Marcoso vs. court of appeals

G.R. No. 96605. May 8, 1992

FACTS:

In 1984, private respondent Rosa Tirol (now Rosa Tirol-Maquirang) filed a complaint against the petitioner Feliciano Morcoso for the recovery of possession and declaration of ownership of a fishpond situated in Barangay Aslum, Ibajay, Aklan.

In her complaint, she alleged that the said fishpond is a part of the 4.5 hectare of land she inherited from her father Eriberto Tirol in 1930; that in December 28, 1979, she entered into a lease agreement with Morcoso, allowing the latter without paying rental and for a period of six years, to develop into a fishpond a 5,880 sq.m. portion of the land she inherited, with usufructuary rights (Exhibit "A"); that while working on the fishpond, Morcoso was informed by the personnel of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR, for brevity) that said portion of the land of Tirol leased to him is within the area of alienable and disposable public land; that in 1973, Morcoso applied for a fishpond permit with the BFAR; that the latter subsequently refused to surrender the possession of the fishpond to Tirol in 1976 when the term of the lease expired, and that Tirol filed an unlawful detainer case against Morcoso but the same was dismissed for not having been timely filed.

As his defense, Morcoso claimed that the fishpond in dispute from which he is being evicted is not the fishpond subject of the contract of lease; that he developed two fishponds: (a) the fishpond subject to the lease, from which he was forcibly ejected by Tirol in 1971 as a result of a disagreement with her; and (b) the fishpond in dispute, which adjoins the first fishpond and which he developed after the BFAR personnel assured him that the area he had moved to is a forested area, suitable for fishpond development; that he applied for a fishpond permit in 1973; and that he declared said fishpond in his name for taxation purposes. Morcoso also assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court because of a pending administrative case before the BFAR regarding their conflicting claims.

The trial court ruled that the fishpond in dispute belongs to Tirol.

ISSUE:

whether or not the doctrine of administrative exhaustion is applicable in cases when the property in dispute is private?

HELD:

The doctrine requiring prior exhaustion of administrative remedies before recourse to courts is inapplicable to the instant case because the fishpond in dispute is private and not public land

We find the foregoing conclusions drawn by the trial court from the documentary evidence submitted by the parties to be in order. The technical descriptions of the fishpond stated in the lease contract and in the sketch plan of the BFAR personnel who conducted an ocular inspection of the fishpond area applied for by Morcoso explicitly show that the latter was the subject of the lease contract between Tirol and Morcoso. The fishpond not having been part of the public domain, the trial court correctly adjudged Tirol as the rightful owner thereof.c

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INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 88550. April 18, 1990

FACTS:

Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal operating contract in the so-called “Giporlos Area.” IEI was later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation

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(MMIC). IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks.

ISSUE:

whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case?

HELD:

It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 110526.  February 10, 1998

FACTS:

On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region in Makati, Metro Manila, to enjoin the  PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA’s Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered “congested” under the administrative order.[1]

On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses to Primex Products, Inc., Coco Manila, Superstar (Candelaria) and Superstar (Davao) upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.[2]

Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority

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from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry.  While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the “monitoring” of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. 

The PCA then proceeded to issue “certificates of registration” to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question.  Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2, 1993, petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President.  The  “certificates of registration” issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate.   

ISSUE:

whether or not respondent pca’s board resolution no. 018-93 is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by an administrative body?

HELD:

The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here.   The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power.   However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.   The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete [4] and it is clear, in the case at bar,  that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of the desiccated coconut industry became effective.  To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President before they become effective.

