CIVIL PROCEDUREDigest #14 (Rule 10 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings)

Martha Rose C. Serrano

Leobrera v. CA This is a PfRC on the admission by the RTC-Makati of a supplemental complaint filed by

petitioner

Petitioner Carlos Leobrera was granted a credit facility by private respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) It was secured by two real estate mortgages and eventually converted into two 90-day

promissory notes

Upon maturity, BPI demanded the full payment of the loan Leobrera failed to pay This prompted BPI to foreclose the mortgages securing said loan Before BPI could institute the foreclosure proceedings, however, Leobrera filed (before

the RTC-Makati) a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin BPI from foreclosing the mortgages

The trial court issued an order restraining BPI from foreclosing the real estate mortgages securing the 90-day loans and, after hearing, issued a writ of preliminary injunction

Later, BPI attempted to foreclose a third mortgage This prompted petitioner Leobrera to file a Motion to File Supplemental Complaint

before the trial court on 11 March 1987 A copy of the supplemental complaint was attached therein Said copy indicated that the supplemental complaint had a notice of hearing, but

no time and place of hearing of the motion were specified 12 March 1987: the trial court granted Leobrera's motion 13 March 1987:

it was only at this point that a copy of the Motion to File Supplemental Complaint was received by BPI, through registered mail

the TC order granting Leobrera's motion was served upon BPI

BPI filed a motion to set aside the 12 March 1987 order, but the same was denied by the TC on 31 March 1987

BPI then filed a PfC and Prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction before the CA Sought to annul the TC's decision and asked that the latter be prohibited from hearing

the petition for injunction prayed for in the supplemental complaint The CA granted the petition

Leobrera thus filed the instant PfRC

Issue: W/N the CA erred in stating that the Motion to File Supplemental Complaint filed by Leobrera was defective for lack of notice of hearing

Decision/Ratio: NO Rule 10, Sec. 6: “Section 6. Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. - Upon motion of a

party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party should plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.

CAB:

The requirement of 'reasonable notice' was not fulfilled: BPI had only learned of the Motion on 13 March 1987, yet the order granting the motion was issued on 12 March 1987

Neither was the requirement of 'specifying the time therefor' fulfilled: the notice of hearing was invalid due to there being no time and place of hearing specified therein

There is therefore clear arbitrariness on the part of the TC which granted Leobrera's Motion to File Supplemental Complaint despite his failure to act according to procedure

Hence, the CA did in stating that the Motion to File Supplemental Complaint filed by Leobrera was defective for lack of notice of hearing

G.R. No. L-32162 September 28, 1984

THE PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, petitioners-appellants, vs.THE CFI of Manila and VICENTE DAVID ISIP, respondents-appellees

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, presided by Honorable Judge Jose L. Moya, denying the motion for reconsideration and the enforcement of the writ of execution and the issuance of garnishment by taking possession of the amount of 600k Php from the deposits of the Pasay City Gov’t in tPhil. Nat’l bank and delivering them to plaintiff

Respondent-appellee V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates represented by Vicente David Isip entered into a contract with the City of Pasay represented by the then Mayor Pablo Cuneta

The contract entitled "Contract and Agreement" was for the construction of a new Pasay City Hall

o Pursuant to the aforesaid contract, the respondent-appellee proceeded with the construction of the new Pasay City Hall building

o The respondent-appellee accomplished under various stages of construction the amount of work (including supplies and materials) equivalent to an estimated value of 1.7M Php of the total contract price of 4.9 M Php

o The appellants paid only the total amount of 1.1M Php to the respondent-appellee

Notwithstanding demands for payment thereof, the petitioner-appellants failed to remit the aforesaid amount of 600k Php to the respondent-appellee

Respondent appellee filed an action for specific performance with damages against herein petitioners-appellants before the respondent Court

The appellants filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint and for bill of particulars.

o This was denied by the respondent Court

The appellants later filed a motion for reconsiderationo This was likewise denied

The appellants filed their answer

The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement which was submitted to the Municipal Board of Pasay City for its consideration

Protracted pre-trial hearings and conferences were held where the respondent Court suggested and advised that "under the principle of quantum meruit, the plaintiff is

forthwith entitled to at least that which is due to him for defendants under the contract and that public interest must perforce require the continuity of construction

Municipal Board of Pasay enacted Ordinance No. 1012 which approved the Compromise Agreement and also authorized and empowered the incumbent City Mayor Jovito Claudio to represent the appellant Pasay City Government, subject to the final approval of the respondent Court herein

Respondent Court approved the said Compromise Agreement including a Manifestation and Addendum thereto

o Requiring plaintiff contractor to submit and file a new performance bond

The appellants filed an urgent motion seeking a declaration of legality of the original contract and agreement from the respondent Court

o the respondent Court issued an order declaring that the original contract is legal and valid

At the instance of the appellee, the respondent Court granted an order of execution pursuant to which a writ of execution was issued

An application for and notice of garnishment were made and effected upon the funds of appellant Pasay City Government with the Philippine National Bank

The appellant filed an urgent motion to set aside the respondent Court's order and to quash the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto

The respondent Court issued an order stating that inasmuch as the defendant has not yet paid the plaintiff as of this date then "the writ of execution and of garnishment are declared to be again in full force and effect ..."

The appellants filed a motion for reconsiderationo respondent Court denied and rejected the appellants' motion for reconsiderationo respondent Court ordered the enforcement of the garnishment already issued to the

City Sheriff for Pasay by taking possession of the amount of P613,096.00 from the deposits of appellant Pasay City Government with the Philippine National Bank

Respondent Court issued an order increasing the performance bond to 100k Php to make it equal to the cost of the nextstage of construction

The appellants Med (exact word from the case) their notice of appeal from the orders of the respondent Court

The appellants filed their manifestation and petition to suspend the writ of execution and garnishment

The appellants filed their manifestation and withdrawal of notice of appealo respondent Court approved said withdrawal

The appellants filed an amended notice of appeal and a record on appeal which were duly approved as per order of the respondent Court

The plaintiff, Vicente David Isip, in the original complaint for specific performance filed an urgent motion for permit to serve a supplemental complaint

o seeking rescission of the original contract titled Contract and Agreement and of the Compromise Agreement

o claiming damages in the sum of P672,653.91 alleging the violations of the defendants specially the Pasay City Government in complying with its obligations incumbent upon it in the compromise

Supreme Court resolved to require the petitioner-appellants to file a petition for review on certiorari

The defendants filed their cautionary answer to the supplemental complaint alleging that:o the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the present supplemental complainto the cause of action is already barred by prior judgmento the principle of res judicata applieso plaintiff's supplemental complaint states no cause of action and that the present

claim of plaintiff has been paid, waived, abandoned and extinguished

The appellants filed their petition for review on certiorari o This was denied for lack of merit by the Supreme Court

The respondent Court set for pre-trial the supplemental complaint

The Supreme Court granted the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and their petition for review on certiorari was given due course

