ānantarya-mārga);(iii)ādhāra-pratipakṣa constitutesthepathofliberation(vimukti-mārga);(iv)dūrībhāva-pratipakṣa constitutes the path of distinction (viśeṣa-

mārga).

12.9.6. A defilement is abandoned through separation from its object

In the Ny121 the question is raised: Through separation from what doesthe absolute abandonment of a defilement result? Is it from (i)its intrinsicnature(svabhāvāt),or(ii)itsconjunction(saṃprayogāt)—i.e., itsconjoined(saṃprayukta)dharma‑ssuchassensations,etc.,or(iii)itsobject(ālambanāt)?

(i)isnotpossiblesincetheintrinsicnaturecanneverberelinquished.(ii)alsois impossible, for theconjoineddharma‑saremutuallycause tooneanother(theyconstitutethesaṃprayuktaka-hetu),andtheirnatureofbeing(conjoined)causeswillalwaysremain.Moreover,acittathatbecomesdefiledasaresult

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of (conjunction with) a given defilement will never become undefiled.Neitheris(iii)possible:adharmawhichistakenasanobjectbythatdefilementwillalwaysremainasitsobject.

TheMVŚexplainstheSarvāstivādaposition,whichisthatabandonmentresultsfromseparationfromtheobject:122

Onespeaksofananuśayaasbeingabandonedwhen,bytheforceofitscounteragent, itwill no longergive rise to any faultwith regard to theobject.Thisis likethecaseofapersonrestraininghissonfromfurthervisitstoadrinkinghouse,ahouseofprostitutionoragamblinghouse,etc.Itisimpossiblethatananuśayacanbemadetoseparatefromitsconjoineddharma‑s.

IntheNy,Saṃghabhadraexplainsmoreelaborately:123

Theabsoluteabandonmentofdefilementsdefinitelyresultsfrom[separationfrom] their objects, for it is by the force of the complete knowledge(ālambana-parijñāna-balena) of the objects that the defilements areabsolutelyabandoned.…

Therearetwotypesofobjectsoftheanuśaya:saṃyoga-vastu(i.e.,sāsrava objects) and asaṃyoga-vastu (i.e.,anāsrava objects). The acquisitionsof thedefilements that take thesaṃyoga-vastu‑s asobjectsandof thosethatareproducedbytheformertypeofdefilements[but]nottakingsuchobjects,continueuninterruptedlyinthepresentseriesofasentientbeingevenwhenhiscitta ispresentlynon‑defiled,constitutingtheeffectsandthe causes of past and future defilements, [respectively]. Likewise arethe acquisitions of those defilements that take the asaṃyoga-vastu-s asobjects,andofthosethatdonottakesuchobjectsandthatareproducedby these defilements, coming into activity following these defilements.By‘constitutingtheeffectsandthecausesofpastandfuturedefilements’ismeant:Thisacquisitionexistingatthepresentistheemanation(niṣyanda)effectofthepastdefilements—hence‘effect’,andistheconditionforthearisingoffuturedefilements—hence‘cause’.

But this acquisition is opposed to the coming into activity of theacquisition(bothacquisitionsarepluralinXuanZang’stranslation)whichis the emanation from the prahāṇa-pratipakṣa for those [defilements](tat-prahāṇa-pratipakṣa-niṣyanda-prāpti-samavadhāna-viruddhā),foritsustains(ā-√dhā) thepastandfuturedefilements thatareacquired[byvirtueofit],sothatthedefilements,onaccountofwhichobjecttheyarearisen,setintomotiondefilementswhichtakeotherobjects(ato yen’ ālambanenotpannāḥ kleśā any’ ālambanān api kleśān pravartayanti).Whenthe emanations of the prahāṇa-pratipakṣa bearing on this objectarise, the acquisition of the defilements is terminated. The acquireddefilements, although still existing as entities, are said tobe abandoned

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with respect to their objects on account of the absolute termination ofthe acquisitionconstituting theircausesandeffects.For,whenacertainobject has not been completely known, the acquisitions—constitutingtheeffectsandcausesofthepastandfuturedefilements—producedbythedefilementswhich take thisobject andby thedefilementsproducedbytheforceofthese(former)defilementsandtakingotherobjects,ariseuninterruptedlyinthepresentseries.Whenthereiscompleteknowledgewithregardtoacertainobject,theacquisitionproducedbythedefilementsdoesnotcontinueanylonger.Thus,itisknownthattheabandonmentofadefilementdefinitelyresultsfrom[theseparationfrom]itsobject.124

Itistobenotedthatintheabandoningofadefilement,thecounteractingnoblepath does not operate simultaneously with the defilement— thetwo beingopposed innature.Nevertheless, as a result of thispath seeing theobject inits aspects of beingduḥkha, etc., the defilements bearing on this object areabandoned.Thenon‑arisingofthedefilementsresultsfromthecessationoftheacquisitionconstituting theeffectsandcausesofdefilements.Saṃghabhadrafurtherillustratesthis125bytheexampleofapersonbittenbyarat:Evenwhennofeverorlossofconsciousnessisoccurring,heissaidtobeasickpersononaccountofthepresenceofthepoisonwhichconstitutesthecausesforfever,etc.Itisonlybytakingtheagadamedicinewhichcounteractsthepoisonthathecanbesaidtobefreefromthesickness.Althoughtheagadaandthesicknessoffever,etc.,arenotpresentsimultaneouslyinthebody,theagadaissaidtoeradicatethesicknesssinceitisonaccountofitspowerthatthepoisonwithinthebodyiseradicatedsothatfever,etc.,donotariseanylonger.

12.10. Traces (vāsanā) of the defilements and distinction between the wisdom of a Buddha and of an arhat126

12.10.1. Distinction between defilements and their traces (vāsanā)

We have seen that both the Pāli commentarial tradition and the northernAbhidharmatraditionhadcometoemphasizethesuperiorityoftheBuddha’swisdomincontrast to thatof the twoyāna‑s(thedisciplesandthepratyeka-buddha)(supra,§10.4.1,§10.4.4).

InthecaseofthePālitradition,thisdifferenceisaccountedformainlyintermsof the notion of the distinction between kilesa and vāsanā. The Theravādaexplanationsonthisdistinction,however,areessentiallythesameasthoseinthe Sarvāstivāda tradition, except that theSarvāstivāda articulately connectsthe notion of vāsanāwith that of theundefiled ignorance (§10.4).Forbothtraditions,vāsanāconstitutes thesubtle traces thatare leftbehindevenafterthedefilementshavebeenabandoned.Whereasadefilementisvoluntaryandkammicallyretributive,vāsanāisconceivedofasbeinginvoluntaryinfluencesofpasthabits,morallyneutralandnon‑retributive.ABuddha’ssuperiorwisdom

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is then accounted forby thedoctrine that theBuddha alone can completelyabandon the defilements togetherwith their vāsanā (cf.:na hi bhagavantaṃ ṭhapetvā aññe saha vāsanāya kilese pahātuṃ sakkonti).127 In the case of theSarvāstivāda, it is said that the Buddha alone is completely freed from thenon‑defiledignorance,andwiththishisvāsanātooisexhausted.

Thefollowingdefinitionofvāsanā,givenintheUdānaṭṭhakathā,isillustrativeofsuchnotions:

Andwhatisthisso‑calledvāsanā?Theysaythatitisatendencyofthisnature:Amerepotencyinthecontinuumofevenonewhohasremovedthedefilements,depositedbythedefilementswhichhavebeenpracticedfrombeginninglesstime,andwhichhavebecomethecauseforbehaviorsimilarto the behavior of those who have not yet abandoned the defilements.ThisisnotfoundintheFortunateOne’scontinuumwherethedefilementsare abandoned by virtue of the abandoning of the knowable‑hindranceon account of the ‘perfection of resolution’.Butwhere the defilementsarenotabandonedinthismanner,itexistsinthecontinuaofthesāvaka andthepacceka-buddha.Forthisreason,itisonlytheTathāgatawhoisunhinderedinknowledgeandvision.128

A Sarvāstivāda definition on vāsanā, given by Bhadanta Anantavarman,isfoundintheVy:

Whatisthisso‑calledvāsanā of the śrāvaka‑s?Thatspecificpotencywhichisacauseofdistortioninbodilyandvocalactions,existinginthethoughtofonewhohaspreviouslycommittedagivenactofdefilement,createdbythatdefilement,iscalledvāsanā. The vāsanāisaspecificthoughtthatismorallynon‑defined.129

Saṃghabhadra informs us of another definition given by “some ancientmasters”:

Thereexistsadistinctnon‑defiledcaittawhichisinducedbytherepeatedpracticeofdefiledandnon‑defileddharma‑s.Itarisesintheseriesofonewhoisnotanomniscient,sothatthecitta-caitta‑sdonotoperatefreely.Thisiscalledvāsanā.130

ThesetwoSarvāstivādindefinitions,whileagreeingintheiressentials,arenotentirelythesameindetail.Anantavarmansaysthatthevāsanāisacitta-viśeṣa,whereas the ancientmasters say it is a caitta-viśeṣa.Moreover, the formerspeaksof themasbeing inducedbydefilements,whereas the latter,bybothdefiled and non‑defiled dharma‑s. Suchadifference in relatively secondarypoints,however,doesnotnecessarilyamount toacontradictionbetween thetwodefinitions.

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12.10.2. Examples of vāsanā in the MVŚ

The MVŚ offers no formal definition of vāsanā. But there are sufficientdescriptionsofitsvisibleeffectonthearhat‑s,fromwhichwemayderiveaclearunderstandingoftheVaibhāṣikaversionofthenotionwhichisessentiallythesameaswhatwereadinthePaliṭīkā (see§12.10.1).

In the case of theBuddha, hisvāsanā is completely abandoned, even thoughHe occasionally uses words that may appear to be tainted with defilements— ‘semblance of greed’ (rāga-sadṛśa), ‘semblance of hatred’ (dveṣa-sadṛśa),‘semblanceofdelusion’(moha-sadṛśa), ‘semblanceofconceit’ (māna-sadṛśa),etc.131Toexplainthatthesearenotcasesofvāsanā—semblancesandnotactuallydefilements—theMVŚcompilerstakepaintorelateatlengththenidāna for each of such episodes, showing that in such cases, the Buddha was actuallyconsciouslyemployingappropriateexpedientstohelpthepractitionersalong.132

Thecaseofthetwoyāna‑sisquitedifferent.Theiractsresemblingdefilementsare involuntary — and therefore morally non‑defined; they are due to theconditioningofvāsanā.Thetwoyāna‑sarehelplessagainstsuch“semblancesof defilements”. Étienne Lamotte, in his “Passions and Impregnations of thePassionsinBuddhism”,givesexamplesofthearhat‑s’vāsanā, althoughmainlyfromtheMahāyānasources.133ButtherearemanysimilarexamplesintheMVŚ.

Themostoft‑citedone(bythePāliṭīkāaswell)isthatofPilindavatsa(Pāli:Pilindavaccha),whobytheforceofhisvāsanā,oftencallsothersvṛṣala (“littleman”).Thus,heshoutsattheGangagod:“Oyouvṛṣala!Stoptheflow!Iwanttocrossover.”Thisisanexampleofvāsanāofhatred.134

Ānandahasa“weakness”fortheŚākya—hefeelstendertowardthem.Thisisanexampleofvāsanāofgreed(loc. cit.).

Śāriputra throws away the medicine. This is an example of vāsanā of conceit.

TheVenerableGavaṃpatialwayscoughsbeforeeating.Hekeepsoneatingeven knowing that he has not digestedwhat has been eaten.This is anexampleofvāsanāofdelusion(loc. cit.).

AnotherexampleisgivenofanelephantwhousedtocarrytheBuddha’srelic (dhātu) toKāśmīra. By themerit of this, hewas born aman andeventually became anarhat.Whenhewas anelephant, heused to havemerely one grain measure for his meal. After becoming an arhat, hecontinuedtobeabletofillhimselfupbyeatingmerelyonegrainmeasureoffood.Thisisaspecialdharmaacquiredbyvirtueofthevāsanāofhishabitofeatingasanelephant.135

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12.10.3. Description in the AKB and the Vy

IntheAKB,wefindonlytwobriefmentionsofvāsanāinthissense,andtheseinthesamechapter:136

(1)The 18 āveṇika-dharma‑s of the Buddha are āveṇika (unique)becauseHe has abandoned the defilements alongwith their vāsanā (sa-vāsanam).

(2)The Buddha’s perfection as regards the abandoning of defilements(prahāṇa-saṃpad)isfourfold:

(I) Hehasabandonedalldefilements(sarvakleśa-prahāṇa);(II) Hehasabandonedthemabsolutely(atyanta-prahāṇa);(III)Hehasabandonedthemalongwiththeirvāsanā

(savāsanaprahāṇa);(IV)Hehas abandoned all hindrances to the attainment of samādhi

(sarva-samādhi-samāpattyāvaraṇaprahāṇa).

For the Vaibhāṣika, the last(IV) aspect refers to the abandoning ofakliṣṭa-ajñāna. (See supra,§10.4.3).

12.10.4. Vāsanā and the two types of ajñāna in the Sarvāstivāda

The MVŚ distinguishes two kinds of false knowledges (mithyā-jñāna) —defiledandnon‑defiled:137

Question:Whatisthisfalseknowledge?

Answer:Thisisthenon‑veiled‑non‑definedknowledge,tobeabandonedbycultivationandpertaining to thesensesphere,andwhichhasafalsemode of understanding (邪行相, mithyākāra). Thus, it generates suchthoughtsasamanwithregardtoapostorapostwithregardtoaman,andofapath(mārga)withregardtoanon‑path(amārga),andanon‑pathwithregardtoapath…

[As a matter of fact,] there are two kinds false knowledge: 1.defiled,2.non‑defiled. The defiled one is conjoined with nescience (avidyā),thenon‑defiled one, such as thatwhich generates the thought of amanwithregardtoapost,isnot.

Asforthedefiledone,boththeśrāvaka‑sandthepratyeka-buddha‑scanabandonitcompletely,aswellasrenderitincapableofmanifesting(sam-ud-ā-√car). As for the non‑defiled one, although it can be completelyabandonedbytheśrāvaka‑sandthepratyeka-buddha‑s,itcanstillmanifestinthem.

ItisonlyinthecaseoftheTathāgatathatitabsolutelydoesnotmanifestanymore,asHehaspermanentlyabandoned thedefilementsaswellas

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the vāsanā‑s. It is for this reason that He alone is called the PerfectlyCompletely Enlightened One (samyak saṃbuddha). The defiled falseknowledge is a false knowledge from the absolute (paramārtha)standpoint.Thenon‑defiledfalseknowledgeisafalseknowledgefromtheconventional(saṃvṛti)standpoint,notfromtheabsolutestandpoint,sinceitisnotassociatedwiththefalsedharma‑s(mithyā-dharma)ofdefilement.

Thenon‑defiledfalseview,which isheresaid tobea falseviewonly fromtheconventional standpoint and not conjoinedwith those of defilement, is amodeofwhatisdoctrinallyarticulatedasthenon‑defiledignorance.Thispassagealsosuggests the close relationship between this non‑defiled ignorance and vāsanā,asitstatesthattheTathāgata,bypermanentlyabandoningthedefilementsandthevāsanā‑s,canrenderthenon‑defiledignoranceabsolutelyincapableofre‑arising.

12.10.5. Vāsanā, non-defiled ignorance and perfect wisdom

When the knowable‑hindrance (jñeya-āvaraṇa), the essence of which is thenon‑defiled ignorance (cf., §10.4.3), is removed, omniscience is attained.For the Vaibhāṣika, this omniscience is not just a state of perfect wisdom.It represents areal, potent, counteractive force which arises at the time ofattaining the supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarā samyak sambodhi),counteracting thevāsanā andnon‑defiled ignorance. It is on account of thisforcethatthedefilementoftheBuddha‑to‑beisutterlyshatteredwithoutanytrace.138InexplainingwhytheBuddha’sabandoningofdefilement,unlikethetwoyāna‑s’,leavesnotrace(vāsanā)behind,theMVŚsays:

The wisdom fire of the śrāvaka‑s and pratyeka-buddha‑s is not fierce.[Withit,]althoughthedefilementisabandoned,thevāsanāremains.Itislikethecaseofordinaryfireintheworld:althoughitcanconsumeathing,it leaves behind ashes.TheBuddha’swisdom is fierce; it consumes thedefilementwithoutleavingbehindanyvāsanā,likethefireattheendoftimewhichconsumeseverythinginitswayleavingnoashbehind.139

The functionofperfectknowledge—inthespiritualsenseorwisdom,asopposedtomereintellectualunderstanding—fortheliberationfromdefilementisinfactadoctrinefundamentaltoBuddhism.Aswehaveseenabove,atermwhichemphasizesthisis“completeknowledge”(§12.1);inthetechnicalterminologyof the Sarvāstivāda,theabandonmentofdefilement(kleśa-prahāṇa)isafruitof knowledge (jñāna-phala).140Thedefilements,onaccountofwhichbeingsarebondedtosaṃsāra,havetheirultimatesourceinignorance.Statedintermsofthedoctrineofthetwo‑foldignorance,thedefiledignoranceisthecognitivebasisfordefiledactions,andthenon‑defiledignoranceisthatforactionswhich,although involuntary and not defiled in nature, bear resemblance to defiledactions andwhichprevent the totalistic visionof all knowables.While bothvāsanāandnon‑defiledignorancearedifferentiatedfromdefilement,theyare

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nonethelessintrinsicallyrelatedtoit.Aswehaveseen(§10.4.4),Saṃghabhadraoffersarticulateexplanationsontherelationshipbetweendefilementontheonehandandnon‑defiledignoranceandvāsanā on the other.

ThefollowingdiscussionintheMVŚexplainsthatthecomparativelyinferiorwisdomofthetwoyāna‑scanbeunderstoodasduetothehindranceofvāsanā ornon‑defiledignorance:

Question:WhyisitthattheknowledgeintheTathāgataisdesignatedasapower(bala),andnotthoseintheśrāvaka‑sandthepratyekabuddha‑s?

Answer: A power is that which cannot be overcome and hindered.The knowledge in the śrāvaka‑s and the pratyekabuddha‑s can still beovercomeby ignorance (ajñāna) and is hindered, hence it is not calledapower.…

Question: Since there is no difference in respect of the exhaustionof outflows (āsrava-kṣaya) among the three yāna‑s, why is it that theknowledgeoftheexhaustionoftheoutflows(āsrava-kṣaya-jñāna)ofthetwoyāna‑sarenotpowers?

Answer: The Buddha’s knowledge of the exhaustion of the outflows issuperiorandsharp;thoseoftheśrāvaka‑sandthepratyekabuddha‑sarenomatchforit.Althoughthe[knowledgeoftheexhaustionoftheoutflowsof theBuddhaaswellas thoseof the twoyāna‑s]canbothexhaust theoutflows,thereisadifferenceinspeed.Thisislikethecaseoftwopersons,eachcuttingdowna tree.One is strongandusesasharpaxe, theotherhasinferiorstrengthandusesabluntaxe.Whileeachcutsdownatree,onedoesitfasterthantheother.Forthisreason,theBuddha’sknowledgeoftheexhaustionoftheoutflowsisdesignatedasapower,notthoseofthetwoyāna‑s.Furthermore, theknowledgeof the twoyāna‑s isnotcalledpowereventhoughitcanexhausttheoutflows,onaccountofthepresenceof vāsanā.141

12.10.6. Saṃghabhadra’s explanation of vāsanā

On vāsanā,Saṃghabhadra142offersanexplanation(cf.anotherexplanationofhisin§10.4.4)accordingtowhichthemechanismwherebyvāsanāresultsfromdefilementissomewhatcomplex:

Atthestagewhenbeingsarestillinpossessionofdefilements,alltheirnon‑defiledcitta‑s,togetherwiththeirseries,areperfumedbydefilementswhichintervenethem,givingrisetoimpregnations(氣分,tobedistinguishedasatermfromvāsanā,習氣)whichaccordwiththearisingofdefilements.Accordingly,specialnon‑defiledcitta‑sandtheirretinuearise,operatinginamannersimilartothatofthe[defilements].Theyarisesuccessivelybyvirtueoftheforceofrepeatedconditioning,andforthisreasonthosewithoutfaults[i.e.,theārya-pudgala‑s]arestillsaidtobeinpossessionof

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vāsanā.InthecaseoftheOmniscientOne,itispermanentlyabandonedanddoesnotmanifest(sam-ud-ā-√car)anylonger.

Atthestagewhenonehasalreadyabandonedthe[defilements]abandonablebyvision,inthementalserieswhichmaybedefiledornon‑defiled,thereremain habitual conditionings (習性) which accord with the arising ofdefilements. These are impregnations of defilements abandonable byvision. Among them, the defiled ones are called “nature/type” (類性)and are totally abandoned, without any possibility of manifesting, bythediamond‑like(vajropama)path.Thosethatarenon‑defiledarecalled“vāsanāofdefilementsabandonablebyvision”.Thesearealsoabandonedby the same path; but they may or may not manifest, depending onthe[practitioner’s]faculty.

At the stage at which one has already abandoned the [defilements]abandonable by cultivation, it is only in the non‑defiled mental seriesthatthereremainimpregnations,acquiredthroughpractice,whichaccordwith the arisingofdefilements.These are impregnationsofdefilementsabandonable by cultivation and are called “vāsanā of defilementsabandonablebycultivation”.Beingwith‑outflow,theyhavealreadybeenabandonedinthecaseofthenon‑trainee.Buttheymayormaynotmanifest,dependingonwhether the [non‑trainee’s] faculty is superioror inferior.AstheBhagavathasacquiredmasteryoverthedharma‑s,such[vāsanā‑s],just like thedefilements, absolutelynevermanifest. It is for this reasonthattheBuddhaaloneiscalledtheSkillfulSeries(kuśala-santati).Onthisveryaccount,Hehasnolapsesinhisconductandacquiresthethreesmṛty-upasthāna‑sandotheruniquedharma‑s.ItisalsoonthisveryaccountthatitisimplicitlydeclaredthattheBuddhaaloneissaidtobeonewhohasacquiredthefruitionofnon‑trainee.

Saṃghabhadra’s explanations may be considered to be more articulateregardingthedispositionalforcesinducedbydefilements.Accordingtohim,the impregnations or habitual conditioning forces induced by defilementsmaybedefiledornon‑defiled.But it isonly the latter that iscalledvāsanā. Thisvāsanā is divisible into two types: (1)vāsanā of defilementswhich areabandonablebyvision, (2)vāsanā ofdefilementswhichare abandonablebycultivation.Thefirst typeisabandonedbythediamond‑likepath.Asfor thesecondtype,eventhoughithasalreadybeenabandonedbyanarhat, itmayormaynotmanifest,dependingonthefacultyofthearhat.InthecaseoftheBuddha,itcannevermanifest.

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NOTES

1 Cf. Cox(1992),67.2 āsavehi cittaṃ vimuttam—M,no.112,3,30.3 E.g.,Ny,430b.4 In the Theravāda tradition, three types of pariññā are spoken of: ñāta|ñāṇa-pariññā,

pahāna-pariññā and tīraṇa-pariññā. But these are found only in the exegeticalliterature.

5 MVŚ,175a–b.6 SeeMVŚ,320c;AKB,322f.7 MVŚ,244a,417c(onupakleśa).8 Entrance,95.9 E.g.:PrŚ,693c;AKB,312:ye yāvat kleśā upakleśā api te |10 AKB,312.11 AKB,308;PrŚ,702a.12 Cf.MVŚ,257a–b;ADV,220;Ny,641c.13 Ny,641c.14 Entrance,92.15 AKB,308.16 Ny,641c.17 Entrance,92;AKB,308;Ny,641c.18 Ny,641c.19 MVŚ,257a–b;seealsoEntrance,Introduction§7.20 Cf. Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta, Samudda vagga 5 and 6, (S35,191): “seyyathāpi āvuso kālo ca

balivaddo odāto ca balivaddo ekena dāmena vā yottena vā saṃyuttā assu … na kho āvuso kālo balivaddo odātassa balivaddassa saṃyojanaṃ, na pi odāto balivaddo kālassa balivaddassa saṃyojanaṃ, yena ca kho te ekena dāmena vā yottena vā saṃyuttā tam tattha saṃyojanam. evameva kho āvuso na cakkhu rūpānam saṃyojanam, na rūpā cakkhussa saṃyojanam yañ ca tadubhayam paṭicca uppajjati chandarāgo tam tattha saṃyojanam.”ThissūtraisquotedbybothSkandhila(cf. Entrance,90)andSaṃghabhadra(Ny,642c)fortheexplanationof‘connection’.

21 MVŚ,237c.22 Foritem‑wiseexplanations,seeAKB,309ff.;Entrance,87ff.23 MVŚ,252b.24 Cf.AKB,310f.Alsoseeinfra,§16.25 PrŚ,693b;soalsoNy,644b.26 Entrance90.SamethreegiveninAKB,311.27 Ny,644b.28 PrŚ,693c;AKB,312.29 Entrance,97.30 Ny,646a.

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31 Cf.AKB,308:āsayanti saṃsāre āsravanti bhavāgrād yāvad avīciṃ ṣaḍbhir āyatanavraṇair ity āsravāḥ |Alsocf.ADV,220:ābhavāgram upādāya yāvad avīciṃ sravanti srāvayanti vā citta-santatim ity āsravāḥ |

32 AKB,308;Entrance,98f.33 AKB,308:evaṃ tu sādhīyaḥ syād āsravaty ebhiḥ saṃtatir viṣayeṣv ity āsravāḥ |34 MVŚ,244a–b.35 MVŚ,247a.Cf. Entrance98:“Theyaregiventhenamefloodsas theymakethegoodthingsofbeingsdriftaway,asdoesaflood.”Alsocf.AKB,308:harantīty oghāḥ |

36 AKB,308.37 ADV,220.38 Cf. Entrance,98.Alsocf.MVŚ,247b.39 Cf.MVŚ,247c—allthreemeaningsinAvatāraarealsoamongthosegivenhereinMVŚ.40 Entrance,100.41 Entrance,100,170notes224and225.42 MVŚ,248c.43 AKB,318.Cf. Entrance,100f.44 Entrance,100f.Likewise,Ny,648c;cf.MVŚ,249c.45 MVŚ,249c;thereasonfortheorderofenumerationisalsogiven(250c).46 MVŚ,194c–195a.Anuruddha’sAbhidhammattha-saṃgahaalsoaddsavijjāasthesixth—seeBhikkhuBodhi,ed.,A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma(Kandy,1993),267.

47 AKB,277;Vy,441.48 AKB,306f.49 Vy,442:satpathād udvartayati viparīta-daiśika-saṃsevā’bhimukhī-karaṇāt—‘itcausesonetoleavethetruepath,foritmakesoneinclinedtowardassociatingwitherroneousteachers’.

50 Ny, 596a–b; The almost identical Sanskrit cited here given in Vy, 442, where the16functionsarementionedandattributedto‘anotherperson’:ṣodaśety anyaḥ |

51 Ny,596b.52 E.g.,seeMVŚ,181c;AKB,248:kuśalamūlacchedas tu mithyādṛṣṭyā bhavaty

adhimātraparipūrṇayā |53 Cf.MVŚ,241c.54 Cf. Entrance,§4.5.25.55 SgPŚ,376b:於欲境界諸貪.Soalsointhelatertexts;e.g.Avatāra,seeEntrance,§

4.5.25.56 SgPŚ,376b–c;likewiseDDŚ,494c–495a.57 E.g.,cf. Avatāra,seeEntrance,§4.5.25.58 ThisreasonisclearlystatedintheMVŚ,241c.59 MVŚ,241b–243b.60 MVŚ,243b.61 Ny,488b.62 SPrŚ,T29,843c–844a.63 SeeDhammajoti,K(2009b).

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64 AKB,280.65 AKB,328:phala-bhūtā upādāna-skandhā duḥkhasatyam |66 Ny,611a.XuanZang’s translationofAKB(AKB(C),101c)contains these same threereasons,whichisamoreelaborateexplanationofsarvatragathanAKB,286f.

67 MVŚ,465c.Alsoseebelow,§10.68 MVŚ,264b.69 MVŚ,313a.70 Cf.theYogācāradoctrine—e.g.,in*Mahāyāna-saṃgraha (T31,134c),etc.—thattheseedsaspotentialities in theālayavijñānaaremorallynon‑defined;andwhen theyaremanifested(sam-ud-ā-√car),theycanbecomeeitherkuśala or akuśala.

71 AKB,278.72 See Study,335ff.73 SeeDhammajoti,KL,‘Sarvāstivāda,DārṣṭāntikaandYogācāra—SomeReflectionsontheirInterrelation’,inJCBSSL,Vol.IV,190ff.

74 See YinShun,(1974a),130.75 For the philosophical implications of these different standpoints, see Yin Shun, op. cit.,

129–137.76 Cf.Ny,641c.77 MVŚ, 313c. TheMVŚ here quotes the PrŚ which speaks of these three sources forthe arising of a defilement (PrŚ, 702c). Cf. AKB, 305: aprahīṇād anuśayād viṣayāt pratyupasthitāt | ayoniśo manaskārāt kleśaḥ saṃpūrṇakāraṇaḥ |Alsocf.MVŚ,990a.

78 AKB,306.79 MVŚ,989c.80 Cf.MVŚ,112c–113a.81 Ny,616b.82 Loc. cit.;cf.AKB,289f.83 Ny,637c.84 Ny,616b.85 Ny,616c.86 MVŚ,113a–b.87 MVŚ,312c.88 MVŚ,479c.89 MVŚ,182b.90 MVŚ,333c;AKB,352;etc.91 MVŚ,796c–797a;cf.479c.92 AKB,321:sarveṣāṃ hi kleśānāṃ sakṛt kṣayaḥ | yasya yaḥ prahāṇa-mārgas tenaiva tasya

kṣayaḥ |93 AKB,321:visaṃyoga-lābhas teṣāṃ punaḥ punaḥ |94 AKB, 321.XuanZang (AKB(C), 111c) renders the lines thus: “There is no repeatedabandonment of defilements. [But] there is the repeated acquisition of [their]disconnection.” (諸惑無再斷，離繫有重得).

95 Ny,652a.

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96 MVŚ,264c.97 MVŚ,264c.98 MVŚ,264b–c,465a: 諸異生能斷欲界乃至無所有處見修所斷隨眠, 唯除有頂.99 Cf.AKB,353f.Seealsoinfra,§15.7.100MVŚ,465a;335a–c.101 Itisperhapsfromthisperspectivethatthecompilersseemtobeabletotoleratetheview

of the Bhadantathat“itisnotpossibleforaworldlingtoabandontheanuśaya;hecanonlysuppresstheenvelopment(paryavasthāna)”.Thecompilers’responseis:“Thereisnoharmintermsofreasoningifoneexplainsthus.”

102AKB,62.MVŚ,290a–b:One‘boundwithallbondages’(sakala-bandhana):hecanbeboundbyanyofthefivecategoriesofabandonables,anddharma‑softhefivecategoriesareallbound.

103 Cf.MVŚ,282c,478b.104Ny,702b.105 Cf.AKB,368.Intheearliertexts(e.g.SgPŚ,444a),someexamplesoftheapplicationofthissix‑modeapplicationaregivenwithregardtothenon‑material(ārūpya)meditativeattainments.

106 Cf.AKB,353f.107MVŚ,328c.108E.g.,cf.MVŚ,267b.109MVŚ,a–b.110AKB,4:yāvanti hi saṃyogadravyāṇi tāvanti visaṃyogadravyāṇi |111MVŚ,465c.112MVŚ,321b–322b.113MVŚ,114b;AKB,319;Vy,498;Ny,649cff.114AKB,288:nirodhadarśana-prahātavyās trayo ‘nuśayā mithyā-dṛṣṭir vicikitsā ‘vidyā ca

tābhyāṃ saṃprayuktā ‘veṇikī ca | mārgadarśana-prahātavyā apy eta eva trayaḥ | ity ete ṣaḍ anāsravālambanāḥ | śeṣāḥ sāsravālambanā iti siddham |

115Ny,650a.116Ny,650a.117Ny,650c.118Ny,loc. cit.119 InAKB,320,Vasubandhuarguesthatthesequentialorderofthefourpathsshouldbe:(iv)→(i)→(ii)→(iii);cf.MVŚ,114b.

120AKB,320:api tv eṣām iyam ānupūrvī sādhvī bhavet… |121Ny,651a.122MVŚ,113b–c.123Ny,651a–b.124 Saṃghabhadra’sexplanationisquotedinVy,500:atr’ ācārya-saṃghabhadraḥ pariharati |

ālambanāt kleśāḥ prahātavyāḥ | ālambana-parijñāna-balena hi kleśāḥ prahīyante | dvividhaṃ cānuśay’ ālaṃbanaṃ saṃyoga-vastu asaṃyoga-vastu ca | tatra saṃyoga-vastu-viṣayāṇām anuśayānāṃ tad-anuśaya-balotpāditānāṃ a-tad-viṣayāṇām api pudgalasya santāne prāptir akliṣṭa-cittasyāpy avichedena pravartate | anāgatātīta-kleśa-hetu-phala-

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bhūtā | evam asaṃyoga-vastu-viṣayāṇām a-tad-viṣayāṇām api ca tad-viṣaya-kleśa-pṛṣṭha-samudācariṇāṃ kleśānāṃ prāptir veditavyā | sā hy anāgatānām utpattau pratyaya-gamanād dhetu-bhūtā bhavati | atītānāṃ ca niṣyanda-bhāvāt phala-bhūtā | sā ca tat-prahāṇa-pratipakṣa-niṣyanda-prāpti-samavadhāna-viruddhā | tad-ādhāritatvāt kleśānām | ato yen’ ālambanenotpannāḥ kleśā any’ ālambananān api kleśān pravartayanti | tad-ālambana-prahāṇa-pratipakṣa-niṣyandotpattau tat-prāpti-vigame te kleśās tad-ālambanā api santo hetu-phalāpakrāntāḥ prahīṇā ity ucyante | tad yasmād aparijñāte kasmiṃścit kleśa-viṣaye a-tad-viṣayāṇām api kleśānāṃ tad-viṣaya-kleśa-balena prāptir anāgatātīta-kleśa-hetu-phala-bhūtā santatau pravartate yathā vastu | tasmād ālambanāt kleśāḥ prahātavyā ity abhimatam iti |

125Ny,651b.126Foradetaileddiscussionofthistopic,seeDhammajoti,KL,(1998a),65ff.127Visuddhimagga‑mahāṭīkā,1.219;Sāratthadīpanī‑ṭīkā,1.217.128UdA 194: kā panāyaṃ vāsanā nāma? yaṃ kilesarahitassāpi santāne appahīna-

kilesānaṃ samācārasadisasamācārahetubhūtaṃ, anādikālabhāvitehi kilesehi āhitaṃ sāmatthiyamattaṃ, tathārūpā adhimuttîti vadanti. taṃ panetaṃ abhinīhārasampattiyā ñeyyāvara^appahānavasena yattha kilesā pahīnā, tattha bhagavato santāne natthi. yattha pana tathā kilesā na pahīnā tattha sāvakānaṃ paccekabuddhānañca santāne atthi, tato tathāgatova anāvaraṇañāṇadassano.

129Vy,647:kaḥ punar iyaṃ vāsanā nāma śrāvakāṇām | yo hi yatkleśacaritaḥ pūrvaṃ tasya tatkṛtaḥkāyavākceṣṭāvikārahetusāmarthyaviśeṣaś citte vāsanety ucyate | avyākṛtaś cittaviśeṣo vāsaneti |

130Ny,502a.131MVŚ,77b.132MVŚ,77b–79a.133 Lamotte, E, ‘Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism’, in Buddhist

Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner(Holland,1974),92f.134MVŚ,77a.135MVŚ,216a.136AKB,vii,414,416.137MVŚ,42b.138MVŚ,780b.Alsocf.SPrŚ(Tno.1563),779a.139MVŚ,77c.140MVŚ,175b.141MVŚ,530c–531a;alsocf.158a.142Ny,502a–b.

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13. The Doctrine of Karma

13.1. Meaningandgeneralnatureofkarma

13.1.1. Threetypesofkarma andtheprimaryroleofvolition

13.1.2. Theagentofkarma

13.1.3. Defilementsasthegeneratingcauseandsupportingconditionforkarma

13.2.Classificationofkarma

13.3. Informative(vijñapti)andnon‑informative(avijñapti)karma

13.4. Definitionandintrinsicnatureofinformativeandnon-informativekarma‑s

13.4.1. Definitionandnatureofinformativekarma

13.4.2.Definitionandnatureofnon-informativekarma

13.4.2.1. Non-informativekarmaasmatter

13.4.3.Themoralnatureofinformativeandnon-informativekarma‑s

13.5. Thenon‑informativeasrestraint,non‑restraint andneither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint

13.5.1. Acquisitionandrelinquishmentofthenon‑informativematter

13.6.Pathsofkarma (karma-patha)

13.7. Rationaleforthedoctrineofnon-informativekarma

13.8.Roleofthenon‑informativeintheprocessofkarmicretribution

13.8.1. CluesfromtheMVŚ

13.8.1.1. Theemphasisofnon‑informativematterqua prātimokṣa-saṃvara

13.8.1.2.Theemphasisofnon‑informativematterasakarmicforce

13.8.2.CluesfromSaṃghabhadra

13.8.3.Non‑informativekarmaasamediumofpreservationofkarmicforce

13.8.4 Conclusion

13.8.4.1. Summary

13.1. Meaning and general nature of karma

The Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas are quite aware of the profundity —and ultimately inconceivability — of certain teachings of the Buddha asverbalization ofHis perfect enlightenment.Among these isHis doctrine ofkarma.TheMVŚgoessofarastodeclarethat,ofalltheBuddha’sdiscourses,thosedealingwithkarmaarethemostprofound.Likewisethekarmaskandha amongtheeightskandhaka‑s(discussedintheJPŚ);thepowerpertainingtokarma among theBuddha’s tenpowers (bala); the inconceivabilityofkarma amongthefourinconceivables1—apparentlyreferringtothestatementfoundin the Aṅguttara that theretributionofkarma is inconceivableandnot tobeconceived.2

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ItshouldbenotedattheveryoutsetthatthekarmadoctrineoftheSarvāstivādaisquiteinkeepingwiththeearlyBuddhistteachingthatkarmaisneitherfatalisticnorcompletelyboundbymechanicalrigidity.ItisundoubtedlyinspiredbytheBuddha’sowndoctrineonkarmawhichistheMiddleWaybetweenabsolutedeterminationandabsolute freedom,being in conformitywith theuniversalprincipleofconditionedco‑arising(pratītya-samutpāda).

TheMVŚgivesathreefoldmeaningofthetermkarma:

(1) karmainthegeneralsenseofanactionordeed(kriyā);

(2) karmaastheecclesiasticalproceedingsusedforregulatingtheaffairsofthesevenfoldBuddhistcommunity—bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī,etc.;

(3) karma as a moral action on account of which the effect can bedistinguishedasdesirable(iṣṭa)orundesirable(aniṣṭa).3

The third meaning refers to the moral action which principally— but notabsolutely—determines thesubsequentexperiencesofone’sexistence. It isto karmainthislastsensethatthedoctrineherepertains.TheMVŚ,however,alsoobservesthatpeopleintheworldgenerallyapplythewordkarmatowhatis,infact,itsfruit(karma-phala).4Inbrief,karma inthislastsensereferstotheretributioncauses(vipāka-hetu)5 whicheffectaspecificexistence,eitherintheir capacity as the principal projecting cause or as causes that assist incompletingthespecificdetailsoftheparticularsentientexistence.(Seeinfra,§14.5).TheMVŚexplainsmorespecificallythattheseretributivecausesarecalledkarmaonaccountoftheirfundamentalroleindeterminingthevariousspheres (dhātu), planes (gati) andmodesofbirth (yoni) of a sentientbeing’sexistence and in differentiating the various types of persons (pudgala)withtheirvariouslife‑span,physicalappearances,socialstatus,etc.6

While all these retributive causes can be considered karma inasmuch astheycontributetowardsabeing’srebirth,someareresponsibleforprojectingaparticulartypeofexistence(e.g.,human),andotherscontributeintermsofthespecificdetails(e.g.,thelifespanofthehuman,etc.)(§14.5);andamongall the different types of karmic contribution, that fromvolition is themostpredominant. It is from this perspective that sometimes karma is made toreferonlytothatwhichprojectsaspecificexistenceand,atothertimes,itisonlyvolitionthatisspokenofaskarma inthepropersense.Fromthissameperspective,itisstated,atyetothertimes,thatitisnotonlykarmaalonethatprojectsanexistence.Forinstance,theAKBstates:

Itisnotkarmaalonewhichistheprojectorofabirth(janman).7

CitingthePrŚ,Saṃghabhadraexplainsthattheconditioningsdisjoinedfromthoughtarenotkarma‑s,articulatelydistinguishingwhatiskarmaintheproper

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sense fromwhat, when co‑existing and co‑ordinatingwith karma, can alsocontributeasretributivedharma‑s:

These retribution causes are, in brief, of two types: 1.thosewhich canproject;2.thosewhichcancomplete.

Now, the group‑homogeneity and the vital faculty which are disjoinedconditioningsareexclusivelytheresultof[karmic]projection(ākṣipta).Howdoweknow?Becauseitissaidinthesūtra.Forinstance,itissaidinthe sūtra:“karmaisthecauseofbirth”;itisalsosaid:“karmacausesthesaṃsāriccycle”;it isalsosaid:“sentientbeingsaredifferentiatedbytheforceofkarma”;itisalsosaid:“theinferiorsphere(i.e.,thesensesphere)isprojectedbyvolition‑karma”.…It isalsosaid in thePrŚ:“Thevitalfaculties are the retribution of karma, because they are not karma‑s.Nodisjoinedconditioningiskarma.”…

It isonlyat the timewhen thekarma isprojecting thevital facultyandthe homogeneity that thosewhich are not karma [in the proper sense],whentakingthemasobjects,canalsoincurtheretribution.…Thebodilyandvocalkarma‑swhichdonot co‑exist, [arising and ceasing togetherwithit](cittānuvartin),definitelycannotprojectthevitalfacultyandthehomogeneity.Otherwise,boththescripturesandlogicalreasoningwillbecontradicted.For, the sūtra says that the inferior sphere isprojectedbyvolition.Thismeansthatthevitalfacultyandhomogeneitybelongingtothesensesphereexistenceisincurredbythementalkarmaalone,notbythebodilyandvocalkarma‑s.…8

13.1.1. Three types of karma and the primary role of volition

Asisclearfromabove,threetypesofkarmaarerecognizedintheSarvāstivāda:mental,bodilyandvocal.Correspondingly,karmaissaidtobeestablishedonathree‑foldbasis—intermsoforiginatingcause(samutthāna),thementalkarma isestablished;intermsofintrinsicnature,vocalkarma;intermsofsupportingbasis(āśraya),bodilykarma.Thisthree‑folddivisionofkarmaisalsocorrelatedwith another three‑fold signification of karma: It is karma because (i)it hasefficacy(有作用),i.e.,vocalkarma,(ii)itentailsmovement,i.e.,bodilyaction,eventhoughthereisnorealmovementassuch,(iii)itisvolitional(造作;abhi-sam-√kṛ),i.e.,“mentalkarmawhichwillsthetwoformeractions”.9

TheMVŚexplainsthatvolitioncomprisesallthatismentalkarma—whetherthatwhichprojects an existence (i.e., thegroup‑homogeneity)or thatwhichcompletes its specifics (cf. §14.5); whether with‑outflow or outflow‑free;whether pertaining to the mind or to the five sensory consciousnesses —since all these karma‑s have the characteristic of being volitional activities(abhisaṃskāra).10Thenotionofmentalkarmaastheoriginatingcausesettingthe other two types of karma into operation shows clearly that in spite oftheirinsistencethatkarmacomprisescetanā‑aswellascetayitvā-karma,the

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Sarvāstivādinstooassigntheprimarykarmicroletovolition.ThisemphasisisdistinctivelybroughtoutinthefollowingcatechismintheMVŚ:

Question:Allwith‑outflowdharma‑s,whether skillfulorunskillful, arecapable of effecting desirable or undesirable retribution fruits. Why isvolitionalone,andnototherdharma‑s,saidtobecapableofdifferentiatingthedesirableorundesirablefruits?

Answer:Itissosaidbecausevolitionismostexcellent[inthisprocess]:volition has the most excellent strength in effecting a desirable orundesirablefruit.11

The JPŚ states that “all dharma‑s (here referring to prātimokṣa-saṃvara;cf.§13.5)areoriginated(sam-ut-√sthā)onaccountofthought,notthatitisnotonaccountofthought”. Commentingonthestatement,theMVŚsays:

Herein it is shown that the bodily and vocal karma‑s are originatedon account of thought.There are two types of thought: [thought as] thepropellerand[thoughtas] thesubsequentpropeller (§9.7). [The thoughtwhich serves as] the propeller projects the bodily and vocal karma‑s; itarisesbeforethem.[Thethoughtwhichservesas]thesubsequentpropellerassiststhebodilyandvocalkarma‑s;itarisestogetherwiththem.Herein,it refers to [thought] as the propeller, not [thought] as the subsequentpropeller.12

TheMVŚstatesthatforthematerializationofafutureexistence,onesinglevolition generically projects it andmany other volitions then determine itsspecifics.13 Saṃghabhadra, likewise, citing the sūtra‑s and explaining theretributive causes in similar terms as theMVŚ, further articulates that it ismentalkarma—volition—thatistoberegardedaskarmaintheproperorspecific sense inasmuchas it is theprominent cause (勝因; *viśiṣṭa-hetu) inprojecting a sentient existence. Bodily and vocal karma‑s, while also beingpart of the retributive causes, can only contribute as completing causes(see§13.8.2).Infact,theircontributionbecomespossibleonlywhenthecetanā karmaisexercisingitsfunctionofprojectingtheparticularsentientexistence.14 In stating that one karma projects one single existence, the story is relatedof Venerable Aniruddha who, by offering a single alms, projected severalretributivefruitsasadevaandasahuman:Thisispossiblenotbecauseonesinglekarmaofalms‑givingprojectedseveraldifferentexistences,butbecause,whenofferingthealms,hehadgeneratedseveralstreamsofvolition—severalkarma‑s — corresponding to several future existences. (See infra, §14.5).Wemustnotehereonceagainthattheprojectingkarmaisvolition.Accordingly,wemay justifiablyspeakof theSarvāstivādanotionofkarma in twosenses:in theproperornarrowersense,karma refersspecifically tovolition—andthe Sarvāstivādadoctrineheredoesnotdeviate fromthestandpointofearly


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Buddhism;inthebroadersense,itreferstoallthatconstitutestheretributivecausescontributingtotheretributivefruit.Inthisconnection,wemaynotetheexplanationinNyastowhythefactor,bhava,inthetwelve‑foldformulationofdependentco‑arisingisnotnamedkarma:Itisbecausebhava isthespecifickarma (karma-viśeṣa)whicheffectsrebirth—allkarma‑sarenotthecauseforrebirth.15

13.1.2. The agent of karma

Given theBuddhist doctrines of impermanence— interpreted to its logicalextreme as that ofmomentariness— and of non‑substantiality (nairātmya),canitbesaidthatthesamepersonwhoincursakarmaexperiencestheeffecthimself?TheMVŚexaminesthisquestion,andexplainsasfollows:

(i) Fromacertainpointofviewitcanbesaidso:Althoughtheskandha‑s,āyatana‑s anddhātu‑sof abeingaredifferent in eachmomentof theirserialcontinuity,yetthereisanoverallintegrity—eachseriesisdistinctfromanother.

(ii) Fromanotherpointofview,itcanbesaidthatthedoerandtheexperienceraredifferent—forinstance,abeingwhohasincurredakarmaasahuman,experiencesitseffectinadifferentplaneofexistence.

(iii)From yet another point of view, it can be said that no one incurs anykarmaandnooneexperiencestheeffect—foralldharma‑sarewithoutaSelf,emptyofaperson(pudgala);allkarma‑sare“devoidofadoerandanexperiencer, therebeingonlytheagglomerationoftheconditioningswhichariseandcease[momentarily]”.16 SaṃghabhadracitesthefollowingtwolinesofastanzawhichheassertsaretheBuddha’sownwordsdenyingatruly,independentlyexistingagentofkarma:

Thereiskarma,thereisvipāka;Thedoerisnotapperceived(na upalabhyate/na vidyate).17

This,hesays,neverthelessdoesnotamounttothedenialofagencyineverysense.ItdeniesonlyareallyexistentSelfthatleavesonegroupofskandha‑sandcontinueswithanothergroup.

It is for the sake of showing that the doers are none other than theconditionings (saṃskāra) themselves, constituting a serial continuityof causes and effects, that [the Buddha] says further: ‘This being thatcomestobe;fromthearisingofthis,thatarises.’(asmin satīdaṃ bhavati / asyo’tpādād idam utpadyate)18

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13.1.3. Defilements as the generating cause and supporting condition for karma

The Sarvāstivāda shares the basic Buddhist tenet that the unenlightenedworldlingexperiencesduḥkha in saṃsāraonaccountofhiskarma;andkarmaisgeneratedbecauseofdefilements:defilement→ karma → duḥkha.Allduḥkha ceaseswhenkarmaistranscended.

Defilements are not only the generating cause of karma. It is by virtue ofdefilements that karma‑s accumulate (upacayaṃ gacchanti — see below),i.e.,becomenecessarilyproductiveofaretribution.19Withoutthem,karma‑sareincapableofeffectinganewexistence.20Infact,“Itisnotthecasethatanarhat doesnot have the indeterminatekarma‑s conducive to a rebirth.But on theaccountoftheabsenceofthedefilements,theybecomeincapableofproducingarebirth.”21Thatis,whilekarmaisthedirectcauseforaretribution,itrequiresthedefilementsasthenecessarysupportiveconditionsfortheprocess.

13.2. Classification of karma

Various classifications of karma are given in the Sarvāstivāda texts, amongwhichthefollowingarethemainones:

(1) volitionalkarma (cetanā)andkarmasubsequenttowilling(cetayitvā);

(2) bodily,vocalandmentalkarma‑s;

(3) informative(vijñapti)andnon‑informative(avijñapti)karma‑s;

(4) skillful (kuśala),unskillful (akuśala)andmorallyneutral (avyākṛta)karma‑s;

(5) karma‑swhicharewith‑outflow(sāsrava)andoutflow‑free(anāsrava)karma‑s;

(6) (i) meritorious (puṇya) karma— skillful actions pertaining to thesphereofsensuality,(ii)non‑meritorious(apuṇya)karma—unskillfulactions pertaining to the sphere of sensuality, and (iii)immovable(āneñjya)karma—skillfulactionspertainingtotheupperspheres;

(7) (i)black(kṛṣṇa)karmayieldingblackretribution—impure(aśubha)action generating disagreeable (amanojña) retribution; (ii)white(śukla)karmayieldingwhiteretribution—actionofrūpa-dhātuwhichis always pure (śubham ekāntena) generating agreeable (manojña)retribution; (iii)black‑white karma yielding black‑white retribution—pureactionofkāmadhātu,beingmixedwiththeimpure,generatingamixed retribution; (iv)neither‑black‑nor‑white karma yielding no


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retribution—outflow‑freeactionwhichdestroystheotherthreetypesofaction;22

(8) karma‑s conducive to pleasant experience (sukha-vedanīya),tounpleasant experience (duḥkha-vedanīya), to neither pleasant norunpleasant(aduḥkhāsukha-vedanīya)experience;

(9) karma‑sexperiencible in this life (dṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya),karma‑sexperiencible in the next life (upapadya-vedanīya) and karma‑sexperiencibleinafuturelifesubsequenttothenext(apara-paryāya-vedanīya);

(10)determinate(niyata)andindeterminate(aniyata)karma—e.g.,akarma conducive to desirable (or to undesirable or neutral) experienceisnotnecessarily retributed;butwhen it is actually retributed, it isnecessarilyexperiencedasadesirableretribution;23

(11)akarmathatisdone(kṛta)andonethatisaccumulated(upacita);

(12)projecting(ākṣepaka)andcompleting(paripūraka)karma‑s.

13.3. Informative (vijñapti) and non-informative (avijñapti) karma

When one performs an action through body or speech, this action informsothers of the corresponding mental state within. Accordingly, it is calledan‘informativeorinformationaction’.Mentalkarmacannotbyitselfprovideanyinformationoutsidethemind.Thus,itdoesnothaveinformative,andhence,non-informative karma. The following chart shows the correlation amongthefirstthreeclassificationsgivenin§13.2:

two‑fold three‑fold vijñapti/avijñapti

cetanā-karma mentalkarma no vijñapti or avijñapti

cetayitvā-karma

bodilykarmabodilyvijñapti

bodilyavijñapti

vocalkarmavocalvijñapti

vocalavijñapti

Abodilyorvocalinformativeactionmaybeprecededbyapreparatorystage(prayoga)andfollowedbysubsequentactions(pṛṣṭham)—actionsconsequentialtotheprincipalaction.Thus,fortheactionofkilling,itmaybeprecededbyaseriesofpreparatoryactions—suchasthevolitiontokill,followedbythedetailedplanning,buyingaknife,sharpeningit,etc.,andfinallystabbingthevictimseveraltimesuntilhedies.Attheverymoment—attheverystroke—when thevictim isactuallykilled, thedoerhascommitted the transgression

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of killing. Thisaction lasts only one moment. But simultaneous with theaccomplishmentofthisprincipalaction,aninvisiblekarmicforceisprojectedwithin the doer’s body which continues to renew itself in aseries. Asthisforceisnon‑informingofthedoer’smentalstate,itiscallednon-informativekarmaornon‑informativeaction.Intermsofwhatiscalleda‘pathofkarma’(infra,§13.6),theinformativekarmaaswellasthesimultaneouslyarisennon-informative karma at the moment when the victim actually dies, constitutethe‘principal (maula)pathofkarma’.Fromthispointonward,allunskillfulinformativekarma‑s—suchasskinning,cuttingandeating thevictim,etc.,—andnon‑informativekarma‑sgeneratedarecalledthesubsequentactions.24

Eachmomentarymemberofthenon‑informative‑seriesisconnectedwiththekiller by the correspondingmomentarymember of the series of acquisitionwhichisalsosimultaneouslyinduced.Inthisway,byvirtueoftheacquisition‑series,thekillercontinuestopossessthenon‑informativekarma—likewise,the volitional and informative karma‑s. This acquisition‑series can only beinterrupted—andhence,thecontinuityofthekarmicforcebroughttoanend—bytheactualizationoftheeffectcorrespondingtothekarmaofkilling.

13.4. Definition and intrinsic nature of informative and non-informative karma-s

13.4.1. Definition and nature of informative karma

Thereisacontroversyastowhatconstitutestheintrinsicoressentialnatureofaninformativekarma.

TheSāṃmitīyaassertsthatitismovement(gati).Forthem,bodilymovementcanberealbecause,unlikethementaldharma‑s,materialthingsarenotmomentary.25

The ancient Dārṣṭāntika26 as well as the Sautrāntika deny the ontologicalstatusofboth the informativeandnon‑informativekarma‑s.Allkarma‑sarenoneotherthanvolition:Thesūtrareferencetocetanāandcetayitvā karma‑scorrespondstotwotypesofvolition.First,atthepreparatorystage,thevolitionof intention (saṃkalpa-cetanā)arises.Next,avolitionofaction(kriyā-cetanā)arises,movingthebodyoremittingaspeech—bodilyorvocalaction.27

For the Vaibhāṣika, cetanā karma is mental karma and cetayitvā karma comprisesbothinformativeandnon-informativekarma‑s,allofwhicharerealentities. Informativekarma is of thenatureof resistant (sapratigha) derivedmatter:

(i) Abodilyinformativekarmaisthespecificbodilyshape(saṃsthāna-viśeṣa)atthetimeoftheaccomplishmentoftheaction.Moreprecisely,itisthetotalnumberofshape‑atoms(saṃsthāna-paramāṇu)ofmatterconstituting


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thepartofthebodyformingthebasisoftheaction.Thisnumbervariesassomeactionsarebasedonjustacertainpartofthebody—asinthecaseofthesnappingofthefingers,etc.;othersarebasedonthewholebody—suchasworshippingtheBuddha.28

(ii) Avocalinformativekarmaisspeechwhichagainismatter,beingarticulatedsound(śabda).

Saṃghabhadraarguesthat,ifallkarma‑saremerevolition,thenassoonasoneproducesavolitionforpatricide,oneimmediatelyhascommittedthemortaltransgression.Shoulditbearguedthatthisfallacydoesnotresult,sinceonehasnotyetmovedthebody,itisthenipso factoestablishedthatbodilyactionexistsapartfromthevolition.Thatis,itisonlywhenthebodymovesthatthereisthebodilykarmaaccomplishingthetransgressionofkilling,etc.Thisisabodilytransgression, even though it is necessarily generated by an evil volition.29 Saṃghabhadra, distinguishing the Vaibhāṣika from both the Sāṃmītīya aswellas theSautrāntikawhoasserts that theshape‑atomsaremerelyspecificarrangementsofcoloratomswhichalonearereal,explainsasfollows:

Within the body [of the doer], there exists a fruit of the four GreatElements arisen by a thought (citta) which is a specific shape capableof informing [others] of the thought. This is called bodily informative[matter].30Thatis,itisafruitofthetransientGreatElementsofemanation(anavasthāyi-naiṣyandika-mahābhūta) born of a thought of preparation.Itis the saṃsthāna-rūpa— a category of rūpa distinct from the varṇa rūpa-s—whichservesasthecauseforvisualcognitionandwhicheclipsesthe saṃsthāna-rūpa‑sthatarebornofretribution(vipākaja)andthatareof thenatureofgrowth(aupacayika) [—theexistingsaṃsthāna-rūpa‑softhedoer’sbody].Suchsaṃsthāna-rūpa‑sarecalledbodilyinformative[matter]. It is not the case that, as a result of such [saṃsthāna-rūpa‑s]which are of the nature of being skillful, etc., thosewhich are born ofretributionandwhichareofthenatureofgrowthcometobeannihilated.This is like thecase that,whenthedivineeye(divya-cakṣus)arises, theotherfacultiesofvisionandauditioncontinueuninterrupted.31

The word ‘transient’ in the above definition is pointed at the Sāṃmitīyawhoholds thatmatter is notmomentary; and thephrase ‘adistinct categoryindependentof othervarṇa-rūpa‑s’ is intended to counteract theSautrāntikaview.Wemaynotefromtheaboveexplanationthat(i)thesaṃsthāna-rūpa‑sconstitutingthebodilyinformativematteraremorallydefinableasskillfulorunskillful;andthat(ii)theyarearisenbythought,ormorecorrectly,athoughtin conjunction with aspecific volition (cetanā-viśeṣa). Herein we see thenecessaryrelationofbodilyandvocalkarma‑swithmentalkarma.ItisforthisreasonthateventheVaibhāṣikasacceptthatifkarma‑saretobeclassifiedfromthe view‑pointoftheirorigination(samutthāna),itshouldbesaidthatthereisonlyonetypeofkarma—sinceallkarma‑sareoriginatedfromvolition.32

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But although amentalkarma—volition— is generally expressed throughthe agencies of the bodily and vocal karma, it does not mean that mentalkarmabyitselfcannotberetributive.Theveryfactthattheretributivecause(vipāka-hetu) comprises dharma‑s of all the five skandha‑s — includingthoughtandthought‑concomitants—meansthatmentalkarmatooconducesto karmic retribution. TheMVŚ discusses the various cases of the “desiredandundesiredfruitseffectedbythe three typesofkarma‑s”—bodily,vocalandmental.Thus,thereexistsasituationwhere,“thevocalandmentalkarma donot effect their fruits of retribution in themanner abodilykarma does”:This is thecase“when there is restraintof thebody,not speech,andat thatmomentonehasaskillfulorneutralthought;thatis,thenon-informativekarma (avijñapti, avijñapti-karma)33 projected by an unskillful bodily informativekarma generated at the presentmoment co‑arises (anu-√vṛt) [with thought],and the non-informative karma projected by askillful vocal informativekarmageneratedatthepresentorapreviousmomentco‑arises[withthought].At thatverymoment,askillfulorneutral thoughtarises—inthissituation,the bodilykarma effects an undesired retribution; the vocalkarma effects adesired retribution. Asfor themental karma, ifit is generated by a skillfulthought,iteffectsadesiredretribution;if itisgeneratedbyaneutralthought,iteffectsneitheradesirednoranundesiredretribution.”34Therearealsocaseswherein, even without any bodily and vocal expression, bodily and vocaltransgressions are incurredbyvirtueof thementalvolition, e.g., thementalhatred(manaḥ-pradoṣa)ofaṛṣi,whichcanbefatal,andthesilence,atthetimeof poṣadha,indicatingacceptance.35

13.4.2. Definition and nature of non-informative karma

Vasubandhudefinesnon‑informativematterintheAKBasfollows:

That serial continuity— pure or impure— which exists even in onewhosethoughtisdistracted(vikṣipta)orwhoiswithoutthought(acittaka),andwhichisdependentontheGreatElements,iscalledthenon‑informative[matter].36

IntheNy,Saṃghabhadraobjectstothisdefinition:

TheKośakāraisunabletodescribethenatureofthenon‑informative[matter]completely by this verse, for he says that the non‑informative [matter]isa serialcontinuity (anubandha).Hisowncommentarysays:Byserialcontinuityismeantacontinuousseries(pravāha).Now,[theavijñapti of] thefirstmomentcannotbedescribedasaserieslesttherebethefallacyofover‑generalization(atiprasaṅga).Thus,hisdefinitiondefinitelyexcludedthe non‑informative [matter] of the first moment. Moreover, aseriesis unreal, and [to describe] the non‑informative [matter] as unreal is


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contrarytotheabhidharma tenets.Moreover,thatwhichisprojectedbyconcentration(samādhi)doesnotcontinueasaseriesinthedistractedandnon‑consciousstates—itwouldthennotbenon‑informative[matter]…37

Hethengivesthefollowingversedefinitionwhichheclaimstobefreefromsuchfaults:

That[morally]defined,non‑resistantmatter,whichexists inthethoughtatthetimeoftheactionaswell[assubsequently],whichisofadissimilaraswell[assimilarmoral]species,andalsointhethoughtlessstate—thisis conceded as the non‑informative [matter]. (kṛte’pi visabhāge’pi citte cittātyaye ca yat | vyākṛtāpratighaṃ rūpaṃ sā hy avijñaptir iṣyate ||)38

IntheSPrŚ39hereplacesVasubandhu’sverseabovewiththis,andexplainseachtermintheprosecommentary.Withregardtokṛte’pi,hesays:

“kṛte’pirefers[bythewordapi]tothose[avijñapti‑s whichare]apartfromtheaction.Generallyspeaking,therearetwokindsofderivedmatterwhicharenon‑resistant:thefirstkindarisesindependenceontheinformative;thesecondonthought.Thosewhichariseindependenceontheinformativearefurtherdivisibleintotwokinds:thosewhichco‑existwiththeaction(i.e., the informative)and thosewhichexistafter theactionhasceased.The wordskṛte’piaregiveninordertoincludeexhaustivelythesedifferentkinds of non‑informative [matter] with their distinctive nature… It is“non‑resistant”becauseofnotbeingatom(paramāṇu)…40

Yaśomitra41quotestheaboveobjectionofSaṃghabhadraandrefutesit:Ifwhatiscalledaseries(pravāha)referstomanymoments,thenthefirstmomenttooamountstoaseries,theword‘series’referringtothemanymomentsbeginningwiththefirstmoment.Moreover,ifby‘aserialcontinuity’ismeant‘thatwhichcontinues’(anubadhnātīty anubandhaḥ),thengrammatically—withthewordhavingafinalasuffix—arealentityisindicated.Accordingly,thereisneitherincompletenessinthedefinitionnoranycontradictionwiththeabhidharma treatises.Ontheotherhand,evenifby‘serialcontinuity’ismeant‘[thestateof]seriallycontinuing’,expressingaflow(anubandhanam anubandha iti sroto ‘bhidhīyate),thereisstillnofaultsinceitsreferenceistomatter.

IntheNy,Saṃghabhadrasummarizes:

In brief, the non‑informative [matter] is that non‑resistant skillful orunskillfulmatterwhicharisesindependenceonaspecificcorporealorvocalinformativekarma,andonaspecificskillfulorunskillfulthought,etc.42

ThisdefinitionmaybecomparedwiththatgivenintheAvatāra:

Fromaspecificvijñapti,cittaand[tetradof]mahābhūta‑s,therearises[intheactor]acontinuousseriesofkuśala or akuśala rūpawhichisnon‑cumulativeandwhichpersistsinthestatesofsleep,wakefulness,distracted(vikṣipta)

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or non‑distracted (avikṣipta) thought, or non‑consciousness (acittaka).Thisisthecharacteristicofthenon‑informative[matter].43

13.4.2.1. Non-informative karma as matter

Althoughthenon‑informativeisinvisible,non‑resistantandnon‑spatialized,44 itneverthelessissaidtobeofthenatureofmattersinceitssupportingbasis(āśraya)—thefourGreatElements—areresistantmatter.Thisiscomparabletothemovementofatree’sshadowwhichfollowsthatofthetree.45 Vasubandhulikens this analogy to another supposedlySarvāstivādin explanation that thenon-informativekarmaissaidtoberūpabecausetheinformativekarmafromwhichitissuesisrūpainnature,andheobjectstoit.

Saṃghabhadraarguesthatitis,infact,tobelinkedwiththefirstinterpretation:allnon‑informativekarma‑s,whether those in thekāma-dhātuwhichdonotco‑existwith thoughtor thosewhichdo (thedhyāna-saṃvara andanāsrava-saṃvara), are necessarily dependent on theGreatElements.46 In the case ofrestraint (saṃvara), theMVŚ gives another reason: it is a rūpa “because itobstructsthearisingofevilmatter”;47i.e.,evilbodilyandvocalactionswhicharematterinnature,for“itisuniversallyacknowledgedintheworldthattheguardingofbodilyandvocalactionsaresaidtobeśīla”48—anotherexplanationthatcancoverallcategoriesofrestraints.

The non‑informative is, however, subsumed as a special case underdharmāyatana,ratherthanrūpāyatana.49ThissubsumptionisjustifiedwiththereferencebytheElephant-simile sūtra to mattersubsumedinthedharmāyatana.50 Fromthissubsumption,onecanalsoseethatwhiletheorthodoxSarvāstivādinsinsist that the non‑informativematter is a subtle kind ofmatter for it to becapableofcontinuousinteractionwiththemind—asweshallseebelowthatitissomeanttobe—itisinthissenseconsideredmoreakintothethoughtconcomitants.Thenon‑informativematter isalsoaspecial typeofmatter inthatitisnotatomicinnature.Inthediscussiononthedoctrinalperspectiveoftheaccumulative(/accumulated;saṃcita)andthenon‑accumulative,theAKBstatesthatamongthe18elements(dhātu)onlythefivesensoryfacultiesandtheirobjectsareaccumulative“becauseoftheirbeingagglomerationofatoms (paramāṇusaṃghātatvāt)”,alltherestarenon‑accumulative.51 SaṃghabhadrarepeatsthisinhisNy,addingthattherestarenotatomsintheirnature(體非極微).52Moreover, aswe have seen above (§ 13.4.2), in his own definition,heexplicitlyspeaksofthenon‑informativematterasbeingnotatom.

