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Diablo Canyon Special
Protection Scheme (RAS)
WECC RASRS Presentation2019-01-03
• Scheme Overview
• Operation (2018-12-01)
• Initial Functional Modification
Internal
Diablo SPS Overview
Internal
WECC Database Categorization
Reporting
Party
Scheme
Name
Classification:
WAPS, LAPS,
Safety Net
(SN) or Non-
BES PS
(NBPS) (7)
Major
WECC
RAS
OPERATING
PROCEDURE
Design Objectives —
Contingencies and system
conditions for which the
scheme was designed.
Operation — The actions
taken by the scheme in
response to Disturbance
conditions.
Modeling — Information on
detection logic or relay
settings that control
operation of the scheme.
Original
In
Service
Date
PG&E
Diablo
Canyon
SPS
Safety Net NA PG&E DOO
Prevent instability at
DCPP for loss of two of
three 500kV lines (Diablo-
Gates, Diablo-Midway #1
and Diablo-Midway #2).
Trip either DCPP Unit
#1 or DCPP Unit #2
The SPS monitors the
status of the three 500 kV
lines connected to Diablo
Canyon PP, as well the
DCPP unit outputs. If two of
three 500 kV lines are lost
on contingency and the total
plant output is above a
specific threshold, the SPS
trips one of the two Diablo
Canyon PP generating
units.
2006
Scheme has been in-service for 12 years with no
operation (correct operation or incorrect operation)
Internal
Local Area Transmission
≈ 160 mi
≈ 200
mi
Internal
Diablo Canyon
500kV Breaker and ½ (8 Breakers)
Three Lines
Two Units (2450 MW Combined Gross)
MIDWAY
BUS 2
GATES
BUS 1
DIABLO
CANYON
BUS 2
742642
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2 500kV LINE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3 500kV LINE
GATES - DIABLO CANYON 500kV LINE
732
722622
812 912
802 902
652 552
542
DIABLO
CANYON
BUS 1
DIABLO
CANYON
UNIT 2
632532
DIABLO
CANYON
UNIT 1
ZZY Y
ZYX Y
ZYX YX YZ Y
Z YXY
DCPP_DCSPS 10-2005
Dpe4
Internal
Planning Study
Intensive Synchronous Swings
Possible Loss of Synchronism between Plant and WECC System for:
– Single Line Trip (or Outage) in a Double Line System (Event 1)
– Double Line Trip (or Outage) in a Three Line System (Event 2)
– Delayed Clearing Faults (Breaker Failure) (Event 3)
Internal
Planning Study (Original)
Possible Consequences of Swings
Loss of Plant (DUO) caused by:
– Plant Out-of-Step relay operation– Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Undervoltage
protection (delayed clearing faults cause motor stall)
Violation of NERC/WECC Planning Standard for Voltage Dips
Internal
Planning Study (Original)
Consequences of Swings and/or Separation
▪ Could Impose significant stress on WECC – Increase dependence on the adequate performance of protecting and regulating devices throughout the system.
▪ Introduce the possibility of a cascading affect.
▪ A loss of 2450 MW may cause a definite strain on the remaining generating resources.
Internal
Scheme Considerations
▪ Pulsing generator voltages upward immediately after a critical disturbance with full utilization of generator short-term overloading capabilities.
▪ Turbine main and intercept valve fast closing, initiated by an advanced overspeed control or by a disturbance detecting device.
▪ Tripping one generator immediately after indication of a critical disturbance.
– It was found that only the third measure is effective enough in the whole range of DCPP generation for the first swing suppression.
A loss of one unit does not affect WECC stability.
Internal
Solution
Diablo Canyon Special Protection Scheme
▪ Provides measures for preventing a loss of two DCPP
units on line/BF trips and unexpected Line Outages
▪ Results in preventing system instabilities on a loss of
two DCPP units.
Instability prevented by intentional tripping of one
Diablo Canyon Unit.
Internal
Instability Conditions
500kV line faults may cause dynamic instability, if
DCPP generates:
▪ above MWL1 for single line trips in a 2-line scheme (1808 MW)
▪ above MWL2 for double line trips in a 3-line scheme (1790 MW)
▪ above MWL3 for delayed clearing (12 cycles) AND V1 < .4 pu (1723
MW)
Post-transient stability – Double Line outage: ▪ DCPP output should be limited to L5 MW if dynamic stability is not
lost (O-23).
