Rubi Vs Prov of MindoroFacts: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law. (2) Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases.

The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

JAVIER VS. COMELEC [144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81; 22 SEPT 1986]

Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.

Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and

also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION V. CITY OF MANILA 20 SCRA 849

Wednesday, January 21, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. Of the City of Manila is violating of due process clause. It was alleged that Sec. 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violate of due process insofar as it would impose P6T fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500 for second class motels, that Sec. 2, prohibiting a person less than 18 years from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours runs counter to due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the due process clause?

Held: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police measure specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the less limitable of powers extending as it does to all great public needs.

Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of police power.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abduction of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.

The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern or common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.