Inaway,thereisadoctrinaladvantageregardingthenon-informativekarma asmaterialratherthanmental:ifitisamentaldharmaconjoinedwiththought,therewouldbethephilosophicalproblemofitscontinuousco‑existencewiththethoughtserieswhichis,atvariousstages,ofvariousmoralnature—skillful,unskillful,neutral.On theotherhand,bypostulating it as amaterial reality,


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theSarvāstivādinsfellintoseriousdifficulties:ithastobeconsideredsomuchofaspecialtypeofmatterthatitmightaswell—atleastfromtheview‑pointof the critics — be treated as non‑material. Besides, as the Sautrāntikaargues, howcan a material force be conceived of as being ‘intelligent’ —asacreativekarmicforceshouldbe?53ItisprobablyoutofsuchconsiderationthatHarivarman,adissidentSautrāntikamaster—pointingoutvariousfaultsinsubsumingavijñapti asarūpa—proposesinhisSatŚthat it isadharma disjoinedfromthought(citta-viprayukta).54

Orthodox Sarvāstivādins apart, some dissident masters within the fold ofSarvāstivādaitself—suchastheearlyDārṣṭāntikamasters—alsodeniedtherealityofthenon‑informativematter.55 BhadantaDharmatrātadeniedtherealityof the so‑called dharmāyatana-saṃgṛhīta-rūpa,56 while Buddhadeva, that ofthe derivedmatter.57ThisDārṣṭāntikadenialwasinheritedbytheSautrāntika.58 ItisalsonoteworthythattheDSŚ,oneoftheearliestSarvāstivādacanonicalabhidharmatexts,alsomakesnomentionoftheavijñaptiinallitsdiscussionon matter.(Seesupra,§4.1.1.1f.).

13.4.3. Moral nature of informative and non-informative karma-s

Informative and non‑informative matter — being karmic forces — mustnecessarilybeeitherskillfulorunskillful.Aneutralinformativeaction—beingweak in nature — cannot generate a karmic force (i.e., non‑informativekarma).Inthiscase,themoralnatureoftheinformativeandnon-informativekarma‑sisendowedbythatofthevolitionandthethoughtconjoinedwiththevolition.Thelatterbecomesskillfulorunskillfulbyvirtueoftheirconjunction(samprayoga) with a thought‑concomitant of either nature— e.g.,greed ormoralshame(hrī).Theinformativekarma,ontheotherhand,althoughbeingmatter in nature, becomesmorally defined by virtue of themorally definedvolitionthatservesastheoriginatingcause(samutthāna)fortheinformativekarmawhich in turndefines themoralnatureof thenon-informativekarma whichitgenerates.(Forsamutthānataḥ kuśala/akuśala,seesupra,§2.4.3.2).

For the generation of a bodily or vocal action, twokinds of origination arespokenof:

(i) origination qua cause (hetu-samutthāna), i.e., the thought — morepreciselythevolition—whichgivesrisetotheaction;and

(ii)simultaneousorigination(tatkṣaṇa-samutthāna),i.e.,thethoughtthatissimultaneouswiththeactionandservingasitssustainingbasis.59

Althoughthevolitionsetsanactionintomotion,theactioncannotactuallytakeplacewithoutthelatter.Thisiscomparedtoanactionprojectedbythevolition“Ishallgotothatvillage”.Theactualactionofgoingtothatvillagecannottakeplaceifthepersondiesimmediatelyaftertheprojection.60

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Astowhetherthefirstfiveconsciousnessescanalsoserveasthesetwotypesoforigination,theMVŚrecordsdiverseviews.Somemastersholdthatmentalconsciousnessalonecandoso.Othersassertthatthefirstfiveconsciousnessesalso can generate bodily and vocal karma‑s; however, they can only serveto sustaining the operation, whereas mental consciousness can be both theprojecting cause (pravṛtti-kāraṇa) and the cause that sustains the operation(anuvṛtti-kāraṇa). Saṃghavasu maintains that the first consciousnesses canserveasbothtypesofcauses.TheMVŚcompilersendorsethesecondopinion.61 TheAKBcomparesthefirstoriginatingcausetothehandthatpropelsawheeltorollonthefloor;ontheotherhand,itisonlybecauseofthefloor—comparableto the ‘simultaneousorigination’— that serves to sustain thewheel at eachmomentthattheactualrollingbecomespossible.62

With regard to the Great Elements on which both the informative andnon-informative karma‑s depend (upādāya), it is explained that thenon-informativekarmaisnotderivedfromthesameGreatElementsformingthederivativebasisfortheinformativekarma.For,itisarguedthatthederivedmatter constituting the non-informative karma and that constituting theinformative karma are different in nature— one is subtle, the other, gross.Accordingly, they must have different causes.63 The informative karma issimultaneouswith theGreat Elements fromwhich it is derived.As for thenon-informative karma of the sphere of sensuality, in the first moment, itarises being derived from the simultaneous Great Elements. Subsequently,althoughhaving become past, thesameGreat Elements of the firstmomentcontinue to serve as the base of operation (āśraya) for the arising of thesubsequentmomentsofthenon‑informativekarma—theyaretheprojectingcause. TheGreat Elements arising simultaneously with the non-informativekarma in each subsequent moment in the doer’s body serve as the support(saṃniśraya)ofthenon-informativekarma—theyarethesustainingcauseofcontinuousoperation.Inotherwords,theGreatElementsofthefirstmomentaretheoriginationquacause,thesimultaneouslyarisingonesarethesimultaneousorigination.(Seeabove).

13.5. The non-informative as restraint, non-restraint and neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint64

Thenon‑informativemattercomprisesthefollowingthreecategories:

(i) restraint(saṃvara):divisibleinto(a)prātimokṣarestraint,i.e.,restraintinrespectoftheBuddhistdisciplinarycodes,(b)meditation(dhyāna)restraintand(c)outflow‑free(anāsrava)restraint,

(ii) non‑restraint(asaṃvara),


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(iii) neither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint(naivasaṃvara-nāsaṃvara).

Thisthirdcategorydoesnotrefertoactionsderivedfromaneutralmind,forallnon-informativekarma‑snecessarilyissuefromasufficientlystrongintention,skillful or unskillful.Rather it refers to thosekarmic actions—comprisingthemajority ofmoral and immoral actions— that fall outside the first twocategories.Thus,murdernotforthesakeoflivelihoodornotcommittedoutofavow‑conditionedmentality,isaninstanceofthiscategory.

(i)(a)Theprātimokṣa restraint is furtherdivided intoeight:bhikṣu restraint,bhikṣuṇī restraint, śikṣamānā restraint, śrāmaṇera restraint, śrāmaṇerī restraint, upāsaka restraint, upāsikā restraint and upavāsa (/upavāsastha)restraint.Theseeightkindsof restraintbelong (pratisaṃyukta) to the sphereof sensuality alone.Themoralobservancesof theheretics (bāhyaka)donotconstitute prātimokṣa-saṃvara. This is because they are undertaken witha view of some form of existence or another, conceived as real liberation(vimokṣa); suchanundertaking does not lead to the absolute rejection of orrelease from evil.65 Thevarious disciplinary precepts may be differentiatedas thosepertaining tomoralityproper (śīlāṅga),beingrestraint fromactionswhichare transgression in their intrinsicnature (prakṛti-sāvadya), and thosewhicharepreceptsbywayofprohibition(pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya)orconvention(prajñapti).Thus,inthecaseoftheeightpreceptsobservedbyalayBuddhistfortnightly, the first four — abstention from killing, stealing, unchastity,falsespeech—belongtotheformercategory.Theothersbelongtothelattercategory. Of the latter, abstention from intoxicants pertains to vigilance(apramādāṅga);thelastthreeabstentions—fromunseemlyshows,etc.,fromwearingornaments,fromtheuseofhighbedsandseats—pertaintoabstention(viratyaṅga)orobservanceofvows(vratāṅga).66Whenproperlyacquired,theprātimokṣa-saṃvaracanactasa restrainingforce,helping theundertaker toavoid transgressing the precepts in the presence of conditions favorable forsuch transgression.67 (See also §13.5.1). The MVŚ explains that a skillfulprecept(=saṃvara)cancounteractimmorality(dauśīlya)byvirtueofitsbeingaccompaniedbyanundertaking(abhy-upagama).68

(b)The meditation restraint is the non‑informative matter co‑existent(anuvartaka) with the concentrations (samādhi) of the fine‑material sphere(rūpa-dhātu).

(c)Theoutflow‑freerestraint is thenon‑informativematterco‑existentwiththe outflow‑freeconcentrations (anāsrava-samādhi),notbelonging toanyofthethreespheres.

(ii) Non‑restraint is a serial continuityofunskillfulnon‑informativematterarising in the following persons: butchers, hunters, robbers, prison‑wardens,executioners(vadhya-ghātaka),etc.

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(iii) The serial continuity of various skillful or unskillful non‑informativemattergeneratedbyactssuchas thefollowingisof thecategoryof“neitherrestraintnornon‑restraint”: thebuildingofavihāra,stūpaandsaṅghārāma,etc., offering food and medicine, etc., to the Saṅgha, worshipping a caitya,singingreligioushymnsofpraise;aswellasstriking(tāḍana),etc.

13.5.1. Acquisition and relinquishment of the non-informative matter

(i)(a) The prātimokṣa restraints are acquired bymaking vows to undertakethem.Thefirstsevenkindslastuntiltheendofone’slife;theeighth,foronedayandonenight.

ItisanemphaticSarvāstivādadoctrinethatprātimokṣa-saṃvaraisnotthemereabstentionfromawrongdoing—asmaintainedbytheSautrāntika.69Norcanitbeacquiredbyamerevowing. It is adistinctdharma (dharmāntara)withadistinctivenature(殊勝法性; *viśiṣṭo dharmatva)70whoseacquisitionrequiresveryspecificconditionsandecclesiasticalprocedure.Tobeginwith,thevowsmustbetakeninfrontofateacherwhoseutterancesrepresentingthevowsaretoberepeatedwordbywordby theundertaker.This iscalledparavijñāpana —informingtoandfromanother(para).However,theVinayahermeneutists(vinaya-vaibhāṣika) concede ten ways of acquiring full ordination, some ofwhich— e.g., the self‑ordination (svayaṃbhūtvena) by the Buddha and thepratyekabuddha‑s—donotrequireavijñapti.71Inbrief,itcanbeacquiredonlyon account of either the force of an original resolution (praṇidhāna), or thecompleteperfectionofintention (āśaya),orthroughthepoweroftheBuddha.It is asserted that the principles involved in these various divergent cases ofacquisition canonlybeproperlyunderstoodby theOmniscientOne.72 In the caseof theupavāsa restraintundertaken, thecandidatewho repeatsafter thepreceptormust be very humble, wearing no ornaments, and undertakes thecompletesetofeightpreceptsforonefulldayandnight.Itisonlywhenalltherequisiteconditionsarefulfilledthattherearisestherestraintasadistinctforceendowed with the ‘nature of restraint’ (律儀性; *saṃvaratva).73 Becauseitisundertaken in thismanner in front of a teacher, the undertaker can, throughthe force of moral shame (apatrāpya)74 — the ‘dominant influence of theworld’ (here, theteacher in frontofwhomhehasmade the commitment)—avoid transgression even in situationswherehis ownmoralmodesty (hrī) isnotoperative.75On theotherhand,whenundertakenwithout fulfillingall therequirements,therecanbe“onlythearisingofgoodconduct(sucarita),nottheacquisitionofrestraint.76Nevertheless,inorderthat[one’sactions]willleadtodesirableresults,evensuchanundertakingshouldbedone.”77(Seealsoinfra,§13.8.1).

Thefirst sevenprātimokṣa restraintsare terminatedbyanyof the followingfourconditions:(1)thewillfulgivingupofthetrainingthatonehasundertaken


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(śikṣāpratyākhyāna), (2)death (mṛtyu), (3)the cutting off of the three rootsofskillfulness (kuśalamūla-samuccheda),and(4)thesimultaneousarisingofboththemaleandfemalesexorgans(ubhayavyañjanotpatti,dvivyañjanodaya).TheMVŚ tells us that, according to the Vinayadhara: “The time of thedisappearance of the Dharma constitutes the fifth condition: at the timeof the disappearance of the Dharma, all the śikṣā, pravrajyā, upasaṃpad,sīmābandha,andkarma-vācanācompletelycease.Thereforethesaṃvaraarealsorelinquishedatthatmoment.”TheMVŚcompilers,whilenotrejectingthislastconditionstraight‑forwardly,offertheirowninterpretation.78 AccordingtoPuGuang,thisconditionisheldbytheDharmagupta.79It istobenotedthatthissameconditionisalsoenumeratedasthefifthinthe*Abhidharmahṛdaya:80 1.giving up of the training, 2.transgression of śīla, 3.death, 4.when falseviewspredominate,5.when the Dharma vanishes.Wemayassume that thisfifthconditionisonewellrecognizedbytheGandhārian/Foreign(bahirdeśaka)Sarvāstivādamasters.Theeighthrestraintisterminatedbyanyoftheaforesaidfourconditions,orbytheendofthenight.

(b–c)Themeditationrestraintisacquiredwhentheskillfulthoughtisacquiredupon entering into a meditation, and is terminated when it is relinquisheduponone’sexitfrommeditation.Likewisefortheacquisitionandterminationof the outflow‑freerestraintwhichfollowsthoseoftheoutflow‑freethought.Theseconditionsareonaccountofthefactthatthesetwocategoriesofrestraintarethought‑accompaniments(cittaparivartin/cittānuvartin/cittānuparivartin).

(ii) The non‑restraint is acquired by both doing (kriyayā) and willfullyundertakingtodo(abhyupagamena)anunskillfulact.Itisterminatedbyanyof the following four conditions: (1)the undertaking of restraint, (2)death,(3)thesimultaneous arising of both sex‑organs, and (4)when the skillfulthought of the fine‑material sphere is acquired spontaneously (dharmatā-prātilambhika)whentheworldsystemisabouttobedestroyed,asunderthissituation,theskillfuldharma‑sareallintensifiedspontaneously.81

(iii) Thecategoryofneitherrestraintnornon‑restraintisacquiredbyoneofthreeways:(1)bydoinganaction;as,forinstance,withapureandardentthoughtoneworshipsastūpawithhymns;or,outofintensedefilement,onestrikesatotherpersonsorthings;(2)byawillfulundertaking,asforinstancewhenonevowsthus:“IshallnevereatbeforeworshippingtheBuddha”;(3)byanactofgiving,as, for instance, buildingmonasteries,making beds and seats (śayanāsana),puttingupparksandmakingofferingstothebhikṣu‑s,etc.;thisnon‑informativematteristerminatedwhentheoriginatingthought(samutthāna-citta)andthematerialbasis(upadhi)—thethingsoffered—arecompletelydestroyed.

Whathappenswhenonehasacquiredthenon-informativekarmaofrestraintandthentransgresses?AccordingtotheSarvāstivādamastersoutsideKāśmīra,

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whenaperson abiding in the prātimokṣa‑restraint transgresses against therestraint, he relinquishes the restraint and acquires the neither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint—anotherkarmicallyretributiveforcebuthavingnothingtodowithmaking a vow. If he, however, sincerely and properly repents, he thenrelinquishes the neither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint and again re‑acquires therestraint. According to the Kāśmīra masters: when the person transgressesagainst the restraint, hedoes not relinquish it, but acquires additionally theneither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint.Heisatthattimesaidtobeabidinginboththeneither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraintaswellasinrestraint.Ifhesincerelyandproperly repents, he then relinquishes the neither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraintandisonlysaidtobeanabiderinrestraint(saṃvarastha).BothopinionsareacceptabletotheMVŚcompilers.82

13.6. Paths of karma (karma-patha)

Theteachingofthetenpathsofskillfulandunskillfulkarma (karma-patha)haveformed amajor ethical guidance among the Buddhists from the Buddha’s time. TheSarvāstivādins explain that these ten paths of karma are intended bytheBuddha to include themost important skillful practices and the gravestunskillfulpractices.83Thetenunskillfulpathsofkarmaare:

1. takinglife(prāṇātipāta),2. takingwhatisnotgiven(adattādāna),3. sexualmisconduct(kāma-mithyācāra),4. falsespeech(mṛṣā-vāda),5. maliciousspeech(paiśunya),6. harshspeech(pāruṣya),7. frivolousspeech(saṃbhinna-pralāpa),8. covetousness(abhidhyā),9. malice(vyāpāda),10. falseview(mithyā-dṛṣṭi).84

Thetenskillfulonesaretheoppositesofthese,i.e.,abstentionfromkilling,etc.Theseareskillfulactionswhicharewith‑outflow,i.e.,stillconducivetorebirthsin saṃsāra.Thefirstthreearebodilyactions;thenextfour,vocal;andthelastthree,mental.Theroot‑causesofthetenunskillfulpathsofkarmaaretherootsofunskillfulness—greed(lobha),hatred(dveṣa)anddelusion(moha):1,6and9areachievedthroughhatred;2,3and8throughgreed;10throughdelusion;4,5and7throughanyoneofthethreeroots.85Likewise,correspondingly,thetenskillfulpathsofkarmaareachievedthroughthethreerootsofskillfulness.86

It is emphasized that a mere conventional moral observation, withoutadominant mental determination, is not a path of karma.87 Conversely, if


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one harbors an evil intention of, say, disrupting the unity of a harmoniouscommunity—whetheronesucceedsornot,onecommitsthepathofkarma of maliciousspeech.88Eachpathofkarmaisdivisibleintoninegrades—weak‑weak(i.e.,thelowestofninegrades),andsoon,uptostrong‑strong(i.e.,thehighestofninegrades).(Seesupra,§12).Thus,althoughmurderleadstoanundesirablerebirth,theparticularplaneofexistenceintowhichthemurdererisgoingtoberebornwilldependonthegradeofgravityoftheaction.89Thesameappliestotheotherpathsofkarma.Amongthetenunskillfulones,itisfalseview—whichdeniescauseandeffect—thatcutsofftherootsofskillfulness:Thestrong‑strongrootofskillfulnessiscutoffbytheweak‑weakfalseview—upto,theweak‑weakrootofskillfulnessbythestrong‑strongfalseview.90

Thepathsofkarmaarecalledthusbecausetheyarethepathsbasedonwhichthevolition—karma—thatoriginatesthemhasitsoperation:“Becauseitoperatesas theyoperate; itmovesastheymove—itcreateskarmically(saṃskaroti)in conformitywith their force…They are paths ofkarma because they aretraversed by the volition: because the volition that originates the bodilyand vocal karma operates through the latter as the object.” They constitutethe paths “throughwhich the volition has itsmovement and operates to itsaccomplishment”.91Thus,volitionisnotcalledapathofkarma.“Justas theroadtraversedbythekingiscalledtheroadoftheking,anditisnottheking;likewiseitiscalledthepathofkarmabecauseitistraversedbyvolition,anditisnotvolition.”92Accordingly,amongthetenpathsofkarma,thefirstsevenarebothkarma—beingbodilyandvocalkarmainnature,aswellaspathsofkarma—beingthepathsfortheiroriginatingvolition.Thelastthreementalones are only paths of karma inasmuch as they serve as the paths for theirconascentvolition,butnotkarma.93

13.7. Rationale for the doctrine of non-informative karma

TheMVŚquotesthesūtrapassageinwhichthreetypesofrūpaarementionedbytheBuddha—visibleandresistant(sanidarśana-sapratigha),invisibleandresistant (anidarśana-sapratigha), invisible and non‑resistant (anidarśana-apratigha).94ThelastissaidtobealludingtotheSarvāstivādacategoryofthenon‑informative.Threelogicalargumentsarealsogiven:

(i) At the time when Ajātaśatru gave rise to the informative karma (vijñapti-karma) tokillhis father, the latterhadnotdied.Whenthelatteractuallydied,theinformativekarmahadalreadybecomepast.It is only on account of the subsequent non‑informative acquiredthroughtheforceoftheprecedinginformativeactionthathecametobe‘touched’bythemortaltransgression.

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(ii) LikewiseforthecaseofthehereticalasceticwhokilledMaudgalyāyana:whenthelatterattainedparinirvāṇa,thepreviousinformativekarma ofthekillerhadalsofadedintothepast.95

(iii)Ifthenon‑informativewereunreal,thentherewouldbenolegitimateestablishment of the differences among those abiding in saṃvara,asaṃvara,andneither‑saṃvara-nor-asaṃvara.96

Elsewhere,theMVŚalsomentions(morebrieflythantheAKBandNy)thecase of an action— say,murder— done through an emissary: at the timewhen thevictimisactuallykilledby theemissary, the informativekarma of theinstigatorisnomore.Besides, thisinformativekarma—vocalinnature—cannotbeonethatconstitutestheprincipalactofkilling.Itisinfactonlypartofthepreparationforthekilling.Therearisesinhimatthistime,however,anon-informative karma of killing. It is this invisible karmic force at thispresentmomentthatcausallyeffectsthetransgressionofamurderer.97

IntheAKB,eightreasonsfortherealexistenceofnon‑informativekarmaareoffered:

(i) Thesūtraspeaksofthreetypesofrūpa‑s(=firstreasonintheMVŚ).

(ii) TheBuddhaspeaksofoutflow‑freerūpa98—apartfromthenon‑informativematter, there cannot be any rūpa which is invisible, non‑resistant andoutflow‑free(inthecaseoftheanāsrava-saṃvara).

(iii)The sūtra speaks of the incessant increase of merit in one who hasperformed a material meritorious action (aupadhika-puṇya-kriyā) —onlybyvirtueofthenon‑informativekarmicforcecouldmeritincreaseevenwhensubsequentlythedonor’sthoughtisunskillfulorwhenheisinathoughtlessstate.99

(iv)Onewhohasanactiondonethroughanemissarywouldnotbeendowedwithakarma-pathaunlessthereexiststhenon-informativekarmawhichconstitutesthekarma-pathaitself.(Seeexplanationbelow,§13.8.2).

(v) The Buddha speaks of invisible and non‑resistant matter which aresubsumed in thedharmāyatana (see supra, §13.4.2.1).He can only bealludingheretothenon‑informativematter.

(vi) Oneinmeditationcanonlybeendowedwiththesethree—samyag-vāc,samyak-karmānta and samyag-ājīva — in the form of non-informativekarma, for these threeare incompatiblewith thestateofconcentration.Otherwise,therewouldnotbethepathcomprisingeightparts.

(vii)The non‑informative matter must exist as the prātimokṣa-saṃvara;otherwise,therewouldnotbeanythingonaccountofwhichtheordainee


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canstillbecalledabhikṣu or bhikṣuṇīwhenheorshelaterhasamentalstatedifferent—unskillfulorneutral—fromthat(askillfulone)inwhichtheordinationvowswerereceived(=(iii)intheMVŚ).

(viii)Thesūtra speaksof theabstention (virati) fromevilasadike (setu)onaccountofitsobstructiontothetransgressionoftheprecepts(dauśīlya-vibandhatvāt).Accordingly,thisabstention—whichisthenon‑informativematter—mustbearealentity,oritwouldnothavethisobstructiveefficacy.

ThisSarvāstivādadoctrineofthenon-informativekarmaishighlycontroversialamongthevariousabhidharmaschools.IntheMVŚ,theDārṣṭāntikas’standpointis that“there isno retributioncauseapart fromvolition;no retribution fruitapart from sensation”.100 They also agree with the Buddha’s own teachinginstating that“thebodily,vocalandmentalkarma‑sareallnoneother thanvolition”.101Boththeseassertionsconstitutearefutationofthedoctrineofthenon-informativekarma. The Sarvāstivādaincludesthenon‑informativematterunderthedharmāyatana,andspeaksofitas‘themattersubsumedunderthedharmāyatana’ (dharmāyatana-saṃgṛhīta-rūpa). The Dārṣṭāntikas, aswellas Dharmatrāta, deny that there is such a thing as ‘matter subsumed underdharmāyatana’,102 whichofcourseamountstoadenialofthenon‑informationmatter.Amoredirectrepudiationisasfollows:

According to the Dārṣṭāntikas, the information and non‑informationkarma‑s are not existent entities. Why? If the information karma isanexistent,thenonecan,withthisasthebasis,makethenon‑information[karma]anexistent.Butiftheinformationkarmaisnon‑existent,howcanit project the non‑information, making it (the non‑information karma)anexistent?103

TheSautrāntikas,too,denytherealexistenceofthenon‑informationmatter.IntheAKB,theyareseentobeengagedinalengthydebatewiththeVaibhāṣika,repudiatingalltheeightreasonsofferedbyVaibhāṣika(seeabove)indetail.104

13.8. Role of the non-informative in the process of karmic retribution

Somemayargueas towhether theSarvāstivādadoctrineof the tri‑temporalexistenceofthedharma‑salonesufficestoensurethecontinuedexistenceoftheefficacyofakarmathathasbecomepast.Oneoftheirmajorargumentsforsarvāstitva isprecisely thatkarmic retributionwouldbe impossible ifapastdharmaceasestobearealentity—possessingcausalefficacy.Theirdoctrineof phala-ākṣepaandphala-dāna toocouldbeseentorenderanyintermediaryagent— such as the non-informative karma — futile for the preservationof karmic efficacy: At the very moment when a retributive cause arises,itdeterminesthecausalconnectionwiththefruit‑to‑be;i.e.,‘itgraspsthefruit’.

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Atasubsequenttime,whenthenecessaryconditionsobtain,it,althoughpast,cancausallyactualizethefruitbydraggingit,asitwere,outofthefutureintothepresent;i.e.,‘itgivesthefruit’.Itmightthenbearguedthatthecategoryofnon‑informativematterwasnotformulatedforthekarmadoctrine,butforrestraint.Suchaconclusionbecomesallthemoretemptingwhenonetakesintoconsiderationthenotionthatthenon‑informationceasesatthetimeofthedoer’sdeath—or, inthecaseofdhyāna‑andanāsrava-saṃvara,whenheemergesfromthemeditation.What,then,canthekarmicroleofthenon‑informationbewhenafruitofretributionarisesafteroneormorelives?

Moreover,aswehaveseen, in thecausalprocess leading toretribution, itistheoriginatingvolitionthatisconsideredbytheMVŚtobethekarma in the proper sense; the avijñapti (where it exists) constitutes the ‘path of karma’— path “through which the volition has its movement and operates to itsaccomplishment”. (Supra, §13.6).Accordingly,one can speakofvolition askarma in the proper or narrower sense; and of the corresponding vijñapti- andavijñapti-karma‑saskarmiccontributors—and,forthatmatter,alsotheassociatedcitta-caitta-sandviprayukta-saṃskāra‑s,allfunctioningasvipāka-hetu‑s—askarmiccausesonlyinageneralsense.

Saṃghabhadra,too,consistentwiththeearlierSarvāstivādins,emphasizestheprimaryandcontinuouskarmicroleoftheoriginatingvolition(infra,§13.8.2),inspiteof theSarvāstivādin insistence thatkarma comprises twocategories,cetanāand thecetayitvā.Thevolitionalthoughpast, isstillexistentandcansubsequentlygiverisetothecorrespondingretributionfruit.

The Sautrāntika‑Dārṣṭāntikas, aswe have seen, deny the reality of both theinformative and non‑informative karma‑s. They claim that their karma doctrine, known as the “seed theory”, is in complete agreement with thecausalprinciplegoverningthecontinuousprocessofgrowthfromaseedintothefinalfruition:Aseed,beingmomentary,doesnotdirectlygiverisetothefruit.However,itscausalefficacyforthefruitioniscontinuouslytransmittedinthetransformationoftheseries(santati-pariṇāma)progressivelymanifestingas seed, stem,branches, leaves,flowers,andfinally fruit.Likewise,akarma —thevolition—doesnotdirectlyproducetheretribution;butthroughasimilartransformationalseries, thekarmicefficacyiscontinuouslytransmitted,untilfinally—whenappropriateconditionsobtain—theretributionisproduced.105

Suchatheorythenreliessolelyonvolitionaskarma,anddoesawaycompletelywiththeneedofthedoctrineoftheinformativeandnon‑informativekarma‑s.

Saṃghabhadra, however, claims that it is the Sarvāstivāda — rather thanthe Sautrāntika—doctrineofkarmathatcanbesaidtoaccordwiththecausalprinciple of the sequential growth of a plant from its seed.106 He faultsthe Sautrāntika theory: Even if one were, for the sake of argument, to grant


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thepossiblevalidityofthistheoryofaprogressivetransformationalseries,itisobservedthatinthecaseofthegrowthfromaseedintoitsfruit,therecannotbeanyinterruptionintheprocess.Butinthecaseofathought‑processthatfinallygivesrisetoaneffect,therecanbeinterruption—thepersoncanhavethoughtsofdifferentmoralnatures subsequent to theoriginatingvolition.Hemayalsobe in the states of asaṃjñi-samāpatti or nirodha-samāpatti in which there isthe complete interruption of mental activity. Accordingly, the Sautrāntika,acknowledgingonlyvolitionaskarma,cannotaccountforakarmicseriesthatcontinuesuninterrupteduntilthefinalfruition.Andsincetheyholdthepresent‑only‑existsstandpoint,itmeansthatinsuchacase,thekarmabecomesextinctbefore any fruition can possibly take place. For the Ābhidharmikas holdingthe doctrine of tri‑temporal existence, argues Saṃghabhadra, the causes ofretributioncancontinuetoexistinrelationtothepersonuntilfruitiononaccountof the acquisition‑series.Thatistosay,althoughtheoriginatingvolition—andforthatmattertheinformativekarma(wherethereisone),otheraccompanyingthought‑concomitantsanddisjoineddharma‑s—hasbecomepast,itcontinuestoexistandbekarmicallyrelatedtothepersonalseriesthroughtheacquisition‑series.Whentheappropriateconditionsobtain,althoughpast,itcanstillhavetheefficacyofgivingfruit.Thisaccordswiththeobservedfactthataseed,althoughceased,canstillhaveitsefficacymanifestedinthefinalproductionofitsfruit.107

TheabovediscussionshowsclearlythattheSarvāstivādinsassigntheprimarykarmicroletovolition.Whatthenpreciselyisthekarmicroleoftheavijñapti karmawhereitexists,projectedbythevolitionandthevijñapti-karma?

13.8.1. Clues from the MVŚ

Toanswerthisquestion,wemustnotrelyontherelativelylaterSarvāstivādatexts alone, such as theAKB,Ny,Avatāra, etc.For these texts represent thelaterstageofdevelopmentwhenthedoctrineofnon‑informativehadcometobeincreasinglyfocusedonthenotionofrestraint.Thus,inthecaseofabhikṣu takingpreceptsfromthepreceptor,thenon‑informativeisemphasizedasaforceofrestraint(inthecaseofprātimokṣa-saṃvara)thatconsequentlyarisesintheformerwhichlegitimatelydefineshisbhikṣu‑hood.ButthisisanunderstandabledevelopmentwithintheSaṅghamembers—theSarvāstivādatheorists—whofoundthenotionofnon‑informativemattervalidlyandconvenientlyapplicableinthiscase.Thepreoccupationwiththeemphasisonrestraintisparticularlyconspicuous in the post‑AKB texts.Thus, theAvatāra classifies, as does theAKB, the avijñapti as saṃvara, asaṃvara, and naivasaṃvaranāsaṃvara,andgivestheonlylogicalargumentforitsrealitythat“it isbyvirtueofthis[non‑informativematter as saṃvara] that the statusof abhikṣu, etc., canbeestablished.Werethisnon‑existent,itwouldnotbelegitimatelyestablishedthatthereexistbhikṣu‑s,etc.”108 Saṃghabhadra’sexplanations,givensummarilyattheveryendofhislengthyrefutationoftheSautrāntika’sobjectionstotheeight

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reasonsfortheestablishmentoftheavijñapti’sreality,couldalsogivethesameimpressionofthispreoccupation:

Whatdoesthisnon‑informative[matter]referto?Itreferstoabstention(virati). ‘Abstention’, ‘non‑doing’, ‘non‑creating’, ‘non‑informing’(avijñapti) — these are synonyms for one and the same entity.…Thisnon‑informative matter is also called a karma, for it is produced[asafruitofemanation]withtheinformative[karma]andthevolitionasitscauses[andthereforehassimilarkarmicnature]…109

Here, Saṃghabhadra speaks of the avijñapti as abstention (=restraint).Butwemustrememberthecontextofthisexplanation:itisgiveninrefutationof the Sautrāntika’sclaimthatsaṃvara isnotadistinctentitybutmerely thenon‑doingofevilactions.Inanycase,asweshallsee,Saṃghabhadra,likeallSarvāstivādins,doesnotconfinesaṃvaratotheroleofbeingamererestrainingforce.Tosaythatsaṃvara(inthepropersense)isnotkarma,doesnotentailthatitdoesnotcontributeatalltokarmicretribution,buttoemphasizethatitisanemanation‑fruitoftheprojectingvolitionandvijñapti-karma.Butbeingsuch an emanation, it is necessarily of the nature of karma— albeit in thebroader senseof the term—ofbeingamong thecauseswhichcontribute tokarmicretribution.(Seeinfra,§13.8.2).

Forbetterclues,weshouldthereforefirstturntotheMVŚ—compiledmorethan two centuries earlier than the AKB. Judging by the rationales offeredtherein,wemaysaythatthedoctrineofthenon‑informativematterseemstohavebeenarticulatedtoaccountforboth

(1)thepreservationofkarmicefficacyaswellas(2) theontologicalstatusofordinationrestraint,

withtheformerprobablyastheinitialproblematization.Atanyrate,thesametwoconcernsarealsounmistakableevenamongtheeightreasonsofferedintheAKB.Itcanbeseen that,of the three logicalreasonsgiven in theAKB,two,i.e.,(iv)and(vi),relatetothenon‑informativematteraskarmicforce,andonei.e.,(vii)relatestothenotionofsaṃvarawhichisnotexplicitlykarmic.The last reason, although in the form of scriptural authority, also interpretsthenon‑informativematterasarestrainingforce.Moreover,aswillbemadeclearbelow, although saṃvara is not explicitlymentioned as akarmic forcein the context of ordination, it has indeed such a nature inasmuch as it iscontributivetokarmicretribution.

13.8.1.1. The emphasis of non-informative matter qua prātimokṣa-saṃvara

As for the emphasis of non‑informative matter qua prātimokṣa-saṃvara, wemaynote the reasonsgiven in theMVŚas towhy,of the three typesof saṃvara,theprātimokṣa-saṃvaraaloneisusedasthebasisfordifferentiating


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thesevenassemblies—bhikṣu,bhikṣuṇī,etc.Thecompilers’ownexplanationis as follows: The prātimokṣa-saṃvara-s, acquired progressively, establishthe sevenfoldassembliesprogressively: (1) thosewhoabstain from the fourtransgressions by nature (prakṛtisāvadya: from killing to false speech) andone transgression by convention (prajñapti-sāvadya, pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya:drinkingliquor)aretheupāsaka‑s;progressivelyupto:(6‑7)thosewhoabstainfromalltransgressionsarethebhikṣu‑sandbhikṣuṇī‑s.Thisisthenfollowedbyanalternativeexplanationby‘some’(kecit; 有作是說):

The prātimokṣa-saṃvara, fromthefirstmomentof itsprojectionby theinformativekarma,ispresentatalltimes[intheordaineewho]isendowed(samanvāgata) with it: whether he is asleep, drunk, mentally derailed,fainted; whether he is having a volition or not; whether he is havingadefiledorneutralthought,oristhoughtless(acittaka)—inallstatesitispresent,existingasanuninterruptedserialcontinuity.Accordingly,itcanformthebasisforthedistinctiveestablishmentofthesevenassemblies.110

This explanation, of course, is essentially the same as the major part ofVasubandhu’sdefinitionof thenon‑informativematter. (Seeabove,§13.4.2).Butwhat is noteworthy is that it is onlyoneof several explanations—noteventhemainone—endorsedbytheMVŚcompilerswhoseownexplanationdoes not allude to the ontological status of saṃvara as a form ofavijñapti. Consideringthisendorsementaswellasthethirdlogicalreasongivenbythecompilers for the reality of the non‑informativematter (see above, §13.7),wemay presume that such an explanation as offered by “some”must havealreadybeenanacceptedoneamongtheSarvāstivādinsaroundthetimeofthecompilationoftheMVŚ.Butfromourdiscussionabove,wemayalsopresumethat theremustsubsequentlyhavebeenaconsciousshiftofemphasis to thenotionofthenon‑informativematterqua prātimokṣa‑restraint.

13.8.1.2. The emphasis of non-informative matter as a karmic force

Asfortheemphasisonthenon‑informativematterasakarmicforce,wemaynote, first of all, that the MVŚ speaks clearly of restraint‑karma (律儀業;saṃvara-karma) as a distinctivekarma (勝業; *viśiṣṭa-karma) that gives riseto a fruit of restraint (律儀果; saṃvara-phala) which is a ‘great fruit’ (大果;mahā-phala).111Aswe have seen above,when the eight lay precepts areundertakenwithoutfulfillingalltherequisiteconditions,whattheundertakerhasisgoodconduct(§13.5.1),andgoodconductiscertainlykarmicallyretributive.

TheMVŚcontainsadiscussiononsuchgoodconduct,inwhichaquestionerelaboratelycitestwostories(nidāna)relatedbyVenerableKātyāyanīputra:

(I) To certain butchers who said that they could not survive withoutpracticing butchery during the day, theVenerable advised them toundertaketheeightpreceptsatnight.Doingaccordingly,theywere

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rebornaspreta‑s.Inthedaytimestheysufferedbybeingrepeatedlydevoured by black dogs; but at night — because of their havingundertakentheprecepts—theywereabletoenjoywiththeirsensestothefullest,likethedeva‑s.

(II)Tocertainprostituteswhocomplained that theycouldnotabruptlyforsaketheiroldhabitofprostitutionatnight,theVenerableadvisedthemtoundertaketheeightpreceptsduringtheday.Doingaccordingly,theywererebornaspreta‑s,sufferingduringthedaybutenjoyinglikedeva‑satnight.

Now,will not these two stories contradict the doctrine that theupavāsa restraintmustbeundertakenforafulldayandnight?Theansweristhatsuchanundertaking—forlessthanafulldayandnight—“comesunder‘good conduct’; they are not saṃvara. What was experienced by them[—thepleasurablepartinthestories—]werethefruitsofgoodconduct,notthefruitsofsaṃvara.”

TheMVŚthenproceedstodistinguishvarioustypesofundertakingoftheupavāsa-saṃvara:

(i) whereinthefundamentalkarma-pathaispurebutnotthepreliminarystages(sāmantaka);

(ii)wherein both are pure but there is the damage done by unskillfulthoughts(akuśala-vitarka);

(iii)wherein both are pure and there is no damage done by unskillfulthoughts,butthereisnopropermindfulnessoftheBuddha,etc.;

(iv)whereinbotharepure,thereisnodamagedonebyunskillfulthoughtsandthereisalsopropermindfulness,butnodedication(pari-ṇāmana)towardsliberation;

(v) whereinitisas(iv),butthereisthededication.Withreferencetothefirstfourtypes,theBuddhasaidthat“thesaṃvaraundertakenbythem,althoughbeingdistinctive/excellentkarma,doesnotyieldgreatfruit”.

Itisonlyinthelastcase(i.e.,(v)that“thesaṃvaraundertakenisadistinctive/excellentkarmacapableofyieldinggreatfruit”.112(Seealsoabove,§13.5.1).

We are therefore given to understand that an abstention from killing, etc.,qua saṃvara is not only a karma — a retributive good action — but hasanadditional,distinctivequality.Thelatter,whichmakesitatonceasaṃvara ‘cum’ karmathatiscapableofyieldingan‘excellentfruit’,isthesaṃvaratva(seeinfra),acquiredthroughadefiniteecclesiasticalprocedurewithinthecontextofaconsciouslycommittedmonastictraininganddedicationtotheBuddhistgoalofliberation.Thissaṃvaratvaalsooperatesasacontinuouslyrestrainingforce


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withintheundertakeruntilitisrelinquished.

Nexttobenotedisthat,ofthethreelogicalreasonsgivenintheMVŚ(supra,§13.7),thefirsttwoclearlyintendthenon‑informativeastheindispensablekarmicagent: In both the examples given, it is at the time of the victim’s death thatthemortal transgression isestablished.There is the repeatedemphasis in thiscontext that “at that time the informative [karma] has already faded; it is onaccountofthesubsequentnon‑informative[karma]acquiredthroughtheforceofthepreviousinformative[karma]that…[thetransgressor]istouchedbythemortalkarma”.113Suchanemphasispromptsus tounderstandas follows: it isatthistimethatthereoccursthesufficientcausaldeterminationofthefruit‑to‑becorrespondingtothetransgression.Butatthistime,theoriginatingvolitionand the informative action have long become past.Andwhile pastdharma‑scanhaveothercausalfunctions(calledvyāpāra,vṛtti,kriyā,sāmarthya,etc.—seesupra, §5.3), including thatof ‘giving the fruit’, theycannotperform thiscausalfunctionofhelpingtoensurethesufficiencyofthecausaldetermination.Evenat their present moment, thesimultaneously generated informativekarma‑s cannot ‘grasp’ or project the same retribution fruit togetherwith theoriginating volition—not beingmutually co‑existent causes (sahabhū-hetu).Thisfunctionthereforehastobedonebyakarmicforce—arealentity—thatispresent.Inthisconnection,weshouldnotethattheMVŚ,whilestatingthattheretributioncausecomprisesallthefiveskandha‑s—therūpa-skandha‑sbeinginformativeandnon-informativekarma‑s—alsopointsoutthattheinformativeand the simultaneously generated non-informative karma‑s have differentretributionfruits:Notbeingmutuallyco‑existentcauses,thesetwocannotsharethe same fruit.114 Thiswould of coursemean that the originating volition toodoes not have the same fruit as the non‑informative karma. Saṃghabhadra’sexplanationsaremuchthesame.Healsospecificallyrejects theview,heldbysomemasters, thatthe thought and thought‑concomitants and the informativeandnon‑informativekarma‑s(unlessthesearecitta-parivartin,asinthecaseinthe rūpa-dhātu,)thatoriginateinthesamemoment,collectivelyeffectthesamefruit.Saṃghabhadra furtherelaboratesonkarmic retributionpertaining to thesphereofsensuality:

Sometimes one skandha serves as the retribution cause, collectivelyeffectingacommonfruit—namely,themorallydefinedacquisitionsandtheirarising(jāti),etc.

Sometimes two skandha‑s serve as the retribution causes, collectivelyeffecting a common fruit — namely, skillful and unskillful matter[i.e.,thebodilyandvocalkarma‑s]andarising,etc.

Sometimes four skandha‑s serve as the retribution causes, collectivelyeffecting a common fruit—namely, skillful andunskillful thought andthought‑concomitantsandtheirarising,etc.115

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It follows from the preceding discussion that, with reference to the twoexamplescitedintheMVŚ,theinformativekarmaatitspresentmomentcannotfunction simultaneously together with its originating volition to project theretributionfruit;stilllesscanitperformthisfunctionalone,beingofthenatureofavocalinstruction(seebelow)only.Neithercanweconceiveoftheprocessof‘grasping’thesamefruitashavingtakenplacetwice:first,bytheoriginatingvolitionwhen it arose, secondlyby thenon-informativekarma arisingat thetimeofthevictim’sdeath.TheillogicalityofafruitbeingprojectedpartbypartismaintainedconsistentlybytheSarvāstivādins.116Thisleavesuswithonlytwooptions:

(i) either the originating volition or the subsequent non-informativekarma—nowendowedwiththespecifickarmicnaturebythepreviousvolition—aloneprojectstheretributionfruit;

(ii)first,thevolitionprojectsthefruit—anecessary,butnotsufficient,firststep;next,thenon-informativekarmasufficientlycompletesthecausaldetermination.

Unfortunately,inbothexamplesthecausalroleoftheoriginatingvolitionisnotexplicitlyspecified.

13.8.2. Clues from Saṃghabhadra

We saw above (§13.8.1) that Saṃghabhadra, concluding that avijñapti isa real entity, refers to it as abstention, etc., clearly equating avijñapti withsaṃvara. Moreover, elsewhere, articulating on avijñapti as acompletingkarma, helikewise refers to it as abstention.117 This seems to suggest thatin Saṃghabhadra’s mind, saṃvara represents the most important notion ofavijñapti.And it is in this sense thatonemaybe justified in speakingofanincreasingemphasisonsaṃvara in the Sarvāstivādaexpositionofavijñapti.

However,Saṃghabhadraalsodefinitelydiscussesthekarmicroleoftheavijñapti. Itistruethathestatesexplicitlyherethatavijñaptiisnotkarma,“butbecauseithaskarmaasitscause,italsoreceivesthenamekarma”.118Butthisshouldnotatallbeunderstoodtomeanthatavijñaptiisnotkarmicallycontributive:

Itmeans,first,thatitistheemanationfruitoftheoriginatingcauses,thevolitionand the vijñapti, which are considered as karma. Such a statement is quiteconsistent with the MVŚ orthodoxy.119 It is also a common Sarvāstivādapositionthatinakarmicretribution,itisonlythevolitioninvolvedthatprojectsthe individual’s existence—hisnikāya-sabhāga and jīvitendriya.120Theonlyretributivecausesinvolved—includingtheavijñapti karma—contributeonlyascompletingcauses.

Secondly,itmeansthatanabstentionisessentiallyanon‑action—refrainingfrom certain action; for this reasonSaṃghabhadra concedesavijñapti could


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alsobecalledanon‑karma.

Further, while making avijñapti synonymous with ‘abstention’, ‘non‑doing’,etc.,healsoarguesinthesamecontextthattheBuddhahimselfspeaksofśīla —abstentionfromevilactions—askarma,andthatboththeGrammariansandpeopleintheworldconsiderstagesofnon‑activitysuchassleepingandstandingasactions(karma).Elsewhere,acceptingtheAKBexposition121thatprātimokṣa-saṃvara has as its synonyms śīla, sucarita,karma and saṃvara,heexplainsasfollows:

It is called sucarita because it is praised by the wise, or because bypracticingthis,oneacquirestheiṣṭa-phala.Itiscalledkarmaforitisactionbynature(kriyā-svabhāvatvāt karma);becausetheshameful,byvirtueofthe avijñapti,donotcommitevil,andthusthereisthesenseofaction.122

Saṃghabhadra’s explanations below, on the case cited above from theMVŚconcerningamurdercommittedthroughanemissary(supra,§13.7),arehelpfulfor an articulateVaibhāṣika understanding of the precise karmic role of thenon-informativekarma:

Onaccountofthepreviousinformative[karma]andtheoriginatingvolitionwhichservedasthepreparation,therestillexiststheunskillfulacquisition(akuśala-prāpti) which continues to arise [in a series] even when theinstigator subsequently generates skillful thoughts that continue foralongtime.Whentheemissaryaccomplishestheaction,[thispreparationbecomes]capableofprojecting(ā-√kṣip)suchatypeofGreatElementsandderivedmatter.Thisderivedmatter [— thenon-informativekarma —] that is generated is the principal karma-patha. Thatvery previousinformative[karma]andoriginatingvolition,atthetimeoftheirarising(their present moment), served as the cause that grasped the derivedmatterofthispresentmomentasafruitofemanation.Atthisverypresentmoment when the non‑informative matter is arising, they — existingaspast[dharma‑s]—cangivethepresentfruit.Itisonlythevolitionalkarmawhichwasgeneratedpreviouslythatservedastheprojectingcause(ākṣepaka)fortheundesiredfruit[i.e.,theretributionofmurder].

The karma-patha[—thenon-informativekarma—]whichisgeneratedsubsequentlyassistsincompleting(paripūraka),sothatthefruitthathasbeenprojectedwilldefinitelyariseinthefuture.…

Itisnotthecasethattheforceofprojectionalonecanensurethatafuturedesiredorundesiredfruitwilldefinitelyarise.Apartfromtheinstigator’svolition which generates the informative [karma], in the case thatsubsequentlyaskillfulthoughtcontinues[asaseries]untilthetimewhenthe emissary accomplishes the action, if the non‑informative [karma] doesnotexist,therewillnotbeanyotherdharmacapableofassistingasthecompletingcause.Thefruitwouldthennotarise.Ifitisthecasethat

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thepreparatoryvolition123alonecanensurethefuturearisingofthefruit,withouttheneedofacompletingcause,then,intheeventthattheemissarysubsequentlydoesnotcommitthemurder,theundesiredfruitshouldstillarisefortheinstigator[—whichisinadmissible].124

Thus,accordingtoSaṃghabhadra,insuchacase:

(i)Thepreparation—comprisingtheinitialvolitionandtheinformativekarma —givesrisetotheunskillfulacquisitionwhichcontinuesasaseriesevenwhenthesubsequentmentalstatesareskillful—e.g.,theinstigatormaylaterbecomeremorseful.125 It is thisseries thatcontinues to linkup theunskillfulvolitionwiththeinstigator.

(ii)Theinitialvolitionandtheinformativekarma,constitutingthispreparation,whentheyarise(i.e.,attheirpresentmoment),firstprojector‘grasp’thefruitofemanation—thenon-informativekarmawhichistoarisewhenthemurderis accomplished— and later actualize or ‘give’ this fruit at the time of theaccomplishmentofmurder.

Weshouldnoteheretheimportantnotionthatthenon-informativekarmaisnottobeunderstoodsimplyasacontinuationofthemomentaryinformativekarma;it is generated “with the informative [karma] and the volition as its causes”(seeabove,§13.8.1).WeseethesamenotioninSaṃghabhadra’sdefinitionofnon‑informativematter:“Thenon‑informative[matter]…arisesindependenceonaspecificcorporealorvocal informativekarma, andonaspecificskillfulor unskillful thought, etc.” (See above §13.4.2). It is for this reason thatSaṃghabhadra states that “theavijñapti haskarma as its cause, anddoesnotserveasthecauseofkarma”.126Itisforthissamereasonthatitisendowedbythevolitionalkarmawiththespecifickarmicnatureofmurder,andnotamereinvisiblecontinuationofthevocalkarmawhich,inthiscase,consistsofanorderto murder. In this way, the karma of murder is seen to involve the totalitycomprisingthevolitional,physical/vocalandnon‑informativecontributions.

(iii) The non-informative karma is the principal karma-patha of killing.Itsfunctionistoassistasacompletingcause,ensuringthefuturearisingofthefruitofmurder.127

(iv)It isonlythe initialkarmaofvolitionthatprojects thisfutureundesiredfruitofretribution.128

Point(iii)aboveaccordswiththegeneralcausalprinciplethatafruit,althoughprojectedbyaprojectingkarma,canneverariseintheabsenceofthecompletingkarma.129Thisseemstomeanthatafutureexistenceprojectedbyakarmacanonlyarisespecifically—withthe‘given’specifiedbythecompletingcauses.Thisis reasonable since a personal existence comprises not only thenikāya-sabhāgaandjīvitendriyaprojectedbytheprojectingkarma(volition),butalso


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the body with the organs— comprising rūpa, gandha, rasa and spraṣṭavya —andwithspecificexperiencesas retributionsderived fromthecompletingkarma‑s. This is, in some respect, similar to the case that a thought alwaysarisesspecifically—thespecificsbeingcontributedbytheassociatedthoughtconcomitants.Thebodilyandvocalkarma‑seffect,as their retributionfruits,“matter, thought and thought concomitants and conditionings disjoined fromthought”.Buttheycannotprojectanikāya-sabhāga—anexistencesuchasthatinhellresultingfromthekarmaofmurder.

Elsewhere,Saṃghabhadrastatesthatthereareinfacttwotypesofretributioncause—projectingandcompleting;130 itaccordswiththesūtra toassignthevolition—mentalkarma—totheformerroleandthenon-informativekarma‑sto the latter.131 Thus, according to some Sarvāstivādamasters, the 32marksofaGreatMan(mahāpuruṣa)arefirstprojectedbythevolitionwhichistheprojecting karma of the nikāya-sabhāga; they are then completed bymanyvolitions.“The32marksofaGreatManarethefruitsofthecompletingkarma of the nikāya-sabhāga,notthatoftheprojectingkarma of the nikāya-sabhāga.”In thisregard, theopinionof theMVŚcompilers is that32volitionsprojectthe 32marks each of which is completed by many karma‑s.132 As anotherexample, theMVŚopines that the falseview(mithyā-dṛṣṭi) thatcutsoff therootsof skillfulness canbothproject aswell as complete anikāya-sabhāga,forthereasonthatthereisvolitionalkarmaconjoinedwithfalseview,andthatthesetwosharethesamefruit.133

In other cases where the doer himself accomplishes the action withthe informative karma, the informative karma so determined, plus thenon-informativekarmagenerated,constitutekarmaproperlycalled.Thus,“if,withathoughtofkilling,oneisactuallydeprivinganother’slife,alltheunskillfulbodilyinformativekarma‑sandthesimultaneousnon‑informativeoccurringatthatverytime,constitutetheprincipal[pathofkarma]ofkilling”.134Hereintoo,then,thekarmicroleofthenon-informativekarmaisclearlyacknowledged.

13.8.3. Non-informative karma as a medium of preservation of karmic force

Oneimportantquestionremains:Afterthefruithasbeensufficientlydetermined,what is theuseof thenon-informativekarmawhich is said to still continueuntilone’sdeathunlessitisbeforehandrelinquishedthroughsomecauses?Theanswer lies in the tacitnotion thatakarmic force—unless relinquished—affectsone’smindforaslongasthemindexists.Inthecaseofanordinationvow, the karmic force generated continues to show its effect in helping theordainee to restrain himself. But this emphasis that came to be developedwithintheSaṅghamembersmustnotbeallowedtoeclipsethekarmicnatureofthenon‑informativeactionsinvolvedwhichareofamoralnature.Inthecaseofakarmicactionsuchaskilling,itscontinuouseffectistobeseenmoreexplicitlyin‘accumulating’(upa-√ci)thekarma:thatis,itcontinuestointeractwiththe

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mindinvariousways,asaresultofwhichonemayrepeatsimilaractions,orrejoiceinit,orfeelremorsefulaboutit(cf.§13.5.1),etc.Allthesesubsequenthappeningswillhaveconsequenceswithrespecttotheactualkarmicretribution:theymaytransforman indeterminatekarma tobedeterminate—e.g.,whenthereisrejoicing,etc.;ortheymayresultindamagingtheotherwisesuperiorqualityof the fruit— e.g.,when the ‘great fruit’ tobeof a saṃvara-karma isdamagedbysubsequentunskillful thoughts (see§13.8.1);or intensify thesufferings in the retribution— e.g., when severalmortal transgressions arecommittedafterthefirstone;oreveneffectivelyexpurgateoratleastrenderharmless theeffectofagrave transgression—e.g., throughrepentance (seeinfra,§14.4).

Suchaninteractionpresupposesacontinuouslypresentandactivekarmicagent—theavijñapti—throughwhichtheexistingstatusofthekarmiceffectcanbecontinuouslymodified.Above(§13.7),wehaveseenoneoftheargumentsthatthenon‑informativematteristherealforce—themerit(puṇya)—thatissaidin the sūtratoincreaseincessantlyinonewhohasdoneameritoriousaction.Inthecaseofamaterialgiving,thismeritincreasesbyreasonofthequalitiesoftherecipientsandofthebenefitsthattheyderivefromthegifts(guṇa-viśeṣād anugraha-viśeṣāc ca).Saṃghabhadraexplainsthatthisincreaseisinthesenseof the meritbeingtransformedfromalowergradetoahigherone,orbecomingmoreintheserialcontinuation.135

13.8.4. Conclusion

From the discussion above, we may conclude that non-informative karma,asmuchas informativekarma, is retributive.This is in factwhatweshouldexpectlogically,sincetheverynotionofkarmaimpliesretribution.Inpristineclearterms,theMVŚstatesthat“thebodilyandvocalkarma‑srefertothosetwokarma‑s[comprising]theskillfulandunskillfulinformative[karma‑s]andthe non-informativekarma‑sderivedfromtheinformativekarma‑swhicharenot co‑existentwith thought (cittānuparivartin)— these definitely can effect retribution fruits”.136 Moreover,asregardsthekarma-patha‑s:

Exceptingsensualmisconduct(kāma-mithyā-cāra),alltheotherprincipal(maula) karma-patha‑s have necessarily non‑informative, but notnecessarilyinformative[karma].Ifanactiondonebyoneselfisimmediatelyaccomplished,thenithasinformativekarma.Ifitisdonethroughanotherperson,orifatthetimeofitsaccomplishmenttheinformative[karma]hasalreadyceased,thenthereisonlynon‑informative[karma].

Forthecaseofsensualmisconduct,thereisalsonecessarilyinformative[karma].Atthepreparatorystage,thereisnecessarilyinformative[karma],not necessarily non‑informative [karma]… At the stage of subsequentaction, there is necessarily non‑informative [karma]; not necessarily


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informative[karma]—[thelatter]existsifa[consecutiveaction]isdone,nototherwise.137

All these, then, point clearly to the role of the non-informative karma ascontributivetokarmicretribution.Evenaftertheseriesofanon‑informativekarma has ended— for example, when the person dies— as in the caseof apast volition and informative karma, thenon‑informative karma too continues tobeconnectedwith thepersonal series (santati)byvirtueof thecontinuous acquisition‑series which ends only when the fruit is actualized.FromSaṃghabhadra’sexplanationabove,however, itwouldappear that it isstilltheoriginatingvolitionthatplaystheprimarykarmicrole;theroleofthenon-informativekarmaisarelativelylimitedone.

Itistruethatinthespecificdiscussionsonrestraint—whichoccupythelargerpart of the Sarvāstivāda exposition of karma— the non‑informative karma is never explicitly stated tobekarmically retributive.Nevertheless, in othercontexts,wedofindintheMVŚthetermssaṃvara-karma,asaṃvara-karma138 and the explicit statement that bodily and vocal restraints are karma‑s.139 Withregardtothesevennon‑mentalpathsofkarma,restraintandnon‑restraintareexplicitlymadesynonymouswithkarmaandpathsofkarma.Thus,

the seven principal skillful paths of karma—whether the informative[karma]orthenon‑informative[karma]arisinginthissamemoment—eachhassevensignifications:1.morality(śīla),2.goodconduct(sucarita),3.restraint (saṃvara), 4.prātimokṣa, 5.prātimokṣa‑restraint, 6.karma,7.path of karma. From this [moment] onward, the non-informativekarma‑shaveonlyfive significations—excludingprātimokṣa andpathof karma. … .

Similarly for the seven non‑mental principal unskillful paths of karma.140 Inthe sphere of sensuality, all the ten skillful andunskillful paths ofkarma canbeacquired.Theskillfulonesaresubsumableeitherasrestraintorneither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint; the unskillful ones, non‑restraint or neither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint.141

Moreover,thecategoryofnon‑informativematterwhichisneither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint—vast inscope—comprisesactionswhichareexplicitlykarmicin nature and which are more explicitly stated or understood as such. Insuchinstances,theterms‘non‑informativetransgression’and‘non-informativekarma’(avijñapti-karma)areacommon‑place.Thefollowingservesasagoodillustration:

Question:Ifwithonepreparation,apersonsimultaneouslykillsbothhismother and another female, with regard to the mother, he acquires thenon‑informative transgression of killing (prāṇātipāta-avadya) and ofanānantarya(matricide),withregardtotheotherfemale,heacquiresonlythenon‑informativetransgressionofkilling.…142

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13.8.4.1. Summary

AnexaminationoftherationalegivenintheMVŚfortheavijñaptidoctrine—similarlyreflectedintheAKBandtheNy—suggeststhatitwasprobablyfirstformulatedoutofatwofoldconsideration:

(i) Therearesituations—suchas thatofamurdercommitted throughanemissary—inwhichaninvisibleforcemustbeassumed,capableofpreservingthekarmicnatureoftheoriginatingvolitionandservingasacompletingcausetoensurethefuturearisingoftheretributionfruit.

(ii) Theavijñaptiasaninvisibleforce—called‘restraint’or‘abstention’—preservingtheessenceoftheordinationvows,servesasalegitimatecauseforthedistinctionamongthebhikṣu‑s,bhikṣuṇī‑s,etc.

Fromthis,thecontrastingcategoriescallednon‑restraintandneither‑restraint‑nor‑non‑restraint, aswell as the categoriesofmeditationandpure restraintscametobeelaborated.Itwouldseemthatthemonasticabhidharmascholiastsgraduallyshiftedtheirfocusofdiscussionontheavijñaptiasrestraintanditsrelatedcategories.

But this shift of emphasis hasnever obscured thenatureof theavijñapti asakarmicforce—asisevidentfromtheAKBandtheNy.Bothworks,composedacoupleof centuriesafter theMVŚ, stillprovideuswitha clearpictureofitskarmicrole,asfollows:

(a) It is a retribution cause capable of karmic retribution, althoughits function is confined to be that of a completing—as opposed toaprojecting—cause.ThisspecificfunctionisdistinctlybroughtoutbySaṃghabhadra.

(b) It preserves the karmic efficacy of the originating volition and thevijñapti-karmaasaserialcontinuitywithwhichthemindcaninteractinwaysthatmodifyitskarmicexistingstatus.

(c)Thispreservation,however,isalimitedone,lastingatmosttilltheendofoneexistence.

(d)Evenaftertheavijñaptihasbeenrelinquished,thekarmicefficacythatitrepresents—aswellasthoseofthevolitionalandinformativekarma‑sthathavebecomepast—continuestobelinkedwiththepersonalseriesthroughtheacquisition‑seriesuntiltheretributionfruitisactualized.

(e)Evenwheretheavijñaptiisconceptualizedasaforceofrestraint,etc.,itskarmicfunctionisstilltobeunderstood—asevidencedbytermslikesaṃvara-karma (律儀業),etc.


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NOTES

1 MVŚ,586b.2 A,ii,80:kamma-vipāko bhikkhave acinteyyo na cintetabbo;theotherthreeinconceivablesare:buddhānāṃ buddhavisayo, jhāyissa jhānavisayo, loka-cintā. Cf. Milindapañha,189.

3 MVŚ,587b.4 MVŚ,587a.5 Fordefinitionandnatureofvipāka-hetu,cf.MVŚ,98a–c.Alsoseesupra,§6.3.4.6 MVŚ,102c.7 AKB,258:na ca kevalaṃ karmaivākṣepakaṃ janmanaḥ |8 Ny,427b–c.9 MVŚ,578b–c.10 MVŚ,216c.11 MVŚ,217a.12 MVŚ,975c.13 MVŚ,604b:一思總感,多思成滿.Seealsoinfra,§14.5.14 Ny,427b–c.15 Ny,492a.16 MVŚ,649b–c.17 Cf. Visuddhimagga,XVI,90:dukkham eva hi, na koci dukkhito | kārako na, kiriyā va vijjati |

atthi nibbuti, na nibbuto pumā | maggam atthi, gamako na vijjati ||Alsocf. Nāgārjuna’s Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā,VIII,especiallystanzas1and12.

18 Ny,485a.19 Vy,441:vipāka-dānāya niyatībhavanti.20 AKB, 277: tāni karmāṇy anuśaya-vaśād upacayaṃ gacchanti antareṇa cānuśayāt

bhavābhinirvartane na samarthāni bhavanti.21 Vy,441:na hy arhataḥ paunarbhavikāni karmāṇy aniyatāni na santi | anuśayābhāvāt tu

punar-bhavābhinirvartane na samarthāni bhavanti |22 SeeAKB,234f.Thesūtra‑sarecitedasthebasisofthisclassification—seeAṅguttara,ii,230;Dīgha,iii,230;T1,600a(Madhyamāgama);MVŚ,589c;etc.(OthersourcesgivenintheAKB(F),128,n.6).ThelastcategorymayinpartbecomparedtotheTheravādanotionofanarahant’skiriya(/kiriyā/kriyā)-citta.

23 Cf.Ny,569a.24 Cf.MVŚ,583b;AKB,239.Forthepreparationofaskillfulpathofkarma,cf.MVŚ,595c.25 AKB,192f.26 MVŚ,634b.27 AKB,195.28 MVŚ,635a.29 Ny,527c–528a.30 Ny,522a.31 Ny,535c.

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32 MVŚ,587b;AKB,192.33 Xuan Zang in the AKB(C) translates avijñapti as both ‘non‑informative’ and‘non‑informativekarma’.

34MVŚ,614a–c.35 MVŚ,617c.36 AKB,8:vikṣiptācittakasyāpi yo ‘nubandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ | mahābhūtāny upādāya, sā hy

avijñaptir ucyate ||37 Ny,335b.38 Ny,335c.TheSanskritisquotedinVy,32.39 SPrŚ,781c–782a.40 SPrŚ,loc. cit.41 Vy,30ff.42 Ny,335b.43 Entrance,76,§1.2.7.1.44 MVŚ,395a.45 MVŚ,390a;AKB,9.46 Ny,338a.Saṃghabhadra’sexplanationisjustifiedbythatintheMVŚ,390a.47 MVŚ,723c.48 Loc. cit.49 AKB,196.50 Dharmāyatana-saṃgṛhīta-rūpa—Ny,540b.Cf.T2,91c.51 AKB,24.52 Ny,357c.53 Cf.AKB,195f.:sā ‘pi ca vijñaptiḥ satī tadākṣepe cetanāyā balaṃ nibhālayte | jaḍatvāt |; Vy,351: sā ‘pi ca vijñaptir bhavadīyā satī vidyamānā avijñapter ākṣepe utpādana-cetanāyā balaṃ sāmarthyaṃ nibhālayate apekṣate | kasmāt | jaḍatvād apaṭutvāc cetanā-balam antareṇa tām avijñaptiṃ janayituṃ na śaknoti | na hy asatyāṃ samādāna-cetanāyāṃ yadṛcchotpannā vijñaptir avijñaptiṃ janayati |

54 T32,290b.55 Cf.MVŚ,383c.56 MVŚ,662b.57 MVŚ,661c,730b.58 SeeAKB,197ff.59 MVŚ,610a;AKB,203.60 Vy,364.61 MVŚ,610a.62 AKB,203.63 MVŚ, 684c: “The non‑informative generated by the informative is of the nature ofanemanation(niṣyanda);itisnon‑appropriated(anupātta)andbelongstoasentientbeing(sattvākhya).TheGreatElementsfromwhichitisderivedareofthenatureofemanation;theyareappropriated(upātta)andbelongtosentientbeings.”

64 Cf.AKB,205ff.;Avatāra,981a–b;Entrance,75ff.


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65 AKB,208:na hi tad atyantaṃ pāpasya pratimokṣaṇāya saṃvartate.66 MVŚ,649a;AKB,214.67 AKB,205:dauśīlya-prasarasya saṃvaraṇaṃ saṃrodhaḥ saṃvaraḥ | cf.Ny,552a.68 MVŚ,623b.69 Ny,543c.SeealsoquotationfromNyin§13.8.1.70 Ny,539c.71 AKB,212,Ny,552a–b.72 Ny,552b.73 Ny,529c.74 For hrīandapatrāpya,seeEntrance,§§4.5.13–14.75 Cf.Ny,552a.76 Seealso,AKB,213.77 Ny,552a–b.78 MVŚ,608c.79 T41,235c.80 Tno.1550,814a81 Cf.AKB,459;MVŚ,779b.82 MVŚ,623a–b.83 AKB,238;cf.D,iii,269;T1,437b;T2,274a.84 MVŚ,583bff.;AKB,243ff.85 MVŚ,243a;AKB,242.86 MVŚ,582c.87 MVŚ,103a–b.88 MVŚ,583c,584a.89 MVŚ,243a.See§14.2.90 AKB,248:tatsamutthānacetanāyās tān adhiṣṭhāya pravṛtteḥ |AKB(C),88c.91 MVŚ,587c,588a,589a–b.92 MVŚ,589a.93 MVŚ,589b–c. ibid.,587a:TheVibhajyavāda, incontrast,holds that the last threeare

karmainnature.94 Cf.D,iii,217.95 Alsocf.AKB,238.96 MVŚ,634c.97 Cf.MVŚ,635a,636c;AKB,196,238.98 Cf.T2,13b–c.99 AKB,196f100MVŚ,96a.101MVŚ,587a.102MVŚ,383b.103MVŚ,634b.

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104AKB,196ff.105See AKB, 477: naiva tu vayaṃ vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiṃ brūmaḥ | …

tatsaṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣād bījaphalavat | yathā bījāt phalam utpadyata ity ucyate | na ca tad vinaṣṭād bījād utpadyate | nāpy anantaram eva | … tatsaṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣād aṅkurakāṇḍapatrādi-kramaniṣpannāt puṣpāvasānāt |

106Ny,535b.107Ny,535a–b.108 See Entrance,26.109SPrŚ, 862a; alsoNy, 543c. See belowwhere Saṃghabhadra explains theavijñapti asaniṣyanda-phala generated by the originating volition and the vijñapti. (Cf. Vy, 356:yathā vaibhāṣikāṇām avijñaptivādinām avijñaptiḥ karma-patha ity ākhyāyate | kārye kāraṇopacārāt | kāyika-vācikatvaṃ tu tat-kriyā-phalatvāt|Alsocf.MVŚ,622c.

