Cavile vs Lintania-HongFacts Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 , a Deed of Partition5was entered into by the heirs of the spouses Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon Subject of the Deed of Partition were several parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Tolong, Negros Oriental, which were then covered by Tax Declarations No. 5615, No. 5729, No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, all under the name of Bernardo. In accordance with the Deed of Partition, the conjugal properties of Bernardo and Tranquilina were divided into two parts. The first part, corresponding to Bernardos share, was further divided into six equal shares The second part, corresponding to Tranquilinas share, was subdivided only into three shares Also stated in the Deed of Partition was the sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs to their co-heir, thus, making Castor the sole owner of the said properties Similarly, the Deed of Partition acknowledged the sale by all the legal heirs to Ulpiano Cavile of their respective shares in the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 5729, thus, transferring to the latter absolute ownership of said parcel of land. Castor and Susana executed a Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition,7whereby Castor recognized and confirmed that the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 were the just and lawful shares of Susana in the properties left by their deceased parents Bernardo and Tranquilina, and that Susana was in actual possession of the said properties The descriptions of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition were strikingly close to those of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, respectively, in the Deed of Partition. Fourteen years after respondents filed on 23 December 1974 a Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery of Property with Damages before the RTC against Perfecta Cavile Respondents invoked the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960 wherein Castor purportedly recognized Susanas ownership of the subject lots After Susanas death in 1965, the subject lots were inherited by her daughters, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who then assumed the mortgage thereon. However, respondents alleged that Castor and petitioner spouses eventually intruded upon and excluded respondents from the subject lots. Petitioner spouses countered in their Answer to the Complaint that, by virtue of the Deed of Partition dated 5 April 1937, the heirs of both Bernardo and Tranquilina took exclusive possession of their respective shares in the inheritance . In 1962, Castor sold to petitioner Perfecta the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, which corresponded to the subject lots in the Complaint. Following the sale, petitioner Perfecta took possession of the subject lots and filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for the issuance of title over the same. The Bureau issued free patent titles over the subject lots in favor of petitioner Perfecta Petitioner spouses asserted that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated 5 August 1960 involving the subject lots was a nullity since said properties were never owned nor adjudicated in favor of Susana, respondents predecessor-in-interest. Castor and Susana executed the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition merely to accommodate the latter who then needed security for the loan she was trying to obtain from the Rural Bank of Dumaguete City RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner spouses. petitioner spouses evidence was more worthy of credence in establishing their ownership of the subject lots RTC further subscribed to the testimony of Perfecta that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was executed by Castor solely to accommodate Susana, enabling her to obtain a bank loan using the subject lots as collateral. It noted that Susana did not bother to apply for the issuance of title to the subject lots in her name Court of Appeals reversed the RTC The Court of Appeals agreed in the respondents contention that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was not a simulated document. The said document should be entitled to utmost respect, credence, and weight as it was executed by and between parties who had firsthand knowledge of the Deed of Partition of 1937. Moreover, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition constituted evidence that was of the highest probative value against the declarant, Castor, because it was a declaration against his proprietary interest Perfecta herself admitted that she only started paying real estate taxes for the subject lots in 1993. It was Susana and, later, her children, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who had been paying for the realty taxes on the subject lots since 1937Issue: Who has the better right to the property? Decision: It is the petitioners.Ratio Decidendi: there being no issue raised on the matter, that the subject lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 described in the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6111 are the very same lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7956 and No. 7421 included in the Deed of Partition, and by Tax Declarations No. 2040 and No. 2039 subject of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition. Nevertheless, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition is just one piece of evidence against petitioner spouses. It must still be considered and weighed together with respondents other evidence vis--vis petitioner spouses evidence the Court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner spouses preponderated over that of the respondents In analyzing the two vital documents in this case, the Court discerns that while the Deed of Partition clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the subject lots, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, even though confirming Susanas ownership of the subject lots, failed to shed light on why or how the said properties wholly pertained to her when her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the inheritance. At best, tax declarations are indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.30Conversely, non-declaration of a property for tax purposes does not necessarily negate ownership.31 Sometime in 1962, petitioner Perfecta applied for and was granted by the Bureau of Lands free patents over