Scheme must issue trip within 70msec of line trips
and within 3 seconds for line outages
Internal
Unit Trip Effectiveness (Event 2)
No fault and 3 second delayed generator trip
( DCPP generator)
DCPP - 2,450 MW with 0.975 p.u. terminal voltage
3ph. fault and immediate generator trip
3ph. fault without remedial actions
Internal
System Throughput Time
Event Detection &
Transient suppression
20 msec
Data Communication 12-16 msec
Logic Execution 2 msec
Trip Decision Transmission 12-16 msec
System Coordination time 12-16 msec
Contact Output Time 4 msec
Total Throughput
Calculated Delay
62-74 msec
Internal
Overview of Events
System Protection (dpe4)2018-12-20 Rev 01
• DCSPS Events Categories 1 and 2: Line Outages
• DCSPS Event Category 3: Breaker Failure at Diablo
Internal
DCSPS Clearing Time for Second 500kV Loss
Due To Fault (Present Scheme Configuration)
Internal
DCSPS Clearing Time for BF Event (Present
Scheme Configuration)
Internal
500kV Line Outage Detection
The scheme is implemented only at Diablo 500kV and the
contingency detection part of the scheme monitors the “outage”
condition of the three 500kV export lines leaving Diablo. Each line
and has three outage detection methods. The three outage
detection methods, combined together, result in determination of a
Line Outage (“OR” of the following conditions) –
1. Protection Trip bus detection (does not sense manual opening of the
CB’s). This “pre-determines” a line outage 2-3 cycles before the
breakers open.
2. Local Outage Detection – Undercurrent and Breaker seals determine a
line outage (invoked for manual opening of the line CB’s.
3. Remote Outage Detection – Undercurrent monitored only at Diablo, and
has a time delay (1-second). This element is only enabled when the
aggregate plant output exceeds the reaches the minimal scheme arming
point (1720 MW).
Setting: 219 Amps
Internal
500kV Line Charging Currents (Actual Measured)
Internal
Trip Category Detection
DCSPS Event Definition
1
One Line Trip or One Line Outage in a Double line configuration (Two Lines Initially In-Service):
Twelve (12) Permutations:
OUTAGE (1st Line) → TRIP (2nd Line)
OUTAGE (1st Line) → OUTAGE (2nd Line)
Diablo – Gates 500kV Line Outage
Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Midway #3 500kV line.
(Two Permutations)
Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Midway #2 500kV line.
(Two Permutations)
Diablo – Midway #3 500kV Line Outage
Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Midway #2 500kV line.
(Two Permutations)
Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Gates 500kV line. (Two
Permutations)
Diablo – Midway #2 500kV Line Outage
Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Gates 500kV line. (Two
Permutations)
Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Midway #3 500kV line.
(Two Permutations)
Internal
Trip Category Detection
DCSPS Event Definition
2
Double Line Trips or Double Line Outages in a Triple line configuration (Three Lines initially In-Service)
Twelve (12) Permutations:
TRIP (1st Line) → TRIP (2nd Line)
TRIP (1st Line) → OUTAGE (2nd Line)
A. Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Gates 500kV line
AND a Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Midway #3
500kV line within the TSIMULTANEOUS time window. (Four
Permutations)
B. Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Midway #3 500kV
line AND a Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Midway
#2 500kVline within the TSIMULTANEOUS time window. (Four
Permutations)
C. Protection Trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Midway #2 500kV
line AND a Protection trip (or Outage) of the Diablo Canyon – Gates
500kV line within the TSIMULTANEOUS time window. (Four
Permutations)
Internal
Trip Category Detection
DCSPS Event Definition
3
500kV Circuit Breaker Failure
Four (4) Distinct Possibilities:
CB 622 Failure
CB 722 Failure
CB 532 Failure (Not Required)
CB 632 Failure (Not Required)
CB 732 Failure
CB 542 Failure (Not Required)
CB 642 Failure (Not Required)
CB 742 Failure
Internal
1. All devices in the DCPP system are time synchronized either via IRIG-B Security (DC Shift
not Amplitude Modulated)
2. Power level transition (up or down) is 10 seconds
3. “Simultaneous” Trip is 10 Seconds
4. Dependability
1. Redundancy (in the form of “Duplication”)
2. Limit Single Points of Failure
3. Trip Coil 1 and Trip Coil 2
5. Security
1. Operation of either system will lock-out both systems
2. Input recognition time: 4 to 16ms (depending on input type)
3. Input sensitivity: 84 volts on a nominal 125VDC battery system.
4. Issue trip only when beneficial (System Topology Supervision)
5. A Line “Trip” is recognized when:
1. All Three trip signals on both breakers indicate a “Trip”
2. Three trip on one breaker with the adjacent CB in the Open/Maint. State
6. System A and B error detection comparison
7. Based on the existing arming levels, If either unit is off-line, the scheme will be
disarmed.