The appellees filed their brief praying that the petition for review on certiorari be dismissed since the issues involved in the supplemental complaint are prejudicial to the present petition for review

The appellants filed their manifestation and petition alleging that the supplemental complaint is not prejudicial to the present petition for review

Hence, this petition

Issue: W/N respondent Court erred in entertaining the supplemental complaintHeld: YesHaving established that the compromise agreement was final and immediately executory, and in fact was already enforced, the respondent Court was in error when it still entertained the supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the respondent Court had no more jurisdiction over the subject matter. When a decision has become final and executory, the court no longer has the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, and its only power thereof is to order its execution After the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment and cannot vacate the sameMoreover, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter Here, the respondent-appellee originally asked for specific performance which was later settled through a compromise agreement. After this, the respondent-appellee asked for rescission of both the contract and agreement and the compromise agreement using a supplemental complaint. It is clear that the supplemental complaint We have before Us is not only to "supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading but is also meant as an entirely new "substitute" to the latter. A supplemental complaint must be consistent with and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the original complaint and a new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such complaint, especially where judgment has already been obtained by him in the original action

Torres v. CA

- PFROC, treated as a special civil action, praying that the judgment rendered by the CA and the Resolution denying the MR and Petition for New Trial be set aside

- Margarita Torres cohabited Leon Arbole w/o the benefit of marriageo Petitioner Macaria Torres was born on 20 June 1898

- Mother died on20 Dec 1931; Father died on 14 Sept 1933- 13 Dec 1910 – The Government issued to Margarita a Sale Certificate payable in 20

installmentso Last installment was on 17 Dec 1936, 3 years after Arbole’s death

- 25 Aug 1933 – Arbole sold and transferred all his rights and interests to the ½ portion of Lot 551 in favor of Petitioner

- 6 June 1953 – Vicente Santillan, legitimate child of Margarita, executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name

- 7 Nov 1957 – The Bureau of Lands issued the patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita

- 3 June 1954 – Respondents filed a complaint against Petitioner for Forcible Entry with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that Petitioner had entered a portion of Lot 551 without their consent, constructed a house and refused to vacate on demand

- The ejectment case was decided against Petitioner and then, the latter appealed to the CFI of Cavite

- 8 June 1954 – Petitioner instituted an Action for Partition of Lot 551 before the CFI of Cavite alleging that she is a legitimate child of Margarita Torres; Respondents averred that they are the only heirs and that the complaint for partition be dismissed

- 20 Nov 1958 – The Ejectment Case and Partition Case were jointly triedo Lot 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita

2/3 to Respondents 1/3 to Petitioner

- Petitioner moved for its Reconsideration- 7 Aug 1963 – CFI of Cavite granted the Reconsideration

o Macaria Torres as a legitimate childo Lot 551 is a conjugal propertyo 4/6 to Macariao 2/6 to the other heirs

- Respondents appealed- 2 April 1973 –CA rendered a judgment

o Macaria Torres is not a legitimate childo Lot 551 is a conjugal propertyo ½ to Macariao ½ to the other heirs

- 16 April 1973 – Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trialo A notarial document, dated 5 March 1930, was presented by Petitioner arguing that

it was found only later as it was allegedly found among the belongings of Vicente, alleging that the latter may have tried to suppress

o Respondents argued against new trial, arguing that it is not newly discovered evidence which could not have been produced during trial by the exercise of due diligence

- 24 Aug 1973 – Denied both Motions

Issue: W/N the CA overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente Santillan and the Respondents that Macaria and Vicente are siblings with their common mother, Margarita

Held: No- Without taking account of the notarial document, she cannot be considered a legitimate

childo Continuous possession of the status of a natural child will not amount to automatic

recognition but that an action for compulsory recognition is necessary; Hence, Petitioner refers to Par. 3 of Respondent’s original complaint in the Ejectment Case

“The plaintiffs and the defendants Macaria Torres are the legal heirs...”- Petitioner then avers that the statement is an admission of her legitimation and is

controlling- However, in the Amended Complaint filed by the Respondents, the said portion referred to

by the Petitioner was deleted- In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The Original is

regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The Original complaint no longer forms part of the record

- If Petitioner had desired to utilize the Original complaint, she should have offered it in evidence

- Having been amended, the Original Complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, requires its formal offer

- Therefore, there can be no estoppels by extrajudicial admission made in the Original Complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence

- It should also be noted that in the Partition Case, Respondents denied the legitimacy of the Petitioner

- However, it is the Court’s view that the notarial document can reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence as per Petitioner’s allegation (that the document was allegedly suppressed)

- The case is hereby REMANDED to the Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial

[G.R. Nos. 119511-13. November 24, 1998]WILFREDO P. VERZOSA and PILAR MARTINEZ, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

NICODEMO FERRER, and FE GIRON USON, Respondents

Petition for Review seeking to set aside the consolidated January 31, 1994 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals

Fe Giron Uson mortgaged his land to Wilfredo Verzosa

Fe Uson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the latter to have the mortgage foreclosed

To prevent the foreclosure sale from taking place, Uson filed with the RTC a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial Sheriff for annulment of mortgage

Masongsong made several demands but Memita failed to pay

defendant Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by

plaintiff Fe Uson

Fe Uson filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the court

Fe Uson then filed her amended complaint which bears the proper verification

Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure of mortgage

Uson, through counsel, wrote the Provincial Sheriff requesting him to discontinue the foreclosure sale in deference to the said pending case

foreclosure sale was conducted and property was sold to Verzosa being the highest bidder

RTC issued an order admitting the amended complaint of Fe Uson

TCT was issued in the name of Verzosa who sold the land to Pilar Martinez thereafter

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court

Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additional defendants the Register of Deeds and Pilar Martinez and praying, among others, the annulment of the latters title

upon Uson’s application for preliminary injunction embodied in her Second Amended Complaint, respondent court issued an order directing the latter to cease and desist from entering, making constructions and performing any act of possession or ownership over the land

after hearing and upon posting of a bond by Uson, respondent Judge issued an order directing defendants Verzosa and Martinez and/or any and other persons acting under their command to desist and cease from entering, intruding and making constructions on the land

Verzosa filed a motion for clarification of the order Lower court issued an order to the effect that the status quo being maintained

is the possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land and that such status quo does not refer to defendant Pilar Martinez being the registered owner of T.C.T. No. 11107

Court of Appeals held that the last peaceable uncontested status that preceded the controversy was that point when private respondent Fe Uson was the registered owner of the land in dispute

Petitioners insist that the status quo refers to the point when Pilar Martinez was already the owner of the property, having purchased it from Verzosa

Petitioners further contend that the controversy started only when the Amended Complaint was filed, because the previous Complaints were expunged from the records

He argued that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original and that the original pleading is deemed abandoned when it is amended

ISSUE: What constitutes the status quo ante in the application of an injunctive writ, in the event a complaint is subsequently amended?