the subject lots. Pursuant thereto, Original Certificates of Title No. FV-4976, No. FV-4977, and No. FV-4978, covering the subject lots, were issued by the Registry of Deeds the Court pronounces that respondents Complaint for reconveyance of the subject lots and damages filed only on 23 December 1974 is already barred. A Torrens title issued on the basis of the free patents become as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of the patent In the instant case, respondents brought the action for reconveyance of the subject lots before the RTC only on 23 December 2004, or more than 12 years after the Torrens titles were issued in favor of petitioner Perfecta on 9 October 1962. The remedy is, therefore, already time-barred. , the Court would still rule that respondents failed to satisfactorily prove that they were in possession of the subject lots prior to the grant of free patents and issuance of Torrens titles over the same in favor petitioner Perfecta No information was provided as to how said possession of the subject lots was actually exercised or demonstrated by Susana

Yujuico vs Republic Facts: In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land with an area of 17,343 square meters covered by plan (LRC) Psu-964 located in the Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal (now Paraaque City), in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI), The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and by Mercedes Dizon Castro won the case He sold it to the petitioner of this case petitioner subdivided the land to two lots, one for him and the other to petitioner Carpio Annotations at the back of TCT No. 446386 show that Yujuico had, at one time or another, mortgaged the lot to the Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and Citibank .Annotations in the title of petitioner Carpio reveal the lot was mortgaged in favor of Private Development Corporation (PDC), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and then Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure various loans. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085 was enacted. This gave lands in the offshore and foreshore areas to Public Estates Authority (PEA). Some of the land included the land of petitioner. Petitioner filed for removal of cloud or quiteting of title. . OnMay 15, 1998the parties entered into a compromise agreement the parties executed a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, pursuant to the compromise agreement, where the PEA property with an area of 1.4007 hectares would be conveyed to Jesus Yujuico and petitioner Carpio in exchange for their property with a combined area of 1.7343 hectares. But the President of PEA did not give his approval, hence filed a petition for relief from the compromise agreement on the basis of mistake and excusable negligence. respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, alleged that when the land registered to Castro was surveyed by Engr. H. Obreto on August 3, 1972 and subsequently approved by the LRC on April 23, 1973, the land was still a portion of Manila Bay as evidenced by Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243, Surveys to 1980 More significantly, respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Fermina Castro.Second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was void.And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were likewise void.[9] The CA observed that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant.Issue: Is a reversion suit proper in this case? (2) Is the present petition estopped by laches? (3) Did the CA erroneously apply the principle ofres judicataDecision: No.Ratio Decidendi: The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of Decree No. N-150912 and its derivative titles was filed onJune 8, 2001with the Paraaque City RTC.It is clear therefore that the reversion suit was erroneously instituted in the Paraaque RTC and should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. This was not done in this case.The Republic misfiled the reversion suit with the Paraaque RTC.It should have been filed with the CA as required by Rule 47.Evidently, the Paraaque RTC had no jurisdiction over the instant reversion case. Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed before the action for reversion was filed, then said action is now barred by laches .Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for value over and above the interests of the government There is no allegation that Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire the land fraudulently.He thus had the protection of the Torrens System that every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate When respondent government filed the reversion case in 2001, 27 years had already elapsed from the time the late Jesus Yujuico purchased the land from the original owner Castro. After the issuance of OCT No. 10215 to Castro, no further action was taken by the government to question the issuance of the title to Castro until the case ofPublic Estates Authority, brought up in the oral argument before this Court onSeptember 6, 2000 Clearly from the above,Firestoneis a precedent case.ThePublic Estates Authorityhad become final and thus the validity of OCT No. 10215 issued to Castro could no longer be questioned. On the other hand, the Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 does not reveal what portion ofManilaBaywas Castros lot located in 1974.Moreover, a hydrographic map is not the best evidence to show the nature and location of the lot subject of a land registration application More so, respondent Government, through its counsel, admits that the land applied by Fermina Castro in 1973 was solid and dry land, negating the nebulous allegation that said land is underwater.The only conclusion that can be derived from the admissions of the Solicitor General and Government Corporate Counsel is that the land subject of the titles of petitioners is alienable land beyond the reach of the reversion suit of the state The waiver by PEA of its right to question petitioners title is fortified by the manifestation by PEA in the Joint Motion for Judgment based on Compromise Agreement The recognition of petitioners legal ownership of the land is further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Paraaque RTC.Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred by laches.Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is already precluded byres judicatain view of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein.