110MVŚ,643c.111MVŚ,648a–b,649c.112MVŚ,648a–b.113MVŚ,634c.114MVŚ,96b–c.115 Ny, 427c–428a; cf. MVŚ, 97b–c. The cases pertaining to the two spheres are alsodiscussed.

116MVŚ,604a,887c;AKB,258.117Ny,427c–428a:“…becausemultipleabstentions(遠離體)aregeneratedbyonecitta…”;“Thevijñapti‑sconsistsofnumerousparamāṇu‑s.Theavijñapti‑stooconsistofnumerousabstentionentities (遠離事; *virati-dravya).Although [thesenumerousentities in eachcase]arenecessarilyconascent,theyneverthelesshavedifferentfruits…”

118Ny,544a.119 Cf,MVŚ,622c.Also,MVŚ,723c:“Itshouldbeunderstoodthat thementalkarma is thecauseprojectingtheśīla (= saṃvara).Theverycauseforśīlamustnotbecalledśīla,lesttherebethefallacyofconfoundingthecausewiththeeffect.”NotealsothatinMVŚ(578c,589a),AKBandNy,cetanāisconsideredthekarmaincontrasttokarma-patha—seesupra,§12.6.

120Seeforinstance,MVŚ,887c,wheretheroleasprojectingkarmaisascribedtocetanā.121AKB,207.122Ny,549b.123JudgingfromthecontextandfromSPrŚ,心mustbeanerrorof思.124Ny,543a;SPrŚ,861c–862a.125Ny,542c.126Ny,544a.127MVŚ,96b.128 Cf.Ny,542c27–28.129 Cf.Ny,486c.130Ny,427b.131Ny,427c.132MVŚ,887c.


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133MVŚ,185a.Forthediscussionontheprojectingandcompletingkarma‑sforthenikāya-sabhāga,alsocf.MVŚ,216c,277a,594a,774a,782c.

134 Cf.MVŚ,583b,etc.135AKB,197;Ny,542b.However,notethatinthecaseofonewhoacquiresarestraintofalowgradewithagenerating thoughtofa lowgrade, therecanbeno increase in thesenseoftransformingtherestrainttooneofahighergradeinspiteofsubsequentmoralefforts.Thesameprincipleappliestotheothergradesofbothrestraintandnon‑restraint—MVŚ,607b–c.

136MVŚ,96b.Cf.alsoMVŚ,157c,whichsaysthatthenon-informativekarmaistobeknownbygoingfromthefruitintothecause;fromthegrossintothesubtle…

137MVŚ,635a.138 Cf.MVŚ,649c,650b,651a,etc.139MVŚ,984c.140MVŚ,585c,584a;cf.AKB,207.141MVŚ,586b,584b.142MVŚ,617c—variousotherinstancesabound.Inthiscase,heofcoursealsoacquirestheinformativekarmaofkilling—butthisiswithregardtomatricide,asitisgraverthanthekillingofanotherfemale(MVŚ,619c;AKB,263).SeealsotheallusiontoAjātaśatru’savijñapti-karmaabove.

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14. Karma and the Nature of its Retribution

14.1. KarmicretributionasaMiddleWaydoctrine14.2.Sixcausesaffectingthegravityofakarma14.3.Determinateandindeterminatekarma14.4. A karmathathasbeendone,andonethathasbeenaccumulated14.5. Projectingandcompletingkarma‑s14.6. Karmaintermsofpratītya-samutpāda14.7. Pastkarma of the arhat‑sandtheBuddha

14.7.1. Canone’skarma beareffectonanotherorbeexperiencedbyanother?14.8.Man’skarmaandhisenvironment,andcollectivekarma

14.1. Karmic retribution as a Middle Way doctrine

TheMiddleWaynature of theSarvāstivāda doctrine ofkarma is especiallyconspicuous in their discussions on retribution. The way in which a givenkarmaistoberetributed—themannerinwhichthe‘doer’experiencesit—isbynomeansabsolutelyfixed.Foronething,itdependsonthespiritualstatusoftheexperiencer.TheLoṇa-phala sutta1givestheexampleofthedifferenceintheeffectofasmallamountofsaltthatisputintoacupofwaterandintotheriver.2Itstatesexplicitlythatiftheeffectofagivenkammaisnecessarilytobeexperiencedinanimmutablemanner,thenthespirituallifewouldbeinvainandtherewouldbenopossibilityoftheutterdestructionofdukkha.Inasimilarvein,theAKBquotesthefollowingstanza:3

The ignorant, committing even a small evil goes below; Thewise,althoughcommittingagreatone,leavesbehindthebad[abodes]. A compacted [piece of] iron, although small, sinks into water; Thesamemadeintoabowl,althoughgreat,floats.4

This is likely an acceptable notion for the orthodox Sarvāstivādins sinceSaṃghabhadraalsorepeatedthestanzaintheNywithoutanyobjection.5

14.2. Six causes affecting the gravity of a karma

The Sarvāstivādateachesthatgiventhesamekarma—e.g.,killing—thegravityintermsofitsretributiveeffectcanvarydependingonvariousfactors.Akarma canbedividedintoninegrades—low‑low(i.e.,thelightest),low‑middle,etc.,uptohigh‑high(i.e.,themostgrave).AccordingtothePrajñapti-śāstra:

For the transgression of killing, the high‑high grade leads to rebirth inAvīci hell [ i.e., the lowest hell, with the greatest amount of sufferingsincessantly];thehigh‑middlegrade,to[rebirthin]PratāpanaMahānaraka,…;thelow‑lowgrade,to[rebirthin]theplanesofexistenceoftheanimalsandpreta‑s.6

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Thecausalfactorsinfluencingtheretributiveeffectaresaidtobesix:

(i) Thesubsequentactions(pṛṣṭha)followingtheprincipalaction—thelattercanbecomegravewhen,forinstance,thesubsequentactionscontributeinsuchawayastoestablishitasbeingnecessarilyretributed.

(ii) Thenatureofthe‘field’(kṣetra-viśeṣa)—thatis,themoralorspiritualstatusofthepersonwithrespecttowhomthekarmaisincurred.Thus,amongthefivemortaltransgressions(ānantarya karma),7thesplittingoftheSaṅghaisthemostgravebecauseitisthemostexcellentfieldofvirtue;splittingtheSaṅghaisruiningtheDharmaBody(dharma-śarīra).NextisthesheddingofaBuddha’sblood,followedbythekillingofanarhat,matricideandlastlypatricide—amotherasafieldissuperiortoafatherbecauseshehasthekindnessofnourishingandrearingthechild.TheAKBgivestheexampleof abhikṣu whowasborn as a female as a result of having insulted theSaṅghaasbeingwomenfolk,eventhoughtheintentioninvolvedwasweak.

(iii)Thebasis(adhiṣṭhāna)—thatis,thedeeditself(thekarma-patha).Giventhesamefactoroffield,thedeeditselfcandeterminetherelativegravityofthekarma.Thuskillingtheparentsismuchgraverthanstealingfromthem.

(iv)Thepreparatoryaction(prayoga)leadingtotheprincipalaction.

(v) Volition (cetanā) — the mental force through which the karma-patha comestobeaccomplished.

(vi)Thestrengthoftheintention (āśaya-viśeṣa)involved.Forthis,theexampleisgivenofaeunuchwhoregainedhismasculinityasaresultofhaving—withastrongintention (tīvreṇ ’āśayena)arisingfromthethought“Ihavesuchkindof suffering in losingmymasculinity”— rescuedbulls frombeingcastrated.8

Tothesesix,onemayaddanother:thefactoroftheexperienceoftherecipientoftheaction.ThisisclearfromthewaytheSarvāstivādaexplainsthenaiva-saṃvara-nāsaṃvara type of avijñapti. Thus,when one offers somematerialgift, suchas food,amonastery (ārāma),etc., tothebhikṣu-saṅgha,oroffersmedicine to the sick, etc., themerit increases in one according to both theexcellenceofvirtuesoftherecipientsaswellasthebenefitstheyderivefromtheoffering.9Likewise,afactorthatmakeskillingagravetransgressionisthesufferingthatthevictimundergoes.

AninterestingquestionisraisedintheMVŚ:Whichtransgressionis themoregrave—destroyingtheeggsofantsorkillingahumanwhohascutofftherootsofskillfulness?TheopinionoftheMVŚcompilersisthatfromthepointofviewofpunishment,thelatteristhemoregravesincethekillerhastherebyincurredanextreme transgression— thevictim is ahuman.From thepoint ofviewof

14. Karma and the nature of itS retribution

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apathofkarma,theformeristhemoregravesincetheyareendowedwiththeskillful dharma‑s. Thismeans that karmically speaking, what matters most isthespiritualstatusofasentientbeing:Itisaverygravetransgressionindeedtointerruptthespiritualprogressofanysentientbeing—beitastriflingasanant!10

14.3. Determinate and indeterminate karma

TheSūtrawasalsosaidtohavetaughtthat therearecertainkarma‑swhich,althoughtheyoughttoberetributedinthepresentlife,aretransformedtoberetributedinthehells,andotherswhich,althoughtheyoughttoberetributedin the hells, are transformed to be retributed in the present life.11 In thisconnection,theSarvāstivādanotionofdeterminate(niyata)andindeterminate(aniyata)karma(seesupra)isparticularlynoteworthy.Theformercomprisesthe three categories— ‘experiencible in this life’, ‘experiencible in thenextlife’,‘experiencibleinasubsequentlife’;theirretributioniscertain.12Thelattermayormaynotberetributed.Saṃghabhadraexplainedtheaniyata-vedanīya-karmaasfollows,clarifyingin theprocesswhat ismeantbyakarma that isdone(kṛta)butnotaccumulated(upacita):

Inwhatsensearetheynotnecessarilyretributed?

TheBhagavat saw that therewere certain types ofkarmawhich—onaccount of ethical conduct (śīla), or resolution, or the spiritual life(brahma-carya), or samādhi, or the power of knowledge (jñāna-bala)— are rendered fruitless or lightened, or moved into a different state.Thesearesaid tobe indeterminatekarma-s. Inorder to transform thesekarma‑s, one should practice the spiritual life. Sentient beings havemostlythesekarma‑s.However,whenthesūtrasaysthattherearecertainkarma‑swhich, although theyought tobe retributed in thepresent life,aretransformedtoberetributedinthehells, itdoesnot, inthiscontext,refer to the karma to be experienced in this life.What itmeans is thatthere are karma‑s which are not necessarily experienced. If one canvigorouslycultivatethepreceptspertainingtothebody,thethought(citta)and understanding (prajñā), these karma‑s ought to be experienced inthehumanworld. [However,] as a result of not cultivating thepreceptspertainingtothebody,thethoughtandunderstanding,onefallsintonaraka throughthesekarma‑s.

TheSūtraalsosays that therearecertainkarma‑swhich,although theyoughttoberetributedinthehells,aretransformedtoberetributedinthepresent life.This toodoesnot refer to thekarma‑s thataredeterminatewithregardtothetime[ofretribution],13buttotheindeterminatekarma. Themeaningistobeunderstoodasabove.

Alternatively,themeaningoftheformersūtra referenceistobeexplainedthus:Therearekarma‑swhich,althoughdone,arenotaccumulated.Ifthey

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areallowed to follow theirowncourse, theywouldbe retributed in thepresentlife.If,[however,]onesubsequentlyfurthercommitskarma‑sthatare retributable in the hells, nourishing the karma and causing it to beaccumulated,onewillproceedtoexperienceitinthehells.Hence,thesūtra says that there are karma‑s which one ought to experience presentlyamong human beings, [but] which— as a result of one subsequentlyfurthercommittingkarma‑sretributableinthehells—arecausedtobeaccumulated, transforming them to be retributed in the hells. Thus weknowthatthereferenceofthesūtraistotheindeterminatekarma.14

The sūtra alluded by Saṃghabhadra here seems to be the Salt-simile sūtra correspondingtothePāliLoṇa-phala-sutta(seeabove,§14.1).TheMVŚcitesthissūtra andexplainsitsimportthus:Apersonwho—say—destroysalife,incurs akarma that can lead to the retributionof beingborn in hell. If thisperson does not vigorously practice the spiritual path and attain arhathood,hewould indeed be born in hell. If,however, he can do so, hewill be abletoexperiencethehellishsufferingsasthekarmicconsequenceinhispresenthumanbody.TheMVŚherequotesVasumitra’sopinionthatsuchanexperienceispossibleonlyinthecaseofanarhatwhosebodyisperfumedbysuperior(viśiṣṭa)samādhiandprajñā —even theśaikṣa‑sare incapableofdoingso,letalonethepṛthagjana‑s.15

Necessarilyretributivekarma‑sotherthanthefivemortaltransgressionsandthefivequasi‑mortaltransgressions—defilingone’smother,defilingafemalearhat,killingapredestined(niyati-stha)Bodhisattva,killingatrainee,stealingfromtheSaṅgha16—aretranscendedunderthreecircumstances:

(i) Whenthepractitionerpassesfromthestageofthesummitstothatofthereceptivities (kṣānti) of thenirvedha-bhāgīya, he transcends the state ofretributionofthekarmaretributableintheevilplanesofexistence.

(ii)Whenheisattainingnon‑returnership,hebecomesdetachedfromthesphereofsensuality;karma‑sretributableinthesphereofsensuality—otherthanthosetoberetributedinthepresentlife—arethereforetranscended.

(iii)Whenheisattainingarhathood,heisdefinitelynotgoingtohaveanymorerebirthsinanyofthethreespheres;thekarma‑sretributableintherūpa- andārūpya-dhātu‑s—otherthanthosetoberetributedinthepresentlife—aretranscended.

TheMVŚandtheAKBexpressthesecircumstancesasthosewhentheaforesaidcorresponding karma‑s, in each case, stand near the practitioner, as it were,obstructing him to the utmost (vighnāyopatiṣṭhate). The AKB compares theobstructiontothatdesperatelymadetothedebtorbyhiscreditorswhenheisabouttoleavethecountry.TheMVŚexplainsthatitisasifthekarma‑sweretosay:

Ifyouareabletoenterintothestateofthereceptivities,youwilldefinitely


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not be experiencing any births in the three evil planes of existence—inwhosebodiesthenarewegoingtohavetheretributions?17

14.4. A karma that has been done, and one that has been accumulated

ThedistinctiondiscussedbySaṃghabhadraabove(§14.3),betweenanactionthathasbeendone (kṛta;byas pa;造作)andone thathasbeenaccumulated(upacita; bsags pa; 增長), also represents an important aspect of theSarvāstivādadoctrineofkarma.Thesetwotermsoccurjuxtaposedinsomeofthe AbhidharmaworksbeforetheMVŚ,e.g.,theSgPŚ,18thePrŚ19andtheJPŚ,20 butarenotdistinguishedfromeachotherordefined. In theMVŚ,elaboratedistinctionsaremadebetweenkarma‑sthatarejustdonebutnotaccumulated,andthosethatarebothdoneandaccumulated.21

WewillfollowtheexplanationsgivenintheAKB22whicharemoreconcisethanthoseintheMVŚ,supplementingwithexplanationsandexamplesprovidedbytheMVŚwhereappropriate.AccordingtotheAKB,anaction,althoughdone,isnottobecountedintermsofitseffectivekarmiceffectorof‘havingbeenaccumulated’underthefollowingfiveconditions:

(i) Ifitisnotdoneintentionally(i.e.,notasaṃcetanīya-karma)orifitisdonecasuallywithouthavingfirstinvolvedthevolition(i.e.,notcetayitvā).23

(ii)If thenumberof actionswhich together are responsible for aparticularrebirtharenotcompleted.Thus,ifonekarmaisresponsibleforaparticularrebirth of a person, at the preparatory stage the karma is done, andatthe stage of the completion it is both done and accumulated. If threekarma‑s are necessary for the person to effect the rebirth, then whenheperformsthefirsttwo,hiskarma‑sareonlydonebutnotaccumulated;whenhefurther performs the third one, then his karma‑s become bothdoneandaccumulated.24

An action is completed only by its consecutive (pṛṣṭha) action whichcomprisesthemomentsofavijñaptiprojectedbytheprincipalaction,e.g.,killing, andother subsequent actions.One is in fact ‘touched’ (spṛśyate)bythetransgressionofkillingonaccountofboththepreparatoryaction(prayoga)andtheachievementorcompletionofitsresult,i.e.,theprincipalaction of killing.25 This applies even in the case of the five mortaltransgressions.TheMVŚgivesthefollowingexamples:

(a)Thereispreparation,butnotaccomplishmentofthefruit—acertainpersonintendingmatricidemistakenlykilledanotherwomanthinkingthat she was his mother. Subsequently, while cleaning his knife bypokingitintoaheapofgrainwhereinthemotherwashiding,themotherwashurtbytheknifeanddiedasaresult.Inthiscase,whentheson

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didthepreparation,thefruitwasnotaccomplished;whenthefruitwasactuallyaccomplished,therewasnomorepreparation.

(b)Thereisaccomplishmentofthefruit,butnopreparation—acertainperson was holding his parents while passing through a dangerouspath.Fearingthatrobberswouldcome,heforciblypushedtheparentsforward.Theparentsfelldownanddiedasaresult.

Inbothexamples,thepersondidnotincurthemortaltransgression.26Infact,onewhoprepares for thekilling,without actuallygenerating thekilling,hasthefruitofthepreparatoryaction,butnotthecompletionofthisfruit.27

There are some other situations where one’s killing does not actuallyincur the transgressionofkilling—e.g.,whenonecausing thedeathofanother,diesevenbeforethevictim’sdeath.Sincethekillerdiesbeforetheaccomplishmentof the fruit (i.e.,theprincipalactionofkilling), thereisno subsequent nikāya-sabhāga to be endowed with (samanvāgata) thattransgression.28Buteventhetransgressionofapreparationcanbeaverygraveone—suchasDevadatta’sinhisattempttokilltheBuddha,whichamounts to amortal transgression.29 Saṃghabhadra explained that whatis ‘done’ refers to the two together—preparatoryandprincipalactions;whatisaccumulatedreferstotheconsecutiveactions.30

(iii)If there are no accompaniments (parivāra) — e.g., having committedanunskillfulaction,onedoesnotrejoiceinit.31

(iv)Ifitisfollowedbyremorse(vipratisāra)orrepentancethroughconfession,etc.,whichiscounteractivetoitseffect(pratideśan’ādi-pratipakṣaḥ).32

(v) Ifitisnotnecessarilyretributed(vipāka-dāne niyataṃ).33

Inbrief,whenakarmaissaidtobebothdoneandaccumulated,itmeansthatit has been volitionally projected as well as accomplished, and it becomesnecessarilyretributive.34

Moreover,theMVŚexplainsthatwhetherakarmaisaccumulatedornotalsodepends on the moral and spiritual status of the doer: thus, ifanunskillfulkarma isdonebyhaving falseviewsconcerningcauseandeffect, it isbothdoneandaccumulated—hencenecessarilyretributed.Conversely,ifthisdoerhas,instead,theproperviewsinthisregard,thenthekarmaisonlydonebutnotaccumulated.

Furthermore,havingdonesuchakarma,ifthedoer“canabandon,castitaway(ut-√sṛj) and relies on counteraction”, or becomes remorseful, or does not“constantly recollect it”, or does not “rejoice in it anddedicate (pari-√nam)ittothefruit”,thenitisnotaccumulated.35Inthisconnection,thenotionthat


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karma‑scanbedestroyedbyoutflow‑freekarma(theneither‑black‑nor‑whitecategory)shouldalsobenoted(supra,§13.2).

Intermsofthedistinctionbetween‘graspingafruit’(phala-grahaṇa)andtheactual‘givingofafruit’(phala-dāna)(§7.4),akarmawhichhasbothfunctionsisbothdoneandaccumulated.Ifithasonlytheformerfunction,itissaidtobedonebutnotaccumulated.BhadantaDharmatrāta36expressedthesamenotionindifferentwords:

Ifakarmathathasbeendonewill—whenanassemblageofconditionsobtains— necessarily effect its fruit, it is said to be done as well asaccumulated;otherwiseitisonlysaidtobedone.37

TheearlyDārṣṭāntikas,whoalsobelongtothegeneralcampoftheSarvāstivāda,infacthadadoctrinethattheeffectofeventhefivemortaltransgressions—theānantarya karma‑s—canbetransformed:

Question: Are the karma‑s experiencible in this life (dṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya karma)necessarilyretributedinthepresentlife(dṛṣṭe dharme)?Thesamequestionforthekarma‑sexperiencibleinthenextlife(upapadya-vedanīya karma)andthekarma‑sexperiencibleinafuturelifesubsequentto the next (apara-paryāya-vedanīya karma).

TheDārṣṭāntikas hold that it is not necessarily so, for all karma‑s aretransformable—[all]uptotheānantarya karma‑saretransformable.38

Question:Ifso,whyaretheycalleddṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya karma‑s,etc.?

Theyexplainthus:Thekarma‑sretributableinthislifedonotnecessarilyhave their fruitsof retribution in thepresent life. [But] thosewhichareretributedarenecessarilyretributedinthis—andnotanother—existence;hence they are called karma retributable in the present life. The sameappliesfortheupapadya-vedanīyaandapara-paryāya-vedanīya karma‑s.39

The above‑mentioned doctrine of the Dārṣṭāntikas represents a denial of theniyata karma.Thisisinkeepingwiththeirdoctrinalpositionwhichrelegatesthewholeofkarmaand itsretribution to thementaldomain:“Apart fromvolitionthereisnoretributivecause;apartfromsensationthereisnoretributionfruit”(cf.§6.3.4).Since,accordingtoBuddhism,themindcanbetrainedandtotallytransformed, there is no reason toprevent the complete transformationof thekarmiceffect.

From the Vaibhāṣika perspective, karmic retribution is not determinedby sensation alone; all the dharma‑s subsumable as the retributive causescontribute to the determination. Saṃghabhadra,40 for one, rejects this viewof the transformability of all karma‑s. He argues that if all karma‑s weretransformable, the Buddha would not have taught that there is determinatekarma.

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However,theAKBalsospeaksoftheoutflow‑freekarmaascapableofdestroyingother karma‑s.41 It is further said that thewise, through asingle thought offaith,canovercomeaninfiniteheapofevilkarma‑swhicharenotofnecessaryretribution.42Suchnotionsareonceagainquiteinlinewiththeearlydiscourses.The Saṃyutta-nikāya,43 for instance,alsospeaksof the transcendenceofevilkamma (pāpassa kammassa samatikkamo) through abstention (virati) andmeditation on loving‑kindness (mettā-bhāvanā). The orthodox Sarvāstivādatoo,whileupholdingtheniyata-karmacategory,neverthelesswouldstillacceptthetransformabilityofevensuchgravestevilthroughrepentance—adoctrinethatcametobedevelopedintheMahāyāna.44

TheMVŚrelatesthestoryofMahādevawhocommittedfouroutofthefiveānantarya-karma‑s(exceptingthesheddingofaBuddha’sblood):

Havingcommittedthethirdānantarya-karma,byvirtueofhisnothavingcutofftherootsofskillfulness,hegaverisetoadeepsenseofrepentanceandbecamerestless.Hewasponderingastohowhisgravetransgressionscouldbeexpurgated.Lateron,helearnedthattheBuddhistśramaṇa‑shadawaytoexpurgatetransgressions.Thereupon,hewenttothesaṅghārāma in Kurkuṭa-vana,outsidethegateofwhichhesawabhikṣupacingupanddownslowlyandrecitingthefollowinggāthā:

Ifonehascommittedagravetransgression,[butlater]cultivatesthegoodforitsexpurgation,heisonewhoilluminatestheworld,likethemoonsetfreefromthecloud.45

Havingheardthis,hegreatlyrejoiced,realizingthatbytakingrefugeinthe Buddha’s teachings the transgression can definitely be expurgated.(Seealsobelow,§14.7,thecaseofahungryghostovercominghiskarmichindrance).46

TheMVŚexplainshowamoralpractice(śīla)cancounteractanimmoralone(dauśilya):

Itisonaccountofthethoughtwithwhichonemakesthevowofundertaking(abhyupagama-citta) — serving as the assisting accompaniment(saparivāra)— that the immorality practiced from beginningless timecomes to be relinquished upon the undertaking of the moral practice.Thisislikethelongaccumulateddarknessinaroombeingbanishedonthearrivalofabrightlamp.Itisalsolikethecaseofone’slongaccustomednotionsaltwithregardtowhatis[actually]notsaltybeingremovedupontastingsalt.Thesameappliesinthecaseofamoralpracticecounteractingan immorality. It is to be understood in the samemanner that the path[asthecounteragent]counteractsadefilement.47


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14.5. Projecting and completing karma-s

AccordingtotheSarvāstivāda,one,andonlyone,karma—intheonemoment—projectsone,andonlyone,nikāya-sabhāga,i.e.,oneexistence.48Suchakarma iscalledaprojecting(ākṣepaka)karma.Ontheotherhand,manykarma‑sareresponsibleforthespecificexperienceswithintheoneexistence—aperson’slifespan,size,wealthorpoverty,etc.Thesearecalledthecompletingorfilling‑up(paripūraka)karma‑s.TheexampleisgivenintheAKBofapainterwhofirstpaintstheoutlineofafigurewithonecolorandthenfillsinthedetailswithvariouscolors.49

In theMVŚ, thesameexample isgivenbysomemasterswhoopine that thecompleting karma‑s follow the projecting karma. Other masters, however,assertthattheorderisreversed.TheopinionoftheMVŚisthatnohardandfastruleapplieshere—eithertypeofkarmacanbeincurredfirst.50Inthecaseofapersonwhohascommittedmorethanoneofthemortaltransgressions,thatareofthenatureofbeingretributedimmediatelyinthenextexistence,onlythefirstonewillprojectthenextexistenceinhell;theothersserveonlyascompletingkarma‑sinthatexistence,causingmoreseveresufferingtothedoer.51

Thestatementthatasinglekarmaprojectsanikāya-sabhāgadoesnotcontradicttheBuddhistprincipleofcausalitythatnothingisproducedbyasinglecausebutbyanassemblageofcausalfactors.Whatismeantbythisstatementisthatkarma—thevolition—istheprincipalcause.Itisdirectlyresponsibleforthearisingofthenikāya-sabhāga.Wehaveseenthatthefunctioningofkarmaneedstheassistanceofthedefilements(seebelow,§14.6).Inbrief,akarmicforcecantake effect onlywhen assisted by various conditions (pratyaya).52Moreover,itisexplainedthatotherretributive(sa-vipāka)53 dharma‑sco‑existingwiththekarma—suchasvedanā,etc.—alsocontributetotheprojection.54Itshouldalsobeunderstood that inagivenexistence,onecan incurmanyprojectingkarma‑s—not justone—eachofwhich leads toacorrespondingplaneofexistenceinthefutureperiod.55(Seealso,§13.1).

The Sarvāstivādaholdsthatthereisanintermediateexistence(antarā-bhava)afterdeathandbeforethenextbirth.56 The projectingkarmaforanintermediateexistenceissaidtobethesamekarmathatprojectsthenextexistence(rebirth).57 Forthisreason,anintermediatebeinghastheform(ākṛti)ofthefuturebeingtobeborninthenextbirth.58AccordingtotheĀbhidharmikas,thekarma for anintermediateexistence,beingofaverystrongnature,cannotbetransformedwithregardtoitssphere(dhātu)andplaneofexistence(gati).59

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14.6. Karma in terms of pratītya-samutpāda60

TheMiddleWaypositionoftheSarvāstivādakarmadoctrine—likethoseofotherBuddhistschools—arealsoexpressedintermsoftheBuddha’steachingof conditionedco‑arising(pratītya-samutpāda)comprising12links(nidāna).Thisis inconformitywiththegeneralBuddhistprinciplethatnothingarisesindependent of conditions, thus avoiding the two extremes of eternalism(śāśvata-vāda)andannihilation(uccheda-vāda).TheSarvāstivādastressesthe‘embryologicalinterpretation’,distributingthe12linksoverthethreeperiodsofexistenceasfollows:

3Periods 12Links Cause/Effect

past1. ignorance(avidyā)2.conditionings(saṃskāra) pastcauses

present

3. consciousness(vijñāna)4.psycho‑physicalcomplex(nāma-rūpa)5.sixentrances(ṣaḍāyatana)6. contact(sparśa)7.sensation(vedanā)

presenteffects

8.craving(tṛṣṇā)9.grasping(upādāna)10.existence(bhava)

presentcauses

future11.birth(jāti)12.old‑age‑and‑death(jarā-maraṇa)

futureeffects

The first two links, ignorance and conditionings, constitute the past karmicfactors leading to a person’s present existence as the result: Ignorancerepresentsinageneralmannerallthedefilementsuptotheverylastthoughtofthepastexistence,sinceallthesepastdefilements—whateverbetheirmodesof operation — are necessarily conjoined with ignorance.61 They all haveignorance as their cause.62Conditionings are all the past karmic formationsdrivenbyignorance.

Thethirdlink,consciousness,istherelinking(pratisaṃdhi)consciousnessthatentersthemother’swombintheperson’spresentrebirth.

Thefourthlink,thepsycho‑physicalcomplex,representsthestageofembryonicdevelopmentofwhichthecompleteddevelopmentofthesixsensefacultiesarerepresentedbythefifthlink,thesixentrances(ṣaḍāyatana).

Thesixthlink,contact,representsthecontactbetweenthechild’ssensefacultiesandtheirobjects.

Theseventhlink,sensation,representsthestagewhenthechildcandifferentiatebetweendifferenttypesoffeelings.


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At the stage of the seventh link, craving, the child has developed sexualawarenessandcraving(eighthlink)formaterialthingsingeneral.

Inthenextstage,grasping(ninthlink),intensifiedcravingdevelops63 andleadstostrongclingingtotheobjectsofcraving.

Thetenthlink,existence,likethesecondlink,iskarmainnature.Itsubsumesallthepresentkarma‑sthat—drivenbythedefilementsofcravingandgrasping—projectafutureexistence.TheNyexplainswhythislink,althoughkarma in nature,isnotcalledkarma:

It is in order to show that this, being a cause that incurs a subsequentexistence,isadistinctivetypeofkarma (karma-viśeṣa);allkarmaisnotacauseforthesubsequentexistence.64

Theeleventhlink,birth,representsthestageofthefirstrelinkingthoughtinthefuturebirth.Itisthereforesimilartothethirdlinkofconsciousness.

Thelast(i.e.,twelfth)link,old‑age‑and‑death,representsthestageofexistencefromthemomentofthefuturerebirthtilldeath.Itisthereforesimilartothefourlinksofthepresentperiod—frompsycho‑physicalcomplextosensation.

These12linksofconditionedco‑arisingareexplainedasthemutualconditioningamongthethree—defilement,karmaandduḥkha—asfollows:

(i) defilementgenerateskarma—theconditioningshaveignoranceastheircondition(avidyā-pratyayāḥ saṃskārāḥ);

(ii) karma generates duḥkha— consciousness has the conditionings as itsconditions(saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam);

(iii) duḥkha generates duḥkha — the psycho‑physical complex hasconsciousnessasitscondition,andsoonupto:sensationhascontactasitscondition(vijñāna-pratyayaṃ nāma-rūpam … sparśa-pratyayā vedanā);

(iv) duḥkha generates defilement— craving has sensation as its condition(vedanā-pratyayā tṛṣṇā);

(v) defilementgeneratesdefilement—graspinghascravingasitscondition(tṛṣṇā-pratyayam upādānam);

(vi) defilement generates karma— existence has grasping as its condition(upādāna-pratyayo bhavaḥ);

(vii)karmagenerates duḥkha—birthhasexistenceas itscondition (bhava-pratyayā jātiḥ);

(viii)duḥkhageneratesduḥkha—old‑age‑and‑deathhasbirthasitscondition(jāti-pratyayaṃ jarā-maraṇam).65

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The12linksarealsoexplainedasbeingdivisibleintothreeparts:

(I) defilements: three links — ignorance as the past cause, craving andgraspingasthecausesforthefuture;

(II) karma:twolinks—conditioningsasthepastcauses,andexistenceasthecauseforthefuture;

(III) phenomenalbases(vastu),socalledbecausetheyserveasthesupportingbases(āśraya, adhiṣṭhāna)forthegenerationofdefilementsandkarma—theremainingsevenlinks.

Thesesevenaretheeffects;theotherfivelinksarethecauses.

TheAKB66 illustrates themutual conditionality among these parts in awaysimilartothatgivenintheMVŚforthedefilement‑karma-duḥkhatriad:

(i) defilementfromdefilement;(ii)karmafromdefilement;(iii)phenomenalbasis(vastu)fromkarma;(iv)phenomenalbasisfromphenomenalbasis;(v) defilementfromphenomenalbasis.

Itfollowsfromthismutualconditionalitythatignorance—beingadefilementand like craving and grasping— has as its cause either a defilement or aphenomenal basis; old‑age‑and‑death — being aphenomenal basis andcorresponding to links 4 to 7 — has as its fruit a phenomenal base or adefilement.67

ThecompilersoftheMVŚgiveanotherexplanation:Thecauseofignoranceisimpropermentalapplication(ayoniśo manaskāra);thefruitsofold‑age‑and‑death are sorrow, lamentation, suffering, grief and despair (śoka-parideva-duḥkha-daurmanasyopāyāsā).68Inbrief,fromkarmaarebornthephenomenawhich,inturn,serveasthebasesforthegenerationoffurtherkarma.Andinthisway,thetwelve‑linkconditionedco‑arisingrepresentstheendlesscycleofsaṃsāricexistence,whereinneitherignoranceisthefirstcause,norold‑age‑and‑death,theend.69

The Sarvāstivādaspeaksofconditionedco‑arisingasbeingfourfold:

(i) momentary(kṣaṇika)—the12linksbeingembracedwithinasinglemoment;

(ii)prolonged(prākarṣika)—extendingoverthreeperiodsofexistence;

(iii) pertainingtostates(āvasthika)—12statesembracingthefiveskandha‑s;

(iv)connected(sāṃbandhika)—throughbeingcausesandeffects.70


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AllthefourinterpretationsareacceptedbytheSarvāstivāda.Theyrepresentthedifferentdoctrinalemphasesofitsvariousmasters.

(i)The“momentary”interpretationisrejectedbyŚrīlāta.71Itisadvocatedbythe Sarvāstivādamaster,Śarmadatta(/Śamadatta;設摩達多):

Within one moment, there are the 12 links. For instance: when onegenerates a thought of greed to kill a sentient being, the delusionconjoined with this [greed] is ignorance. The conjoined volition isconditionings.Theconjoinedthoughtisconsciousness.Ingeneratingtheinformative karma, therenecessarily is the co‑existent name‑and‑form;theaccompanyingfaculties(indriya)are thename‑and‑formandthesixentrances (āyatana). Theconjoined contact is contact. The conjoinedsensation is sensation. Thegreed itself is craving; the enwrapments(paryavasthāna)conjoinedwith itareclinging.The twokarma‑s,bodilyandvocal,arebecoming(bhava).Theveryarisingofallthesedharma‑sisbirth;theirmaturingisold‑age(jarā);theirperishingisdeath.72

(ii) The “prolonged” interpretation emphasizes the fact that karma and itsretributionarenotconfined to just the immediatelyprecedingandsucceedingexistences, but extends throughout saṃsāra— to the beginning past and thefutureexistences73untilonehastranscendedthesamsaricexistencealtogether.Saṃghabhadraexplainsthatitreferstothebeginninglesscycling(saṃsāra)onaccountofthedefilementsandkarmapertainingtothepreviousandsubsequentperiodsofexistence.74ThisinterpretationisgivenbyDevaśarmaninhisVKŚ:75

On account of non‑cognizance (ajñāna), one generates intense greed (等貪; saṃrāga)with regard to an agreeable object; the non‑cognizanceherein is ignorance. The intense greed is conditioning. The cognitionof thecharacteristicof theobject isconsciousness.The fouraggregatestogetherwithconsciousnessconstitutename‑and‑form.Thefacultiesquasupport of name‑and‑form are the six entrances. The coming togetherof the six entrances is contact. The experience (anubhava) therein issensation.Thedelightgeneratedfromsensationiscraving.Thegrowingofthiscravingiscalledclinging.Thekarmacapableofproducingafutureexistenceiscalledbecoming.Thearisingoftheaggregatesiscalledbirth.Thematuring of the aggregates is called old‑age. The relinquishing oftheaggregatesiscalleddeath.Thefever(熱惱;*jvara)issorrow.(*śoka).Utteringoflamentationisgrief([悲]歎;*parideva).Theunevensensationconjoinedwiththefivesensoryconsciousnessispain(苦;duḥkha).…76

TheMVŚalso cites the abovepassage, and explains that this interpretationdiffersfromthe“momentary”interpretation:Thisonereferstoanuninterruptedcontinuance(相續;*prabandha)ofnumerousthought‑momentsratherthantojustasinglemoment;mostofthe12linksaredistinctdharma‑s,thoughtheymay arise simultaneously.77 This tallies with Yaśomitra’s explanation onthe“prolonged”ConditionedCo‑arising:

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… prolonged; it means connected with an uninterrupted continuance.… because of the fact that it pertains to many moments or to manyexistences.78

(iii)Theabove‘embryonic’explanationissaidtobetheBuddha’sexplanationintermsof“states”,pertaining tosentientbeings(sattvākhya); it is for thesakeoferadicatingdelusion (saṃmoha) regarding thepast,presentand future.79Thisisthe preferred interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda in terms of the twofold causalrelationship in the threeperiodsofexistence—causes in thepastexistence→effectinthepresent;causesinthepresent→effectinthefuture.(Seechartabove).

TheMVŚ states that in the JPŚ, the interpretation pertaining to states andthe prolonged interpretation are expounded.80 Saṃghabhadra explains thisConditionedCo‑arisingpertainingtostatesasfollows:

ConditionedCo‑arisingpertainingtostatesreferstothefactthatinthethreeperiodsofexistence,thefiveaggregatesof[eachof]thetwelve[states]81 continue uninterruptedly,manifesting their efficacies asdharma‑s.As itissaidinthesūtra,“karma isthecauseofbirth,cravingisthecauseofarising.”…

AllAbhidharmamastersassertthattheBuddhaexpoundsonConditionedCo‑arisingintermsofstates.…Ifineachlinkallthefiveaggregatesarefound, why only the name “ignorance”, etc., is designated [in a givenlink]?This isbecause in [eachof] the states, thename, ignorance, etc.,isdesignated when ignorance, etc., is predominant. That is, in a givenstate,ifignorance,etc.,predominatesmost,thefiveaggregatesinthisstateiscollectivelygiventhename“ignorance”;andsoonupto:inthestatewhereinold‑age‑and‑deathpredominatesmost,thefiveaggregatesinthatstate is collectively named “old‑age‑and‑death”.… In thisway, thefiveaggregates in the preceding state serve as the condition to induce thearisingofthefiveaggregatesinthesucceedingstate.”82

(iv)ThePrŚissaidtoexpoundsontheboth“connected”andthe“momentary”interpretation.83Yaśomitracomments:

Connected means conjoined with the cause‑effect connection(sāṃbandhikaḥ hetuphala-sambandha-yukta). … In the PrŚ, it is said:“WhatisConditionedCo‑arising?Alltheconditioneddharma‑s.”Therein,ConditionedCo‑arisingis[saidtobe]momentarybecausetheconditioneddharma‑sare ineverymomentconjoinedwithperishing(vinaśa-yogāt).Itis[saidtobe]connectedbecauseoftheconnectionofthetwomomentsquacauseandeffect(hetuphalabhūtobhayakṣaṇa-saṃbandhāt).84

TheĀbhidharmikasalsoapplytheprincipleofconditionedco‑arisingtoexternalcausality, thus covering both the sentient and the non‑sentient. In theAKB,thisextensionofapplicationisjustifiedwiththeassertionthattheteachingsin


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theSūtraareintentional(ābhiprāyika),whereasthoseintheAbhidharmaaredefinitive(lākṣaṇika).85TheMVŚexplainsinasimilarmanner,assertingthatapplicationtoboth,thesentientandnon‑sentient—suchasthatinthePrŚwhichspeaksofconditionedco‑arisingaspertainingtoalltheconditioneddharma‑s—representstheteachingatthelevelofabsolutetruth(paramārtha).86

However,thefollowingcommentsgivenelsewhereintheMVŚwouldseemtoimplythatsomeĀbhidharmikasthemselvestooholdthattheBuddhahimselfattimesappliedtheprincipletothewholeofphenomenalexistence:

Forthesakeofthosetobetransformed(vineya),theFortunateOnetaughtconditionedco‑arisingasbeingmoreorless:

Sometimeshespokeofoneconditionedco‑arising—alltheconditioneddharma‑s are collectively called conditioned co‑arising.Thus, it is said‘Whatisconditionedco‑arising?Allconditioneddharma‑s.’

Sometimeshespokeofconditionedco‑arisingasbeingtwo—causeandeffect.

Sometimes,hespokeofconditionedco‑arisingasbeingthree—thethreedifferent periods of existence, or the [triad:] defilement, karma andphenomenalbases….87

14.7. Past karma of the arhat-s and the Buddha

Whathappenstothepastkarma of the arhat‑sandtheBuddha?

Itwouldseemthateventheycannotescapetheconsequencesofthosewhicharedeterminate.However,theirmoralandspiritualperfectionaresuchthateventhegravestpastevilkarma—suchasthesplittingofasaṅgha (saṅgha-bheda)88—canbemadetobeexperiencedinthepresentexistenceinsuchawaythatfinallynorealharmisdone.Thisthendoesnotamounttoaretributionassuch.

TheMVŚstatesthatanāryadoesnothaveretributionofpreviousevilkarma:He has necessarily experienced the retribution of the determinate karma before entering the noble path. As for the indeterminate karma-s, he hasalready transformed and extinguished them through the power of the noblepath.89 However, it is said that only an arhat can properly know his ownpreviouslyincurredkarma‑sastowhicharetransformableandwhicharenot.Hetransformstheformerthroughthepowerofcultivation.Asforthelatter—ofthecompletingtype—hecaninducethemtobeexperiencedinthepresentlife,therebeingforhimnomorefutureexistence.90

TheMVŚgivesexamplesofevilkarma‑swhichcouldnotbeavertedbyeventhe arhat‑s.For instance, as a result of aprevious evilkarma, anarhatwasimprisonedforalongtimeintheprison.Theforceofhisevilkarmawassuch

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thathisdisciplesweremadeunawareoftheimprisonmentduringallthattime.Itwasonlywhenthisevilkarmawasexhaustedthattheycouldfindoutwhathadhappenedandrequestedthekingtoreleasetheirinnocentteacher.Onhearingtheking’sordertoreleasetheśramaṇainprison,thearhatsuddenlywokeupasiffromadreamandwasabletoriseuptotheskythroughhispower.91

An example of a Buddha’s non‑transformable karma which therefore isnecessarilyretributed,istheeventofDevadatta’ssplittingtheSaṅgha.TheMVŚexplains that theBuddhahimself, having examinedhis ownprevious birthsbymeansofHisproperknowledge,sawthat,inapreviousbirth,innumerablekalpa‑sago,Hehadsplittheretinueoftheṛṣi‑s.Seeingthattheretributionofthatkarmawaspresentlyarising,HerealizedatthetimethatHisSaṅghawasinevitablygoingtobesplit.Accordingly,HewithdrewintoHisroomandsattheresilentlyastheschismwasabouttotakeplace.92

Althoughthelife‑spanofasentientbeingisdeterminedbythecompletingkarma,boththeBuddhaandanarhatcanextendorshortentheirlifespanforthesakeofbenefitingsentientbeingsorthesuccessfulcontinuationoftheDispensation.Thus, through the power of the action of giving as well as that of dhyāna,anarhatcantransformakarmaconducivetotheretributionofgreatwealthtothatconducivetolongevity,orvice versa.93

14.7.1. Can one’s karma bear effect on another or be experienced by another?

Anotherallusiontothepossibilityofovercomingtheseriouseffectofevilkarma isfoundinadiscussiononthehungryghosts(preta),inthecourseofwhichthefollowingcaseisexamined:Apersonbecomesahungryghostonaccountofhisextrememiserliness.Theresultingkarmichindrancethatheexperiencesissuchthatheseesfoodasimpuritiesanddrinkasblood,etc.,thusbeingunableto consume either of them. Hisrelatives then perform a meritorious act ofmakingofferingstośramaṇa‑sandbrāhmaṇa‑sonalargescale,withthewishthatthemeritoriousactionwouldhelphimbecomefreefromsuchsufferings.Itisconcededthatthehungryghostwouldindeedacquirethepuṇya (得其福).

Butthequestionthenarisesastowhetherthisamountstothecaseoftransferringmeritfromonepersontoanother—doesitimplythattheeffectofakarma donebyonepersonisexperiencedbyanother?

FortheMahāyānists,theanswerwouldeasilybeintheaffirmative.

TheSarvāstivādins,however,stickingtotheearlyBuddhistteachingonkarma thatonereapswhatonehassown,denythatsuchisthecase.Theirexplanation,instead, is as follows: That person earlier created himself, through hismiserliness,thekarmichindrancefortheexperienceoffoodanddrink.Atthetimeofwitnessingthemeritoriousactoccurringinhisownabode,hethoughtoftherelativesandfellowvillagersasiftheywerehisveryownfamilymembers


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andoftheirbelongingsasiftheywerehisown.Thereupon,hegreatlyrejoicedin their meritandgaverise tofaithandrespect in thefieldofmerit (puṇya-kṣetra),i.e.,thereligieuxreceivingtheofferings.

Realizing the merit of giving and the fault of miserliness, his volitionconjoinedwithgivingcametobeaccumulated,accomplishingthedṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya-karmaandacquiringthedṛṣṭa-dharma-phala.94

Vasumitraexplainsthephenomenonthus:

The fruit that he experiences now is projected by an earlier karma. Theearlierkarmaisahindrancewhichisremovedbythepresentkarma —hencethereisnofallacyofapersonexperiencingthefruitofakarma donebyanother.

Asamatteroffact,evenifthepersonwasbornintoaplaneofexistenceotherthan that of thepreta‑s, hewould still have been able to acquire thepuṇya ifhecouldlikewisecausethevolitionconjoinedwithgivingtobeaccumulated.Andwhen this volition has accumulated, the person would experience theretributionofbothrequisites(gettingfood,clothings,houses,etc.)andasuperiorpsycho‑physicalcomplex.95

ThereisanotherinterestingdiscussionintheMVŚthatisrelevanthere:Whentheuniverseisatitslastphaseofexistence,thehumanlife‑spanisonlytenyears.However,thosewhocanpracticethetenskillfulkarma-patha‑swillgivebirthtochildrenwithalife‑spanof20.Thequestionthenarises:Doesthisnotamounttothatsomeone—thechild—isexperiencingtheretributionofthekarma of someoneelse—themother?Dharmatrāta’sexplanationisinterestinghere:

Karma and retribution fruit are individuallyfixed:A karma retributableas a 20‑year life‑spanwill effect a fruit of 20‑year life‑span, and so onupto,akarmaretributableasa80,000‑yearlife‑spanwilleffectafruitof80,000‑yearlife‑span.However,onaccountoftheparents’skillfulkarma‑s,thechild’s karma [conducive to the retribution of a 20‑year life‑span]comestobecapableofgivingfruit(phala-dāna):Althoughthereisnowaythat someonecanexperience the fruitof someoneelse’skarma;karma‑s[ofdifferentindividuals]canmutuallyserveasconditionsingivingfruit.96

14.8. Man’s karma and his environment, and collective karma

Anindividual’skarmahasrepercussionsnotonlyforhimself,butforthewholeuniverse aswell.All paths ofkarma, skillful or unskillful, are said to haveathreefold result: fruit of retribution, fruit of emanation (niṣyanda-phala),andfruitofdominance(adhipati-phala).Thetenpathsofkarmaareinfactsaidtobeestablishedonaccountofthesethreefruits.97

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Forinstance,forthepathofkarmaofkilling,practicedrepeatedly:

(i) thefruitofretributionisrebirthinhell,amongtheanimalsoramongthepreta‑s;

(ii)the fruit of emanation is a short life‑span when the transgressor issubsequentlyreborninthehumanworld;

(iii)thefruitofdominanceisthelackofvitality(alpaujasa)andnon‑durabilityofexternalthings—suchasplants,theplanets,etc.Similarlyfortheotherpathsofkarma.98

Whereas,ofthethreefruits,thefirsttwoareuniquetotheindividual,thethirdissharedbyallbeings.

Thecaseof theUniversalMonarch’s(cakra-vartin)sovereigntyoverall fourcontinentsisalsoillustrative:hispersonalmightinessishisfruitofretribution;thingsunderhisdominationarehisfruitofdominance—broughtaboutbyhispastkarmacontributingtotheseobjectsforhispersonalenjoyment.99

Thepathsofkarmaarealsosaidtobeestablishedonaccountofthefactthattheirprevalence,orotherwise,affectsnotonlythepersonbywayofretribution,butalsovisiblytheexternalstateofthings.Thus,whenthepathofkarma of the abstentionfromstealingprevails,allexternalthingswillnotsufferanycalamityordamagescausedbyfrost,storm,etc.Andwhenalltenskillfulpathsofkarma prevail,thisJambudvīpa(ancientIndia)willwitnessfourincreases—oflife‑span,ofsentientbeings,ofexternalitemsofutilityandenjoyment(pariṣkāra),andofskillfuldharma‑s.100Alltheseclearlyimplythatanindividual’skarmicaction has both personal and collective aspects. The latter iswhat is calledcollectivekarma.

The Sarvāstivādaview—essentiallyinagreementwiththoseofallBuddhists—isthatthewholeuniverse,withallitsplanets,mountainsandoceans,etc.,istheresult—thefruitofdominance—ofthecollectivekarmaofthetotalityofbeingsinhabitingtherein.101Itbeginswiththewindsendowedwithspecialpowerbornofthiscollectivekarma.102 Theexhaustionofthiscollectivekarma bringsaboutthedissolutionoftheuniversethroughthreegreatcalamities—offire,waterandwind.103Thefactthatthekarma‑sofbeingsinthisworldaremixed—somegood,somebad—accountsfortheexistenceofbeautifulandpleasant external things such as fragrantflowers, etc., on the onehand, andhumanbodieswith all their impuritieson theother. In the caseof thegods(deva),theirexclusivelyskillfulkarma‑sresultintheequalbeautyofboththeirinternalbodiesandexternalobjectsofenjoyment.104

Aquestionisraised:Ifthewholeuniverseoriginatesfromthecollectivekarma ofallbeings,whyisitthatwhenapersonthereinattainsparinirvāṇa,thereis


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nodecreaseintheexternalthingsresultingfromtheextinctionofthekarma‑sofsuchabeing?Vasumitraexplainsasfollows:

Therewouldbedecreaseinthosethingsthatarevirilefruits(puruṣakāra-phala) and proximate fruits of dominance [— fruits brought aboutpersonally and directly, and hence to be experienced personally].[Mount]Sumeru,etc.,areonlytheperson’sremotefruitsofdominance[—hehasonlycontributedtotheirarisingindirectlyandcollectivelyalongwithotherbeings—]thereisthereforenodecreaseinsuchcases.

[Moreover,]Sumeru,etc.,havingarisenfromthecollectivekarmaofallbeings,wouldnotbecomediminishedevenifamongthem[just]onesinglebeingremains,onaccountof theirbeingsustainedbyhiskarmic force,howmuchmoresowhentherearestillinnumerablebeingswhohavenotattainedparinirvāṇa. …

[Moreover,]evenifinnumerablebeingshaveattainedparinirvāṇaorhavebeenbornelsewhere,therearealsoinnumerablebeingswhohavecometobeborninthisuniverse;onaccountofthelatter’skarmicforce,thereisnodecrease.105

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NOTES

1 A,i,250;theSarvāstivādaversioniscitedinMVŚ,99bff.,astheSalt-simile sūtra,鹽喻經—seebelow.

2 Cf.AKB(F),1062,n.219.3 AKB,357.4 AKB,357:kṛtvā‘budho ’lpam api pāpam adhaḥ prayāti | kṛtvā budho mahad api prājahāty

anartham | majjaty ayo ’lpam api vāriṇi saṃhataṃ hi | pātrīkṛtaṃ mahad api plavate tad eva|.(Theunderlinedpartsareemendations).

5 Ny,694b.6 QuotedinMVŚ,182b.7 Cf.MVŚ,619a,etc.8 MVŚ,620a–c;AKB,232,271;Vy,394.9 See supra,§13.8.3;AKB,197;Ny,542b.10 MVŚ,184c.11 Ny,569c;seepassagequotedbelow.12 MVŚ,593b.13 ThisisarejectionoftheDārṣṭāntikanotionthattherearekarma‑swhicharedeterminatewithregardtothetimeofretribution,butindeterminatewithregardtoretribution.

14 Ny,569c.15 MVŚ,100a.16 AKB,264.17 MVŚ,276b–c.Cf.AKB,265—LaValléePoussin’stranslationhereisnotinaccordwiththeSanskrit.

18 E.g.,T28,386b–c.19 T26,718a.20 T26,921b,etc.21 MVŚ,125c.Itstatesthataccordingtosomemasters, thetwotermsdonotsignifyanydifference.

22 AKB,269,stanza120,summarizes thefiveconditionsunderwhichakarma issaid tohavebeenaccumulated:

Onaccountof[i]itsbeingintentional,of[ii]itscompletion,of[iii]beingwithoutremorseandcounteraction,

Of[iv]accompaniments,andof[v]retribution,akarmaissaidtobeaccumulated.saṃcetana-samāptibhyāṃ niṣkaukṛtya-vipakṣataḥ |

parivārād vipākāc ca karmopacitam ucyate ||120||23 Cf.MVŚ,125c.24 Cf.MVŚ,loc. cit.25 AKB,239:dvābhyāṃ hi kāraṇābhyāṃ prāṇātipātāvadyena spṛśyate prayogataḥ mṛte sati

phala-paripūritaś ca | 26 MVŚ,619a–b.


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27 Vy, 401: prayogasya maulaḥ karma-pathaḥ phala-paripūriḥ | yo hi prayujyate maulaṃ karma-pathaṃ na janayati tasya prayoga-phalam asti | na tu phala-paripūriḥ |

28 MVŚ,617c.29 Cf.AKB,260.30 Cf.Ny,569b.31 Cf.MVŚ,126a.32 Cf.MVŚ,126a;alsoseeabovewhereanaiva-saṃvara-nāsaṃvara—aretributivekarmicforce—isrelinquishedthroughsincererepentance,andthroughnotdoinginaccordancewithone’spledge,etc.

33 AKB,271f.;Vy,435;Ny,569b;cf.MVŚ,125c.34 Cf.MVŚ,125b.35 Cf.MVŚ,126a,618aff.36 MVŚ,619a.37 Cf.MVŚ,125c–126a,618a–619a.38 Cf.MVŚ,359b.39 MVŚ,593b;Ny,570b–571a.40 Ny,570c–571a.41 AKB,235.42 AKB,416.43 S,iv,317.44 Cf. YinShun,Origin and Development of Early Mahāyāna Buddhism 初期大乘佛教之起

源與發展(Taipei,1981),72.45 Cf. Dhammapada,173;Tno.210,562c.46 MVŚ,511a.47 MVŚ,623b.48 MVŚ,99a–b;AKB,258.49 AKB,258.50 MVŚ,98a,887c.51 Ny,578b;AKB,261.52 Cf.Ny,396a.53 MVŚ,820c:Onlytheakuśalaandthekuśala-sāsrava dharma‑saresa-vipāka,although

their vipāka-phala‑smayormaynotbeacquired.54 AKB,259.55 Cf.AKB,258;MVŚ,99c.56 AKB,120ff.57 Cf.MVŚ,356cff.58 AKB,123.59 MVŚ,359b.60 MVŚ,116bff.—especially122a–c;AKB,131ff.;Ny,480cff.61 Cf.MVŚ,126a–b.62 Ny,497a.

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63 Ny,496c.64 Ny,492a.65 MVŚ,122b.66 AKB,134f.67 Ny,497a.68 MVŚ,121c;otherexplanationsarealsogiven(ibid.,121c–122a;cf.AKB,135).69 MVŚ,122b;AKB,134f.;Ny,496c–497a.70 MVŚ,117c;AKB,132f.;Ny,493b–494b.71 Ny,493c.72 MVŚ,118c;AKB,133.73 Cf.Ny,494b.74 Ny,494b.75 However,accordingtoYinShun,theinterpretationgivenintheVKŚisthe“connected”interpretation.SeeStudy,217.

76 VKŚ,547b.AlsoquotedinMVŚ,118c.77 MVŚ,118c.78 Vy, 286: … prākarṣikaḥ prabandha-yukta ity arthaḥ | … aneka-kṣaṇikatvād

anekajanmikatvād vā|79 AKB,133;Ny,494b.80 MVŚ,118c.81 MVŚ,118:“Herein,onlytheConditionedCo‑arisingpertainingtostatesisexpounded:thetwelvestesaredesignatedastwelvelinkseachpossessingthefiveaggregates.”

82 Ny,494b.83 MVŚ,117c;AKB,133:kṣaṇikaḥ sāṃbandhikaś ca yathā prakaraṇeṣu pratītya-

samutpādaḥ katamaḥ | sarve saṃskṛtā dharmā iti |84 Vy,286.Cf.Ny,494b:“ConnectedConditionedCo‑arisingreferstothefactthathomogeneousandheterogeneouscausesandeffectsariseinimmediatesuccession,mutuallyconnected.”

85 Cf.AKB,133.86 MVŚ,117b.87 MVŚ,122a.88 MVŚ,620c.89 MVŚ,658b.90 MVŚ,103c.91 MVŚ,654c–655a,655b.92 MVŚ,603c.93 MVŚ,656a–657c.94 MVŚ,61a.95 MVŚ,61a–b.96 MVŚ,103a.97 MVŚ,588c.


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98 MVŚ,588c–589a;AKB,253f.99 MVŚ,107a.100 Cf.MVŚ,588a–c,127c.101MVŚ,41b,106c,692c.102AKB, 157f., 189: sattvānāṃ karmajaḥ prabhāva-viśiṣṭo vāyurbījam | Cf.MVŚ, 691b;Ny,216b.

103MVŚ,690aff.104AKB,192.105MVŚ,106c–107a.

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15. The Path of Spiritual Progress

15.1. Doctrineofgradualenlightenment15.2.Preliminariesforthepreparatorystage15.3.Differentstagesofthepath

15.3.1. Mokṣa-bhāgīya15.3.1.1. Śamathaandvipaśyanā

15.3.2. Nirvedha-bhāgīya15.3.2.1.Warmth(uṣmagata)15.3.2.2.Summits(mūrdhan)15.3.2.3. Receptivities(kṣānti)15.3.2.4.Suprememundanedharma‑s

15.3.3.Summary15.4. Direct realization (abhisamaya), path of vision (darśana-mārga) and stream entry

(srotaāpatti)15.4.1. Satyābhisamayaasagradualprocess15.4.2.EntryintotheCertaintyofPerfection(samyaktva-niyamāvakrānti)

15.5. Non-retrogressibilityofstream‑entry15.6. Pathofcultivation(bhāvanā-mārga)15.7. Attainmentofthefourfruitsofthespirituallife15.8.Out‑of‑sequenceattainments15.9. Retrogressibilityofanarhat

15.1. Doctrine of gradual enlightenment

The sixth chapter of the AKB is devoted entirely to the discussion on thepath and spiritual attainments and it enumerates and defines various paths.1 Indeed,thestudyofthenatureandfunctionsofthevariouspathsisanintegralpart of abhidharma. One of the four great Sarvāstivāda masters, Ghoṣaka,underscoresthisinhisdefinitionofabhidharma:

For the seeker for liberation engaged in the proper practice,[abhidharma] can analyze what has not been understood: this isduḥkha; this is thecauseofduḥkha; this is the cessationofduḥkha;this is thepath leading to the cessation; this is thepreparatorypath(prayoga-mārga); this is theunhinderedpath(ānantarya-mārga); thisis thepathof liberation (vimukti-mārga); this is thepathofadvance(viśeṣa-mārga);thisisthepathofthecandidate(pratipannaka-mārga);thisistheacquisitionoffruit.Abhidharmaissocalledbecauseitcancorrectlyanalyzesuchmeanings.2(Seealso,§1.2).

For the Sarvāstivāda, the path of spiritual progress is a very long journey.Ittakesthree asaṃkhyeya-kalpa‑sforapractitionertoreachthestateofperfectBuddhahood3practicingaccumulativelythesixperfections(śīla‑, dāna‑, vīrya‑,

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kṣānti-, dhyāna-andprajñā-pāramitā)andtensofthousandsofdifficultpracticesontheway.4Thislongperiodofpracticepertains,infact,onlytothestageofpreparatory effort (prayoga).5 Thewhole process is one of gradual progress,and theSarvāstivādadoctrine isdefinitelynotoneofsuddenenlightenment.TheMVŚrecordstheBuddha’sownstatementsinthisregard:

Irememberthat in thepast, Ihavestatedthus:Thereisnośramaṇa or brāhmaṇa, etc., in the past, present or future who can acquireknowledgeandvisionwithregardtoalldharma‑sabruptly.Ifonesaysthereis,[oneisspeakingof]animpossibility.Onemustfirstgothroughthree asaṃkhyeya-kalpa‑s, practicing tens of thousands of difficultpractices,graduallyperfectingthesixpāramitā‑s,inorderthatonecanpossesstrueknowledgeandvisionwithregardtoalldharma‑s.6

TheMVŚrecordstheviewofsome,suchasthe‘abrupt‑abandonmentśramaṇa‑s’,that defilements are abandoned all at once at the stage of the arising of thevajropama-samādhi;atallthepreviousstagesthereonlycanbethetemporarysuppressionoftheactiveparyavasthāna‑s.Others,liketheDārṣṭāntikasandtheBhadanta, assert that ordinaryworldlings cannot abandon any defilements atall.This is becauseonly theārya‑s possess thenoble (i.e.,pure)prajñāwithwhichalonethedefilementscanbeabandoned(cf.§12.9.3).Forthesevariousmasters thenonecannotproperlyspeakofanyspiritualprogress throughtheworldly paths. TheMVŚ states, in this connection, that it is in fact for thepurposeofrefutingsuchviewsthatthetwocounteractionsfortheabandonmentofdefilements—thedistinctionbetween thepathofvision (darśana-mārga)andthepathofcultivation(bhāvanā-mārga)—areshown.7Eachofthethreespheresofexistencehas these twocategoriesofdefilements—darśana-heya andbhāvanā-heya—whichmustbetotallyeradicated,andthisprocesstakesplacegradually.LiketheSarvāstivādins,theseopponentsalsoconcedethattherearefourfruitsofthespirituallife(śrāmaṇya-phala).However,theyholdthattheabandonmentofthedefilementscantakeplaceonlyatthetimeofvajropama-samādhi.Thefirstthreefruitscanonlysuppressthedefilements,inducingthevajropama-samādhi.Otheropponentsholdthatdirectinsightintoallfournobletruthsarisesabruptly(seebelow,§15.3.1).ThisviewtooisrefutedinthesamecontextbytheSarvāstivādinswhoarguethatlikethebhāvanā-heyadefilements,the darśana-heyaonesmustalsobeabandonedgradually,notallatonce.8

In brief, in the Sarvāstivāda system, the gradual path of spiritual progressbegins at the stagewhen thepractitioner is anordinaryworldling.Whenhebecomesanārya,hemustcontinuetomoveupgradually.Thegradualdegreesof spiritual insight acquired on the whole path correspond to the gradualabandoningofdefilementsatthevariousstages.Attheveryfinalstageofthepathofcultivation,thevajropama-samādhiarisesandthepractitionercutsoffwhateverdefilementsremain.Hethenacquiresahomogeneousacquisitionofdisjunction (visaṃyoga-prāpti) collectively with regard to the abandonment

15. the Path of SPiritual ProgreSS

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of all the defilements pertaining to the two categories in the three spheres,andheissaidtohaveacquiredthecompleteknowledgeoftheexhaustionofall fetters (sarva-saṃyojana-paryādāna-parijñā).9 The end of the journey iswhentheknowledgeoftheabsolutenon‑arising(anutpāda-jñāna)ofallfuturedefilementsarisesinhim,andheissaidtohaveattainednirvāṇa.

15.2. Preliminaries for the preparatory stage

The preparatory stage (prayoga), in the proper sense, comprises meditativepractices. But, in keeping with the general Buddhist tradition, the wholespiritual path of the Sarvāstivāda is an integrated system of śīla–samādhi–prajñā.Thatistosay:meditativepractices(samādhi)cannotbeisolatedfromthetotalcontextofspiritualcommitmentandalifeofethicalalignmentthatis,ingeneral,inkeepingwiththiscommitment.Accordingly,therearepreliminarypreparationsbeforeonecanevenproperlyembarkonthosemeditativepractices.

TheDSŚprescribesthefollowingstepsinthepathofprogress,startingfromlearningtheDharmafromspiritualguides:

If one can draw near to and attend on the TrueMen (sat-puruṣa),thenonecanheartheTrueDharma. HavingheardtheTrueDharma,onecanthenproperlycontemplate(yoniśo manas‑√kṛ,whichinsuchcontexts means meditation or contemplation) on the profound andsubtlemeanings.Havingproperlycontemplatedontheprofoundandsubtlemeanings,onecanthenproceedtothepracticeoftheDharma andwhataccordswiththeDharma (dharma-anudharma-pratipatti).10 Having vigorously practiced the Dharma and what accords withthe Dharma, one can then enters into the Certainty of Perfection(nyāmāvakrānti = niyāmāvakrānti).11

Thesefoursteps—drawingneartotheTrueMen,listeningtotheTrueDharma,propercontemplationandthepracticeoftheDharmaandwhataccordswiththe Dharma—arecalledthefourfactorsofStream‑entry(srota-āpatty-aṅga),beingconducivetoitsattainment.12

Inthecontextofcommentingonthesūtrareferenceto“profoundAbhidharma”,the MVŚ brings out more explicitly the integrated practices in terms ofAbhidharmastudies,meditativepracticesandrealization:

In the absolute sense (paramārtha), the intrinsic nature ofAbhidharmacan only be the outflow‑free faculty of understanding (prajñendriya).Fromthisveryperspective,thosewhichbringabouttheexcellent(viśiṣṭa)worldly‘understandingderivedfromcultivation’(bhāvanā-mayī prajñā)—namely,‘warmth’,‘summits’,‘receptivities’andthe‘suprememundanedharma‑s’—canalsobecalledAbhidharmaonaccountoftheirabilitytodiscernthefournobletruthsseparately.

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Again from this very perspective, those that bring about the excellent‘understanding derived from reflection’ (cintāmayī prajñā) — namely,contemplationontheimpure,mindfulnessofbreathing,etc.—canalsobecalledAbhidharmaonaccountoftheirabilitytodiscerntheaggregates(skandha)separatelyandcollectively.

Again from this very perspective, those that bring about the excellent‘understanding derived from listening’ (śrutamayī prajñā)— [namely,]theanalysisandestablishmentoftheintrinsicandcommoncharacteristicsof dharma‑s, destroying the delusion with regard to existent entitiesandcognitiveobjects (ālambana)—canalsobecalledAbhidharmaonaccountofthefactthattheyneithersuperimpose(sam-ā-√ruh)nordeny(apa-√vad)withregardtodharma‑s.