8. Scheme is Cut-Out during scheduled unit outages
9. A Voltage Failure alarm is provided
10. Two Trip contacts in series
DCSPS General Requirements2
2
Internal
6. The DCSPS will issue a Unit Trip when:
1. System A and System B decide to trip the same unit
2. Either system decides to trip and the other system has no trip decision within
16ms
1. Ex: Sys A is armed and Sys B is unarmed due to different power level
measurements
3. One System decides to trip and the other system has a critical error
7. If System A indicates one unit trip and System B indicates the other unit trip, NO
trip is issued.
8. A Line “Trip” is recognized when:
1. All 3-Phase trip signals on both breakers indicate “trip”
2. Three trip on one breaker with the adjacent breaker in the Open/Maintenance
state
Fail Safe Logic
Internal
Single Line and Meter Diagram
MIDWAY
BUS 2
GATES
BUS 1
DIABLO
CANYON
BUS 2
742642
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2 500kV LINE
537DCSPS-B
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3 500kV LINE
537DCSPS-A
GATES - DIABLO CANYON 500kV LINE
732
722622
812 912
802 902
652 552
542
DIABLO
CANYON
BUS 1
DIABLO
CANYON
UNIT 2
632532
DIABLO
CANYON
UNIT 1
SYS - A GE UR-N60: Place in LFDC CURRENT CIRCUIT
SYS - B GE UR-N60: Place in PLS CURRENT CIRCUIT
ZZY Y
ZYX Y
ZYX YX YZ Y
Z YXY
537/511DCSPSA-1537/511DCSPSA-2
537/511DCSPSB-2 537/511DCSPSB-1
578/586DCSPSA-1578/586DCSPSA-2
578/586DCSPSB-1578/586DCSPSB-2
SYS-A
F1: DIABLO-GATES
M1: DIABLO-MID #3
M5: DIABLO-MID #2
SYS-B
F1: DIABLO-MID #2
M1: DIABLO-MID #3
M5: DIABLO-GATES
RELAY CONFIG AS
VIEWED FROM
BEHIND PANEL
UNIT #2 DCSPS RACK 3
RELAY CONFIG AS
VIEWED FROM
BEHIND PANEL
UNIT #1 DCSPS RACK 2
RELAY CONFIG AS
VIEWED FROM
BEHIND PANEL
LINES DCSPS RACK 1
DCPP_DCSPS 12-2005
Dpe4
Internal
Direct Communication and Panel Layout
RX
TX
W7IC
1
TX
RX
C
2
RX
TX
W7IC
1
RX
TX
C
2
RX
TX
W7IC
1
RX
TX
C
2
RX
TX
W7IC
1
RX
TX
C
2
REDUNDANT
FIBER RING (TX &
RX 64 Bit)
RELAY TO RELAY
COM
REDUNDANT
FIBER RING (TX &
RX 64 Bit)
RELAY TO RELAY
COM
SYS - A
SYS - B
DCPP_DCSPS 12-2005
Dpe4
RX
TX
W7IC
1
TX
RX
C
2
RELAY CONFIG AS
VIEWED FROM
BEHIND PANEL
UNIT #2 DCSPS RACK 3RELAY CONFIG AS
VIEWED FROM
BEHIND PANEL
UNIT #1 DCSPS RACK 2
RELAY CONFIG AS
VIEWED FROM
BEHIND PANEL
LINES DCSPS RACK 1
RX
TX
W7IC
1
TX
RX
C
2
RX
TX
W7IC
1
RX
TX
C
2
RX
TX
W7IC
1
RX
TX
C
2
RX
TX
W7IC
1
RX
TX
C
2
RX
TX
W7IC
1
TX
RX
C
2
578/586DCSPSA-1
DD 3
578/586DCSPSA-2
DD 4
537/511DCSPSA-1
DD 1
537/511DCSPSA-2
DD 2
537DCSPS-A
DD 5
578/586DCSPSB-1
DD 3
578/586DCSPSB-2
DD 4
537/511DCSPSB-1
DD 1
537/511DCSPSB-2
DD 2
537DCSPS-B
DD 5
Internal
CB Trip Detection and CB Fail Detection
BF
(A)
BF
(B)
BF
(C)
DSPS
SYS A
DSPS
SYS B
BF DC (-)
BF DC (+)
Protection Relay
Breaker Fail init
DCSPS BFI
UNIT CB’s
CB
BREAKER
FAIL RELAY
TIMER
TD-5
BREAKER
FAIL RELAY
TIMER
AR TRIPPING
RELAYS
DSPS
SYS A
DSPS
SYS B
TCO
RCO
DCPP_DCSPS 10-2005
Dpe4
Internal
Events 2a, 2a, 1d
0 = Open
1 = Closed
N = No Action
U1 = Trip Unit 1
U2 = Trip Unit 2
E = Either (Unit Selector Sw)
Internal
Event 1 and 2
BUS 2
742642
732
722622
542
BUS 1
632532
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2
500kV LINE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3
500kV LINE
GATES - DIABLO
500kV LINE
DIABLO
UNIT 2
DIABLO
UNIT 1
BUS 2
742642
732
722622
542
BUS 1
632532
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2
500kV LINE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3
500kV LINE
GATES - DIABLO
500kV LINE
DIABLO
UNIT 2
DIABLO
UNIT 1
BUS 2
742642
732
722622
542
BUS 1
632532
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2
500kV LINE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3
500kV LINE
GATES - DIABLO
500kV LINE