Roque vs Aguado Facts: petition for review on certiorari1 The property subject of this case is a parcel of land with an area of 20,862 square meters (sq. m.), located in Sitio Tagpos, Barangay Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal, known as Lot 18089.5 petitioners-spouses Jose C. Roque and Beatriz dela Cruz Roque (Sps. Roque) and the original owners of the then unregistered Lot 18089 namely, Velia R. Rivero (Rivero), executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of Real Property6over a 1,231-sq. m. portion of Lot 18089 (subject portion) for a consideration ofP30,775.00. parties agreed that Sps. Roque shall make an initial payment ofP15,387.50 while the remaining balance of the purchase price shall be payable upon the registration of Lot 18089 After the deeds execution, Sps. Roque took possession and introduced improvements on the subject portion which they utilized as a balut factory Fructuoso Sabug, Jr. (Sabug, Jr.), former Treasurer of the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), applied for a free patent over the entire Lot 18089 and was eventually issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-59558in his name on October 21, 1991 Sabug, Jr., through a Deed of Absolute Sale10), sold Lot 18089 to one Ma. Pamela P. Aguado (Aguado), who caused the cancellation of OCT No. M-5955 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-96692 dated December 17, 199911in her name. Aguado mortgaged the property and it was eventually consolidated under the ownership of Landbank. Roque filed for a reconveyance. In defense, NCCP and Sabug, Jr. denied any knowledge of the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale through which the subject portion had been purportedly conveyed to Sps. Roque.16 For her part, Aguado raised the defense of an innocent purchaser for value On the other hand, Land Bank averred that it had no knowledge of Sps. Roques claim relative to the subject portion The RTC found that the Roque failed to establish their ownership over the subject portion RTC ruled that Sps. Roques action for reconveyance had already prescribed, having been filed ten (10) years after the issuance of OCT No. M-5955 , the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the foregoing RTC findingsIssue: whether or not the CA erred in not ordering the reconveyance of the subject portion in Sps. Roques favor.Decision: No. Petition Denied.Ratio decidendi: The petition lacks merit for recovenyance, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value Examining its provisions, the Court finds that the stipulation above-highlighted shows that the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in the nature of a contract to sell and not one of sale contrary to Sps. Roques belief why? , it has been consistently ruled that where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the purchase price, the contract is only a contract to sell even if their agreement is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale Sps. Roque have not paid the final installment of the purchase price thus transfer of ownership of the subject portion from the sellers to the buyers cannot be deemed to have been fulfilled Sps. Roque did not even take any active steps to protect their claim over the disputed portion. 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale was never registered did not seek the actual/physical segregation of the disputed portion For the distinguishment of contract to sale and contract to sell ( go to original case) If it is a contract to sell, a third person buying such property despite the fulfilment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property since it is a contract to sell, reconveyance is not a remedy.