HELD: Although the Complaint was subsequently amended, the controversy began when the first Complaint was filed

The status quo is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ

when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint.

for demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed to have commenced upon the filing of such original complaint.

for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or demand

an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint but before service of amendment

when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint. I

for demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed to have commenced upon the filing of such original complaint.

for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or demand.

an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint but before service of amendment

It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission of the amended

the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different cause of action or demand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter to implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa

MAGASPI vs. RAMOLETE*okay guys, this case is just about the 2 parties arguing about the freagin

docket fee. Quite lengthy, sorry, but I feel that I have to include just in case dean asks for little details. Basta, they’re all arguing about how the docket fee should be calculated. Also, they’re questioning if the 1st docket fee that has been paid is enough to say that the case “has been filed”. Ganito lang yung drama nung case. Sorry.

This is a petition for certiorari to review the actuations of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case No.R-11882 in respect of the correct amount to be paid for the filing of the case as provided in Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

September 16, 1970, petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages against The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. and/or The Shell Refining Co. (Phil.) Inc., Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings & Loan Association in the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

Upon filing and the payment of P60.00 as docketing fee and P10.00 for sheriff fees, the complaint was assigned Civil Case No. R11882.

The complaint contains the following:o Declare TCT issued in the name of the Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc.

as null and void and hence of no legal effect;o Declare the plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Sps. Magaspi as owners of the land in

question;o Order the RD of Cebu to cancel TCT and issue a neew one under the name of the

plaintiffs;o For the defendants to pay the plaintiffs damages.

September 18, 1970, Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings and Loan Assn. filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs to pay the correct amount for docket fee.

The motion reads: o The complaint of the plaintiffs contains or states two, if not three alternative causes

of action: Reconveyance of real property. If the plaintiffs are unable to have the property reconveyed and the title

cancelled, having passed to an innocent purchaser for value, their recourse would be for damages, i.e., recovery of the value of the land and other damages.

Cancellation of Titles.o Further, until such time as the correct docket fee is paid, the time for filing of

responsive pleadings by the defendants be suspended.

The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) who claimed that the main cause of action was the recovery of a piece of land and on the basis of its assessed valued, P60.00 was the correct docketing fee and that although the Revised Rules of Court do not exclude damages in the computation of the docket fee, damages are nonetheless still to be excluded.

October 5, 1970, the presiding judge ordered the Clerk of Court to comment on the motion and the opposition. The following comment was submitted:

o That in the matter of fixing the amount of fees that shall be collected by the Clerks of Court of First Instance for the filing of an action or proceeding, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

o If the case concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof shall be considered in computing the fees.

In case the value of the property or estate of the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.

o That a reading of the complaint in this case would show that the action is not only for recovery of property but also for actual and moral damages as well as for attorney's fees;

o Accordingly, the correct amount of the legal fees for the filing of this case should be fixed at P3,164.00 plus P2.00 Legal Research fee;

October 14, 1970, Judge Mateo Canonoy issued the following order: o This is a motion of the defendants to order the plaintiffs to pay a filing fee of

P6,730.00 on the ground that the total demand of the said plaintiffs should be the

basis for computing the filing fee and not the value of the land alone. The plaintiffs paid the amount of P60.00 as filing fee in this case.

o The damages are not merely incidental or ancillary but are principal demands. Besides, Rule 141, Sec. 5 (a) of the new Rules of Court no longer excludes damages, like interest, from computing the filing fees.

o The exclusion of damages from the exemption in the computation of the filing fees in the new Rules of Court is intentional, since oftentimes, as in the present case, the claim for damages far exceeds the value of the land. To thus exempt the plaintiffs from paying the filing fee for damages is against reason. Besides, in determining the jurisdiction of the court, the amount of damages claimed is taken into account.

o The Court hereby overrules the opposition of the plaintiffs and orders them to pay an additional sum of P3,104.00 as filing fees.

October 19, 1970, the Shell companies filed their respective answers. October 23, 1970, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed another

manifestation stating that an additional sum of P1,000 be imposed in accordance with the ROC.

November 3, 1970, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint so as to include the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant.

The amended complaint still sought the return of the lot in question but the pecuniary claim was limited to the extent that the Government of the RP is except from the joint and solidary liability of paying damages.

November 12, 1970, the defendants (herein respondents filed an opposition to the admission of the amended complaint. They based their opposition on the following grounds:

o That while the only reason given for the amendment of the complaint is the inclusion of the Government of the Philippines as an indispensable party; the plaintiffs have taken the improper liberty of amending portions of the allegations in the complaint and even has eliminated entire paragraph;

o That these amendments are obviously intended to circumvent, it not entirely subvert, the lawful Order of this Honorable Court for the plaintiff to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as docket fee, on the basis of the total amount claimed for damages (plus Pl,000.00 docket fee on the P500,000.00 exemplary damages, pending resolution before this Honorable Court);

November 16, 1970, Judge Canonoy admitted the amended complaint although the plaintiffs had not yet complied with his Order of October 14, 1970, that they should pay an additional P3,104.00 docket fee.

December 2, 1970, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed the motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs do not pay the proper docket fee within 7days as ordered by the court.

The above motion was opposed by the plaintiffs on the ground that the amended complaint which had been admitted by the court had replaced the original complaint.

February 12, 1971, the Republic filed its answer to the amended complaint and the plaintiffs filed a reply on February 23, 1971.

March 13, 1971, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed a petition to have their motion of December 2, 1970, resolved by the court.

April 3, 1971, Judge Jose R. Ramolete who had replaced Judge Canonoy issued the following order:

o It is a rule that the correct docket fee must be paid before the Court will act on the petition or complaint. The Court of Justice is not called upon to act on a complaint or a petition in the absence of payment of a corresponding docket fee. Before the payment of the docket fee, the case is not deemed registered and docketed.

o The original complaint, up to the present, is not deemed registered or docketed. It follows, therefore, that there is likewise no amended complaint deemed to have been filed and admitted.

The petitioners assail the above order. They insist that they had correctly paid the docketing fee in the amount of P60.00, or in the alternative, that if they are to pay an additional docketing fee, it should be based on the amended complaint.

For initial determination is the question as to The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee

regardless of the actual date of its filing in court., (Malimit vs. Degamo, No. L-17850, Nov. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 450, 120 Phil. 1247; Lee vs. Republic, L-15027, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65.)

Is the case at bar covered by the above rule? It is not because the question posed in the Malimit and Lee cases was the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee whereas the case at bar has no reference to the time of payment but concerns the amount that has to be paid.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Civil Case No. 11882 may be considered as having been filed and docketed when P60.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court even on the assumption that said payment was not sufficient in amount.

HELD:

The petition is granted. The petitioners shall be assessed a docket fee on the basis of the amended complaint; and after all of the lawful fees shall have been paid, the proceedings in Civil Case No. R-11882 shall be resumed. No special pronouncement as to costs.