DIABLO
UNIT 2
DIABLO
UNIT 1
DCSPS EVE-1A
DCSPS EVE-1D
DCSPS EVE-1C
DCSPS EVE-1F
DCSPS EVE-1B
DCSPS EVE-1E
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3 LINE OUTAGEDIABLO - MIDWAY #2 LINE TRIP
DIABLO - GATES LINE OUTAGEDIABLO - MIDWAY #2 LINE TRIP
DIABLO - GATES LINE OUTAGEDIABLO - MIDWAY #3 LINE TRIP
DIABLO - GATES LINE TRIPDIABLO - MIDWAY #3 LINE OUTAGE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3 LINE TRIPDIABLO - MIDWAY #2 LINE OUTAGE
DIABLO - GATES LINE TRIPDIABLO - MIDWAY #2 LINE OUTAGE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3 LINE TRIP or OUTAGEDIABLO - MIDWAY #2 LINE TRIP or OUTAGE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2 LINE TRIP or OUTAGEDIABLO - GATES LINE TRIP or OUTAGE
DIABLO - GATES LINE TRIP or OUTAGEDIABLO - MIDWAY #3 LINE TRIP or OUTAGE
DCSPS EVE-2B DCSPS EVE-2CDCSPS EVE-2A
DCPP_DCSPS 10-2005
Dpe4
For DCSPS Event 2x, the breakers at Diablo on the linethat is OUT may not be open (Remote Open Detection).The Remote End breakers, instead, may be open. Thefigure above is equivalent to the remote end breakersOpen.
Diablo - Midway #2 Line is the only export Path
By inspection, Unit 2 will never be tripped in thiscondition.
DCSPS Trips UNIT #1, (if MW and VOLTAGEsupervision is satisfied), AND only if CB’s 532, 542,and 642 are closed. (742 position status is not relevant)(DCSPS will be restricted from tripping unless theconfiguration of the four breakers that are unaffected bythe event are in a configuration such that DCSPS willresult in a beneficial action. )
DCSPS Event - 1x and 2x: Unit Trip Selection as a function of BUS CONFIGURATIONN
OT
ES
For DCSPS Event 2x, the breakers at Diablo on the linethat is OUT may not be open (Remote Open Detection).The Remote End breakers, instead, may be open. Thefigure above is equivalent to the remote end breakersOpen.
Diablo - Gates Line is the only export Path
By inspection, Either Unit #1 or Unit #2 can be tripped.
DCSPS Trips by the Unit Selector Switch Preference, (ifMW and VOLTAGE supervision is satisfied), AND onlyif CB’s 532, 542, and 622 are closed. (722 position statusis not relevant)(DCSPS will be restricted from tripping unless theconfiguration of the four breakers that are unaffected bythe event are in a configuration such that DCSPS willresult in a beneficial action. )
For DCSPS Event 2x, the breakers at Diablo on the linethat is OUT may not be open (Remote Open Detection).The Remote End breakers, instead, may be open. Thefigure above is equivalent to the remote end breakersOpen.
Diablo - Midway #3 Line is the only export Path
By inspection, Unit 1 will never be tripped in thiscondition.
DCSPS Trips UNIT #2, (if MW and VOLTAGEsupervision is satisfied), AND only if CB’s 532, 542,and 632 are closed. (732 position status is not relevant)(DCSPS will be restricted from tripping unless theconfiguration of the four breakers that are unaffected bythe event are in a configuration such that DCSPS willresult in a beneficial action. )
UN
IT T
RIP
DE
CIS
ION
AS
A
FU
NC
TIO
N O
F R
EM
AIN
ING
50
0k
V B
RE
AK
ER
CO
NF
IGU
RA
TIO
N
BU
S C
ON
FIG
UR
AT
ION
AS
A
FU
NC
TIO
N O
F T
HE
EV
EN
T
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
U1
N
N
N
N
N
N
00 01 11 10
00
01
11
10
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
U2
N
N
N
N
N
N
N N N N
N N N N
N N E N
N N E N
00 01 11 10
00
01
11
10
00 01 11 10
00
01
11
10
622 532
722 542632 532
732 542642 532
742 542
U1 U2
1: CB is Closed at the time of Initiating Event (t0) 0: CB is Opened at the time of Initiating Event (t
0)
Diablo SPS will only trip if it results in a benefit. (Removal of one of two units that remain tied to the system after the initiating event.