Iglesias Filipina Independiente vs TaezaFacts: Petition for Review on Certiorari plaintiff-appellee Iglesia Filipina Independiente was the owner of a parcel of land described as Lot 3653, situated at Ruyu, Cagayan and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-8698. The said lot is subdivided as follows: Lot Nos. 3653-A, 3653-B, 3653-C, and 3653-D sold Lot 3653-A and B to Taeza for the amount ofP100,000.00, through installment, the defendant allegedly completed the payments a complaint for the annulment was filed through Supreme Bishop Most Rev. Tito Pasco, against the defendant-appellant, with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3. the defendant Bernardino Taeza registered the subject parcels of land. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-77995 and T-77994 were issued in his name. The defendant then occupied a portion of the land. The plaintiff-appellee allegedly demanded the defendant to vacate the said land which he failed to do. It is alleged that the sale of the property in question was done without the required approval and conformity of the entities mentioned in the Canons; hence, petitioner argues that the sale was null and void. IFI lost in RTC and CAIssues: whether then Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga is authorized to enter into a contract of sale in behalf of petitioner.Decision: No. IFC lawful owner. The Court finds it erroneous for the CA to ignore the fact that the laymen's committee objected to the sale of the lot in question. The Canons require that ALL the church entities listed in Article IV (a) thereof should give its approval to the transaction. Thus, when the Supreme Bishop executed the contract of sale of petitioner's lot despite the opposition made by the laymen's committee, he acted beyond his powers. In the present case, however, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Bernardino Taeza, had already obtained a transfer certificate of title in his name over the property in question. Since the person supposedly transferring ownership was not authorized to do so, the property had evidently been acquired by mistake The Court held in the same case of Aznar,21that unlike in express trusts and resulting implied trusts where a trustee cannot acquire by prescription any property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust, in constructive implied trusts, the trustee may acquire the property through prescription even if he does not repudiate the relationship. It is then incumbent upon the beneficiary to bring an action for reconveyance before prescription bars the same. it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property Here, the present action was filed on January 19, 1990,24while the transfer certificates of title over the subject lots were issued to respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Bernardino Taeza, only on February 7, 1990.25 Clearly, therefore, petitioner's complaint was filed well within the prescriptive period stated above, and it is only just that the subject property be returned to its rightful owner. Since it was filed on time, 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens title, Petitioner wins the case.Republic vs Transunion CorporationFacts: petition for review on certiorari Salamat) filed an Application to Purchase Friar Lands,5specifically Lot No. 5741 of the Imus Estate (Lot No. 5741), with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR indorsed to the Land Management Bureau (LMB) Thereafter, Salamat was informed that Lot No. 5741 was already covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-6167408in the name of Transunion Made Salamat file against Transunion a protest on the ground of fraud ( no deed of conveyance issued to anyone) Salamat averred that she and her family had been in continuous possession and occupation of the said lot since time immemorial and had even introduced improvements thereon. She likewise stated that it was only after the LMB favorably endorsed her application, that it was discovered that Lot No. 5741 was already covered by TCT No. T-616740.12 On April 20, 2004Republic filed a reversion complaint against Transunion and its predecessors-in-interest, with the RTC.23 Petitioner won in RTC but lost in CAIssue: The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly granted Transunions petition for certiorari against the RTC's order denying the latters motion to dismiss.Decision: No. Petition granted. Ratio Decidendi: An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction In the present case, the Court finds that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying Transunions motion to dismiss considering that the latters further reconsideration or appeal of the investigation report was not a condition precedent to the filing of the Republics reversion complaint the LMB proceeding subject of Transunions motion to dismiss was merely investigative in nature since it was conducted as a fact-finding/recommendatory procedure, meant only to determine whether or not the LMB Director should initiate reversion proceedings. Transunion confuses the investigation report and the recommendation made therein with an action of the LMB Regional Executive Director found in Section 3.1 of the Manual on Settlement of Land Disputes39 Finally, the Court finds that there was no violation of Transunion's right to administrative due process since, as the Republic pointed out, not only did it file an answer, but it also presented its evidence and formally offered the .same.46It is well-established that the touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be heard.47This Transunion was unquestionably afforded in this case For the reasons above-stated, the Court therefore concludes that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying Transunion 's motion to dismiss against the Republic's reversion complaint. As such, the CA committed a reversible error in granting Transunion's petition for certiorari, warranting the reversal of its Decision