Again from this very perspective, those that bring about the excellent‘understanding derived from the abode of birth’ (upapatti-sthāna-prātilambhikā prajñā) can also be called Abhidharma on account oftheir ability to operate (√vṛt) non‑erroneously in receiving, bearing inmind,ponderingandexaminingthe12‑limb(dvādaśāṅga)teachingofthetripiṭaka. …13

Theaboveexplanationsareinfactastatementofpreparatorystagesthatleadto the attainment of perfect prajñā (= Abhidharma in the absolute sense).Thesestagesareasfollows:

StudyingtheBuddha’steachingwiththesupportoftheunderstandingderivedfrombirth(upapatti-prātilambhika-prajñā)

⇓StudyingtheAbhidharma—analyzingthecharacteristicsofdharma‑s

(śrutamayī prajñā)⇓

Meditationssuchascontemplationontheimpureandmindfulnessofbreathing(cintāmayī prajñā)

⇓‘Warmth’,‘summits’,‘receptivities’andthe‘suprememundane

dharma‑s’(bhāvanāmayī prajñā)⇓

Attainmentofoutflow‑freeprajñā (finaldestination)

Amorecomprehensive,althoughsuccinct,prescriptionforthestepsleadingtostreamentryisgivenintheMVŚasfollows:

These are the preliminary preparations for one [aiming at] the fruit ofstreamentry:

At the beginning, because of his aspiration for the fruit of liberation,he diligently practices [i]giving (dāna) and the pure precepts (śīla);


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[ii]the understanding derived from listening, the contemplation of theimpure, mindfulness of breathing and the foundations of mindfulness(smṛtyupasthāna);and[iii]warmth,summits,receptivitiesandthesuprememundanedharma‑s;and[thenheentersinto][iv]the15momentsofthepathofvision.Thisiscollectivelysaidtobe“firmlyonone’sfeet”.14

The above prescription clearly includes the practice of skillful acts such asgivingandethicalalignment.

Elsewhere,theMVŚexplainswhythereisnoretrogressionfromstreamentryandspeaksofthefoundationofthepathofvision:

Question:Whyistherenoonewhoretrogressesfromstreamentry?Answer:Becauseofthefirmnessofitsfoundation.Whatisthefoundation?Thiscomprisesthe[followingpractices]oftheseekerforliberation:giving;ethicalliving;engagementintheworksoftheBuddha,DharmaandSaṅgha;attendingontheoldandthesick,recitationofthenoblewords and expounding them to others; proper mental application(yoniso manaskāra);thepracticeofthecontemplationontheimpure,mindfulness of breathing, the foundations of mindfulness, thecontemplationofthethreemeanings(三義),skillfulnesswithregardtothesevenabodes(七處善;*sapta-sthāna-kauśala),warmth,summits,receptivitiesandthesuprememundanedharma‑s.15

Wehaveheretheprescriptionofnotonlymoreskillfulactivities,bothsocialandreligious,suchasattendingonthesickandexpoundingtheDharma,butalsothefollowingtwoadditionalcontemplativepractices:16

(1)Contemplationof the threemeanings,which refers to the sequentialcontemplationonthetruemeaningsoftheskandha‑s,āyatana‑sanddhātu‑s.

(2)Skillfulnesswithregardtothesevenabodeswhichisanexaminationof the five aggregates truly as they are, from seven perspectives.Totake rūpa as an example: one examines rūpa itself as (i) fruit,and(ii)thecausesfromwhichitisgenerated.Onefurtherexamines(iii)itscessation,(iv)thecounteractingpathleadingtoitscessation,(v)itsenjoyableaspect(āsvādana)asanobjectofattachment,(vi)itsloathsomeaspectasafault(ādīnava)tobeavoided,andfinally(vii)thetranscendenceofitsattachment.

Thesetwopracticesarenotmentionedin theAKBinthiscontext.But theiroccurrenceisalreadyattestedintheSaṃyuktāgama.17

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TheAKBprescribesthepreliminariesasfollows:18

(I) observanceoftheprecepts(śīlaṃ pālayati);

(II)development of the proper understanding derived from listening(śruta-mayī prajñā) — studying and receiving instructions fromteachers.

Toensuresuccessinmeditation,onemustpurifyone’sbodyandmindinthreeways:

(i) physical withdrawal or distancing (vyapakarṣa) by dissociatingfromevilfriendsandcuttingoffunfavorableconditions,andmentalwithdrawalbyeradicatingunskillfulthoughts(akuśala-vitarka);

(ii) practicingcontentmentandhavingfewdesires(saṃtuṣṭiś ca alpecchatā ca);

(iii)abidinginthefournoblelineages(ārya-vaṃśa)—calledthusbecausethenobleonesarebegottenfromthem(āryāṇām ebhyaḥ prasavāt)—whicharenon‑greedinnature(alobha):[theyare](a‑c)contentmentwithclothing,food,bedandseat,and(d)delightintheabandonmentofdefilements(=intherealizationofcessation(nirodha))andinthecultivationofthenoblepath(prahāṇa-bhāvanā-ārāmatā).19

UnlikeintheYogācāra,thepreliminarypracticesarenotspecificallyreferredtoasadistinctstage,knownas“thestageoftherequisites”(資糧位;saṃbhāra-avasthā) or sometimes “the path of requisites” (資糧道; *saṃbhāra-mārga; tshogs gyi lam),intheprocessofspiritualprogress.Nevertheless,evenintheearly texts such as the SgPŚ,we can findmeritorious practices like givingreferredtoasrequisitestobecultivatedandaccumulated.20TheMVŚexplainsthattheBuddhaacquiresthepuregreatcompassion(mahā-karuṇa)asaresultof the perfection of the twofold requisites of merits and knowledge (福德智慧資糧; puṇya-jñāna-saṃbhāra); the former comprising acts of giving,includingthatofhislife,observationofthepureprecepts,asceticpracticesandendurance.(i.e.,dāna‑,śīla-, kṣānti- and vīrya-pāramitā);thelatter,cultivationof the dhyāna‑sandrelentlessseekingforexcellentwisdom(i.e.dhyāna‑andprajñā-pāramitā).21

Elsewhere,theMVŚexplainsthatthebodhisattva(i.e.,theBuddha‑to‑be)canenterthewombwithoutanytopsy‑turvi‑nessonaccountofhisbeingexcellentlyequippedwithmeritandknowledge:

Accordingtosomemasters(presumablysomeSarvāstivādamasters),onaccountof theverygreatpredominanceofmerit andknowledgein the bodhisattva,whenhe isabout toenter thewomb,hedoesnothaveany topsy‑turvy ideationanddoesnotgive rise to any sensual


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craving.AlthoughaUniversalMonarch(cakravartin)andaPrivatelyEnlightenedOne(pratyeka-buddha)alsopossessmeritandknowledge,theyarenotgreatlypredominantintheircase;forthisreason,whentheyenterthewomb,theytoogiverisetosensualcravingeventhoughthereisnotopsy‑turvyideation.22

WithintheAbhidharmatradition,meritsandknowledgehaveindeedcometobehighlighted as the twofold fundamental requisites in thepathof spiritualprogress.ThisSarvāstivādinemphasisisconsistentlymaintainedinlatertime.Thus, Samghabhadra states likewise that a Universal Monarch, a PrivatelyEnlightenedOneandaPerfectlyEnlightenedOne(=Buddha)enterthewombdifferently.Thefirsthasproperawareness(withouttopsy‑turviness,andhencesensualcraving) inentering,butnot in staying inside it andexiting from it.Thesecondcanmaintainproperawarenessinbothenteringandstaying,butnotinexiting.Thethirdcanmaintainproperawarenessthroughoutthethreestagesofentering,stayingandexiting.Thedifferenceisaccountedforasfollows:

Thefirst excels inkarma, in asmuch as he has cultivated extensivemerits.The second excels in knowledge, in as much as he has cultivated learning(bahuśruta)andexcellentdiscernmentforalongtime.Thethirdexcelsinboth,inasmuchashehascultivated[both]excellentmeritsandknowledgeformanyaeons(曠劫修行勝福慧故).23

Theemphasis ofmerits is also indicated in thedoctrineof the three skillful rootsattested in the MVŚ and the subsequent texts: that conducive to merits (puṇya-bhāgīya), thatconducive to liberation (mokṣa-bhāgīya) and that conducive topenetration (nirvedha-bhāgīya). As we shall explain below, the second and thirdtogetherconstitutethestageofpreparationproper.TheAKBdescribesthethreethus:

Thatconducivetomeritsisthatwhichbringsaboutdesirableretribution.Whenthatconducivetoliberationhasarisen,[thepractitioner]isdestinedtobeofthenatureof[realizing]Nirvāṇa (parinirvāṇa-dharmā bhavati)…Thatconducivetopenetrationisfourfold,warmth,etc.

Itisthusclearthattheskillfulrootconducivetomerits,thoughcertainlyhelpfultothepractitionerinageneralwayandthereforealsoconstitutespreparatoryeffort in the broader sense, is not on a par with the other two roots whichspecificallypreparehimforspiritualattainment.Itisforthisreasonthatitisnotincludedinthepreparatorypathproper.Thedescriptionsintheothertexts24 areessentiallythesame,butexplainthisrootinmorewords.Saṃghabhadra’sexplanation,whichisverysimilartothatintheADV,isasfollows:

That conducive tomerits is thatwhich effects the seedof desirableretribution among gods andmen, etc. It is that by virtue ofwhich,therecome about the various desirable retributions such as thoseof a greatly eminent clan (maheśākhya) in the world, great wealth

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(mahābhogya), physical beauty (rūpya), the Universal Monarch(cakravartin),Sakra,Brahmā,etc.Thatconducivetoliberationisthatonaccountofwhich,becauseofthestabilizationoftheskillfuldispositiontowards liberation (mokṣāśayāvasthānāt), rendered unshakable,[the practitioner] becomes destined (niyata) for parinirvāṇa … Thatconducivetopenetrationisfourfold,warmth,etc.25

15.3. Different stages of the path

ThewholepathleadingtothisfinalperfectionisdividedbytheSarvāstivādinsinto thesevenstagesofpreparatoryeffortandfourstagesofspiritual fruits,asshowninthefollowingchart:

4 phala

I. srotaāpatti

IV. arhat

II. sakṛdāgāmin

III. anāgāmin

pratipannakaphala

darśana-mārga{ {pratipannakaphala

pratipannakaphala

pratipannakaphala

bhāvanā-mārga

aśaikṣa-mārga

7 prayoga

I. śamathapractices

IV. uṣmagata

II. smṛtyupasthāna‑s(individually)III. smṛtyupasthāna‑s(collectively)

V. mūrdhanVI. kṣāntiVII. laukikāgradharma

vipaśyanāmokṣabhāgīya

nirvedhabhāgīya (4 kuśalamūla){ {{

Fromthechartabove,oneseesthatthepreparatorypathcomprisestwoportions:

(1)mokṣa-bhāgīya: thoseconducing,i.e.,servingascauses,toliberation(= nirvāṇa);

(2)nirvedha-bhāgīya: thoseconducing todecisivedistinction, i.e.,to thearisingofoutflow‑freeknowledge.

In theAKB, thenirvedha-bhāgīya isalsocollectivelycalled thefourskillfulroots,astheyleadtothefruitionofstreamentry(srotaāpatti)whichisthepointofnoreturninthespiritualjourney—thepractitionerishenceforthdestined


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forperfectliberation.Itisthecriticalpointatwhichapṛthagjanabecomesanārya,nevertoretrogresstobeamundaneworldlingagain.TheMVŚ,however,speaksofbothportionsequallyasbeingskillfulroots—inthesenseofbeingseeds,andexplainsthetwotermsasfollows:

The mokṣa-bhāgīya kuśala-mūla‑s: [the practitioner] plants the seedsthataredecisiveforliberation.Onaccountofthis,hedecidedlycan(/isdestinedto)attainparinirvāṇa.

The nirvedha-bhāgīya kuśala-mūla‑s: i.e.,uṣmagata, mūrdhan, kṣānti,laukikāgra-dharma.26

15.3.1. Mokṣa-bhāgīya

TheMVŚ27proceedsheretoanalyzethemokṣa-bhāgīyaarticulately:

(i) Theyhaveastheirintrinsicnature(svabhāva)thethreefoldkarma—bodily,vocalandmental—withthepredominanceofthemental.

(ii) Theypertaintothemindground(mano-bhūmi).

(iii) Theyareacquiredthrougheffort,notinnate.

(iv) Theyarederivedfromśruta-mayī andcintā-mayī,notbhāvanā-mayī prajñā.

(v) Theyareproducedonlyamonghumanbeings,onlyinthoseexistingin kāmadhātu—notrūpa-ārūpya-dhātu‑s;andonlythoseinthethreecontinents—notintheUttarakuru‑dvīpa.

(vi) Theyareplanted(asseeds)onlywheretheBuddha-dharmaexists,henceonlywhenaBuddhaappears.

(vii) Theyareplantedbybothmalesandfemales.

(viii) Theymay arise as a result of the practice of giving, or of ethicalobservance,orofhearing(learning) theDharma fromothers:Onemayplanttheseseedsofliberationbythemeregivingofonelump(piṇḍa) of food or by the mere observance of the eight precepts(upavāsastha-śīla), etc., provided the motivation is genuinely forliberation.

(ix) Thesecanbeplantedonlybythosewhohaveastrongaspirationfornirvāṇaanddisgustforsaṃsāra.

(x) Oncetheyhavebeenplanted, it takesaminimumofthreelivestoattainliberation:inthefirstlifetheseedsareplanted;inthesecond,theyarematured;inthethird,liberationisattained.Butitmaytakemanymany kalpa‑s (a) if the practitioner fails to give rise to thenirvedha-bhāgīya, or (b) if he, although having given rise to the

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nirvedha-bhāgīya,failsinthemanykalpa‑sthatfollowtogiverisetosamyaktva-niyāma-avakramaṇa(i.e.,attainstreamentry—seeinfra,§15.4).

(xi) Therearesixprogressivelysuperiortypes/families(gotra)(seeinfra —onsixtypesofarhat)of mokṣa-bhāgīya:(1)parihāṇa-dharman —thosesusceptible toretrogression;(2)cetanā-dharman—thosecapableofendingtheirexistencesatwill;(3)anurakṣaṇā-dharman — those capable of protecting themselves from retrogression;(4)sthitākampya — those capable of abiding in their attainmentwithoutretrogressing,althoughtheymaynotprogressunlesseffortisexerted; (5)prativedhanā-dharman—thosecapableofpenetratingthe state of arhat; (6)akopya-dharman — those absolutely notsusceptible to retrogression. Each preceding type is transformedprogressivelytothesucceedingtype.

(xii) Theśrāvaka‑type(śrāvaka-gotra)of mokṣa-bhāgīyaistransformed,givingrisetothoseofthepratyeka-buddhaandBuddha.Thepratyeka-buddhatypeistransformed,givingrisetothoseoftheśrāvakaandBuddha.TheBuddha‑typehavingbeengivenriseto,therecanbenofurthertransformationasitisthestrongest(tīkṣṇa,tīvra)type.

Thosewhohavenotplanted thekuśala-mūla‑sofmokṣa-bhāgīyaaresaid tobestream‑accordants(anu-srota);thosewhohavedoneso,stream‑discordants(prati-srota).“Stream”herereferstosaṃsāra.Forevenifoneshouldperformgreatmeritoriousactions,ormasterthetripiṭaka,orpracticeandhavevariousmeditative attainments and supernormal powers, etc., and obtain favorablestatesofrebirth,onewouldstillhavetoexperienceduḥkha in saṃsāra. On the otherhand,asaresultofhavingplantedthekuśala-mūla‑sofmokṣa-bhāgīya atthepreparatorystage,

apersoncanbesaidtobeabidingontheshoreofnirvāṇa.[Thisisso]evenifheshould,onaccountofhisdefilements,subsequentlycommitvariousbodily,vocalormental actions,or theānantarya-karma‑s,or cutoffallkuśala-mūla‑stotheextentthatthereexistsinhimnottheslightestseedofwhitedharma‑s,[evenifheshould]fallintotheAvīcihells,undergoingvariousformsofsuffering.Thisisonaccountofthispersonbeingdestinedtoattainparinirvāṇa.28 (However,heisnotsaidtohaveenteredsamyaktva-niyāma).

Suchbeingthespiritualsignificanceofthemokṣa-bhāgīya,themeaningofthetermshouldbecomeobvious.ItissaidthatitisbettertobeDevadattawhofellintotheAvīcihellthantobeUdraka‑rāmaputrawhowasbornintothenaiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñā heaven. For, although the former committed three of theānantarya-karma‑sandtherebycutoffthekuśala-mūla‑s,hewill—onaccount


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ofhavingacquiredthemokṣa-bhāgīya—attainpratyekabuddha-bodhiat thetimewhenhumanlifecanlast84,000years,becomingatīkṣṇendriyaexcellingeven Śāriputra,etc.The latterdidnotplant themokṣa-bhāgīya.Accordingly,inspiteofhisrebirthinthebhavāgra,heendedupintheevilplanesofexistenceunabletogainliberation.29

15.3.1.1. Śamatha and vipaśyanā

The above emphasis on the critical importance of the mokṣa-bhāgīya for liberation also spells out the great significance of tranquility (śamatha) andinsight(vipaśyanā)—ofwhichthemokṣa-bhāgīyaiscomprised—asspiritualpraxis.

Thepractitionerbeginswith the twośamathapracticesofcontemplationon theimpure (aśubha-bhāvanā) and mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasmṛti) whichconstitute the entrance30 into spiritual cultivation proper. The former practiceis the contemplation on the progressive deterioration of the body, and has thecounteraction of greed as its aim. The latter comprises six aspects: counting,following,fixing,observing,modifyingandpurifying.31TheMVŚ32callsthesetwomeditativepracticesthetwogatewaysofimmortality(amṛta-dvāra),i.e.,nirvāṇa.

IntheChinesecommentary,thetranquilitymeditationsareoftencollectivelyspokenofasthe‘five‑foldmentalstilling’(五停心).33ThisisalsothetermthathadbeenusedinthevariousworksofthegreatTianTaimaster,ZhiYi(智顗;ca.538–597).34

ThecorrespondingSanskrittermcannotbetracedintheAKBorotherrelatedIndianAbhidharmatextsintheiroriginal.IntheMVŚ,themeditationsunderthis group are mentioned in some places, but are not explicitly groupedtogether.35Atoneplaceinthistext,itisstressedthat“meditatorsrelymostlyonthecontemplationoftheimpuritiesasthegatewayforenteringintothenoblepath”.36There,thiscontemplationisdiscussedatverygreatlength,37anditisshown how, immediately after completing this contemplation, themeditatorcansailintothevipaśyanāpracticeofthemindfulnessonthebody,etc.

But,asaspecificgroupoftranquilitypractices,thefivemethodshadprobablydevelopedatafairlyearlystage.AnearlyChinesetranslationoftheBodhisattva-bhūmi (菩薩地持經;T30,no.1581)enumeratesthemasthefive“gateways(/methods)forentry”(度門,*avatāra-mukha):1.contemplationontheimpure.2.meditation on loving kindness (maitrī), 3.contemplation on conditionedco‑arising, 4.contemplation on the division of the dhātu‑s, 5.mindfulnessof breathing.38 In Buddhamitra’s Essential Methods of the Five-gateway Dhyāna-sūtra (T15, no. 619,五門禪經要用法; 325c), the contemplation onthe dhātu‑s isreplacedby the‘recollectionon theBuddha’(buddhānusmṛti).Thesemeditationsaresaidtohavebeentaughtinconsiderationofthedifferent

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personality types — those of the predominantly greedy type (adhi-rāga),thoseofthepredominantlydistractedtype(adhi-vitarka),etc.:39

(1) contemplationontheimpure—greedytype(2) meditationonlovingkindness—hatefultype(3) contemplationonconditionedco‑arising—deludedtype(4) contemplationonthedhātu‑s—conceited,self‑attachedtype(5i)mindfulnessofbreathing—distractedtype(5ii)(recollectionontheBuddha—thosewhoaredrowsy,haveunwholesomethoughts,andareoppressedbyobjectdomains)

Havingachieved tranquility, thepractitioner thenproceeds to thepracticeofinsightcomprising the fourfoldapplicationofmindfulness40onbody(kāya),sensation (vedanā), ideations (saṃjñā) and dharma‑s.41 This is done in twoways:First,hecontemplates thespecificcharacteristics42ofeachof the four— thebody is impure; sensations areunsatisfactory (duḥkha); ideations areimpermanent; all dharma‑s are without a Self.43 He must also contemplategenerallythatthebody,sensations,ideationsanddharma‑sare—ineachcase—likeallconditioneddharma‑sinbeingimpure,unsatisfactory,impermanentandwithoutaSelf.Next,hecontemplatescollectively thatall four—body,sensations, ideations and dharma‑s — are equally impure, unsatisfactory,impermanentandwithoutaSelf.

It is to be noted that for the Sarvāstivādins, śamatha and vipaśyanā are notmutuallyexclusivepractices,noraretheytobetoosharplydifferentiated.Itisanabhidharmadoctrinethatwithinoneandthesamethoughtthereexistsbothśamathaandvipaśyanā.44Indeed,accordingtotheSarvāstivāda,samādhiandprajñānecessarilyco‑exist as twoof the tenuniversal thought‑concomitants(seesupra,§9.3.4.1).Thetwotypesofpractitioneraretobedistinguishedfromthepointofviewoftheirpreparatorystages:

Thosewhomostlycultivatetherequisitesofśamathaarethosewho,atthestageofpreparatoryeffort,alwaysdelightinsolitudeandshunnoisiness.They see the faults of socializing and constantly dwell in quiet places.Whentheyenterintothenoblepath,theyarecalledtheśamatha‑typeofpractitioner(śamatha-carita).

Thosewhomostlycultivatetherequisitesofvipaśyanāarethosewho,atthestageofpreparatoryeffort,alwaysdelightinstudyingandreflectingonthetripiṭaka.Theyrepeatedlyexaminethespecificandgeneralcharacteristicsofalldharma‑s.Whentheyenterintothenoblepath,theyarecalledthevipaśyanā‑typeofpractitioner(vipaśyanā-carita).45

Theirmutual non‑exclusiveness is also underscored in the various opinionsgivenintheMVŚ46bydifferentĀbhidharmikamastersastohowmanyofthe


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sixaspectsofmindfulnessofbreathing(§15.3.1.1)comeundereitherśamatha or vipaśyanā:Somesay thefirst threeareśamatha, the last threevipaśyanā;otherssaytheopposite.ThecompilersoftheMVŚremarkthat“thereisnofixedrulehere—allmaycomeunderśamathaorallmaycomeundervipaśyanā”.

One question here arises:Does one need to attain thedhyāna‑s in order toacquirethepureprajñā whichliberatesusfromsaṃsāra?Doesoneinfactneedtopracticemeditationatall?

FromtheSarvāstivādaĀbhidharmikaperspective,theanswerisclearly‘yes’.It is stated that the fourskillful roots (i.e., thenirvedhabhāgīya)canonlybeproduced from the understanding derived from cultivation, not from thosederivedfromreflectionandlistening.47 In other words,atthepreparatorystageleading to the actual attainment ofwarmth, etc., the practitioner necessarilydependsonmeditativepractices.

Itisfurtherstatedthatthepractitionercanacquiretheserootsonlyatthestagesofthe‘not‑yet‑arrived’(anāgamya),theintermediatemeditation(dhyānāntara)and the fourmeditations (dhyāna).48Thismeans thathemusthaveacquiredthe degree of concentration of the ‘not‑yet arrived’ stage. This stage isa‘neighborhood’(sāmantaka),i.e.,ameditativestateborderingthedhyānastageproperintowhichitspowerofconcentrationisstrongenoughtolead.Thereisone such ‘neighborhood’ stage bordering each of themeditative attainments(samāpatti). Since there are eight meditative attainments — four dhyāna‑s(alsocalledthefour‘fundamentalorprincipalmeditations’,maula-dhyāna)ofthefine‑material sphereand fourmeditativeattainmentsof thenon‑materialsphere(ārūpya)—therearecorrespondingeight‘neighborhood’stages,thefirstofwhich,borderingthefirstdhyāna,iscalledthe‘not‑yet‑arrived’stage.49

15.3.2. Nirvedha-bhāgīya

Penetration(nirvedha)herereferstoinsight—thatis,theārya-mārga.TheAKBexplainsthetermasfollows:

Penetrating (vidha) is in the sense of distinction (vibhāga).Nir-vedhaḥ meansdecisivedistinctionwhichisthenoblepath.Forthroughit[—thenoblepath—]thereistheabandonmentofdoubtandthedistinctionofthetruths:‘Thisisduḥkha’;upto‘Thisisthepath’.Itsportion(bhāga)refersto one portion of the darśana-mārga. They are conducive to nirvedha (nirvedha-bhāgīyāni)becausetheyarefavorabletoitonaccountofbeingitsinducer. 50

The nirvedha-bhāgīya‑s comprise the warmth (uṣmagata/ūṣmagata),the summits (mūrdhan), the receptivities (kṣānti), and the suprememundanedharma‑s (laukikāgra-dharma); each servesas thesamanantara-pratyaya for thesucceedingone.51Thesefourarealsocalled

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(1)“truth‑coursing”(satya-cāra ?),(2) “counteraction‑cultivation”(pratipakṣa-bhāvanā ?),(3) skillfulroots(kuśala-mūla):

(1)becausetheycoursethroughthefourtruthsbymeansofthe16modesofactivities(ākāra);(2)because“forthesakeoftheārya-mārga,onecultivatesthebodyasareceptacle(kāya-bhājana),removingtheimpuritiesandinducingthe ārya-mārga”; (3)because“these four constitute thevery foundationandfooting for the ārya-mārgaandnirvāṇawhicharethetrulygood(paramārthena kuśala).”52 In terms of the threefold prajñā — śruta-mayī, cintā-mayī andbhāvanā-mayī — the mokṣa-bhāgīya‑s are subsumed under cintā-mayī prajñā,whilethenirvedha-bhāgīya‑sunderbhāvanā-mayī prajñā;bothbeinginducedbytheabhidharmawhich,initsintrinsicnature,inthehighestsense(paramārthatas)istheoutflow‑freeprajñā.53

Astowhetherabodhisattva,inthecourseofhispreviousexistenceshasgivenrisetothenirvedha-bhāgīya‑s,opinionsdifferamongtheSarvāstivādamasters.The Vaibhāṣikaview(evaṃ tu varṇayanti)isthatwithintheonesittingofthefourthdhyānaofthepresentlife,thebodhisattvagivesrisetoalltheexcellentkuśala-mūla‑sfromaśubha-bhāvanāuptoanutpāda-jñāna.54

As in the case of themokṣa-bhāgīya‑s (supra, §15.2.1), there are also sixgotra‑sofnirvedha-bhāgīya‑s,eachbeingprogressively transformed into thesucceeding superior type.55 These are produced among humans of the threecontinents,exceptingUttarakuru‑dvīpa,andamonggods—ofbothsexes—of thesphereof sensuality,butnotamongbeingsof the threeevilplanesofexistence. They can only be producedwhere one can enter into samyaktva-niyāma,andthisispossibleonlywhere:

(i) bothreceptivity(kṣānti)andknowledge(jñāna)canbeproduced,(ii) boththedharma-jñānaaswellastheanvaya-jñānacanbeproduced,(iii) thereexistboththesuperiorbodilybasis(āśraya)andtheexperience

of duḥkha.

Intheothertwospheres,onlykṣānti andanvaya-jñānacanariseandthereisnoexperienceofduḥkha.Accordingly,thenirvedha-bhāgīya‑sarenotproducedinthetwoupperspheres.56

15.3.2.1. Warmth (uṣmagata/ūṣmagata/ūṣman)

Thisisthefirstindicationortheanticipationoftheanāsrava-jñāna.TheMVŚexplainsasfollows:

Asaresultof theoperationofknowledgeonanobject, therearises thewarmthofthenobleknowledgecapableofburningthefuelsofdefilements.


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Hence,itiscalled‘warmedup/warmth’.Thisislikerubbing[twostones]togetfire—asaresultofthemutualdependenceofthelowerandupper[stones],therearisesthewarmthoffirecapableofburningfuels.…

VenerableGhoṣakaexplains:Onaccountofseekingliberation,therearisethe kuśala-mūla‑s.Theyarethefore‑sign(pūrva-rūpa)forthearisingofthesunofthenoblepath…[and]ofthefireofthenoblepath;hencethename‘warmth/warmed‑up’.Thisislikethecaseofsmokeasthefore‑signprecedingthearisingoffire.57

This is a lengthy stage the practice of which is characterized by the threeprajñā‑s—śruta-mayī,cintā-mayīandbhāvanā-mayī.First,onebeginswiththecultivationoftheśruta-mayī prajñābylearningfromateacherorstudyingthetripiṭaka.Thenonerealizesthatallthetripiṭakateachingscanbesummarizedintothe18dhātu‑s,the12āyatana‑sandthe5skandha‑s.Onethenproceeds—progressivelyseekingmoreandmoreconciseteachings—toexamineeachof them, understanding in terms of terminology, specific characteristics andcommoncharacteristics.Inthismanner,oneprogressestothepracticeofthefoursmṛtyupasthāna‑s,andfinallytherepeatedcontemplationofthe16ākāra‑softhefourtruths,pertainingtoboththesphereofsensualityandthetwoupperspheres.Ākāraheremeansthemodeofcomprehendingactivityofthemind.Thisactivityonanobjectresultsinaresemblanceorreflectionoftheobjectinthemind—the‘mode’.The16ākāra‑sareasfollows:

(I) duḥkha-satya—impermanent(anitya),unsatisfactory(duḥkha),empty(śūnya)andsoulless(anātman);

(II) samudaya-satya — cause (hetu), origin (samudaya), successivecausation(prabhava)andcondition(pratyaya);

(III)nirodha-satya — cessation (nirodha), calm (śānta), excellence(praṇīta)andescape(niḥsaraṇa);

(IV)mārga-satya — path(mārga),rightmethod(nyāya),courseofpractice(pratipatti),conducivetoexit(nairyāṇika).

Thisexaminationofthefournobletruths,however,doesnotconstitutedirectspiritualinsight;“itislikeexaminingpicturesthroughtheveilofasilk‑cloth”.It is only up to this point that the practitioner has perfected the śruta-mayī prajñā.

Withthisasthebasis,heproducesthecintā-mayī prajñā. Havingperfectedthis, he next produces the bhāvanā-mayī prajñā. This is also called the‘warmth’. From warmth, the summits are produced. Fromsummits,receptivities. From receptivities, the supreme mundane dharma‑s.Fromsupreme mundane dharma‑s, the darśana-mārga. From darśana-mārga, the bhāvanā-mārga. From bhāvanā-mārga, the aśaikṣa-mārga. Inthisway,thekuśala-mūla‑saregraduallyfulfilled.58

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Thewarmthmaybelostthroughretrogression,ortranscendenceofsphereorstage,orlossofthenikāya-sabhāga.Asaresult,onemaycommittheānantarya-karma‑s,cutoffthekuśala-mūla‑s,andfallintothebadplanesofexistence.Nevertheless,itcanserveas thedecisivecausefor theattainmentofnirvāṇa.“Onewhohasacquiredthewarmed‑upislikeafishthathasswallowedthefisherman’shook—

[destinedtobecaught];heisdestinedforthenirvāṇa-dharma.”59

15.3.2.2. Summits (mūrdhan)

Atthisstagethepractitionercontinuestocontemplatethe16modesofactivitiesof thefournoble truths.But theserootsreceiveanothernameonaccountoftheirexcellence.60Theyarecalledsummits/peaksbecause:

(i) Theyarethehighestoftheshakableskillfulroots.Atthisstage,onecaneitherproceedtothenextstageorfallbacktocommitevilsandbebornintheunfortunateplanesofexistence(durgati).61

(ii)Theyarelikepeaks,betweenthepreviousandthesubsequentstages.Thisislikeapersonsituatedatthepeakofamountain:Hedoesnotremainforlong—either,intheabsenceofanyobstacle,hepassesoverthismountain to anothermountain, or, in the presence of obstacles,hehastodescend.Thenirvedha-bhāgīya‑saretwofold:retrogressibleandnon‑retrogressible.Among the former, the inferiorone is called“warmedup”;thesuperior,“summits”.Amongthelatter,theinferior,“receptivities”; thesuperior,“suprememundanedharma‑s”.It isalsobecausetheseexcelamongtheretrogressiblenirvedha-bhāgīya‑sthattheyarecalled“summits”.62

Likethewarmth,thesummitsmaybelostthroughthesamecauses.Asaresult,one may commit the ānantarya-karma‑s and fall into the bad planes ofexistence.However, these skillful roots excel the previous one in that evenwhenthepractitionershouldfalltocommitevil,hewillneverfalltotheextentofhavingtheskillfulrootscutoff.63

15.3.2.3. Receptivities (kṣānti)

Althoughall four nirvedha-bhāgīya‑sareconducive to insight into the truth,the receptivities accord with satyābhisamaya more so than the other three,hencetheyalonearesaidtobetruth‑accordant.64Theyarecalledreceptivities“because of the greatest receptivity to the truths — onaccount of thenon‑regressibility[ofthisstage]”:65

Atthestageofwarmth,thetruthisacceptabletooneandpleases(kṣamate rocate) one weakly; at the stage of the summits, to a medium degree.Immediately after that, receptivities now arise because of the greatest


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receptivitytothetruths.…Thisisbecausereceptivitiesdonotretrogress,whereasthereisthepossibilityofretrogressionfromthesummits.66

Like thewarmth and the summits, the receptivities can be lost through thetranscendenceofsphereandstageorlossofthenikāya-sabhāga,notthroughretrogression.Infact,onewhohasacquireditcanneverretrogressfromit,norcanhecommittheānantarya-karma‑sorfallintothebadplanesofexistence.67

The receptivities are also threefold: weak, medium and strong. As in thecase of the warmth and the summits, the weak and medium receptivitiescontemplatefullyall16modesofactivityofthefourtruths—fourpertainingto the sphere of sensuality and four to the two higher spheres; in all, eighttruthsand32modesofactivity.However,thestrongreceptivitiescontemplateonlythetruthofunsatisfactorinesspertainingtothesphereofsensuality.Thisis because, at the stage of contemplation of themedium receptivities, therebeginsasuccessivereductionofthehighermodesofactivityandspheresuntilfinally,inthelasttwomomentsofthestage,thepractitionerapplieshismindtoonlytwomodesofactivity—impermanenceandunsatisfactoriness—ofthesphereofsensuality.68Thereasonforbeingsuccessivelymorerestrictivein contemplation is so as to make the contemplation progressively morefocusedandthusmoreeffectiveininducingtheoutflow‑freeknowledge.TheMVŚ69explainsthiswithasimile:Awealthyman,unabletobringalongallhispossessiontoanothercountry,changedthemintomoney.Unhappythatthemoneywastoomuch,hechangedthemintogold.Stillunhappythatthegoldpiecesweretooheavy,hechangedthemintoexpensivejewels.Inthisway,hewasfinallyabletocarryhispossessionswithhimandtravelfreely.

In theverynextmomentwhen the strong receptivitiescome intooperation,thepractitioner, inasingle thought,contemplatesonlytheunsatisfactorinesspertainingtothesphereofsensuality.Atthisstage,althoughthedarśana-heya defilementsarenotyetabandoned,theyarealreadysuccessfullysuppressed.

15.3.2.4. Supreme mundane dharma-s

Immediatelyfollowingthelastmomentofthestrongreceptivities,thesuprememundanedharma‑sarise,contemplating—likethestrongreceptivities—inonemomentonlytheunsatisfactorinesspertainingtothesphereofsensuality.Thesedharma‑s have as their intrinsic nature those citta-caitta‑s whichserve as the samanantara-pratyaya for the entrance into samyaktva-niyāma (i.e.,darśana-mārga).70 That is, with these as the samanantara-pratyaya,thepractitionerrelinquishesthenatureofanordinaryworldling(pṛthagjanatva —seebelow,§15.3.2)andacquiresthenatureofthenoble(āryatva).

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IntheJPŚ71thesearethefirstofthefournirvedha-bhāgīya‑stobediscussed.TheMVŚattemptstojustifythischoiceoforder,givingelaborateexplanations.

These citta-caitta‑s — [the last of an ordinary worldling] — incomparisontotheotherworldlydharma‑s,arethebest,theexcellent,thesenior,thechief,thesuperior,thewonderful;hencetheyarecalledthe suprememundanedharma‑s.72

They are said to be excellent since they alone can open up the door of thenoblepath.73Moreover,theyaresaidtobethebestincomparisontotheśruta-mayī;excellent,incomparisontotheśruta-mayī;senior,incomparisontotheśamathaandvipaśyanāpractices;chief, incomparisontouṣmagata;superior,incomparisontomūrdhan;wonderful,incomparisontokṣānti.VariousotherexplanationsforthesesixattributesaregivenintheMVŚ.74

There is another view that the supreme mundane dharma‑s have the fiveoutflow‑freefaculties(indriya)—śraddhā,vīrya,smṛti,samādhi,prajñā—astheir intrinsicnature.Thisview isattributed toeither theoldĀbhidharmikamastersortheVātsīputrīyas.Theformerinthiswayinordertorefutetheviewof the Vibhajyavādins that these five faculties are necessarily outflow‑free.Byassertinginthisway,theoldĀbhidharmikasintendtoshowthatthesefivefaculties canalsobewith‑outflowsince theyexist in anordinaryworldling.TheVātsīputrīyasholdthatthesefivefacultiesarekuśala in their intrinsicnature(svabhāvatas),andalldifferencespertainingtotheāryaaretobeestablishedonthebasisofthesefive.75

ThetwoDārṣṭāntikamasters,DharmatrātaandBuddhadeva,alsoholddifferentviewsinthisregard.Fortheformer,allcitta-caitta‑saresimplyspecificstatesof cetanā;accordingly, thesuprememundanedharma‑shavecetanāas theirintrinsicnature.For the latter, thecitta-caitta‑sarenoneother than thecitta itself;accordingly,thesuprememundanedharma‑shavecittaastheirintrinsicnature.76

Saṃghabhadra’sviewapparentlyalsodifferssomewhatfromthatoftheMVŚ:

Warmth, etc., all have understanding (prajñā) as their intrinsicnatures. If we consider their retinue (parivāra), then all thefive aggregates are included in each case; this is because therenecessarilyexiststheaccompanyingmatter(anuparivartaka-rūpa).Buttheiracquisitionsaretobeexcluded,lestitbethattheskillfulroots,warmth,etc.,re‑ariseinanārya.Butitisnotconcededthatwarmth,etc.,ariseforonewhohasalreadyseenthetruth,sinceitbecomesfutileforpreparatoryefforttoariseinthecaseofonewhohasseenthetruths.77


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15.3.3. Summary

Tosumup:thenirvedha-bhāgīyaconstitutestheprajñāderivedfromcultivation,and the mokṣa-bhāgīya, the prajñā derived from reflection. Thesetwoprajñā‑s, togetherwith that derived from hearing—which, inabhidharma,refersspecifically to thestudyof thespecificandcommoncharacteristicsofdharma‑s—inthepreliminarystage,constitutethethreefoldimpureorwith‑outflowprajñā.Theyareconsideredasabhidharmaintheconventionalsense,andwecandiscernherethereasonfortheĀbhidharmikastobeconcernedwithspiritualpractices.Theseconventionalabhidharma‑sserveastheinstrumentsforbringingabouttheout‑flow‑freeprajñāwhichisabhidharmaintheabsolutesense78(seesupra,§1.2).

15.4 Direct realization (abhisamaya), path of vision (darśana-mārga)

and stream entry (srotaāpatti)

Inthestagesofpreparatoryeffort,contemplationsonthetruthswerecarriedoutwithknowledges thatarewith‑outflow(sāsrava). Immediately followingthemomentofthesuprememundanedharma‑s,thepractitionerisabletogiverise to the outflow‑free knowledges (anāsrava-jñāna) with which he againcontemplates the16modesof activityof the four truths— thosepertainingto the sphere of sensuality followed by those pertaining to the two upperspheres.TheMVŚexplainswhy, foreachof themodesofactivity (duḥkha,etc.), thepractitionermust first contemplate that pertaining to the sphere ofsensuality,andthencollectivelythatpertainingtotheupperspheres:

(i) theformerisgrosserandmoreeasilyobservedthanthelatter;(ii)thesphereofsensualityisanon‑concentratedstage,whereasthetwo

upperspheresarebothconcentrated(samāhita)stages;

hencethepractitionermustdothetwocontemplationsseparately.79

Thiscontemplationistermedabhisamaya—directrealization—whichisthedirectspiritualinsightintothetruths.OneoftheĀbhidharmikadefinitionsofabhidharmaisthat“itisthatwhichdirectlyrealizes(abhi-sam-√i)andrealizes(sākṣāt-√kṛ)thedharma‑s”.AndVasumitraexplainsthat“abhidharmaisthatwhichcandirectlyrealizethefournobletruths”.80Thisprocesstakes16thoughtmoments thefirst15 ofwhich constitute the path of vision and the 16th the beginningofthepathofcultivation.

Complete insight intoeachof the truths is achieved in twomoments, called‘paths’onaccountoftheirhavingtobegonethrough.Inthefirstmoment,calledthe unhindered path (ānantarya-mārga), theoutflow‑free understanding thatarisesiscalledareceptivity(kṣānti)toknowledge,andwiththis,thedefilements

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abandonablebyvisionintotheparticulartruthareabandoned.Inthefollowingmoment, called the path of liberation (vimukti-mārga),81 knowledge properarisesthroughtheinductionofwhichtheacquisition(prāpti)ofthecessationthroughdeliberation(pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha)ofthedefilementsarises.82Inthisway, for thewhole contemplative process covering the sphere of sensualityfollowed by the two upper spheres, there arise eight receptivities and eightknowledges, all being prajñā in their intrinsic nature. This doctrine can beunderstood as follows:The abandoning of a defilement requires a sufficientdegreeofinsight,representedbythenotionofreceptivity,intothetruenatureof things—unsatisfactory, impermanent,etc.When in thenextmoment thedefilementwhichdisturbsandsullies(twoconnotationsof√kliś)themindisnomore,wisdomproper—ahigherdegreethanreceptivity—‘shinesforth’asitwere.Putdifferently,thiscanbeseenasacorollaryofthegeneralBuddhistpositionthatinsightisthemeansaswellasthatwhichnecessarilyarisesattheend—andinthissensethevirtuepar excellence—ofspiritualpraxis.IntheSarvāstivādaconception,theinsight,designatedasjñāna,thatconstitutestheverypathof liberation isnot justamerestateofmentalclarityorcognitiveperfection.Itisapositiveforcehavingtheefficacyofinducingtheacquisition of pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha; which is to say, it serves as the necessary causalfactorfortheacquisitionofthenirodha.Thelatter,beingunconditioned,isnotdirectlycausedordirectlyproducedbyit;itis,however,acquired(prāpta)byvirtueoftheacquisitionsoinducedbyit.(Seeinfra,§16).

Thattheunhinderedpathandthepathofliberationrepresenttheindispensablefunctioning of insight in overcoming defilements and attaining cessation isalsounderscoredbythedoctrineofthethreeoutflow‑freecognitivefaculties: anājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya, ājñendriya and ājñātāvīndriya. These threefaculties,intheiressentialnature,areconstitutedofmanas,sukha,saumanasya,upekṣā,śraddhā,vīrya,smṛti,samādhiandprajñā.Theseninearesaidtobedifferentiatedasthethreedistinctivefacultiesonaccountofthepredominancethat theyexercise in thedarśana-mārga,bhāvanā-mārga andaśaikṣa-mārga,respectively: theanājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya,withregard to thecessationofthe darśana-heyadefilements;theājñendriya,withregardtothecessationofthebhāvanā-heyadefilements;theājñātāvīndriya,withregardtothestateofblissinthepresentlife(dṛṣṭadharma-sukha-vihāra)ofanarhat.83 In the acquisitionof the fruit of streamentry, theanājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya functions as theinductor(āvāhaka)ofthevisaṃyoga-prāpti,andtheājñendriya functionsasthesupportofthisacquisition.Thefirstconstitutestheunhinderedpath;thesecond,the pathofliberation.Intheacquisitionofthefruitofarhathood,theājñendriya constitutestheunhinderedpath;theājñātāvīndriya,thepathofliberation.84

Vasubandhuexplainsthatthekṣānti‑sarecalledtheānantarya-mārga‑sastheycannotbeobstructedinthecuttingoftheacquisitionofthekleśa (kleśa-prāpti-vicchedaṃ pratyantarayitum aśakyatvāt).Thejñāna‑sarecalledvimukti-mārga‑s


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becauseinthosewhoarethusliberatedfromtheacquisitionsofthesekleśa‑s,theyco‑arisewiththe visaṃyoga-prāpti.85 Saṃghabhadracriticizes:

If so, the vimukti-mārga should also be named ānantarya, inasmuch asits co‑nascence also cannot be obstructed. Rather, one should explainthus: itis called ānantarya because there exists no antara (nothing in between);ānantaryaitselfisthemārga,hencethenameānantarya-mārga. Themeaningisthatthereisnomārgaofthesamespecieswhichcancomeinbetween,preventingitfrombecomingtheconditionforthe[arising]ofthe vimukti-mārga;fortheānantarya-mārgaalllastonlyonekṣaṇa,whilethe vimukti-mārgamaycontinueasaseries…86

In the contemplation of the four truths pertaining to the sphere of sensuality,thereceptivities and knowledges are called dharma-jñāna-kṣānti and dharma-jñāna—thetermdharmasignifyingthefactthatthenatureofdharma‑ssubsumableundertheparticulartruthisseenforthefirsttime.87That“dharma”herereferstothefactorsofexistenceisclearfromtheexplanationsintheMVŚthat“dharma-knowledgeissocalledbecauseitsintrinsicnaturepertainstoalldharma‑s(智體是法)”;“althoughallknowledgeslikewisepertaintodharma‑s,onlyoneofthemisdesignatedasdharma-knowledge”,inthesamemannerthat“dharma-āyatana”,“dharma-dhātu”,etc.,arespecificallydesignatedwiththename“dharma”.88

Thereceptivitiesandknowledgespertainingtothetwoupperspheresarecalledanvaya-jñāna-kṣānti andanvaya-jñāna,89 the termanvaya —‘subsequent’ or‘following’— signifying the fact that these truths are realized subsequentlyand in a similar manner to those pertaining to the sphere of sensuality.90 Saṃghabhadra91insiststhattheanvaya-jñānaisnotaninferentialknowledge,butratheradirectonelikedharma-jñāna.92Thefollowingchartsummarizesthe16momentsofinsight:93

The process of the direct insight into the four truths

darśana mārga (15moments)

1. duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti 9. duḥkhanirodhe dharmajñānakṣānti

2. duḥkhe dharmajñāna 10. duḥkhanirodhe dharmajñāna

3. duḥkhe anvayajñānakṣānti 11. duḥkhanirodhe anvayajñānakṣānti

4. duḥkhe anvayajñāna 12. duḥkhanirodhe anvayajñāna

5. samudaye dharmajñānakṣānti 13. duḥkhapratipakṣamārge dharmajñānakṣānti

6. samudaye dharmajñāna 14. duḥkhapratipakṣamārge dharmajñāna

7.samudaye anvayajñānakṣānti 15. duḥkhapratipakṣamārge anvayajñānakṣānti

8.samudaye anvayajñāna

bhāvanā-mārga 16. duḥkhapratipakṣamārge anvayajñāna (Cf.AKB,350f.)

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Aquestionmayarisehere:directrealizationisdirectperceptionpar excellence (pratyakṣa),anddirectperceptionisdirectinsightintotheintrinsiccharacteristicof the object beingperceived.But direct realization is said to be an insightintothecommoncharacteristicsofthefourtruths—isthereacontradictionhere?TheMVŚaddresses this issue, and explains that in direct realization,the intrinsic characteristics are realized through the direct realization of thecommoncharacteristics.Moreover,totalandtruerealizationofthenatureofthetruthsnecessarilyentailsdirectrealizationofboththeirintrinsicandcommoncharacteristicsatonce:

Question: If the truths are directly realized through their commoncharacteristics,whenaretheintrinsiccharacteristicsofthetruthsrealizedbymeansoftheknowledgethatknowstruly(如實智;*yathābhūta-jñāna)?Andif[thepractitioner]cannotrealizetheintrinsicnatureofthetruths,howisitsaidtobea“directrealizationofthetruths”(satyābhisamaya)?

Answer:Itisnotthecasethat“directrealizationofthetruths”issocalledinrespectoftherealizationoftheintrinsicnaturesbymeansoftheknowledgethatknowstrulythrougharealizationofintrinsiccharacteristic.Rather,itiscalleda“directrealizationofthetruths”inrespectoftherealizationoftheintrinsicnaturesbymeansoftheknowledgethatknowstrulythrougharealizationofcommoncharacteristics.

Moreover,atthetimeofdirectrealization,thenon‑cognizance/ignorance(ajñāna)with regard to the intrinsic and commoncharacteristics of thetruthsaretotallyeradicatedatonce;itcan[therefore]alsobecalledadirectrealizationoftheintrinsicandcommoncharacteristicseventhoughit isarealizationofcommoncharacteristics.

Moreover, unsatisfactoriness, impermanence, etc. (i.e., the 16modes ofunderstanding),aretheintrinsiccharacteristicsofthetruths;thesearenoneotherthanthecommoncharacteristicsoftheaggregates(skandha).Thus,theverydirectrealizationofunsatisfactoriness,etc.,isadirectrealizationof[both]intrinsicandcommoncharacteristics…

15.4.1. Satyābhisamaya as a gradual process

TheaboveprocessillustratestheSarvāstivādapositionthatthedirectrealizationinto the truths is a gradual process. In support of this position, the MVŚquotesasūtrainwhichtheBuddhaisrepresentedasstatingtoAnāthapiṇḍada(Pāli: Anāthapiṇḍika) explicitly that satyābhisamaya is a gradual process,likeascending a four‑rung ladder.94 This position is consistent with theSarvāstivādadoctrine thatdefilementsareabandonedgradually. In theAKB,Vasubandhuexplainstherationalefortheprogressivesequenceasfollows:

Thediscourseofthetruthsisinconformitywith[theorderof]directrealization.Now,whatisthereasonthattheabhisamayaofthesetruthsisinthisway?


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For,thattowhichoneisattached,bywhichoneisoppressed,andfromwhichliberationissought—thatveryone,duḥkha-satya,atthestageofinvestigationisexaminedfirst.

Afterwards, [proceeding to investigate:] “What is the cause of this(duḥkha)?”—thesamudaya-satya.“Whatisthecessationofthis?”—nirodha-satya.“Whatisthewayofthis?”—themārga-satya.

Itislikehavingseenthedisease,[therefollows]thesearchingforitscause,itseliminationanditsmedicine.95

However, otherBuddhist schools disagree. TheMahāsāṃghika,Mahīśāsakaand Dharmaguptaka are known to hold that it is an abrupt process.96 Thus,theMahāsāṃghikastates:

Withintheonemomentoftheknowledgederivedattheendofthedirectrealization[ofthefournobletruths](ekakṣaṇikābhisamayāntika-jñānena),the differences in the variousākāra‑s of the four noble truths are fullyknown(parijñāta).97

Therewas,however,acertainbranchoftheMahāsāṃghikawhichheldthattherewasadistinctivedirectrealizationforeachofthedistinctiveākāraofthetruths.98

AccordingtoYaśomitra99 the abruptviewbelongstotheDharmaguptakas,etc.;butaccordingtoPuGuang,100theMahāsāṃghikas,etc.TheMVŚmentionstheVibhajyavādinsasamongthoseholdingtheabruptview:

Therearesomewhoassertthatthefournobletruthsaredirectlyrealizedatonce,suchastheVibhajyavādins.…Theybasethemselvesonthesūtra:TheBhagavat said, ‘If,with regard toduḥkha-satya, there is no doubt,there is likewise no doubt with regard to the samudaya‑, nirodha‑ andmārga-satya.Sincedoubtwithregardtothefournobletruthsdisappearsatonce,itisknownthatthedirectrealizationisdefinitelyabruptandnotgradual.101

The Bhadanta,whileholdingthatthedirectrealizationintothefourtruthsisacquiredgradually,heldthatatthefirstmomentofgainingentryintosamyaktva-nyāma(seebelow),oneissaidtohavedirectfaithwithregardtoallthetruths102 [atonce]:

Whenone abides in theduḥkha-dharma-jñāna, if onedoes not acquirefaithwithregardtoallfourtruths,onecannotbesaidtoabide[therein].Thisislikethecaseofonewhotakesanearthernvesselupapavilionandthenthrowsitontotheground.Whenthevesselhasnotyetreachedtheground,itcanbesaidtobebroken,eventhoughithas[infact]notyetbeenbroken,onaccountofthefactthatitisdefinitelyabouttobebroken.103

The Theravādaalsoupholdstheabruptview.Buddhaghosa,inhisVisuddhimagga,reasonsasfollows:

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Ineachofthefourpath‑knowledges(sotāpatti-magga,etc.),[and]inthatorder, four functions— comprehension, abandonment, realization andpractice— are exercised in one and the samemoment. It follows thatthe four noble truths are fully realized in a singlemoment.Moreover,there is thesingle realizationof the four truths in thesenseof truenessin 16aspects: oppression (pīḷana), being compounded (sankhata),torment (santāpa)andchange(vipariṇāma)pertaining todukkha-sacca;accumulation (āyūhana), source (nidāna), connection (saṃyoga) andobstruction (paḷibodha) pertaining to samudaya-sacca; exit (nissaraṇa),separation (viveka), being uncompounded (asaṅkhata) and immortality(amata)pertainingtonirodha-sacca;leadingout(niyyāna),cause(hetu),seeing(dassana)anddominance(ādhipateyya)pertainingtomagga-sacca. Thisiscomparedtothesimultaneousfunctionsofthelamp:

thelampburningthewick—knowledgecomprehendingdukkha;thelampdispellingdarkness—knowledgeabandoningsamudaya;thelamprevealinglight—knowledgedevelopingthemagga;thelampconsumingtheoil—knowledgerealizingnirodha.104

Although the Sarvāstivāda holds the gradual view, it too concedes a certainsenseofabruptrealization.Thisschoolspeaksofthreetypesofabhisamaya:

(1)darśanābhisamaya (abhisamaya as darśana) — the direct clearrealizationofthefournobletruthsbypureprajñāalone;

(2)ālambanābhisamaya (abhisamayaofobject)—thispureprajñātakingthesameobjectsasitsconjoineddharma-s;

(3)kāryābhisamaya (abhisamaya as enterprise) — this pure prajñā,the conjoineddharma‑s sharing the sameobjectswith it, andotherconascent dharma‑s such as jāti and other viprayukta-saṃskāra‑s,etc.,allparticipatinginthesameenterprise.TheSarvāstivādinswouldconcede that it is permissible to speak of abrupt abhisamaya withregardtokāryābhisamaya:Attheverymomentofthedirectrealizationinto duḥkha-satya, there can be the abandoning of samudaya, therealizationofnirodha,andthecultivationofmārga.Thisissobecauseatthetimeoftheseeingofduḥkha-satya,thereisthekāryābhisamaya withregardtotheotherthreesatya‑s.105

Anintermediatepositionbetweenthe‘abruptview’andthe‘gradualview’isgivenintheSatŚ.Ontheonehand,itstatesasfollows:

As a result of the insight into the nirodha-satya, one is said to beenlightened.106

Thus,whenonetruthisrealized,completeinsightintoallthetruthsisobtained— a view similar to those of the Mahāsāṃghika and the Vibhajyavāda.


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Ontheotherhand,theprocessthatleadsfinallytotherealizationofnirodha-satyaisagradualone:

Thethoughtofconcept(*prajñapti-citta),thethoughtofdharma (*dharma-citta), the thought of śūnyatā (*śūnyatā-citta) — these three thoughtshavingceased,itiscallednirodha-satya.107

Initially,atthestageofdevelopingtheśruta-mayī prajñāandcintā-mayī prajñā,thepractitionereliminatesthethoughtofprajñaptibyrealizingthatconceptssuch as the pudgala and a vase, etc., exist only at the saṃvṛti-satya levelandarewithout anyontological status from theabsolute standpoint.Butthedharma-s,suchasnirvāṇaandtheskandha‑saretrueexistents.Thisiscalledtheeliminationoftheprajñapti-citta bymeansofthedharma-citta.

Next,atthesecondstage,i.e.,thestageofdevelopingthebhāvanā-mayī prajñā,the practitioner further contemplates the dharma-s such as nirvāṇa and thefive skandha‑s.He then realizes that thesedharma‑s too, from the absolutestandpoint,arenon‑existent—empty(śūnya).This is theeliminationof thedharma-cittabymeansoftheśūnyatā-citta:

Thefiveskandha‑s tooare inactual factnon‑existent; theyexist [only]fromthestandpointofsaṃvṛti-satya.…Moreover,asaresultoftheinsightinto the nirodha-satya,oneissaidtoattainenlightenment(得道).Thus,weknowthatnirodhaexistsfromthestandpointofparamārtha-satya,butnotthe skandha-s.108

Finally, at the third stage, one must eliminate even the thought of śūnyatā,i.e.,“thethoughttakingnirvāṇaasitsobject”.109Itisonlythenthatoneperfectlyrealizesthenirodha-satya.Throughfurthercontemplationonenowrealizesthat:

[In the anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa,] the skandha‑s have ceased without anyremainder—hencethenamenirvāṇa.Herein,whatistherethatexists?…Itisnotthatthereisnonirvāṇa;onlythattherearenorealdharma‑s.110

Inthisway,oneaccomplishestheinsightintothenirodha-satya.111

15.4.2. Entry into the certainty of perfection (samyaktva-niyāmāvakrānti)

Fromthefirstmomentofinsight—thereceptivitytothedharma-knowledgewithregardtounsatisfactoriness(duḥkhe dharma-jñāna-kṣānti)—thepractitionerbecomesanobleone,anārya,atermfortheBuddhistsaint.TheAKBgivesthepopularetymologyasārād yātaḥ—‘hasgonefar’:

[Theārya‑sare]thoseinwhomtheoutflow‑freepathhasarisen.Theyareārya‑s because they have gone far from the evil dharma‑s on accountof their obtaining the acquisition of absolute disconnection [from thedefilements], for, being destined for the exhaustion of the defilements,theyaredestinedforperfection(samyaktva-niyatāḥ).112

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Prior to this critical point in his spiritual career, he has been an ‘ordinaryworldling’.TheJPŚdefinesthe‘qualityofanordinaryworldling’(pṛthagjanatva)asthenon‑obtainment(=non‑acquisition,aprāpti)ofthedharma‑softhenobleones.113Thisnon‑obtainment isnot justamereabstractconceptofnegation;itisaviprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma—arealforce—theefficacyofwhichisexplainedbyVasumitraasfollows:

Itcausessentientbeingstogenerateviewsofdifferenttypes(pṛthag-jāti),defilementsofdifferent types,dokarma‑sofdifferent types,experiencefruitsofdifferenttypesandbirthsofdifferenttypes.Furthermore,itcausessentient beings to fall into different spheres, go to different planes ofexistence(gati),experiencedifferentbirths.Hence,itiscalledthequalityofanordinaryworldling.…114

The MVŚ further explains that all ārya‑s are called ‘equal beings’ (同生; samāna-jana?) because they attain the truth equally, see equally, areinclined equally. The ordinaryworldlings are different from them— nothaving equality in the samemanner as the ārya‑s; hence they are called pṛthagjana.115

Fromthefirstmomentofhisentryintothepathofvisionuptothe15thmoment,thisāryaiscalledthecandidateforthefruitofstream‑entry(srotaāpatti-phala-pratipannaka).Hehasnowabandoned88defilementsabandonablebyvision(see supra, §12.6.2.1a).At the16thmoment, he is called the “abider in thefruitofstreamentry”(srotaāpatti-phala-stha).Heisdestinedtofinalliberationwithinamaximumofsevenrebirths.116However,accordingtotheVaibhāṣikas,thestream‑entrantissaidtoberebornatmostseventimesinthesensethathewillhavesevenbirthsasahuman,sevenintermediateexistences(antarābhava);likewisehisbirthsamongthegods—atotalofupto28existences.117TheMVŚexplainsthetermstreamentrantasfollows:

Srotasmeansthenoblepath;ā-pannameansentered.Heiscalledastreamentrant(srotaāpana)ashehasenteredthenoblepath.118

Two types of practitioners who enter the path of vision are distinguished:Onewithaweakfaculty(mṛdvindriya)enters thepathhavingfirst reliedonfaith in the teacher’s teachings; theother,withasharpfaculty(tīkṣṇendriya),having first studied and understood the Buddha’s teachings himself. In thefirst 15moments of the path, the former is called a ‘pursuer through faith’(śraddhānusārin);thelatter,‘pursuerthroughthedoctrines’(dharmānusārin).119 At the 16thmoment,theformeriscalled‘onewhoisfreedthroughpredominanceof faith’ (śraddhādhimukta); the latter, ‘onewhohas attained throughviews’(dṛṣṭi-prāpta):


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Aliberatedpersonwithapredominanceoffaithiscalledśraddhādhimukta. Itisnotthathedoesnothaveanyprajñāatall;butheisnotillumined(i.e.,madeconspicuous)bythat,hencehedoesnotreceivethatname.Oneisadṛṣṭi-prāptafromthefactofbeingilluminedbyviewsonaccountofthepredominanceofprajñā.Itisnotthathedoesnothaveanyfaithatall…

Others, however, on the basis of etymology, explain thus: “Aśraddhādhimuktaisonefreedfromthoseabandonablebyvisiononaccountofthepredominanceoffaith.Adṛṣṭi-prāptaisonewhohasattainedthefruitonaccountofthepredominanceofviews.”120

The first receptivity is also explained as the entry into certainty (niyama/niyāma/nyāma),foritistheentryintothecertaintyofperfection(samyaktva-niyāmāvakrānti).That is, fromthispointonward, thepractitioner isdestinedfor — i.e.,will definitely attain — nirvāṇa (= samyaktva).121 Xuan Zang’stranslation here— probably following a fanciful etymology of the variantnyāma as<ni + āma (‘separation from the raw’; Tibetan: skon med pa —‘free from defects’) given in theMVŚ122— corresponds additionally to thealternativetermsamyaktva-nyāma,renderedas正性離生,‘perfectionwhichistheseparationfromtheraw’:

Thisiscalled‘entryintosamyaktva-nyāma’,andalso‘entryintosamyaktva-niyāma’,forthisisthefirstentryintosamyaktva-nyāmaaswellasthefirstentry into samyaktva-niyāma. In the sūtra,nirvāṇa is called samyaktva. Or,samyaktva signifies thenoblepaths. ‘Raw’(生—āma)refers to thedefilementsortheimmaturityofthe[skillful]roots;thenoblepathscango beyond them, hence ‘separation from the raw’. The noble paths aresaidtobecertaintyonaccountofthefactthattheycandecisivelyleadtonirvāṇa,orthattheycandecisivelydiscernthecharacteristicsofthetruths.Reachingthisstageissaidtobeentry.123

Although an ordinaryworldlingwhohas obtained themokṣa-bhāgīya‑swilldefinitelyattainnirvāṇa also,heisnotsaidinthesamewayashavingenteredthe Certainty of Perfection for he could still commit evil and fall into thecategoryofbeingdestinedforevil‑ness.124Moreover,unlikethestreamentrantwhowillberebornatthemostseventimes,thetimeofhisattainmentofnirvāṇa isunfixed.(SeeexampleofDevadatta,in§15.2.1).

15.5. Non-retrogressibility of stream-entry125

The darśana-mārgaisnotretrogressible,foritisapath—process—whichproceedsveryswiftly,withoutbeingheldbackorprematurelyinterrupted.Justasonebeingcarriedforwardbyarapidincapableofholdingback,whenthepractitioner ison thispath,he isbeingcarriedawayby thegreat currentofDharma;thereisnopossibilityofhisgoingbackward.

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Moreover, one retrogresses mostly on account of the manifestation ofdefilements;whenoneiswithinthedarśana-mārga,thereisnopossibilityofgeneratingevenakuśala-citta thatiswith‑outflow,letaloneacitta of defilements.Hencetherecanbenoretrogression.

Besides,retrogressibilityinthiscasewouldentailthefollowingfallacies:

Havinggainedinsightintothetruths,onedoesnothavetheinsightagain;having attained the spiritual fruit, one does not attain it again; havingdirectlyrealized,onedoesnotdirectlyrealizeitagain;havingenteredintosamyaktva-nyāma,onedoesnotenterintoitagain;havingbecomeanārya,onebecomesanordinaryworldlingagain;havingabidedinthecategoryof those destined for perfection (samyaktva-niyata-rāśi), one abides inthe category of those who are not destined [for perfection or evil‑ness(mithyātva)]again.…126

In fact, the practitioner can fall from all the fruits excepting the first.127 The Mahāsāṃghika,ontheotherhand,holdsthatastreamentrantissusceptibletoretrogression.Heisinfactsaidtobecapableofcommittingallevilsexceptthemortaltransgressions(ānantarya).128

15.6. Path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga)

Thewordbhāvanā,oftentranslatedas‘meditation’ismoreliterally—andalsomorecorrectly—‘cultivation’or‘development’ofthemind.Itis,however,truethatmeditationconstitutesthemost importantaspectof theprocess.Butthis‘meditation’ must not be equated with samādhi as opposed to vipaśyanā. ThereisnoindicationintheSarvāstivādasystemthat darśana-mārgareferstothelatter,andbhāvanā-mārga—incontrast—totheformer.TheMVŚstatesexplicitly that, in truth, the twomārga‑s are not separable from each other.Thetwoaredifferentiatedonlyonaccountofthefactthat,whilebothparijñā andapramādaarepresentinboth,indarśana-mārgatheformerpredominatesandisstrongandinbhāvanā-mārga,thelatter.VenerableVasumitraexplainsthat

thedefilementsabandonedby therealization into thefour truthscannotbe distinguished as ‘this is abandoned by insight’, ‘that is abandonedby cultivation’. However, what is abandoned (prahīṇa), cast aside(pratiniḥ-sṛṣṭa) and expurgated (vyantī-bhūta) by the power of insightis said tobeabandonablebyvision.Those [defilements]whosevariousgrades come to be gradually thinned andfinally abandoned completelyas a result of practice, cultivation and repeated action (āsevita-bhāvita-bahulīkṛta)inaccordancewiththepaththathasbeenacquiredaresaidtobeabandonablebycultivation.129


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The pathofcultivation is the stageof repeatedpracticewhichbeginsat the16thmoment of satyābhisamaya. It is through this stage which may lasta considerable period of time that all the tenacious defilements remainingafter the darśana-mārga come to be gradually eradicated. These bhavanā-heya defilements comprise rāga,pratigha,moha andmāna pertaining to thekāmadhātu;andthreeeach—excludingpratighawhichdoesnotexistinamindofmeditationwhich is concentrated— in the twoupper spheres.Thisgivesatotal of ten defilements (see chart in §12.6.2.1 b). As these defilementsare blunt by nature and hence difficult to detect and differentiate, they arecollectivelyclassifiedintoninegradesonthebasisof thedegreeofstrengthoftheirarising—weak(mṛdu),medium(madhya),strong(adhimātra);eachagainsubdividedintoweak,medium,strong—thusgivingweak‑weak,etc.,uptostrong‑strong.130Whereasthe darśana-mārgaisasharporforceful(tīvra, tīkṣṇa)pathwhichonarisingcutsoffall theninegrades (seebelow)of thedefilementsatonce,the bhāvanā-mārgaisnotforceful,sothattheninegradesarecutoffgraduallythroughrepeatedpractice,onebyone.

Thisisliketwoknives,onesharpandoneblunt,cuttingthesamething;thesharponecutsitatonce,thebluntonegradually.131

Thesequenceofabandoningthedefilementsbeginswiththestrong‑stronggradein the kāmadhātuandendswiththeweak‑weakgradeinthebhavāgra bhūmi of the ārūpya-dhātu. In thisway,a totalof88gradesofdefilementsexistingin the nine bhūmi‑s—kāma-dhātu, the fourdhyāna‑sof therūpadhātu andthefourārūpya‑softheārūpya-dhātu—cometobesuccessivelyeradicated.Thestrong‑stronggradeofdefilementsisabandonedbytheweak‑weakgradeof thecounteractivepath.The reason for this is that thecoarsestdefilementis graded as the strong‑strong and the subtlest, weak‑weak. On the otherhand,themostpowerfulcounteragentisgradedasthestrong‑strong,andtheweakestisgradedasweak‑weak.Sincethecoarsestdefilementistheeasiesttocounteractandthesubtlestthemostdifficult;theweakestcounteractivejñānaisutilizedfortheformer,andthestrongest,forthelatter.TheAKBexplainsthiswithtwosimiles:thegrossstainofaclothiswashedoutfirst,andthesubtlest,last;agreatdarknessisdispelledbyasmalllight,andasmalldarknessbyagreatlight.132Asinthecaseofthedarśana-heyadefilements,theabandonmentofeachgradeof thebhāvanā-heyadefilements involves theunhinderedpathandthepathofliberation.Thedifferenceisthatinthiscase,thedefilementsareabandonedintheunhinderedpathbyknowledge(jñāna),notreceptivity.133 At thefinalstage,when thepractitionerabandons theweak‑weakgradeandarrives at its path of liberation, one enters into the path of the non‑trainee(aśaikṣa-mārga)andbecomesanarhat.