RATIO:

The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.

Is the case at bar covered by the above rule? It is not because the question posed in the Malimit and Lee cases was the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee whereas the case at bar has no reference to the time of payment but concerns the amount that has to be paid.

The case at bar can be distinguished from the Lazaro case in at least two respects, namely: (a) The Lazaro case involved the timeliness of the perfection of the appeal which was made to depend in turn on the timeliness of the full payment of the docket fee whereas the instant case does not involve an appeal nor the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee; and (b) in the Lazaro case, the amount (P8.00) which was initially paid was palpably inadequate, whereas in the case at bar there is an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee.

The Garcia case, supra, appears to favor the petitioners. In that case, a will was sought to be probated in Special Proceeding No. 62818. Docket fees amounting to P940.00 were paid. Later, a second will was sought to be probated in the same special proceeding. This Court held that there was no need to pay a separate docket fee because the probate of the second will was not sought in another proceeding.

We hold that under the circusmtances, Civil Case No. R. 11882 was docketed upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount is insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular.

The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid as docket fee. Judge Canonoy on October 14, 1970, ordered the payment of P3,104.00 as additional docket fee

based on the original complaint. However, the petitioners assert as an alternative view, that the docket fee be based on the amended complaint which was admitted on November 14, 1970, also by Judge Canonoy.

The petitioners have a point. "When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on the amended pleading only. "

On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be paid by the petitioners should be based on their amended complaint.

MWSS vs. CA and The City of Dagupan (1986)

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the CFI Pangasinan

NOTES before the case (I feel that the court was so full of it, so now, may sermon before you read the case ) – this is important when we reach appeals - KARA

- Before proceeding further, it may be necessary to invite attention to the common error of joining the court (be it a Regional Trial Court, the Intermediate Appellate Court, or the Sandiganbayan) as a party respondent in an appeal by certiorari to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

- The only parties in an appeal by certiorari are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent.

o The court which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal.

- It is in the special civil action of certiorari under Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or respondent.

- The joinder of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan as party respondent in an appeal by certiorari is necessary in cases where the petitioner-appellant claims that said court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

- The petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and the joinder of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan becomes necessary.

FACTS: - The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against NAWASA, now MWSS for recovery of

ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA argues that RA 1383 vested upon it ownership, possession and control of all waterworks systems and has made some necessary expenses

- The TC rendered judgment in favor of the CITYo It found that NAWASA was a possessor in bad faith, and is not entitled for the

reimbursement of expenses that it claims- NAWASA appealed to the CA and argues that the CITY should be liable for the amortization

of the balance of the loan secured by NAWASA for the improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System

o CA affirmed the TC decision The useful expenses were made in bad faith NAWASA, Builder in BF, therefore not entitled to indemnity

No right whatsoever to claim anything- MWSS, as successor-in-interest of NAWASA appealed to the CA

o W/N it has the right to remove all the useful improvements notwithstanding that NAWASA was a possessor in BF

- The CITY argues that the rulings in the cases cited by the petitioner are not applicable because such improvements WERE NOT ACTUALLY IDENTIFIED

o Therefore, there should be a rehearing o That such improvement, even if they could be identified, could not be separated

without causing substantial injury or damage to the Dagupan Waterworks System.- THE COURT – The CITY is correct, NAWASA should have alleged its additional

counterclaim in the alternative, for the reimbursement of the expenses it incurred

o MWSS argues that such issue of removal was never pleaded as a counterclaim It was joined with the implied consent of the CITY because it never filed a

counter-manifestation or objection to petitioners manifestation wherein it stated that the improvements were separable from the system

MWSS quotes Section 5, Rule 101

ISSUE: Whether or not NAWASA is correct in saying that the CITY gave an implied consent, that the improvements were indeed SEPARABLE from the system?

HELD: No.

- This argument is untenable because the above-quoted provision is premised on the fact that evidence had been introduced on an issue not raised by the pleadings without any objection thereto being raised by the adverse party. In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever had been introduced by petitioner on the issue of removability of the improvements and the case was decided on a stipulation of facts. Consequently, the pleadings could not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence.

- The Court set aside the procedural aspect and looked at substantive lawo A possessor in BF does not have the right to remove useful improvements

(remember your property law)o As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made

without right to indemnityo Article 546 NCC, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful

expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed;o Article 547 only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this

can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession

NORTHERN CEMENT CORPORATION V IACGR NO. L-68636, 1988

Nature of Action: Appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Facts:

1 SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.-When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or

implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. ...

In connection with its exportation of cement, NCC contracted the arrastre, stevedoring and other related services of Shipside. The understanding was that for the latter's "integrated services," the former would pay it at the fixed rate of P0.41 per bag of cement, which amount was, after Shipside had started rendering its services, later increased to P0.46 by agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Shipside advised NCC of another increase in this rate and billed it accordingly, as well as for "regular and overtime stand-by, lighting, equipment rental, gears, empty bags, and other charges. NCC apparently acceded to the new arrangement but about two years later questioned this billing, contending that the agreed integrated rate of P0.46 covered all the services rendered by Shipside and that such rate could not be increased unilaterally. Shipside said that only arrastre and stevedoring services were included; all other services were subject to separate billings; and, moreover, NCC had not earlier objected to the billing. In the end, as no agreement could be reached, Shipside flied its complaint for collection of the amount allegedly due from NCC. NCC's argument is that it had never accepted the unilateral increase of the said fee and the other fees billed by Shipside beyond the charges for arrastre and stevedoring services. To the contention that it never protested the billing, NCC has a rather quaint explanation, to say the least. First, it says it continued availing itself of the services of Shipside despite such billing because it had no choice as Shipside had a monopoly of such services in the region. Second, it says it did not object to the billing because it was not really a demand for payment but a mere request it could ignore. In any event, the records show that the increase in the rates was communicated to NCC on August 12, 1974, and the billing based on these rates was made initially on September 13, 1974It would have been so easy for NCC to manifest its objection to the increased billing, but it did not. It was silent for almost two years and until shortly before the suit against it was filed by Shipside. Shipside, for its part, continued rendering its services to NCC, believing that the latter, by its failure to object to the billing, had accepted the same. It is contended that the respondent court erred in limiting the refund to the amount specified by the petitioner in its counterclaim. The trial court had allowed the refund in the sum of P526,280.53 on the justification that this had been established by the evidence adduced at the trial. On appeal, however, the respondent court reversed, holding that this refund should be limited to the sum of P31,652.62, which was the amount claimed in the counterclaim.

Issue: WON the TC acted with GAD in allowing the counterclaim without amending the pleadings?

Held: No.