De Luzurriaga vs Republic Facts: Subject of the instant controversy isLotNo. 1524 of the Bacolod Cadastre , petitioners filed anApplication for the Registration of Title the subject lot was specifically identified as Lot No. 1524, AP-06-005774, Cad. 39, Bacolod Cadastre, situated in the City ofBacolod The survey plan, conducted by Geodetic Engineer Eluminado E. Nessia, Jr. technical description of the subject lot Application approved and issued in the name of the late Jose Luzurriaga OSG, Republic made appearance. Among the evidence petitioners adduced during the hearings was a copy of Decree No. 22752[8]dated October 7, 1916, issued by the General Land Registration Office (GLRO trial court confirmed the incomplete title of the late De Luzuriaga The OSG, for the Republic, received a copy of the Decision on June 22, 1999, but opted not to file an appeal. six months after, filed a petition for relief from judgment. alleged first, that petitioners failed to indicate in their application all the heirs of the late De Luzuriaga, Sr. and their corresponding authorization for the application in their behalf. Second, the Republic asserted that petitioners cannot use Decree No. 22752 as basis for the application of land registration as said decree effectively barred said application.It invited attention to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, which requires the simultaneous issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title.As argued, the policy of simultaneous issuance prescribed in the decree has not been followed in the instant case. (DAALCO) filed a Complaint[10]against petitioners before the RTC forQuieting of Title, Annulment and Cancellation of [OCT] No. RO-58 DAALCO claimed that its predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Lizares, was the registered, lawful, and absolute owner of Lot No. 1524 as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Finally, DAALCO maintained having been in actual, open, and continuous possession as registered owner of the subject lot. The RTC denied petition of Republic but CA granted the same.Issue: whether the appellate court gravely abused its discretion in granting the Republics petition for relief from judgmentDecision: No. Petition denied. we agree with the appellate courts holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for relief from the May 24, 1999 Decision. Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.[31]And its determination rests with the court.In the instant case, certain attending facts and circumstances, as shall be set forth below, make for an exceptional case for allowing relief from judgment First. The Letter/Report[32]issued by the Bacolod City RD on December 7, 2001 provides a reasonable ground to believe that a case of double titling would result should another title issue for the same lot in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr Second.The prior issuance on November 14, 1916 of OCT No.2765in the name of Lizares over Lot No. 1524 persuasively buttresses aprima faciecase on the issue of double titling. Obviously, one and the same decree cannot serve as basis for a valid grant of separate titles in fee simple over the same lot to two different person Third.Since petitioners and DAALCO separately claim owning Lot No. 1524, the ownership issue would be best litigated in Civil Case No. 99-10924 filed by DAALCO for quieting of title Nothing on the records adequately explains, nor do petitioners attempt to do so, how a registration decree adjudicating Lot No. 1524 to De Luzuriaga, Sr. became the very medium for the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Lizares.Consequently, whatever rights petitioners might have over the subject lot as heirs of De Luzuriaga, Sr. ought to be litigated against the successors-in-interest of Lizares to put a final rest to their clashing claims over Lot No. 1524 Fourth.OCT No. RO-58 was issued by the RD of Bacolod City Yet the Court notes that the title issuance went beyond the scope of the judgment sought to be executed. Cadastral Case and Quieting of Title Case can proceed independently A final consideration. A petition for relief is in effect a second opportunity for an aggrieved party to ask for a new trial

People vs CaingletFacts: Wilfredo G. Cainglet was prosecuted before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for falsification of public and/or official documents the accused moved to quash the afore-quoted informations on the ground that they contain averments, which if true, would constitute an excuse or justification, invoking Section 2(g) of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court consist in the statements in the informations that in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184 the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur declared Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492 with improvements thereon to be the private properties of Wilfredo G. Cainglet Such judicial pronouncement which has become final, as can be inferred from the information, allegedly runs counter to the charge that accused falsely claimed said real estate to be his own private properties.Issue: whether or not the final judgment in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184 declaring Wilfredo G. Cainglet owner of Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492 bars his subsequent prosecution for falsely stating in his answers in said Cadastral Case that he possessed and owned Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492.Decision: It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding a proceedingin rem is binding and conclusive upon the whole world However, this conclusiveness of judgment in the registration of lands is not absolute. It admits of exceptions the aggrieved party may file a suit for reconveyance of property2or a personal action for recovery of damages against the party who registered his property through fraud In the same way, therefore, the State may criminally prosecute for perjury the party who obtains registration through fraud, such as by stating false assertions in the sworn answer required of applicants in cadastral proceedings Section 116 applies to all and