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15.7. Attainment of the four fruits of the spiritual life

Thefourfruitshavetheirorigininthesūtra‑s.Asexplainedabove,accordingto the Sarvāstivāda,atthe16thmomentofthesatyābhisamaya,thepractitionerattains the fruit of stream entry. He has abandoned all the 88categories ofdefilements abandonable by vision. In the sūtra,134 this attainment came tobe associatedwith the overcoming of three fetters (saṃyojana)— satkāya-dṛṣṭi (Pāli; sakkāya-diṭṭhi), śīla-vrata-parāmarśa (Pāli: sīlabbata-parāmāsa)andvicikitsā (Pāli:vicikicchā).These three, togetherwithkāmacchanda andvyāpāda, constitute the avarabhāgīya (Pāli: orambhāgīya). In this context,the SarvāstivādaagreeswiththeTheravāda:Thestreamentranthasovercomeonlythefirst threeavarabhāgīya fettersandmuststillovercomethelast twoaswell asall thefiveūrdhva-bhāgīya (Pāli:uddhambhāgīya) fetters—rāga pertainingtothetwoupperspheres,auddhatya,mānaandavidyā.135 HowevertheAKBexplanationhereisnotacceptabletoSaṃghabhadra.136

In the pathofcultivation,thepractitionerwhohasovercomeuptofivegradesofthedefilementsbecomesacandidateforthefruitofonce‑returner.Whenhehasabandonedthesixthgrade,heattainsthefruitofaonce‑returner(sakṛdāgāmin),socalledbecause,havingbeenbornamongthegodsandreturningoncetothehumanworld,hewillhavenofurtherrebirth.Inadditiontobeingfreefromthefirstthreeavarabhāgīyafetters,hehasnowalsoweakenedorthinnedrāga,pratighaandavidyā.137

Havingabandonedtheseventhoreighthgrade—ormorestrictlyspeaking,having reached the ānantarya-mārga of the ninth grade — he becomesacandidateforthefruitofanon‑returner.Havingcompletelyabandonedtheninth grade and abiding in the vimukti-mārga of the ninth grade, he attainsthe fruit of anon‑returner. He will no longer be reborn in the kāmadhātu since he has now abandoned all five avarabhāgīya fetters that bind one tothe lowerdhātu.138 The non‑returnerwhohas realized thenirodha-samāpatti (= saṃjñāvedita-nirodha-samāpatti)iscalleda‘bodilywitness’(kāya-sākṣin).Heissocalledbecausehehasdirectlyexperiencedthepeaceofthissamāpatti throughthebasisofthebody—therebeingnomentation—whichissimilarto nirvāṇa.Thisisthesharpestofallthefacultiesofnon‑returners.139

Fromthemomentwhenthenon‑returnerbecomesdetachedfromthefirstgradeof thedefilementspertaining to thefirstdhyāna up to themomentwhenheabandonstheeighthgradeofthedefilementspertainingtobhavāgra—ormorestrictly,whenheisintheānantarya-mārgaoftheninthgradeofdefilementofbhavāgra—heisacandidateforthefruitofarhathood.Thisunhinderedpathisthemostpowerfulofall,capableofbreakingalldefilementswhatsoever,andisaccordinglycalledthevajra‑like(vajropama)samādhi.Whenthisninthgradeiscompletelyabandoned,therearisesinthepractitionertheknowledgeofthe


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exhaustionof theoutflows (kṣaya-jñāna). Immediatelyafter thisknowledge,ifhebecomesanarhat,ifheisoftheimmovable(i.e.,non‑retrogressible)typein the vimukti-mārga,therearisesinhimtheknowledgeofthenon‑arisingofoutflows,forhehasthenabsolutelyabandonedalldefilementsalongwiththeirtraces (vāsanā)andovercome theundefiled ignorance (akliṣṭa-ajñāna—cf. supra,§12.10).Otherwise,ifheisaretrogressibletype,therearisesinhimthesameknowledgeofexhaustionortheperfectviewofthenon‑trainee.Anarhat iscalledanon‑trainee,forhehascompletedalltraining.

15.8. Out-of-sequence attainments

The above account of the sequential attainment of the four fruits representsthe stages of progress of anānupūrvaka—onewho progresses according tothe regular order. He begins as a sakala-bandhana. Aswe have seen earlier(§12.9.3),however,theSarvāstivādamaintainsthatanordinaryworldlingcanabandondefilementsthroughthemundanepaths,exceptthosethatpertaintotheexistence‑peak(bhavāgra).Sincespiritualprogressresultsfromtheabandonmentofdefilements,itmeansthatanordinaryworldlingcanmaketremendousprogressbeforeheentersintothenoblepath,andwhenhedoesenterit,hecanattainuptothestageofanāgāmin-phala—albeittheactualattainmentofthefruitcanproperlytakeeffectonlyafterhehasenteredintodirectrealization.

Beforeenteringintothedarśana-mārga,ifthepractitionerhasnotabandonedanybhāvanā-heya defilement pertaining to the sphere of sensuality throughthe worldlypath,orhasabandoneduptothefifthcategoryonly,hebecomesacandidateforstreamentryuponenteringthedarśana-mārga.However,ifhehas abandoned from six to eight categories, he thereupon skips to becomea sakṛdāgāmi-pratipannaka. In the 16th moment, he abides in the fruit ofsakṛdāgāmin.Suchapractitionerisknownasabhūyo-vītarāga—‘onewhohasbeenmuchdetached’.Ifthepractitionerhasbecomefullydetachedbeforehandfromthesphereofsensualitybyhavingabandonedalltheninecategoriesofdefilementpertainingtoit,orifheisdetachedwithregardtothehigherspheresbyhavingadditionallyabandonedallninecategoriesofdefilementspertainingtoeachofthestagesofthefine‑materialsphereandthefirstthreeimmaterialspheres—i.e.,uptothestageoftheākiñcanyāyatana—heskipstobecomeananāgāmi-pratipannakauponenteringthedarśana-mārga,andananāgāmin inthefollowingmoment.

15.9. Retrogressibility of an arhat

Itisanabhidharmacontroversyastowhetheranarhatisretrogressibleornot.FortheVibhajyavādins,hisretrogressionisimpossible:

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Whenavasehasbeenbroken,thereremainonlythebrokenpieces;itcannofurtherbeavase.Thecaseofanarhatoughttobethesame—havingcrushedthedefilementswiththevajropama-samādhi,heoughtnottogiverise to the defilements again and retrogress. Just as, a log having beenburnt, there remainonly the ashes, it doesnotbecomea loganymore.The same should be true for thearhat—having burnt the defilementswiththefireoftheoutflow‑freeknowledge,heoughtnotgiverisetothedefilementsagainandretrogress.140

The Mahāsāṃghika is also known to hold a similar view.141 So too,the SautrāntikawhoseviewisendorsedbyVasubandhuintheAKB.142Accordingto the Sarvāstivāda, however, anarhatwho has started as a śraddhānusārin is still susceptible to retrogression. He is said to be one circumstantiallyliberated(samaya-vimukta).Hisrealizationofsamāpattiisalsodependentoncircumstances(samaya).TheMVŚquotesthesūtraasteachingthattherearefivereasonsfortheretrogressionofsuchanarhat:

(1)havingtoomanyundertakings;(2)indulgenceinconceptualproliferation(prapañca);(3)beingfondofquarrel;(4)beingfondoftravelingafar;(5)beingconstantlysick.Moreover,thesūtramentionsanarhatnamedGautika,asamaya-vimukta whohadretrogressedsixtimes.Attheseventhtime,fearingthathemightagainretrogress,hekilledhimselfwithaknifeandattainedparinirvāṇa.143

Incontrast,onewhohasstartedasadharmānusārinisnotretrogressible.Heissaid to be non‑circumstantially liberated (asamaya-vimukta) and is called‘one liberated throughwisdom’(prajñā-vimukta). If,additionally,hehasalsoovercomethehindrancetosamāpattiandcanenterintothenirodha-samāpatti at will, he is said to be ‘liberated doubly’ (ubhayobhāga-vimukta). In all,sixtypesofarhat-saredistinguished:

(1) parihāṇa-dharman—thosesusceptibletoretrogression;(2)cetanā-dharman—thosewhocanendtheirexistencesatwill;(3)anurakṣaṇā-dharman — those who can preserve themselves by

constantlyguardingagainstthelossofwhathasbeenacquired;(4)sthitākampya—thosewhoremainstableintheirstageofattainment,

withneitherprogressnorretrogression;(5)prativedhanā-dharman—thosecapableofpenetratingthestateofthe

akopya-dharman arhatwhichtheycanattainquickly;(6)akopya-dharman—‘theunshakableones’—thosenotsusceptibleto

retrogression.Thefirstfivearesamaya-vimukta‑s, the lastasamaya-vimukta‑s.144


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NOTES

1 AKB,391.2 MVŚ,4b;seesupra,§1.2.3 MVŚ,70a,85a,315c,etc.4 MVŚ, 428b: śrāvaka-bodhi requires only 60kalpa‑s of prayoga; pratyekabuddha,

100 kalpa‑s.5 MVŚ,154a,157c,159a,210b,etc.6 MVŚ,327c.7 Cf.MVŚ,264b–c,465c;seealsosupra,§12.7,§12.9.3.8 MVŚ,264c–265a.9 MVŚ,317a.10 DSŚ,463b:“NirvāṇaiscalledDharma;thenobleeightfoldpathiscalledanu-dharma. TheBuddha’sdisciples’practicethereiniscalleddharma-anudharma-partipatti.”

11 DSŚ,459c.12 DSŚ,loc. cit.13 MVŚ,3a‑b.14 MVŚ,317c.15 MVŚ,933c.16 SeeJPŚ,964b;MVŚ,560b,etc.17 SeeSĀ,T2,10a–11c.18 AKB,334ff.19 AKB,335f.;MVŚ,906cff.20 E.g.,SgPŚ,402a–c.21 MVŚ,159b–c.22 MVŚ,363c.23 MVŚ,479a.24 MVŚ,34c–35a;Ny,595b–c;SPrŚ,892b;ADV,218.25 Cf.ADV,218: puṇyabhāgīyaṃ yena devamanuṣyopapattibījaṃ pratigṛhṇāti maheśākhyaiś

ca kulamahābhogarūpyacakravartiśakrapuṣpaketubrahmatvādīnāṃ prāptaye phalam ākṣipati | mokṣabhāgīyaṃ yenāvikampyamokṣāśayāvasthānād avaśyaṃ pari(ni)vāṇadharmā bhavati | nirvedhabhāgīyam ūṣmagatamū(laṃ) caturvidham ||

26 MVŚ,35a.27 MVŚ,35a–b.28 MVŚ,885b–c.29 MVŚ,885b–886a.30 AKB,337.31 AKB,339f.;MVŚ,134c.32 MVŚ,384b,662c,etc.33 E.g.:PuGuang’scommentaryontheAKB,T41,339b;etc.

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34 E.g.:T46,no.1918,557c–558a,564a–b;Tno.1916;Tno.1911,35c;etc.35 E.g.,MVŚ,410a.36 MVŚ,205a.37 MVŚ,205a–208c.38 T30,905b.Alsocf.YBŚ,T30,427b,458a‑b,whichenumeratesthemandalsoexplainstheir respective counteracting functions, but without assigning to them a collectivename.

39 Cf.AKB,337.40 smṛty-upasthāna—MVŚ,936cff.,AKB,341ff.41 Alldharma‑s other than body, sensation and ideation.MVŚ, 937a:mental objects—otherthanthevedanā-skandha—subsumedunderthedharmāyatana.

42 svalakṣaṇa = svabhāva—AKB,341.43 MVŚ,938a:Thisfourfoldmindfulnessisforcounteractingthefourcorrespondingtopsy‑turvy‑ness(viparyāsa).

44 MVŚ,148a.45 MVŚ,148a.46 MVŚ,135b.47 AKB,346:tac caitac caturvidham api nirvedhabhāgīyam

bhāvanāmayam |

na śrutacintāmayam |48 AKB,346.49 SeeAKB,447f.50 AKB,346:nirvedhabhāgīyāni ko ’rthaḥ | vidha vibhāge | niścito vedho nirvedhaḥ āryamārgas

tena vicikitsā-prahāṇāt satyānāṃ ca vibhajanād idaṃ duḥkham ayaṃ yāvāt mārga iti | tasya bhāgo darśanamārgaikadeśaḥ | tasya āvāhakatvena hitatvān nirvedhabhāgīyāni |

51 MVŚ,30a.52 MVŚ,29c–30a.53 MVŚ,3b.54 MVŚ,33a–b.55 MVŚ,33b.56 MVŚ,33c.57 MVŚ, 28a. I have suggested an alternative for uṣmagata/ūṣmagata as ‘warmed‑up’(‘gone/becomewarm’), taking it as an adjectivewhich describes the first stage of thenirvedha-bhāgīya: the stage characterized as getting warmed up. However, in XuanZang’s translation,heseems tounderstand the termasanoun. In theAKB,ofcourse,thisfirstnirvedhabhāgīyadoesoccur—albeitveryrarely—asanoun,ūṣman,insteadof uṣmagata. Moreover, uṣmagatam could also be compared to dṛṣṭi-gatam which isessentiallythesameasdṛṣṭi.Thisbeingthecase,wecancertainlyrenderevenuṣmagata as“warmth”.Onotherhand,Vasubandhu’sglossof the termcouldsuggesteitherway,anounoranadjective:

AKB,343:ūṣmagatam ivoṣmagatam (1)“ūṣmagatameansasifitiswarmedup(/hasbecomewarm)”.Or, (2)“ūṣmagatameansasifitisakindofwarmth.”


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This second alternative understanding would tally with Yaśomitra’s gloss: “ūṣmagata means askillful rootwhich is of the species ofwarmth.” (u(ū)ṣmagatam ity u(ū)ṣma-prakāraṃ kuśala-mūlam |)

58 MVŚ,34c.59 MVŚ,30b.60 AKB, 344: yādṛśā ūṣmāṇas catuḥsatyālambanāḥ ṣoḍaśākārāś ca | utkṛṣṭataratvāt tu

nāmāntaram |61 AKB,344:cala-kuśalamūlamūrdhatvāt mūrdhānaḥ | ebhyo hi pāto ’tikramo vā |Vy,532:

mūrdha-śabdo ’yaṃ prakarṣa-paryanta-vācī | tathā hi loke vaktāro bhavanti | mūrdha-gatā khalv asya śrīr iti … mūrdhabhyaḥ pātaḥ parihāṇiḥ | atikramo vā kṣānti-saṃmukhī-bhāvo vā | mūrdhnāṃ calatvāt |

62 MVŚ, 25c; Vy, 532: dve hi kuśala-mūle cale | uṣmagata-mūrdha-lakṣaṇe parhāṇi-saṃbhāvāt | dve acale kṣānti-laukikāgra-dharma-lakṣaṇe viparyayāt | tatra tayor yan mṛdu tad uṣmagatam | yad adhimātraṃ te mūrdhānaḥ | acalayor api yan mṛdu sā kṣāntiḥ | yad adhimātraṃ te laukikāgra-dharmāḥ |

63 MVŚ,30b.64 MVŚ,24aff.:variousreasonsgivenfortheepithet;alsocf.MVŚ,223c.65 AKB,344:adhimātra-satya-kṣamaṇād aparihāṇitaḥ |66 Vy, 533: adhimātra-satya-kṣamaṇād iti | uṣmagatāvasthāyaṃ mṛdu satyaṃ kṣamate

rocate | mūrdhāvasthāyāṃ madhyaṃ tad-anantaram idānīm adhimātra-satya-kṣamaṇāt kṣāntir utpadyate | … yasmāt kṣāntir na parihīyate | mūrdhabhyas tu parihīyata ity asti saṃbhavaḥ |

67 MVŚ,30b–c.68 AKB, 344: agradharma-saṃśleṣād asau kāmāvacara-duḥkhālambanaiva | ata

evoṣmagatādīnāṃ traidhātuka-duḥkhādyālambanatva-siddhir niyamāvacanāt | yadā kila rūpārūpya-pratipakṣādīnām ekaika-satyākārālambanāpahrāsena yāvat kāmāvacaram eva duḥkhaṃ dvābhyāṃ kṣaṇābhyāṃ manasikaroty eṣā sarvaiva madhyā kṣāntir yadaikam eva kṣaṇaṃ tadādhimātreti |;MVŚ,25a–b.

69 MVŚ,25b.70 MVŚ,7b.71 JPŚ,918aff.72 MVŚ,5aff.73 MVŚ,11b.Cf.AKB,345: sarva-laukikaśreṭhatvād iti laukikāgradharmāḥ | vinā sabhāga-

hetunā mārgasya tat-puruṣakāreṇākarṣaṇāt |74 MVŚ,11b–12a.75 MVŚ,7b–8b.76 MVŚ,8c—refutedbytheVaibhāṣika.77 Ny,680b.78 MVŚ,3b.79 MVŚ,16a—otherexplanationsarealsogiven.80 MVŚ,4a–b.81 Seealso,supra,§12.9.3.182 According to the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins: “The ānantarya-mārga‑s can abandon the

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kleśa‑s,becausetheyblocktheprāpti‑s of the kleśa‑ssothattheydonotcontinue;theycanalsorealizethenirodha‑s,becausetheyinducethevisaṃyoga-prāpti‑ssothattheymayarise.Thevimukti-mārga‑sareonlysaidtorealizenirodha‑s,astheyappeartogetherwiththe visaṃyoga-prāpti‑s.”(MVŚ,465c)

83 AKB,40.Forfurtherexplanationofthesethreeindriya‑s,seeAKB,42,49.84 AKB,49.85 AKB,352.86 Ny,690a.87AKB,350:prathamato dharmatattva-jñānād dharma-jñānam.Vy,542:ādito duḥkh’ ādi-

dharma-tattva-jñānād ity arthaḥ|SeealsoEntrance,172f.,n.237.88 SeeMVŚ,547c–548a.89 On dhamme ñāṇaṃandanvaye ñāṇaṃinthePālicanon,seeFrauwallner,168.90 AKB: tadanvayād ūrdhvaṃ duḥkhālambanam anvaya-jñānam | tathaivānugamanād | AKB(C):“Itiscalled‘species’(類)becausethisknowledge,bearingonthesubsequentobject, is similar to the preceding one, for the subsequent one realizes the object inaccordancewith(/following)theprecedingone.”Vy,542explainstad-anvayatvātastad-dhetukatvāt(‘havingthat(i.e.,dharma-jñāna)asitscause’).

91 Ny,735c.92 See Entrance,173,n.238.93 SeeIAKB,I,xxxx.94 MVŚ,265a,522a–b.95 AKB,328.96 See Entrance,177,n.259;alsocf.T32,257b.97 T49,15c.98 T49,16a.99 Vy,542:ārya-dharmagupta-prabhṛtayaḥ |100T41,351c.101MVŚ,533a.102Itake寶tobeanerrorfor實 in the text.103MVŚ,533b.104 Cf.Vism,593.105AKB,351;AKB(C),121c–122a;MVŚ,732c,16b.106T32,257b.107T32,251b;seeStudies,586,108T32,333b.109T32,333c110 Ibid.,368c–369a.111 See YinShun,Study,586ff.112AKB, 157: āryāḥ katame | yeṣām anāsravo mārga utpannaḥ | ārād yātāḥ pāpakebhyo

dharmebhya ity āryāḥ | ātyantika-visaṃyoga-prāptilābhāt | ete hi kleśa-kṣaye niyatatvāt samyaktva-niyatāḥ |Seebelowforthenotionofsamyaktva-niyāma-avakrānti.

113JPŚ,928c;cf.MVŚ,232b.Seealsosupra,§11.3.1.


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114MVŚ,231c.115MVŚ,232a–b.116AKB,355:akṣīṇabhāvanāheyaḥ phalasthaḥ saptakṛtparaḥ |117AKB,356.118MVŚ,240a.Cf.AKB,356: nirvāṇasroto hi mārgas tena tatra gamanāt | tadasāv āpanna

āgataḥ prāpta iti srotaāpannaḥ |119Vy,548.120Vy,549:śraddhā’dhiko muktaḥ śraddhā’dhimukta iti kṛtvā | na tu tasya prajñā naivāsti |

tayā na tu prabhāvita iti na tan nāma labhate | prajñā’dhikatvena dṛṣṭi-prabhāvitatvāt dṛṣṭi-prāptaḥ | na tu tasya śraddhā nāsti … apare tu punar nairukta-vidhim ālambya vyācakṣate | śraddh’ādhipatyena darśana-heyebho muktaḥ śraddhā’dhimuktaḥ | dṛṣṭy-ādhipatyena prāpta-phalo dṛṣṭi-prāpta iti |

121Heisthereforesaidtobeabidingintheclass(rāśi)ofthosedestinedforsamyaktva. Cf. MVŚ,140b.

122MVŚ, 12a.which gives various interpretations. The grammarians (śābdika‑s) explainasfollows:Thetermisniyāma-avakrānti;yāmaalsosignifiesgoing(<yā);nisignifies‘toprevent’andalsohasthesenseof‘not’.Theyogācārya‑s,havingacquiredthenoblepath,willnevergo to thegati‑sof theasat-puruṣa.Thus thenoblepath isalsocalledniyāma.

123AKB(C),121b.124 Cf.MVŚ,140b.125 Cf.MVŚ,265aff.126MVŚ,22c.127 Cf.AKB,157, for the three classes (rāśi) ofbeings:Those in the samyatva-niyata-rāśi are destined for nirvāṇa;mithyātva, for rebirths in the evil destinies (gati); aniyata;non‑destinedornon‑fixedasregardeither.Cf.MVŚ,22c,316b;AKB,374f.,forotherargumentsforthenon‑retrogressibilityofthedarśana-mārga.

128T49,15c.129MVŚ,276a–c.130AKB,355.131MVŚ,267a–b.132AKB,355.133MVŚ,267b.134E.g.,S,v,356–357.135AKB,356.136Ny,694a.137AKB, 358:devāt gatvā sakṛn manuṣyalokāgamanāt sakṛdāgāmī | pareṇa janmābhāvāt |

rāgadveṣamohānāṃ ca tanutvād ity ucyate | mṛdu-prakārāvaśeṣatvāt |138AKB,358ff.;fivetypesofanāgāminwhoattainnirvāṇa in the rūpadhātuarementionedand explained herein: antarā-parinirvāyin, upapadya-parinirvāyin, sābhisaṃskāra-parinirvāyin, anabhisaṃskāra-parinirvāyin, andūrdhvasrotas. Including the typewho,being detached from the rūpa-dhātu, is reborn in the ārūpyadhātu where he attainsnirvāṇa—i.e.,theārūpyaga—thetotalnumberofanāgāmin‑sbecomessix.Alsocf.A,iv70,380;S,v,201;Puggalapaññatti,16–17,70;Vism,677.

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139AKB,363.140MVŚ,312b.141T49,15c;T41,375a.142AKB,375.143MVŚ,312b.144AKB,372ff.;MVŚ,315b.

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16. The Unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) Dharma-s

16.1. Three unconditioneddharma‑softheSarvāstivāda16.1.1. Controversialnatureoftheunconditioneddharma‑s.16.1.2. Sarvāstivādaconceptionoftheunconditioned

16.2.Cessationthroughdeliberation16.2.1.Proofoftherealityofnirvāṇa16.2.2.Cessationthroughdeliberation,acquisition,andspiritualliberation16.2.3. Sautrāntikaconceptionofnirvāṇa16.2.4.ConclusiononCessationthroughdeliberation

16.3.Cessationindependentofdeliberation16.3.1. Distinction between cessation through deliberation, cessation independent of

deliberationand cessation of impermanence(anityatā-nirodha)16.3.2 Summary

16.4. Space16.4.1. ArgumentsintheMVŚ16.4.2.ArgumentsbySaṃghabhadra16.4.3. Summary

16.1. Three unconditioned dharma-s of the Sarvāstivāda

The orthodox Sarvāstivādins teach that there are three categories ofunconditioneddharma‑s:

1. cessationthroughdeliberation(pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha);2. cessationindependentofdeliberation(apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha);3. Space(ākāśa).

In the Sarvāstivādaperspective,theunconditioneddomain—exceptingSpace—justliketheconditioneddomain,ispluralistic.

1. Thecessationsthroughdeliberationreferstothecessationofdefilementsacquiredthroughtheprocessofdiscriminativeordeliberativeeffort.Thereare as many cessations through deliberation as there are with‑outflowdharma‑s.1Thisisthemostimportantunconditionedcategory,representingas it does, the goal of Buddhist praxis. In some schools, such as theTheravāda, this is theonlyunconditioned.Accordingly,amongthethreekindsoftheunconditionedoftheSarvāstivāda,wewillbedealingwiththisatconsiderablygreaterlengthbelow.

2. Thecessations independentofdeliberationare thoseacquiredsimplyonaccount of the deficiency in the required assemblage of conditions fortheparticulardharma‑s.Theyaresocalledbecausetheyareindependentof any deliberative effort. The quantity of this category is even greaterthanthatofthecessationsthroughdeliberation,beingasnumerousastheconditioneddharma‑s.2

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3. Spaceisthatontologicalentitybyvirtueofwhichresistantthingscanbeaccommodated.Itistobedistinguishedfromthe‘elementofspace’whichisspaceintheordinarycase,suchasthatfoundinawindow.

16.1.1. The controversial nature of the unconditioned dharma-s.

Variousschoolshavedifferentconceptionsoftheunconditionedanddisagreeastotheontologicalstatusofthesedharma‑s.

In the Sarvāstivādaconception,anunconditionedis:

1. thatwhichtranscendsarisingandceasing,2. anontologicallyrealpossessingauniqueefficacy—albeitnotcausal

efficacyobtaininginthetemporalprocess.

TheMahāsāmghikaupholdsthecriterionthatthenotionofanunconditionedentails that which remains unchanged eternally and, from this perspective,includes Conditioned Co‑arising and the noble path, representing theeternalprinciplesofcausalityand liberation respectively,asamong thenineunconditioneddharma‑s:

1. pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha;2. apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha; 3. ākāśa; 4. ākāśānantyāyatana; 5. vijñānānantyāyatana; 6. ākiñcanyāyatana; 7. naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana; 8. pratītya-samutpādatva; 9. ārya-mārgatva.3

For the Sautrāntika,theunconditionedissimplyaconcept(prajñapti)ofthatwhichisopposedtotheconditioned.

Alltheunconditionedarenon‑entities(sarvam evāsaṃskṛtam adravyam),fortheydonotexistasdistinctexistents(bhāvāntara)likerūpa,vedanā,etc.4

Thus,nirvāṇaisnothingmorethantheabsoluteabsenceofunsatisfactoriness. Accordingly, this school categoricallydenies the realityof allunconditioneddharma‑s.

Even within the Sarvāstivāda school itself, opinions differ as regards theontological status of these unconditioned dharma‑s. It appears that at theearlystages,theSarvāstivādadidnotelaborateontheontologicalstatusoftheunconditioneddharma‑s.IntheJPŚ,thecanonicaltextupheldasthesupremeauthority by the orthodox Sarvāstivādins, one finds only the mention of

16. the unConditioned (asaṃskṛta) Dharma-S

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pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaandapratisaṃkhyā-nirodha,butnotākāśa.IntheMVŚ,thevariousācārya‑sholdcontradictoryviews.Thus,Buddhadevaacceptstherealities of all three;5 the Bhadanta (=Dharmatrāta?)6 denies the reality ofākāśa; theDārṣṭāntikadenies theontologicalstatusofall three.7Probably inresponsetothedenialbytheDārṣṭāntikaandtheSautrāntika,inthepostAKBperiodtherehadconsistentlybeenanadditionalrequirementinthedefinitionof ‘Sarvāstivāda’: A Sarvāstivādin must accept not only the tri‑temporalexistence ofdharma, but also the reality of all three kinds of unconditioneddharma‑s.8 Thecontroversialnatureof theseunconditioneddharma‑s isalsoevidentinSaṃghabhadra’srepeatedaccusationoftheSautrāntikaassidingwiththefollowersofthe‘sky‑flower’(空花; ākāśa-puṣpa)doctrine—apparentlyreferringtotheŚūnyatā‑vādaprevailingatthetime—obstinatelydenyingthesvabhāvaofalldharma‑s.9

16.1.2. Sarvāstivāda conception of the unconditioned

Initsaspectofbeingadependentlyco‑arisen(pratītya-samutpanna)existent,aconditioneddharmaissaidtobesaṃskṛta—‘compounded’,‘co‑produced’,‘conditioned’.Initsotheraspectofbeingacausallyproductiveforce,itisalsocalledasaṃskāra—‘conditioning’or‘conditioningforce’.

In direct contrast, the asaṃskṛta‑s are neither produced by causes andconditions,noraretheycausallyproductiveofotherdharma‑s.Saṃghabhadraargues,however,thattheirrealitycannotbedeniedsimplyonthegroundthattheyareneithercausesnoreffects—theSautrāntika,forone,acceptscausalityofpastandfuturedharma‑sbutnottheirreality.10(Seealsobelow,§16.2.1).

The AKB states that the asaṃskṛta‑s are not subsumable under theskandha taxonomy, since “skandha”means a heap (rāśi), and, unlike rūpa, etc., theasaṃskṛta‑s do not form separate heaps of “past asaṃskṛta‑s”,“presentasaṃskṛta‑s”,etc.11InSthiramati’s*Tattvārthā,aquestionisraised:

If the asaṃskṛta‑sarenotrealentities,itisreasonablethattheydonotformaskandha.Sincetheyareasserted[bytheSarvāstivāda]tobeexistents,whyisitnotconcededthatapluralityofthemagglomerateasaheap—anasaṃskṛta-skandha?12

Sthiramatiexplains:

Therearetwosignificationsofaheap:(i)Whenthosethatexistseparatelyinvariouslocationsaregatheredtogetherinoneplace,onecallsitaheap.(ii)Whentri‑temporaldharma‑saregroupedtogetherthroughourfacultyof understanding (prajñā) into groups each pertaining to one temporalperiod,onecalls these [groups]heaps.Now,as theasaṃskṛta dharma‑shaveneitherofthesetwosignifications,howcantheybecalledheaps?13

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Thus, the essential characteristic of theasaṃskṛta dharma‑s is that they areneither temporalizednorspatialized.This,however,doesnotmeanthat theyarenotdistinctlyindividuated;rather,theyexistasapluralityofrealentities(dravya).Beingbeyondthespace‑timedimension, theycanneitherarisenorcease,andaccordinglyarenotdirectlyinvolvedinanycausalprocess.14Onlythepast and present saṃskṛta dharma‑s have the functions of ‘grasping afruit’(phala-grahaṇa/phala-ākṣepa) and ‘giving a fruit’ (phala-dāna) (cf. supra,§7.4). These two functions are lacking in the future conditioneddharma‑sas well as in the unconditioned dharma‑s. Nevertheless, the unconditioneddharma‑s, quadharma‑s, are real forces and can have an impact on humanexistence,eventhough,asSaṃghabhadraputsit,thewayofestablishingcausesandeffectsamongtheconditioneddharma‑sisnotapplicabletothecaseoftheunconditioneddharma-s.(Seebelow,§16.2).

16.2. Cessation through deliberation

In the Sarvāstivāda, the better known term nirvāṇa is synonymous withpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. The latter is defined as a disjunction (visaṃyoga)fromwith‑outflowdharma‑sacquired throughtheprocessofdiscrimination/deliberation (pratisaṃkhyāna) which is a specific outflow‑free prajñā.15 Sthiramati explains that this specificprajñā refers to that in theānantarya-mārga (seebelow)whentheacquisition(prāpti)ofdefilement isabandoned,subsequenttowhichcessationthroughdeliberationisrealized(sākṣāt-kṛta)16 oracquired (prāpyate).TheMVŚ17enumeratesasmanyas14synonymsforcessationthroughdeliberation, togetherwithvariousinterpretationsforeachofthem:

(1) Nirvāṇa;(2) Dissimilar(不同類; asabhāga);(3) Non‑agglomerated(非聚 arāśi?;asamudaya?);(4) Non‑manifest(非顯; avarṇa);(5) MostExcellent(parama);(6) Penetration(通達;prativedha,);(7) Arhat;(8) Non‑intimate(不親近; asaṃsṛṣṭa);(9) Non‑cultivated(asevita,abhāvita);(10)Lovable(abhipreta,ramaṇīya);(11)Proximate(antika,āsanna);(12)Wonderful(praṇīta);(13)Exit(niḥsaraṇa).


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Thefirstandforemost,nirvāṇa,isexplainedinfoursenses:

(i) theabsoluteexit(nir)fromallgati (vana);(ii) theabsoluteabsence(nir)ofkarmaandofdefilements—badsmell

(durgandha = vana)andimpurities;(iii)theabsoluteexit (nir) fromall theforests (vana)ofskandha‑swith

theirthreefiresandthreecharacteristics;(iv) the non‑(nir-)weaving (vāna) of the fabric — vipāka-phala — of

saṃsāricexistence.

Elsewhere,theMVŚgivestenmeaningsof nirvāṇa, mostofwhicharecoveredbytheabovefoursenses;theothersensesthatcouldbeconsideredadditionalare:‘withoutfurtherexistence’,‘freedomfrombondage’and‘transcendenceofallsaṃsāricsufferings’.18Thus,nirvāṇaasthesummum bonumofBuddhismisthepratisaṃkhyā-nirodhawhichisacquiredatthefinalmomentofenlightenmentasaresultofwhichalldefilements—andhenceallduḥkha—pertainingtothethreespheresofexistencehaveceasedabsolutely,andsaṃsāricexistenceis totally transcended.TheMVŚalso speaksof this specifically in termsoftheabandonmentofdefilement,thecorrespondingjñānaarisenandthepath‑structureasfollows:

When[thepractitioner]isdissociatedfromtheninth(i.e.,final)gradeofbond,thevajropama-samādhi(inwhichwhateverdefilementsremainingareeradicatedwithoutanytrace)havingceasedandtheanutpāda-jñāna havingfirst arisen, that abandonment [of defilement] acquired is called‘abandonment’ (prahāṇa), ‘disjunction’ (visaṃyoga), ‘cessation’(nirodha), ‘truth’ (satya), ‘complete knowledge’ (parijñā), i.e.,thecompleteknowledgethat[refersto]thedestructionofallbonds,‘fruitofthespirituallife’(śrāmaṇya-phala),i.e.,thearhat-phala,and‘thesphereof nirvāṇawitharemnantofsubstratum’(sopadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu).…Whentheskandha‑s,āyatana‑sanddhātu‑sofanarhatceaseanddonot continue any longer, [he enters] into the sphere ofnirvāṇawithoutaremnantofsubstratum(nirupadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu).19

Accordingly,onecanspeakonlyofthenon‑trainee’sdisjunctionfromdefileddharma‑sasnirvāṇa-dhātu:

Thedisjunctionacquiredbyanordinaryworldling…isnotsubsumableaseitherofthetwotypesofnirvāṇa-dhātu…Itshouldonlybecalledanabandonment,adisjunction,acessation,atruth(satya).Itisnottobecalledacompleteknowledge(parijñā),oraśrāmaṇya-phala,orasopadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu,oranirupadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu.

The disjunction acquired by a trainee is called an abandonment, adisjunction,acessation,atruth;atsomestagecalledacompleteknowledge

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andatsomestagenotsocalled;atsomestagecalledaśrāmaṇya-phalaandatsomestagenotsocalled.Itisnotcalledasopadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu oranirupadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu.

The disjunction acquired by a non‑trainee is called an abandonment,adisjunction, a cessation, a truth, a complete knowledge, a śrāmaṇya-phala.Atsomestageit iscalledasopadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu;atsomestageitiscalledanirupadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu.20

AsthefollowingdiscussionintheMVŚsumsup,whileontheonehandeachabandonmentofdefilementcanbespokenofasanirvāṇa,ontheotherhand,thistermisinactualfactreservedfortheperfectattainmentofanarhat:

Question:Theabandonmentofany[defiled]dharmasuchassatkāya-dṛṣṭi isnirvāṇa,whydoesithereinspeakonlyoftheabsoluteabandonmentofgreed(rāga)andsoonuptotheabsoluteabandonmentofalldefilements?

Answer:Althoughtheabandonmentofeachandevery[defiled]dharma isnirvāṇa,hereinitspeaksonlyofthe“perfectnirvāṇa”.…Furthermore,thenamenirvāṇais[reserved]exclusivelyforthestageofthenon‑trainee.Thestageofthetraineebeingyetincomplete,itisnotcallednirvāṇa.21

As unconditioned dharma‑s, the pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑s are not causesor conditions in the proper sense.Hence they cannot be said to have fruits(sa-phala).Nevertheless,inconformitywiththesūtratraditionwhichspeaksofśrāmāṇya-phalaandconventionalusage,itispermissibletocallpratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaa“fruitofdisjunction”(visaṃyoga-phala)withoutimplyingthatitiscausallyproduced,anditisalsopermissibletoconsiderthemasa“conditionqua object” (ālambana-pratyaya)— e.g., as an object of thought of a yogi,and adhipati-pratyaya — making an indirect contribution by merely notobstructing.22AccordingtotheSarvāstivāda:

The way of establishing causes and effects among the saṃskṛta‑s is notapplicabletothecaseoftheasaṃskṛta‑s.Accordingly,apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha isacausewhichiswithoutaneffect,andaneffectwhichiswithoutacause.23

16.2.1. Proof of the reality of nirvāṇa

For the Sarvāstivāda,nirvāṇa or pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is a distinct positiveentity (dravyāntara) — an ontologically real force that is acquired by thepractitioner when a given defilement is completely abandoned.24 In fact,thisrealforceactstoensurethattheacquisitionofthedefilementsoabandonedwillabsolutelynotbeable toariseanymore.25Skandhila’sdefinitionclearlybringsoutthisdynamicfunction:

The cessation through deliberation is that which causes the non‑productionofduḥkha—[arealentitywhichisapositivepresence]:likeadikeholdingbackthewaterorascreenblockingthewind.26


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ThefollowingarethemainVaibhāṣikaargumentsforitsreality:27

1. TheSūtra says, “Among alldharma‑s— thosewhich are saṃskṛta‑s orthosewhichareasaṃskṛta‑s—detachmentissupreme.”28 Here the asaṃskṛta‑sarementioned—intheplural—asamongthedharma‑s,andthereforecannotbenon‑existent.Thosethatarenon‑existentdonothavethenatureofdharma.

Howcananon‑existentbesaidtobesupremeamongthenon‑existents?It is observed empirically that among dharma‑s which have their self‑characteristics(svalakṣaṇa),somearesaidtobesuperior,othersinferior.Thus nirvāṇa‑s definitely exist as distinct entities which sustain theirself‑characteristics and hence are called dharma‑s. (Cf. svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇād dharmaḥ /AKB,2).

2. Theessencesandfunctionsofrūpa,vedanā,etc.,whichexistasaseries,areempiricallyobservable.Thoseofnirvāṇa,whichdonotexistasaseries,aresubtleanddifficulttoperceive.Nevertheless,whenasaresultofdiligentcontemplativepracticesthebhāvanā-mayī prajñāarisesinthepractitioner,thetrueessentialnatureandfunctionofnirvāṇaarerealizedbyhim.Indeed,atthemomentwhenhecomesoutfromthecontemplation,heexclaims:“Wonderfulisnirvāṇa,itiscessation(nirodha),calm(śānta),excellent(praṇīta)andexit(niḥsaraṇa).”Thesespecificcharacteristicsofnirvāṇawhichareexperientiallyverifiablebythepractitionerprovetheirveryexistenceasrealentities.Infact,characteristicandessentialnatureareoneandthesamething.WemayalsonoteheretheMVŚdoctrinethatwhatpertainstotheabsolutetruth(paramārtha)istheuniversalprinciplesdirectlycognized(abhi-sam-√i)bytheārya.

3. There are certain sūtra‑swhich explicitly say thatnirvāṇa exists. Thus,asūtrasays:

Omonks!thereisdefinitelytheunborn.Ifthiswerenot,therewouldnotbeanendtobirth‑deathandduḥkha.Asthereistheunborn…(cf. Itivuttaka,43).

Also:

“There is anabode (sthāna), anexit”; “I see that there truly is the realcategory(padārtha)ofasaṃskṛta,namelynirvāṇa”;“Itiscallednirodha onaccountofthenirodhaofthefiveaggregatesofgrasping”;“Therearethree dhātu‑s — nirvāṇa-dhātu, saṃskṛta-dhātu, asaṃskṛta-dhātu”;“Thereisanirodha-dhātu”;“Thereistheborn(jāta),thereistheunborn(ajāta)”; “There is theārya-satya of duḥkha-nirodha”; “Iknowdirectlytheabodeofsecurity(kṣemāyatana,kṣema-gati)”;etc.

The Sautrāntika and others, of course, deny that these sūtra statementsconstituteproofofnirvāṇaasarealentity.Thus,“Thereistheunborn”refersnottoarealentity,butsimplytothediscontinuityofthebirth(janmāpravṛtti)

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of existents; itmeans simply: “there is the cutting off of the series of theborn”.Saṃghabhadrarepliesthatitisonlywhentheunbornisconcededtobeadistinctrealentitythatitismeaningfultosay“thereis”.Besides,iftherewerenosuchentity,theBuddhashouldhavesimplysaid“thereisthediscontinuityoftheborn”.Moreover,beforethepathhasarisen,thereisno‘cuttingoffoftheseries’;whenthepathisarisen,thereis;againthereisnot,whenanārya retrogresses in giving rise to defilements— thus the cutting off of a seriesshouldnotbeasaṃskṛta.Toshowitsunreality, theSautrāntikaalsocitesthesimileinthesūtrawhichlikensnirvāṇatotheextinctionoftheflameofalamp.The Vaibhāṣika,however,arguesthatthissimiledoesnotcontradicttheirview‑point:Theextinctionreferred therein is theanityatā-lakṣaṇawhichexistsasarealviprayukta-saṃskāra dharma,distinctfromtheflame.Besides,thissimileismadewithreferencetothetimeofenteringintothenirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa whenallremainingupadhi‑sarecompletelycutoff.

4. The Sautrāntikaandsomeabhidharmamastersconcedethatnirvāṇaexists,butonlyasarelativelyreal(prajñaptisat).TheSarvāstivādaarguesthatifitisconcededtoexist,itmustbeacceptedtoexistasanabsolutelyreal(dravya-sat,paramārtha-sat),forarealsupportingbasis—onwhichnirvāṇaisdesignatedasarelativelyreal—cannotbefound.

The saṃskāra‑s cannot serve as this basis for designating nirvāṇa as theircessation, for in this case, nirvāṇa, like its basis, would have to be a thingwhosenature is tobeabandoned,defiled,withoutflowand impermanent—completelycontradictorytothenatureofnirvāṇa.Moreover,logicallyspeaking,the saṃskāra‑sbeingopposedinnaturetonirvāṇa,cannotbethebasisofthelatter:therehasneverbeenarelativelyrealdharmathatisopposedinnaturetoitsverysupportingbasis,asinthecaseoflightanddarkness.Furthermore,sincenirvāṇaisconcededtobethecessationofthesaṃskāra‑s,thelattercannotserveasthebasis—itisnotobservedthatlighthasdarkness(itsextinction)asthebasis.Besides,itisalsoillogicalinviewofthefactthatwhenthesaṃskāra‑sareexisting,thereisnocessation:apersonwhoisnon‑detached,aslongasheisstillhavingdefilementslikegreed,etc.,cannotbesaidtohavethecessationofthesedefilements.Itisonlywhenthedefilementsnolongerexistinhimthatherealizesnirvāṇa.

Conclusion:Ifnirvāṇahasanyreality,itmustbearealentityinitself,notameredesignationderivedfromanybasis.(Cf.thelastargumenttothatemployedintheNy(624cff.)inestablishingthatthepastandfuturedharma‑sarenotjustdesignationsonthebasisoftherealpresentdharma‑s.Alsocf.ADV,278).

5. Someassertthatnirvāṇaisunrealbecauseaknowledge(jñāna)necessarilyhasanobject,andforthemtheprajñāwhichperceivesnirvāṇa (nirvāཇālambanā prajñā)hasname(nāman)asitsobject.Saṃghabhadrarefutesthis,pointingout


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thatitwouldleadtotheconsequenceofmithyā-dṛṣṭiandsamyag-dṛṣṭibeingmutuallyaccomplishing:

A samyag-dṛṣṭi comprehendingnirvāṇa as being śānta andnityawouldbecomeadṛṣṭy-upādāna,sinceallnamesareimpermanent.Amithyā-dṛṣṭi vilifyingnirvāṇaasbeingimpermanentinnaturewouldbecomeasamyag-dṛṣṭi,sinceitwouldbeanunderstandinginconformitytoreality.Thosewhoholdthatnirvāṇaisdevoidofanyessentialrealitywouldneverconcedethatnameisanon‑existent;thosewhoholdthatnirvāṇahasanessentialnaturewouldneverconcedethatnameitselfisnirvāṇa.

6. If nirvāṇawerenotarealentity,howcanthereceptivebeingsgiverisetodelightinnirvāṇaanddisgusttowardssaṃsāra—therecannotbeinferiorityorsuperiorityamongnon‑existents.Moreover,itwouldmeanthattheBuddhahadbeendeludingthereceptivebeings, forhewouldhavebeenspeakingofthenon‑existentsinthesamemannerthathespokeoftheexistents.Afurtherimplicationwouldbethataviewthatdenies therealityofnirvāṇawouldbeasamyag-dṛṣṭi. (Cf.followingargument).

In this argument, there is an implicit stress that nirvāṇa, as much as theconditioneddharma‑s, are real forceswhich canhave impacton thementalstream of sentient beings. It is cognizable (vijñeya), even though ordinaryworldlings cannot cognize it truly as it is (yathābhūtam). This point is alsobroughtoutfromthefollowingdiscussionintheVKŚ:

Canathoughtpertainingtothesensesphere(kāmadhātu-pratisaṃyukta-citta) … cognize the dharma‑s which do not pertain to any sphere(apratisaṃyukta)—[namely,theoutflow‑freedharma‑s]?

Answer:Yes,itcan.Thatis:withregardtocessation,itmay[cognizeit]as cessation, calm, excellence and escape (the fourākāra‑s of the truthof cessation—§15.2.2.1).Withregardtothepath,itmay[cognizeit]aspath,rightmethod,courseofpracticeandbeingconducivetoexit(fourākāra‑softhetruthofthepath).…Itmaybeacognitionofthenatureofdoubt,orofdelusion,orofbeinggeneratedfromproperreasoning(yoga-vihita),orofbeinggeneratedfromimproperreasoning(ayoga-vihita).29

7. Theopponentsargue:TheBuddhaexplicitlystatesinthesūtra that“all”dharma‑sarecomprisedinthe12āyatana‑s(Saṃyutta-nikāya,iv,13),andalsothat these12āyatana‑saresa-prapañcaandanitya.Now,ifnirvāṇa isarealexistentand ispermanent, theBuddhawouldhavedistinguished it from the12 āyatana‑s.Saṃghabhadraanswers:Inthesamecontext,theBuddhafurtherspeaksofallthe12āyatana‑sasbeingwith‑burning(sa-dāha)—i.e.,havingtheheatofdefilement.Now,surelytheārya-mārgaisincludedinthe12āyatana‑sandyetitiscertainlydevoidoftheburningofgreed,etc.WhythendoestheBuddhanotdistinguishitfromtheotherdharma‑s?Thus,itmustbeunderstood

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thattheBuddhainthiscontextreferstothe12āyatana‑swhicharewithoutflow.Hencetheopponents,byquotingtheabovesūtracannotestablishtheunrealityof nirvāṇa.

8. Whenduḥkhaisceased,apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha—distinctfromduḥkha andmārga—isacquired.Itisthisthatiscallednirvāṇa(432c).Iftherewereno nirodhathatexistsasarealentity,thenanarhatoughttohavedefilementsandoneattheśaikṣastageoughttohavebeenfreedfromdefilements,sincethemoment(knownasvimukti mārga)followingthatatwhichtheacquisitionofthedefilementisabandoned(knownasānantarya-mārga)wouldnotbedifferent.Infact,itisthisrealentityarisingatthefollowingmomentthatfunctionsasaforceabsolutelypreventingtheacquisitionofthedefilementsoabandonedfrom linking up the defilementwith the individual series (saṃtati). That is,pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha isnotamereconcept;itisarealforcethatabsolutelypreventsthere‑arisingofthedefilement.

9. Nirvāṇa,ifunreal,couldnothavebeensubsumedasoneofthenobletruths—thenirodha-satya—anon‑existentcannotbepredicatedas‘true’or‘false’.An ārya,inhisabhisamaya,seestrulyallfourtruths.Nowsinceprajñācannotarisewithregardtoanon-existentobject(thisisthearticulatedpositionoftheVaibhāṣika30),itwouldbetopsy‑turvytosaythatanāryaseesanon-existentobject.Moreover, with regard to a non‑existent which absolutely defies allverbalqualifications,howcantheārya,inhisspiritualrealization,say:“Thisiscessationofduḥkha”?Itisobservedintheworldthatthedemonstratives‘this’and ‘that’ are applicable only to existent things. Furthermore, all this willamount to the denial of the existenceof the third truth.Besides, ifduḥkha-nirodhasignifiesthemereabsenceofduḥkha,thereneedonlybethementionof duḥkha-nirodha-gāminī-pratipat(thefourthtruth)—thementionofmārga-satyasufficestoindicatetheabsenceofduḥkhathatitcounteracts.Ifitdoesnotresultintheabsenceofduḥkha,whyisitsaidtobeacounteractivepath?

16.2.2. Cessation through deliberation, acquisition and spiritual liberation

The proposition that there are as many Cessations through deliberation asthere areobjectsof junction (saṃyogavastu)31— i.e.,with‑outflowdharma‑sto which the ordinary worldlings are bound32 — is consistent with theSarvāstivādaviewthatspiritual liberation isagradualprocessdependentonthegradualabandoningofdefilements.Itisargued:Ifthereisonlyonesinglepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha or nirvāṇa, thenat thetimewhenthepractitionerfirstgainsinsightintoduḥkha-satyaandtherebyrealizesthepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha ofthecorrespondingdefilement,hewouldhaveatthesametimerealizedthecessationofalldefilements.Consequentlyitwouldbefutileforhimtofurthercultivatethecounteractionoftheremainingdefilements.33


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The same proposition also entails that all sentient beings realize a commonnirodha corresponding to the particular defilement.But this raises importantquestionsasrecordedintheMVŚ:whensentientbeingsrealizepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha,(i)dotheytogetherrealizeacommononeor(ii)dotheyindividuallyrealizeadifferent (i.e.,identicalbutdistinct)one ineachcase? In the formercasewhy isnirvāṇa said to be the unique (asādhāraṇa)Dharma?Moreover,whenonesentientbeingrealizesnirvāṇa,[then]allbeingsshouldalsoacquireitatthesametime,whichentailsthatliberationcomesaboutautomaticallywithoutanyeffort!Ontheotherhand,ifeachsentientbeingrealizes adifferentnirodha,whyis nirvāṇa said to be non‑similar (asabhāga). Furthermore, how, inthatcase,isonetounderstandthesūtrastatementthatliberationofthetathāgataandthatoftheothersarenotdifferent?34TheMVŚcompilers’answeristhat

whensentientbeingsrealizepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha,theyrealizeacommonone.However,althoughnirvāṇaisinactualfactcommonasanentity,itissaidtobenon‑commoninrespecttoitsacquisitionsincethevisaṃyoga-prāptiarisesseparatelyintheseriesofeachindividual.(loc. cit.)

Itisonlywhentheacquisitionofnirvāṇaarisesinaparticularindividualthatheissaidtohaveacquired/attainednirvāṇa.35

TheaboveexplanationgivenbytheSarvāstivādaspellsouttheimportantrolethatacquisitionplaysinspiritualattainments.Anyreligionorphilosophythatpositsatranscendentalabsoluteneedstoaccountforthewayinwhichtheempiricalisrelated to the transcendental. In theSarvāstivādaperspective, the relationshipiseffectedbyacquisition,arealforceexistinginitsownright,whichconnectsadharmatoagivenseries.Thedharmathenisonepossessedbythatparticularindividual.Inabandoningadefilement,twofinalmomentsareinvolved:Inthefirstmoment known as ānantarya-mārga, the acquisition of the defilement issevered.Inthesecondmoment,knownasvimukti mārga,theacquisitionofthecorrespondingpratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaarises,andthepractitionerissaidtohaverealizedthenirodha.

The notion of acquisition is also invoked to explain away the apparentcontradictioninvolvedinstatingthatthenirvāṇaisaphala—visaṃyoga-phala —although it isnot causallyproducedby the spiritualpath.Saṃghabhadraexplains:

Worldlings collectively sanction the name phala with regard to theaccomplishment through effort of what has been longed for. Death ismostdistressfulforhumanbeings;accordinglyitisdeathlessness(amṛta = nirvāṇa)thathumanbeingsmostlongfor.Whatissolongedfor,whenrealized through the efficacyof thepath, is called aphala. It is said tobewithoutacause(ahetuka)since thepath isnotanyof thesixcausesfor the asaṃskṛta pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha to be acquired. Pratisaṃkhyā-

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nirodha is not aphala [causally] produced by the path (theānantarya-mārga);itisaphalarealizedbyvirtueofit.Thepathisnotageneratingcauseforthepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha;itisacauseofrealization.36Hence,betweenthetwo—thepathandthenirodha—onecannotdefinitelyspeakof acause‑effect relationship or otherwise.… [As amatter of fact, theacquisitionofthenirodhacouldbeconsideredthephalaofthepath,]sincethepath is thehomogeneouscause(sabhāga-hetu)—oralsosaid tobetheco‑existentcause(sahabhū-hetu)—fortheacquisitionofthenirodha. Nevertheless,thisisnotthephaladirectlysoughtafterbytheārya.Itiswiththenirodhatobeacquiredinmindthattheāryapracticestheārya-mārga.Accordingly,thespecificphalaofthepathisnoneotherthantheacquirednirodha;nottheacquisitionofnirodha,sinceitisnotforthesakeof the saṃskṛta‑sthatanāryapracticestheārya-mārga.37

In this connection the Sautrāntika raises a question:38 What cause is thereto ensure that a specificacquisition is linked to a specificnirodha?—Whatensures that one acquires a particular pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha and not anotherone?Saṃghabhadrarepliesthatthereisinfactnoneedforaspecifyingcause:bythepowerofonemārga,thedefilementsceaseen blocandthedisjunctionisacquireden bloc.Or,itistheverynatureofthings(dharmatā)thatthatwhichacquires (i.e.,themārga) and thatwhich is acquired (i.e.,the visaṃyoga) arespecifically related. Or, it is the path bywhich the defilement is abandoned(prahāṇa-mārga)thatisthespecifyingcause,foritisbyvirtueofthepaththatthearisingof theacquisitionofdisjunction is induced‑—thenirodha of the defilements to be abandoned by a specific path cannot be acquired throughadifferentpath.

Afurtherquestion:

Thereisapluralityofpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑sacquiredthroughoneandthesameprahāṇa-mārga—whatspecifyingcauseistheretoenableustosaythisis[thepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha] of rāga,thisofdveṣa,etc.?

Tothis,Saṃghabhadraanswerssimilarly:

All the [defilements] to be ceased, constituting a given category, areabandoned through a single path; the disjunctions acquired havingthe same acquisition,what need is there for a specifying cause?Or, asmentioned before, by virtue of the nature of things, the relation is notconfused:Fromthebeginning,thereexists—betweenrāga,etc.,andthe[corresponding]nirodha—aspecific,non‑confusedrelationbyvirtueofthe nature of things. Since at the timewhen theprahāṇa-mārga arises,the[pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑s]areacquireden bloc,thereisnothingwrongevenifthereisnospecifyingcause.


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16.2.3. Sautrāntika conception of nirvāṇa

Byway of contrast, wemay here outline the Sautrāntika conceptionwhichSaṃghabhadravehementlyrepudiates.TheSautrāntika(andothers)maintainthatnirvāṇaisamereconceptreferringtotheabsenceofduḥkha39onaccountoftheabsolutenon‑arisingorabandoningofdefilementsduetotheabsenceofthe defilement‑seeds(kleśa-bīja).40Forthem,pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhais“thenon‑arising—byvirtueoftheforceofdeliberation/consideration(pratisaṃkhyā)—of[any]otherproclivityatthetimeofthecessationofthearisenproclivitiesandofbirth”.41 The acquisitionofnirvāṇa is explainedas theacquisitionofa personal basis (āśraya = skandha-saṃtati) absolutely opposed (atyanta-viruddha)tothedefilementsthatwouldariseandtofutureexistence.42

In theAKB, theSautrāntika— in a similarmanner—explains acquisitionas a mere concept. There the Vaibhāṣika argues that acquisitionmust be arealentitywithoutwhichonewouldnotbeabletodifferentiateanāryafromapṛthagjana: anārya, evenwhenhepossessesworldly thoughtsat times, isdifferentfromapṛthagjanabecausehehastheacquisitionoftheārya dharma‑s.The Sautrāntika,however,arguesthatthevalidityofthedistinctiondoesnotrequiresuchanontologicalentitycalledacquisition.Thedistinctionismadeintermsofthedifferenceinthepersonalbasis:Thewholepersonalbasisofanārya,asaresultofhisspiritualattainment,istotallytransformed(parāvṛtta) to bepure,fullypurgedofallpotencies(bīja)fordefilements.Assuch,therewillabsolutelybenofurtherarisingofanydefilementforhim.Suchanāryaissaidtohaveabandonedthedefilements.43

SaṃghabhadrarefutestheSautrāntikaconception:44

(i) Thepratisaṃkhyā-nirodhathusdefineddoesnotdifferfromthenon‑arisingowingtothedeficiencyinconditions.

(ii) Spiritualcultivationwouldbeinvain,sincetherecanalsobenon‑arisingwithouttheārya-mārga.

(iii)Thedharma‑sdestinednottoarisearelikethosethathavebecomepast,unabletore‑arise—evenwhentheirseedshavenotbeenabandoned—whythentheneedtocultivatethepath?IntheSarvāstivādasystemwhichholds that pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑s are realized separately through thegradualabandoningofthedefilementandduḥkhapertainingtothethreeperiodsoftime,dharma‑swhichcannotarise—owingtoapratisaṃkhyā-nirodha having been acquired — still need to be abandoned throughfurthercultivation,astheiracquisitionobstructsnirvāṇa.

(iv) Ifnirvāṇaismerelyanon‑arising,howcanonespeakofacquiringit?Itisnot logical to answer that, through the acquisition of the counteraction

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(pratipakṣa), there is the realizationof a transformedpersonal basis asdescribedabove.For then, at theverymomentwhenonefirst acquiresthe ārya-mārga, oneought tohaveacquirednirvāṇa of thedefilementscounteracted by the path, since at this very moment one would haveacquired such a personal basis. The practitioner abiding subsequentlyin the śaikṣa-mārgawouldhavealreadybecomeanaśaikṣa.Thiswouldrenderanyfurthercultivationfutile.TheSautrāntikatriesinvaintoavoidthisconsequencebysayingthatsuchapersonalbasisisnotacquireduntilonehasabsolutelyabandonedtheseedsofdefilements,andthatthisoccursonlyafterthearisingoftheānantarya-mārga.Forinthatcase,theseedsofdefilements,notbeingopposedtotheāryamārgaofthefirstmoment,oughttobelikewiseunopposedtothoseofthesubsequentmoments—whichmeansthatanaśaikṣawouldhavedefilements!ThisfallacycannotbeavoidedbytheSautrāntikawhichteachesthattheseedsofdefilementsaremerely the transformation of the series (saṃtati-pariṇāma) servingasthesupportingbasisofthedefilement,andthatnirvāṇaismerelythenon‑arisingofdefilement.Giventhisteaching,whatdistinctdharma‑saretherethatareopposedtowhichdharma-sandthatareunopposedtowhichdharma‑s?TheSarvāstivādadoctrineisfreefromthisfallacy,foritteachesthatacquisition‑saredistinctentitiesinthemselves.Theyareunopposedto the kṣāntiatwhichmomentthedefilementisabandoned,andopposedtothe jñānaatwhichsubsequentmomenttheprāptiofdisjunctionarises:thejñānaarisesatthesametimeastheprāptiofdisjunctionwhichisopposedto the prāpti of the defilements. Furthermore,when theārya-mārga of the moment is about to arise, the body of the worldling (pṛthagjana-kāya)isabouttoperish;whentheformerarises,thelatterisrelinquished.Whatdistinctseedsofdefilementsapartfromthisbodyaretherewhicharesaidtobeunopposedtothefirstārya-mārgabutbecomeopposedtothesubsequentones—thepathsbeingnotdifferent?45

16.2.4. Summary

In the Sarvāstivādaperspective,thereareasmanynirvāṇa‑sorpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑sastherearewith‑outflowdharma‑s.Theseareontologicallydistinctreal entities. Their reality is not even dependent on the criterion of causalefficacyin thespace‑timedimensionbuton thefact that theycan impactonthemental streams of beings. Eachnirvāṇa—viaprāpti— acts to ensuretheabsolutenon‑arisingofthedefilementcounteractedbytheārya-mārgabyvirtueofwhichtheprāpti of the nirvāṇaisinduced,andeachisexperienciblebytheāryaashavingdistinctcharacteristics.

Nirvāṇa in the sense of the ultimate spiritual realization of the Buddhistpractitioner refers to thepratisaṃkhyā-nirodha realizedwhenall thekleśa‑sandduḥkha‑spertainingtothethreeperiodsoftimearecompletelyabandoned


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(Ny,430b).Althoughallpractitionersacquirethesamenirvāṇacorrespondingtoagivenimpuredharma,each individual’sexperienceofnirvāṇa isuniquebyvirtueoftheprāptithatlinksthenirvāṇatohim.Acquisition—althoughconditionedinitselfbutneithermentalnormaterialinnature—infactplaystheimportantroleofrelatingtheunconditionedtotheconditioned.Itisthesine qua nonforman’sexperienceofnirvāṇa.

ItisnotdifficulttounderstandwhySaṃghabhadra’sargumentsfortherealityofnirvāṇa—totallytranscendingthespace‑timedimensionasitdoes—arenotalwayscogent.SomeobviouslyarecontingentupontheSarvāstivādapostulatesandpresuppositions.Ultimately,apartfromsomescripturalpassagesin theirfavor,theSarvāstivādinscannotbutappealtotheauthorityofspiritualinsight:

Its self‑nature can be personally realized only by theārya. Thismuch,although,canbesaid:Thereexistsadistinctentitywhichispermanentandskillful.Thatiscalledadisjunctionandapratisaṃkhyā-nirodha.46

16.3. Cessation independent of deliberation

Among the three unconditioneddharma‑s, the reality of theapratisaṃkhyā-nirodha and ākāśa is especially contentious.47 Unlike the cessation throughdeliberation,thecessationindependentofdeliberationisnotofthenatureofdisjunctionfromadefileddharma.Althoughthetermisattestedintheearlycanonicaltexts,thereisverylittlediscussiononitsnatureinthem.TheSgPŚ,in defining name‑and‑form (nāma-rūpa), simply mentions it as among theitemssubsumableundername.48TheDSŚincludesallthethreeunconditioneddharma‑s under the dharma-āyatana;49 and distinguishing among the threeelements — material, non‑material and cessation — defines the cessationelement (nirodha-dhātu) as comprising the two unconditioned cessations.50 ItalsospeaksofthecessationindependentofdeliberationandSpacetogetherwithallconditioneddharma‑saslowerdharma‑s(sa-uttara;‘withahigher’)in contrast to the cessation through deliberationwhich is called the highest(anuttara;‘withoutahigher’)dharma.51

ItisfromtheJPŚonwardsthatwecanseedefinitedoctrinaldevelopmentonthenatureofthiscessation.Threetypesofcessationsaredistinguishedanddefinedtherein: (1) Cessation of impermanence is the disintegration and perishingof the conditioning forces (saṃskāra). (2) Cessation through deliberationis a cessation of the nature of disjunction (from defilement). (3) Cessationindependent of deliberation is emancipation fromdiseases, calamities, grief,etc., and“thedharma‑sofunsatisfactorinessinthetemporalprocess”(行世苦法;*adhva-saṃcāra-(duḥkha-)dharma),withoutdependingondeliberation/discrimination;“itisnotthesubduing,abandoningortranscendingofsensualgreed.”52ThecommentaryoftheMVŚstatesthatthispassageisintendedto

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refute those like theDārṣṭāntikaswhodeny all the three typesof cessation.Inits comments, various important doctrinal developments on this cessationarediscernible.(Seebelow,§16.3.1).

ThenatureofthiscategoryisfurtherelaboratedintheMVŚ:

Itiscalledacessationindependentofdeliberationbecauseitisnotacquiredthrough deliberative understanding, not being an effect of deliberation.Furthermore,itissocalledbecauseitisnotacquiredthroughdeliberationbymeansofnecessaryeffort,necessarypreparationornecessaryexertion.Furthermore, … because its acquisition does not require the repeatedascertainingofduḥkha,etc.…

It is [acquired] on account of the deficiency in conditions (pratyaya-vaikalyāt).Thus,whenoneisfocused[onanobject]inonedirection,alltheotherobjects—visible,sound,smell,tasteandtangible —intheotherdirectionscease.Thethoughtandthought‑concomitantsthatwouldhavetakentheseobjectsdonotariseabsolutely(atyantam); theydonotariseowingtothedeficiencyinconditions.Onaccountofthisnon‑arising,theircessationsindependentofdeliberationareacquired.53

The Sautrāntikasmaintain that this cessation is nothingmore than a notiondesignatingthedeficiencyinconditions.54InNy,Saṃghabhadraarguesagainstthis, emphaticallymaking thepoint that theapratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is a realentitycapableofobstructingabsolutelythearisingofthedharma‑sconcerned:

The deficiency in conditions is merely a non‑existence of condition.A non-existentdharmaisincapableofobstructinganexistent:Whenlaterthenecessaryconditionshappentoassembletogether,whatdharmawilltherebe that iscapableofpreventing [thesaiddharma,which failed toarise earlier on,] fromarising again?Yet it is impossible for adharma which abides among the un‑arisen (anutpanna) dharma-s to still ariselater.Hencetheremustexist [arealdharma]capableofobstructingtheconditionsabsolutely.Itisnotthemeredeficiencyinconditionsthatcausestheabsolutenon‑arising.55

ThispositivedescriptionbySaṃghabhadraisconsidereda‘neo-Sarvāstivāda’doctrinebymanyscholars.However,suchapositiveemphasisisalreadyfoundintheMVŚ:

This cessation independentofdeliberation is acquiredonlywith regardto the futuredharma‑swhichareof thenatureofbeingdestinednot toarise (anutpatti-dharmin, anutpatti-dharmaka). Why? This cessation isoriginallymeantforobstructingabsolutelythe arisingofaconditioneddharma. The acquisitionofthis[cessation]arisesuponthenon‑arisingofthesaiddharma[whichhasbeenthusobstructed].56


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Skandhilatooexplicitlyemphasizesthiscessationasarealforce.HavinggivenaverysimilardefinitiontothatintheMVŚquotedabove,headds:

Thedeficiency in the [necessary] conditions is alsodue to the forceofthiscessation.Hence,theredefinitelyexistsarealentitynamed‘cessationindependentofdeliberation’.57

16.3.1. Distinction between cessation through deliberation, cessation independent of deliberation and cessation of impermanence (anityatā-nirodha)

Skandhila further argues for the reality of this category by distinguishing itfromcessationas pratisaṃkkhyā-nirodhaandasimpermanence:

The Bhagavat has said: “If, at that moment the pleasurable sensationappears,theothertwosensations[—unpleasurableandneutral—]cease.”Now,whatcanthiscessationbeapartfromthe[cessationindependentofdeliberation], since it definitely is not [the cessation of] impermanenceor the cessation through deliberation? Again, it is said in the sūtra,“Obhikṣu‑s, if one attains stream‑entry, one has exhausted [rebirths in]hells, the infernal regions and the animal region. The exhaustion hererefers to thecessation independentofdeliberation,sinceat themomentonehasnotacquiredthecessationthroughdeliberationfortheretributivedharma‑s.”58

SuchanarticulatedistinctionisimportantfortheSarvāstivādins,asitamountsto the establishment of the three nirodha‑s as discrete ontological entities.Saṃghabhadramakesthesamedistinction,citingthesamesūtrapassageandarguingsimilarly:

Moreover,cessationandexhaustionaretwodifferentnamesofthesamesubstance.Thesūtrasaysthatasrotaāpannaexhausts[existencein] thethree durgati‑s.Therefore,weknow that there isadistinctentitywhichis the apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, as this exhaustion definitely cannot beincludedunderothernirodha‑s:Thesūtrasays:

A srotaāpanna has already exhausted [existence in] hells, hasalready exhausted [existence in] the animal realm, has alreadyexhausted[existencein]thehungry‑ghostrealm.…

Now, it is not the case that he is already capable of abandoning thedurgati‑s, since he has not yet beendetached (vīta-rāga)with regard tothe kāmadhātu,andthedurgati‑saresaidtobeabandonedonlywhenonehascompletelybeendetached fromkāma-rāga.… .Nordoes theword‘exhaustion’ here refer to theanityatā-nirodha, sincewhat is exhaustedis all asyet unproduced.Hence, it is proved that theredefinitely existsadistinct dharma named apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. As a result of this

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dharma being acquired, the durgati‑s aremade absolutely incapable ofbeingproduced.59

Aswehaveseenabove,thedistinctionbetweenthethreecessationshasalreadybeenmadeintheJPŚ.(§16.3).TheMVŚcommentaryelaboratesupontheJPŚpassage,differentiatingthethreecessationsindistinctivelyabhidharmicterms:

(1) Distinction between with‑outflow and outflow‑free cessationsindependentofdeliberation(=ap‑n):Theemancipationfrom“diseases,calamities,etc.”referstothewith‑outflowones;theemancipationfrom“thedharma‑sinthetemporalprocess”referstotheoutflow‑freeones.