It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the abovementioned rule and in light of the decisions cited, the trial court should not be precluded from awarding an amount higher than that claimed in the pleadings notwithstanding the absence of the required amendment. But this is upon the condition that the evidence of such higher amount has been presented properly, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to support their respective contentions and to refute each other's evidence. We find in the case at bar that there was a failure of the above-stated condition. The record discloses that although NCC was allowed to adduce evidence in support of its claim for refund beyond the amount indicated in its counterclaim, Shipside's rebuttal evidence was practically brushed aside on the ground that it was not permitted by the stipulation of facts earlier entered into by the parties, besides being hearsay and self-serving. This was not consistent with due process and therefore vitiated the findings of the trial court based on the unilateral assertions of the petitioner.

Valenzuela vs CA

In resolving the propriety of the amendment of the complaint in the present case, which motion to amend was filed after the lapse of fifteen years from the filing of the initiatory pleading sought to be amended, this Court painstakingly considered not only the peculiar circumstances obtaining, but also accorded premium to the legal truism that "adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law" and that the rules of procedure must not be perverted into engines of injustice.1

Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the decision2 of the Court of, which nullified and set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 231. The subject orders of the RTC denied private respondents' motion to admit amended complaint.

Facts: Herein private respondents spouses Manuel and Leticia De Guia filed a complaint for

specific performance and damages (Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P from now on Civil Case A) against herein petitioners spouses Jovito and Norma Valenzuela before the then CFI of Rizal in Pasay City. The complaint prayed that the Spouses Valenzuela be ordered to execute in favor of private respondents the necessary deed of sale covering the two (2) parcels of land allegedly subject of a contract to sell between said parties.

Private respondents spouses De Guia, upon discovering that the subject real properties were sold and transferred by the spouses Valenzuela to herein co-petitioners spouses Alfredo and Bella Gonzales Quiazon, filed for annulment of sale, cancellation of title and damages (Civil Case No. PQ 9432-P from now on Civil Case B), against spouses Valenzuela, spouses Quiazon, and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City.

In the complaint, private respondents spouses De Guia prayed specifically for the annulment of the deed of sale executed by the spouses Valenzuela in favor of the spouses Quiazon, cancellation of TCT Nos. 39396 and 39397 in the name of spouses Quiazon, and the reinstatement of TCT No. 39142 in the name of the spouses Valenzuela, or in the alternative, the reconveyance of the subject properties by the spouses Quiazon to spouses Valenzuela.

Private respondents spouses De Guia amended their complaint in Civil Case B, impleading Webb-Hegg Construction Resources, Inc. as additional defendant.

Spouses De Guia filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case B, impleading as additional defendant Gerardo Villacorta. Prior to the resolution of such pending motion, Civil Case B was transferred to the RTC of Makati, Branch 133 pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129. As a result, Civil Case No. B was redocketed as Civil Case No. 2723 (From now on still Civil Case B).

The RTC of Makati, Branch 133 issued an order admitting the second amended complaint. Upon motion of the defendants therein, however, Civil Case B was returned to RTC-Pasay,

where herein private respondents spouses De Guia filed a motion to admit third amended complaint seeking to implead spouses De Guzman, De Guzman Development Corporation, Skyfreight Brokerage, Inc. and Lawyer Romeo Bobadilla, as additional defendants.

The RTC-Pasay issued an omnibus order7 denying the motion to admit the third amended complaint and declaring as automatically vacated the order of RTC-Makati, Branch 133, which admitted the second amended complaint.

Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, private respondents spouses De Guia then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the appellate court which was also dismissed.

Private respondents spouses De Guia appealed the dismissal of said case before the Court of Appeals.

The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the lower court. Aggrieved, private respondents spouses De Guia filed a petition before the Supreme Court

assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. The High Court dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Private respondents moved to reconsider. The motion was denied.

Upon motion of spouses Quiazon in Civil Case A and B, the lower court issued an order directing the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens and the Adverse Claim on two TCTs in the name of spouses Quiazon.

Private respondents sought to reconsider the trial court's order and filed a motion to admit another amended complaint in Civil Case A.

Prior to the resolution of the two pending motions, private respondents filed a motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge of Branch 117, RTC-Pasay.

The court granted the motion for inhibition resulting in the re-raffle of Civil Case A to Branch 231, presided by Judge Cesar Z. Ylagan.

Judge Ylagan denied the motion to admit amended complaint prompting herein private respondents spouses De Guia to file a motion for reconsideration which the lower court denied.

Private respondents elevated the lower court's order denying the motion to admit amended complaint to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus, and ordered respondent to admit petitioners’ amended complaint.

The RTC-Pasay, Branch 231 issued an order8 admitting the amended complaint. Herein petitioners filed with the lower court a manifestation with motion to reconsider9 to

the effect that they would file a "petition for review on certiorari" before the Supreme Court, to which manifestation private respondents filed an opposition. Petitioners then filed a reply to the opposition.

The lower court decreed "that the admission of the amended complaint and service of summons are hereby held in abeyance until after the Supreme Court has resolved the case before it which has effectively placed this court on notice."

Herein petitioners filed the instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the propriety of the amendment of the complaint in Civil Case A.

Issue:(a) Whether or not the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure can be applied retroactively?(b) Whether or not the amendments can be introduced?

Held: Yes to both.

Ratio:(a)Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from procedural laws.

(b)Section 1, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides:"SECTION 1. Amendment in general. - Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner." (emphasis ours)Equally important is Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules:"SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard."The contention of the petitioners that the introduction of the amendments would radically change the cause of action is untenable. Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure11 amended the former rule12 in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense."13 This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and

prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure, after all, are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the Supreme Court is empowered to suspend their operation.15 This Court will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.True enough, the delay that has so characterized the adjudication of the merits of this case — which original complaint was filed practically two decades ago — has not escaped the attention of this Court. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court allows the introduction of amendments to the complaint so as to afford the party-litigants the full and genuine opportunity to substantiate their respective claims and defenses and for the trial court to finally resolve the matters relating to the merits of the case.Besides, the defendants sought to be impleaded in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P are not left without justifiable recourse. To this end, the law in no uncertain terms provide for the necessary legal implements and the adoption of effective means and defenses sanctioned by the Rules, wherein both parties in the controversy may very well advance and protect their respective legal interests. By sanctioning the introduction of amendments to the complaint, the issues shall at last be viewed, so to speak, in the clear light of day and substantial matters therein shall not anymore be lost in the abyss of technicalities and procedural jargon.Petition is Granted

G.R. No. 169551             January 24, 2007SPOUSES ORLANDO M. LAMBINO and CARMELITA C. LAMBINO, Petitioners,vs.HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 172, Valenzuela City, and BPI FAMILY BANK, Respondents.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The CA affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, which denied the motion of petitioners to admit the supplemental complaint.

On July 21, 1994, petitioners Orlando M. Lambino, a lawyer, and his wife, Carmelita C. Lambino, secured a housing loan of P600,000.00 from private respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI). Petitioners executed a Mortgage Loan Agreement (MLA) over their property as security for the loan.