In any event, although the APCD has appealed the resolution in question to the Office of the President, considering the fact that two months after they had sent their first letter on April 26, 1993 they still had to hear from the President’s office, meanwhile respondent PCA was issuing certificates of registration indiscriminately to new coconut millers, we hold that petitioner was justified in filing this case on June 25, 1993. [5]Indeed, after writing the Office of the President on April 26, 1993[6] petitioner sent inquiries to that office not once, but twice, on May 26, 1993[7]and on June 2, 1993,[8] but petitioner did not receive any reply

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

255 SCRA 438 (1996)

FACTS:

Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After the consolidation of these petitions and the filing of the comments, other pleadings and certain motions by the parties, this Court referred the cases to public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition 1 , where SIPALAY’s petition was docketed as S.B. 0095, and that of ALLIED as S.B. 0100.

Concerning SIPALAY (S.B. 0095), its 360, 875, 513 shares of stock in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation which owns the Century Park Sheraton Hotel are, according to the PCGG, part of Lucio C. Tan’s ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG on July 24, 1986 thus sequestered these SIPALAY shares under a "Sequestration Order and Supervisory Committee.

SIPALAY was forced to litigate after the PCGG sought to implement the sequestration without acting on its motion." . . To Lift Sequestration Order" and." . . For Hearing For Specification Of Charges And For Copies Of Evidence." SIPALAY maintained that the sequestration was without evidentiary substation, violative of due process, and deemed automatically lifted when no judicial proceeding was brought against it within the period mandated under Article XVIII, Section 26 of the Constitution.

Anent ALLIED (S.B. 0100), its Valenzuela branch on August 13, 1986 was served a "Search and Seizure Order" by agents of the PCGG. The order was directed to submit for search and seizure all bank documents in the abovementioned premises which our representative may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being conducted by this Commission.

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ALLIED went to court for the same reason that the PCGG was bent on implementing the order. ALLIED contended that this order is not one for sequestration but is partially a general search warrant which fails to meet the constitutional requisites for its valid issuance.

For the PCGG’s part, its witnesses were Commissioner Dr. Quintin Doromal, former PCGG Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista, now deceased, and Atty. Benjamin Alonte, Director IV, Legal Department of the PCGG who headed the team that served the search and seizure order on ALLIED. Commissioner Doromal identified voluminous documents. Former Commissioner Bautista died midway her cross-examination. The PCGG almost failed to present Atty. Alonte, had the SANDIGANBAYAN not reconsidered its Order of March 8, 1993 6 declaring the cases submitted for decision after the PCGG was deemed to have waived presentation of its evidence for its repeated postponements of the hearing. After Atty. Alonte’s testimony and upon the PCGG’s manifestation that it was no longer presenting any witness, the SANDIGANBAYAN 7 gave the PCGG twenty (20) days (from July 1, 1993) within which to submit its formal evidence in writing. SIPALAY and ALLIED were given the same period (20 days) from receipt of such written formal offer of evidence within which to file their formal comments and/or objections thereto, and after which, the incident will be deemed submitted for resolution.

What the PCGG filed on July 7, 1993 was not a written formal offer of its evidence as directed by the SANDIGANBAYAN, but a "Motion To Dismiss" the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions. Admittedly, this motion to dismiss came nearly seven (7) years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally filed their petitions before this Court on September 16, 1986 and August 26, 1986, respectively. The ground was SIPALAY’s and ALLIED’s alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first appealed the sequestration orders t o the Office of the President before challenging them in court, invoking Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. An "Oppositions" and a "Reply" were filed in relation to the motion.

At some earlier time (May 21, 1992), the PCGG filed a "Motion For The Consolidation Or Joint Trial" of SIPALAY’s and ALLIED’s petitions (S.B. 0095 and S.B. 0100) with Civil Case 0005 — a complaint for "Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages" dated July 17, 1987 likewise filed before the SANDIGANBAYAN by the PCGG against Lucio Tan, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, and other defendants. 8 The SANDIGANBAYAN formally denied this motion in an extended Resolution dated July 6, 1993. The PCGG filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" thereof. This motion was deemed submitted for resolution when no opposition and reply were filed. SIPALAY and ALLIED then filed a "Motion To Consider Cases Submitted For Decision", to which an opposition and reply were filed.