(2) Thecessations throughdeliberation(=pr‑n)arecessationsofwith‑outflow dharma‑s through deliberation. The apr‑n is emancipationfromdiseases,etcwithoutdependingondeliberation.Thecessationofimpermanence(=ani‑n)isthedisintegrationoftheconditionings.

(3) The pr‑n is of the nature of both emancipation and disjunction.Theapr‑nisemancipation,notdisjunction.Theani‑nisneither.

(4) Thepr‑nareacquiredwithregardtothewith‑outflowdharma‑softhethreeperiodsoftime.Theapr‑nareacquiredwithregardtothefutureconditioneddharma‑sdestinednottoarise.Theani‑noperateonallofthepresentdharma‑s.

(5) In terms of moral species: the pr‑n are skillful and so are theiracquisitions.Theapr‑n arenon‑defined andsoaretheiracquisitions.Theani‑ncanbeanyofthethreespecies,andsoaretheiracquisitions.

(6) Thepr‑nareoutflow‑freeandtheiracquisitionsareeitherwith‑outflowor outflow‑free;theapr‑nareoutflow‑free,andtheiracquisitionsarewith‑outflowonly;theani‑ncanbeeitherwith‑outfloworoutflow‑free,andsoaretheiracquisitions.

(7) Thepr‑narenotboundtoanysphereofexistence(apratisaṃyukta)and their acquisitionsmay be bound to fine‑material sphere or the non‑material sphere or not bound to any sphere.The apr‑n are notbound to any sphere, and their acquisitions are bound to the threespheres only. The ani‑nmay be bound to the three spheres or notboundtoanysphere,andsoaretheiracquisitions.

(8) The pr‑n are neither‑trainee‑nor‑nontrainee (naiva-śaikṣa-nāśaikṣa)andtheiracquisitionsmaybetrainee,non‑traineeorneither‑trainee‑nor‑nontrainee.Theapr‑nareneither‑trainee‑nor‑nontrainee, andsoaretheiracquisitions.Theani‑ncanbeanyofthethreetypes,andsoaretheiracquisitions.


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(9) Thepr‑narenot tobeabandoned(aheya)andtheiracquisitionsareeithertobeabandonedbycultivationornottobeabandoned.Theapr‑narenottobeabandoned,andtheiracquisitionsaretobeabandonedbycultivationonly.Theani‑ncanbeanyofthethreetypes,andsoaretheir acquisitions.

(10)The pr‑n and the apr‑n are both non‑defiled, and so are their acquisitions.Theani‑nmaybeeitherdefiledornon‑defiled,andsoaretheiracquisitions.(Likewiseforthecharacterizationintermsofbeingsāvadya/anavadyaandparihāṇi/aparihāṇi).

(11)Thepr‑narewithoutretributionandtheiracquisitionsareeitherwithorwithoutretribution.Theapr‑narewithoutretribution,andsoaretheir acquisitions.Theani‑ncanbeofeither type,andsoare their acquisitions.

(12)Thepr‑narefruitsofthepaths60andtheiracquisitionsmaybeeitherpathsand fruitsof thepathsor neitherpaths nor fruitsof thepath.Theapr‑nareneitherpathsnorfruitsofthepaths, andtheiracquisitionsare both. The ani‑n are either, or both, or neither, and so are their acquisitions.

(13)The pr‑n are subsumed under the truth of cessation and their acquisitionsaresubsumedundertheotherthreetruths.Theapr‑narenot subsumedunder the truths,and theiracquisitionsaresubsumedundertwotruths,namelythetruthsofunsatisfactorinessandoforigin.The ani‑n are subsumed under three truths excepting the truth ofcessation,andsoaretheiracquisitions.61

There are various other investigations into the nature of the cessationindependent of deliberation. The following is on whether it is acquiredcollectivelyorindividually:

Question: Are the cessations independent of deliberation acquiredcollectivelyornotacquiredcollectively?

Answer: This is not fixed. The cessation independent of cessation ofshareddharma‑sareacquiredcollectively;thoseofunshareddharma‑sareacquiredindividually.Inthecaseofordinaryworldlingslivinginagivenplaneofexistence(gati),theyacquire,frommomenttomoment,cessationsindependent of deliberation of dharma‑s pertaining to other planes ofexistence;for,whenobjectssuchasvisiblesperisheverymoment,thevisualconsciousness,etc.,whichtakethemascognitiveobjects,willabsolutelynotarise.Thesameappliestothecaseof[livingin]agivensphere(dhātu),agivenstage(bhūmi)oragivenabode(āyatana).62

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Anothermoreinterestingelaborationconcernstheroleofthiscessationinpathofspiritualprogress:

Question:Bymeansofwhatskillfuldharma‑sdothespiritualpractitionersacquirecessationsindependentofdeliberationoftheunfortunateplanesofexistence?

Answer:Bymeansofgiving,orethicalobservances,ortheunderstandingderivedfromlistening(learningfromteachers), fromreflectionorfromcultivation.

Bymeansofgiving:therearethosewho,inspiteofpracticingopen‑doorgreatgivingfor12years,areunabletoacquirethecessationindependentofdeliberationoftheunfortunateplanesofexistence…;therearesomewho,thoughgivingjustonceandjustalumpoffood,areabletoacquireit on account of being profoundly disgustedwith saṃsāra.… (Similardescription for theothermeans,up to:)Bymeansof theunderstandingderivedcultivation:…whenthereceptivitiesofthelowergrade(cf. supra,15.3.2.3) are acquired … According to the Bhadanta (Dharmatrāta):the cessation independent of deliberation of the unfortunate planes ofexistenceisacquiredonlywhentherearisestheoutflow‑freeprajñāwhichcomprehends Conditioned Co‑arising; for, apart from the noble path(i.e.,theoutflow‑freeprajñā),theunfortunateplanesofexistencecannotbetranscended.(Bhadanta’sviewisrejectedbythecompilershere).

[For the caseof] the fortunate planes of existence (sugati):At the timeof the receptivities of the strong grade, [the practitioner] acquires thecessationindependentofdeliberationofallexistences—exceptthesevenexistenceseachamonghumansandgods,andoneexistenceeach in thefine‑materialandnon‑materialspheres.63

16.3.2. Summary

Littlemorethanthemerementionofthiscessationisfoundintheearliercanonicaltexts.Starting from the JPŚ,however,webegin tofinddoctrinal articulationson it. This text, besides offering a definition of the cessation independent ofdeliberation,alsodistinguishesbetweenwith‑outflowandoutflow‑freecessationsindependent of deliberation. In the MVŚ, elaborate analysis— utilizing theAbhidharmicdoctrinalperspectives—ofitsnatureincomparisontothosethecessationthroughdeliberationandthecessationofimpermanence.

Moreover,already in theJPŚ,wesee the implication that suchcessationsdonotexclusivelypertaintomundanehumanexperienceswhereinthecognitionsof certain objects are commonly missed out in the absence of the requiredconditions.ThespecificseparationofsuchexperiencesfromthetypewhicharedescribedintheJPŚascessationsof“thedharma‑sofunsatisfactorinessinthetemporalprocess”,andspecifiedasthoseofoutflow‑freedharma‑s,suggeststhat


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thistypeofcessationcanbeofspiritualsignificanceaswell.Thispointbecomesmore explicit in the MVŚ which distinctly discusses the type of cessationsindependentofdeliberationoccurringeverymoment,ofobjectsnotcognizablebyus,andalsothetypeeffectingthenon‑arisingoftheunfortunateplanesofexistenceasaresultofspiritualpraxislikegiving,ethicalobservances,etc.

Finally, whereas in the earlier canonical texts, this cessation is explainedsimplyasbeingtheresultofthedeficiencyinconditions;sincetheMVŚ,ithasbeen further asserted that the cessation independent of deliberation is itselfanecessarycontributoryfactor:Itisapositiveforce—arealexistent—whichhelps to bring about the non‑arising of the object concerned.This aspect isarticulatelyexpoundedbySaṃghabhadra.

16.4. Space

TheontologicalstatusoftheunconditionedSpaceisalsohighlycontroversialamongtheabhidharmaschools.ItisnoteworthythatevenintheJñānaprasthāna-śāstra,thecanonicalSarvāsitivādaabhidharmatextupheldbytheVaibhāṣikasasthesupremeauthority,onlythetwonirodha‑sarementioned, butnot ākāśa. In theMVŚ,someof theSarvāstivādaācārya‑s, suchasDharmatrāta,whileacceptingtherealityofthefirsttwoasaṃskṛta‑s,denythatofākāśa(§16.1.1).It is thereforepossible that this category came tobe regarded as oneof thethree unconditionedatarelativelylaterstagebytheorthodoxSarvāstivādins.ThelattermaintainthattheunconditionedSpaceisnottobeconfoundedwiththe conditionedspace‑element(ākāśa-dhātu)whichisthecavityofthedoor,mouth,etc,andofthenatureofrūpa—morespecificallyofthenatureoflightanddarkness(āloka-tamaḥ-svabhāva),aswhatweperceiveinsuchcavitiesislightordarkness.64

16.4.1. Arguments in the MVŚ

The MVŚ gives the Ābhidharmika definition of the space‑element anddistinguishesthetwoasfollows:

The Ābhidharmikas assert thus: What is the space element? It is theagha-sāmantaka rūpa.Byagha ismeantagglomerated[matter](citasthaṃ rūpam),i.e.,awall,etc.Thereexistsamatterthatisproximatetoit,calledagha-rūpa.65 Such space as found in thewall, in the forest, in the leaves,inthewindows,amongthefingers—theyarecalledthespace‑elements.…

WhatisthedifferencebetweenSpaceandthespace‑element?Spaceisnotmatter; thespace‑element ismatter.Space is invisible(anidarśana); thespace‑elementisvisible(sanidaṛśana).Spaceisnon‑resistant(apratigha);the space‑element is resistant (sapratigha). Space is outflow‑free; thespace‑elementiswith‑outflow.Spaceisunconditioned;thespace‑elementisconditioned.66

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VasumitraarguesthattheexistenceofSpaceasarealentityisnotonlyinferablefrom the sūtra‑s; it can be known through direct perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa):

(i) IfSpacedoesnotexist,allexistentthingsoughtnotbeabletofindaccommodation.Sinceitisobservedthatthingsareaccommodatedinvariousplaces,oneknowsthatSpaceexists.

(ii)Oneknowsitsexistencebyobservingthatthereareplacesforgoing,comingandgathering;TheseactivitieswouldnotbepossiblewithoutSpaceastheaccommodativecause(hetu).Thatis,Spaceisefficacious.

(iii)Obstructivethingsareseentooccupyspace—ifSpacedoesnotexist,theycannotbeaccommodated.

(iv) In theabsenceofSpace, thereought tobeobstructioneverywhere;thefactthatsomeplacesareobservedtobenon‑obstructiveprovesitsexistence.67

TheMVŚexplainsthat,althoughtherealityofSpaceisestablishedfromthefactof itbeingefficacious, it isnot tobeunderstood that ithasanyactivity(zuo yong;作用), since it is unconditioned. It means that it can serve asadominantcondition(adhipati-pratyaya),makinganindirectcontributionbywayofnon‑obstruction(seesupra,§7.1.4):

The asaṃskṛta ākāśa has no activity. Nevertheless, it can serve as theproximateadhipati-pratyayaforthevariousākāśa-dhātu‑s.Thesevariousākāśa-dhātu‑scanserveastheproximateadhipati-pratyayaforthevariousmahābhūta‑s. These various mahābhūta‑s can serve as the proximateadhipati-pratyaya for the resistant (sapratigha) derivedmatter (upādāya rūpa).Theseresistantderivedmatterscanserveastheproximateadhipati-pratyayaforthevariouscitta-caitta-dharma‑s.

If Spacewerenon‑existent,suchasuccessivecausalsequencecannotbeestablished.Hence the intrinsicnatureandcharacteristicofSpaceexist,lesttherebesuchafallacy;theymustnotbedenied.68

16.4.2. Arguments by Saṃghabhadra

VasubandhupresentstheSautrāntikaviewthatSpaceisunreal:Itismerelytheabsenceoftangiblethings(spraṣṭavyābhāva-mātra)—peopleindarknesssaythatthereisspacewhentheydonotencounteranyobstacles.69 Saṃghabhadrainforms us that the Sautrāntika master Sthavira Śrīlāta and all the otherDārṣṭāntikamastersholdtheviewthatthespace‑elementisnothingapartfromSpace;butSpacedoesnotexistasarealentity,hencethespace‑elementtooisunreal.70SkandhilainvokesscripturalauthorityandapplieslogicalargumentstoestablishtherealityofSpace.71


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SaṃghabhadratooarguesatlengthagainsttheSautrāntikaandothers.Hismainargument is thatākāśa has anempiricallyobservable intrinsic characteristic(lakṣaṇa), and this unique characteristic points to its existence as a distinctentity. Or rather, its effect is observable, and one can therefore infer theexistenceofthecausefromthatoftheeffect.72Toconcludethischapter,wewillgivehislengthyargumentbelowwhichreadsverymuchlikeacommentaryonthecorrespondingpassageinSkandhila’sAvatāra:

Astotheirstatement‘ākāśaismerelytheabsenceofspraṣṭavya’,wealsoacceptthatākāśaistheabsenceofspraṣṭavya,asākāśahasnotangibility.[But]whathetuhaveyoutoproveyourstatementthatākāśaismerelytheabsenceofspraṣṭavyaanddoesnotexistasaseparatedravya?

Wehavealreadyprovedthatwhenpeopleindarknessdonotencounteranyresistantobject,theysaythatitisākāśa.Isnotthishetusufficienttoproveitsnon‑existence?

Onecannotbythishetualoneprovethatākāśaisdefinitelynon‑existent:Theysayonlythatitisākāśa,notanobstacle.Howdoweknowthattheyspeakoftheabsenceofspraṣṭavyaaloneasākāśa?Peopleintheworld,forinstance,say:“thisissukha,notduḥkha”.Now,howcanitbethattheabsenceofduḥkhaaloneissaidtobesukha?

Youmight argue: “No, it is a false analogy— the activitiesof the twovedanā‑s, duḥkha and sukha, being harmful and beneficial respectively,aredistinct.[Ontheotherhand],ākāśa,notaccomplishinganythingatall,cannotbeperceivedlikesukha.”[But]ifso,theabovehetugivenbyyouwouldbeuseless,sincenowyouareprovingthenon‑existenceofākāśabytheassertionthatitabsolutelyaccomplishesnothing.

Now, one definitely cannot take as necessary hetu that the absence ofobstruction is said to be ākāśa, to prove that ākāśa is nothing but theabsenceofspraṣṭavya.Thus,theKośakāra(i.e.,Vasubandhu)herehasnohetucapableofprovingthatākāśaisdefinitelynon‑existent.

Moreover, the sūtra says that the unconditioned ākāśa accomplishessomething;thereforeitisnotincomparabletosukha:Thus,theBhagavatsays,“Windissupportedbyākāśa;ithasnoactivity,hasasupport,andisnotappropriatedbythethought.”

Moreover, the rūpa, light, is the lakṣaṇa of ākāśa, hence we knowthatākāśa exists as a real entity. Thus the sūtra says, “…Nevertheless,Spacebecomesmanifestbyreasonoflight.”Hencethelakṣaṇa of Space,i.e.,light, is decisively shown. It is for this reason that the sūtra goesontosaythesewords:TheBuddhafirstsaysthatWindissupportedbyākāśa;subsequentlyHesaysthatākāśaiswithoutsupport.Thisissothatthe brāhmaṇa[towhomtheBuddhaisspeaking]wouldnotharborsuchdoubt:“NowtheBhagavathassaidthattheWindwassupportedbyākāśa.

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Buthowcanoneprovethatākāśa[really]exists?”Inordertodispelhisdoubt,theBuddhagoesontosaythosewords.Ifākāśawerenon‑existent,what[ismanifested]byreasonoflight?Lightismaterial(rūpin),visible(sanidarśana)andresistant(sapratigha);ifthereisnoākāśa,bywhatcanitbeaccommodated?ThereforewhentheBhagavatsays:“Nevertheless,Spacebecomesmanifestbyreasonoflight”, itshowsthatlight,arūpa,can serve as the truly‑existent lakṣaṇa of ākāśa.TheSthavira [Śrīlāta],however, not comprehending the import of this sūtra, replies thus:“Ifākāśabecomesmanifestbyreasonoflight,itoughttobeincludedasarūpa-dharma.”Howdoeshearriveatsuchaconclusion?

Moreover,ākāśaoughttoexistasarealentity,becauseitisdescribedinthesūtrajustasthought(citta)is:Thus,thesūtrasays:‘ākāśaisimmaterial,invisibleandnon‑resistant.Bywhatcanitbesupported?’Nowtherecannotbe suchwordsof differentiationwith regard to [absolutelynon‑existentthingsas]theātmanorthehornofthehare,etc.

Astothis,heexplainsthatthosewordsareutteredindirectresponsetothe[brāḥmaṇa’s]question.Justaswhenthesūtrasays:“Wellsubduetheātman,theātmanisthesupport.”Butifthosewordswereindeedutteredindirectresponsetothequestion,[theBuddha]shouldnothavespokenthus;Heshouldsimplyhavesaid:“Obrāḥmaṇa,ākāśaiswithoutasubstance,by what can it be supported?” Moreover, He should not have said:“Nevertheless,ākāśabecomesmanifestbyreasonoflight.”Thepūrvānta isnotspokenofasbeingdiscernible;thedoerofanactionisnotspokenof as apperceivable (upa-√labh)— and yet these are to be known asdirect replieswhichaccordwith truth. If,withregard toanon‑existent,one speaks in the manner of speaking of an existent, then it becomesmeaningless(anartha)speech.Moreover,theexamplecitedcannotserveasaproof,astheātmantobesubduedreferstothought(citta)—thishasbeenconsideredindetail[earlier](ibid.,260c;cf.alsoAKB(C),39a)whendiscussing the meaning of ādhyātmika. If the words ‘immaterial’, etc.,donothavea [corresponding] realobject (artha),howcan theexamplecitedbevalid?[Thoughtisalsodescribedasbeingimmaterial,etc.]

Furthermore, as regards theSthavira’s assertion: “Ifākāśa had any realsubstanceatall,itwouldbeeternalandhencetheresistantrūpa‑swouldneverbeproduced;orrather,oneoughttosubsumeitasasaṃskṛta,asdotheVātsīputrīya‑s.”Thisisanassertionmadewithoutcarefulconsideration,because[theākāśa]imaginedbyhimindeedcannotaccommodateotherresistantrūpa‑s.Itisnotthecasethattheākāśa dravyacanbeobstructedbyother resistantrūpa‑s so that itmustgiveway tootherrūpa‑sbeingproduced—whichwouldimplythatitisimpermanent.Ontheotherhand,becauseākāśaisaccommodativebynatureandnotrūpabynature,itdoesnothavetogiveway.[But]theākāśa-dhātu,beinganobstructiblerūpa,necessarilygiveswaywhenotherrūpa‑sarebeingproduced.That is tosay:theākāśa-dhātuisafinerūpa;althoughnotobstructingothers,itis


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obstructedbyothers,andissoclassifiableasimpermanentandsaṃskṛta. Ākāśa has the lakṣaṇa of being neither obstructive to others nor beingobstructiblebyothers,atthetimewhenrūpa-dharma‑sarebeingproduced.Howcanitbeclassifiedasimpermanentandsaṃskṛta?Asākāśaco‑existsharmoniouslywithrūpa,itdoesnotariseorperishatthedifferentstages[oftherūpa‑s].

Astothefactthatthereisresistanceinthewall,etc.,itisbecausethereareresistantrūpa‑sinitwhichobstructothers.Thisisnotthecasewiththeunconditioned ākāśasincethereisno[resistantrūpa] therein. The ākāśa-dhātu rūpa isfineand light andcannotobstructothers; as soonas it isexcluded through being obstructed by other gross rūpa‑s, it givesway.Suchisthenatureofsapratigha rūpa‑s:Whenagivenspaceisoccupiedbyone,itcannotbeoccupiedbyanother.Theākāśadiffersfromtheākāśa-dhātuinbeingapratigha;howcanitbeconsideredasimpermanentlikethelatter.

Moreover, as regardshis assertion: ‘Ifākāśa exists as a real substance,itoughttobecomesaṃskṛta,asthisdoesnotdifferfromtheākāśa-dhātu.’This is an emptyassertionwithout any truth, for theBhagavatHimselfsaysthattheydiffer:Thusthesūtrasays:“ākāśaisimmaterial,invisibleand non‑resistant”. It also says: “when one is detachedwith regards torūpa‑s,theākāśa-dhātuisabandonedtogetherwiththefour[mahābhūta‑s;the vijñāna-dhātuisnotsaidtobeabandoned]”(alsocitedinibid.,347b).Now, if ākāśa-dhātu does not differ from ākāśa, which is immaterial,invisibleandnon‑resistant, it ought also tobe the same. Itought tobe,like vijñāna-dhātu, said to be abandoned when one is detached withregard to theārūpya-dhātu.Moreover, the sūtra says: “theākāśa-dhātu accomplishesthevyavahāra-puruṣa”;andalsosays:“Neverthelessākāśa becomesmanifestbyreasonoflight.”Now,ifākāśa-dhātuisnoneotherthanākāśa,andlightisnoneotherthanākāśa-dhātu,thenwouldthesūtra notbesaying[ineffect]:“Nevertheless,lightbecomesmanifestbyreasonoflight”?Henceweknowthereisadifference[betweenthetwo].

Moreoverthesūtrasays:“Amongalldharma‑s,whethertheconditionedonesortheunconditionedones,detachment(vairāgya)issupreme.”Inthissūtra,dharma‑saresaidtobeoftwokinds;theunconditionedonesbeingdharma‑scannotbesaidtobenon‑existent,aswithoutdravya,theyoughtnot be of the nature of dharma‑s. Thewords, ‘the unconditioned ones’show that theycomprisemanydravya‑s; therefore, theremustbeākāśa and apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha‑s from which one can be detached beforetheymaybedescribed inpluralistic terms, as apart from these there isno other asaṃskṛta.Hence thisākāśa-dhātu isnot identicalwithākāśa. TheSthavira,withoutreflection,assertsthatthetwoarenotdifferent.

Thereareotherācārya‑swhoassert:“Ākāśadoesnotexistasadistinctdravya;foritiswithregardtotheabsenceofresistantrūpathatonegivesrisetotheidea(buddhi)ofspace.”Theirassertionisillogical.Infact,itis

496


bythisveryhetuthatonecanprovethatākāśaexistsasadistinctdravya:Thisisbecausethereexists,atalocationdifferentfromthatoccupiedbythe resistant rūpa, a distinctākāśa that serves as theālambana for the buddhiofspace,andbecausewherethereisnoālambana,buddhicannotarise.Hence their assertion ismere emptywords. Furthermore, [by thesametoken,]onecanalsosay:‘Thereexistsnoresistantrūpaasadistinctdravya, for thebuddhi of rūpa ariseswhere there isno space.’Yet thiscannotprovethenon‑existenceofrūpa.Hence,theyareunabletoprove,[inthismanner,]thatākāśadoesnotexist.

Should they say that rūpa‑s, possessing a [distinct] naure (有體; i.e., existingasarealentity),arecognizable,thenthesameoughttobetrueof ākāśa, for it canbe cognized through inference: Just ascakṣus, etc.,althoughnotcognizablethroughdirectperception(pratyakṣa),areknowntopossessa[distinct]naturethroughinference(anumāna)fromthefactthat they possess efficacies (有用). Likewise, as ākāśa too possessesefficacy—asmentionedabove—oneknows through inference that itpossessesa[distinct]nature.Henceitisknownthatākāśahasadistinctrealnature(i.e.,existsasarealentity).73

16.4.3. Summary

Not all the canonicalAbhidharma treatisesmention Space as a conditioneddharma.IntheMVŚ,too,someoftheSarvāstivādinmasters,likeDharmatrāta,donotacceptSpaceasarealexistent.TheorthodoxSarvāstivādins,however,consistentlymaintain that it is a real existent, and not themere absence oftangibles.StartingfromtheMVŚ,weseevariousargumentsforandagainstthepositionthatitisarealentity.AcleardistinctionismadeinthistextbetweentheunconditionedSpaceontheonehand,andtheconditionedspaceelement,on the other.Vasumitra and otherĀbhidharmas in theMVŚ argue that thereality of Space can not only be inferred, but actually is directly perceivedsincetheeventsobservedinourexperiencenecessarilyhavearealcausalbasis—whenweperceivethatmaterialthingscanbeaccommodatedorthatpeoplecan move about, we are actually directly perceiving a distinctive functionof Space; and this distinctive function necessarily proves the existence ofadistinctexistent.AlthoughSaṃghabhadradoesnotgosofarastoassertthatSpaceisactuallydirectlyperceived,hetooarguesthatwecaninferitsrealityfromitsobservabledistinctivefunctionandcharacteristic(lakṣaṇa);andthatwhichpossesses aunique functionandauniquecharacteristic is auniquelyreal:Itsfunctionismanifestedthroughthefactthatitaccommodatesresistantthings;itscharacteristic—i.e.,itsobservableaspect—ismanifestedthroughlight. To further distinguish it as a unique existent from the space element,Saṃghabhadra articulates thatwhereas the space element is non‑obstructivebutisobstructed,Spaceisneitherobstructivenorobstructedbyotherthings.


497

NOTES

1 MVŚ,162a;AKB,4.2 MVŚ,164.3 T49,15c.4 AKB,92.5 MVŚ,662a.6 MVŚ,388c.7 Cf. Entrance,3,20,44.8 See supra,§3.2.9 E.g.,Ny,432b.10 Ny,433b.11 AKB,14;cf.AsmB,17.12 ZW,188.13 ZW,188.14 MVŚ, 105c–106a, gives various reasons why the asaṃskṛta-dharma‑s are devoid ofcausesandeffects.

15 AKB, 4: yaḥ sāsravair dharmair visaṃyogaḥ sa pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaḥ | duḥkhādīnām āryasatyānāṃ pratisaṃkhyānāṃ pratisaṃkhyā prajñāviśeṣas tena prāpyo nirodhaḥ pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaḥ | Cf.alsosamedefinitioninMVŚ,161a.

16 TA(U,J),II,231.17 MVŚ,163a–164b.18 MVŚ,147b.19 MVŚ,322a–b.20 MVŚ,168b–c.21 MVŚ,147b.22 Ny,428c.23 Ny,429a.24 MVŚ,432c.25 Cf.TA(U‑J),I,219.26 Entrance,125.27 Ny,430a–434b.28 Cf. Aṅguttara-nikāya,ii,34;etc.29 VKŚ,560a‑b.30 Saṃghabhadradefinesanexistent(sat)asthatwhichcanserveasanobjectforthearising

of buddhi(Ny,621c622a).31 Cf.AKB,4:yāvanti hi saṃyogadravyāṇi tāvanti visaṃyogadravyāṇi |32 Cf. alsoMVŚ, 162a: “TheCessations through deliberation are of the same extent asthewith‑outflowdharma‑squaentities;because, to theextent that theyareobjectsofjunction,tothatsameextentthereareentitiesquadisjunction(visaṃyoga).”

498


33 AKB,4:anyathā hi duḥkhadarśanaheya-kleśa-nirodha-sākṣātkaraṇāt sarvakleśa-nirodha-sākṣātkriyā prasajyeta |;cf.MVŚ,161c–162a.

34 MVŚ,162a–b.35 MVŚ,162b.36 MVŚ,108c:“Thefruitofliberationisrealized(sākṣātkṛta)bythepath,notacquiredbyacause.”

37 MVŚ,428c;cf.MVŚ,341a;AKB,91f.38 Ny,432c.39 Cf.asimilarviewby‘some’inMVŚ,177b.40 Ny,430b.41 AKB, 92: utpannānuśaya-janma-nirodhe pratisaṃkhyābalenānyasyānutpādaḥ prati-

saṃkhyānirodhaḥ |42 Ny,431a.43 AKB, 63: āśraya-viśeṣād etat sidhyati | āśrayo hi sa āryāṇāṃ darśanabhāvanāmārga-

sāmarthyāt tathā parāvṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tatpraheyāṇāṃ kleśānāṃ prarohasamartho bhavati | ato’gnidagdhavrīhivad abījībhūte āśraye kleśānāṃ prahīṇa-kleśa ity ucyate | Cf.alsothecontrastingviews(bījaandprāpti)inADV,166.

44 Ny,430aff.45 Similardefinitionsofprahāṇaandnirvāṇa—withMahāyānaovertones—inAsm,62;AsmB.,42;Siddhi(S)(commentaryonlast2stanzas);etc.

46 AKB. 92: āryaireva tatsvabhāvaḥ pratyātmavedyaḥ | etāvattu śakyate vaktuṃ nityaṃ kuśalaṃ cāsti dravyāntaram | tadvisaṃyogaścocyate pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaśceti |

47 ItisinterestingtonotethattheTheravādaNettipakaraṇaalsoincludesbothpaṭisaṅkhā-nirodhaandappaṭisaṅga-nirodhaasamongalistoftennirodha‑s(Nettipakaraṇa,87).

48 SgPŚ,369c.49 DSŚ,500c50 DSŚ,504c.51 DSŚ,716a.52 JPŚ,923b.53 MVŚ,164b.Cf.AKB,4:

utpādātyantavighno’nyo nirodho’pratisaṃkhyayā ||6||

anāgatānāṃ dharmāṇām utpādasyātyantavighnabhūto visaṃyogād yo’nyo nirodhaḥ so’pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ | na hy asau pratisaṃkhyayā labhyate | kiṃ tarhi | pratyayavaikalyāt | yathaikarūpavyāsaktacakṣur manaso yāni rūpāṇi śabda-gandha-rasa-spraṣṭavyāni cātyayante |Alsocf. Entrance,127.

54 Cf.Ny,429a.55 Ny,434b.56 MVŚ,164b–c.SeeStudy,703f.57 Entrance,127.58 Entrance,127.59 Ny,435a.60 However,strictlyspeaking, this isnotquitecorrect,sincetheunconditioneddharma‑s


499

arebeyondthecausalprocess.Onecanonlyspeakofthemasbeingacquired(prāpyante)throughthepath.See,above,§16.2.2.

61 MVŚ,161b–c.62 MVŚ,164c.63 MVŚ,164c–165c.64 Cf.AKB,18.65 AKB,18,explains theSarvāstivādanotionof the agha-sāmantakaṃ rūpamas follows:

aghaṃ kila citasthaṃ rūpam | atyarthaṃ ghātāt | tasya tat sāmantakam iti | Vy,57,comments:aghaṃ kila citasthaṃ rūpam iti citasthaṃ saṃghātastham | atyarthaṃ

hanti hanyate ceti aghaṃ nairuktena vidhinā | atyartha-śabdasya a-kār’ādeśaḥ kṛto hanteś ca gh’ādeśaḥ | tasya tat sāmantakam iti tasyāghasya kuḍy’ādikasya sāmantakaṃ samīpastham | tad apekṣya vyavasthāpitam ity arthaḥ |I.e.,theetymologygivenhereforaghais:a=atyartham;gha = hanti.

66 MVŚ,388b.67 MVŚ,388c.68 MVŚ,389a.69 AKB,92.70 Ny,347b.71 Entrance,124.72 Ny,347b.73 Ny,429a–430a.

500


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Sanskrit-English Glossary(orderedaccordingtotheRomanalphabets)

ābhāsa Appearance;representationalimage.ābhāsagata Appeared;comingintothefieldofone’sexperience.abhāvita Non‑cultivated, one of the 14 synonyms forpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha in

theMVŚ.abhidhāna Expression.abhidharma EnvisagingDharma;supreme(uttama)doctrines.Itissoexplainedbecause

Abhidharmaleadsustobefacetofacewith(i.e.,directrealizationof)Nirvāṇa,ortothetrueinsightintothecharacteristicsofdharma‑s.Inthehighestsense,Abhidharmaispureprajñā.

abhidharma-kathā Asolemndialogueonthedharma(betweenbhikṣu‑s).Ābhidharmika Aspecialistinthe Abhidharma.abhidheya The expressed.abhidhyā Covetousness.abhijñā Higherknowledge;supernormalpower.abhimāna Conceitofattainment,amodeofmāna.Itischaracterizedthus:“Ifonehasnot

attainedthedistinctiveacquirementofsrota-āpatti,etc.,andoneclaimsthatonehas.”(Cf. Avatāra)

abhinirūpaṇā Examination,judgementalinvestigation.abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa Discriminationintheformofexamination.abhinna Undifferentiated,general.ābhiprāyika Withimplicitintention.abhipreta Intended;Lovable/InclinedToward,oneofthe14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-

nirodhainMVŚ.abhisamaya Directcomprehension/realization(ofthefournobletruths).abhisamayāntika-jñāna Theknowledgederivedattheimmediateendofadirectrealization

intoaparticularnobletruth.→abhisamaya.abhisaṃskāra Volitional action (often implying a karmic significance);willful

preparation.abhivinaya 1.‘Facingvinaya’,‘pertainingtovinaya’;2.‘excellent/profoundvinaya’.This

term,asfoundinthesūtra‑s,parallelsthetermabhidharma.ābhogātmaka Alertiveinnature.abhyupagama Commitment,undertaking.abhyupagama-citta Thethoughtwithwhichonemakesthevowofundertaking.abrahma-carya-virati Abstentionfromunchasteconduct.accha clear,transparent.acittaka ‘Thoughtless’,withoutanymentalactivity(asinthecessationmeditation).adattādāna Takingwhatisnotgiven.adatta-phala Thatwhichhasnotyetgivenfruit.adbhuta-dharma Awonderfuloccurrence.ādhāra-pratipakṣa Counteragent that effects themaintenanceof the abandonment so

obtained.


512

adhigama Realization.ādhikarmika Beginner.adhimātra Strong(grade).adhimokṣa Resolve,inclination.adhimukti Inclination→adhimokṣa.adhimukti-manaskāra ‘Mentalapplicationofresolve’.Thisreferstotheapplicationof

adhimukti,inmeditativepracticesliketheaśubhā,asaforceinvisualizingadesiredstate(e.g.thestateofdeteriorationofcorpse)whichisnottheactualstateatthepresentmoment(e.g,thepersonbeingsovisualizedisactuallynotadeterioratingcorpse).Thisisincontrasttotattva-manaskāra.

adhipati-phala ‘Fruitof(pre)dominance’;thisisthefruitofthekāraṇa-hetu.Thefruitsofcollectivekarma‑salsocomeunderthiscategory.→karma.

adhipati-pratyaya Dominantcondition.ādhipatya Sovereignty,dominance.adhicitta ‘Highermentaltraining’;ithasthesamesignificationasadhisamādhi.adhiprajñā ‘Higherunderstanding/wisdom’adhirāga The‘predominantlygreedytype’ofpersonality.Themeditationtocounteract

thisisaśubhā.adhisamādhi ‘Highermeditation’.adhiśīla ‘Higherethics’.adhiṣṭhāna Support,base.adhivitarka The‘predominantlydistractedtype’ofpersonality.Themeditationtocounteract

thisisānāpānasmṛti.adhvan Time.adhvan-saṃcāra Coursingintime.ādhyātmika Internal.adhyavasāya Determination,conceptualjudgement.ādīnava Distress;theunpleasantaspect,demerit.adṛśya ‘Invisible’;non‑empirical.

aduḥkāsukha Neitherpleasantorunpleasant.

adveṣa Non‑hatred.

agada Freefromdisease/affliction;atypeofmedicinethatcounteractspoison.āgama Traditionalorcanonicaltexts;scripturalauthority.→āptāgama.āgantuka Foreign,adventitious.agha Thatwhichisexceedinglyobstructive(a = atyartham, ‘exceedingly’;gha = hanti

‘strike/obstruct’; atyarthaṃ hanti hanyate ceti agham); i.e.,agglomerated,obstructivematter.

agha-sāmantaka-rūpa A matterthatisproximatetoagha(agglomeratedmatter);i.e.,thespaceelement.

agraja Previouslyarisen.āhāra Food.ahetuka Withoutacause.aheya Nottobeabandoned(theoutflow‑freedharma‑s).āhrīkya Non‑modesty.

gloSSary

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airyāpathika Pertainingtodeportment:walking,standing,sittingandlyingdown.aiśvarya Sovereignty,freedom.ajāta Theunborn.ajñāna Ignorance.Therearetwokinds:kliṣṭaandakliṣṭa.ājñātāvīndriya The‘havingfullyknown’faculty;thelastofthreeoutflow‑freecognitive

faculties.Itexercisespredominancewithregardtothestateofblissinthepresent.Inthe acquisitionof thearhat‑fruit, itconstitutes thepathof liberation.→anājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya.

ājñendriya Thesecondof threeoutflow‑freefaculties. Itexercisespredominancewithregardtocessationofbhāvanā-heyadefilements.Intheacquisitionofthefruitofstreamentry,itfunctionsasthesupportofthe visaṃyoga-prāpti,andconstitutes the pathofliberation. In the acquisitionof thearhat‑fruit, itconstitutes the immediate path.→anājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya.

ākāra Modeofactivity.TheSarvāstivādaexplainsthisasprajñā, thatis, theparticularmodeofunderstandingthatarisesinthemindwhenanobjectiscognized.Withregardtothefournobletruths,therearefourforeachtruth.Thereare,forduḥkha-satya:anitya, duḥkha, śūnya, anātma;forsamudaya-satya:hetu, samudaya, prabhava,pratyaya;fornirodha-satya: nirodha, śānta, praṇīta, niḥsaraṇa; formārga-satya:mārga, nyāya, pratipatti,nairyāṇika.

ākāra-samatā ‘Samenessinmodeofactivity’:Conjoinedthoughtandthought‑concomitantshavethesamemodeofcomprehendingthesharedcognitiveobject.→pañca-samatā

ākāśa Space,anunconditioneddharma.ākāśa-dhātu Spaceelement;tobedistinguisedfromtheunconditionedākāśa.→agha-

sāmantaka-rūpa.ākāśānantyāyatana The abode/sphere of infinite space; thefirst of fourmeditation

attainmentspertainingtotheimmaterialsphere.→samāpatti,ārūpya-dhātu.ākāśa-puṣpa Sky‑flower(referringtosomethingabsolutelynon‑existent).ākiṃcanyāyatana Theabode/sphereofnothingness;thethirdoffourmeditationattainments

pertainingtotheimmaterialsphere.→samāpatti,ārūpya-dhātu.akliṣṭa-ajñāna Non‑defiledignorance.Thisignorancehasnothingtodowithdefilements,

andcanbefullyeliminatedonlyinabuddha.Owingtothepresenceofthis,theprajñā ofapratyeka-buddhaoraśrāvakaisinferiortothatofabuddha.

akopya-dharman ‘Ofthenatureofbeingunshakable’.Thehighesttypeofarhatwhoisabsolutelynotsusceptibletoretrogression.

akṣara Phoneme; one of the conditioning disjoined from thought.→ viprayukta-saṃskāra.

akṣema ‘Non‑peacefulnessandinsecurity’,‘notpeacefulandinsecure’.Thisisadefiningfeatureofwhatisakuśala.

ākṣepa Projection.ākṣepaka-karma Projectingkarma(asopposedtoparipūraka-karma);karmaresponsible

fordeterminingthespecifictypeofsentientexistenceintowhichoneisreborn.akuśala-karma-patha Asetof10principalunskillfulactions:1.prāṇātipāta,2. adattādāna,

3. kāma-mithyācāra, 4.mṛṣā-vāda, 5.paiśunya, 6.pāruṣya, 7. saṃbhinna-pralāpa,8.abhidhyā,9.vyāpāda,10.mithyā-dṛṣṭi.

akuśala-mahābhūmika dharma Universalunskilful/unwholesomedharma‑s.akuśala-mūla Unskilfulroots.akuśala-vitarka Unskilfulreasoning.


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ālambana Cognitiveobject,adharmacapableofgeneratingacognitionofitself.ālambana-abhisamaya Oneofthreetypesofdirectrealization.Itreferstothefactofthe

outflow‑freeprajñātakingthesameobjectsasitsconjoineddharma‑sintheprocessofdirectrealization.→abhisamaya

ālambana-pratighāta Obstructionquacongitiveobject.→pratighātaālambana-pratyaya Conditionquaobject,oneofthefourpratyaya‑s.ālambana-samatā Samenessofcogitiveobject(oneoffiveconditionsfor twomental

dharma‑stobesaidtobeconjoined).→pañca samatā.ālambanato ’nuśete (Adefilement)growsconcordantlybytakingasāsravaobject.alāta-cakra Fire‑wheel.ālaya-vijñāna Store consciousness(oftheYogācārasystem).alobha Non‑greed.ālocana Perceiving,reflecting.āloka Light.alpaujasa Lackofvitality.alpecchatā Havingfewdesires.amala Taintless,pure.amanojña Disagreeable.amoha Non‑delusion.amṛta-dvāra Gatewayofimmortality.(i.e.,toNirvāṇa),referringtoānāpāna-(anu)smṛti

and aśubhānusmṛti/aśucyanusmṛti.anāgāmin Non‑returner.anāgāmin pratipannaka Candidateofthefruitofnon‑returner.anāgata Future,thefuture.anājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya The‘Ishallknowwhathasnotbeenknown’faculty;thefirst

of three outflow‑freecognitivefacultieswhichare: ājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya,ājñendriya andājñātāvīndriya.Thesethreefaculties, in theiressentialnature,areconstitutedofmanas,sukha,saumanasya,upekṣā,śraddhā,vīrya,smṛti,samādhiandprajñā.Theseninearedifferentiatedasthethreedistinctivefacultiesonaccountofthepredominancethattheyexerciseinthedarśana-mārga,bhāvanā-mārgaandaśaikṣa-mārga,respectively.The anājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriyaexercisespredominancewithregardtothecessationofthe darśana-heya defilements.Intheacquisitionofthefruitofstreamentry,itfunctionsastheinductor(āvāhaka)ofthevisaṃyoga-prāpti,andconstitutesthepathofliberation.

anālambana (Consciousness)havingnocognitiveobject.ānantarya karma (Thefive)mortaltransgression:patricide,matricide,killinganarhat,

causingaBuddha’sbleedingandsplittingoftheSaṅgha.Thetermlit.means“immediate”:Thesefivearethegravestevilkarma‑sbringingimmediateretributioninhell.

ānantarya-mārga Unhinderedpath.Themomentofabandoningadefilement.Immediatelyafterthisisthepathliberation.

ānāpānasmṛti Mindfulnessofbreathing.anapatrāpya Shamelessness.anāsrava Outflow‑free(‘pure’inthesensethatsuchadharmadoesnotconducetothe

saṃsāricprocess).→sāsrava .anāsrava-jñāna Outflow‑freeknowledge.anāsrava-saṃvara Outflow‑freerestraint.andhakāra-phala Fruitofdarkness/ignorance.

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āneñjya Immovable.aṅga Limb,part.anidarśana Invisible.anidarśana-apratigha Invisibleandnon‑resistant.animitta ‘Signless’;oneofthe3vimokṣa-mukha‑s.aniṣṭa-vipāka Undesirableretribution,generatedfromanakuśala karma.anityatā Impermanence.anityatā-anityatā ‘Impermanence‑impermanence’, one of fouranulakṣaṇa‑s of the

conditioneddharma‑s.Itsfunctionistocausetheperishingofanityatā/vyaya.→anulakṣaṇa.anityatā-lakṣaṇa ‘Impermanence‑characteristic’, aviprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma that

causestheperishingofaconditioneddharma.Oneoffourcharacteristics(lakṣaṇa)oftheconditioneddharma‑s.→saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa.

anivṛta-avyākṛta Non‑veiled‑non‑defined.Adharmathatisbothmorallynon‑definedandnon‑obstructivetothenoblepath.

anivṛta-avyākṛta-mahābhūmika-dharma Universaldharma‑swhicharenon‑veiled‑non‑defined.

aniyata-dharma Indeterminatedharma.Acategoryofdharma‑swhosenature(skilful,unskilful;etc.)cannotbedetermined.

aniyata-karma Indeterminatekarma. A karmathatisnotnecessarilyretributed.antagrāha-dṛṣti Aviewgraspingthetwoextremes:existence,non‑existence.antarā-bhava Intermediateexistence .anta End,extreme.antika Proximate,oneofthe14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaintheMVŚ.aṇu Fine,subtle.IntheSarvāstivādaatomictheory,sevenparamāṇu‑sconstituteanaṇu. It

isthefinestamongallrūpa‑sperceivablebytheeyeandvisualconsciousness;andeventhenbyonlythreetypesofeyes:1.thedivya-cakṣus,2.theeyeofacakravartin,3.theeyeofabodhisattvainhislastbirth.

anubandha Series,continuity.anubhava-pratyakṣa Direct perception qua experience, one of three types of direct

perception.→pratyakṣa.anudhātu ‘Subsidiary element’, a term similar in significance tobīja (seed), usedby

Śrīlāta.anulakṣaṇa Secondarycharacteristic(oftheconditioneddharma‑s).Therearefour:jāti-

jāti,sthiti-sthiti,jarā-jarā,anityatā-anityatā(/vyaya-vyaya).Eachsaṃskṛta-dharma ismomentarythankstotheoperationofthesaṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa-s,andeachoftheseisinturnedrenderedmomentarythankstotheoperationofthefouranulakṣaṇa‑s.

anumāna Inference.anunaya Lust.anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa Nirvāṇawithoutsubstratum.anuprasaṅga Asubsidiarytopicordigressionfromthemaintopicunderdiscussion.anupūrvaka Onewhoprogressesaccordingtotheregularorder.anurakṣaṇā-dharman Of the nature of being capable of protecting oneself from

retrogression.anuṣaṅga →anuprasaṅga.


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anuśaya Proclivity.FortheSarvāstivāda,itisoneofthesynonymsforkleśa(defilement),signifyingitssubtlenature.FortheSautrāntikaandothers,itisalatentdefilement,theseedoftheparyavasthāna.

anuśayana Theactofadherenceandgrowth(ofaproclivity/defilement).anuśerate (Defilements)adhereandgrowconcordantly(withthesāsravaobjects).anusmaraṇa-vikalpa Discrimination in formof recollection; one of three formsof

discrimination.→vikalpa.anu-srota Stream‑accordants, thosewhohavenot planted the skilful roots ofmokṣa-

bhāgīya.anutpāda Non‑arising. anutpāda-jñāna Knowledgeofnon‑arising(ofalldefilements).Inthecaseofthenon‑

retrogressivetypeofarhat(→asamaya-vimukta,aparihāna-dharman),themomentoftheknowledgeofexhaustionisimmediatelyfollowedbythearisingofthisknowledge.

anutpātta Non‑appropriated(byabeing'scitta-caitta‑s);i.e.sensitive(rūpa). anutpatti-dharmaka (Futuredharma‑swhichare)ofthenatureofbeingdestinednot

toarise.anutpatti-dharmin Sameasanutpatti-dharmaka.anuttarā samyak-saṃbodhi SupremePerfectEnlightenment(ofabuddha).anu(pari)vartaka 1.‘Operating inaccompanimentwith’.2. ‘Subsequentpropeller’ (as

opposedtoinitialpropeller).anvaya-jñāna Subsequentknowledge.Itisaspiritualinsightsimilarinnaturetodharma-

jñānaandacquiredsubsequentlytoit,whileoneisgaininginsightintoanobletruthpertainingtotherūpa‑andārūpya-dhātu‑s.

anvaya-jñāna-kṣānti Receptivitytothesubsequentknowledge.anyathā-anyathātva (/anyathā-anyathika) Buddhadeva’sexplanationontemporality:

adharmaissaidtobefuture,presentorpastrelativetothatwhichprecedesand/orthatwhichsucceeds.

anyonyānuparivartanaikakṛtya (The sahabhū-hetu‑sareofthenatureof)‘sharinganactivitybymutuallyoperatinginconcordance’.

ap Water(oneoffourGreatElements).apakāra Harm,injury.aparānta(-koṭi) Theveryend(ofsaṃsāra).apara-paryāya-vedanīya karma Karma‑swhoseretributionisexperiencibleinafuture

lifesubsequenttothenext.aparihāna-dharman ofthenatureofnon‑retrogression.Anarhatofthisnatureisofthe

highestgrade;heisanasamaya-vimukta.apatrāpya Shamefulness.apekṣā Relativedependance,cause‑effectconnection.aprahīṇa Havenotbeenabandoned.aparijñāta Havenotbeencompletelyknown.apramāda Diligence,heedfulness.apramādāṅga (Pertainingto)thesectionofvigilance;thisreferstotheabstentionfrom

intoxicants.apramāṇa Immeasurable.Therearefour:maitrī,karuṇā,muditā,upekṣā.apraṇihita ‘Aspiration‑free’, (themind) not beingbent on anything. It is oneof three

vimokṣa-mukha‑s.

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aprāpti Non‑acquisition,oneoftheviprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma‑s.Itisaforceoppositeinnaturetoprāpti,andservestoseverethelinkofadharmafromtheserialcontinuityofthesentientbeing.

apratigha Non‑resistant.apratilambha Non‑obtainment.apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha Cessationindependentofdeliberation,oneofthethreetypesof

asaṃskṛta-dharma‑s.Itisacessationacquirednotthroughanyeffortofdeliberation,butduetothedeficiencyinpratyaya‑s.Butlikeapratisaṃkhyā-nirodha,itisalsonotamereabsence,butapositiveforcepreventingthearisingofthedharmawhichhasceased.

apratisaṃyukta Notboundoryoked(i.e.,notpertainingtoanysphereofexistence).Thisreferstotheanāsrava dharma‑s.

apratyakṣa Indirectperception.āptāgama Scripturalteachingsasanauthority(pramāṇa)forourknowledgeofwhatis

true/real.apuṇya Anon‑meritoriousdeed.ārāma Amonastery.araṇya Anhermitagedwelling.āraṇyaka Hermitagedweller.arāśi Non‑agglomerated, one of the 14 synonyms forpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha in

theMVŚ.arati Disgust,non‑delight.arbuda Thesecondstageinthefoetaldevelopment.arhat ‘AWorthyOne’,epithetforonewhohasachievedthehighestspiritualattainment.arhat pratipannaka Candidateforthefruitionofarhat.artha Object‑referent;meaning;purpose(Therearemanyothermeanings).artha-kriyā-samartha Efficaciousforapurposefulaction.artha-pratisaṃvid Unhinderedknowledgewithregardtomeaning.Oneoffourtypesof

pratisaṃvid:dharma-,artha-,nirukti-,andpratibhāna-.artha-svarūpa Theobjectinitsuniquenature.arthasya pratinidhi Imageorrepresentationoftheexternalobject.arthaviniścaya Determinationorascertainmentofmeaning.arūpi-dharma‑s Immaterialdharma‑s.arūpin Immaterial.ārūpya Immateriality.Italsostandsfortheārūpya-dhātu.ārūpya-dhātu The sphere of immateriality.This is subdivided into four progressive

stages (bhūmi): 1.ākāśānantyāyatana, 2.vijñānāntyāyatana, 3. ākiṃcanyāyatana;4. naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana.

ārūpya-dhātu-pratisaṃyukta Pertainingtothesphereofimmateriality.ārūpyāvacara-pratisaṃyukta Sameasārūpya-dhātu-pratisaṃyukta.ārya Noble;alsoatermforonewhohasbecomeaBuddhistsaint(whohasattainedoneof

theeightstagesofspiritualattainment,andhencenomoreapṛthagjana).ārya-jñāna Noble(i.e.,anāsrava)knowledge.ārya-mārga Noblepath.ārya-mārgatva The (universal) nature of theārya-mārga; one of the unconditioned

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ārya-satya Nobletruth.Therearefour:duḥkha,samudaya,nirodha,mārga.āryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga Thenoble eightfold‑path. It comprises: samyag-dṛṣṭi, samyak-

saṃkalpa,samyag-vāk, samyak-karmānta, samyag-ājīva, samyag-vyāyāma, samyak-smṛti, samyak-samādhi.

ārya-vaṃśa Noblelineage.asabhāga Non‑similar.Also,‘Dissimilar’, oneof the 14 synonyms forpratisaṃkhyā-

nirodhaintheMVŚ.asad-ālambana (Consciousness)takinganon‑existentobject.asādhāraṇa Unique.asad-viṣayaṃ jñānam Knowledgewhoseobject‑domainisnon‑existent.aśaikṣa Non‑trainee;anepithetforanarhat,becausehehascompletedalltraining.aśaikṣa-mārga Pathofthenon‑trainee.asāmagrī Non‑harmony.ItismentionedintheMVŚasaviprayukta-saṃskāra,aforce

thatcausesschismintheSaṅga.asamanvāgama Non-endowment.Aviprayukta-saṃskāra.When adharma is lost or

disconnectedfromapersonandcontinuestobedisconected,hehastheasamanvāgama ofthatdharma.Itssvabhāvaisaprāpti.

asamaya-vimukta Non‑circumstantiallyliberated.āsaṃjñika Ideationlessness,oneoftheviprayukta-saṃskāra‑s.asaṃjñi-samāpatti Ideationlessattainment,oneof theviprayukta-saṃskāra‑s.This is

soughtbythehereticswhomisconstruethatsuchastateisfinalliberation.asaṃjñi-sattva Ideationlessbeing.asaṃkhyeya-kalpa Incalculableaeons.asaṃprajanya Lackofproperdiscernment.asaṃskṛta Unconditioned.There are three categories of unconditioneddharma‑s:

pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha,apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha,ākāśa. asaṃṣṛṣṭa Non‑intimate, one of the 14 synonyms forpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha in the

MVŚ.asaṃvara Non‑restraint.asaṃvara-karma Non‑restraintaction.asaṃyoga-vastu Objectwithoutbinding.āsanna Proximate,oneofthe14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaintheMVŚ.āsanna-kāraṇa Theco‑nascentproximatecause.asarvatraga-kleśa Non‑universaldefilement.asattvākhya Non‑sentient,notpertainingtosentientbeings.āśaya Intention.āśaya-vipanna Evilintention.āśaya-viśeṣa Aspecifictypeofintention.asevita Non‑cultivated,oneofthe14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodhainMVŚ.āsevita-bhāvita-bahulīkṛta Wellpracticed,cultivatedandrepeatedlydone.asmimāna Self‑conceit.Amodeofmāna,characterizedthus:“Oneclingstothepañcopādāna-

skandhaastheātman or ātmīya”(Cf. Avatāra)āśraddhya Lackoffaith.āsrava Outflow,asynonymofkleśa.

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āsravakṣaya-jñāna Theknowledgeofthedestructionoftheoutflows.āśraya Supportingbasis.āśraya-samatā ‘Sameness of the supporting basis’: conjoined thought and thought‑

concomitantssharethesamesupport‑basis.pañca samatāāśrita ‘supported’,asopposedto thesupport(āśraya).E.g., theGreatElementsare the

āśraya‑sandthederivedmattersareāśrita.aṣṭadravyaka ‘Comprising eight substances’.TheVaibhāṣikas teach that theminimal

moleculethatcancomeintoexistenceinthekāma-dhātuisanoctadcomprisingeightdravya‑s.

astitva Existence.aśubha Impure. aśubhā Themeditationontheimpure(=aśubha-bhāvanā).aśubha-bhāvanā Contemplationontheimpure.aśucyanusmṛti Recollectionoftheimpure.Sameasaśubhāandaśubha-bhāvanā.asura This term isgenerallyonly transliterated inChinese,butoccasionally translated

as“non‑god”,etc.Theyarebelievedtobebeingswhoareconstantlyfightingwiththedeva‑s.

āsvādana Tasting,enjoying;theenjoyableaspect.atikrānta-manaskāra Onewho‘hastranscendedmentalapplication/effort’.i.e.,onewho

hasattainedperfectmastery(inapractice),beyondthestagesofabeginner(ādikarmika)andanadept(kṛta-parijaya).

atimāna Superiority‑complex.Itischaracterizedthus:“Ifothersareequaltoone,andoneclaimsoneissuperior,orifothersaresuperiorandoneclaimsoneisequal.” (Cf. Avatāra).

atīndriya ‘Beyondthesenses’,supra‑sensuous.atiprasaṅga Over‑generalization.atireka Supplementary.ātman AmetaphysicalSelf/SoulwhoseexistenceisupheldbytheBrahmanicalschools.ātma-vāda Soultheory.ātmavādopādāna Soul‑theory‑clinging.ātmīya Thatwhichpertainsto(/belongs)toSelf(ātman).atyantābhāva Anabsolutenon‑existent.atyantaṃ prahīṇa (Adefilement)‘abandonedcompletely/absolutely’willnotariseany

more. atyanta-viruddha Absolutelyopposed(/contradictory).audārika Coarse.auddhatya Restlessness.auddhatya-kaukṛtya Restlessness‑remorse.aupacārika Metaphorical.aupacayika Ofthenatureofgrowth.OneofthedoctrinalperspectivesinAbhidharma

analysis:dharma‑saredivisibleasthosewhichareaupacayika (e.g. rūpa)andwhicharenot(e.g.,citta).

aupadhika-puṇya-kriyā Amaterialmeritoriousaction.avadāna One of the dvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana.Itisintheformofasimileorstory

clarifyingordemonstratingthetruthofacertaindoctrinalpoint.avadhāraṇa Affirmation,emphasis.


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avadya ‘Notpraise‑worthy’,vice,transgression.āvāhaka Thatwhichbringsout,inductor.avara-bhāgīya Pertainingtothelowersection. pañca-avara-bhāgīya.āvaraṇa Covering,obstruction,hindrance.Animportanttwo‑folddivisioniskleśāvaraṇa

andjñeyāvaraṇa.Sometimes,otherāvaraṇa‑sarealsomentioned,suchassamāpatty-āvaraṇa,vipāka-āvaraṇa,etc.

āvaraṇa-pratighāta Obstructionquahindrance. → pratighātaavarṇa Non‑manifest,oneofthe14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaintheMVŚ.avasthā State,position.avasthā-anyathātva (/avasthā-anyathika) ‘Differenceinstate’;Vasumitra’sexplanation

ontemporality:Adharma inagiventemporalstateis termedfuture,presentorpastaccordingly.

āvasthika pratītya-samutpāda Conditionedco‑arisingin(twelve)states.avatāra Descent,entering,entrance.avatāra-mukha Gatewayofentering.avayava Part.Itisalsoasynonymofsvabhāva.avetya-prasāda Faith/conviction(prasāda)basedoninsight.āveṇika Unique,unshared.āveṇikī avidyā ‘Independent ignorance’, amodeofavidyā. In thismode, theavidyā

arisesthroughitsownstrength,withoutrelyingontheotherfundamentalorsecondarydefilements.

avidyā Ignorance,nescience.Itisnotjusttheabsenceofvidyā,butarealexistentfunctioningaspositiveforcecausingthenon‑cognizance.Itoperatesintwomodes:assaṃprayuktā avidyāandāveṇikī avidyā.

avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārāḥ ‘Conditionings[inthepresentexistence]haveavidyāastheir[causal]condition.’

avidyāsrava Ignorance‑outflow.avidyaugha Ignorance‑flood.avihiṃsā Harmlessness.avijñapti Non‑information.Thisreferstoavijñapti-karmaand avijñapti-rūpa.avijñapti-karma Non‑informativeaction.Unlikeavijñapti karmawhichinformsusof

thementalstateofthedoer,thisisakarmicforcewhich,onceprojectedbyabodilyorvocalkarma,continuestoexistasaseriesinvisibly;hence,non‑informative.

avijñapti-rūpa Non‑informativematter.Thisisaspecialtypeofrūpawhichconstitutesanavijñapti-karma.Itisnon‑resistantandinvisible,andcomesintoexistenceindependenceontheforceofacetanā,avijñapti karmaandasetofmahābhūta‑s.Itisaspecialtypeof upādāya-rūpawhichisnotcomprisedofparamāṇu‑s.

avikṣipta Non‑distracted.avinā-bhāva Beingnotmutuallyseparated.avinirbhāga Non‑separation.aviparīta Non‑topsy‑turvy,non‑erroneous.avyākṛta (Morally)non‑defined.avyākṛta-mūla Non‑definedroot.āya-dvāra Gatewayofarising.

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āyatana Entrance,abode:auniquecognitivespecies.Thereare12;the6internalfaculties(fromcakṣus to manas)andthe6correspondingobject‑domains(fromrūpa to dharma).

āyatana-pratilambha Obtainmentofabode.āyatana-svalakṣaṇa Intrinsiccharacteristicofasingle,uniquespeciesofdharma,such

asrūpaasdistinctfromvedanā,etc.ayoniśo manaskāra Impropermentalapplication.ayukta Unreasonable,notlogical.āyus Lifeprinciple.āyuḥsaṃskāra Life‑force,life‑principleconditioning.bahirdeśaka Foreign/outsidemasters(thoseoutsideKaśmīra).bahu-dhātu Multipleelements.bahu-nāma-kāya Groupofmultiplewords.bahu-śruta ‘Heardmuch’;learnedintheBuddhistdoctrines.bāhya External.bala Power.balavat Strong.bandhana Bondage.Itisalsoasynonymforkleśa.bhājana-loka 'Receptionworld';i.e.,thephysicalworld.bhautika ‘Derivedfromthemahā-bhūta‑s’=bhautika-rūpa.bhautika-rūpa Derivedmatter.Sameasupādāya rūpa.bhava ‘Existence’,‘becoming’.bhāva Anexistent,amodeofexistence,astateofbeing.bhāva-anyathātva (/bhāva-anyathika) ‘Difference inmode of existence/being’;

Dharmatrāta’sexplanationontemporality:Adharmaissaidtobefuture,presentorpastaccordingtoitsmodeofexistence.

bhavāgra Existence‑peak.bhāvanā-mārga Pathofcultivation.bhāvanā-mārga-heya (Defilements)abandonablebyrepeatedcultivation.bhāvanā-mayī-prajñā Understandingderivedfromcultivation. bhavāsrava Existence‑outflow.bhavaugha Existence‑flood.bhāvita Developed,cultivated;perfumed(byavāsanā).bhedābheda Non‑differenceindifference.bhinna Differentiated,specific.bhikṣu AfullyordainedmalememberoftheSaṅgha. bhikṣuṇī AfullyordainedfemalememberoftheSaṅgha.bhūmi Stage.bhūta-pratyakṣa ‘Truedirectperception’,directperceptionparexcellence.bhūyo-vītarāga ‘Onewhohasbeenmuchdetached’;apractitionerwho,beforeentering

into the darśanamārga,hasalreadyabandoned(throughtheworldlypath)thedefilementsabandonablebycultivation,fromsixtoeightcategories.

bīja Seed.bodhi Enlightnment,awakening.AccordingtotheĀbhidharmikas,itcompriseskṣaya-and

anutpāda-jñāna.


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bodhipakṣya-dharma Dharma‑s conducive to Enlightenment. There are 37:foursmṛtyupasthāna‑s,foursamyak pradhāna‑s,fourṛddhipāda‑s,fiveindriya‑s,fivebala‑s,sevenbodhyaṅga‑s,eightāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga‑s.

bodhyaṅga Enlightenment‑factors.There are seven: smṛti,dharma-(pra)vicaya,vīrya,prīti,praśrabdhi,samādhi,upekṣā.

brahma-carya ‘Brahma‑faring’,thespirituallife;alifeofcelibacy.bṛhatphala Great‑fruit[Heaven].buddhānusmṛti Recollection of theBuddha, ameditation on theBuddha’s perfected

virtues.Buddha-vacana WordsoftheBuddha.buddhi Intellect,perception,cognition.buddhi-pratyakṣa Directperceptionquadiscernment.caitasika Thought‑concomitant.caitta Sameascaitasika.cakṣur-abhijñā Supernormalpowerofvision,cakṣur-indriya Visualfaculty.cakṣus Eye.cakra-vartin ‘Wheel‑wielding’,UniversalMonarch.catuṣ-koṭi ‘Four‑cornered’(alternative),tetralemma.cetanā Volition.cetanā dharman Ofthenatureofbeingcapableofendingexistenceatwill.cetanā-viśeṣa Aspecifictypeofvolition.cetayitvā-karma Karmasubsequenttowilling.chanda Predilection,desire.cintā-mayī prajñā Understandingderivedfromreflection.citasthaṃ rūpa Agglomeratedmatter.citra Variegated.citta Thought. citta-caitta ‘Thoughtandthought‑concomitant’;oftenusedasacollectivetermstanding

forallmentalfactorsgenerally.cittānuparivartin Accompanyingthought;thought‑accompaniment.cittānuvartin Sameascittānuparivartin.citta-anuvartaka-rūpa ‘Matteracompanying(/operatingtogetherwith) thought’; i.e.,

the avijñapti. cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra Conditioningsdisjoinedfromthought.Theyareforces/dharma‑s

whichareneithermaterialnormental.TheSarvāstivādagenerallyenumerates14suchforces,suchasprāpti,aprāpti,etc.

damana Subduing,taming.dāna-śīla-aviruddha Unopposedtogivingandprecept.darśana Seeing,insight,vision.darśana-abhisamaya Abhisamayainrespectoftheseeingofthefournobletruthsby

thepureprajñāalone.darśana-heya (Defilements)abandonablebyvision/insight.