U1: Unit #1 Tripped U2: Unit #2 Tripped E: Either - Unit Tripped based on Unit Selector Sw
Internal
Events 1 and 2 Implemented Logic
AND
CB 532 CLOSED
CB 542 CLOSED
CB 642 CLOSED
OR
AND
AND
AND
DG OUTAGE
DM#3 TRIP
DM#3 OUTAGE
DG TRIP
DM#3 (OUTAGE or TRIP)
DG (OUTAGE or TRIP)AND
UNIT #1 TRIP
AND
CB 532 CLOSED
CB 542 CLOSED
CB 622 CLOSED
OR
AND
AND
AND
DM#2 OUTAGE
DM#3 TRIP
DM#3 OUTAGE
DM#2 TRIP
DM#3 (OUTAGE or TRIP)
DM#2 (OUTAGE or TRIP)AND
UNIT TRIP BY UNITSELECTOR
AND
CB 532 CLOSED
CB 542 CLOSED
CB 632 CLOSED
OR
AND
AND
AND
DG OUTAGE
DM#2 TRIP
DM#2 OUTAGE
DG TRIP
DM#2 (OUTAGE or TRIP)
DG (OUTAGE or TRIP)AND
UNIT #2 TRIP
DCSPS EVE-1A
DCSPS EVE-1D
DCSPS EVE-1C
DCSPS EVE-1F
DCSPS EVE-1B
DCSPS EVE-1E
DCSPS EVE-2B
DCSPS EVE-2C
DCSPS EVE-2A
TRIP LOGIC DCSPS Event - 1x and 2x (SEE STATE TRANSITION DIAGRAMS)
Physical Topology ofthe 500kV Bus
(From Karnaugh Map)
Physical Topology ofthe 500kV Bus
(From Karnaugh Map)
Physical Topology ofthe 500kV Bus
(From Karnaugh Map)
DCPP_DCSPS 12-2005
Dpe4
Internal
Event 3
632
742
BUS 2
742642
732
722622
542
BUS 1
632532
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2
500kV LINE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3
500kV LINE
GATES - DIABLO
500kV LINE
DIABLO
UNIT 2
DIABLO
UNIT 1
FAILBUS 2
642
BUS 1
632
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2
500kV LINE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3
500kV LINE
GATES - DIABLO
500kV LINE
DIABLO
UNIT 2
DIABLO
UNIT 1
722
FAIL
622
732532
542 742
BUS 2
642
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2
500kV LINE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3
500kV LINE
GATES - DIABLO
500kV LINE
DIABLO
UNIT 1
FAIL
532
542
BUS 1
722
732
622
DIABLO
UNIT 2
BUS 2
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2
500kV LINE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3
500kV LINE
GATES - DIABLO
500kV LINE
DIABLO
UNIT 1
532
542
722622
DIABLO
UNIT 2
732632
642
FAIL
742
DCSPS Event - 3x: Unit Trip Selection as a function of BUS CONFIGURATION
DCSPS EVE-3ACB 622 Failure
DCSPS EVE-3BCB 722 Failure
BUS 1
DCSPS EVE-3ECB 732 Failure
DCSPS EVE-3HCB 742 Failure
BU
S C
ON
FIG
UR
AT
ION
AS
A
FU
NC
TIO
N O
F T
HE
EV
EN
T
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
E
N
N
N
N
00 01 11 10
00
01
11
10
732 632
742 642
E
E
E
UN
IT T
RIP
DE
CIS
ION
AS
A
FU
NC
TIO
N O
F R
EM
AIN
ING
50
0k
V B
RE
AK
ER
CO
NF
IGU
RA
TIO
N
Diablo - Midway #2 or #3 Lines can be anexport Path (Depending on Initial Busconfiguration)
Given the proper initial bus configuration,Either Unit Can be tripped.
DCSPS Trips by the Unit Selector Switch, (ifMW and VOLTAGE supervision is satisfied),AND only if CB’s 632, 642, are closed. (732and 742 Position is not relevant)
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
E
N
N
N
00 01 11 10
00
01
11
10
632 532
642 542
EE E
U1
U2
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
00 01 11 10
00
01
11
10
622 532
642 542
U1
U1
N N U1 U1
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
00 01 11 10
00
01
11
10
622 532
632 542
U2
U2
N NU2 U2
Diablo - Midway #2 or #3 Lines can be anexport Path (Depending on Initial Busconfiguration)
Given the proper initial bus configuration,Either Unit can be tripped (Provided the MWand VOLTAGE supervision are satisfied):
DCSPS Trips by the Unit Selector Switch, IfCB 632 and CB 642 are closed. (CB 532 and542 position status is not relevant)
DCSPS Trips UNIT #1, If CB’s 532, 542, and642 are closed AND 632 is opened.