does not distinguish between those who make false statements and successfully procure registration by such statements, and those whose statements were not given credence by the land registration court. The law therefore applies with equal brunt on both types of offenders. For the Court, therefore, to sustain appellee's view would be to unduly discriminate in the prosecution of persons charged with falsification or perjury , on the other hand, every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities a judgment on the guilt of the appellee would not undermine the indefeasibility of the titles over Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492. Neither would the criminal proceeding for falsification or perjury be a collateral attack on the titles in question. The prosecution for falsification or perjury is a proceedingin personamwhich inquires into the criminal liability of the accused. Not being an attack on the validity of the titles in question, any judgment rendered therein would leave said titles undisturbed

Treasurer of the Phil vs CAFacts: Lawaan Lopez offered to sell to the private respondents a parcel of land located in Quezon City and consisting of 1,316.8 square meters, which he claimed as his property. . The sale was deferred because the prospective vendor said his certificate of title had been burned in his house in Divisoria, and he would have to file a petition with the court of first instance of Quezon City for a duplicate certificate of title The corresponding transfer certificate of title was subsequently issued to them after cancellation of the duplicate certificate in the name of Lawaan Lopez. Two years after, another person claiming to be the real Lawaan Lopez, filed a petition in the court of first instance of Quezon City to declare as null and void the transfer of her land in favor of the private respondents Subsequently the private respondents filed a complaint against the impostor Lawaan Lopez and the Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of the Assurance Fund for damages Lower courts held Treasurer liable ( Assurance Fund) because the impostor could not be located.Issue: Whether or not the Treasurer is liableDecision: No. Ratio Decidendi: A careful reading of the above provision will readily show that the private respondents do not come under either of the two situations above mentioned. The petition correctly points out that such sale conveyed no title or any interest at all to them for the simple reason that the supposed vendor had no title or interest to transfer. He was not the owner of the land. He had no right thereto he could convey. the real Lawaan Lopez had her own genuine certificate of titleall the timeand it remained valid despite the issuance of the new certificate of title in the name of the private respondents. That new certificate, as the trial court correctly declared, was null and voidab initio, which means that it had no legal effect whatsoever and at any time The private respondents were not for a single moment the owner of the property in question and so cannot claim to have been unlawfully deprived thereof when their certificate of title was found and declared to be a total nullity. Additionally, the Court observes that the private respondents were not exactly diligent in verifying the credentials of the impostor whom they had never met before he came to them with his bogus offer The fact alone that he claimed to have lost his duplicate certificate of title in a fire, not to mention the amount of the consideration involved, would have put them on their guard and warned them to make a more thorough investigation of the seller's Identity. we are not prepared to rule under the circumstances of this case that they are entitled to even claim the status of innocent purchasers of the land. They are, of course, not entirely without recourse, for they may still proceed against the impostor in a civil action for recovery and damages or prosecute him under the Revised Penal Code, assuming he can be located and arrested

Lopez vs EsquivelFacts: Petitions for Review onCertiorari Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes), father of the Lopez siblings, applied with the Bureau of Lands for a homestead patent over a parcel of land the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes application The patent was subsequently transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for transcription and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title[9]in Hermogenes name. Unaware that he had already been awarded a homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land, Hermogenes sold[11]the same to Ambrocio Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale[12]dated31 July 1959 Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property, with an area of 2.6950 hectares, was erroneously included in survey plan H-138612 of Hermogenes property.The subject property supposedly formed part of the land owned by Lauro Hizon (Hizon), which adjoined that of Hermogenes. Hermogenes executed a Quitclaim[13]over his rights and interests to the subject property[14]in Hizons favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to Esquivel and Talens, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land[15]dated26 August 1968. The Lopez siblings filed a cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Hermogenes and Aguilar Esquivel and Talens filed an Application for Registration of the subject property with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73 but the Lopez siblings opposed it. Respondents then filed for Reconveyance on the advise of the RTC RTC ruled in favor of respondents. the Deed of Absolute Sale dated31 July 1959between Hermogenes and Aguilar was already declared null and voidab initioby a court of competent jurisdiction.Therefore, the Lopez siblings were estopped from asserting said Deed to defeat the rights of Esquivel and Talens to the subject property. CA affirmed RTCIssue: Whether or not the respondents have a right to reconveyance of the property based on the quitclaim made by Hermogenes in Hizon's favor.