Petitioners failed to pay the monthly amortizations from January 15, 1995 to May 15, 1995. On May 22, 1995, private respondent filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the MLA with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On June 26, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the MLA. They alleged therein that private respondent had released only P555,047.19 on a staggered basis out of their P600,000.00 loan. The court issued a TRO and the sale at public auction was reset.

April 16, 1996, petitioners offered to settle the balance of their loan. However, private respondent rejected the offer.

In the meantime, the court suspended pretrial to enable the parties to settle the matter amicably. The pretrial proceeding was terminated on July 23, 1998.

On July 10, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint wherein they alleged the following:

The plaintiffs were forced to litigate due to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage filed by defendant bank and unlawful imposition of escalating and arbitrary rate of

interest without the consent of the plaintiffs and not authorized under the Real Estate Mortgage Contract

The unauthorized deductions and advance interest charges were known by plaintiffs only for the first time at the Pre-Trial Brief of defendants.

Aside from the unauthorized deductions and advance interest payment made, defendant bank also imposed escalating and arbitrary rate of interest.

On August 11, 2000, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion of petitioners in its finding that the alleged escalating and arbitrary rate of interest and other charges imposed by private respondent had accrued long before the complaint was filed. It held that under Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, only transactions, occurrences, or events which accrued after the date of the complaint may be set forth in the supplemental complaint.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. January 2, 2001, the court issued an Order denying the motion of petitioners.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to nullify the Orders of the RTC. Petitioners reiterated that they came to know of the escalating and arbitrary charges, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees only when they received the statements of account dated June 5, 1996, November 15, 1996, and August 15, 1998, after the filing of their original complaint; hence, they could not have been alleged as an integral part of their causes of action in their original complaint.

On March 7, 2005, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition.

W/N the petitioner’s Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint can be granted?

SC = No.

The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court is Section 6 of Rule 10 which reads:

Sec. 6: Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. – Upon motion of a party, the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.

The rule is a useful device which enables the court to award complete relief in one action and to avoid the cost delay and waste of separate action. A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter.

The supplemental complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action.

Before they filed their original complaint, petitioners were already aware of the deductions made on the proceeds of the loan, for interest charges, MRI premium, and fire insurance premium in the total amount of P44,952.88. They received notices on the following dates: July 25, 1994, September 5, 1994, October 24, 1994, and November 15, 1994. And because petitioners had alleged all these charges in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure sale, it behooved petitioners to have incorporated in their original complaint as a cause of action the alleged "illegal/unauthorized and unconscionable" charges for MRI, escalating interest charges, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and foreclosure expenses. They should have sought to

nullify such charges in the original complaint, but they did not. They are thus proscribed from incorporating the same via a supplemental complaint.

Philippine Ports Authority v. William Gothong & ABoitiz (WG&A), Inc.

Facts:This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Philippine Ports Authority (petitioner) seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 24, 2002 and its Resolution dated May 15, 2003.

WGA requested PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the Marine Slip Way in the North Harbor.

Pres. Estrada approved the request to lease from Jan 1 to Jun 30, 2001 or until such time that PPA turns over its operations to the winning bidder for the North Harbor Modernization Project.

Believeing that the said lease already expired on Jun 30, 2001, PPA sent WGA a letter directing the latter to vacate the contested premises not later than November 30, 2001 and to turnover the improvements made therein pursuant to the terms and conditions agreed upon in the contract.

In response, WGA wrote PPA urging the latter to reconsider its decision to eject the former. Said request was denied by the PPA.

Petitioner WG&A commenced an Injunction suit before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner WG&A amended its complaint for the first time. The complaint was still

denominated as one for Injunction with prayer for TRO. In the said amended pleading, the petitioner incorporated statements to the effect that PPA is already estopped from denying that the correct period of lease is until such time that the North Harbor Modernization Project has been bidded out to and operations turned over to the winning bidder.

TRO was denied by court. Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Attached Second Amended Complaint. It included

as its fourth cause of action and additional relief in its prayer, the reformation of the contract as it failed to express or embody the true intent of the contracting parties.

The admission of the second amended complaint met strong opposition from the respondent PPA. It postulated that the reformation sought for by the petitioner constituted substantial amendment, which if granted, will substantially alter the latter's cause of action and theory of the case.

Court denied admission of Second Amended Complaint. Petitioner filed a MR but the same was denied.

WGA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the nullification of the RTC orders.

CA granted petition. MR filed was subsequently denied.

Issue:W/N the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the admission of the second amended complaint

Held:NO.

Ratio: Note: Old rule provides that substantial amendments may be made only upon leave

of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered.

The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus: Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or

that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

CIVIL PROCEDUREDigest #15 (Rule 11 When to file responsive Pleadings)

Martha Rose C. Serrano

Delbros Hotel Corporation v IAC

Petitioner: DELBROS HOTEL CORPORATION Respondents: IAC, HILTON INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, RICHARD CHAPMAN, FLAVIANO

MOSQUERA, JR.

Facts: Petition for certiorari on the resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Feb. 27, 1985. Delbros filed a complaint for termination of agreement and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against private respondents Hilton.

In their Management Agreement, Delbros will financed, built, furnished and equipped a first-class hotel and the operation and management of which was granted to Hilton.

Delbros alleged that Hilton refused to remit their share of the gross profit as stipulated in their agreement.

In their Answer with compulsory counterclaim, Hilton said that Delbros has no cause of action and that their claims had been waived or abandoned.

Mar. 21, 1985. The RTC then issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Hilton and Chapman from disposing, concealing corporate records and stocks, as well as disbursing and transferring funds therefrom.

Hilton went to the IAC on a petition for certiorari assailing the said writ. July 3, 1985, the 3rd Special Cases Division of IAC issued a TRO on the injunction order by the RTC. And on Aug. 21, 1985, the said TRO was then replaced by a writ of preliminary injunction.

Meanwhile, on Apr. 12, 1985, Delbros filed a motion to admit supplemental complaint in which petitioner impleaded an additional defendant, Mosquera. The said motion was granted and a copy of the order was received by Hilton on June 21, 1985. However, the motion for extension to answer supplemental complaint was received by the RTC only on July 16.

The RTC declared Hilton in default upon motion of the petitioner. And on July 15, judgment was rendered in favor of Delbros declaring that the termination of the agreement is valid and to surrender the Hotel to Delbros. A writ of execution was subsequently issued by the trial court on Sept. 3, 1985.

Sept. 4, 1985. Hilton filed a petition for certiorari to assail the writ of execution having issued with grave abuse of discretion. And on Sept 5, the 1st Special Cases Division of the IAC issued a TRO to stop the writ of execution issued by the RTC. Delbros filed a MR but was not acted upon. Then filed this petition arguing that the order was null and void.

Issue:W/N the RTC erred in declaring a party in default for failure to answer a supplemental complaint. YES.

Held:Petition was DISMISSED. The default judgment on July 15, 1985 and the writ of execution on Sept. 3, 1985 were set aside.