DCSPS Trips UNIT #2, If CB’s 532, 542, and632 are closed AND 642 is opened.
NO
TE
S
Diablo - Midway #2 or Diablo - Gates Linescan be an export Path (Depending on InitialBus configuration)
Given the proper initial bus configuration,Only Unit 1 will be tripped.
DCSPS Trips UNIT #1 For (3) Conditions(Provided the MW and VOLTAGEsupervision are satisfied):
If CB’s 532, 542, and 642 are closed (CB 622position status is not relevant).
If CB’s 622, 642, and 532 are closed (CB 542position status is not relevant).
If CB’s 532, 542, and 622 are closed (CB 642position status is not relevant).
DCPP_DCSPS 10-2005
Dpe4
1: CB is Closed at the time of Initiating Event (t0) 0: CB is Opened at the time of Initiating Event (t
0)
Diablo SPS will only trip if it results in a benefit. (Removal of one of two units that remain tied to the system after the initiating event.
U1: Unit #1 Tripped U2: Unit #2 Tripped E: Either - Unit Tripped based on Unit Selector Sw
Diablo - Midway #3 or Diablo - Gates Linescan be an export Path (Depending on InitialBus configuration)
Given the proper initial bus configuration,Only Unit 2 will be tripped.
DCSPS Trips UNIT #2 For (3) Conditions(Provided the MW and VOLTAGEsupervision are satisfied):
If CB’s 532, 542, and 632 are closed (CB 622position status is not relevant).
If CB’s 622, 632, and 542 are closed (CB 532position status is not relevant).
If CB’s 532, 542, and 622 are closed (CB 632position status is not relevant).
Internal
Events 3 Implemented Logic
AND
CB 632 CLOSED
CB 642 CLOSED
ANDCB 622 Fail
UNIT TRIP BY UNITSELECTOR
AND
CB 542 CLOSED
AND
CB 632 CLOSED
CB 642 CLOSED
TRIP LOGIC DCSPS Event - 3x (SEE STATE TRANSITION DIAGRAMS)
Physical Topology ofthe 500kV Bus
(From Karnaugh Map)
PhysicalTopology of
the 500kV Bus (From
KarnaughMap)
DCSPS EVE-3A
CB 642 CLOSED
AND
CB 542 CLOSED
CB 632 CLOSED
AND
CB 632 OPENED
CB 642 OPENED
CB 532 CLOSED
CB 532 CLOSEDAND
UNIT TRIP BY UNITSELECTOR
UNIT #1 TRIP
ANDUNIT #2 TRIP
CB 722 FailDCSPS EVE-3B
OR
AND
CB 532 CLOSED
CB 542 CLOSED
CB 642 CLOSED
AND
CB 532 CLOSED
CB 542 CLOSED
CB 622 CLOSED
AND
CB 532 CLOSED
CB 622 CLOSED
CB 642 CLOSED
ANDCB 732 Fail
UNIT #1 TRIP
DCSPS EVE-3E
PhysicalTopology of
the 500kV Bus (From
KarnaughMap)
OR
AND
CB 532 CLOSED
CB 542 CLOSED
CB 632 CLOSED
AND
CB 532 CLOSED
CB 542 CLOSED
CB 622 CLOSED
AND
CB 542 CLOSED
CB 622 CLOSED
CB 632 CLOSED
ANDCB 742 Fail
UNIT #2 TRIP
DCSPS EVE-3H
PhysicalTopology of
the 500kV Bus (From
KarnaughMap)