ISSUE:

whether or not non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is deemed for failure to invoke at proper time?

HELD:

A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principle aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss, nearly seven (7) years already came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Sotto v. Jareno," 144 SCRA 116, 119 has mad it quite clear that: "Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it." PCGG is guilty of estoppel by laches. With its undenied belated action, it is only to presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed lack of cause of action. PCGG should be deemed to have waived such perceived defect for "proper time" cannot mean or sanction an unexplained and unreasoned length of time. The leniency extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches — or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time.

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ANG TIBAY VS. CIR

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

FACTS:

That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. w library

That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.c] virtual law library

That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.virtuallawlibra

That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.

That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (

That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood. law library

That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. law library

That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due process.

HELD:

Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these

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rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

REMOLONA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

362 SCRA 304 (2001)

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FACTS:

petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in Infanta, Quezon, while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.

In a letter 3 dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as to the status of the civil service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for Teachers. 4 Mr. America likewise disclosed that he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher's board examinations.

On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas issued an Order directing CSC Region IV Director Bella Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona's eligibility, after verification from the Register of Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records revealed "that Remolona's name is not in the list of passing and failing examinees, and that the list of examinees for December 10, 1989 does not include the name of Remolona. Furthermore, Examination No. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belongs to a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who took the examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%." 5cräläwvirtualibräry

During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G. Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field Office, Lucena City, Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of facts 6 regarding the issuance of the questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolona.

Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together. Based on the foregoing, Director Pasion recommended the filing of the appropriate administrative action against Remolona but absolved Mrs. Nery Remolona from any liability since it has not been shown that she willfully participated in the commission of the offense.

Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona, and Atty. Hadji Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty.  8 A formal hearing ensued wherein the parties presented their respective evidence. Thereafter, CSC Regional Director Bella A. Amilhasan issued a Memorandum dated February 14, 1995 9 recommending that the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona be found guilty as charged and be meted the corresponding penalty.

Said recommendation was adopted by the CSC which issued Resolution No. 95-2908 on April 20, 1995, finding the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. The case against Atty. Hadji Salupadin was held in abeyance pending proof of his identity. 10 In its Resolution No. 965510 11 dated August 27, 1996, the CSC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Remolona, absolved Nery Remolona from liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense which is not work related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty?

HELD:

It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. 14cräläwvirtualibräry

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The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and confidence in the government. 15cräläwvirtualibräry

LUMIQUED VS. EXCEVEA

282 SCRA 125 (1997)

FACTS:

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqueds death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari andmandamus, questioning such order.

the dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by dar-car and private respondent Jeannette with the board of discipline of the dar. alleging therein the lumiqued was charged with malversation through falsification of gasoline receipts, unliquadated cash advances in the total amount of P116, 000.00 and oppression and harassment. and according to private respondent her two previous complaints prompted lumiqued to retaliated by relieving her from her post as regional cashier without just cause.

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The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.

The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued or removal from office without prejudice to the filling of the appropriate criminal charges. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 finding limqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

HELD:

The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and inthe presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not anabsolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in anadministrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to havecompetent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in theproceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was forthe purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filedagainst him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or thelaw.There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to berepresented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. Theassistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the dueprocess clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side.Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal andhis subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

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FORTICH VS. CORONA

289 SCRA 624 (1992)

FACTS:

This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371[3] of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.

In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Grower’s Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title.  The lease expired in April, 1994.

In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.[4]

NQSRMDC resisted the DAR’s action.  In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives “to desist from pursuing any activity or activities” concerning the subject land “until further orders.”[5]

Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property.   NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject property. 

The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank “to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992;” (b) nullifying  the DAR Regional Director’s memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the

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summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and  (c) directing the Land Bank “to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDC’s subject property to the DAR until further orders.”[6]

The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.[7]

In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6,[8] dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.

ISSUE:

HELD:

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