Rationale: Default orders are taken on the legal presumption that in failing to file an

answer, the defendant does not oppose the allegations and relief demanded in the complaint. In the case at bar, however, no such presumption can arise as proven by the Answer filed by HILTON and Chapman to the original complaint. Their institution of the certiorari proceedings in opposition to petitioner's attempt to interfere with and/or take over the control and management of the hotel pendente lite; and their vigorous opposition to the admission of the supplemental complaint under consideration. These factors, of which the trial judge had full knowledge and notice, should have cautioned him from precipitately rendering the default order as well as the default judgment.

"A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading — substitute for the original one. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand, and the issues joined under the original pleading remain as issues to be tried in the action." While it is conceded that there is authority in support of a default judgment being predicated upon defendant's failure to answer a supplemental complaint, the same cannot apply here. The reason is that although in the supplemental complaint, the relief prayed for was altered from termination of the management contract to judicial confirmation of its termination, the basic and principal issue of whether or not

petitioner was entitled to terminate the management contract, remained. As this basic issue had been previously traversed and joined by the Answer filed by HILTON and Chapman, there was no necessity for requiring them to plead further to the Supplemental Complaint. Consequently, the trial judge did not have a legal ground for declaring them in default for such failure to plead.

The Court said that the trial court should have treated the supplemental complaint as an amended complaint, and the original answer thereto as sufficient; or otherwise to have waited for the answer of the newly-impleaded defendant before acting on the motion to declare the original defendants in default and rendering the default judgment, considering that a common cause of action has been asserted against the three defendants, so that the answer of Mosquera, Jr. could inure to the benefit of the original defendants.

Further, no prejudice wouId result to petitioner had the trial judge taken a more prudent and judicious course of action. Acting as the trial judge did, grave, irreparable and serious damage caused to private respondents. Mosquera was not yet declared in default, consequently, any defense set up by him for himself and for the benefit of his co-defendants was rendered practically inutile by the execution of the default judgment.Barraza vs. CamposFACTS: Alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Presiding Judge, spouses-petitioners, through the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court, prayed for the annulment of the latter's judgment by default dated January 29, 1979 rendered against them, as well as his Order declaring them in default dated December 1, 1978 in Civil Case No. Pq-6692-P entitled "Renato Gatchalian, plaintiff, versus Spouses George Barraza and Yolanda Gatchalian, defendants" for damages and injunction filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, BranchPrivate respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on defendants' (petitioners herein) use of plaintiff's (now private respondent) trade name and style of "Gatchalian-The House of Native Lechon and Restaurant",

petitioners were properly served with summons together with the corresponding complaint and annexes thereof.

petitioners as defendants therein filed an "Urgent Ex- Parte Motion" for extension of time of 15 days within which to file an Answer which the Court granted in its Order

Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days, defendants filed through their counsel, Atty, Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a "Motion to Dismiss Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction" which was filed with the Court

The same motion was set for hearingprivate respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default" on

the ground that the defendants failed to file an answer within the reglementary period allowed by the Rules of Court.

the Court finding the reasons stated in the "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default" filed by plaintiff, through counsel to be well-taken, granted said motion and allowed the plaintiff to present evidence exparte

respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of the plaintiff,defendants through counsel moved for the reconsideration of the court's order but

the court denied the said motion.Upon an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution" dated March 29, 1979,

the Court in its Order of April 2, 1979 granted the motion and caused the issuance of a writ of execution.

Defendants filed an "Urgent Omnibus Motion" praying that the Order of the Court declaring the defendants as in default, the proceedings held on the strength thereof and the decision rendered in the case at bar be set aside and that the defendants be given three (3) days from receipt of the corresponding order within which to file their answer in the case at bar.

the Court denied defendants' Omnibus Motion in its Order

ISSUE: whether the Order of respondent Judge dated December 1, 1978 declaring defendants, now the herein petitioners, in default for failure to file their answer within the reglementary period provided by lawHELD: NO. Under the facts of the case at bar, respondent judge had granted petitioners an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer, or up to November 18, 1978. Instead of filing the answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on November 17, 1978, one (1) day before the expiration of the period as extended by the court. This is clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. A motion to dismiss is the usual, proper and ordinary method of testing the legal sufficiency of a complaint.

There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the period within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the extension of time to file the answer as granted by the court.

This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days period but also within "a different period (as) fixed by the court. "

In Simeon Mandae, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Eustaquio Gumarad and Regino Lagundino, defendants and appellees, L-2202, Aug. 31, 1950, 87 Phil. 278, We ruled: "It appearing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the expiration of the period for filing defendants' answer as extended by the court, there was no legal reason for declaring defendants in default. "

Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint must be resolved by the trial court and if the Motion to Dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, petitioners shall file their answer pursuant to Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

Judgment of default was reversed and set aside by SC

SPOUSES GEORGE BARRAZA and YOLANDA GATCHALIAN-BARRAZA, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., Presiding Judge, Br. XXX, CFI-Rizal, Pasay City, 7th Judicial District, and RENATO GATCHALIAN, respondents.

FactsPETITION for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.The petition at bar evolved from a dispute between brother and sister over the use of the business name or style “GATCHALIAN-THE HOUSE OF NATIVE LECHON.”CFIPrivate respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on defendants’ (petitioners herein) use of plaintiff’s (now private respondent) trade name and style of “Gatchalian—The House of Native Lechon and Restaurant”, with prayer for preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance.Petitioners were properly served with summons together with the corresponding complaint and annexes thereof. Petitioners as defendants therein filed an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion” for extension of time of 15 days within which to file an Answer which the Court granted in its order.Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days, defendants filed through their counsel, a “Motion to Dismiss Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction.” Said motion moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds:

That the complaint states no cause of action; That venue is improperly laid; and That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of

action, namely for Infringement of Trade Name before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila.

The same motion was set for hearing, notice thereof served to counsel for the plaintiff and the Clerk of Court.

Private respondent filed an “ExParte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default” on the ground that the defendants failed to file an answer within the reglementary period allowed by the Rules of Court.The Court finding the reasons stated in the “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default” filed by plaintiff, through counsel to be well-taken, granted said motion and allowed the plaintiff to present evidence. The hearing before the commissioner was held whereat plaintiff presented his evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex-parte.Respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of the plaintiff; judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants.

Defendants through counsel moved for the reconsideration of the court’s order declaring defendants in default and of the decision on the ground that:

Defendants were denied of their rights of procedural due process and Defendants were also denied of their day in court.

Plaintiffs opposed the motion for reconsideration. The Court denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration.

Upon an “Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,” the Court in its Order granted the motion and caused the issuance of a writ of execution.Defendants through a new counsel, filed an “Urgent Omnibus Motion” praying that

The Order of the Court declaring the defendants as in default, the proceedings held on the strength thereof and the decision rendered in the case at bar

be set aside and that the defendants be given three (3) days from receipt of the corresponding order within

which to file their answer in the case at bar.