DCPP_DCSPS 12-2005
Dpe4
Internal
Operator Interface
RESET
LINE OUT AT DC 2-LINES TRIP
LINE OUT / P > L1
2-LINES OUT
LINE OUT / LINE TRIP
System Unavailable
Sys DD Com Fail25
29
32
26
27
28
30
31
33
37
34
35
36
38
39
9
12
17
20
14
16
10
11
13
15
18
19
22
21
23
24
7
2
3
5
4
6
8 40
1
47
42
43
45
44
46
48
41
LINE OUT GATES
DC - GATES DC - MIDWAY #2 DC - MIDWAY #3
622 OPEN / MAINT.
722 OPEN / MAINT.
LINE TRIP ACTIVE
622 SYS A&B DISAG
722 SYS A&B DISAG
CB & UC DISAGREE
Operational Status Operational Status ALARMS
LINE TRIP / LINE OUT
BFT PLANT TRIP
UNIT #1 TRIP
UNIT #2 TRIP
LINE OUT AT DC
LINE OUT MIDWAY
642 OPEN / MAINT.
742 OPEN / MAINT.
LINE TRIP ACTIVE
642 SYS A&B DISAG
742 SYS A&B DISAG
CB & UC DISAGREE
LINE OUT AT DC
LINE OUT MIDWAY
632 OPEN / MAINT.
732 OPEN / MAINT.
LINE TRIP ACTIVE
632 SYS A&B DISAG
732 SYS A&B DISAG
CB & UC DISAGREE
622 BF
722 BF
532 BF
632 BF
732 BF
542 BF
642 BF
742 BF
ETHERNET Fail
MAINTENANCE ALARM
537DCSPS – (A or B) LED’s and Pushbuttons
Rack 1 Rack 2 Rack 3
Sys - A
Sys - B
537DCSPS-A
537DCSPS-B
Sys - A
Sys - B
Lines Rack Unit 1 Rack Unit 2 Rack
Internal
Trip Circuit
Trip Coil 1 DC (-)
Trip Coil 1 DC (+)
DCSPS Unit-1 Tripping Relays
U1
CB
TC 1
DCPP_DCSPS 01-2006
Dpe4
Cut-Out Switch
RCO/DCSPS-A
Cut-Out Switch
RCO/DCSPS-B
Trip Coil 2 DC (-)
Trip Coil 2 DC (+)
U1
CB
TC 2
Cut-Out Switch
RCO/DCSPS-A
Cut-Out Switch
RCO/DCSPS-B
OPEN
CLOSE
LATCH
SYS-A
BF DC (-)
BF DC (+)
Cut-Out Switch
RCO/DCSPS-B
Cut-Out Switch
RCO/DCSPS-A
PRI
TC-1
SYS-A
Mod-F
PRI
TC-1
SYS-B
Mod-F
OPEN
CLOSE
LATCH
SYS-B
OPEN
CLOSE
LATCH
SYS-BOPEN
CLOSE
LATCH
SYS-B
OPEN
CLOSE
LATCH
SYS-AOPEN
CLOSE
LATCH
SYS-A
BF INIT
SYS-A
SYS-B
CB
CLOSE
579H
Auto Reclose
DCSPS
TRIP COIL #1
TRIP
DCSPS
Reclose
Block
DCSPS
TRIP COIL #2
TRIP
DCSPS
Breaker Failure
Initiate
Unit #1 Sys - A Trip
Unit #1 Sys - B Trip
ORUnit #2 DCSPS
Lockout
Close
Close Close
Close
Ope
n
Unit #1 DCSPSLockout
(From U2 Trip bySys-A OR Sys-B)
SYS A RESET PB
Open Close
Clo
seSEC
TC-1
SYS-A
Mod-M
SEC
TC-1
SYS-B
Mod-M
PRI
TC-2
SYS-A
Mod-F
PRI
TC-2
SYS-B
Mod-F
SEC
TC-2
SYS-A
Mod-M
SEC
TC-2
SYS-B
Mod-M
PRI
BFI
SYS-A
Mod-F
PRI
BFI
SYS-B
Mod-F
SEC
BFI
SYS-A
Mod-M
SEC
BFI
SYS-B
Mod-M
Close
Close Close
Close
U1 Trip Lockout U1 Trip Lockout
Sys-B Reset
Close
Close
Close
Clo
se
SYS-BSYS-A SYS-BSYS-A SYS-BSYS-A
SYS B RESET PB
Sys-A Reset
Sys-B Reset
Sys-A Reset
Internal
Test Modes & Alarms
1. Design Validation & Commissioning1. System test – all conditions, all states, all transitions
2. Periodic (w/ system out of service)1. Breaker status information integrity
2. Trip circuit integrity (output contact and associated wiring)
3. BFI detection integrity
4. Aux relay integrity
3. Scheme Alarms1. System A / System B Consistency Alarm
1. Status & Decisions
2. Communication Alarms
3. Relay Alarms1. Critical – disable respective system
2. Operation alarm
4. Operator Interface1. LED
2. SCADA
3. Unit Selector Switch
4. Reset Pushbutton
Internal
Testing Document
EVE Scenario ARM LEVELS G→MW2 Test MW2→G Test G→MW3 Test MW3→G Test MW2→MW3 Test MW3→MW2 Test
UNIT SEL SW
1
LLO → TRIP
L3<MW<L1 No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
L1<MW U2 TRIP U2 TRIP U1 TRIP U1 TRIP
U1 TRIP U1 TRIP Unit 1 Selected
U2 TRIP U2 TRIP Unit 2 Selected
ROD → TRIP
L3<MW<L1 No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
L1<MW U2 TRIP U2 TRIP U1 TRIP U1 TRIP
U1 TRIP U1 TRIP Unit 1 Selected
U2 TRIP U2 TRIP Unit 2 Selected
LLO → LLO
MW<L1 & V1<Vdlos No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
MW>L1 & V1>Vdlos No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
L1<MW & V1<Vdlos U2 TRIP U2 TRIP U1 TRIP U1 TRIP
U1 TRIP U1 TRIP Unit 1 Selected
U2 TRIP U2 TRIP Unit 2 Selected
LLO → ROD
MW<L1 & V1<Vdlos No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
MW>L1 & V1>Vdlos No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