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darśana-mārga Pathofvision(/insight).Itconsistsof16momentsofinsightintothefourNobleTruths.Emergingfromthismeditativeprocess, thepractitioner is transformedfrombeingapṛthagjanaintoanārya.

daśa-kuśala-karmapatha Thetenskillfulpathsofkarma.→kuśala-karmapathadaurmanasya Distress,dejectedness.dauśīlya ‘Badbehaviour’,immorality,transgressionofprecepts.dauśīlya-vibandhatva Obstructiontothe transgressionofprecepts.deva Adivinebeing;god.deva-putra Abeinginaheavenlyabode;agod.→deva.dharma (1)Anultimatefactorofexistence,definedas“thatwhichsustainsitsspecific

characteristic”(svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇād dharmaḥ).(2)Mentalobjects.(3)Doctrine.(therearemanyothermeaningsofthisword).

dharmānudharma-pratipatti “Nirvāṇa is calledDharma; thenoble eightfoldpath iscalledanu-dharma.TheBuddha’sdisciples’practicethereiniscalleddharma-anudharma-pratipatti.”(DŚŚ,463b)

dharmānusārin ‘Doctrine‑pursuant’.ApractitionerwhoreliesprimarilyontheunderstandingoftheDoctrineforspiritualprogress.

dharma-jñāna Thespiritualinsightintothetruenatureofdharma‑s,derivedforthefirsttimeinone’ssaṃsāricexistence,inthedirectrealizationofduḥkha-satyapertainingtothe kāma-dhātu.

dharma-pratisaṃvid Unhinderedknowledgewithregardtodharma,oneoffourtypesof pratisaṃvid→artha-pratisaṃvid.

dharma-pravicaya Investigation/examinationofdharma-s.Thisisthedefinitionofbothprajñāandabhidharma.

dharma-sabhāgatā Homogeneityamongdharma‑s.dharma-śarīra DharmaBody.dharmatā Natureofdharma;natureofthings.dharmatā-prātilambhika Obtainedspontaneously(acquiredinaccordancewiththenature

ofthings).dharmāyatana The dharma‑abode, theāyatana corresponing tomanas in the twelve‑

āyatanaclassification.dharmāyatana-saṃgṛhīta-rūpa Matter subsumed under the dharmāyatana.Thisrefers

specificallytotheavijñapti-rūpa.dhātu Element(alsoexplainedas“sourceoforigin”);sphere.dhṛti Supporting,sustaining.dhyāna Meditation,reflection.Onlythefirstfoursamāpatti‑spertainingtotherūpa-dhātu

canbecalleddhyāna,becauseinthesefourmeditations,śamathaandvipaśyanāexistevenly.dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukha-vihāra

dhyānāṅga ‘Contemplation‑factors’.There arefive: (1)vitarka, (2)vicāra, (3)prīti,(4)sukha,(5)cittaikāgratā.Thefirstdhyānahasall5;second,(3)–(5);third,(4)and(5);fourth,only(5).

dhyāna-antara ‘Intermediatedhyāna’,betweentwomūla-dhyāna‑s.dhyāna-saṃvara Meditation‑restraint;onetypeofavijñapti.divya-cakṣus Divineeye.dravya Substance;arealentity.dravyāntara Adistinctentity.


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dravya-paramāṇu ‘Substance‑atom’,atomasasingleentityinitself;e.g.,agreencolouratom.

dravya-samatā ‘Samenessinrespectof[beingasingular]substance’:Conjoinedthoughtandthought‑concomitantsareequalinbeingsingularinsubstance.E.g.,althoughtherearethreetypesofsensation(vedanā)andvarioustypesofideations(saṃjñā),onlyonesingletypeofsensationandonesingleofideationatatimeisconjoinedwiththoughtandotherthought‑concomitants.→pañca-samatā

dravyasat Existentasarealentity;absolutelyreal.dravya-svalakṣaṇa Intrinsiccharacteristicofauniqueentity(dravya),suchasagreencolour.dṛṣṭa-dharma-phala Fruitexperiencedinthepresentlife.dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukha-vihāra Stateofblissinthepresentlife.dṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya-karma Karmaexperiencibleinthislife.dṛṣṭānta Example,simile.dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukha-vihāra ‘Happydwelling(stateofbliss)inthepresentexistence’.

Thisisoneofthetermsdescribingtheblissfulexperiencesofdhyāna.dṛṣṭe dharme Inthepresentexistence.dṛṣṭi ‘View’; its svabhāva isprajñā. It is characterizedby a strongmodeof activity

(ākāra)ofspeculationandjudgment(saṃtīraṇa).Askleśa,itisfive‑fold:satkāya-dṛṣṭi,antagraha-dṛṣṭi,mithyā-dṛṣṭi,dṛṣṭi-parmārśaandśīlavrata-parāmarśa.Italsooperatesasproperview(samyag-dṛṣṭi).

dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa Clingingtoone’sviewsastheonlytrueones.dṛṣṭi-prāpta Onewhohasattainedthroughviews.dṛṣṭyogha View‑flood.dṛṣṭy-upādāna View‑clinging.duḥkha Unpleasant;painful;unsatisfactory;pain;unsatisfactoriness.duḥkha-darśana-heya (Defilements)abandonablebyinsightintounsatisfactoriness.duḥkha-jñāna Knowledgeoftheunsatisfactoriness,acquiredintheprocessofabhisamaya.duḥkhe anvaya-jñāna Subsequent‑knowledgewithregardtoduḥkhapertainingtothe

twoupperspheresofexistence.Itisaspiritualinsightsimilarinnature,andacquiredsubsequently,totheduḥkhe dharma-jñāna.

duḥkha-satya Thenobletruthofunsatisfactoriness.duḥkhatā Thefactofunsatisfactoriness.duḥkha-vedanīya Experiencibleasbeingunsatisfactory;unpleasant/unsatisfactoryexperience.duḥkhila Miserable,depressing.dūragama Far‑going.durgati Unfortunateplaneofexistence.dūrībhāva-pratipakṣa Counteragentwhichresultsindistancing(fromtheprāpti of the

defilement).dvādaśāṅga ‘Twelve‑limb’, twelve‑fold (classification).→dvādaśāṅga-dharma-

pravacanadvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana The twelve‑fold classification of the ‘Words of the

[Buddha]Dharma’:1.sūtra,2.geya,3.vyākaraṇa,4.gāthā,5.udāna,6.nidāna,7.avadāna,8.itivṛttaka/ityuktaka,9.jātaka,10.vaipulya,11.adbhuta-dharma,12.upadeśa.

dveṣa Hatred.Oneofthreeakuśala-mūla‑s.

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dveṣa-sadṛśatva ‘Resemblanceofhatred’.Itisnotthekleśa,hatreditself,butonlyaresemblanceofit.Thisreferstothevāsanāleftbehindasaresultoftheperfumingofdveṣa.

dyotita Illuminated,elucidated,clearlyshown.eḍaka-rajas ‘Ram‑dust’.Thesizeofsevenśaśa-rajas‑s.ek’ālambanakṛtya (The samparyukata-hetu‑s are of the nature of) ‘sharing the same

cognitiveobjectandactivity’.ekaṃśena Categorically.ekottara One‑incremental.evaṃ-pādaka ‘[Astraight‑forwardanwer]consistingtheword“yes”’(toaquestionof

theform:“doespimplyq?”).gambhīra Profound.gahana Adenseforest.gandha Smell. gandha-artha Olfactoryobject.gāthā Astanza.gati Planeofexistence.TheSarvāstivādaspeaksoffive:manuṣya,deva,tiryañc,naraka,

preta.Someschools,liketheVātsīputrīya,addasuraasthesixth.geya ‘Tobesung’,thesecondofthedvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana.ItOriginallyreferredto

anuddāna(summary)versemnemonicallysummarizingthenamesofthe(ten)precedingsūtra‑sduringthefirstCouncil.Ithassubsequentlycometodenotearepetitionversesummarizingwhathasbeensaidintheprecedingprose.

ghrāṇa Nose. ghrāṇa-indriya Olfactoryfaculty.go-rajas ‘Cow‑dust’,thesizeofseveneḍaka-rajas.gotra Clan.1.Family,lineage.2.Kind,class.grāhaka Grasper(subject).grāhya The‘graspable’,thegrasped(the‘object’).grāhyatā Theessenceofbeinga‘graspable/object’grantha 1.Atext.2.‘tie’,oneofthetermsreferringtoaformofkleśa.guṇa Virtue,benefit.gurutva Heaviness.haituka Logician.hetu ‘Cause’,‘reason’.1.Therearesixcauses:kāraṇa-hetu,sabhāga-hetu,sarvatraga-hetu,

sahabhū-hetu,saṃprayuktaka-hetu,vipāka-hetu.2.Asetoffivecauses:janana-hetu,niśraya-hetu,pratiṣṭhā-hetu,upastambha-hetu),upabṛṃhaṇa-hetu.

hetu-jñāna Knowledgeofthecause.hetu-kauśalya Skilfulnesswithregardtocause.hetu-phala-bhāva Thestateofcause‑effect,causalrelationship.hetu-phala-mātra Merecauseandeffect.hetu-pratyaya Conditionquacause.hetu-samutthāna Originationquacause.Hetuvāda ‘Theoryofcauses’; the schoolwhichexpoundsor stresseson the theoryof

causation.ItisanamefortheSarvāstivādaschool.


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hetu-vidyā Abranchofscience/studydevelopedinBuddhism,correspondingroughlyto(butwithabroaderscopethan)whatweunderstandaslogic.

Hīnayāna The‘lower/inferiorvehicle’;aderogatorytermusedbytheMahāyānatorefertotheBuddhistschoolswhichemergedintheAbhidharmaperiod.

hrī Modesty.idaṃsatyābhinirveśa-kāyagrantha Corporealtieofdogmatism.indhana Fuel.indriya Faculty,organ.indriya-pratyakṣa Directperceptiondependentonasensefaculty.indriyāśrita-pratyakṣa 'DirectPerceptionsupportedbyan indriya'.Sameas indriya-

pratyakṣa.īraṇā Mobility.īrṣyā Jealousy.īryāpatha Deportment.iṣṭa-vipāka Adesirableretribution,generatedfromakuśala karma.itivṛttaka “Oftheform,‘ithappenedthus’,”.Oneofthedvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana.

Itassumestheformofthenarrationofapastevent.ityuktaka “Oftheform,‘itwassaidthus’,”.Itstandsforthesameasitivṛttaka.jaḍa Dull,inanimate,unintelligent.jananāvighna Non‑obstructiontobirth.janana-hetu Generatingcause.Oneofasetoffivehetu‑s.janman birth.janmāpravṛtti Non‑proceedingofbirth,discontinuityofbirth.jarā-lakṣaṇa Deterioration‑characteristic,aviprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmathatcausesthe

decayofaconditioneddharma.→saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa.jarā-jarā ‘Deterioration‑deterioration’,oneofthefouranulakṣaṇa‑s.Itsfunctionisto

causethedeterioarationofjarā.jarā-maraṇa Old‑age‑and‑death.jātaka Birthstories(oftheBuddhaasabodhisattva).jāti-lakṣaṇa Production‑characteristic, aviprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma that causes the

arisingofaconditioneddharma.→saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa.jāti-jāti ‘Production‑production’,oneofthefouranulakṣaṇa‑s.Itsfunctionistogenerate

jāti.→anulakṣaṇa.jighatsā Hunger.jihvā Tongue.jihvā-indriya Gustatoryfaculty.jīvitendriya Vitalfaculty.Adisjoinedconditioning(viprayukta-saṃskāra)onaccountof

whichasentientbeingisalive.jīvitendriya-saṃskāra Theconditioningforceofthevitalfaculty.jñāna ‘Knowledge’,amodeofprajñā,characterizedbydecisive(niścita)understanding.

SomeSarvāstivādamasters require thatknowledge repeatedlydiscerns thecognitiveobject.Thereisastandardsetof10:1.dharma-jñāna,2. anvaya-jñāna,3.duḥka-jñāna,4. samudya-jñāna,5.nirodha-jñāna,6.mārga-jñāna,7.saṃvṛti-jñāna,8.paracitta-jñāna,9.kṣaya-jñāna,10.anutpāda-jñāna.

jñāna-ākāra Knowledge‑form.

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jñāna-bala Powerofknowledge.jñāna-cihna ‘Knowledge‑marker’.Prāpti is themarker of the knowledge that “this

[dharma]belongstothatperson”.jñāna-parijñā Completeknowledgequaabandonment.Ithasknowledgeasitssvabhāva.

→prahāṇa-parijñā.jñeya ‘Knowable’,objectofknowledge.jñeya-dharma ‘Dharma‑stobeknown’;i.e.,objectsofknowledge.jñeyāvaraṇa Knowable‑hindrance.Only aBuddha can overcome this, in addition to

overcomingthedefilement‑hindrance(kleśāvaraṇa).Whenitisovercome,aBuddhaisperfectlyomniscient,capableofknowingboththeintrinsic(svalakṣaṇa)andcommoncharacteristics(sāmānya-lakṣaṇa)ofallthings.

kāla Time.kalala Thefirstfoetalstage.kāla-samatā ‘Samenessoftime’:Conjoinedthoughtandthought‑concomitantsnecessarily

ariseatthesametime.→pañca samatā.kalpanā Conceptualization.kāmacchanda Sensual‑desire.kāma-dhātu-pratisaṃyukta Pertaining(lit.:‘bound/yoked’)tothesphereofsensuality.kāma-mithyā-cāra Sensualmisconduct. kāmāsrava Sensuality‑outflow.kāmaugha Sensuality‑flood.kāmavacara-pratisaṃyukta Sameaskāma-dhātu-pratisaṃyukta.kāmopādāna Sensuality‑clinging.kāraṇa Cause,reason,instrument.kāraṇa-hetu Efficientcause.→hetu;jananāvighna.kāraṇa-prajñapti ‘Designation/teachingoncause’,nameofachapterinthePrajñapti-

śāstra.kārikā Stanza.kāritra Activity.FortheVaibhāṣika,theactivitybelongsonlytoapresentdharma;itisits

efficacyofprojectingitsownfruit(existence)inthenextmomentofitsserialcontinuity.Inthisstrictsense,thistermisusedincontradistinctionfromothergeneraltermsdesignatingfunction,potency,efficacy,etc,suchaskriyā,vyāpāra,sāmarthya,śakti,etc.

karkaśatva Coarseness.Acharacteristicofpṛthivī.karma ‘Action’.InthespecificallyBuddhistsense,itprimarilymeansamorallyskilfulor

unskilfulactionwhichdeterminesspecificallythemanneroffutureexistenceofthedoer.Itisdivisibleasmano-karma,kāya-karmaandvāk-karma.Thelattertwocaninduceavijñapti-karma. Karmacanalsobedisinguishedasindividualandcollectivekarma‑s,ofwhichthefruitsofthelatterarenotregardedasvipāka,butadhipati-phala‑s.

karmadhāraya samāsa DeterminativecompoundinSanskritgrammar.karma-patha Pathsofkarma;theprincipalactions(usuallygivenasten)donethrough

body,speechandmind.akuśala- karma-patha.karma-prajñapti ‘Designation/teaching’onkarma’,nameofachapterinthePrajñapti-

śāstra.karma-vācanā Speechsuchasannouncementmadeduringanecclesiasticalproceeding

inaSaṅghameeting.karuṇā Compassion.


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kārya-abhisamaya ‘Abhisamayaquaeffect’.MVŚ,16b–c:Abhisamayaisthepenetration(*prativedhanā)intotheālambana‑s;thisisabhisamayaquajñāna.Accomplishingthetaskistheabhisamayaquaeffect;itistheabandonmentofdefilements.Abhisamayaisjñāna-parijñā;theaccomplishingofatask(=kārya-abhisamaya)isprahāṇa-parijñā. Further,abhisamayaisachievedthroughtheānantarya-mārga;theaccomplishmentofthetaskisachievedthroughthevimukti-mārga.

Kāśyapīya AschooloftheVibhajyavādalineage.TheydifferfromotherVibhajyavādinsinconcedingthatpastkarma‑swhchhavenotgivenfruitsareexistent.→adatta-phala.

kaukṛtya Remorse.Itcanbeeitherpositiveornegative:remorseafterhavingdoneagoodactionisnegative;thatafterhavingdoneabadactionispositive.

kaurmasya roman Thetortoise’shair,asimileforsomethingabsolutelynon‑existent.kauśīdya Slackness,laziness.kāya Body;group.kāya-bhājana Bodyasareceptacle.kāyacitta-avasthāviśeṣa Adistinctivepsychophysicalstate.kāya-grantha ‘Corporealtie’,akleśa.kāya-indriya Tangiblefaculty.khara Solidity.kleśa Defilement.kleśa-bīja Defilementseed.kleśa-prahāṇa Abandonmentofdefilement.Thisisnotthedestructionofdefilement(as

no dharmacanbedestroyedassuch),butrathertheseveringoftheprāptifromtheserialcontinutityoftheindividual.

kleśamahābhūmika dharma Universaldharma‑sofdefilement.kleśāvaraṇa Defilement‑hindrance.→āvaraṇakliṣṭa Defiled.Thisincludesbothwhatisakuśalaandwhatisnivṛtāyākṛta.kliṣṭa-ajñāna Defiledignorance.Thisisignoranceconnectedwithdefilement.Itisovercome

in the arhatandthepratyeka-buddhaaswellasthesamyak-saṃbuddha.kriyā Action,activity(notinthespecificsenseofkāritra).kriyā-cetanā Volitionofaction.kṛṣṇa karma Ablackkarma; onethatyieldsablack(i.e.,disagreeable)retribution.krodha Anger.kṛta Done.kṛta-parijaya Onewho ‘hasgainedvictory’. i.e.,onewhohasbecomeanadept (ina

practice)andisnomoreabeginner(ādikarmika).kṛtnāyatana Baseofentirety.kṣaṇa Moment;theshortestunitoftime.kṣaṇika Momentary.Kṣaṇikavādin Onewhoholdsthatdharma‑sexistfornomorethanonekṣaṇa.Saṃghabhadra

ridiculestheSautrāntika‑Dārṣṭāntikas,callingthemKṣaṇikavādinsbecausetheyholdthatdharma‑sexistonlyinthesinglepresentmoment.

kṣaṇika-pratītya-samutpāda Oneof the fourfold interpretationof theSarvāstivāda.Thisinterpretationisthatthe12linksofconditionedco‑arisingareembracedwithinasinglemoment.

kṣānti 1.Endurance,tolerance,patience.2.Receptivity,whichisafromofprajñā.Twomajormeanings:(i)Thecognitiveabilitytofullyacceptatruth/doctrineinadvance,even

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beforeonehasactuallyacquiredthejñānaproperofthattruth/doctrine.Itisthemomentimmediatelyprecedingthatjñāna.(ii)Thethirdspiritualattainmentintheprayogastageknownasthefournirvedha-bhāgīya‑s.

kṣatriya Thewarriorclass;thesecondofthefourmajorcastesintheHindusystem.kṣaya-jñāna Knowledgeofexhaustion(oftheāsrava).kṣema Peaceandsecurity.Thisisthenatureofwhatiskuśala.Itisalsoasynonymfor

Nirvāṇa.kṣetra-viśeṣa Distinctivefield(ofmerit).kṣīna-āsrava Onewhohasexhaustedtheoutflows,anepithetforanarhat.kṣudra-vastuka Minor/miscellaneousmatter.kuśala Wholesome,skilful.kuśala-dharma-chanda Aspiration/desireforthegood.kuśala-karmapatha (The10) ‘skillful paths ofkarma’; the opposite of theakuśala-

karmapatha.kuśalamahābhūmika dharma Universalskilfuldharma‑s.kuśala-mūla Rootsofskilfulness.Therearetwosetsofthree:1.alobha,adveṣa,amoha;

2. puṇya-bhāgīya,mokṣa-bhāgīya,nirvedha-bhāgīya.kuśalamūla-samuccheda Cuttingoffoftheskillfulroots.laghutva Lightness.lajjā Shamefulnesslakṣaṇa Characteristic.lakṣaṇa-anyathātva (/lakṣaṇa-anyathika) ‘Difference in characteristic’;Ghoṣaka’s

explanationontemporality:adharmaisfuture,presentorpastdependingonthetemporalcharacteristicofwhichitisinpossession.

lākṣaṇika Definitive.lakṣya Thecharacterized.laukika Mundane,worldly.laukika-bhāvānā-mārga The mundanepathofcultivation.TheSarvāstivādaholdsthat

apṛthagjanacanalsoabandondefilements,albeitnotabsolutely.Hedoessothroughthemundanepathofcultivation,developingdisgusttowardsalowerstagebycontemplattingon itsbeingaudārika, sthulabhittaka andduḥkhila, anddelight in ahigher statebycontemplatingitasbeingśānta,praṇītaandniḥsaraṇa.

laukikāgra-dharma The worldlysupremedharma.Thefourthnirvedhabhāgīya-sbelongingto the prayogastageimmediatelyafterwhichoneentersintothedarśana-mārga.

laukika-jñāna Mundaneknowledge.laukika-mārga Mundanepath.laukikī samyak-dṛṣṭi Worldlyrightview.loka-prajñapti ‘Designation/teachingonoftheworld’,achapterinthePjŚ.lokavyavahāra Conventionalusagesintheworld.lokottara-jñāna Supramundaneknowledge.Theoutflow‑freeknowledgeacquiredbyan

āryaintheprocessofdirectrealization.mada Pride,intoxication.madhya Middle,medium.mahābhūmika dharma Universaldharma.mahā-bhūta GreatElement.


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mahā-karuṇā Greatcompassion.Itssvabhāvaisprajñā.mahā-phala Greatfruit.mahā-puruṣa ‘GreatMan’.mahā-rājan Greatking.Mahāyāna ‘GreatVehicle’.AnameusedbytheMahāyāniststostressthattheyaimat

theperfectBuddha‑hoodof all beings, and their ideal is thus superior to thatof theHīnayāna.

maitrī Love,lovingkindness.maitrī-bhāvanā Meditationonloving‑kindnessmāna Conceit, characterized bymental elevation (unnati)whenone compares oneself

withothers.Thereare7modes:(i)māna,(ii)atimāna,(iii)mānātimāna,(iv)asmimāna,(v)abhimāna,(vi)ūnamāna,(vii)mithyāmāna.

Asthefirstofthe7modes,itsnatureisdescribedthus:“Whenothersareinferiorandoneclaimsthatoneissuperior,orothersareequaltoone,andoneclaimsthatoneisequal.”(Cf. Avatāra)

manaḥ-pradoṣa (Awillinglyprojected)thoughtofhatred.manas 1.Mind.2.Thementalfacultywhichis theimmediatelypastcitta inamental

series.mānātimāna Hyper‑superiority‑complex.Amodeofmāna,characterizedthus:“Ifothers

aresuperior,andoneclaimsoneissuperior,thementalelevationsoproducedisnamed.”(Cf. Avatāra)

manaskāra(also:manasikāra) Mentalapplication,attention.mānātimāna Extremeconceit.mano-bhūmi ‘Mind‑ground’,mentalsphere,mentalstage.manojña Mentallyagreeable.manuṣya Humanbeing.mārga Path.mārga-darśana-heya (Defilements)abandonablethroughinsightintothepathleading

tocessationofduḥkha.mārga-jñana Knowledgeofthepath,acquiredintheprocessofabhisamaya.mārga-satya Nobletruthofthepathleadingtothecessationofduḥkha.mati Understanding.Itisaglossforprajñā.mātṛkā Matrix,alistsummarilyenumeratingdoctrinaltopicstobeelaboratedupon.mātṛkā-dhara ‘Maintainer/holder ofmātṛkā’; the ancient specialists inwhat later on

evolvedtobetheĀbhidharmikas.mātsarya Avarice.māyā Deceptiveness,illusion.middha Drowsiness,sleep.miśra Mixed.mithyā Wrong,false.mithyā-ākāra Falsemodeofunderstanding.mithyā-dṛṣṭi Falseview.mithyā-jñāna Falseknowledge.mithyāmāna Falseconceit,amodeofmāna.Itischaracterizedthus:“Oneclaimsthatone

hasvirtueswheninrealityonehasnot”(Cf. Avatāra).

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moha Delusion.Oneofthethreeakuśala-mūla‑s.moha-sadṛśatva ‘Resemblanceofdelusion’.Itisnotthekleśa,delusionitself,butonlya

resemblanceofit.Thisreferstothevāsanāleftbehindasaresultoftheperfumingofmoha.

mokṣabhāgīya Preparatory efforts (prayoga) conducing to liberation.They essentiallycompriseśamathaandvipaśyanāmeditationalpractices.

mrakṣa Concealment.mṛdu Blunt,weak.mṛdvindriya ‘Weakfaculty’;incontrasttoatīkṣnendriya.mṛṣā-vāda Falsespeech.mṛtyu Death.muditā Sympatheticjoy.mūla Fundamental,primary,basic,root.mūla-dhyāna ‘Fundamentaldhyāna’.Therearefour:prathama-dhyāna,dvitīya-dhyāna,

tṛtīya-dhyāna,caturtha-dhyāna.→dhyāna,dhyānāṅga.mūla-lakṣaṇa The(four)primarycharacteristics.Mūla-sarvāstivāda ‘Fundamental/originalSarvāstivāda’. In spite of thename, it is a

sub‑sectthatbranchedofffromtheoriginalSarvāstivāda.mūrdhan Summits,thesecondstageofthenirvedha-bhāgīya.naiḥṣyandika Of the nature of being an emanation (niṣyanda).Oneof the doctrinal

perspectivesinAbhidharmaanalysis:dharma‑saredivisibleasthosewhicharenaiḥsyandika (e.g. citta)andwhicharenot(e.g.,kāya).

naivaṃ-pādaka ‘[Astraight‑forwardanwer]consistingtheword“No”’(toaquestionoftheform:“doespimplyq?”).

nairātmya Soullessness,thefactoftherebeingnoSelf;non‑substantiality.nairmāṇika Transformational;pertainingtothepsychicabilitytotransform.nairyāṇika Conducivetoexit;oneofthefourākāra‑softhemārga-satya.naiva-śaikṣa-nāśaikṣa Pertainingtoneitherthetraineeorthenon‑trainee.naivasaṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana Thesphereofneither‑ideation‑nor‑non‑ideation’,thefourth

of the ārūpya-samāpatti. samāpatti,ārūpya-dhātu.nāma 1.Name.2.Word,oneofthedisjoinedconditionings(citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra).

3.Thementalpartofthepsycho‑physicalcomplex(nāma-rūpa)nāma-kāya Word‑group;oneoftheviprayukta-saṃskāra‑s.nāma-rūpa ‘Name‑and‑form’,thepycho‑physicalcomplexofasentient.naraka Hell.nāstitva Non‑existence.navāṅga-(buddha-)śāsana (/navāṅga-dharma-pravacana) Thenine‑foldclassification

oftheBuddha’steachings,expoundedalmostexclusivelyintheSoutherntradition(UsuallygiveninPāliasnavaṅga-satthu-sāsana.ItalsooccursintheSaddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra of the Mahāyāna):1.sūtra (/sutta),2.geya (/geyya),3.vyākaraṇa (/veyyākaraṇa),,4.gāthā,5.udāna,6. ityuktaka (/itivuttaka),7.jātaka,8. adbhuta-dharma (/abbhuta-dhamma),9.vaidalya (/vedalla).→dvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana

nendriya Notofthenatureofafaculty.neyārtha (Adoctrine)whosemeaningisyettobefullydrawnout;implicit(teaching)nidāna Introduction;source;link.


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niḥsaraṇa Escape;Exit,oneofthe14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaintheMVŚ.Ahigherstateofattainmentistobecontemplatedasoneofniḥsaraṇa.

niṣyanda-phala Uniform‑emanationfruit.nikāya 1.Group,Division.2.ABuddhistsect.nikāya-sabhāga Grouphomogeneity,oneoftheviprayukta-saṃskāra‑s.Itisaforcewhich

causesthesimilaritiesinappearance,inclination,etc.,amongagroupofbeings.E.g.:Allhumanssharesimilaritiesashumanbecauseofthisforce.

nimitta Mark,sign;cause.nirantara Withoutaninterval.nirdeśa Exposition,discourse.nirmāṇa-citta Transformation‑thought.nirodha ‘Cessation’.nirodha-darśana-heya (Defilements)abandonablethroughinsightintothenirodha-satya.nirodha-jñāna Knowledgeofcessation,acquiredintheprocessofabhisamaya.nirodha-samāpatti Cessation‑attainment,ameditationalattainmentinwhichallmental

activitiescometocease.nirodha-satya Nobletruthofthecessationofduḥkha.nirukti-pratisaṃvid Unhinderedknowledgewith regard toetymology,oneof thefour

typesofpratisaṃvid.→artha-pratisaṃvid.nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa Nirvāṇawithoutaremnantofsubstratum.nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu Thesphereofnirvāṇawithoutaremnantofsubstratum.nirvāṇa ThegoaloftheBuddhistspirituallife,explainedinBuddhismastheextinction/blowing

outofthefireofrāga,dveṣaandmoha.Itisthestateofperfectbliss,andtranscedenceofallduḥkhaandbirths.InSarvāstivāda,thisisnotamereabsenceofduḥkha,butapositiveentityacquiredwhenadefilementisabandoned,whichservestopreventthefurtherarisingofthedefilement.Itisasynonymforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha.

nirvāṇālambanā prajñā wisdom(understandinginthehighestform)havingnirvāṇa asitsobject.

nirvāṇa-dhātu Sphereofnirvāṇa.nirvedha Penetration,decisivedistinction.nirvedha-bhāgīya Preparatoryeffortsconducingtodecisivedistinction:i.e.,tothearising

of outflow‑freeknowledge.Thesearealsocalledtheskilfulroots;therearefour:uṣmagata, mūrdhan, kṣānti, laukikāgra-dharma.

niśraya-hetu Reliancecause,oneofasetoffivecauses. →janana-hetu. niścita Decided,decisive,definite.niṣyanda Emanation.niṣyanda-phala ‘Emanationfruit’.Thisisthefruitforthesabhāga-hetu. nītārtha (Adoctrine)whosemeaninghasbeenfullydrawnout;explicit.→neyārtha.nivaraṇa Hindrancenivṛta-avyākrta Veiled‑non‑defined;i.e.,morallynon‑definedbutstillobstructivetothe

spiritualpath.nivṛtāvyākṛta-mahābhūmika-dharma Universaldharma‑swhich are veiled‑non‑

defined.nivṛtāvyākṛta-vijñapti-rūpa Veiled‑non‑definedinformativematternivṛtti Reversing/stoppingofthesaṃsāricprocess.

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niyama Principle,afixedrule.niyata karma Determinatekarma.nyāya Logic,rightmethod.Itisalsooneoftheākāra of mārga-satya.ogha Flood.pāda Foot;aline,a(fourth)part.pada-kāya Phrase‑group,oneoftheviprayukta-saṃskāra.padārtha (Real)category.paiśunya Maliciousspeech.pāka Cooking,maturation.pakti Cooking,maturing.pañca-avara-bhāgīya ‘Fivefetterspertainingtothelowerportion’,i.e.,tothekāma-dhātu.

Theycomprise:satkāya-dṛṣṭi,śīla-vrata-parāmarśa,vicikitsā,kāmacchandaandvyāpāda.pañca samatā Thefivefold sameness or equality the fulfilment ofwhich twomental

factorsaresaidtobeconjoined(saṃprayukta):1.āśraya-samatā,2.ālambana-samatā,3. ākāra-samatā,4.kāla-samatā,5.dravya-samatā.

pañca-nikāya Fivecategoriesofabandonables:(1)‑(4)thoseabandonablebyinsightintoduḥkha,samudaya,nirodha,mārga,and(5)bybhāvanā.

pañca nivaraṇa ‘Fivehindrances’toasuccessfulmeditation:1.kāmacchanda,2.vyāpāda,3. styāna-middha,4.auddhatya-kaukṛtya,5.vicikitsā.

pañca ūrdhva-bhāgīya The‘five(saṃyojana‑s)pertainingtotheupperportion’;i.e.,tothe rūpa‑andārūpya-dhātu‑s.Theycomprise:rāgaarisenfromrūpa-dhātu,rāgaarisenfromārūpya-dhātu,auddhatya,mānaandavidyā.

pañcavastuka ‘Comprisingfivethings/categories’,animportantchapterofthePrŚdealingwiththefivecategoriesofdharma‑s:rūpa,citta,caitasika,citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra andasaṃskṛta.

pañca-vijñāna-kāya Thegroupfive(sensory)consciousnesses.pañcopādāna-skandha (pañca-upādāna-skandha) Five aggregates of clinging/

grasping.I.e.,theskandha‑sofapṛthagjana.para-bhāva ‘Other‑nature’,asopposedtointrinsic(/self‑)nature.→svabhāva.paracitta-jñāna Knowledgeofanother’smind.para-kṛta Donebyothers,other‑caused.parama Highest.Also,‘MostExcellent’,oneofthe14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha

intheMVŚ.paramāṇu ‘Theextremelyfine’,anatom.TheMVŚdefinesitthus:“Aparamāṇuisthe

smallestrūpa.Itcannotbecut,broken,penetrated.….Itisneitherlongnorshort,….Ithasnosmallerparts;itcannotbedecomposed,….Itis…thefinest(sarva-sūkṣma)ofallrūpa‑s.”Paramāṇuisdivisibleasdravya-paramāṇuandsaṃghāta-paramāṇu.

parāmarśa (Irrational) adherence.Two types are usuallymentioned:dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa andśīla-vrata-parāmarśa.

paramārtha Highestsense;anabsolutereal.paramārtha-sat Absolutelyreal,existentfromtheultimatestandpoint.paramārtha-satya Absolutetruth.pāramitā ‘Perfection’.Abodhisattvafufillsthesixperfectionsbeforeattainingenlightenment.

Thesixare:dāna,śīla,vīrya,kṣānti,samādhiandprajñā. parāvṛtta Transformed.paravijñāpana Informingtoorfromothers.


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parihāṇa-dharman Ofthenatureofbeingsusceptibletoretrogression.parihāṇi Retrogression(fromspiritualattainment).parijñā Completeknowledge.Two‑fold:prahāṇa-parijñāandjñāna-parijñā.pariṇāma Transformation.parinirvāṇa Complete,finalNirvāṇa;i.e.,thefinalpassingawayofanarhat or buddha.parinirvāṇa-dharman Ofthenatureofbeingabletoattain(/destinedfor)Nirvāṇa.paripūraka-karma Completingkarma;karmathatcontributestospecificdetailsofagiven

typeofexistence(human,etc.)determinedbyanākṣepaka karma.pariṣkāra Utensils.parīttakleśabhūmikā dharmāḥ Dharma‑sofdefilementofarestricted/limitedscope.

AlistoftenisgivenintheAKB:krodha,upanāha,mrakṣa,pradāśa/pradāsa,śāṭhya,māyā,mada,mātsarya,īrṣyā,vihiṃsā.

parivāra Retinue,accompaniment.pāruṣya Harshspeech.paryavasthāna Envelopment.FortheSautrāntikaandsomeotherschools,thisrepresents

themanifested(asopposedtolatent)defilement.→anuśayaparyāya Synonyms,alternatives,doctrinalperspective.paścātkālaja Thatwhicharisessubsequently.paścāt-pādaka Thatwhichaccordswiththelatter(andnottheformer)alternative.pāścātya Westernmasters, theSarvāstivādamasters livingwest (around theGandhāra

region)ofKaśmīra.paṭutva Forcefulness.phala Fruit.The standard set of 5 fruits are: 1.adhipati-phala, 2.puruṣakāra-phala,

3. niṣyanda-phala,4.vipāka-phala,5.visaṃyoga-phala.phala-ākarṣaṇa Thedraggingoutofafruit(outofitsexistenceinthefuturetemporal

period).phala-dāna The actual giving of the fruit (as opposed tophalākṣepa/phala-

parigrahaṇa).phalākṣepa Projectionofthefruit;i.e.thecausaldeterminationthataparticulardharma,

y,willbethecorrespondingfruitofapresentdharma,x.Eachdharma,atthepresentmoment,andonlyatthepresentmoment,canprojectitsownfruit(i.e.,canhavethisactivityofyieldingitsownnextmomentofexistenceinitsserialcontinuity.→kāritra).

phala-pratigrahaṇa ‘Graspingofthefruit’;i.e.,acquiring,inthepresentmoment,thecausalefficiencyforadharma’seffect.→phalākṣepa.

pipāsā Thirst.prabandha Continuance,continuity,serialsuccession.prabhā Radiance.prabhava Source,origin,cause,production.Asoneoftheākāra of samudaya-satya,it

meansproductionorsuccessivecausation.pradāśa (/pradāsa) Depravedopinionatedness.pradhāna 1. Chief.2.Sameaspahāṇa,inthesenseof'exertion','effort',asinsamyak-

pradhāna.pradhāna-dravya Chiefsubstance/essence.prahāṇa Abandonment.

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prahāṇa-parijñā Completeknowledgequaabandonment.Itistheabsoluteabandonment(atyanta-prahāṇa)ofkleśa.Abandonmentbeingtheresultofcompleteknowledge,itisalsosaidtobeacompleteknowledge.

prahāṇa-bhāvanā-ārāmatā Delightinthecultivationofabandonment(ofdefilements).prahāṇa-mārga Pathofabandonment.prahāṇa-pratipakṣa Counteragentresultinginabandonment(ofdefilements).prajñā Understanding,wisdom. prajñā-indriya Facultyofunderstanding.prajñapti Designation,concept,convention,teaching,arrangement.prajñapti-sat Conceptuallyexistent,relativelyreal.prajñapti-sāvadya Anoffenceortransgressionbywayofconvention(prajñapti);e.g.,

drinkingliquor.prajñaptitaḥ sat →prajñapti-sat.Prajñaptivādin Onewho asserts that every is nothingbutmere concept/designation

(prajñapti).Saṃghabhadrausesthistermtorefertothosewhodenytherealityofeventhepresentdharma‑s.

prajñā-vimukta Liberatedthroughunderstanding/wisdom.Thisreferstothetypeofarhat who,throughprajñā,overcomesthekleśāvaraṇaandbecomesliberated.

prākarṣika-pratītya-samutpāda OneofthefourfoldSarvāstivādininterpretationoftheconditionedco‑arising.Accordingtothisinterpretation, conditionedco‑arisingextendsover (prākarṣika)threeperiods(past,present,future)ofexistence.

prakṛti ‘Nature’,‘originalnature’.prakṛti-sāvadya Atransgressionwhichisanoffenceinitsintrinsicnature;e.g.,killing.pramāda Non‑diligence,heedlessness.pramāṇa 1.‘Measure/criterion’;authority.2.Avalidmeansofknowledge;threeareoften

mentionedintheAbhidharma:1.pratyakṣa,2.anumāna,3.āptāgama;theĀbhidharmikasusuallyinvokesatwo‑foldargumentforthevalidityofadoctrine:oneisāptāgama,theotherisyukti.

prāṇātipāta Takingoflife.praṇidhāna Resolution,pastvow.praṇidhi-jñāna Knowledgethatisproducedinaccordancewiththeparticularmannerof

thepractitioner’sformerresolutiontohavetheknowledge.praṇidhi-jñāna-samādhi Themeditation,inaccordancewiththestrengthofwhich,the

particularpraṇidhi-jñāna isproduced.praṇīta Excellent,wonderful.Also,oneof the14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodha

intheMVŚ.prapañca Conceptualproliferation.prāpti Acquisition,aviprayukta-saṃskārawhichlinks(establishesarelationshipwith)a

dharmatoasentientbeing.prasāda 1.Faith, freedom fromdoubt. 2.Clarity, translucence, sensitivity (said of the

sensefaculties).prasaṅga Attachment;consequence.prasiddha Bilaterallyoruniversallyestablished.praśrabdhi Calm.prati-bimba Image,reflection.pratideśan’ādi-pratipakṣaḥ Counteractiveeffectbywayofconfession,etc.


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pratigha Hostility.pratighāta Obstruction.Threetypesofpratighātaare:āvaraṇa-, viṣaya-, and ālambana-.pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya Atransgressionthatisintermsofprohibition.pratilābha Obtainment.pratilambha →pratilābha.prātimokṣa-saṃvara Restraint (asan avijñapti-karma) in the formof undertaking

ordinationvows.pratiniḥsṛṣṭa Castaside.pratiniyama-hetu Distinguishing/specifyingcause.pratipad Path(leadingtoNirvāṇa);asynonymformārga.pratipakṣa Counteragent.pratipakṣa bhāvanā Counteraction‑cultivation.pratipakṣodaya (Abandonmentofdefilementon)arisingofitscounteragent.pratipannaka Candidateofaspiritualfruitonthepathofspiritualprogress.pratipatti Courseofpractice.pratisaṃdhi Relinking.pratisaṃdhi-citta The‘relinkingthought’;i.e.,theconsciousnessthatentersthemother’s

wombatthetimeofrebirth.pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha Cessationthroughdeliberation.→nirvāṇa.pratisaṃvid Unhinderedknowledge.→dharma-pratisaṃvid.pratisamyukta Connectedwith,pertainingto.pratiśaraṇa Reliance,refuge.prati-srota ‘Stream‑discordant’,onewhohasplantedtheskilfulrootsofmokṣa-bhāgīya.

Stream(srotas)referstosaṃsāra.pratiṣṭhā-hetu Supportingcause,oneofasetoffivehetu‑s.→janana-hetu.pratītya-samutpāda ConditionedCo‑arising.pratītya-samutpādatva The fact/principle ofpratītya-samutpāda, one of the nine

unconditioneddharma-sofsomeschools.pratyutpanna Present,thepresent.prativedha Penetration,oneofthe14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaintheMVŚ.prativedhanā-dharman Of thenatureofbeing capableofpenetrating the stateof an

arhat.prativijñapti Discernment/cognitionwithregardtoanobjectpratyakṣa ‘Infrontof(/facing)theeyes’,directperception. → pramāṇapratyakṣa-buddhi Aperceptionthatisapratyakṣa.pratyakṣa-jñāna Aknowledgethatisapratyakṣa.pratyakṣa-pramāṇa Thevalidmeansofknowledge,whichisdirectperception.pratyaya Condition.Therearefour:hetu‑,ālambana‑,samanantara‑,adhipati-.pratyaya-kauśalya Skillwithregardtocondition.pratyeka-buddha PrivatelyEnligtenedOne.Hepractisesbyhimselfwithoutateacher,

andbecomesenlightened.However,helacksmahākaruṇa,andhisprajñāisinferiortoasamyak-saṃbuddha.

pratyupasthita Comingintothefieldofone’sexperience;appearingrightinfront.pravāhaḥ Acontinuity.

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pravartaka Initialpropeller,asopposedtosubsequentpropeller(anuvartaka)pravrajyā ‘Goingforth’,leavingthehomelife.pravṛtti Process;thesaṃsāricprocess.prayoga Preparatoryeffort.Thisstagecomprisesthemokṣa-bhāgīyaandthenirvedha-

bhāgīya.prayoga Preparatoryeffort.prayoga-avasthā Thestageofprayoga.prayoga-mārga The preparatorypath.prayogaviśeṣa Aspecialordistinctiveeffort.prāyogika Derivedfrompreparatoryeffort.premā Affection.preta Hungryghost.prītīndriya Thefacultyofjoy.pṛṣṭha Subsequent;back.pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna Themundane‘knowledgeofanāryaobtainedsubsequently’tothe

truespiritualinsightintheprocessofdirectrealization(abhisamaya).pṛthagjana Anordinaryworldling(onewhohasnotyetbecomeanārya).pṛthagjanatva Thequalityofaworldling;sometimeslistedasaviprayukta-saṃskāra.

AccordingtotheSarvātivāda,itistheasamanvāgama of the ārya-dharma‑s.pṛthivī Earth;alsothe Earthelement,oneofthefourmahābhūta-s.pudgala Person.pudgala-vāda ThedoctrineoftheVātsīputrīyaschoolanditsbranchesthatthereexists

aineffable‘person’(pudgala)whichisneitheridenticalwithnordifferentfromthefiveskandha‑s.

puṇya Merit,meritoriousaction.puṇya-bhāgīya Thepartpertainingto(theaccumulationof)merit.TheMVŚspeaksof

threetypesofkuśala-mūla:puṇya-bhāgīya, mokṣa-bhāgīya, nirvedha-bhāgīya.puṇya-jñāna-saṃbhāra Therequistesofmeritandknowledge.Thistwinrequisiteisthe

mainconstituentsofthepreliminarypracticsleadinguptothestageofprayoga in the pathofspiritualprogress.

puṇya-kṣetra Fieldofmerit.puruṣa Aman.puruṣa-kāra ‘Manly/virileactivity’.Thistermreferstotheefficaciousactionofadharma

inaverygeneralsense:Justasaman’sactivityisnotapartfromtheman,likewise,adharma’sefficaciousactionbringingaboutacorrespondingeffectisnotapartthedharma itself.

AKB,96:“Thatfruitwhichisbornthroughtheforceofacertain[dharma]isthefruitofthemanlyactivityofthat[dharma].”

puruṣakāra-phala ‘Manly/virilefruit’,thefruitforthesahabhū-hetuandsaṃprayukta-hetu.However,sincepuruṣa-kārareferstotheefficacyofadharmainaverygeneralsense,thefruitofanyhetucouldalsobecalleda“manlyfruit”.

pūrvācārya Ancientmaster.pūrva-rūpa Fore‑sign.pūrvaṅgama Fore‑running.pūrvānta(-koṭi) Thefirstbeginning(ofsaṃsāra).


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pūrvānubhūta Experiencedbefore.*pūrvānudhātu Subsidiaryelementsthathasbeenaccumulatedfromthepast;atermused

byŚrīlātainhisversionofthebījatheory.pūrva-pādaka Thatwhichaccordswiththeformer(andnotthelatter)alternative.rāga Greed.Oneofthethreeakuśala-mūla‑srāga-sadṛśatva ‘Resemblanceof greed’. It is not thekleśa, greed itself, but only a

resemblanceofit.Thisreferstothevāsanāleftbehindasaresultoftheperfumingofrāga.rāja-sthānīya Governor.ramaṇīya Lovable,oneofthe14synonymsforpratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaintheMVŚ.rasa Taste.rasa-artha Gustatoryobject.rāśi Heap.ṛddhipāda Basesof(supernormal)power.ruci Inclination.rūpa Matter.rūpa-artha Visualobject.rūpa-dhātu-pratisaṃyukta Pertainingtothesphereoffine‑materiality.rūpaṇa (/rūpaṇā) Thecharacteristicofrūpa(primarily:obstructivenessandresistance).rūpa-prasāda Translucent, sensitivematterwhich is the constituent of the sensory

faculties.rūpāvacara-pratisaṃyukta Pertainingtothefinematerialsphere.rūpi-dharma Materialdharma.rūpin Material,havingaparticularformorfigure.śabda Sound.śabda-artha Auditoryobject.sabhāga Homogenous,similar.sabhāga-dhātu-sarvatraga (Defilements) thatareaidtobe‘universal’(sarvatraga) in

thattheymoveinallthefivecategory(nikāya)ofabandonablespertainingtotheirownsphere(dhātu).

sabhāga-hetu ‘Homogeneouscause’.Oneofthesixcauses;ityieldsaneffectwhichissimilarinmoralspecies.→svaphala-nirvartana.

sabhāgatā Group‑homogeneity;oneoftheviprayukta-saṃskāra‑s.sabhāgavibhāga-kliṣṭadharma-prabandha-janaka (Thenatureofasarvatraga-hetu

isthatitis)generativeofthecontinuance(prabandha)ofdefileddharma‑swhicharesimilarordissimilarinnature.

sābhāgya-kāraṇa Causeofsimilarity.sa-dāha Havingtheheat(ofdefilement).ṣaḍ-āyatana Thesixentrances/abodes.saddharma TheTrueDoctrine(oftheBuddha).sādṛśya Resemblance.sahabhū-hetu Co‑existentcause;oneofsixcauses.→hetu;anyonyānuparivartanaika

kṛtyasahaja (/sahajāta) Conascent,borntogether.sahāya Companion.

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śaikṣa Trainee;referringtotheārya-s whoarenot artha-s; pertainingtothetrainee.śaikṣa-mārga pathoftraineeśakti Power,potency.śailpa-sthānika Artsandcrafts.sa-indriya Possessingofthefaculties.sakala-bandhana Aworldlingwhohasnotabandonedanydefilementsthroughthemundane

pathbeforebecominganārya.sākāra (1)Havingamodeofactivity;thisreferstothefactthatallcitta-caitta-dharma‑s

cancognizeanobject.(2)Havingthesamemodeofactivity,oneoftheconditionsforsaṃprayoga.→pañcadhā samatā.

sākāra-jñāna-vāda The theory that knowledgenecessarilypossesses an imageof itsobject.

sākāra-vijñāna-vāda Sameassākāra-jñāna-vāda.sakṛdāgāmin Once‑returner.sakṛdāgāmin pratipannaka Candidateforthefruitofaonce‑returner.sākṣāt Directly,face‑to‑facesākṣāt-karaṇa Realization.sālambana ‘Havingacognitiveobject’;adescriptivetermforallmentaldharma‑s,since

theyallnecessarilytakeanobjectinarising.sallakṣaṇa ‘Characteristicoftheexistent’.Whatisexistentiswhatcanserveasanobject

forgeneratingacognition(buddhi)samādhi Concentration,meditation.samādhi-bhāvanā Cultivationofconcentration.samādhija-prajñā Understanding/wisdomderivedfromconcentration.sāmagrī Harmony,congruence.Itisalsothenameofaconditioningdisjoinedfromthought

whichoperatesamongagroupofsentientbeingsbringingaboutharmony.samāhita-bhūmi ‘Concentratedstage’,thestageofconcentration.samanantara-pratyaya Equal‑immediatecondition,oneofthefourpratyaya‑s.Itserves

asthesupportfor,andgiveswayto,thearisingoftheimmediatelysucceedingdharma intheserialcontinuity.

sāmantaka Neighbouring.Inthecontextofmeditation,thisreferstothestageneighbouringameditationalattainment.→samāpatti.

samanvāgama Endowment.Oneissaidtohaveanendowmentofadharmawhenone,havingacquiredthedharma,continuestopossessit.→ prāpti,asamanvāgama.

samanvāgama-asaṃanvāgama-kauśalya (AnĀbhidharmika’s)skilfulnesswithregardto endowmentandnon-endowment.

samanvāhāra Holdinginmind(ofapreviouslyexperiencedobject).sāmānya-lakṣaṇa Commoncharacteristic.sāmānyalakṣaṇa-kauśalya (AnĀbhidharmika’s) skilfulnesswith regard to common

characteristics.samāpatty-āvaraṇa ‘Hindrancetomeditativeattainment’.Somemastersholdthatthis

constitutesthevimokṣa-āvaraṇa.samāpatty-āvaraṇa-vimukta Liberatedfromallhindrancestomeditativeattainment.sāmarthya Capability,potency.


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śamatha Calm,tranquility.Asameditationpractice,itisdistinctfrom(thoughnotopposedto)vipaśyanā.

śamatha bhāvanā Tranquilitycultivation/meditation.śamatha-carita Thetranquillitytype(ofpractitioner).śamatha-vipaśyanā Tranquilityandinsight,thetwofundamentalaspectsofmeditative

praxis.samatikrama Transcending;transcendence.samāpatti Attainment.Inparticular,itreferstotheninemeditationattainment:fourdhyāna‑s

pertainingtotherūpa-dhātu,fourārūpya samāpatti‑s,andnirodha-samāpatti.samāropa Superimposition,addition.E.g.:Wherethereisnometaphysicalātman in the

skandha‑s,thebeliefthatitexistsisasamāropa on the skandha‑ssaṃbandha Connection,relationship.sāṃbandhika pratītya-samutpāda OneofthefourfoldinterpretationoftheSarvāstivāda

onconditionedco‑arising.Thisinterpretationisthatthe12linksofconditionedco‑arisingareconnected(sāṃbandhika)throughbeingcausesandeffects.

saṃbhāra Requisite,provision(neededonthespiritualjourneyorforspiritualattainment).saṃbhinna-pralāpa Frivolousspeech.saṃcetanīya-karma Adeedthatisdoneintentionallysaṃcaya Accumulation,collection.saṃcitatva Thefactofbeingaccumulated.saṃdhāna (Birth‑)relinking;adescriptivetermforvijñāna.Sameaspratisaṃdhi.saṃghāta-paramāṇu Atoms in agglomeration, ‘aggregate‑atom’, akin to themodern

conceptionofamolecule.saṃgīti ‘Collectivesinging/rehearsal’;oftenrenderedas‘Council/Congregation’(ofthe

Saṅgha,todiscussandascertaintheBuddha’steachings).saṃgraha (1)Mutualsubsumption,inclusion,subordination.(2)Cohesion.saṃgraha-asaṃgraha-kauśalya (AnĀbhidharmika’s) skilfulnesswith regard to

subsumption,non‑subsumption.saṃjñā Ideation.saṃjñāpavana ‘Windofsaṃjñā’.saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha-samāpatti (Meditation) attainment of cessation of sensation

andideation.Sameasnirodha-samāpatti.saṃkalpa cetanā Volitionofintention.saṃkara Confusion,mixingup.saṃkleśa Pollution,theprocessofdefiling;oppositetovyavadāna.saṃmoha Delusion.saṃmukhībhāva Comingintodirectpresence,becomingface‑to‑face.saṃnipāta Comingtogether,assemblage.saṃniśraya Support.saṃprayoga Association,conjunction.Mentaldharma‑saresaidtobeinconjunctionin

accordancewiththefive‑foldequality.→pañcadhā samatā.saṃprayogato ’nuśete (Adefilement)adheresandgrowsthroughtheprocessofconjunction

withtheobject.saṃprayoga-viprayoga-kauśalya (AnĀbhidharmika’s) skilfulnesswith regard to

conjunction,disjunction.

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saṃprayukta Conjoined,associated.→pañca samatā.saṃprayuktā avidyā Conjoinedignorance;i.e.,theignorancethatalwaysarisestogether

with,andnecessarilythroughthesupportof,otherdefilements.→āveṇikī avidyā. saṃprayuktaka-hetu Conjoinedcause;oneofsixhetu‑s.Thecitta-caitta‑s,whenarising

together,areconjoinedcauses.→hetu;ek’ālambanakṛtya.saṃsāra Thecycleofbirthsanddeath.saṃskṛta Conditioned,compounded.saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa ‘Characteristic of the conditioned’.There are four of them, of the

natureofviprayukta-saṃsāra:jāti,sthiti,jarā,anityatā/vyaya.Together,theyrenderaconditioneddharmamomentary(kṣaṇika).

saṃskāra Conditionings,conditioningforces.saṃsthāna Shape.saṃtati (/santati) Serialcontinuity.saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa Adistinctivetransformationoftheserialcontinuity.saṃtīraṇa Judgement,judgementaldecision.saṃtuṣṭi Contentment.samudācāra Manifestation,comingintoplay.samudaya Origin.samudaya-darśana-heya (defilements)abandonablethroughinsightintothesamudaya-

satya.samudaya-jñāna Knowledgeoftheorigin(ofduḥkha),acquiredintheprocessofabhisamaya.samudaya-satya Nobletruthoftheorigin(ofduḥkha).samutthāna-citta Originatingthought.samutthāna-hetu Originatingcause.saṃvara Restraint.Itisatypeofavijñapti.saṃvara-karma Restraintqua(avijñapti)karma.saṃvarastha Abidinginrestraint(i.e.,possessingrestraint).saṃvṛti-jñāna Conventionalknowledge:knowledgeofconventionalthings.saṃvṛti-saṃjñā Conventionalnotion.saṃvṛti-satya Conventionaltruth.samyag-ājīva Properlivelihood.Oneaspectoftheāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga.samyag-vāc Properspeech.Oneaspectoftheāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga.samyag-dṛṣṭi Properview.Oneaspectoftheāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga.samyak-karmānta Properaction.Oneaspectoftheāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga.samyag-vyāyāma Propervigor.Oneaspectoftheāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga.samyak-pradhāna Propereffort.Sameassamyag-vyāyāma.→pradhāna.samyak-smṛti Propermindfulness.Oneaspectoftheāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga.samyak-samādhi Properconcentration.Oneaspectoftheāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga.samyak-saṃkalpa Properthinking.Oneaspectoftheāryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga.samyaktva-nyāma Perfectionthatistheseparationfromtheraw;i.e.fromdefilementsor

theimmaturityoftheskilfulroots.samyaktva-niyāma CertitudeofPerfection(i.e.ofNirvāṇa).samyaktva-niyāma-avakramaṇa Entering into samyaktva-nyāma;i.e.,attainingstream

entry.


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samyaktva-niyamāvakrānti Sameassamyaktva-niyāma-avakramaṇa.saṃyoga Connection,conjunction.saṃyoga-vastu Objectofconjunction.saṃyojana Fetter.Itisalsoasynonymforkleśa.Saṅgha (/Saṃgha) TheBuddhistmonasticcommunity.saṅgha-bheda ‘Splitofthemonasticcommunity’;itisalsothenameofacitta-viprayukta-

saṃskāra,havingasāmagrīasitssvabhāva. sanidarśana Visible.śānta Calmed.santāna Sameassantati/saṃtati. santāpa Torment.santati-pariṇāma (Progressive)transformationofaserialcontinuity.saparivāra Togetherwiththeretinue.sapratigha Resistant.sārūpya Co‑ordination.sarvadā asti Allexists;i.e.dharma‑salways(sarvadā)exist,whetherfuture,presentorpast.sarvahatāndhakāra Onewhohasdestroyedalldarkness(/ignorance).sarva-saṃyojana-paryādāna-parijñā Completeknowledgeof theexhaustionofall

fetters.sarvāstitva Thefactof‘allexists’,tri‑temporalexistence(ofalldharma‑s).Sarvāstivāda Afollowerofthesarvāstitva doctrine.sarva-sūkṣma Thefinest.sarvathā-sarvahatāndhakāra Onewhohasdestroyeddarknessinallways;i.e.,abuddha

(whohasovercomebothkliṣṭa and kliṣṭājñāna. sarvatraga ‘Goingeverywhere’,universal.sarvatraga-hetu Universalcause.Oneofthesixhetu‑s.śaśa-rajas ‘Rabbit‑dust’,thesizeofsevenap-rajas.śaśa-śṛṅga Hornofahare;asimileforsomethingwhichisanabsolutenon‑existent.sāsrava With‑outflow.Awith‑outflowobjectisonebytakingwhichthedefilementadheres

toitandgrows.Itisalsoonewhoseeffectistoretainusinsaṃsāra.sāśraya ‘Havingasupportingbasis’,adescriptivetermforthecitta-caitta-dharma‑s.sāśtra Atreatise.śāśvata-vāda Thetheoryofeternalism.śāṭhya Dissimulation.satkāya-dṛṣṭi Self‑view.satpuruṣa The'TrueMan'.sattva Sentientbeing.sattvākhya Pertainingtosentientbeings.satya Truth.satyābhisamaya Directrealizationofthe(fournoble)truths.saumanasya Joyousness,joy.Sautrāntika Followerofanimportantschoolofthought,characterizedas“onewhotakes

asauthoritythesūtraandnottheśāstra.”

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sa-vāsanaṃ kleśa-prahāṇa ‘Abandonment of defilement togetherwith thevāsanā'. Thisreferstotheabandonmentofkleśainthecaseofaperfectlyenlightenedbuddha,incontrasttothatofaśrāvakaorapratyeka-buddha.

sāvayava Havingapart.sa-vipāka Retributive.śikṣā Training.śikṣāmānā ‘Learning’;‘training’.AfemalememberoftheSaṅghawhoisunderprobation

for the bhikṣuṇīordination.śikṣā-pada Trainingfactors.śīla Morality,precept. śīlāṅga Thesectionofśīla.śīla-vrata-parāmarśa (Irrational)adherencetoabstentionsandvows.śīla-vratopādāna Clingingtoabstentionsandvows.sīmā-bandha Thebondofboundary.śīta Cold.skandha Aggregates,explainedas‘heap’(rāśi).Therearefiveaggregates:rūpa,vedanā,

saṃjñā,saṃskāra,vijñāna.ślakśṇatva Smoothness.smṛti Memory,recollection.smṛtyupasthāna Base ofmindfulness.There are four:kāya-, vedanā-, citta- and

dharma-s.sneha Humidity,adhesion.śoka Sorrow.sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu SphereofNirvāṇawitharemnantofsubstratum.sparśa Contact,touch.spraṣṭavya Tangible.śraddhā Faith. śraddhādhimukta (Onewho)isfreedthroughpredominanceoffaith.śraddhānusārin ‘Faith‑pursuant’.Apractitionerwhoprimarilyreliesonfaithforspiritual

progress.śrāmaṇera AmalenovicememberoftheSaṅghawhohasnotyetreceivedtheHigher

Ordination.śrāmaṇerī AfemalenovicememberoftheSaṅghawhohasnotyetreceivedtheHigher

Ordination.śrāvaka 'Listener'.AdiscipleoftheBuddha.śrāmaṇya-phala Fruitofthespirituallife;spiritualattainment.Therearefour:srotaāpatti,

sakṛdāgāmin,anāgāmin,arhat.srotaāpanna Streamentrant.srotaāpatti-phala Fruitofstreamentry. srotaāpatti-phala-stha Abidinginthefruitofstreamentry.srotaāpatti pratipannaka Candidateforthefruitofstreamentry.srota-āpatty-aṅga ‘FactorsofStream‑entry’.Thereare4:drawingneartotheTrueMen,

listening to theTrueDharma, propercontemplationand thepracticeof theDharma andwhataccordswiththeDharma.Theyarecalleditsfactors,beingconducivetoitsattainment.


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śrotābhijñā Supernormalpowerofaudition.śrotra Ear.śrotra-indriya Auditoryfaculty.śruta-mayī-prajñā Understandingderivedfromlistening.sthāna Abode,place.Sthaviravāda The‘Schooloftheelders’.Thepresent‑dayTheravādaisabranchderived

romthelineageoftheSthaviravādainancientIndia.sthitākampya (Those)abiding in theirattainmentwithout retrogressing,although they

maynotprogressunlesseffortisexerted.sthitikālāvedha Momentumfor theduration.Anarhat’s ability toprolonghis lifeat

willisbyvirtueofhismasteryoverthepowerofsamādhi.Withthis,hetransformsthemomentumforthedurationofthemahābhūta‑softhefacultiesandprojects,throughhispowerofsamādhi,anewmomentumforthesame.

sthiti-lakṣaṇa Duration‑characteristic, aviprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma that causes themomentarydurationofaconditioneddharma.→saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa.

sthiti-sthiti ‘Duration‑duration’,oneofthefouranulakṣaṇa‑s.Itsfunctionistocausethemomentarydurationofsthiti.→anulakṣaṇa.

sthūlabhittika Likeathickwall.stūpa ABuddhistrelic‑mount,adagoba.styāna Torpor.styāna-middha Torpor‑drowsiness.sucarita Goodconduct.sugati Fortunateplaneofexistence.sukha Happiness.sukha-vedanīya Conducivetopleasantexperience.sukha-vihāra ‘Dwellingofhappiness’.sukhendriya Facultyofhappiness.śukla karma Awhite(śukla)karmayieldingwhiteretribution:theactionofrūpa-dhātu,

whichisalwayspure(śubham ekāntena)generatingagreeable(manojña)retribution.śūnyatā Emptiness.Śūnyatā-vādin On0ewhoproclaimsthedoctrineofemptiness.śūnyatā-citta Thethoughtofthenatureofśūnyatā(asaconcept).sūtra (1)AdiscoursebytheBuddha.(2)Aconcisediscourse;thefirstofthedvādaśāṅga-

dharma-pravacana.sūtra-pramāṇa Criterionorauthorityforthesūtra. The VaibhāṣikasassertthatAbhidharma

istheauthorityforascertainingtheauthenticityofadiscoursecalimedasasūtra. sūtra-prāmāṇika (One)whotakesthesūtraastheultimatecriterion/authority.sūtraviśeṣa Aspecifictypeofsūtra.svabhāva Intrinsicnatureofadharma.Theintrinsicnatureofasaṃskṛta dharmaremains

thesamethroughouttime;butisnonethelessimpermanent.TheSarvāstivādaholdsthatadharma’ssvabhāvaexistsalways,eventhoughitsactivityisimpermanent.

svabhāva-vikalpa Discriminationwhichistheverynatureofconsciousnessitself.svalakṣaṇa Specificcharacteristic(uniquetoadharma).This isdivisible intodravya-

svalakṣaṇaandāyatana-svalakṣaṇa.

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svalakṣaṇa-kauśalya (An Ābhidharmika’s) skillfulnesswith regard to intrinsiccharacteristics(ofdharma‑s).

svaphalākṣepa-kāritra Theactivitywhichistheprojectionofa(dharma’s)ownfruit.Thisisthedefinitionofkāritra.

svaphalanirvartana (The sabhāga-hetu is of thenature of) ‘bringing forth their ownfruits’.

svarūpa Essentialnature.Thistermisoftenusedsynonymouslywithsvabhāva.sva-saṃbhāraṃ parigṛhṇāti (An anuśaya)gathersuptoitsownrequisites(i.e.,itsown

causes).Thisisinthesensethatitrepeatedlygathersupandgivesrisetoimpropermentalapplication(ayoniśo manaskāra).

sva-saṃvedana Reflexiveknowledge/awareness.svayaṃ-kṛta Self‑done,self‑caused.tadālambana-kleśa-prahāṇa Theabandonmentofakleśawhichtakesaparticular(kuśala

oranavyākṛta dharmaas)object.Whenthishappens,thedharmawhichistheobjectisalsosaidtobeabandonedsinceatthattimethedharmacomestobedisconnected.

tāmra-rajas (/loha-rajas) ‘Copperdust’;thesizeofsevenaṇu‑s.tandrī Exhaustion.tarkābhimāna Conceitinlogicalskill.tatkṣaṇa-samutthāna Moment‑origination; i.e.,originationat theverymomentof the

action.tatsabhāga ‘Similartothat(whichispresentlyactive,althoughthisitselfisnon‑active)’,

a‘facsimile’.E.g.,aneyeindarknesswhichdoesnotexerciseitsfunctionofseeingisatatsabhāgaeye.

tattva Reality,suchness.tattva-manaskāra ‘Mentalapplicationonthereal’.Acontemplationontherealnature

ofthingsiscalleda“mentalapplicationtothereal”,suchasthetruecharacteristicofadharma.

tejas Fire;also,oneofthefourmahābhūta‑s.tīkṣṇa Sharp.tīkṣṇendriya ‘Sharpfaculty’;incontrasttoamṛdvindriya.tīrthakāra Heretics.tīrthika Sameastīrthakāra.tiryañc Animal.tīvra Strong,intense.traidhātukavyāpin Pervadinginallthreespheres.tripiṭaka ‘ThreeBaskets’;thethreecollectionsoftheBuddha’steachings:sūtra,vinaya,

abhidharma. tri-ratna ‘TripleGem’:Buddha,DharmaandSaṅgha.tṛṣṇā Craving.ubhayabhāga-vimukta 'Doublyliberated'.Anarhatissocalledwhenheovercomesboth

the kleśāvaraṇa and vimokṣāvaraṇa. Besidesbeing prajñā-vimukta,heisalsofreedfromallthehindrancestomeditativeattainments.

uccheda-vāda Theoryofannihilation.udāna ‘Breathingout’,inspirationalversessaidtobeutteredspontaneouslybytheBuddha;

one of the dvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana.