Decision: Yes.Ratio Decidendi: The Lopez siblings additionally avow that in the proceedings conducted on Hermogenes homestead application by the Bureau of Lands, it was verified that the land applied for, which included the subject property, was disposable public land.If it was true that the subject property was only erroneously included in the homestead patent awarded to Hermogenes, then such an award could only be challenged by the government in an action for reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act The Lopez siblings also maintain that Hizon, predecessor-in-interest of Esquivel and Talens, who claimed ownership over the subject property, was duty bound to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family by opposing or taking exception to Hermogenes homestead application, which included said property.Even after the homestead patent over the subject property was already awarded to Hermogenes, Hizon still had opportunity to protest the same before the Bureau of Lands, prior to the registration of said homestead patent with the Register of Deeds.For failing to take appropriate actions, Hizon, and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and Talens, are now barred from doing so by the statute of limitations and laches. In this case, the subject property was included, whether correctly or erroneously, in the 19.4888-hectare land awarded to Hermogenes Between the date of issuance of the homestead patent to Hermogenes and that of the execution of the Quitclaim, more than26 yearshad passed.Therefore, the execution of the Quitclaim was no longer within the five-year period within which the land covered by the homestead patent issued to Hermogenes must not be encumbered or alienated; and was also beyond the period between five and 25 years following the issuance of patent within which approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources is still necessary to make the alienation or encumbrance valid the intention of Hermogenes in executing the quitclaim was to restore to Hizon the subject property, which Hermogenes believed to have been mistakenly included in his homestead patent. Hermogenes cannot simply convey property to Hizon. Since it is a homestead, the property was originally public hence belonging to the State. the property must therefore ( if really erroneously included in Hermogenes patent) be returned to the state and not hizon. There is no other proof that Hizon possessed, cultivated, and introduced improvements on the subject property.Neither is there any showing that after the execution of the Quitclaim, Hizon himself applied for a homestead patent over the subject property.In fact, it is undisputed that the subject property has always been in the possession of Hermogenes, then the Lopez Siblings.Hizon and Esquivel and Talens never came into the possession of the subject property even after the execution of the supposed deeds of conveyances in their favor. Even grantingarguendo, that the Quitclaim is valid and transferred ownership of the subject property from Hermogenes to Hizon, the latter and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and Talens, are now barred by the statute of limitations and laches from asserting their rights to the subject property, after failing to exercise the same for an unreasonable length of time.

Bulawan vs AquendeFacts: petition for review Bulawanfiled a complaint for annulment of title against Yap Bulawanclaimed that she is the owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13733 having bought the property from its owners, brothers Santos and FranciscoYaptengco(Yaptengcobrothers Yap clarified that she asserts ownership 1996 trial court ruled in favor ofBulawan. CA affirmed RTC in 2002, Aquendeallegedthat he was unaware of any litigation involving his property having received no summons or notice thereof, nor was he aware of any adverse claim as no notice oflispendenswas inscribed on the title. Aquendefiled a Third Party Claim15against the writ of execution because it affected his property and, not being a party in Civil Case No. 9040, he argued that he is not bound by the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision Thereafter,Aquendefiled a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction Aquendeargued that there was extrinsic fraud whenBulawanconveniently failed toimpleadhim despite her knowledge of the existing title in his name and, thus, prevented him from participating in the proceedings and protecting his title CA ruled in favor of AquendeIssue: Whether or not petition for annulment is a proper remedyDecision: Yes.Ratio Decidendi: Bulawanadds that the Court of Appeals erred because it annulled a decision which had already been considered and affirmed by another division of the Court of Appeals. According toBulawan, the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision is already final and had been fully executed. In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.26Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.27The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it took cognizance ofAquendespetition for annulment of judgment and overturned the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision even if another division of the Court of Appeals had already affirmed it and it had already been executed During the proceedings before the trial court, the answers of Yap36and the Register of Deeds37should have prompted the trial court to inquire further whether there were other indispensable parties who were notimpleaded. The trial court should have taken the initiative toimpleadAquendeas defendant However, even ifAquendewere not an indispensable party, he could still file a petition for annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled.40What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and that he would be adversely affected thereby Likewise,Aquendewas never made a party in Civil Case No. 9040. Yet, the trial court ordered the cancellation of Psd-187165 and any other certificate of title issued pursuant to Psd-187165, includingAquendesTCT No. 40067.Aquendewas adversely affected by such judgment as his title was cancelled without giving him the opportunity to present his evidence to prove his ownership of the property.

Benatiro vs CuyosFacts: Petition for Review onCertiorari GloriaCuyos-Talian(respondent Gloria filed a petitionfor Letters of Administration Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case