L1<MW & V1<Vdlos U2 TRIP U2 TRIP U1 TRIP U1 TRIP
U1 TRIP U1 TRIP Unit 1 Selected
U2 TRIP U2 TRIP Unit 2 Selected
ROD → LLO
MW<L1 & V1<Vdlos No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
MW>L1 & V1>Vdlos No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
L1<MW & V1<Vdlos U2 TRIP U2 TRIP U1 TRIP U1 TRIP
U1 TRIP U1 TRIP Unit 1 Selected
U2 TRIP U2 TRIP Unit 2 Selected
ROD → ROD
MW<L1 & V1<Vdlos No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
MW>L1 & V1>Vdlos No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
L1<MW & V1<Vdlos U2 TRIP U2 TRIP U1 TRIP U1 TRIP
U1 TRIP U1 TRIP Unit 1 Selected
U2 TRIP U2 TRIP Unit 2 Selected
2
TRIP → TRIP Within 10 sec
MW<L3 No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
L3<MW<L2 No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
L2<MW U2 TRIP U2 TRIP U1 TRIP U1 TRIP
U1 TRIP U1 TRIP Unit 1 Selected
U2 TRIP U2 TRIP Unit 2 Selected
TRIP → LLO L3<MW<L2 No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip
Internal
Testing Document
Internal
2018-12-01Scheme Operation
Internal
Unit #1 Ramping Down
Intake fouling followed by Coolant Pump Vibration
1h 50m
Internal
Conditions Immediately Prior to Scheme Actuation
MIDWAY
BUS 2
GATES
BUS 1
DIABLO
CANYON
BUS 2
742642
DIABLO - MIDWAY #2 500kV LINE
DIABLO - MIDWAY #3 500kV LINE
GATES - DIABLO CANYON 500kV LINE
732
722622
812 912
802 902
652 552
542
DIABLO
CANYON
BUS 1
DIABLO
CANYON
UNIT 2
632532
DIABLO
CANYON
UNIT 1
ZZY Y
ZYX Y
ZYX YX YZ Y
Z YXY
DCPP_DCSPS 10-2005
Dpe4
796 Amps
1216 Amps
1603 Amps
210 Amps
210 Amps
Internal
Historical Data (2/26/2018)
Internal
Historical Data (3/19/2018)
Internal
Historical Data (11/30/2018)
Internal
PI Trend of the Event (12/1/2018)
Internal
Historical Data
Internal
Control Point Implementation & Monitoring
• The Control Point equations below will allow the Grid Control
Center to monitor the potential line flows if DCPP were to ramp
down to 1700 MW.
• Mitigation strategies considered if ROD were not removed.
Internal
Example – Risk for a Ramp Down
Internal
Example – Risk for a Ramp Up
Internal
Trend Comparison to Event Data
Internal
Logic Change
Internal
Logic Change (Relay Implementation)
Internal
Verbiage from Corresponding 5MM
1. Diablo Canyon Power Plant will be restricted to 1700 MW output under the
following conditions:
• Diablo-Gates 500kV line outage
• Diablo-Midway #2-500kV line outage
• Diablo-Midway #3-500kV line outage
• Midway #1-500kV bus outage
• Midway #2-500kV bus outage
• Any outage of Midway CB 802, 902, 912, or 812 that places the system in a
configuration where a single contingency with a breaker failure operation
would cause the open ending of both the Diablo-Midway #2 and #3 500kV
lines.
For any loss of the remote ends of the Diablo-Gates 500kV line, Diablo-Midway #2-
500kV line, and the Diablo-Midway #3-500kV line, the Grid Control Center would
deenergize the line from Diablo Canyon so that the local portion of the Diablo SPS
recognizes that the line is out of service. At the same time, Diablo Canyon will be
given the order to limit output to 1700 MW.
Internal
RASRS Approval Request
PG&E seeks approval to remove “Remote Open Detection” portion of
the logic and monitor with a control point calculation.
The scheme will be less dependable in detecting Open Ended lines.
A newly developed operating procedure covers the scenario with “Remote
Outage Detection” disabled.
PG&E requests two changes –
1. Short Term (Today): Disabling the Remote Outage detection. Cover via operating
procedure captured in a 5 Minute Meeting.
2. Longer Term (Six Months): Implement the Remote Outage detection in a more
secure manner. Place devices at the remote end of the line and implement logic
like the “local Outage detection”. Monitor with control point calculation and
documented procedure.