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ūnamāna Defensiveconceit,amodeofmāna.Itischaracterizedthus:Ifothersexcelonegreatly,inrespectofclanandlineage,etc.,andoneclaimsthatoneisonlyalittleinferior;thementalelevationsoproducedisnamed(Cf. Avatāra).

unnati Bending upwards. A characteristic of māna.upabṛṃhaṇa-hetu Developmentcause;oneofasetoffivehetu‑s. janana-hetu.upacita Accumulated.upādāna Clinging.upādāya Dependenton,derived.upādāya-rūpa Derivedmatter.upadeśa ‘Teaching’,‘elaborativeexposition’;thelastmemberofthedvādaśāṅga-dharma-

pravacana.Inaspecificsense,itissynonymouswithAbhidharma. In Saṃghabhadra’swords, “upadeśa refers to thenon‑erroneous revealing, answeringof objections andascertainment,ofthepreceding[eleven]members[ofthedvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana]”.

upadhi Materialbasis,substratum.upakleśa Secondarydefilement.Initslesstechnicalsense,thistermisalsousedtorefer

todefilementingeneral.upalabdhi Apperception.upalakṣaṇa Examination;closeobservation.upanāha Enmity.upapadya-vedanīya-karma Karmaexperiencibleinthenextlife.upapatti-pratilambhika Acquiredbybirth.upapatti-sthāna-pratilambhikā jñāna/prajñā Acertaintypeofknowledgeacquired

bybeingsbyvirtueofbeingborninaparticulargati.E.g.,hellbeingspossessbybirththe paracitta-jñana.Forhumans,thisknowlegehastobeacquiredthroughcultivation.

upāsaka AmalelayBuddhist.upasaṃpad ‘Completion’;thehigherordinationforonewhohasjoinedtheSaṅgha.upāsikā AfemalelayBuddhist.upastambha-hetu Maintainingcause;oneofasetoffivecauses.→janana-hetu.upātta Appropriated(bythecitta-caitta‑s);i.e.sensitive(rūpa).upavāsa-saṃvara Restraintundertakenforonefulldayandanight.upavāsastha-śīla Preceptsundertakenforonefulldayandnight.Sameasupavāsa-saṃvara.upekṣā Equanimity.upekṣendriya Thefacultyofequanimity.ūrdhva-bhāgīya (Fetters)pertainingtotheupperportion.→pañca-ūrdhva-bhāgīya.ūṣman Warmth.uṣmagata ‘Warmed‑up’,‘warmth’.Thisisthefirstattainmentinthenirvedha-bhāgīya of

the prayogastage.Itissometimesalsogivenasūṣman.uṣṇatā Heat.uttama Supreme,highest.vadhya-ghātaka Executioner.vag-vijñapti Vocalexpression;theinformationkarmaofspeech.Vaibhāṣika ASarvāstivādinwhotakestheAbhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā astheauthority.Vainaśika ‘Onewhois(totally)destructive’,anihilist.Saṃghabhadrarefersbythisterm

tothosewhodenytherealityofthesvabhāva of dharma‑s.

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vairāgya Detachment. vaitulya Unmatchability.Asatechnicalterm,itissaidbytheVaibhāṣikatobesynonymous

withvaipulyaandvaidalya(Pāli:vedalla).vaipulya ‘Development’,oneofthedvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana.→vaitulya.vajropama-samādhi ‘Diamond‑likeconcentration’,socalledbecause,likeadiamondthat

cancutthroughallthings,itisthelaststageintheabandonmentofdefilements;whateverdefilementsthathaveremainedareallabandonedinthissamādhi.

vāk Speech.vākya Sentence.varga Aseparatepart/division,achapter. varṇa Color.vartamāna ‘Turning’,‘operating’;present,thepresent.vāsanā ‘Trace’,perfuming.Saṃghabhadraexplainsthatthisisadesignation(notareal

entity)foramentalstateconditionedbytheakliṭa-ajñāna.TheBuddhaisfreefromthisbecausehedoesnothavetheaklisṭa-ajñāna.

vāsita Perfumed.I.e.,conditioned/developedbyavāsanā.vastu Thing,base,reason.vātāyana-rajas Dustinthewindpassage.Vātsīputīya AschoolthatbranchedofffromtheSarvāstivāda.Theirspecialdoctrines

aretheineffablepudgala,theasuraasthesixthgati,etc.→Pudgalavāda.vāyu Air. vedanā Sensation,feeling.Vibhajyavāda Aschoolof thoughtdoctrinallyopposed to theSarvāstitvāda. Itholds

thatthepresentdharma‑saloneexist.However,someamongthem,likethefollowersofthe Kāśyapīya,concedethatthepastkarmathathavenotyetgivenfruit(adatta-phala)canalsobesaidtoexist.

vibhaṅga Analysis,exposition.vibhāṣā Commentary.vicāra Investigation.vicikitsā Doubt.vidūṣaṇa-pratipakṣa Acounteragentwhichgeneratesdisgust.vidyā 1.Knowledge,understanding.(Theoppositeisavidyā)2.Ascienceorstudy;e.g.

hetu-vidyā.vihiṃsā Harmfulness.vijñāna Consciousness.vijñāna-dhātu The consciousnesselement.vijñānāntyāyatana The sphere of infinite consciousness, the secondof fourārūpya

samāpatti‑s.→samāpatti,ārūpya-dhātu.vijñapti-karma Informativekarma.Thisreferstothebodilyandvocalkarma-sthatare

‘informing’,i.e.,indicativeofthementalstateofthedoer.vijñaptimātratā TheYogācāradoctrineof‘cognition‑only’.vijñeya Cognizable.vikalpa Discrimination,conceptualization.vikṣipta Distracted.vikriyotpādanā Thenatureofchange(beingdisfigured)inarising.


548

vimokṣāvaraṇa Hindrance of liberation.To attain perfect liberation, anarhatmustovercomethishindrancebesidesthekleśāvaraṇa.TherearedifferentopinionsamongtheAbhidharmamasters:somesaythisisthesamāpatty-āvaraṇa;otherssayitistheakliṣṭa-ajñāna. → ubhayabhāga-vimukta.

vimokṣa-mārga Pathofliberation.(=vimukti-mārga).vimokṣa-mukha ‘Gatewayofliberation’.Therearethree:śūnyatā,animitta,apraṇihita.vimukti-mārga Sameasvimokṣa-mārga.vinaya ThedisciplinaryteachingsoftheBuddha.vineya Thosetobetransformed.vipāka Retribution,maturation.vipākaja ‘Bornofretribution’.OneofthedoctrinalperspectivesinAbhidharmaanalysis:

dharma‑saredivisibleasthosewhichareretribution‑born(e.g.,eye)andthosewhicharenot(e.g.sound).

vipāka-hetu Retributivecause.→ hetu;visadṛśaphal’ākṣepakatva.vipāka-phala Retributionfruit.vipariṇāma Change.viparīta Beingtopsy‑turvy,turnedupsidedown.viparyāsa Topsy‑turviness,erroneousness.E.g.:takingwhatisduḥkha for sukha,śūnya

for aśūnya,anitya for nitya,anātman for ātman.vipaśyanā bhāvanā Insightcultivation/meditation.vipaśyanā-carita Theinsight‑meditationtypeofpractitioner.vipratisāra Remorse.viprayukta-saṃskāra Conditioningsdisjoinedfromthought.virati Abstention.viraty-aṅga Thesectionofabstention.vīrya Vigor.visabhāga-dhātv-ālambana (Defilements)whichtakeobjectspertainingtootherspheres

(thanthattowhichitbelongs).visadṛśa Different,dissimilar.visadṛśaphal’ākṣepakatva (The vipāka-hetuissodesignatedonaccountofits)‘projecting

afruitwhichisdifferent[inmoralnature]’.visaṃyoga ‘Disjunction(fromadefilement)’.visaṃyoga-phala ‘Fruitofdisjunction’;i.e.pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha.Thisiscalledafruitonly

expediently:Anunconditioneddharmatranscendsthecause‑effectprocesscompletely;properlyspeaking,onecanonlysaythatthenirodhaisacquired(prāpta)bymeansofthepath.I.e.,thepathinducesthearisingoftheprāpti of the nirodhaforthepractitioner.

visaṃyoga-prāpti Acquisitionofdisjunction.viṣaya Object‑domain.viśeṣa Difference,distinction,special,specific.viśeṣa-mārga Pathofadvance/distinction.viśiṣṭa Distinguished,special.viśiṣṭa-karma Distinctivekarma.viṣkambhana Subduing.viśuddhi Purification,purity.vīta-rāga Detached.

gloSSary

549

vitarka Reasoning.viveka Separation.vratāṅga Thesectionofobservationofvows.vṛtti Operation,action.vyākaraṇa Explanation, prediction (a later acquiredmeaning).Also, the third of

the dvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana.vyañjana-kāya Thesyllable‑group,oneoftheviprayukta-saṃskāra‑s.vyantībhūta Expurgated.vyāpāda Malice.vyapakarṣa Physicalwithdrawal.vyāpāra Function,operation.vyatireka Theprincipleofdifference(/exclusion).vyavadāna Purification;oppositetosaṃkleśa.vyaya-vyaya ‘Disappearance‑disappearance’. Same as anityatā-anityatā. →

anulakṣaṇa.vyūha Extension,distribution,arrangement.yathābhūtam Truly;trulyasitis.yathābhūta-jñāna Knowlegeofthingstrulyastheyare.yoga Yoke. Asynonymfordefilement.yoni Modeofbirth.Yukta-vādin ‘Onewho accordswith (or emphasizes) logical reasoning’, a termused

byfollowersoftheSarvāstivāda torefertothemselvesincontra‑distincionfromtheVibhajyavāda.

yukti Logicalreasoning;logic.

550

abandonable 15, 43, 46, 47, 48, 105, 150, 152, 153, 198, 215, 216, 223, 224, 249, 303, 318, 323, 324, 331, 332, 336, 337, 338, 339, 349, 352, 363, 452, 458, 459, 460, 462

abandonable by cultivation 15, 43, 46, 47, 216, 223, 224, 249, 323, 324, 349, 352, 363, 460

abandonable by the path of vision 258, 316, 328, 370

abandonable by vision 15, 43, 46, 47, 48, 150, 152, 153, 215, 216, 224, 303, 323, 324, 331, 336, 339, 349, 352, 363, 452, 458, 459, 460, 462

Abhidharma definition9–12;function13–17;

origin1–8Abhidharma-kathā3Ābhidharmika8,9,10,11,15,18,21,

23, 24, 25, 27, 65, 74, 75, 100, 111, 117, 171, 188, 189, 198, 206, 269, 274, 285, 295, 299, 321, 322, 331, 444, 445, 450, 451, 491

abhidhyā328,386abhinirūpaṇā230,244,246abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa230,244,246abhisamaya 8, 27, 71, 148, 248, 271,

294, 323, 337, 433, 451, 454, 456, 480

abhisamayāntika-jñāna455abhisaṃskāra217,316,371,469abhivinaya 3abhyupagama-citta 416abrupt-abandonmentśramaṇa340,348,

352, 434abrupt awakening 352abrupt view 455, 456absolute existent 67, 254absolute truth 15, 52, 65, 66, 67, 69,

242, 263, 264, 272, 278, 282, 423, 477

acittaka 26, 378, 380, 393acquisition 7, 9, 25, 37, 97, 146, 148,

154, 177, 178, 218, 222, 249, 257, 285, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 315, 321, 329, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 355, 356, 357, 366, 376, 384, 385, 391, 397, 398, 401, 402, 433, 434, 452, 457, 458, 471, 474, 476, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 486, 513, 514. Seealsoprāpti.

activity 32, 53, 60, 61, 118, 120, 126, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136, 143, 144, 149, 167, 172, 173, 174, 177, 178, 183, 196, 212, 217, 221, 225, 226, 245, 262, 264, 272, 273, 274, 276, 294, 302, 307, 308, 318, 328, 332, 335, 342, 345, 350, 356, 391, 397, 447, 449, 451, 492, 493

ādhāra-pratipakṣa355adhimokṣa36,97,101,214,219–222adhimukti 101, 219, 220, 267adhimukti-manaskāra219,220,267adhipati-phala 145, 169, 177, 180, 425adhipati-pratyaya 145, 169, 175, 176,

476, 492adhvan 61, 118, 122, 123, 125, 135, 148,

163, 212ādhyātmika44,207,494adṛśya272āgama1,4–5,57,63,211,213,310agha 491, 499agha-sāmantaka-rūpa491,499āhrīkya36,40,41,102,214,215,325ajñāna4,57,79,129,131,132,219,

241, 257, 258, 259, 260, 321, 323, 336, 360, 362, 421, 454, 463

ājñātāvīndriya452ājñendriya452ākāra20,24,66,135,167,220,225,

228,241,257,265,269,270–278,

Index

index

551

282–284,328,342,446,447,455,479

ākāra-samatā24,167ākāśa14,34,37,39,41,75,76,97,194,

206, 208, 471, 472, 473, 485, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496

ākāśa-dhātu39,194,206,491,492,494,495

ākāśānantyāyatana472ākāśa-puṣpa76,473ākiṃcanyāyatana302,348akliṣṭa-ajñāna219,241,257,258,259,

260, 360, 463akopya-dharman 442, 464akṣema334ākṣepa180,389,474ākṣepaka-karma301akuśala15,36,37,38,39,88,99,102,

154, 182, 214, 215, 216, 217, 233, 270, 321, 334, 335, 366, 374, 379, 381, 394, 397, 429, 438

akuśala-mahābhūmikadharma36,215,216

akuśala-mūla214,321,334ālambana21,24,28,35,58,59,61,64,

70, 93, 94, 132, 134, 145, 147, 167, 169, 174, 175, 178, 190, 225, 228, 236, 241, 243, 245, 270, 271, 273, 274, 277, 280, 283, 284, 318, 331, 336, 353, 354, 356, 367, 368, 436, 476, 496

ālambanābhisamaya456ālambana-pratighāta190ālambana-pratyaya91,93,145,147,

169, 171, 175, 178, 228, 476ālambanato’nuśete43,326ālaya-vijñāna160alobha 36, 438alpecchatā61,438amṛta-dvāra115,443anāgāmin349,440,463,469anājñātam-ājñāsyāmīndriya452ānantaryakarma410,415ānantarya-mārga7,177,179,250,295,

347, 348, 351, 354, 355, 433, 451,

452, 453, 462, 467, 474, 480, 481, 482, 484

ānāpānasmṛti108,443anapatrāpya36,40,41,102,214,215,

325anāsrava15,38,42,51,215,250,270,

305, 331, 336, 344, 353, 354, 356, 374, 380, 382, 383, 388, 390, 446, 451

anāsrava-jñāna446,451anāsrava-saṃvara388,390āneñjya374anger 36, 223, 224, 325, 327anidarśana37,44,198,387,491anidarśana-apratigha387animitta 11anityatā22,37,38,79,105,124,131,

134, 146, 156, 172, 283, 287, 290, 293, 307, 308, 318, 471, 487

anityatā-anityatā308anityatā-lakṣaṇa37,293,478anivṛta-avyākṛta40,41,216aniyata dharma 36, 223aniyata-karma 375, 411antagrāha-dṛṣṭi58,333,334,337,339antarā-bhava87,417aṇu199,200,204,209,325anubhava-pratyakṣa255,272,276,277anudhātu35anulakṣaṇa155,285,308anumāna20,104,272,283,496anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa457anu(pari)vartaka 230, 383. See also

cittānuparivartin.anurakṣaṇā-dharman442,464anuśaya43,77,81,98,110,132,233,

321,324–327,331,339,340–343,356, 367, 403

anuśayana99,325,339,343–345anusmaraṇa-vikalpa230anutpāda-jñāna13,249,251,252,353,

435, 446anuvyañjana-grāhin231anvaya-jñāna248,272,283,446,453anyathā-anyathātva119


552

apara-paryāya-vedanīya375,415apatrāpya36,40,384,405apramāda36,214,460apramādāṅga383apramāṇa86,221apraṇihita11aprāpti25,37,97,285,290,292,293,

346, 347, 458apratigha 44, 51, 99, 491, 495apratilambha 298apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha14,34,37,39,

41, 97, 245, 471, 472, 473, 483, 485, 486, 487, 495

arhat 98, 171, 173, 234, 249, 256, 257, 259, 304, 321, 322, 338, 340, 342, 346, 353, 359, 363, 374, 409, 410, 412, 423, 424, 433, 440, 442, 452, 461, 463, 464, 475, 476, 480, 544

circumstantially liberated 464artha 35, 40, 68, 69, 73, 193, 212, 218,

283,239–313,494arthaviniścaya16arūpi-dharma99ārūpya26,58,86,99,216,248,302,

333, 367, 412, 441, 445, 461, 495ārya20,56,66,71,74,78,107,113,

148, 220, 242, 272, 290, 295, 296, 298, 301, 302, 317, 321, 346, 349, 350–352,362,423,434,438,441,445, 446, 450, 457, 458, 460, 468, 472,477–480,482–485

jñāna2,13,20,23–25,40,58,64,71,89, 94, 95, 98, 107, 110, 179, 241, 245–249,251–253,257,260,271,272, 276, 278, 280, 283, 316, 322, 350,353,360–362,411,435,438,446,451–455,457,461,463,468,475, 478, 484

mārga4,7,42,45,71,99,110,177,179, 220, 248, 250, 295, 331, 336–338,347–349,351,353,355,360,433,434,438,440,445–447,449,451–453,455,456,459–463,466,468,469,479–484

ārya-satya86,477

āryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga4ārya-vaṃśa86,438asabhāga474,481asad-ālambana59aśaikṣa44,99,215,440,447,461,484

marga 440, 447, 452, 461asamanvāgama15,18,93,94,290,298,

346, 347asamaya-vimukta 464asaṃjñi-samāpatti287,292,302,391asaṃjñi-sattva303asaṃprajanya101asaṃskṛta15,23,28,34,37,38,42,62,

96, 97, 100, 127, 174, 177, 178, 199, 287, 314, 331, 473, 474, 477, 478, 481, 492, 495, 497

asaṃvara58,96,388,391,401asaṃvara-karma401asaṃyoga-vastu356,367,368Asaṅga4,159,160āsanna-kāraṇa306asarvatraga(defilement)321,336,339āśaya41,384,410asevita 474āsevita-bhāvita-bahulīkṛta460Aśokāvadāna5,88,89,90āśraddhya36,101,325āsrava42,249,283,322,326,327,328,

362āsravakṣaya-jñāna280,322āśraya24,28,33,35,167,192,200,

203, 205, 221, 225, 284, 294, 330, 371, 380, 382, 420, 446, 483, 498

āśraya-samatā24,167aṣṭadravyaka201,203,204astitva 138, 145aśubha293,374,443,446aśubhā221aśubha-bhāvanā443,446aśucyanusmṛti108āsvādana437Aśvaghoṣa104,341atikrānta-manaskāra10atīndriya192ātma-vāda328

index

553

ātmavādopādāna328atomic theory 198, 204atyantābhāva162atyantaṃpra-√hā214,349auddhatya 36, 101, 215, 222, 325, 350,

462aupacayika 377aupadhika-puṇya-kriyā388āvaraṇa185,190,241,256,258–281,

303, 335, 360, 361, 368āvaraṇa-pratighāta190āvaraṇa-vimukta303avasthā10,119–122,124,130,132,

135, 136, 308, 438avasthā-anyathātva10,119–122,124,

130, 132, 135, 136, 308, 438āvasthika-pratītyasamutpāda420avayava 65, 67āveṇikīavidyā224,336,520,540avetya-prasāda86,520avidyā57,90,101,151,152,214,215,

224, 242, 323, 325, 329, 334, 336–339,353,354,360,418,419,462

avidyāsrava327avidyaugha 328avihiṃsā36avijñapti27,28,30,32,35,57,87,88,

96, 111, 154, 190, 193, 205, 369, 374,375,378,379,381,390–393,396–398,400–402,404,406,407,410, 413

avijñapti-karma378,390,401,407avijñapti-rūpa35,88,193avyākṛta-mūla77,214āyatana8,15,21–23,26,28,30–35,53,

57, 59, 60, 64, 65, 86, 87, 95, 98, 100, 102, 110, 114, 146, 154, 180, 188, 190, 201, 203, 204, 206, 208, 212,257,262,287–289,300,305,311, 319, 349, 353, 373, 421, 437, 447, 453, 475, 479, 480, 485, 489

āyatana-pratilambha287,288āyatana-svalakṣaṇa21,204ayoniśomanaskāra420

āyus25,26,304,305

bahirdeśaka75,385bahu-dhātu86bandhana 47, 214, 326, 327, 329, 350,

367, 463Bhadanta 7, 67, 75, 108, 135, 172, 174,

194, 206, 208, 250, 289, 340, 358, 367, 381, 415, 434, 455, 473, 490. SeealsoDharmatrāta.

bhājana-loka182bhautika-rūpa96bhava 87, 153, 330, 333, 334, 373, 417,

418, 421bhāva-anyathātva119,137bhavāgra42,249,302,327,328,349,

443, 461, 462, 463bhāvanā-mārga338,433,434,440,447,

452, 453, 460, 461bhāvanā-mayīprajñā9,435,441,446,

447, 477bhūmi182,215,217,223,230,249,

316, 332, 441, 443, 461, 489bhūyo-vītarāga463bīja35,54,128,160,295,340,483,498bodhi 13, 249, 443, 465bodhipakṣya-dharma8bodhisattva 199, 412, 438, 446bodhisattva-bhūmi443bodhyaṅga4,10,13,45,86,227brahma-carya 411bṛhatphala303Buddhadeva 8, 56, 74, 75, 104, 119, 122,

123, 124, 125, 131, 139, 172, 193, 208, 226, 289, 381, 450, 473

buddha-dharma 115Buddhamitra 443buddha-vacana 6, 15, 16, 17, 75, 285,

309, 310Buddha-word 309. See also buddha-

vacana.buddhi-pratyakṣa255,272,276–278

caitasika18,36,96–98,100,102,211–214,218,226,287


554

caitta 27, 28, 34, 35, 38, 59, 73, 87, 102, 111,134,155,173,174,211–219,222,225–229,241,253,260,261,265,266,269,273–278,282,283,292, 318, 331, 343, 344, 346, 358, 390, 449, 450, 492

cakra-vartin 426cakṣur-abhijñā298catuṣ-koṭi45cessation 7, 37, 39, 46, 47, 58, 66, 110,

148, 149, 154, 174, 177, 219, 245, 248,249,259,285,287,292–295,302–304,322–324,331,339,346, 347, 350, 352, 353, 357, 433, 437, 438, 447, 452, 455, 471, 474, 475–480,483,485–491,514

cessation independent of deliberation 37, 245,249,294,471,485–491

cessation through deliberation 37, 148, 177, 294, 295, 452, 471, 474, 476, 480,485–490,497

cetanā36,75,78,97,101,153,213,214, 217, 226, 227, 371, 372, 374–377,390,404,406,410,442,450, 464

cetanā-dharman464cetayitvā-karma371,375chanda 36, 97, 101, 213, 214, 218, 221,

236characteristics of the conditioned 38,

154, 155, 194, 285, 306, 307cintā-mayīprajñā446,447citta24,28,32,34–36,38,40,42,58,

59, 73, 87, 91, 96, 97, 100, 102, 111, 129, 134, 153, 155, 167, 173, 174,176,180,211–217,219,222,225–229,232–236,238,241,253,259–261,269,273–278,283,285–287,290,292,298,300,315,318,322,343–346,355,356,358,362, 365, 377, 379, 381, 385, 390, 395, 403, 406, 411, 416, 449, 450, 457, 460, 479, 492, 494

cittānuparivartin385,400

completing karma 301, 396, 398, 399, 407, 409, 417, 424

conceit 533concentration 36, 222, 332, 338, 379,

388, 445, 539, 541, 546condition 15, 18, 24, 29, 33, 38, 96,

128–131,140,145,151,169–178,182, 226, 228, 237, 252, 263, 264, 289, 306, 307, 331, 356, 369, 374, 385, 419, 422, 447, 453, 476, 486, 492

conditionality 110, 158, 176, 420conditioned 7, 8, 11, 15, 23, 24, 27, 38,

42, 51, 63, 67, 70, 71, 87, 97, 119, 125,128,138,143,146–150,153–156,158,161–164,171,173,178, 190, 194, 221, 222, 229, 243, 263, 271, 280, 285, 289, 294, 300, 306–308,327,329,331,370,383,418, 419, 420, 422, 423, 443, 444, 471–474,479,485,486,488,491,495,496.Seealsosaṃskṛta.

Conditioned Co-arising 7, 8, 67, 146, 149, 153, 162, 263, 280, 329, 370, 418, 419, 420, 422, 423, 443, 444. Seealsopratītya-samutpāda.

consciousness 20, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 40, 51, 53, 57, 58, 61, 63, 70, 73, 93, 96, 128, 130, 143, 149, 153, 156, 161, 162, 169, 170, 171, 174, 181, 191,192,199,200,211,215–218,226,228–232,238,241,243–245,247,250–252,254,261–270,272–278,282,283,286,305,311,330, 332, 357, 380, 382, 418, 419, 421, 489

contact 36, 143, 188, 191, 205, 218, 226, 227, 345, 346, 418, 419, 421

contemplation on the impure 220, 436, 437, 443, 444

Cox, C 93, 100, 131, 310, 319, 364

darśanābhisamaya456darśana-heya272,326,479

index

555

darśana-mārga294,336,337,447,466,469,449,451,452,459–461,463

Dārṣṭāntika15,60,74,76,80,110,118,119, 121, 139, 146, 152, 171, 211, 225–227,242,261,289,340,341,366, 381, 428, 450, 473, 492

dauśīlya383,389,405defilement7,17,24,25,36,42,43,72,

90, 216, 219, 221, 223, 229, 232, 233,242,243,250,293–295,300,311,321,322,324–327,329,331–333,336,341–348,350–358,361, 362, 366, 374, 385, 416, 419, 420,423,452,461–463,474–476,479–485,514.Seealsokleśa.

derivedmatter155,187,192–194,197,198, 203, 204, 376, 379, 381, 382, 397, 492

derived tangibles 193, 208deterioration 21, 37, 156, 188, 189, 191,

293, 307, 308, 330, 443Devaśarman56,84,91,169,421dharma2–11,14–48,50–53,55,57,

58–76,86,87,89,94–102,106,107,113–115,117–138,140,141,143–164,168–180,182,183,189–195,197,199,201,205,211,214,215,216–223,225,227–229,233,235,236,242–249,252–254,258–260,262,263,264–279,282,283,285–314,317,318,322,325–327,330–334,336,339,343–346,350,353,355,356,358,359,360,361,363,367,371–373,375, 376, 378, 380, 381, 384, 385, 389, 391, 395, 397, 410, 411, 415, 417,421–423,425,426,429,433–437,441,442,444–451,453,455–458,465–468,471–481,483–490,492,494–498

-definition(svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇāddharmaḥ)14,17,19,477

Dharmagupta 468

dharma-jñāna178–180,221,247,272,283, 350, 353, 446, 453, 455, 457, 468

dharmānudharma87dharmānusārin458,464dharma-pratisaṃvid312dharma-pravicaya 9, 15, 23, 25, 31, 37,

218, 242, 246, 247, 270, 322, 331dharma-sabhāgatā300,317Dharmaskandha 83, 86, 88dharmatā2,128,141,308,385,482dharmatā-prātilambhika385Dharmatrāta2,7,43,74,75,98,104,

109, 119, 122, 123, 125, 130, 135, 137, 139, 163, 193, 206, 208, 225–227,250,261,341,381,389,425, 450, 473, 490, 491, 496

dharmāyatana30–33,188,191,193,286, 289, 380, 381, 388, 389, 404, 466

dharmāyatana-saṃgṛhīta-rūpa381,389,404

dhātu8,15,21,22,23,26,29–35,39,44,53,54,58,86–88,95,98,99,100, 102, 110, 114, 146, 187, 194, 195, 206, 212, 216, 248, 259, 289, 300, 311, 316, 328, 332, 333, 339, 353, 354, 359, 370, 373, 374, 380, 383, 395, 412, 417, 437, 441, 443, 444, 447, 453, 461, 462, 469, 475–477,485,489,491,492,494,495

Dhātukāya83,101,103,215dhyāna86,108,154,180,214,223,302,

303, 326, 348, 380, 382, 390, 424, 434, 438, 445, 446, 461, 462

dhyānāṅga214dhyāna-saṃvara380Dhyāna-sūtra443Diamond-like 546. See also vajropama.direct perception 20, 66, 73, 161, 199,

201, 241, 242, 243, 255, 269, 271, 272, 273, 276, 284, 454, 492, 496. Seealsopratyakṣa.


556

direct realization 9, 20, 46, 71, 148, 220, 248, 250, 271, 272, 276, 294, 322, 323, 337, 349, 350, 351, 451, 454, 455, 456, 463. See also abhisamaya.

divya-cakṣus199,377done and accumulated 413, 414, 415doubt 533dravya 5, 32, 38, 73, 88, 98, 238, 243,

245, 271, 287, 289, 356, 367, 368, 420

dravyāntara120,146,305,318,341,476, 498

dravya-paramāṇu200–202dravya-samatā24,167dravya-svalakṣaṇa21,204dṛṣṭa-dharma-phala425dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukha-vihāra317dṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya-karma425dṛṣṭi23,41,47,58,99,214,223,237,

241, 246, 249, 251, 252, 267, 272, 281,325,326,332–334,337,339,345–347,353,354,386,399,458,459, 462, 466, 469, 476, 479

dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa337,339dṛṣṭi-prāpta249,458,459,469duḥkha7,39,45,79,86,99,153,178,

179, 195, 221, 245, 248, 271, 272, 283, 302, 322, 326, 328, 329, 331, 336, 337, 339, 352, 353, 354, 357, 374, 375, 419, 420, 421, 433, 442, 444–447,451,455,456,475–477,480,483–486,493

duḥkha-darśana-heya99,337,339duḥkha-jñāna245,248,271duḥkha-satya79,283,337,353,366,

447, 455, 456, 480duḥkhatā22,79,271,283duḥkha-vedanīya375dūragama212durgati 9, 58, 107, 327, 448, 487, 488dūrībhāva-pratipakṣa355dvādaśāṅga5,6,17,436dvādaśāṅga-dharma-pravacana17

endowment 15, 18, 24, 25, 61, 62, 97, 219,285,289,290,293,296–298,332.Seealsosamanvāgama.

envelopment 326, 328, 367epistemology 241, 270essential nature 8, 23, 31, 72, 123, 124,

127–129,132,134,135–138,140,141, 163, 219, 233, 295, 376, 452, 477, 479, 514

evaṃ-pādaka45,51existence-peak 249, 302, 303, 351, 463existent8,19,22,25,30,55,58,59,61–

73,78,91,96,106,119,127–129,134,136–138,143,145–147,149,153–164,169,170,174,178–180,183,190,195–197,199,201,202,204,213,241–244,246,253,254,266–270,278,282,296,299,301,313, 314, 318, 333, 336, 340, 341, 346,347,373,383,389–391,395,400, 421, 436, 457, 473, 477, 479, 480,482,486,491–497

feeling 26, 217, 226, 256, 284, 547fetters 533five-foldmentalstilling443foreign masters 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 111,

326Frauwallner, E 84, 98, 100, 103, 112,

114,117,120–126,132,133,139,140, 141, 468

function1,6,8,10,11,17,22–24,26,35,70,104,125,126,129–131,136, 140, 147, 159, 161, 169, 172, 175, 177, 183, 196, 201, 211, 219, 220,228–230,246,247,250,255,261–264,268,270,271,284,285,293, 295, 301, 309, 310, 313, 323, 325, 327, 345, 346, 361, 372, 395, 396, 398, 402, 415, 476, 477, 496

gati 25, 92, 107, 212, 217, 300, 316, 318, 328, 370, 376, 417, 458, 469, 475, 477, 489

geya 5

index

557

Ghoṣaka7,43,75,104,108,119,122,125, 132, 139, 140, 163, 225, 261, 346, 433, 447

ghrāṇa-indriya35gotra 29, 53, 212, 442, 446gradual view 456

hetu 15, 18, 24, 57, 58, 64, 73, 76, 93, 97, 100, 105, 126, 130, 133, 141, 143–150,152–155,160,162,164,165, 167, 169, 173, 176, 184, 185, 189, 195, 197, 213, 214, 219, 230, 287, 301, 332, 342, 355, 367, 368, 370, 372, 378, 381, 390, 395, 403, 447, 456, 482, 492, 493, 496

hetu-kauśalya18,24hetu-pratyaya 24, 91, 93, 130, 145, 169,

173Hetuvāda24,55,145,164hindrance173,182,189–191,254–256,

259, 326, 335, 358, 361, 362, 416, 424, 425, 464

hrī36,40,381,384,405

idaṃsatyābhiniveśa-kāyagrantha328ideation 24, 26, 31, 33, 36, 143, 146,

154, 156, 218, 227, 286, 295, 302, 349, 438, 439, 466

ideationlessness 37, 285, 292, 302, 303ignorance 533immediate path 513impregnation 128indirect perception 161indriya 522indriyāśrita-pratyakṣa277inference 19, 20, 64, 162, 242, 243, 272,

283, 496informativekarma369,375–383,385,

387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 393, 395–402,404,407,421.Seealsoavijñapti-karma.

intention 15intrinsiccharacteristic18–21,31,72,73,

149, 191, 199, 203, 204, 242, 243,

257, 260, 285, 454, 493. Seealsosvalakṣaṇa.

intrinsicnature8,11,18,19,22–24,29,40, 41, 43, 44, 61, 65, 67, 69, 73, 90, 118, 119, 121, 130, 134, 145, 146, 148, 149, 154, 156, 187, 191, 192, 201, 205, 206, 219, 220, 222, 226, 234, 244, 246, 253, 254, 259, 262, 269, 270, 290, 291, 295, 310, 311, 313, 323, 332, 340, 353, 355, 369, 371, 376, 383, 435, 441, 446, 449,450,452–454,492. Seealsosvabhāva.

irrational adherence 46, 48, 49, 326, 328, 329

īrṣyā36,101,214,223

janana-hetu 197janmāpravṛtti477jarā-jarā308jarā-lakṣaṇa37,293jāti-jāti368jāti-lakṣaṇa37,292,306,308,318jihvā-indriya35jīvitendriya25,37,97,100,154,285,

287, 290, 292, 303, 304, 396, 398jñāna2,13,20,23,40,58,64,67,71,

89, 94, 100, 107, 179, 214, 215, 221,241,245–249,251–253,257–260,271,272,276,278,280,283, 295, 303, 316, 322, 350, 353,360–362,411,435,438,446,451–455,457,461,463,468,475,478, 484

jñāna-parijñā322Jñānaprasthāna83,93,94,100,118,

144, 491jñeya71,99,241,244,246,258,259,

336, 361

kāmacchanda326,329,462kāma-mithyā-cāra386,400kāmāsrava327kāmaugha328kāmopādāna328


558

kāritra70,117,120–124,126–134,136–138,140,141,147,163,178–180,183,194,207,307

karma13,38,40,56–58,60,61,63,78–91,97,100,144,147,154,162,180–183,185,191,198,217,230, 231, 300, 301, 303, 305, 319, 322,327–330,332,334,335,369,370–383,385–407,409–429,439,441, 442, 448, 449, 458, 475

karma-patha 335, 369, 386, 388, 394, 397, 398, 400, 406, 410, 425

karuṇā9kāryābhisamaya456kāśyapīya59,80Katō74,79,80,209Kātyāyanīputra2,16,83,93,94,103,

140, 393kaukṛtya36,222,223,224,272,325,

326, 329, 479kaurmasya roman 268kleśa36,42,43,98,101,211,214–217,

223, 258, 259, 286, 321, 322, 324–328,336,337,361,367,368,452, 453, 468, 483, 484, 498

kleśa-bīja483kleśamahābhūmikadharma36,98,101,

215, 216, 223kleśāvaraṇa241,258,259,335kliṣṭa-ajñāna260knowledge 2, 13, 17, 20, 23, 40, 41,

45–47,51,58,59,62,64,66–68,71, 86, 94, 97, 105, 173, 179, 216, 224,241–243,245–260,265–269,271, 272, 276, 278, 280, 282, 283, 291,295,303,312,322–324,347,351–353,356–358,360–362,411,424,434,435,438–440,446,449,451–457,461–464,468,475,476,478.Seealsojñāna.

krodha 36, 101, 214, 223, 325kṛta-parijaya10kṛtsnāyatana267kṣaṇika-pratītya-samutpāda38,420kṣaṇikavādin60

kṣānti23,71,179,180,221,241,246,247, 248, 250, 350, 353, 412, 433, 434, 438, 440, 441, 445, 446, 448, 450–453,457,467,484

kṣaya-jñāna13,249,251,252,280,303,322, 362, 463

kṣema39,477kṣīṇa-āsrava332Kumāralāta74,341kuśala15,36–40,43,58,87,97,99,

154,182,215–217,233,270,305,346, 363, 366, 374, 379, 381, 429, 446, 450, 460

kuśala-dharma-cchandakuśala-karmapatha87kuśala-mahābhūmikadharma215kuśala-mūla11,40,97,214,441,442,

446, 447, 448kuśalamūla-samuccheda333,346,385

lajjā61lakṣaṇa-anyathātva119Lamotte 54, 78, 112, 359, 368laukika-jñāna67laukika-mārga349laukikīsamyak-dṛṣṭi251laukikāgra-dharma441,445,467life principle 304, 305. See also

jīvitendriya.logic 57, 71, 74, 93, 105, 117, 122, 137,

138, 242, 275logical reasoning 3, 26, 63, 371lokottara-jñāna67

mada 36, 101, 214, 223, 325mahābhūmikadharma211215–217mahābhūta57,95,96,187,192–195,

264, 377mahā-karuṇā9Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa83mahāpuruṣa399Mahāsāṃghika16,75,80,182,232,

233, 234, 252, 253, 341, 455, 456, 460, 464

index

559

Mahāyāna4,13,56,76,117,159,160,256, 359, 366, 416, 429, 498

Mahīśāsaka59,80,253,455māna36,214,223,325,334,336,337,

338, 359, 461, 462manas 28, 149, 153, 211, 212, 305, 435,

452manasikāra213.Seealsomanaskāra.manaskāra10,36,97,101,214,219,

220, 226, 267, 271, 342, 420, 437mano-bhūmi215,223,230,441mārga4,7,42,45,58,71,99,177,179,

220,248,250,295,331,336–338,347–349,351,353–355,360,433,434,438,440,445–447,449,451–453,455,456,459,460,461–463,466–469,474,479,480–484

mārga-jñāna248mārga-satya42,45,337,353,447,455mātṛkā86,88,89,99,103mātṛkā-dhara1,5mātsarya36,101,214,223,325matter5,22,26,27,30–33,35,41,100,

122, 123, 128, 137, 138, 148, 150,151,153–155,157,163,174,184,187–195,197–205,218,226,244,254,258,262,285–287,290,298–300,303,304,308,322,323,344,349,360,369,376–385,388–393,395,397–401,425,450,482, 491, 492

māyā36,101,214,223,325mentalapplication10,36,219–222,267,

271, 273, 330, 342, 420, 437merits 133, 359, 388, 400, 410, 424,

425,438,439.Seealsopuṇya.mindfulness 10, 36, 108, 220, 221, 394,

436,437,443–445,466mindfulness of breathing 108, 220, 221,

436, 437, 443, 444, 445mithyādṛṣṭi337,339mode of activity 167, 174, 225, 272,

274, 276, 328, 335, 342, 513, 539

moha 36, 40, 214, 327, 334, 359, 386, 461

mokṣa-bhāgīya433,439,440,441,442,443, 446, 451, 459

mrakṣa36,101,214,223,325mṛdvindriya458mṛṣā-vāda386Mūla-sarvāstivāda5,88,90mundane path 47, 321, 332, 348, 349,

350, 351, 352. See also laukika-mārga.

mundane path of cultivation 349, 352.mūrdhan58,290,433,440,441,445,

448, 450

Nāgārjuna149,403nairātmya22,27,79,283,373nairmāṇika216nairyāṇika447naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñā154,302,349,

442nāma67,185,213,218,237,266,268,

292,296,309–316,319,469nāma-kāya37,285,287,293,309,310,

311, 319nāma-rūpa292,418,485naraka 92, 107, 411nāstitva138nendriya 44neo-Sarvāstivāda111,118,134,244,

486neo-Vaibhāṣika126,134neyārtha15,16,17,25,52,100,163nikāya-sabhāga154,285,287,292,300,

301, 316, 317, 398, 399, 407, 414, 417, 448, 449

nimitta 218, 231, 235, 266, 291, 301, 317

nimitta-grāhin231nirmāṇa-citta180,298nirodha14,34,37,39–42,45,57,61,

97,99,110,148,149,154,177–179, 219, 221, 222, 245, 248, 259, 272, 287, 292, 293, 295, 302, 317, 336,337,339,347,350,352–354,


560

391,438,447,452,455–457,462,464,468,471–477,480–487,491,495, 498

nirodha-darśana-heya99,337nirodha-jñāna248nirodha-samāpatti37,40,61,110,154,

287, 292, 302, 317, 391, 462, 464nirodha-satya353,354,447,455–457,

480nirukti-pratisaṃvid312nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa353,478nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu353nirvāṇa7–11,25,28,39,40,57,63,108,

148, 149, 177, 179, 219, 222, 242, 296, 300, 302, 322, 328, 344, 353, 435,439–443,446,457,459,469,471,472,474–481,483–485,498

nirvāṇa-dhātu328,353,475,476,477nirvedha-bhāgīya433,439–442,445,

451, 466niśraya-hetu197nītārtha10,15,16,17,25,52,100niḥsaraṇa350,447,474,477nivaraṇa326,329nivṛta-avyākṛta40,216nivṛtāvyākṛta-vijñapti-rūpa298nivṛtti7,39niyata karma 415non-acquisition 25, 37, 97, 285, 290,

292, 293, 296, 298, 299, 315. See alsoaprāpti.

non-defined15,37,39,40,41,51,77,150, 151, 182, 198, 216, 222, 223, 231, 259, 293, 296, 298, 299, 305, 358–360,366,488

non-endowment 15, 18, 24, 62, 97, 290, 298,539.Seealsoasamavāgama.

non-existent object 63, 73, 266, 268, 480,518.Seealsoasad-ālambana.

non-informative karma 369, 375, 376, 378,380–383,385,387–389,395,396,397–401,407.Seealsoavijñapti-karma.

non-informative matter 35, 190, 197, 380.Seealsoavijñapti-rūpa.

non-returner 462non-veiled-non-defined40,41,182,216,

298, 299, 360

obtainment 285, 288, 289, 293, 296, 297, 298, 303, 315, 348, 458

omniscience57,241,252,254–257,259, 361

outflow9,13,15,20,40,42,43,51,58,66, 69, 97, 144, 150, 153, 180, 198,212,221,246–250,258,270,271,277,278,296,321,325–327,331,339,342–345,347,349–352,363, 371, 372, 374, 375, 382, 383, 385, 386, 388, 415, 416, 435, 436, 440,446,449–452,457,460,464,471,474,478–480,484,488,490,491,497.Seealsoāsrava.

outflow-free9,13,15,40,42,43,51,58, 66, 97, 150, 153, 180, 198, 212, 221, 246, 247, 249, 250, 258, 270, 271, 278, 296, 321, 331, 339, 343,345,347,349–352,374,375,382, 383, 385, 388, 415, 416, 436, 440,446,449,450–452,457,464,474, 479, 488, 490, 491. See also anāsrava.

outside masters 101

pada-kāya37,285,287,290,293,309,319

padārtha44,495paiśunya386pancavastuka 34, 98, 100, 214, 261, 287pañca-vijñāna-kāya21paracitta-jñāna248,280paramāṇu196,197,199–204,209,244,

376, 379, 406paramārtha13–15,17,22,40,65,68,

79, 94, 202, 278, 361, 423, 435, 457, 477, 478

paramārtha-satya68,457pāramitā434,438parihāṇa-dharman464parihāṇi290,489

index

561

parijñā322–324,353,435,460,475parinirvāṇa55,173,388,426,427,

439–442,464parīttakleśabhūmikādharmāḥ36,98,

211,215–217,223,336partially-common 22pāruṣya386paryavasthāna215,326,340,341,342,

348, 367, 421, 434pāścātya75path of cultivation 43, 331, 338, 349,

352, 434, 451, 461, 462path of distinction 355path of liberation 7, 250, 295, 330,

350–352,355,433,452,461pathofpurification337path of the non-trainee 461path of vision 258, 316, 328, 370. See

alsodarśana-mārga.perfuming160,164.Seealsovāsanā.phala 8, 15, 24, 41, 57, 86, 87, 126, 127,

129, 132, 133, 143, 145, 155, 166, 169, 177, 178, 180, 182, 183, 216, 219, 307, 330, 349, 352, 353, 361, 366–368,370,389,393,397,406,409,412,415,425,427–429,434,440,458,463,474–476,481,482

phala-ākarṣaṇa180phala-dāna126,127,180,183,389,415,

425, 474phalākṣepa126,129,132,133,307phala-pratigrahaṇa126,133,183phoneme 309, 312pipāsā193pleasure 188, 189, 242, 277, 350, 351potency 124, 130, 358pradāśa(/pradāsa)36,101,223,325prahāṇa-bhāvanā-ārāmatā438prahāṇa-parijñā322prahāṇa-pratipakṣa354,355,356,368prajñā7–10,12,14,18,20,23,25,36,

39, 41, 58, 68, 89, 97, 101, 148, 214, 215, 218, 219, 228, 230, 232, 236, 238, 241, 242, 246, 247, 251–253,256,258,260,261,265,

266,269,270–283,291,298,322,336,338,346,411,412,434–436,438,441,444–447,450–452,456,457, 459, 464, 469, 473, 474, 477, 478, 480, 490

prajñapti55,70,83,89,191,212,256,296, 305, 383

Prajñapti-śāstra1,5,83,89,90,296,409

prajñapti-sat478prajñaptivādin35,60prajñā-vimukta464Prakaraṇa24,83,84,97,100,101,103,

279prākarṣika-pratītya-samutpāda420prakṛti-sāvadya383pramāda36,101,214,325pramāṇa17,90,104,242,492praṇidhāna384praṇidhi-jñāna2,89prāpti13,24,25,37,40,97,132,146,

177, 179, 249, 285, 290, 292, 293, 316, 346, 347, 355, 356, 368, 397, 434, 452, 453, 468, 474, 481, 484, 485, 498. See also acquisition.

prasāda27,86,87,136,192,300praśrabdhi36pratideśan’ādi-pratipakṣa414pratigha 36, 214, 223, 325, 334, 336,

337, 338, 461, 462pratighāta188,189,190,205pratilambha285,287–289,296,297prātimokṣa-saṃvara96,369,372,383,

384,388,391–393,397pratiniyama-hetu 301pratipakṣa283,329,346,354,355,356,

368, 446, 484pratipannaka 7, 433, 440, 458, 463pratipatti 13, 435, 447pratisaṃdhi58,212,298,329,418pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha34,37,39,97,

177–179,219,222,295,347,350,452,471–476,480–485

pratisaṃvid312pratiṣṭhā-hetu197


562

pratītya-samutpāda7,8,24,86,335,370, 409, 418. See also Conditioned Co-arising.

prativedhanā-dharman442,464pratyakṣa-buddhi255,276pratyakṣa-jñāna241,272,276,283pratyaya 15, 18, 24, 29, 58, 91, 93, 100,

123, 130, 143, 145, 147, 159, 160, 164,169,173–176,178,182,184,219, 228, 243, 331, 368, 417, 445, 447, 449, 476, 486, 492

pratyaya-kauśalya18,24pratyeka-buddha 439, 442pravrajyā62,385pravṛtti7,382prayoga 7, 54, 221, 242, 303, 342, 355,

375,410,413,429,433–435,440,465

prāyogika329predilection 36, 218, 243, 344.

See also chanda.premā45preparatory action 410, 413, 414preparatory path 7, 355, 433, 439, 440,

537preta 58, 107, 394, 409, 424, 425, 426primary characteristics 306, 308prītīndriya96proclivities 8, 43, 98, 99, 233, 336, 483production 37, 126, 129, 130, 156, 157,

161, 167, 172, 173, 205, 286, 287, 292, 306, 307, 308, 311, 313, 318, 339,391,476.Seealsojāti.

projecting karma 301, 305, 372, 398, 399, 406, 417

pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna20pṛthagjana107,113,296,302,317,349,

350, 412, 441, 458, 483, 484pṛthagjanatva97,101,290,291,296,

449, 458pṛthivī21,193,196Przyluski, J 74, 80pudgala-vāda56,60,91,92

Pu Guang 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 115, 223, 224, 237, 241, 273, 274, 282, 283, 284, 385, 455, 465

puṇya374,388,400,424,425,438,439puṇya-bhāgīya439,465puṇya-jñāna-saṃbhāra438Pūrṇavardhana238puruṣa-kāra168,180puruṣakāra-phala145,155,169,177,

178pūrvācārya67,110,344pūrvānudhātu35pūrva-pādaka45,51

rāga24,36,214,218,223,234,325,327, 333, 334, 336, 337, 338, 343, 359, 444, 461, 462, 476, 482, 487

ṛddhipāda4,reasoning 3, 5, 26, 36, 63, 159, 203, 218,

222, 234, 255, 264, 277, 367, 371, 479

receptivity 23, 179, 241, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 291, 347, 352, 353, 446, 448, 449, 451, 452, 457, 459, 461

reflexiveknowledge254,255retrogressibility 433, 459, 460, 469rūpa19–22,26–28,30,32–35,38,39,

41,44,53,57,58,63,67–70,73,76, 81, 87, 88, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 119, 126, 129, 134, 136, 150, 152–155,159,187–191,193–197,199,201–203,205,207,209,213,216,219,220,228–231,243,244,248, 262, 269, 270, 271, 275, 276, 281, 282, 287, 289, 292, 298, 300,309,310,312–314,319,333,374,377,379–381,383,387–389,395, 399, 404, 412, 418, 437, 441, 447, 450, 469, 472, 473, 477, 485, 491–496.Seealsomatter.

rūpaṇā(/rūpaṇa)22,187–190,205,209rūpa-prasāda27,300

index

563

sabhāga57,73,76,87,97,126,133,143–145,150,154,185,285,287,292, 300, 301, 316, 317, 339, 353, 354, 396, 398, 399, 407, 414, 417, 448, 449, 467, 482

sabhāga-dhātu-sarvatraga353sabhāga-hetu57,73,76,97,126,133,

143–145,150,482sabhāgatā97,285,290,300,316,317sahabhū-hetu58,97,143,145,154,162,

167, 195, 213, 395, 482śaikṣa44,61,99,215,296,480,484,

488śaikṣa-mārga484sakala-bandhana 47, 350, 367, 463sākāra174,241,269,273,274,276,

278, 283sākāra-jñāna-vāda241,276,278sākāra-vijñāna-vāda241,269sakṛdāgāmin349,440,462,463sālambana44,174sallakṣaṇa64,65,246samādhi12,36,57,59,86,89,97,101,

214, 222, 232, 258, 304, 338, 340, 348, 349, 353, 360, 379, 383, 411, 412, 434, 435, 444, 450, 452, 460, 462, 464, 475

samādhi-bhāvanā86sāmagrī243,261,290samāhita-bhūmi332samanantara-pratyaya 29, 58, 93, 145,

169, 173, 182, 184, 331, 445, 449sāmantaka394,445,491samanvāgama15,18,24,25,93,97,

219, 285, 293, 296, 346, 347samanvāgama-asamanvāgama-kauśalya

18 sāmānya-lakṣaṇa15,19,37,73,94,219,

241, 271, 272, 276, 277, 278sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-kauśalya15,19,37,

73, 94, 219, 241, 271, 272, 276, 277, 278

samāpatti37,40,61,110,153,154,257,259, 287, 292, 302, 317, 391, 445, 462, 464

samāpatti-āvaraṇa-vimukta303samāpatty-āvaraṇa303samāropa60śamatha215,222,440,443,444,445,

450śamatha-carita444saṃbhāra9,11,438saṃbhinna-pralāpa386saṃcetanīya-karma413Saṃghabhadra2,3,5,6,8,9,16,17,

28, 32, 33, 35, 39, 40, 52, 55, 57, 60,64,66,68–73,76,79,88,89,109–111,115,117,118,123,126–137, 141, 143, 144, 147, 149, 151, 154,157,158,161–63,165,166,168,169,174,176,178–180,183,185,189–193,195,197,200–204,208, 217, 219, 220, 222, 224, 228, 230,231,234,238,241–244,246,254,259,260–265,267,268,270,272,275–277,280,282–284,290,291, 295, 297, 300, 302, 305, 306, 308, 310, 312, 313, 317, 321, 326, 327, 329, 331, 332, 336, 339, 343, 344, 348, 350, 354, 356, 357, 358, 362–364,367,369,370,372,373,377–380,390–392,395–402,404,406,409,411–415,421,422,439,450, 453, 462, 471, 473, 474, 478, 479,481–483,485–487,491–493,496, 497

saṃghāta-paramāṇu200,201,202,204Saṃgītiparyāya83,88saṃgraha11,15,18,22,23,24,26,102,

114, 160, 171, 193, 219, 246, 279, 366

saṃjñā20,24,26,27,34,36,67,78,97,98, 101, 102, 103, 146, 154, 167, 174, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 225, 226, 227, 228, 235, 238, 265, 266, 275, 276, 302, 309, 316, 319, 348, 349, 442, 444, 472

saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha-samāpatti302saṃmoha257,422


564

saṃprayoga15,18,23,102,211,219,225, 227, 237

saṃprayogato’nuśete43saṃprayoga-viprayoga-kauśalya18saṃprayuktaka-hetu97,143,145,155,

167, 213, 214, 355saṃsāra10,11,29,39,40,148,173,

211, 230, 242, 322, 327, 328, 330, 334, 361, 374, 386, 421, 441, 442, 445, 479, 490

saṃskāra24–28,34,35,37,38,40,87,96, 97, 98, 100, 102, 111, 118, 123,124,127,133–135,138,146,217, 220, 226, 227, 268, 269, 285, 287–289,292,304,309–311,316,318, 319, 345, 373, 390, 418, 419, 456, 458, 473, 478, 485

saṃskṛta24,27,38,42,51,97–100,121–125,130–133,138,149,154,174, 175, 177, 178, 194, 263, 285, 306, 318, 331, 473, 474, 476, 477, 482, 494, 495

saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa285,306saṃsthāna200,203,317,376,377saṃtati(/santati)-pariṇāma-viśeṣa127,

390, 406, 484saṃtīraṇa246samudaya-jñāna248,271samutthāna-citta385samutthāna-hetu332saṃvara58,96,369,372,380,382–385,

388,390–394,396,397,400–402,406, 429

saṃvara-karma393,400–402saṃvṛti-jñāna245,248saṃvṛti-satya79,457samyaktva 433, 442, 446, 449, 455, 457,

459, 460, 468, 469samyaktva-niyāma442,446,449,459,

468samyaktva-niyāma-avakramaṇa442saṃyoga-vastu243,356,357saṃyojana46,214,215,326,435,462sanidarśana37,44,190–192,198,387,

494

santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa127,390,406,484

sapratigha 44, 57, 99, 198, 201, 376, 387, 491, 492, 494, 495

Śāriputra2,37,38,84,86,88,256–258,359, 443

Śāriputrābhidharma232,286,287,341sarvadāasti25,119,132,135,138,300sarvahatāndhakāra257sarva-saṃyojana-paryādāna-parijñā435sarvāstitva24,55,56,59–61,85,87,91,

115,117,118,134–137,145,162,164, 263, 267, 389

Sarvāstivāda1–3,5,6,19,21–25,26,28,32,35,55–57,59–63,65,69,73–76,78–80,83,85,87,88,90,91,93–96,103,104,107–111,113,117–121,124,125,131,134–136,139,141,143,145,148–151,153,154,158,161–164,167, 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177, 180,183,188–190,192–194,196,198, 200, 201, 204, 205, 207, 208, 211,216,217,220,224–227,234,241–247,250,253,255,256,260,265,266,269,270,272–275,277,278,280,283–285,289–291,295,299–301,303,309–311,314,317,321, 324, 325, 336, 341, 342, 345, 347,352,353,356–358,360,361,366,369–374,381,384,385,387,389–391,396,399,401,409–411,413,415–418,420–422,426,428,433–435,438,444–446,452,454,456,460,462–464,471–474,476,478,480,481,483–486,491,499

sarvathā-sarvahatāndhakāra257sarvatraga-hetu97,143–145,152śaśa-śṛṅga268sāsrava9,38,42,51,58,154,215,251,

270, 271, 283, 305, 325, 331, 336, 343, 344, 354, 356, 374, 429, 451

śāśvata-vāda418śāṭhya36,101,214,223,325

index

565

satkāya-dṛṣṭi41,326,333,334,337,462, 476

sattvākhya182,404,422satya 8, 15, 21, 42, 45, 68, 79, 86, 282,

283, 337, 353, 354, 446, 447, 455–457,467,475,477,478

satya-abhisamaya 220, 278, 284, 351, 448, 454, 461, 462

Satyasiddhi-śāstra13,57,227,282saumanasya 514Sautrāntika15,16,28,32,34,35,52,

55, 60, 63, 64, 73, 74, 76, 80, 81, 110,111,123,126–128,131,133,150, 157, 159, 161, 174, 196, 200, 201, 208, 211, 217, 218, 225, 227, 241,255,262–266,268,269,274,277, 278, 282, 284, 295, 305, 308, 313, 327, 333, 340, 341, 376, 377, 381,384,390–392,464,471–473,477,478,482–484,492,493

savāsanaṃprahāna272,326,479sa-vipāka417,429scriptural authority 62, 63, 229, 268,

291, 392, 492śikṣā-pada10śīlāṅga383śīla-vrata-parāmarśa326,333,334,462śīla-vratopādāna328skandha 5, 8, 15, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27,

31–34,53,65,86,87,89,96,98,114, 146, 187, 188, 206, 207, 226, 238, 244, 270, 271, 286, 288, 290, 300.303,309–311,333,395,436,454, 457, 466, 473, 483

skillfulness with regard to the seven abodes 437

smṛti10,36,97,101,146,214,219,227, 228, 230, 265, 266, 450, 452

smṛtyupasthāna4,5,86,89,437,440,447

sopadhiśeṣanirvaṇa-dhātu353sound 28, 33, 72, 149, 154, 162, 201,

202,205,261–263,267,296,309,311–313,377

Space75,194,245,471,472,491–494.Seealsoākāśa.

space-element 491, 492. Seealsoākāśa-dhatu.

sparśa36,97,101,102,214,218,226,418, 419

spraṣṭavya28,34,35,41,95,193,399,493

śraddhā36,45,214,221,450,452,469śraddhādhimukta249,458,459śraddhānusārin458,464śrāmaṇya-phala8,87,349,352,353,

434, 475, 476śrāvaka256–258,422,465srotaāpatti433,440,441,445,446,450,

466, 467srota-āpatty-aṅga435śrotābhijñā298srotaāpanna487śruta-mayī-prajñā20,298,436,438,

441, 446, 447, 450, 457Stcherbatsky, Th 80Sthaviravāda55,56,59,74,80,94,286sthitākampya442,464sthitikālāvedha304sthiti-lakṣaṇa37,133,134,293,318sthiti-sthiti 308sthūlabhittika350stream entry 87, 349, 433, 458, 487Study 1, 15, 18, 22, 26, 103, 187, 433,

451. See also Yin Shun.styāna36,215,223,325,329styāna-middha223,329subsumption 11, 18, 22, 98, 99, 102,

103, 114, 171, 380, 540sucarita 384, 397, 401sugati 39, 490sukha 213, 317, 375, 452, 493sukha-vedanīya375sukhendriya 96śuklakarma374summits 412, 435, 436, 437, 445, 447,

448, 449śūnyatā11,22,79,282,283,457supramundane path 351, 352


566

supreme mundane dharma 258, 316, 328, 370

sūtra-pramāṇa17sūtra-prāmāṇika16,52sūtraviśeṣa17svabhāva19,23,26,43,52,60,65,69,

70,76,117–119,122,123,130,132,134–138,141,148,193,230,234, 258, 259, 263, 266, 289, 310, 332, 345, 346, 441, 466, 473, 491

svabhāva-vikalpa230,266svalakṣaṇa14,15,18,19,21,23,72,73,

123, 135, 138, 141, 204, 219, 243, 272, 276, 466, 477. See also intrinsic characteristic.

svalakṣaṇa-kauśalya18svaphalākṣepa-kāritra130svarūpa52,70,134,135sva-saṃvedana255

tadālambana-kleśa-prahāṇa43tangible 28, 30, 35, 57, 195, 492Tatia 133, 141, 167tatkṣaṇa-samutthāna381tatsabhāga44,126,129,133tattva 73, 276, 468tattva-manaskāra219Tattvārthā140,473temporality 5, 45, 117, 118, 125, 133,

177Theravāda1,2,3,8,455thought-concomitants 23, 156, 252, 265,

326, 380, 399tīkṣṇendriya249,443,458time5,8,19,23,24,27,58,60,63–65,

68,70,75,117–122,124,125,127, 128, 131, 134, 136, 138, 145, 147, 148, 161, 163, 175, 178, 183, 199, 200 (smallest unit), 206, 215, 225, 229, 262, 263, 266, 295, 299, 306

traidhātukavyāpin305tripiṭaka1,11,13,83,436,442,444,

447tri-ratna 334

tṛṣṇā102,105,152,153,218,344,418,419

tīrthakāra198truth-coursing 446

ubhayabhāga-vimukta(ubhayatovimukta) 464

uccheda-vāda93,418unconditioned15,23,27,31–33,37–39,

58,60–63,75,91,119,147,148,150, 164, 175, 177, 194, 208, 221, 229, 242, 246, 249, 272, 285, 292, 294,295,331,347,452,471–474,476,485,491–493,495

understanding 8, 20, 23, 24, 31, 36, 59, 64, 66, 96, 104, 135, 137, 151, 156, 218, 219, 226, 228, 241, 246, 247,250–253,256,260,261,271,273, 274, 277, 278, 283, 298, 330, 337,338,340,349,353,359–361,397,411,435–438,445,447,451,473, 479, 486, 513, 532, 535. See alsoprajña.

unhindered path 7, 250, 295, 348, 351, 352, 354, 355, 433, 451, 452, 461, 462

upabṛṃhaṇa-hetu197upacita 375, 411, 413upādāna-skandha102,188,366upādāyarūpa155,187,193,197,209,

492upadeśa5,6,13,17upadhi 287, 385, 478upakleśa214,223,325,330,364upalabdhi 228, 262upanāha36,101,214,223,325upapadya-vedanīya-karma375,415upapatti-pratilambhika 9, 14upapatti-sthāna-pratilambhikājñāna436upāsaka301,383upasaṃpad385upastambha-hetu 197upavāsa-saṃvara394upavāsastha-śīla441upekṣā36,452

index

567

ūrdhva-bhāgīya462uṣmagata433,440,441,445,446,450,

466, 467uṣman433,440,441,445,446,450,

466, 467

Vaibhāṣika2,16,24,31,33,34,57,60,63, 76, 80, 81, 84, 108, 109, 111, 117,121–123,125,126,133,134,137, 138, 141, 153, 158, 159, 172, 179,194,195,199,203–206,208,209, 217, 222, 225, 227, 241, 247, 252,259,261,262–265,267,268,274, 276, 278, 283, 284, 296, 307–309,319,327,333,340,341,359, 360, 361, 376, 377, 389, 397, 415, 446, 467, 477, 478, 483

Vaināśika60vaitulya 3, 4, 6vajropama 57, 338, 340, 348, 349, 353,

363, 434, 462, 464, 475vāsanā160,241,256,258,259,260,

280,281,321,338,357–363,368,463

vastu 5, 32, 38, 73, 88, 98, 238, 243, 245, 271, 287, 289, 356, 367, 368, 420

Vasubandhu 34, 59, 67, 76, 94, 109, 110, 122, 123, 127, 133, 134, 141, 150, 151, 155, 167, 179, 202, 206, 208, 214, 222, 223, 261, 262, 264, 265, 274, 275, 283, 290, 291, 297, 305, 309, 326, 327, 333, 341, 355, 367–380,393,452,454,464,492,493

Vasumitra 7, 35, 38, 55, 67, 75, 84, 97, 98,100,101,104,119–126,130,134, 139, 140, 145, 172, 174, 176, 189, 190, 194, 196, 199, 206, 214, 223, 225, 250, 287, 321, 342, 343, 412, 425, 427, 451, 458, 460, 492

Vātsīputrīya80,90,91,117,165,123,253, 341, 450, 494

vedanā19–21,24,26,36,70,71,78,97,98, 101, 102, 103, 127, 136, 146,

153, 167, 174, 213, 214, 217, 219, 220, 225, 226, 227, 235, 238, 271, 275–278,286,302,417–419,444,466, 472, 477, 493

Vibhajyavāda5,26,55,56,59,60,80,90, 139, 233, 234, 266, 313, 341, 405, 456

vibhaṅga4,44,87,102,103vicāra36,213,214,218,222,223,230,

255, 266vicikitsā36,153,223,325,334,339,

353, 354, 367, 462, 466vidūṣaṇa-pratipakṣa355vidyā86,151,322,336,367view21–23,35,41,58,60,63,65,67,

74, 76, 95, 100, 103, 109, 110, 114, 118, 119, 123, 124, 135, 137, 140, 147, 152, 153, 160, 166, 171, 172, 174, 182, 195, 226, 233, 241, 246, 250, 251, 255, 261, 262, 264, 265,267,270,272–274,277,278,283, 291, 304, 306, 309, 317, 323, 325, 326, 328, 333, 334, 336, 337, 340,341,344–346,348,351,352,361, 367, 373, 377, 381, 383, 386, 387, 395, 399, 410, 415, 426, 434, 444, 446, 450, 455, 456, 463, 464, 478, 479, 480, 492, 498, 513

vihiṃsā36,101,223,325vijñapti-karma391,392,402Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi279vijñāna21,26–28,34,40,44,51,98,

100, 102, 153, 160, 176, 211, 212, 218,220,225–227,238,247,251,261, 265, 266, 275, 280, 305, 319, 418, 419, 495

vijñāna-dhātu21,26,27,28,34,40,44,51, 98, 100, 102, 153, 160, 176, 211,212,218,220,225–227,238,247, 251, 261, 265, 266, 275, 280, 305, 319, 418, 419, 495

vijñapti-karma387,391,392,402vijñeya99,245,479vikapla230–232,244,246,265,266,

270, 275, 278


568

vimokṣa7,241,259,383vimokṣa-mārga7vimokṣāvaraṇa241,258,259Viṃśikāvijñapti-mātra-siddhi279vimukti-mārga58,250,347,355,433,

452, 453, 462, 463, 468vipāka41,42,61,79,97,100,107,

143–145,153,154,162,169,177,182, 198, 217, 287, 331, 370, 373, 378, 403, 414, 417, 429, 475

vipāka-hetu97,100,143,145,153,154,287, 370, 378, 403

vipākaja58,216,299,318,377vipāka-phala41,145,169,177,182,475viparyāsa43,242,466vipaśyanā11,215,222,433,440,443,

444, 445, 450, 460vipaśyanā-bhāvanā11vipaśyanā-carita11,444vipratisāra414viprayukta-saṃskāra25,35,38,40,87,

96, 97, 100, 102, 111, 146, 268, 269,287,290–294,309–311,314,390, 456, 458, 478

virati 389, 392, 406, 416viraty-aṅga383vīrya13,36,214,218,227,236,433,

450, 452visabhāga-dhātu-ālambana354viṣaya27,31,64,72,190,193,217,

218, 231, 245, 312, 342, 368viṣaya-pratighāta190visaṃyoga169,177,179,221,346,347,

348, 353, 366, 434, 452, 453, 468, 474, 475, 476, 481, 482, 514

visaṃyoga-phala169,177,476,481visaṃyoga-prāpti434,453,468,481viśeṣa-mārga7,348viśuddhi335vitarka 438, 444vratāṅga383vyākaraṇa5,185vyañjana-kāya37,285,287,290,293,

309, 310 vyāpāda326,328,329,386,462,513

vyavadāna238vyaya146,308.Seealsoanityatā.

warmed-up 447, 466warmth 258, 316, 328, 370Western Masters 343with-outflow15,42,43,58,150,198,

212, 221, 246, 248, 249, 271, 321, 325, 326, 331, 339, 342, 344, 345, 349, 352, 363, 372, 374, 386, 451, 460, 471, 491, 542. See also sāsrava.

words 309, 311, 313, 317worldly path 321, 332, 348, 349, 350,

463.Seealsolaukika-mārga.worldly supreme dharma 435, 436, 437,

445, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 529

XuanZang7,56,86,88–90,93,94,97,98, 101, 103, 109, 129, 131, 166, 182,188,189,202,207–209,213,229, 269, 273, 274, 302, 345, 356, 366, 404, 459, 466

yathābhūta-jñāna454Yin Shun 13, 56, 59, 77, 85, 88, 89,

90, 94, 98, 99, 102, 139, 214, 215, 239, 366, 429, 468. See also Study.

yoga 272, 326, 479, 513, 514Yogācāra3,5yoni 258, 316, 328, 370Yukta-vādin115,242,254yukti 3, 63

Zhi Yi 443zuo yong 129, 131, 132