Opposition having been filed by the plaintiff, the Court denied defendants’ Omnibus Motion in its Order.SCDefendants now come before Us on a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to restrain the execution of the decision, particularly the sale of the petitioners’ properties. After hearing to render the preliminary injunction permanent with the annulment of all the proceedings held and conducted by the respondent judge from the declaration of default, the rendition of the decision based thereon, the levy, etc. and enjoining said respondent judge to rule and decide the petitioners’ motion to dismiss or in the alternative, to allow the petitioners to file their answer.IssueWhether the Order of respondent Judge declaring defendants, now the herein petitioners, in default for failure to file their answer within the reglementary period provided by law, was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

RulingThe applicable provisions of the Revised Rules of Court state:

“Rule 11, Section 1. Time to answer.—Within fifteen (15) days after service of summons the defendant shall file his answer and serve a copy thereof upon the plaintiff, unless a different period is filed by the court.

Section 7. Extension of time to plead.—Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these rules.

The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these rules. Rule 16, Section 1. Grounds.—Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds: x x x

Section 4. Time to plead.—If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.

Under the facts of the case at bar, respondent judge had granted petitioners an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer. Instead of filing the answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, one (1) day before the expiration of the period as extended by the court. This is clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Private respondents’ argument that although a motion to dismiss interrupts the running of the period within which to file an answer, this refers to the original period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the responsive pleading and not to the extension of time within which to file the answer, is without merit. There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the period within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the extension of time to file the answer as granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days period but also within “a different period (as) fixed by the court.”Without resolving petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, respondent Judge declared defendant in default in his Order. This is clearly in contravention of the Rules for under Section 3, Rule 16, and the court after hearing may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable. And it is only from the time that the movant receives notice of the denial or deferment of the motion to dismiss that the period within which he shall file his answer is computed, which period is prescribed by Rule 11, unless the court provides a different period.

Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners were denied their day in court; there was lack of due process. Consequently, the decision rendered by respondent Judge is null and void and must be set aside. The writ of execution issued by respondent Judge and the levy made by the Sheriff on the properties of the petitioners and all orders and acts proceeding or emanating therefrom are hereby declared of no legal force and effect.Petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint must be resolved by the trial court and if the Motion to Dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, petitioners shall file their answer pursuant to Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.SO ORDERED.

CIVIL PROCEDUREDigest #16 (Rule 12 Bill of Particulars)

Martha Rose C. Serrano

JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, vs.HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.FACTS:

Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married in church rites on January 25, 1986. A year later their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988.

Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity.

The petition for annulment was filed in January 7, 1992 before the RTC of Quezon City. The petition alleged that “sometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent

was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter.”

Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted.

Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars and argued that the “assertion in the bill of particulars is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of ‘ultimate facts’, as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may be properly be inferred.”

The trial court found the Bill of Particulars adequate and directed Joselita of file her responsive pleading.

Joselita was not convinced and she filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The SC referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied due course to her petition. It was the view of the CA that the specification more than satisfies the Rules’ requirement

that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting plaintiffs cause of action. Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion,

not an averment of facts, and fails to point out the specific essential marital obligations she was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action.

Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires.

ISSUE: Was the Bill of Particulars submitted by respondents of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading.HELD:The Bill of Particular filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action and to requirement more details from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters.A complaint only needs to state the “ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or causes of action.” Ultimate facts has been defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support.”The Bill of Particular specified that *** at the time of marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession – that of a verily qualified Doctor of Medicine – upon petitioner’s time and efforts sot that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to loss his job.Consequently, the SC has no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of the annulment proceedings which have already been delayed for more than 2 years now, even before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.

G.R. No. L-15808 April 23, 1963

FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband ULPIANO PASION, assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.BRUNO MERCADO and ANTONIO DASALLA, defendants-appellants.

This is an appeal by defendants Mercado and Dasalla from the CFI-Isabela on a question of lawFACTS:

Plaintiffs Agcanas, et al, filed an action to recover portions of parcels of land in Isabela against defendants Mercado and Dasalla

Defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars◦ Notice of hearing was made on 8 Dec. 1956◦ The CFI received the motion only on 12 Dec. 1956◦ The CFI set it for hearing on 22 Dec. 1956

17 Dec. 1956: defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and set the hearing thereof on 22 Dec. 1956

22 Dec. 1956: the court issued an order postponing 'consideration' of both motions to 29 Dec. 1956

7 Mar. 1957: the court denied the motion to dismiss; ordered the defendants to file an Answer◦ Defendants failed to file an Answer; on motion of the plaintiffs, the court issued an

order declaring defendants in default Upon learning of the order of default, the defendants filed a motion asking that the court

set aside the order of default and resolve the motion for a bill of particulars◦ The court denied said motion; it explained that the defendants had "tacitly waived their

right to push through with the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars," because of their failure to set it for hearing or to ask the clerk of court to calendar it after denial of the motion to dismiss

The defendants filed a record of appeal before the Supreme Court◦ But because they subsequently filed a petition for relief from the judgment of default,

they asked that consideration and approval of the record on appeal be held in abeyance until said petition had been resolved

◦ The request was granted▪ The petition for relief was denied▪ The motion for reconsideration on such denial was also denied

Hence, this appeal

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in declaring the defendants in defaultRULING: YES

Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt the time to file a responsive pleading

In a situation where:◦ motions to dismiss and for a bill of particulars are filed;◦ the resolution of the bill of particulars is held in abeyance; and◦ the motion to dismiss is denied,◦ the period to file an Answer remains suspended until the motion for a bill of particulars

is denied (or if it is granted, until the bill is served on the moving parties)CAB:◦ The motion for a bill of particulars had yet to be resolved.

▪ The defendants did not tacitly waive their right to the resolution thereof “by failing to set it for hearing” since it was already set for hearing (22 Dec 1956, postponed to 29 Dec 1956)

◦ Therefore, the period to file an Answer was still suspended.◦ Since said period was still suspended, their failure to file an Answer could not result in

a ground for default◦ Hence, the lower court erred in declaring the defendants in default

JOSE SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LORENZO J. LIWAG, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

CFI-

Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo J. Liwag seeking the annulment of certain documents, attached to the complaint and marked as Annexes "A", "B", and "C", as having been executed by means of misrepresentations, machination, false pretenses, threats, and other fraudulent means, as well as for damages and costs. 

LiWAG moved for bill of particulars for him to prepare an intelligent and proper pleading necessary and appropriate in the premises –GRANTED with respect to the paragraphs specified in defendant's motion", and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the court, acting upon previous motion of the defendant,  dismissed the complaint with costs

Hence, the present appeal.

RULLING: The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order.

CASE AT BAR complaint is without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers from vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court In an orderly and expeditious disposition in the case.

The allegations must state the facts and circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as a conclusions In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that all the documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular-facts on which alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. Hence, it was proper for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint.