Diplomatic Discourse - The Case of Diego Garcia

Diplomatic Discourse: The Case of Diego Garcia

Jessica Grandio Fra, Alba Mora Carrillo & Jeppe Blumensaat Rasmussen

[DIPLOMATIC DISCOURSE: THE CASE OF DIEGO GARCIA] 8. december 2010

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Project Form

Please place this form right after the cover page of your project. It must appear from the table of contents which student is responsible for each section of the project.

Line spacing: 1½.

Study program: International Studies, English & International Cultural Studies

Name of exam: Discourse and Society

Title of project report: Diplomatic Discourse: The Case of Diego Garcia Number of characters allowed according to the curriculum (one standard page is 2400

characters spaces included): 108,000 Number of characters handed in: 107,890 (List the number of characters handed in not counting table of contents, bibliography and appendix)

(NB! Please note that you won‘t be allowed to hand in the project if it exceeds the maximum number of standard pages allowed according to the curriculum. If the maximum number is exceeded, it means that you will have used an examination attempt). Language (if relevant) English

Project group No : Group 14

Students‟ CPR numbers

CPR: 020890-2199 Name: Jeppe Blumensaat Rasmussen CPR:110289-3324 Name: Alba Mora Carrillo

CPR: 140389-3826 Name: Jessica Grandio Fra

Hand in date: December 8, 2010

Name of supervisor: Laura Bang Lindegaard


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1 Table of contents 2 Table of illustrations ...........................................................................................................................5

3 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................7

3.1 Problem formulation ................................................................................................ 8

4 Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 9

4.1.1 Order of the analysis in the project report ........................................................................ 11

4.1.2 Front Page ........................................................................................................................... 11

4.1.3 Choice of words .................................................................................................................. 11

4.1.4 Tables of ‘Chagos Archipelago’ discourse, ‘Chagossian identity’ discourse

and ’Depopulation’ discourse ........................................................................................................... 12

4.2 Literature .............................................................................................................. 12

4.3 Wikileaks .............................................................................................................. 13

4.3.1 Responsibility of written material..................................................................................... 14

5 Theory ............................................................................................................................................... 15

5.1 CDA practice......................................................................................................... 16

5.2 Identity .................................................................................................................. 18

6 Analysis............................................................................................................................................. 20

6.1 British and American spelling................................................................................ 20

6.2 Public knowledge of the affair on Diego Garcia‘s military base. How UK and US Government coped with (the) Public Opinion? - Jeppe .................................................. 21

6.3 Geographical framing - Alba ................................................................................. 24

6.4 Chagos Archipelago discourse -Alba ................................................................... 25

6.5 Pronouns - Jeppe ................................................................................................. 27

6.6 Analysis of passive structures within the gathered official documents - Jeppe ..... 29

6.7 The Chagos people – identity construction - Alba ................................................. 30

6.7.1 The Wikileaks documents ................................................................................................. 32

6.8 Depopulation discourse - Jessica ......................................................................... 33

6.8.1 The Wikileaks documents ................................................................................................. 37

6.9 Resettlement of Diego Garcia seen as a Business - Jessica ................................ 37

6.10 Defence and discourse - Jessica ....................................................................... 42

7 Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................45

8 Enclosure 1– List of words repeated 25 times or more ................................................................... 47

9 Enclosure 2 - Glossary of key terms ................................................................................................ 49

9.1 Autonomy ............................................................................................................. 49

9.2 Citizenship ............................................................................................................ 49


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9.3 Conspiracy ............................................................................................................ 50

9.4 Manipulation ......................................................................................................... 50

9.5 Public Opinion....................................................................................................... 51

9.6 State ..................................................................................................................... 52

9.7 Self-determination ................................................................................................. 52

9.8 Special Relationship ............................................................................................. 53

10 Enclosure 3 – Collection of pronouns ..........................................................................................54

11 Enclosure 4 - British and American spelling ................................................................................ 55

13 Enclosure 5 - Geographical location ............................................................................................ 56

14 Enclosure 6 - Chagos Archipelago discourse ............................................................................... 57

15 Enclosure 7 - Chagossian people discourse ................................................................................. 60

16 Enclosure 8 - analysis of 'we' ........................................................................................................ 63

18 Enclosure 9 - depopulation discourse ......................................................................................... 68

19 Enclosure 10 - SUBJECT: HMG OUTLINES NEW PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING INTEL

FLIGHT CLEARANCES (Wikileaks) ........................................................................................................ 71

20 Eclosure 11 - SUBJECT: HMG FLOATS PROPOSAL FOR MARINE RESERVE COVERING

(Wikileaks) ............................................................................................................................................... 74

21 Enclosure 12 - SUBJECT: U.S.-UK CLUSTER MUNITIONS DIALOGUE (Wikileaks) ............... 79

22 Enclosure 13 - Letter to Joanne Yeadon ....................................................................................... 83

23 Enclosure 14 – Corpus ................................................................................................................. 85

24 Description of collection of document ....................................................................................... 86

24.1 Memo March 3 1964 .......................................................................................... 88

24.2 Memorandums May 1964 .................................................................................. 88

24.3 Minute October 20 1964 .................................................................................... 89

24.4 Memo June 12 1965 .......................................................................................... 89

Memo July 28 1965 ........................................................................................................ 90

24.5 Notes November 1965 ....................................................................................... 90

24.6 Note February 25 1966 ...................................................................................... 91

24.7 Minute June 1966 .............................................................................................. 91

24.8 August 1966 ...................................................................................................... 92

25 Note August 24 1966 .....................................................................................................................93

26 Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966 ....................................................................................... 94

27 Agreed Confidential Minutes December 30 1966 ....................................................................... 101

28 Secret side note to Agreement December 30 1966 .................................................................... 103


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28.1 Minute October 23 1968 .................................................................................. 106

28.2 Proposal July 5 1968 ....................................................................................... 106

28.3 Telegram September 4 1968 ........................................................................... 106

28.4 Minute July 25 1968 ........................................................................................ 106

29 Letter of February 3 1969 ............................................................................................................ 107

29.1 Note February 21 1969 .................................................................................... 111

29.2 Minute April 21 1969 ........................................................................................ 111

29.3 Advisory opinion January 16 1970................................................................... 111

29.4 Letter November 13 1970 ................................................................................ 112

Minute January 11 1971 ............................................................................................... 112

30 Memorandum March 16 1971 ....................................................................................................... 113

30.1 Memorandum September 14 1972 .................................................................. 117

30.2 Exchange of notes October 24 1972 ............................................................... 117

31 Exchange of notes February 25 1976 ........................................................................................... 124

Exchange of notes June 22 1976 ............................................................................................................... 135

32 UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982 ..................................................................... 136

33 Supplement December 13 1982 ................................................................................................... 139

34 Letter of November 16 1987 .......................................................................................................... 141

35 Agreement June 18 1999 .............................................................................................................. 143

36 Letter June 21 2000 ...................................................................................................................... 146

Exchanges of letters 2001-2004 .............................................................................................................. 149

36.1 Letter November 16 2004 ................................................................................ 154

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ 156

2 Table of illustrations Table 1 - Tag cloud table - words that appear 25 times or more ........................................ 47

Table 2 - collection of pronouns ......................................................................................... 54 Table 3 - British and American spelling.............................................................................. 55 Table 4 - Geographical location ......................................................................................... 56 Table 5 - Chagos Archipelago discourse ........................................................................... 57

Table 6 - Chagossian people discourse ............................................................................. 60 Table 7 - analysis of 'we' .................................................................................................... 63 Table 8 - depopulation discourse ....................................................................................... 68

Table 9 - Sender - addressee ............................................................................................ 86 Table 10 - Communication categorisation.......................................................................... 87


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1

1 Harwood Jr., Diego Garcia: The “criminal question” doctrine, 2008

Picture this:

You’re at home one evening and an armed convoy rolls into town.

Soldiers arrest you and your family, and everybody else – the whole

town. They allow you to pack one suitcase each; load you all into trucks;

machine-gun all your livestock and pets; burn your house and contents;

and a few days later deposit you on a street-corner in a slum in Mexico

City. They inform you that the U.S. Government needs your town for a

military base, and that the Border Patrol, Immigration Service, and

Coast Guard have been ordered to prevent your return to the States,

and by force if you insist.

Your lawyer tells you that U.S. Courts will not hear your complaint,

because the decision by U.S. Officers to do this is a ‘discretionary

function’ and a ‘political question’ which U.S. Courts will not interfere

with; that s/he can be fined by the Court for even filing such a hopeless

complaint; and that you have no remedy for your troubles – at least no

peaceable remedy.

Now what are you going to do?

Charles Judson Harwood Jr1, September 1, 2002


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3 Introduction The quote on the previous page is, of course, fiction. But for a specific group of islanders in the middle of

the Indian Ocean something quite similar happened around forty years ago.

Our cover, which has a focus on “United Government”, was constructed by a tagcloud generator based on a

series of documents from the British and American Governments regarding the construction of an

American army base on British soil. Why the tagcloud generator has created the compound “United

Government” from our sources, we would hang in balance, but the fact is that the army base was

constructed in cooperation between the two governments.

This army base at Diego Garcia was the reason why the whole population of the Chagos Archipelago was

exiled from the islands where all their roots lie. Instead of living in some idyllically tropical islands the

Chagossians found themselves living under poor conditions in Seychelles and Mauritius. Today, “the

footprint of freedom” (the American soldiers slang to refer to Diego Garcia, which is shaped as a horseshoe)

is one of the most important American military bases outside the US territory. Diego Garcia is the point

where the war against Afghanistan and Iraq was launched.

All of us were introduced to the case of the Chagossians through John Pilger’s award winning documentary

Stealing a Nation from 2004. The documentary inspired us to think about the language within the former

classified documents between the British and American Government and how it shaped the construction

and maintenance of the base. The availability of the documents made us been able to access internal

communications between powerful governments, and also discover how diplomacy works from the inside.

We wanted to have a critical approach to the language. The access to the language in the documents would

allow us to get to the created discourse without the eyes of the public opinion. On the basis of this, we saw

an opportunity to connect it to a CDA approach. Of those areas CDA has been covering according to

Jørgensen & Phillips (2002, p. 61) the most related to the Diego Garcia army base case would be

nationalism and identity, the spread of market practices and democracy and politics.

The quote below goes further than we are able to talking about military and intelligence; though it paints a

picture of a special relationship between the two governments and their communication:

Beyond the diplomatic and political links, an intricate network has, over the years, been established in which British and American military and intelligence officers work closely together. Such operational requirements of cooperation, whether it be on bases in Britain or more far-flung facilities, such as the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, create parallel channels of communication. (Newsom, 1987, Spring, pp. 228-9)

Creating and maintaining that base can be understood within the frame of a Neorealist International

Relations Theory. This theory emphasizes the anarchy of international relations and make clear how

powerless international institutions and laws are. Our intention is to prove if language and discourse can

constitute this idea of power regardless of laws and social practises. As long as our project is within a


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discourse and society angle we would analyse the language and the links to the social practises and social

world. Therefore we would not discuss how the social practises are created within International Relations.

Below we have put in our problem formulation but after that we will elaborate on it and ask questions

regarding power, language, discourse and the case of the construction and maintenance of the army base

in Diego Garcia.

3.1 Problem formulation

In terms of which discourses did the British and US officials through exchanged documents (internal

& external) construct and maintain the American army base at Diego Garcia?

How was the reproduction of the assumed “Chagossian” identity constructed by the two

governments?

We have identified the most important features of the creation and maintenance of the base. The creation

features would be the construction of the Chagossian identity, the depopulation act, and business aspect of

the relationship. On the other hand, the maintenance feature would be the defence and security purposes

of the base and keeping it uninhabited. Why are these four categories so important to the construction and

maintenance? How are power relations an important characteristic of these four categories? Why are social

practices and the social world an important feature shaping and reflecting the case of Diego Garcia.

In all, working with documents with diplomats and politicians as senders and addresses allows us to give

the project the title Diplomatic Discourse: the Case of Diego Garcia. Beforehand, we would like to make

clear to the reader that the use of diplomatic and diplomats is very rare since our analysis works upon the

language produced by them regarding the Diego Garcia case, but not on whom they are. This is emphasised

since we do not wish to disappoint the reader’s expectations regarding a general use of diplomatic

discourse, but expectations on how diplomats and politicians use languages and discourses in this specific

case.


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4 Methodology We have summarized the procedures we have undertaken to create this project in these two charts below.

The first step we have chosen was collecting information about both the main characteristics of CDA and all

available literature about Chagos Archipelago, latter there will be a section describing our literature and the

method of collecting it. Furthermore, there is a bibliography at the end of the project report.

We realised reading through our literature about Chagos Archipelago that our sources had some small

samples from court cases which extended version had to be searched in law journals, law scholars and

court cases. The reason why there were so many diplomatic documents and exchanges was that the

Chagossians, especially Olivier Bancoult, have sued the two respective governments. Our method of

collection was “as-much-as-accessible”, since working with diplomatic discourse implies a lot of secrecy

and classification. We have done a more specific description of the corpus collection in Description of

1•Collecting data of CDA

•Collecting data of Chagos Archipelago

2•Collecting corpus texts

•Ordering corpus texts chronologically

3•Reading corpus texts

•Starting the analysis

Discovering topics of the corpus

AnalysisChoosing the topics!

Quantative method: analysing wording in

the corpus

Qualitative method: analysing specific

sentences and paragraphs

bring the quantative and qualitative method together categorising them into the topics


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collection of document. The reason why we ordered our corpus chronologically is that this way would give a

clearer understanding of processes as well as changes in discourses and language uses.

After reading the corpus through the first time we identified topics to give an idea about what the corpus

was, as well as separate former knowledge and the actual corpus themes. After that we tried to analyse

the topics we had already collected in a quantitative manner. We counted the number of times certain

words or patterns appeared. With that information we constructed a tag cloud which helped us to identify

significant words and patterns to look upon once the qualitative analysis had started.

Inspired by our quantitative findings we chose certain structures that we wanted to do a qualitative

analysis of. We analysed how sentences and paragraphs were constructed and the choice of wording.

Some of the constructions we have looked upon are nominalisation, passive structures, pronouns usage,

time-space frame, production of identity and power relations. After bringing together quantitative and

qualitative findings, we stated six main topics on which we developed a deeper analysis:

- Avoiding public awareness of the army base.

- Chagos Archipelago discourse

- Chagossian identity discourse

- The depopulation discourse

- Business aspects of Diego Garcia from the two governments point of view

- Defence discourse

The reproduction of the Chagossian identity based on our experiences analysing the corpus, does not only

contain of the references to the Chagossian themselves but also through the reference of their homeland,

the Chagos Archipelago. Thus, we have analysed the references to the Chagos Archipelago and placed it

before the section dealing with the references to the Chagossians. We have placed the “homeland”

discourse before the Chagossian identity discourse in order to make it function as an introduction. This

inspiration is based on the Jew Diaspora and how their shared feelings about their homeland shape their

identity, similar as the case of the Chagossians.

In each topic above we went through a process starting in a quantitative approach collecting all

appearances in the corpus moving into a qualitative approach choosing significant words, phrases, clauses,

and sentences. Because of this the reader would have to look closely in to our enclosures to fully

understand our approach of analysis in some of the analysis sections. Our analysis also consists of three

additional topics.

- British and American spelling, there were two communicators which through their social practises

used the same words but different spellings, despite the fact that they are using the same

language. Two other significant differences between American and British English are vocabulary


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and grammatical structures. We chose not to include these features in the project report, because

we have not found as many as of the other category in our corpus.

- Use of pronouns and passive structures (further explained in section Pronouns and in section

Analysis of passive structures within the gathered official documents)

- Geographical framing was analysed in order to identify agents and locations of actions that were, in

some examples, expressed as power relations.

4.1.1 Order of the analysis in the project report

The order of the analysis in the project report is based on the principle of going from a broader and

quantitative approach to the topic to a really specific qualitative analysis focused on samples of texts and

their construction. We also have ordered the topics following a principle of linking different sections of

analysis, ending up on the purpose of the army base.

4.1.2 Front Page

We have constructed a tag cloud on the front page based on our findings in Enclosure 1– List of words

repeated 25 times or more. The reason for doing this was to give the reader an impression what the corpus

analysed was about illustrated through a topicalization based on word counts. We are fully aware of that it

seems little unstructured and information overload, but our experience is that tag clouds often are

perceived like that at first hand. If not discovered, the tag cloud is clip into a satellite photograph of Diego

Garcia in the background.

4.1.3 Choice of words

When we talk about the Islands geographically situated near to the geographical centre of the Indian Ocean

we refer to them as the Chagos Archipelago instead of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). Further it is

important to emphasise that the project report circles around the largest island of the Chagos Archipelago,

namely Diego Garcia, so naturally Diego Garcia would be more used than the Chagos Archipelago.

When we talk about the people who used to live in the Chagos and their descendents we use ‘Chagossian’.

As you will discover in one of the analysing sections there has been quite a lot of different expressions used

to describe who these people are. Further as an interview (done earlier this year) made us aware of are

that in the public and academic world the people originating from the Chagos Archipelago and their

descendents are often ‘just’ referred to as the Chagossians, since it is conceived that they are a

homogenous group of people. But as the interviewee emphasised was that the islands are located with

large distance in between, so they were not as connected and homogenous as ‘presented’. This has

especially come into play when the ‘Chagossians’ has won court cases from time to time since the late 90’s

and gained the right of return. That has been portrayed as right to return of all the people to all the islands,


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when it is actually a fact that they have never won a case to return to Diego Garcia, and the right of return

of those who perceive themselves as ‘Diego Garcians’2. Even though we are aware of this we have chose to

use Chagossian, since it was the whole population that were expelled.

When we talk about the process of making the islands being uninhabited (or as one US official described it

in a secret document: ‘Swept and sanitized’ (Pilger, Stealing a Nation, 2007, p. 44)) we use depopulation.

4.1.4 Tables of ‘Chagos Archipelago’ discourse, ‘Chagossian identity’ discourse and ’Depopulation’

discourse We have created the tables regarding the ‘Chagos Archipelago’, ‘Depopulation’ and ‘Chagossian identity’

discourse showing the specific term used (e.g. clause, phrase, etc.) to the left and then the times it

appears and in which documents. The order of table is fairly chronologically. Our tables rank the order by

first time it appears, and if it is repeated in later documents, because of that it is not totally chronological.

The reason for this choice of method is that it gives us a chance to see whether the discourse has changed

over time as well as if some terms are reused on and on. In the ‘Depopulation’ table we have added

another column for analysing whether a nominalisation process has happened.

4.2 Literature

Our sources are mainly western academic work. Our main sources collected are listed below with a

comment added.

David Vine’s book Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia 2009.

Anthropologist David Vine focuses in his book on the assumed production of the Chagossians, but who he

uses ‘the Ilois’ to describe. All along his book he proves the Ilois to be an ingenuous people. Furthermore,

he gives a quite detailed historical outline of the people and construction of the base. Since he is American

his main focus is upon the American side of the history, as revealed in the title.

Peter H. Sand’s book United States and Britain in Diego Garcia 2009. Law Scholar P.H. Sand focuses a lot

upon the legal aspects of the case from both sides. Furthermore, his book did a great contribution to our

project by making us realise the accessibility of full length documents and text samples. Another aspect is

his environmental and environmental law aspect upon the case. Unfortunately, his book does not include

the Marine Protected Area constructed April 1, 2010.

Richard Edis’ book Peak of Limuria: the Story of Diego Garcia and the Chagos Archipelago 2004

The book gives an historical outline upon various topics regarding the Chagos Archipelago, varying from

natural history and science, biodiversity and the construction of the army base.

Vytautas Blaise Bandjunis’ book Diego Garcia: Creation of the Indian Ocean Base 2001

2 Interview with Allen Vincatassin, Diego Garcian Community Leader, July 31, 2010 at Allen’s office in Crawley,

West Sussex (interviewer: J. B. Rasmussen)


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Bandjunis’ as a former American military personal stationed at Diego Garica, paints a picture of the

construction from the Army base from the inside and American point of view. It is really clear to the reader

that it is one of the first full length books released in the US about Diego Garcia, missing historical facts, as

well as lack of academic references, argumentation and what is assumed as “academic language”.

Furthermore, it is very one-wayed American point of view.

Chapter in Catherine Lutz’ book The Empire of Bases: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts

chapter: “Give us back Diego Garcia”: Unity and Division among Activists in the Indian Ocean

John Pilger’s book “Freedom Next Time” the chapter “Stealing a Nation” 2007

Chapters in Tim Slessor’s “Lying in State: how Whitehall Denies, Dissembles and Deceives” “The Ilois: The

purpose is to maintain the fiction” 2004

The three chapters, in the books above, circle around the Diego Garcia army base as an example suitable

for the books themes regarding governance, human rights violations and military. Unfortunately, we were

not able to access all the work released upon the Chagos Archipelago, two examples are (only available in

India at the present time of data collection):

- KS Jawatkar: Diego Garcia in International Diplomacy, 1983

- Ian Walker: Zaffer pe sanze: Ethnic identity and social change among the Ilois in Mauritius, 1986

Almost all the books circle around the use of language of the internal and external exchange documents

between the UK and US Governments, without analysing the language, and this is where our project report

comes into justification. We have tried to do a research upon similar cases analysed in a CDA approach

without any luck. The most related cases of analysis upon previous classified documents has been the wel-

known linguistic Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn in their essays upon the Pentagon Papers. Unfortunately

we have not been able to access the essays, but we are aware of their existence. A CDA approach done

upon a specific part of the Pentagon Papers has been done by Moya Ann Ball in: Revisiting the Gulf of

Tonkin Crisis: An Analysis of the Private Communication of President Johnson and his Advisers.

Connected to the Pentagon Papers mentioned before we have decided to enclose the contemporary

answer: Wikileaks. We have found three documents relating to the Diego Garcia army base.

Our expectations of the newly leaked classified US Embassy cables are a continuation of the development

this genre we are researching within: Critical Discourse Analysis applied to diplomatic communication

exchanges, which are classified/secret or previously classified/secret documents. We will elaborate in a

small scale upon the Wikileaks in next section.

4.3 Wikileaks

Connected to in the previous section regarding literature, we have decided to enclose three Wikileaks

documents, one highly relevant carrying the subject: HMG FLOATS PROPOSAL FOR MARINE RESERVE


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COVERING THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO. We have tried to incorporate the documents as much as possible

to try to discover any changes in discourse and language use but due to the late leakage it has of course

been limited how much we could used them. Had the deadline being later we would, of course, have added

them to the corpus of analysis instead of just enclosed them.

The importance we give to the cables released through Wikileaks has been ratified, by Noam Chomsky as

follows,

In fact, the current leaks are -- what I've seen, at least -- primarily interesting because of what they tell us about how the diplomatic service works. (Chomsky, 2010)

4.3.1 Responsibility of written material

We would like to make the reader aware of the fact that we had difficulties when stating the authorship of

each part of the project report. This is due to the fact that we had a really close cooperation while

producing the written material. Therefore the authors stated in the table of contents are random since we

had to state areas of responsibility for each student.


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5 Theory

CDA stands for Critical Discourse Analysis and it is an extended school of thought that has its main aims on

communication and discourse. CDA, even if it focuses on communication, does not use only a linguistic

approach, in fact, CDA is a social research trend. CDA scholars understand that discourse itself is one of the

basic constitutors of society, so if we want to understand a certain society we should start by analysing how

discourse is created and addressed to the citizens by the, official or not, elites.

The main defenders of this type of approach argue that anything can be established on an “a priori”

manner when talking about the effects that discourse and its shaping has in our lives. Each citizen would

have a different reaction towards the same discursive input. This reaction will depend on the individual

beliefs, ideologies and personal background of each person. So we can say that each discourse can be seen

as a different utterance depending of the addressed. Fairclough clearly states that “discourses differ in how

social events are represented, what is excluded or included, how abstractly or concretely events are

represented, and how more specifically the processes and relations, social actors, time and place or events

are represented”. (Fairclough, 2003: 17). When it comes to analyse a text or discourse from a CDA

perspective we have to keep these differences in mind because the personal background of the researcher

will have certain influence on the result. It is clear that “what we are able to see of the actuality of a text

depends upon the perspective from which we approach it, including the particular social issues in focus,

and the social theory and discourse theory we draw upon” (Fairclough, 2003: 16) We also should have on

account that the (CDA) scholars said that no theory can be separated from the environment (social,

political, economical and ideological) where it is produced. Even the researchers have to admit that their

own ideologies and personal backgrounds have a real influence on their works, on how they do the

research and even on the results. As Fairclough states:

there is no such thing as an ‘objective’ analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which

simply describes what is ‘there’ in the text without being ‘biased’ by the ‘subjectivity’ of the

analyst. As I have already indicated, our ability to know what is ‘there’ is inevitability limited

and partial. And the questions we ask necessarily arise from particular motivations which go

beyond what is ‘there’

(Fairclough 2003, 14-15).

As long as CDA is a social research method, we can assume it as an adequate technique to understand how

power and ideological dominance work, but it cannot be used on its own to analyse these situations.

Overall, social sciences depend on each other to draw results from their researches and CDA is not an

exception. Even though scholars take as a point of departure a linguistic approach, textual analysis cannot


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be seen as the only way to understand a discourse. Critical Discourse Analysis, then, should be seen as an

open process which relies on other social sciences and their methodologies. As a result we can assume that

Critical Discourse Analysis is not a fixed theory or a static thinking current. Neither does it want to give only

a unique explanation of reality.

Nowadays the power and dominance relationships in our societies are enforced by the use of certain

discursive structures which shape our ideologies. This is the reason why one of the main objectives of CDA

is to clarify and bring to light the way on which inequality works in our societies, mainly through the

manipulation of the public opinion and of the citizens' minds and ways of thinking. As Van Dijk states CDA

approach wants not only to highlight social inequality, but also to “take explicit position, and thus want to

understand, expose and ultimately to resist social inequality” (Van Dijk, 2008: 85)

The social inequality which Van Dijk talks about is produced through the manipulation of the public opinion.

The fact that public opinion can be manipulated depends on some of the human cognitive structures that

can be called, according to George Lakoff, ‘frames’. We can say that a frame is a structured collection of

concepts that we use to filter and interpret inputs from the world, in fact, frames

tend to structure a huge amount of our thought. Each frame has roles (like a cast of characters), relations between the roles, and scenarios carried out by those playing the roles. (Lakoff, 2008: 22)

The way we understand what surround us is based upon these fixed concepts and if someone is able to

shape these concepts that lie really deep in our mind, that person can also control how we think. When this

takes place, arouses what Van Dijk calls “manipulation”, an action which

implies the exercise of a form of illegitimate influence by means of discourse: manipulators make others believe or do things that are in the interest of the manipulator, and against the best interests of the manipulated (Van Dijk, 1998: 10)

As a conclusion, when doing a CDA analysis, we should not forget that all our words and our interactions

are always full of underlying meanings, even if we are not aware of them. In our daily conversations we, as

citizens and individuals, actually use a language that “shape and constrain our identities, relationships, and

systems of knowledge and beliefs. [...] the nature of our social relationships, and our knowledge and belief

systems are shaped and constrained by the language and words espoused by us and by others” (McGregor,

2003)

5.1 CDA practice

If we now move to the practice of CDA as a social analysing tool we just should start by questioning

ourselves about the reality that surrounds us. The area we must try to uncover is that related to the way

we speak, we communicate and how elites (official or not) address their ideas to us, the citizens. We may

take as a point of departure McGregor when she motivates us to ask ourselves: “How can they even think


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that way? What are they really saying? Do all people believe this? What else could have been

said?”(McGregor, 2003). McGregor proposes this beginning just before warning us that we must never take

for granted all the words, expressions and interactions of elites. The reason she argues is that “our words

are politicized, even if we are not aware of it, because they carry the power that reflects the interests of

those who speak”. (McGregor 2003). We, as citizens and as CDA analysts should be aware of the discursive

manipulation to which we are exposed. But, as we said before, we cannot forget that also our words and

our visions of reality are biased and that they will have certain influence in the results of our investigations.

The next step- the first in fact- that McGregor proposes when analysing any document, speech, or verbal

interaction, relates to the existence of “frames” among our unconscious way of thinking.

To analyse the frames we just need to look at how the discourse is presented. McGregor adds a few lines

describing a possible way of doing that, establishing the analysis of Huckin (“Critical discourse analysis” In T.

Miller (Ed.), Functional approaches to written text 1997) as a point of departure for understanding the

framing of any kind of discourse. This approach is focused on how these specific concepts are portrayed

(McGregor 2003, “Critical Discourse Analysis – A Primer”, in Critical Science and Critical Discourse Analysis,

vol. 15 nº 1, Spring 2003, Kappa omicron nu forum, http://www.kon.org/archives/forum/15-

1/mcgregorcda.html accessed on 22nd November):

1) choosing and placing specific photographs, diagrams, sketches, and other embellishments to get the

reader’s attention;

2) using headings and keywords to emphasize certain concepts by giving them textual prominence (called

foregrounding if the text is emphasized and backgrounding if text is there but de-emphasized or

minimized);

3) leaving certain things out completely, counting on if it is not mentioned, the average reader will not

notice its absence, and thereby not scrutinize it;

4) using certain words that take certain ideas for granted, as if there is no alternative (presupposition),

begging the question, “What could have been said that wasn’t, and why not”; and,

5) manipulating the reader by using selective voices to convey the message that certain points of view are

more correct, legitimate, reliable, and significant while leaving out other voices (referred to as register and

relates to who the voice belongs to, such as elected politicians, corporation presidents, union leaders,

bureaucrats, laborers, criminals).

After analysing the framing McGregor proposes a next step in which we analyse small bits of the text,

maybe sentences or even words. There are, also, several techniques to do that and this scholar quotes

Huckin on how are used the tools of topicalisation, agency, presupposition, and connotations when


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creating a discourse. As a result, we have taken McGregor as a reference when doing the analysis. She

inspired us on the election of these topics. Therefore, the points we intend to analyse are the following:

We are going to look upon topicalisation. It is the choice of vocabulary that creates a certain perspective in

the reader. We would take a look on which grammar constructions are used to describe a certain group of

people or situation.

After that, we will look on the existence of agency. It involves the portrayal or not of the subject of the

action and the reflection on how the power is displayed. We would look upon how governments refer to

each other and how they talk about of the Îlois.

The following step we will take would be the analysis of presuppositions. They are statements that the

public takes for granted even if they do not know for sure what happens. It is important to know the social

recognition of the author among the public. As we noticed in the official letters we have collected, there

are certain communicative strategies to address to the public opinion when talking about a specific topic.

These strategies would form the latter presuppositions.

In addition, we will search for connotations. They imply series of ideas that are shared among a public

based on a common cultural knowledge. As we have found, most of them would be related to national

security and defence ideas.

Another important feature of our analysis will be the use of pronouns. We would focus on how they use

“we” as an inclusive or exclusive category. The analysis of pronouns would be also useful to understand

how the categories of “us” and “others” are portrayed.

We have found that in several letters there are references that point to other former documents, this is

known as intertextuality. Most of these references point to official international agreements such as the

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-BAN treatment or the Charter of United Nations (specially article 73)

Our final step will be to study how the modal verbs appear in the different texts. We are especially

interested in how these verbs portray the authority relationship between the sender and the receiver.

We can conclude that all the features we intend to analyse can be covered by the “ten points” of Fairclough

approaching to CDA which try to make clear what should be looked upon when doing a CDA analysis.

McGregor’s propositions can be understood in a more simple way than Fairclough’s but are mainly the

same.

5.2 Identity

Through all the analysis we have undertaken we can see that in international relations texts and discourses

base themselves in a major principle that explains that the text in itself shapes what can be taken as reality.

As we have argued before it also has to be understood that every individual has its own reaction to what he


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or she is exposed. Obviously, these concepts have an effect on how the identity is constructed in the mind

of each individual. As Derrida states, “there is nothing beyond the text: reality is always representation, and

therefore it is language that constitutes the “I” of the subject and brings it into being through the process of

signification.” (Benwell, 2006: 31)

Identity can be constituted as something individual, but as human beings feel the need to fit in a specific

group, to which they share some connection, identity becomes also a matter of social interaction within

larger communities. Among the various theories that analyse how people interact in everyday life, the

Social Identity Theory explains that “social identity (as opposed to personal identity) is defined by

individual identification with a group: a process constituted firstly by a reflexive knowledge of group

membership, and secondly by emotional attachment or specific disposition to this belonging”.(Benwell,

2006: 25) This theory emphasizes on the socio – cognitive processes of membership and how it initiates and

maintains. The membership to a group is defined by the activities in which one is engaged in contrast to the

ones performed by other groups. An interesting way of understanding the everyday life´ discourse that has

also been used in the field of international relations, is acknowledging that we usually define ourselves in

terms of the belonging to a group in opposition to all the other possible groups that surround us. This

would be the construction of our group as “Us” against “Others”. Using this device, we could also create an

“enemy”.


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6 Analysis In this section we intend to go through the discourses related to the army base in Diego Garcia, the created

and assumed identity of the Chagossians and the internal communications between all the governments

involved in the affair. Our intention was to get the closest possible vision of how these discourses were

entwined and which have been their effects along the last forty years.

6.1 British and American spelling

We have decided that our analysis starts by illustrating the different social practice in spelling between the

two central countries in our corpus namely the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of

the United States of America. It has been naturalised3 that there are differences in British and American

spelling practices.

We have collected the cases of different spellings within the two languages and organised them in a table

comparing the ways of spelling and the times they appear in Enclosure 4 - British and American spelling.

The table shows a great variation of words and through some main differences between British English and

American English we have chosen some examples and explained them.

Honour/ Honor

The British spelling, due to its French influence and contact to this language during the middle Ages,

developed a diphthong /ou/ that was lost in the evolution of it on the United States. Due to this fact, some

words have different spelling, as can be concluded from the example.

Defence/defense

The American word ‘defense’ follows the Anglo - French spelling. Nonetheless, the British changed into a

/c/ although the fact that it is pronounced as an /s/.In spite of this change, both still use different endings

to differ from nouns and verbs, nouns ending in –ce and verbs in –se. American English has only abandon

this method in words like ‘practice’ and ‘license’ which uses both of them either for nouns or verbs.

Authorise/Authorize

The use of /s/ in the British case and /z/ in the American one can be explained by the usage that was done

to it in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In those times the expression preferred was with the /s/

ending, which was the one that prevailed in the United Kingdom, but the one accepted by the great

dictionaries of the epoch, such as Johnson’s, was with the /z/ ending, which was chosen by the American.

Centre/Center

Although the pronunciation is done as /er/, the British spelling is /re/ as a result of the usage with French,

Latin, and Greek words after a consonant in these words. In America, the spelling matches the

3 Fairclough’s concept for what is otherwise known as ‘common knowledge’ (a naturalized expressions as well!)


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pronunciation, and that is the reason why the letter´s order changes. Also has to be taken in consideration

that this orthographical change in British English allows them to distinguish between some words as metre,

the unit of length, to meter, the measuring instrument.

The most significant, thereby meaning the most repeated pair in the corpus, of the differences in spelling, is

defence/defense. That pair frames one of the important topics of the corpus, namely defence and security

purposes of the base, which we will elaborate on in the end of the analysis. Next up we will analyse the

discourse regarding why it was of such importance to keep secrecy around the army base before going

deeper into the critical discourse analysis.

6.2 Public knowledge of the affair on Diego Garcia’s military base. How UK and US

Government coped with (the) Public Opinion? We traced the knowledge that citizens and other international politics (apart from the ones directly

involved) had on what was going on behind the curtains to create a military American base on the Chagos

Archipelago in an historical line. This way we can get to see better the different approaches that United

States and British Governments took to portray the creation of the B.I.O.T. (British Indian Ocean Territory),

the depopulation of the Chagos Archipelago and the establishment of military facilities on Diego Garcia.

Attending to the data collected and chronologically organised, the observation that can be draw is that the

attitudes of the ones in charge in both Governments changed according to the historical and international

context. We will try to trail the line which the official documents followed along the years.

According to David Vine (2009) publicity of the affair was something that really bothered both

governments. Even if, in general, there was no much international interest around the Indian Ocean area,

the United Kingdom and the United States were aware that their movements would be suspicious among

the international community. This awareness led them to try to silence the media on this affair, in several

times. Vine reports that

despite attempts to maintain the total secrecy of the discussions and planning, the Washington Post was ready to run a story about the London Agreements by June 15, 1964. Fearing that the story may derail their plans, Kitchen and Assistant Secretary of State Jeff Greenfield went to meet with the managing editor of the Post, Alfred Friendly, to ask him to hold the story

(Vine 2009: 80)

Nonetheless the method of silencing the media was not the only strategy that they were engaged in. At

first terms, back to the end of sixties, the policy that the United Kingdom and the United States promoted

was denying not only connections but also their plans related to Diego Garcia. They also stated how

important was to get the collaboration of other colonial governments on the overseas territories. They


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clearly remarked that the publicity around the project they were undertaking could damage not only their

image in front of the United Nations (UN) but also the feasibility of the future military base on Diego Garcia.

(On a telegram from September 4, 1968. From US Embassy in London to State Departement)

[...]Most difficult question likely to be how and when to make project public knowledge. It will clearly be necessary for both governments to concert closely over this. It is essential to preclude unfavourable reactions by governments of India and Mauritius by taking them into our confidence before there is any possibility of project becoming publicly known or rumoured. UKUN [UK Mission to UN in New York] would prefer no public announcement before end of coming session of General Assembly. (Our emphasis)

On a second phase they, somehow, admitted the existence of some kind of plans relating to the Chagos

Archipelago. In addition they tried to prepare the public opinion for the hypothetical moment when they

would have to admit that they intended to build a military base on Diego Garcia. They even exchanged, at

least one, press guidance stating how they should react in front of an unexpected leakage. The main point

stated was that the only facility present in the island would be a refuelling station.

(From a letter of February 3, 1969. From the Embassy of the United States in London to Richard A. Sykes,

Esq., C.M.G., M.C. Defence Department Foreign and Commonwealth Office)

Notwithstanding our desires, we recognize there is a danger of premature leakage before the Committee hearings are held. To preserve our general credibility, we believe that any public statement we find it necessary to make at this time should take into account the facts previously given out, and, to the extent that security permits, prepare the ground for an eventual announcement of the decision to proceed with facilities in the BIOT. In the event that a public statement becomes unavoidable, therefore, we propose using the following

“Since concluding an agreement (subsequently published) with the United Kingdom in 1966, we have been in a continuing review with British authorities about the possible use for refueling and communications facilities of a number of islands in the Indian Ocean. Additional review and decisions have yet to be made prior to the implementation of any plans.”

(The U.S. representative in the United Nations Committee of 24 made a statement on July 19, 1967, acknowledging that the U.S. and U.K. had an agreement permitting the establishment of “refueling and communications facilities” in the BIOT, but disclaiming plans to build a “military base”.)

Please let me know if this press guidance is acceptable to your Government. (Bold in original, our italics)

When media and public attention focused on the Chagos Archipelago and the British and American

movements in the area, the problem was not related only to the government actions but to what was going

to happen with the population on the islands. The question of identity arises in this moment when they

have to decide how to portray them publicly. After deep considerations they concluded that the most

suitable policy would be to deny the existence of “inhabitants” and rely only on the idea that the people

there were only temporary “copra workers”. This manoeuvre proved to be a way to elude the

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/bancoult-d16b1.html#1966


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responsibilities acquired by signing the United Nations Charter in 1945 (especially Article 73) as we can read

in the next documents from our corpus.

( From Advisory opinion on purpose of Immigration Ordinance January 16 1970 by Anthony I. Aust (later

CMG), assistant legal adviser of the FCO, UK)

Purpose of Immigration Ordinance

(a) To provide legal power to deport people who will not leave voluntarily;

(b) to prevent people entering;

(c) to maintain the fiction that the inhabitants of Chagos are not a permanent or semi-permanent population. I will consider these separately.

“Maintaining the fiction”:

As long as only part of BIOT is evacuated the British Government will have to continue to argue that the local people are only a floating population. This may be easier in the case of the non-Chagos part of BIOT ... where most of the people are Seychellois labourers and their families. However, the longer that such a population remains, and perhaps increases, the greater the risk of our being accused of setting up a mini-colony about which we would have to report to the United Nations under Article 73 of the Charter. Therefore strict immigration legislation giving such labourers and their families very restricted rights of residence would bolster our arguments that the territory has no indigenous population. (our emphasis)

[Letter marked: (“secret and personal”) from November 13, 1970. From Eleanor J. Emery, Head of the Pacific and Indian Ocean Department, FCO. To Sir Bruce Greatbatch, Governor of the Seychelles]

As you will have gathered from Washington Tel. No. 3229 to the F.C.O., from the ‘Times Diary’ of 9 November, and from the two P.Q.s in our telegram B.I.O.T. 22 of 10 November, there has recently been a revival of public interest in the British Indian Ocean territory.

[...]We would not wish it to become general knowledge that some of the inhabitants have lived on Diego Garcia for at least two generations and could, therefore, be regarded as “belongers”.

We shall therefore advise Ministers in handling supplementary questions about whether Diego Garcia is inhabited to say that there is only a small number of contract labourers from the Seychelles and Mauritius engaged to work on the copra plantations on the Island.

Should a Member ask about what would happen to these contract labourers in the event of a base being set up on the Island, we hope that, for the present, this can be brushed aside as a hypothetical question at least until any decision to go ahead with the Diego Garcia facility becomes public.” (our emphasis)

As we can see from the previous excerpts even if it had been public interest about the B.I.O.T and the

future of the islands, the governments still kept in 1970 the hopes that the affair would not become known.

Even if in 1971 some information about Diego Garcia was officially released on the BIOT Gazette the

expectations of not getting publicity relied on the fact that this publication “*...+has only very limited

circulation both here and overseas, after signature by the Commissioner. Publicity will therefore be

minimal.” (From a minute of January 11, 1971 written by Anthony I. Aust (later CMG), assistant legal adviser

of the FCO, UK)


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Despite the fact that they were really able to keep most of the procedures out of public sight both

governments were extremely aware, even seriously worried, of the consequences that they would have to

face in the future regarding the threatening of human rights in Diego Garcia. This is fairly exposed on this

paragraph written by Stoddart (Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, US) to Sir Bruce Greatbatch (Governor of

the Seychelles, UK) on a 1972 Memorandum.

the relocation of the former copra workers on Diego Garcia has worked out fairly well, with little adverse publicity, although resettlement is not yet completed and the possibility exists that unfavourable publicity may still result from this process. The UK is responsible for the resettlement, but the US cannot escape identification with the problem. (our emphasis)

As we have seen along this series of documents it is quite clear that public knowledge of what they intend

to do in Diego Garcia was a subject that really worried both American and British Government. This can be

related to the effects that the discovery of the threatening of human rights would have not only on their

international credibility but the economic feasibility of their plans on the B.I.O.T.

6.3 Geographical framing

A feature of a Critical Discourse Analysis is the time-space frame. As described in the case introduction, the

corpus extends over the time of decolonisation under the Cold War (1964) to today’s globalised world and

the War against Terror (2004). As large and extensive as the time frame is the space frame, and to give the

reader an overview over the space we have done a research on the geographical places mentioned in the

corpus and created the table to be found in Enclosure 5 - Geographical location. Since the agents of the

corpus are mainly Governments (the UK and US) an important feature is what they govern, basically the

geographical bounded territories, as well as those locations of interest.

On basis of the table we can quickly identify that the geographical locations, even though 40 different

geographical locations, circles around the two agents, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the

geographical area of action, the Indian Ocean, and the surrounding parts. Further it is important to add,

that the abbreviations have not been accounted apart from BIOT4, nevertheless the corpus does contain

1107 references to geographical locations. Taking that into account, we can without discussion make clear

that geographical bounded territories are really significant in the discourse of the corpus.

Further, we have chosen to implement world(wide) (noun and adjective based on conversion) and global

(adjective: conversion of globe), since they give an impression of the discourse or rather a change in

discourse in the corpus since they only occur in the documents from 2000 and 2004. Global is used when

communicating about US military actions (Letter November 16 2004) whereas world(wide) ( Letter June 21

4 E.g. UK and US are quite heavily used.


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2000, Letter November 16 2004) is used to emphasise the unique location of Diego Garcia in comparison

with other bases:

The Chagos Archipelago's geographic location, isolation and uninhabited state make it unique among operating bases throughout the world.

The boundaries of the specific area of action, the Chagos Archipelago, are referred to 335 times in different

variations such as Diego Garcia, BIOT, Peros Banhos etc.

This analysis and table in the enclosure could easily be criticised relating to Fairclough’s time-space analysis

tool, since it does not incorporate nouns5 used to refer to the space. Clearly, that is a choice made by us

since our analysis has pointed us in the directions that the uses of nouns relating to the time-space frame

was much more interesting in the case of looking specifically at the Chagos Archipelago, which next section

will deal with under the heading “Chagos Archipelago discourse”.

6.4 Chagos Archipelago discourse

As prepared for in the previous section we will in this section do an analysis of the way of referring to the

Chagos Archipelago, since we discovered that it is referred to with a wide use of vocabulary. In Enclosure 6

- Chagos Archipelago discourse is the table counting the references, ranked as described in the

methodology. The collection is a combination of geographical names as well as articles and nouns and

clauses existing of articles, nouns, prepositions, verbs, adjectives, adverbs etc. This collection of references

to the Chagos Archipelago as well as more specifically Diego Garcia does reveal some of the patterns and

discursive practices of the British and American Government which we will analyse below.

The most used reference to the Chagos Archipelago by far is the specific proper noun Diego Garcia (180

times). The second most used is the abbreviated form of the British Indian Ocean Territory6: BIOT (72

times). The term BIOT states their ownership over the archipelago. The Mauritian Government claims the

Chagos Archipelago as well as the British, but by using BIOT the British and American Government neglect

that claim. The language choice reinforces the power relations and social structures of international

relations emphasized in the quote below:

It would be unacceptable to both the British and the American defence authorities if facilities of the kind proposed were in any way to be subject to the political control of ministers of a newly emergent independent state7 (Minute October 20 1964)

The ‘Chagos Archipelago’, though used 31 times in the corpus, nearly appears in the exchanges of notes

regarding contracts since they use British Indian Ocean Territory or BIOT, since US and UK are the only

states of the world that recognise the state of British Indian Ocean Territory. A change in the discourse on

5 except for world(wide) (the conversion of world into a adjective) and global

6 38 times used making it the fourth most common reference.

7 Referring to Mauritius


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basis of the social relations as well as unequal power relations is for instance indicated in our only

document involving a third part in the 1982 document between UK and Mauritius Governments where the

only time BIOT appears is as an order of law as seen in this quote:

All acts, matters and things done by or pursuant to the British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965, including the closure of the plantations in the Chagos Archipelago,

Instead they use Chagos Archipelago (3 times), British possession and claims (10 times) referring to the

islands. Especially, the use of British possession reveals the unequal power relation between the two

governments. Though, it is important to emphasise that the Mauritian Government are not the most

suppressed in this document which we will analyse in the section regarding the Chagossian identity

discourse. The use of British possession reflects the power relations as well as shapes and reflects the social

structures of the two parties. Two single appearing references portraying the power relations through

nouns instead of proper nouns are “some rocks” and “Copra plantations of a number of islands” occurring

in the corpus before the construction of the army base, devaluating the islands. Actually, the term “the

islands” is the second most common reference constructed by a noun, appearing 38 times. This term

proves that there is intertextuality within the corpus, because by being it used, should be understood which

islands are referred to as in this example:

of particular importance that the decision taken by the Colonial Office should be that there are no permanent inhabitants in BIOT. First and foremost it is necessary to establish beyond doubt what inhabitants there are at present in the islands (Minute June 1966)

The most used noun referring to the Chagos Archipelago is “the Territory” it is used 52 times in the 1966

exchanges of notes document plus two times in the agreed confidential minutes out of the 61 cases. There

is a clear reason for this discourse and the concentration of the term stated in the quote below:

the islands of Diego Garcia and the remainder of the Chagos Archipelago, and the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar, and Desroches constituting the British Indian Ocean Territory, hereinafter referred to as “the Territory”. (Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966)

Although the quantity of “the Territory” is roughly the double of “the islands”, the latter term is more

representative because it is widespread, apart from the seventies, along the entire corpus.

What is important to emphasise as well is that not all references are exclusively to the Chagos Archipelago,

one case could be ‘the Indian Ocean islands’ written in late December 1966 which includes Mauritius, the

Seychelles etc. Another example is ‘the Dependencies’ from a May 1964 document.

We would like to end up the analysis by illustrating a change in discourse regarding the valuing of the

Chagos Archipelago and especially Diego Garcia. As analysed above, the UK and US Governments were

devaluating the islands before the construction of the army base, but that is not the case anymore. We

have collected four sentences which illustrate this fact.


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Diego Garcia’s desirability as a location for such varied past and future military operations hinges on the combination of its strategic location and isolation, which is unique among operating locations around the world. (Letter June 21 2000)

the current and future strategic value of Diego Garcia (Letter June 21 2000)

Diego Garcia represents for us an all but indispensable platform (Letter June 21 2000)

The United States has an interest in preserving the security of the Archipelago and in protecting Diego Garcia's strategic value. (Letter November 16 2004)

As we have proved with our texts, both terms “some rocks” and “copra plantations of a number of islands”,

where used before the army base was constructed (1965 and 1966 by the UK Government respectively)

and the ones that refer to the islands in a more positive way were written after 2000 in the era of US

hegemony in the Indian Ocean as well as the world. We can see here a connection between economic

investments and the valuing of the islands. In some way it was logical that the UK Government tried to

devaluate the islands in order to spend the less possible on their depopulation. On the other hand, is also

logical that the US Government had tried to increase again the value of the islands based on their

investments. We will elaborate on the economical and business aspects of the construction and

maintenance of the base in the section Resettlement of Diego Garcia seen as a Business. There have been

some disputes about the value of the islands among British and American Governments. This can be related

to the study of how pronouns are used and how they portray the relationship between both governments.

6.5 Pronouns

We have decided to analyse the use of pronouns in the collection of documents we have gathered, hence

we have done a research of the pronouns in the corpus to discover what were the most significant. We

have attached our findings in Enclosure 3 – Collection of pronouns.

One of the most common ways of shaping a discourse is the creation of a feeling of membership among the

audience. Every speaker can create a climate, by a conscious use of pronouns that allows the addressed to

feel as being part of something bigger. The use of pronouns in this specific way is called, especially when it

is about creating an “imaginary group”, “inclusive we”. On the other hand, the opposite imaginary

construction also exists. The same pronoun can be used to separate the speakers from the audience and

allow the receivers to understand that they do not belong to the same group of the people that is

addressing to them (“exclusive we”).

Our intention was to search for grammatical constructions that would refer to a group or which presented

the two governments as a whole. This presupposition is based in what we have already read, as in some

documents appear words such as share, union, etc. The use of these words induced us to think that as they


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were working together, and sharing duties and rights on the island, they would consider themselves as a

group.

After the analysis of the use of this pronoun, we have obtained a completely different result than the one

we expected. These results are attached in Enclosure 8 - analysis of 'we'. We hoped that the use of an

inclusive pronoun would be higher due to the close relationship between United Kingdom and the United

States8. We find that this use of the pronoun seldom appears, but we also realized that when the need of

reference to the two governments arises, the constructions “both governments” and “two governments”

are used. Most of the time, these constructions refer to the United Kingdom and the United States, but in

just one case, they refer to the United Kingdom and Mauritius. As we considered it quite relevant and

related to the use of passive, we will analyse it in the following section.

More pronouns can also be interesting to be an analysed, as the case of “I”. The number of times it

appeared was higher than we expected, it actually 61 times within the corpus. At the beginning of our

readings we thought that the presence of the pronoun could indicate a close relationship between the

sender and the addressee. After analyzing the presence of this pronoun, we can conclude that the main

uses given to it were in fixed constructions that just reaffirm the modality of these formal exchanges, for

example as in the sentence “I have the hono(u)r”, which appears 35 times. If we also look at the possessive

form of I (“my”), we obtain the same results. Most of the times that it appears is in the fixed construction

“My highest consideration”, that is usually offered to the addressee at the ending of the letters. The

politeness in the documents is another feature we looked upon. Appear mainly at the headings of the

correspondence gathered. On one hand, this characteristic way of addressing shows that the texts analysed

are very formal. On the other, shows that the relationship which we thought was close between the United

States and United Kingdom, turns out to be a colder and a more polite one than we expected.

Another case can be created on the use of “your”, it appears 52 times within the entire collection of

documents. We have found that the main appearances of this pronoun are related to an intertextual

function; in fact it appears more than a half of the times that it is actually used in the whole collection of

official documents. The next most important use of the pronoun deals with formality, usually followed by

“Excellency”. The existence of interxtuality creates a common thread along the whole corpus analysed that

allows the researcher to have a clear vision of the events.

8 The first direct correspondence in our corpus between the two governments is the agreement from December

30, 1966 and ‘we’ do not appear a single time. Anyway we expected to find “inclusive we” uses in internal letters as they were supposed to be working together.


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6.6 Analysis of passive structures within the gathered official documents

They assume, as we can see through the secrets memos that their actions were scarcely legal. In the

agreements we expect to find the passive structures, as a tool to hide the agent of the actions that had

taken place, and as a result protect themselves from public opinion. We have taken into account the

passive structures, because they are one of the grammatical forms that most easily pay attention to the

action not to the agent, and as a result the performer is usually omitted. This omission, creates confusion

on the reader who does not really know who has carried out the process.

We were looking for passive constructions on the different texts, but we have only found a few. We

expected to find that these types of sentences were giving a greater importance to the agents of the

actions or even the actions, in order to hide the agents. The reason why we looked for the existence of

agents in this type of sentences was the fact that the no mentioning of the main agent evokes that a

passive sentence elides the performer of the action. This could be taken as in order to avoid the

responsibilities of the action that has been done. Throughout the analysis of the texts, we have reached the

conclusion that what they wanted to emphasize is the fact that the responsibilities of each country had to

be clearly stated and with them the consequences had also to be attached to their duties. Every time that

they really wanted to establish which duties were going to be shared, they need the use of clear

constructions such as “both governments” or “two governments” instead of blurry pronoun as can be “we”

Despite the fact that we were looking for agency in the passive structures, the goal of this construction in

the documents we have analysed was to create the impersonal tone that an official document should have.

An example that we could appreciate for this passive construction is:

“It was agreed a joint survey of Diego Garcia should take place quickly” (Memo March 3 1964 )

We could combine the analysis we have done about the passive structures to the one about the pronouns.

The absence of the inclusive use of “we” could be related to the fact that the appearance of the

governments in the letters is only done when one refers to itself. This reference to them brings the speaker

the opportunity of not getting involved in the consequences that the responsibilities that the other

government could have to face when the United Nations would demand explanations of the action that

have happened. Even if USA and UK Governments were considered workmates in the affair of Diego

Garcia, the depopulation of the islands and the building of military facilities, the use of the pronouns is

clearly exclusive. This, in our opinion, highlights the fact that each of the Governments were maintaining

their own political, economic and military interests separated even if they shared from the 60’s some duties

and rights over the Chagos Archipelago (BIOT). In contradiction the communication and exchange platform

enjoys high cooperation as emphasised in this quote: “In the spirit of the open and frank exchanges that

characterize relations between our two governments” (p. 146, Letter June 21 2000).


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Historically, the union created between the UK and the US since the Second World War, was called the

“Special Relationship”. Both governments have been sharing interests and attitudes on political, economic

and foreign affairs because they wanted to maintain certain influence in the world by being related to the

powerful nation that was going to become the United States. The relationship involved the United

Kingdom, the Commonwealth and the United States. It was built in order to fight against communist

countries and to protect the interests of other non – communist (capitalists) countries. Although they had

interests in common, they still maintained many points of view separately towards what they considered

important. The fact of being in that relationship did not imply that they would lose their own autonomy on

political and international affairs.

Throughout the years the participants of this relationship had many different understandings of what it

meant depending of were in charge of each government, some had a quite pleasant relation and others

not. For further information, A Special Relationship: Anglo – American Relations in the Cold – War and After

by John Dumbrell.

6.7 The Chagos people – identity construction

In the analysis of the Chagossian as an ethnic group, the identity is considered a resource for everyday life.

This is highly remarkable when they talk about their own constructed identity; they do it recalling the life

they used to have before being expelled from Diego Garcia. Once they were in exile, the fact of having a

similar culture and roots allowed them to keep a feeling of belonging to a community even in the exile.

Having good memories of their past, give them the strength to remain together as a group and to fight for

their rights. David Vine´s interviews can give us a sight of it:

“I had a dog named Katorz – Katorz, when the sea was at low tide, he would go into the sea. He caught fish into his mouth and he brought them back to me,” recalled Rita 1,200 miles from her homeland. “Life there paid little money, a very little” she said, “but it was the sweet life” (Vine 2009:3)

The construction of this identity (Chagossian) was known beforehand by the British and American

Governments and it represented a threat to their economic and military interests in the islands. If they had

admitted that there were indigenous people that had their own cultural identity, they would have to

protect that identity and encourage self – determination. The latter was something that really scared them.

[...]despite Colonial Office reservations and desire to consult local authorities, the Foreign Office clearly indicated that control over the Chagos Archipelago should be transferred in such a way as to minimize substantially or remove the possibility that use of the islands could be hampered by external pressures for self-determination . . . (our emphasis) (Memo March 3 1964)


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As we can see in this excerpt international pressures about the decolonization process at that time were

quite high. The future military facilities on Diego Garcia would be endangered if the existence of population

would be discovered, as analysed in a previous section. If the governments wanted to get along with their

plans over the Chagos Archipelago they would need to get the natives out of the territory without having

any kind of publicity. One of the ways they used to avoid public recognition of the rights of these people

was clearly denying their presence in Chagos Archipelago. This denial, as we will see through our corpus,

was done by the choice of certain grammatical constructions. They even, consciously, created a new

category where the islanders will be included, in which they portrayed them as “copra workers” denying

this way the rights that citizenship would grant them. The Chagossians were officially no longer residents of

the archipelago.

In the Enclosure 7 - Chagossian people discourse we have collected all the clauses (references and

expressions) referring to the Chagossians in the corpus.

It must be noticed that there is no use of Chagossian or Chagossians at all. The obvious reason for that is of

course that the UK and US in any case want to link the former population to the Chagos Archipelago by

using an expression directly linking them to the islands and create an identity connecting them to the

islands. Instead, they use a lot of other different constructions to express, who they are writing about.

Though stating that they use a lot of different expressions, the most common is ‘the inhabitants’

sometimes being a part of a larger clause as noted in the footnote in the table. In that note it is further

emphasised that we estimate the references to the Chagossians being between 90-100 cases, which leaves

the clause ‘the inhabitants’ to appear a little more than in every tenth case. An additional analysis is that

the ‘the inhabitants’ only appears in the documents from November 1965-March 1971, which shows the

clause was only used when there was Chagossians still at Diego Garcia9. The corpus itself illustrates clear a

change since Stoddart’s (US) memorandum mailed to the British Governor in Seychelles in September 1972

contains the clause ‘the former copra workers’ clearly stating that they are gone. Looking at the corpus

until the depopulation ‘the inhabitants’ roughly appears in one out six cases, but to conclude that it was the

significant discourse pattern using ‘the inhabitants’ would be to over exaggerate. Whether the discourse

was that the author should use every other expression than Chagossian or Ilois, which only appears in our

last document from 1971, though in March. Before elaborating on ‘the Ilois’-clause or the Îlois (“correct

spelling”), the second most used clause, we need to make clear what it consist of. Originally, Ilois originates

from French meaning remote islander (Minihan, 2002, p. 414). The clause (with “correct spelling”) only

appears in the 1982 UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement, but 11 times. This choice of wording does not

surprise us since selecting Chagossian would emphasise the Chagossians identity connected to the Chagos

9 The Nordvaer shipped away the last Chagossians away from Diego Garcia in September 1971 (Edis, 2004, p. 84)


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Archipelago. Further its stresses the Mauritians perception of the Chagossians in the Mauritian Community,

where they are view upon as a burden on the Mauritian society. Therefore, giving them an identity as

remote islanders, distances them from the society, though there is a change in discourse and they

acknowledge that they belong to somewhere but not Mauritius. Additionally, remote islander has a

negative connotation and it emphasises the devaluation.

A positive aspect of that, are the many different references which it creates, is a quite varied discourse

often with a single appearing ‘clause’. That demands quite some creativity, to avoid using Chagossian. In

other words the vocabulary is quite large. But on the other hand by not using Chagossian they chose to

refuse their identity, and somehow devaluate them as already illustrated in the Îlois case. The most obvious

case of devaluating the Chagossians identity is without doubt ‘Few Tarzans or Men Fridays’ written by

Dennis A. Greenhill in a handwritten note from August 24 1966. The clause has become quite well-known

within the circles of studies of the Chagos Archipelago case since the document was declassified after 30

years and used in several of the Chagossians court cases. Further it has been spread through John Pilger’s

Documentary ‘Stealing a Nation’, where Greenhill’s former colleague Andrew Stewart, FCO, defends him by

stating: “People put things on paper that they do not really mean....” (Pilger, Stealing a Nation, 2004, p.

27:10). It is quite hard to understand that justification, but what is really interesting regarding this

commentary is Stewart’s use of ‘People’, totally generalising.

6.7.1 The Wikileaks documents

Contradictorily to our corpus analysis we have found in a Wikileaks leaked document [Eclosure 11 -

SUBJECT: HMG FLOATS PROPOSAL FOR MARINE RESERVE COVERING (Wikileaks)] that UK and US

Governments actually use “Chagossians” in their communications. The contradiction lies in the fact that

they use this expression in contemporary exchanges and they actually acknowledge that the Chagossians

belong to the archipelago. Further they recall and create intertextuality by using “Man Fridays” and “no

human footprints” when referring to the people from the archipelago. This quotation is really close to the

one used above by Dennis A. Greenhill. On the other hand, even if these expressions are recalled, we can

see in the same document, that nowadays, Chagossians are seen in a more “civilised” condition, as we can

find quotes like “we need to find a way to get through the various Chagossian lobbies” but they are still

considered not as evolved as other groups “UK’s environmental lobby is far more powerful than the

Chagossians’ advocates”. Regarding nouns “inhabitants” and “population” are, anyway, still used within this

communication. While speaking about the “inhabitants” they also mention their descendants, like they fear

the possibility that they could claim any right to return to the archipelago, something that, in UK and US


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Governments opinion should be prevented. By saying that the Chagossians have “descendants” they are

also admitting that the Chagossians’ identity is being reproduced. Essential to linking to this is that they use

“the plight of the so-called Chagossian diaspora”, an expression that also legitimates the existence of a

homeland where the identity is connected to. On basis of the Wikileaks document we can clearly conclude

that there has been a change regarding the discourse involving the Chagossian people and their assumed

identity. Right now this identity is assumed not only by the Chagossians themselves, but also by the UK and

US Governments.

6.8 Depopulation discourse

The process of making the Chagossians a population in exile are naturally one of the main events of the

social practices and structures, where power comes into the picture as well. Reading the corpus through,

we recognised that the act of depopulation was referred to in quite some different ways. Therefore, we

have collected the examples in tables similar to the tables already referred to. Nevertheless, to this table

there have been added two more categories and one has been changed. We have added the headings

“nominalisation” and “type” in order to explain which kind of phrases were in use. “Phrases” have replaced

“clauses” in previous tables since our collection showed that it was a combination of verbs, nouns, etc.

Especially the use of nouns and verbs and the change from verbs to nouns has been significant, this is the

reason why we have added the category “nominalisation”.

We have collected 82 examples of the depopulation discourse and organised them in Enclosure 9 -

depopulation discourse.

In one of the first communications we found that the word “repatriation”10 had been used in an unusual

approach. By the use of this coordinating conjunction it is understood that both terms are equivalent. Even

though some of the population on the islands actually was originally from Mauritius and Seychelles it

cannot be stated that the action of “repatriation” is the same as the “resettlement”. By the use of “or” all

the population is ascribed to the same group, when they actually belong to different social groups, so the

Chagossians could actually not be repatriated since they have never lived anywhere else than the

archipelago. However this clause represents the British perception of “reality” of the islands and their

inhabitants.

10

In the Oxford Dictionary is stated in the entry that repatriation is: “The return or restoration of a person to his or her native country; an instance of this.” We are fully aware that Fairclough do not recognize the use of a dictionary within CDA analysis, but in this case is essential to make the reader aware of the denotation of “repatriation”. repatriation, n. Third edition, January 2010; online version November 2010. <http://www.oed.com:80/Entry/162690>; accessed 03 December 2010. An entry for this word was first included in New English Dictionary, 1906.


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… the repatriation or resettlement of persons currently living on the islands selected...(Memorandums May 1964)

In the next paragraph of the same memorandum we have found yet another interesting choice of wording

in the case of “be evacuated”. Usually this verb only involves the existence of a military action, neither an

“appropriate compensation” nor a “re-employment”. In addition, the term “compensation” is usually

related to a negative action that is being tried to repair by economic means. We will analyse deeper the use

of “compensation” throughout the communications.

It is important to state that some verbs, like, for instance, “evacuate” have been through the process of

nominalisation. These words actually have changed from verbs to nouns and this has also produced a

change on their meanings. For instance, one example that we have found was “evacuate” turning into

“evacuation”.

One of the most striking matches that we found relating to the act of depopulation and to the

nominalisation was the sentence:

Our best present estimate is that we still desire ultimate removal of all migrant laborers from Diego Garcia after giving six month’s notice to the lessees in accord with the confidential agreed minutes to the BIOT Agreement, but no firm decision has been made at this stage. (Note February 21 1969) (our emphasis)

The verb here (to remove) has changed to become a noun, maintaining the meaning of taking away

something, generally unwanted, in this occasion the migrant labourers (as the excerpt itself asserts).

Nevertheless, the most important feature in this paragraph is, possibly, the adjective that goes with this

nominalisation: “ultimate”. The use of these adjective adds intensity to the process that British and

American Governments expect to go through, as long as “ultimate” usually implies the most extreme

example of the noun it accompanies. By the use of this specific construction (“ultimate removal of all

migrant laborers”) we can see how important was the need of having the island clear and ready to be used

by the American military forces. We will discuss the economic and strategic value of the island in next

sections. We can also highlight the presence of other adjectives used with “removal”, namely entire, that

almost have the same character of meaning as the use of “ultimate”.

the removal of the entire population of the atoll by July if possible (Memorandum March 16 1971)

This sentence appears on the most significant section regarding the depopulation in the corpus; the section

with the heading The Problems of Resettlement in Memorandum March 16 1971. On the basis of that we

created a text box with the exact text sample and highlighted the use of language relating to depopulation.


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The Problems of Resettlement

7 There are now about 829 people in the Chagos Archipelago, of whom about 359 live on Diego Garcia

itself and the remainder on the two other inhabited atolls of Peros Banhos and Salomon. Of the total, 386

are dual citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and of Mauritius (they are known as Ilois). As far as

we know, neither the Ilois themselves nor the Mauritius authorities are aware of their dual nationality. There

are {p.3} also 35 citizens of Mauritius, and 408 citizens of the UK and Colonies from Seychelles

(―Seychellois‖). A population chart is at C.

8 There will be no difficulty in returning the Seychellois to Seychelles, but there would be strong political

objections in Seychelles to attempting to settle the Mauritians or Ilois there.

9 In December 1965, a question in the Mauritius Legislative Assembly asked for confirmation that

certain obligations in respect of BIOT had been definitely undertaken by the British Government, including,

whether all Mauritians then living in Diego Garcia would be resettled in Mauritius; whether the costs of

repatriation would be met from the British Exchequer; whether all costs of rehousing them would be met by

the British; and finally whether work would be found for them by the British Government. With the approval

of the Colonial Office, the Mauritius Government spokesman gave the following answer:

―The British Government has undertaken to meet the full cost of the resettlement of Mauritians at present

living in the Chagos Archipelago.‖

The reply did not refer to the place of resettlement; nor does it ever seem to have been specifically

established between the UK and Mauritius Governments that this resettlement would be in Mauritius. But

that has been the implication and understanding on our side, and we do not expect the Mauritius

Government to dispute it in principle.

10 However, with at least 40,000 men (representing 20% of the labour force) already without work

Mauritius has a formidable unemployment problem. In our High Commissioner‘s view failure by the

Mauritius Government to tackle the unemployment could lead to outbreaks of disorder, perhaps

comparable to those which in September 1970 led to appeals for British military assistance. The High

Commissioner advises that, because {p.4} of the already high level of unemployment, we must expect

negotiations with the Mauritius Government about the resettlement of the people from the Chagos

Archipelago to be difficult and the terms demanded high. There are already about 100 families now in

Mauritius whose contracts to work in Diego Garcia have not been renewed. The Mauritius Government

have been asking how we intend to fulfil our obligations to these people. An answer has been delayed

pending a decision about resettlement as a whole.

11 Ideally, we ought to try to settle as many of these people as possible in British territory. There would,

however, as stated above, be strong political objections in Seychelles (which has its own economic and

over-population problems) to accepting back any other than its own people. The possibilities of resettling

Mauritian citizens and Ilois elsewhere in the Indian Ocean area have been re-examined but without

success, and it is doubtful if they would wish to go anywhere but Mauritius. However, it may be possible,

subject to the concurrence of the Mauritius Government, to resettle as many as 50 Ilois or mono-Mauritian

families on the Mauritian island of Agalega, to work on copra plantations run by Moulinie & Company the

firm who manage the existing plantations in BIOT. Whatever the result of the proposed negotiations with

the Mauritius Government, it will be necessary – if the US deadline for clearing the Diego Garcia is to be

met – for the inhabitants to be moved temporarily to plantations on Peros Banhos and Salomon, which are

also in the Chagos Archipelago. The Governor of Seychelles has confirmed that there will be no practical

difficulties in accomplishing this, and that adequate housing and welfare facilities exist for those who are to

be moved. Such a measure would, however, be only an interim one.


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This text sample and the table in Enclosure 9 - depopulation discourse have some similarities in the

collected (from corpus) and highlighted (in text box) wording. Both of them use resettlement most often,

but have a wide variety of verbs and nominalisations describing the depopulation. Though, it is important

to emphasise that ‘resettlement’ appears 19 times in the Memorandum March 16, 1971 out of 29 times the

ten last cases still makes it the most used way of referring to the depopulation.

Other of the remarkable features that we should take into account is the fact that in some of the

communications neither a verb nor a nominalisation was used to refer to the depopulation. In these cases

we find that other constructions, especially based on a shared knowledge, are used to explain how the

depopulation process would be carried out. We decided to show one of the most significant examples:

In this respect we are able to make up the rules as we go along and treat the inhabitants of BIOT as not “belonging” to it in any sense.(Minute October 23 1968)

In fact, in the UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982, this strategy is used in a part of the document:

Article 2. The claims referred to in Article 1 of this Agreement are solely claims by or on behalf of the Îlois arising out of:

(a) All acts, matters and things done by or pursuant to the British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965, including the closure of the plantations in the Chagos Archipelago, the departure or removal of those living or working there, the termination of their contracts, their transfer to and resettlement in Mauritius and their preclusion for returning to the Chagos Archipelago (hereinafter referred to as “the events”); and

(b) Any incidents, facts or situations, whether past, present or future, occurring in the course of the events or arising out of the consequences of the events.

The only difference from the previous example is that in this excerpt is they make clear for the reader the

existence of this strategy (Article 2.a)

An important part of the maintenance of the army base is to keep the island uninhabited, because the

population would represent a threat to the isolation of the army base. It would help the reader to

understand the reason the previous section where we analysed the valuing of the islands by the American

Government.

We believe that an attempt to resettle any of the islands of the Chagos Archipelago would severely compromise Diego Garcia's unparalleled security and have a deleterious impact on our military operations, and we appreciate the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to prevent such resettlement. A decline in Diego Garcia's military utility would have serious consequences for our shared defence interests. Your actions to prevent resettlement anywhere in the Chagos Archipelago have safeguarded our ability to conduct current and future military operations from the islands in support of our national security objectives.

(Letter November 16 2004)

We should remark that the highlighted parts all refer to a tool used by the United Kingdom Government by

which some laws and rules can be passed without the approval of the Parliament. Regarding to Diego


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Garcia, the last time this device was used was the 10 of June of 2004, on the elections day (Pilger, Stealing a

Nation, 2007, p. 43).

6.8.1 The Wikileaks documents

A document released through Wikileaks from May 2009 could be use in our analysis to prove a change on

discourse trends within both Governments. This cable was written by US Officials as an internal

memorandum stating the British Foreign Office opinion regarding the proposal of a Marine Protected Area

(MPA) in the Chagos Archipelago. It should be highlighted that they state that it exists a deadline for the

creation of the MPA, as to make it before the British elections. It was defined by law not to be later than

May 2010. Nevertheless, even if the discourse seems to have changed from previous ages further reading

on cable shows that some patterns are still in use. We can remark the use of some words within quotation

marks, this use of them with this quoting device allow us to say that they are not taken seriously. This fact

diminishes the impact that a change in discourse would have had by proving that the change probably

would never have existed.

Senior HMG officials support the establishment of a "marine park" or "reserve" in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), which includes Diego Garcia. [Eclosure 11 - SUBJECT: HMG FLOATS PROPOSAL FOR MARINE RESERVE COVERING (Wikileaks)]

We will analyse other extracts of that document in Defence and discourse, given further proofs of the

maintenance of the discourse along the years.

6.9 Resettlement of Diego Garcia seen as a Business

From a starting point, the analysis on certain structures in some sentences along the corpus showed us that

the business side of the Diego Garcia´s affair was one of the most important for all the participants on it.

From the texts we can conclude that they wanted to know: how to find the funds to create the base, how

to spend those funds on the base and how to pay other governments to take care of the indigenous

population of the island. The countries involved in the affair saw on Diego Garcia not only a military

opportunity, but also an economic one.

Some examples related to these three issues that bother them would be:

Letter from February 1969, from US Embassy in London to Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London

(on how they were concerned about the funds to build the facilities)

Dear Richard:

We have been informed that the proposed project for a naval facility on Diego Garcia was included (without identification) in the FY 1970 Department of Defense military construction budget request presented to Congress last week. The proposal envisages construction of the


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26 million dollar facility as outlined to you last July, plus 11 million dollars for procurement of communications equipment [...]

For example, many of the administrative planning details will depend upon the method of {p.2} construction, i.e., whether we use a private U.S. contractor or Naval Construction Forces. If the latter are available, both the foreign exchange costs and construction time would be reduced, and our need for local unskilled labor would be minimal or non-existent. (Our emphasis)

The creation of the military base in Diego Garcia could be contextualised in the era of the decolonization

process. By 1950’s many countries around the world were claiming their legitimated right to assert their

self-government. These actions affected to some small countries, soon to be independent, where the

United States had had military bases. Even if the naturalised thought would be that Empires had

disappeared after World War II, the real fact was that

Empires did not go away, but went underground, surfacing in guises ranging from socialist empire in the Soviet Union to various forms of neo-imperialism aggressive democracy as in the case of the United States. [...] Which meant the United States came to exert is power through increasingly subtle and discreet means: most importantly through economic markets, international agreements and foreign bases. (Vine, 2009: 54) (our emphasis)

It was in those moments when the “Strategic Island Concept” was proposed by Stuart Barber, a civilian

working for the Navy at the Pentagon. His idea was to avoid diminish of American power in international

relations by finding some remote and depopulated islands strategically located where to build military

bases. These facilities would keep American control over the world, specifically in the Indian and Pacific

Oceans. This concept (“Strategic Island Concept”) was explained within the military hierarchies using

constructions belonging to the semantic field of economics. In our opinion the economic importance of

Diego Garcia’s affair is not marked only by the budgets highlighted on the documents we had gathered but

also by these constructions that Barber had used when explaining his idea to his officers. Here we have a

clear example of how the “Strategic Island Concept” was portrayed within the American Navy:

If the United States was going to protect its “future freedom of military action”, Stu realized, they would have to act quickly to “stockpile” island basing rights as soon as possible. Just any sensible investor would “stockpile any material commodity which foreseeably will become unavailable in the future”, Stu believed, the United States would have to quickly buy up small colonial islands around the world or otherwise ensure its Western allies maintained sovereignty over them. Otherwise the islands would be lost to decolonization forever. (Vine, 2009: 5)

Barber’s proposal was shaped by the isolation of the islands where the bases would be located, this, joint

to the fact that they should be in military strategic area, was the main start point of the “Strategic Island

Concept”. This advantage of isolation was essential in the choice of Diego Garcia, and almost thirty years

later is still considered valid and should be protected:

Diego Garcia’s desirability as a location for such varied past and future military operations hinges on the combination of its strategic location and isolation, which is unique among


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operating locations around the world. The settlement of a permanent civilian population on the islands of the Chagos {p.3} archipelago, even those at some distance from Diego Garcia, would seriously diminish that isolation and as a consequence erode the island’s nearly unparalleled strategic importance.

[from a Letter of June 21 2000 between the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (United States Department of State) to Mr. Richard D. Wilkinson, CVO ,Director for Americas in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)] (our emphasis)

Nevertheless the economic approach that we have been trying to explain was also still maintained

throughout this period of time. Even in the beginning of the twenty first century United States Government

was still concerned by keeping the security of the islands at the lowest price.

Introduction of settlements on the outer islands of the archipelago would put facilities on Diego Garcia more easily within potential reach of hostile states or terrorists operating by boat. As you know, the potential danger from such an attack on the 21 prepositioning ships located at Diego Garcia would be very serious. For the first time in the history of our military cooperation on Diego Garcia, significant personnel and other assets would be required solely for the purposes of protecting the forces, materials, and facilities located there. Initiation of such requirements on the island would, beyond the considerable expense for both of our governments, possibly {p.4} entail reconfiguration of base facilities and potential limitations on a number of activities and operations.

[from a Letter of June 21 2000 between the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (United States Department of State) to Mr. Richard D. Wilkinson, CVO ,Director for Americas in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)] (our emphasis)

The next example we want to highlight is related on how funds would be spent on the construction of new

facilities on the island. This paragraph belongs to the notes related with 1976 Diego Garcia Agreement

In accordance with the recent discussions between representatives of our two Governments, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States of America, subject to the availability of funds, plans to undertake the following additional construction on Diego Garcia for the United States Navy support facility to be developed there [...] (Our emphasis)

These six examples prove that the economic approach was of great importance to the United States along

the years. As we can see in our corpus, many passages of the written communication emphasize the

monetary side of the politic attitudes regarding the construction of a military base on Diego Garcia. This

economic approach, that we maintain existed in all processes related to Diego Garcia’s usage as a military

base, was also accomplished by the United Kingdom attitudes towards the relocation of the Islanders.

These attitudes could easily be found in our document collection as we show in the following examples.

The third topic we intend to discuss (how to pay other governments to take care of the Îlois) can be easily

traced on the 1982 UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement Agreement because almost all the treaty is about

how Mauritius must spend the funds that were given to resettle the population.

Article 1. The Government of the United Kingdom shall ‘ex gratia’ with no admission of liability pay to the Government of Mauritius for and on behalf of the Îlois community in Mauritius in accordance with Article 7 of this Agreement the sum of ₤4 million which, taken together with the payment of ₤650,000 already made to the Government of Mauritius


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should be in full and final settlement of all claims whatsoever of the kind referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement against the Government of the United Kingdom by or on behalf of

the Îlois. (our emphasis)

This specific paragraph proved to have capital importance to the topic we are dealing with. The main

aspects we can remark lay on the Latin expression. When used in legal grounds, ‘ex gratia’, means that a

subject makes a payment without having any further responsibility or liability towards the receiver of that

payment. The importance of this paragraph stems from the document itself; this was the Agreement issued

to negotiate and establish the terms of the relocation of the Îlois. The United Kingdom Government clearly

states that future claims on behalf of the islanders would not be taken into account. Therefore, we can say

that they want to “close” the affair involving them in Diego Garcia. We could keep analysing this thread of

thought by paying attention to the use the British gave to the idea of “compensation”. Along the texts

“compensation” is portrayed as a payment, so a priori we can understand that they gave Mauritius these

funds in return for a service or good. But, the word “compensation” involves in itself the previous

performance of a negative action which effects the agent is trying to repair in an economical way. We could

deduce that this use is conscious, and therefore they in some way know what effect they are causing on the

population and try to avoid being charged on it by any international organization s (i.e. UN).

In addition, Great Britain due to its social and economic context after 1945, was extremely concerned about

its overseas territories, which some of them were about to reach independence. The metropolis did not

want to lose its rights over the colonies because that would represent the shrinking of British international

power. The interference of Great Britain in Diego Garcia not only had political and economic reasons, but

also consequences.

In Great Britain, despite the fact that the society was meant to be protected by the “social welfare” system

and was living on a consumer boom, the economy was threatened by short and long term problems. The

major problem was the inadequate productivity of its industry. Nonetheless, the expenses on defence were

extremely high due to their need to maintain themselves a great international power in the context of the

Cold War. One of their most important issues was the preserve of their control over the colonies. In order

to do that, the military forces in those place should be retained and hence “the British committed

themselves to conscription and to substantial foreign military expenditures” (Heyck, 2002: 246). Some of

the consequences that have existed due to this fact have result to be the attempts to build the atomic

bomb and the H – bomb. The original idea was to avoid dependence from the United States and to fight

against the communism, but they achieved exactly the opposite. Great Britain was extremely economically

dependent on American nuclear programs. Our analysis on the texts takes us to conclude that some of the

works of Great Britain in the base was on exchange to those aids from the United States in military


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research. Heyck states that “the British had to depend on the United States for delivery systems – first

“Skybolt”, which the Americans cancelled in 1961, and thereafter Polaris submarines” ( Heyck, 2002: 253)

From our collected corpus of agreements, the secret side note between United Kingdom and United States

referring the 1966 Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes, effected by exchange

of notes, is the one which best depicts the situation on nuclear research and the Diego Garcia issue. This

note was sent from F David K.E. Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to London, to George Brown, M.P., Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

2. Under the POLARIS Sales Agreement signed by our two Governments at Washington on April 6, 1963, the United Kingdom is obliged to make certain payments as participation in expenditures incurred by the United States after January 1, 1963, for research and development of the POLARIS missile system (hereinafter "R&D surcharge"). Since the United Kingdom is assuming the costs of the administrative detachment of the Indian Ocean islands and of the acquisition of the lands thereon, the United States will forego the R&D surcharge to the extent of $14 million, or one half of the foregoing Indian Ocean islands costs incurred by the United Kingdom, whichever is less. The amount of the R&D surcharge so foregone is

referred to below as the contribution. (Our emphasis)

To conclude what we said about why British gave a great importance to nuclear power, we can quote Prime

Minister Macmillan when he said: “The independent *nuclear power+ gives us a better position in the

world, it gives us a better position with respect to the United States. It puts us where we ought to be, in the

position of a Great Power. (Heyck, 2002: 253)

In addition to what we have already stated, the following selected examples taken from our corpus can be

seen as another proof of which points we are trying to maintain:

On the grounds that ‘the ante has gone up’ they now ask that we contribute one half of the anticipated detachment costs (estimated up to £10 million, US share about $14million). (our emphasis)

This sentence portrays the resettlement into economy. The use of this metaphor is explained by the fact

that the need of changes in the island was higher than the one they had expected, and as a result, a request

for more money was made to the United States. The use of “the ante has gone up” means that they need

more money in order to accomplish the task.

The US Government are anxious to begin work. (our emphasis)

The use of “anxious” draws upon some kind of mental statement in which the subject is worried about

something. Here it can be seen as the set of procedures they need to undertake to establish the army base

on Diego Garcia. The American government feels the urge to start the construction of the base as soon as

possible (referred here as “the work”) but it also implies that they want the depopulation of the island to

be done in the shortest period of time.

The Treasury have given their concurrence on the understanding that any necessary expenditure over and above the sum of £10 million allocated for the setting up of BIOT will


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be met from within existing TESC provisions, and subject also to the conditions that resettlement costs shall be kept as low as possible and shall be charged in the first instance to the unspent balance of the sum of £10 million.

The main important point of that paragraph is the fact that all the issues related to moving the Îlois to a

new place are settled in economic terms. We can see “necessary expenditure”, “resettlement costs”, “shall

be charged” and “unspent balance”. Nevertheless in any moment we can see mentions to the human side

of this action undertaken by the British. It does not appear in the text anything about how they are going to

assure the life conditions of the Îlois.

After giving these examples we believe that our hypothesis was ratified and the economic and business side

of Diego Garcia´s affair was one of the most relevant for British and American politicians.

6.10 Defence and discourse The fact that, when the base was being constructed the Cold War was going on, could have given a broader

context in which we could include the communications between the British Government and the United

States. It was expected that communism could be portrayed as a threat to the international balance of

power. We expected that communism was seen as an enemy to the status quo because it was supposed to

be in that way to the public opinion. The possible discursive use of this type of regime could legitimize the

construction of the base in Diego Garcia, but internally they never, in our corpus, discuss a possible threat

from the Soviets as a way of legitimizing the base, which was really surprising to us.

Speaking about foreign policy, what is portrayed publicly usually responds to a fixed “narrative structure” in

which is intended to create two sights of the same situation, one that is meant to be trusted and the other

that is wanted to be fought against. In addition it is important to acknowledge that the socio – cultural

context of both addresser and receiver should be the same to achieve what is pursued by the official voice.

Bormann defines this kind of communications in “the terms of the ‘what’ and ‘who’ of threat with regard to

the ‘what’ and ‘who’ of the threatened” (Bormann 2008: 80). The use of this fixed structure of

communication makes international dangers to establish within a set of frames that illustrate the

relationship between the fact and what it is understood in each social context.

In our corpus, despite what has been mentioned and what theorists usually state, there is no wide

reference to the threat of communism, and socialism also does not appear. More shocking is the fact the

word ‘enemy’ is not present in any document of the corpus. Highlighted can be that the circumstances

leading to the construction of a military base should respond to a threat, but that is not the case. Searching

through the data collected, the word ‘threat’ only appears twice in forty years of communications, always

referring to the facilities on the island. If the purpose of the base, from the beginning, was not to confront a

threat, that could explain why there was no publicity on it, because the international reaction would


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challenge it. Therefore, the purpose was to keep it secret and unknown to official institutions such as the

United Nations, because it could not be explained by any of the former theories. The Strategic Island

Concept proposed by Stuart Barber can be recalled again as it clarifies what the main purpose of a base like

the one in Diego Garcia would be. Barber´s idea arose in a moment where also a new vision of the world

had emerged. This new vision was the one of

an “intrinsically threatening world”, where instability, no matter how far removed from United States, was seen as a threat to the nation. And in this world, the role of the military have become that of a “permanently mobilized force” ready to confront threats wherever they might appear

(Vine 2009: 58)

According to this vision, United States military forces should be ready in any moment to protect civilization

using whatever means would be necessary. Barber actually portrays the idea of “the base network”. This

chain, on his own words, “permits the forward deployment of ground, sea and air forces in or close to

potential spots in areas throughout the world were the security interests of the United States require

military strength to deter or deal swiftly with any military action against areas of the Free World.”

(Vine 2009: 58)

Despite the fact that time has passed and the purposes of the construction of the base never became to

public knowledge, the facilities on Diego Garcia still have to fulfil a task similar to the one proposed by

Barber in the 50’s. Military expert John Pike, when asked about the functions that it carries out today,

asserted that the current aim of the base is to “run the planet from Guam and Diego Garcia by 2015” (Vine

2009: 10). This statement makes clear that some of the positions that had a hold within the American

military forces during Cold War are still valid (i.e. Strategic Island Concept). Pike continues by saying that

Diego Garcia “It’s the base from which we control half of Africa and the southern side of Asia, the southern

side of Eurasia.” (Vine 2009: 10) and concludes that it is “the facility that at the end of the day gives us

some say-so in the Persian Gulf region. If it didn’t exist it would have been to be invented” (Vine 2009: 10)

As we have analysed at the beginning, on the recent years of the formation of the base, the idea was to use

the facilities for possible military operations that would counteract any hypothetical attack against what

they considered the “Free World”. Nonetheless, from our corpus we can conclude that this attitude was

maintained even in the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the twenty first.

[...]it is also worthwhile to consider the central role the facility on Diego Garcia has in recent years played in the defense activities and military operations of our two governments. For example, during Operation Earnest Will, which involved protection of merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S Air Force used Diego Garcia as a staging site for a large number of supply flights to the region by C-5 and C-141 aircraft from the Military Airlift Command. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, over 600 combat missions were flown from the island, and facilities there housed over 2000 additional personnel required to support those missions. During September and October of 1996, B-52, KC-135


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and KC-10 aircraft operated from Diego Garcia in direct support of Operation Desert Strike. In November 1997, B-52, KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft operated from Diego Garcia in support of Operation Desert Thunder. (our emphasis) (Letter June 21 2000)

Despite the fact that the Strategic Island Concept was something created within the United States, the

United Kingdom also participated in it in an indirect way due to their participation on the construction and

maintaining of the base on Diego Garcia. This participation can be seen in the previous excerpt (highlighted

in bold) when it is mentioned that they shared security and defence interests. To prove this collaboration

we can also rely on enclosure number 4 (US Embassy cables 05/15/09 obtained through WikiLeaks) where

Colin Roberts, the FCO Director of the Overseas Territories, observed that “BIOT has ‘served its role very

well,’ advancing shared U.S. – UK strategic security objectives for the past several decades”. This enclosure

has special importance for us because on it, they honestly admit that “do not regret the removal of the

population”. Both UK and US governments considered that the removal was necessary to fulfil the

‘strategic purpose’ of the base. We consider that this last document can be seen as a proof of our thesis.


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7 Conclusion

After having gone through our analysis we have reached the point of conclusion. All the findings we have

gathered within the project report allow us to state a general overview of the analysis we have done based

on our questions in the introduction, specified in the methodology. Our conclusion will deal with the six

main categories of critical discourse analysis stated in our methodology based on the four categories we

presented in the introduction: construction of the Chagossian identity, the depopulation act, business

aspect of the relationship (the construction categories), and the defence and security purposes of the base

(the maintenance category). Through the analysis we have become aware that these categories were not

so strict and usually overlapped each other. This can be seen when the depopulation category also deals

with the maintenance feature since the islands need to continue being uninhabited. The prerogative

council from 2004, referred to by the Americans as the British Government action of “prevent”, and the

creation of the Marine Protection Area in April 2010 would be the most important proofs of that thesis.

The relationship between the American and the British Governments is one of the other remarkable points

of our analysis. Even if from the beginning we expected a close relationship between the two governments,

we found that when dealing with nation-states communication by their representatives, diplomats and

politicians, that it is important to make the responsibilities clear. That can be stated through the language

and discourse in documents where they assert which duties and rights over the base would have each

government. This can be seen in Public knowledge of the affair on Diego Garcia’s military base. How UK

and US Government coped with (the) Public Opinion? Furthermore, the use of pronouns and passive

structures in our analysis emphasizes the existence of really separated responsibilities and duties, for

instance by only using “exclusive we”. From the division of responsibilities we can trace how both

governments were concerned with avoiding public knowledge of the affair. We can see that in the press

guidance referred in the same section.

By using various terms of wording regarding the Chagossians identity they created a people with no

connections to their homeland. The discourse is reflected by avoiding using any reference which could

connect them to the Chagos Archipelago and thereby creating a flourish vocabulary even containing de-

evaluative connotations of the people. The discourses referring to the Chagos Archipelago showed the

same pattern. Both cases took a turn in discourse in the new century. On the one hand the Americans

started to highly valuate the islands in order to protect their isolation and strategic military position. On the

other hand a contradiction appeared when analysing the Wikileaks source using Chagossian and other

expressions as “Diaspora” linking the people’s identity to the archipelago.


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On basis of our corpus and discourses found on it we are sure that the contract of leasing would at least go

its full potential length until the end of 2036 based on the pure power relations expressed through

language in the corpus. The reason for that is specially to be found in the latest change of discourse of the

new century by emphasizing that they recognise the people to belong there but neglect the Chagossians

rights. They openly assume on their discourse that the reason of this defence and security purposes lies on

the fact that they overruled the rights of the people. The discourse all the way through clarifies the power

of the British and American Governments.


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8 Enclosure 1– List of words repeated 25 times or more The table below is constructed on the purpose of constructing the tag cloud at the front page. Online software at http://www.wordle.net/ has been used for word counting as well as generating the tag cloud. Further, the result of the word counting has been checked and edited through Microsoft Word‘s manual word counting to adjust for settings in the online software which distinguishes between normal and capital letters. The text pasted in the generator is to be found on the enclosed CD in a document entitled: Document for tag cloud.docx. Table 1 - Tag cloud table - words that appear 25 times or more

Words Times Words Times Words Times Words Times

the 2409 at 88 Britain 39 station 30

of 1482 not 87 defence 39 following 30

to 796 may 85 its 39 1976 30

and 695 British 82 great 39 operations 29

in 520 it 80 forces 38 defense 29

United1

418 authorities 78 they 38 made 29

be 340 use 76 Northern 38 into 29

for 325 governments 73 these 37 who 29

a 282 islands 71 Ireland 37 members 28

States2

274 other 70 London 35 resettlement 28

or 270 Mauritius 70 arrangements 35 U.S. 28

Government3

271 BIOT 67 all 35 communications 28

on 226 paragraph 63 necessary 35 inhabitants 27

shall 220 between 62 archipelago 35 notes 27

that 218 I 61 support 35 agreed 27

as 196 there 61 Chagos 35 exchange 27

by 179 personnel 59 appropriate 34 area 27

Diego4 178 two 59 foreign 34 right 26

agreement 176 no 59 out 34 about 26

Garcia 172 if 58 provisions 34 office 26

this 164 their 56 but 34 could 25

with 163 has 54 services 34 service 25

any 143 our 53 subject 34 officer 25

Kingdom 135 military 52 December 33 however 25

will 132 your 52 UK 33 provided 25

is 131 Indian 51 should 33 administrative 25

have 125 ocean 51 population 32 some 25

facility 119 construction 51 article 33 monitoring 25

which 111 America 48 aircraft 33

such 110 purposes 47 within 31

territory 109 time 46 commissioner 31

are 105 been 43 1966 31 Words in all 136

from 100 facilities 41 under 31

would 95 state 40 over 31

an 93 force 40 US 30

we 92 note 39 concerning 30

http://www.wordle.net/


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1. Adjusted by plus one. United appears as ‗United Kingdom‘ 137 times, ‗United States‘ 272 times and ‗United Nations‘ 9 times, never alone

2. States is used twice with ‗united‘ as in ‗United States‘ 3. Adjusted to 271 from 262 times after manual word count. 10 times Government

appears with a small letter.

4. Diego appears 6 times without Garcia, 5 of the times in the letter of February 3rd 1969


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9 Enclosure 2 - Glossary of key terms

9.1 Autonomy

If we look this word upon the Oxford Dictionary, we find that it is considered as:

1. of a state, institution, etc.: The right of self-government, of making its own laws and administering its own affairs. // 1.b. Liberty to follow one's will, personal freedom.

3. A self-governing community (cf. a monarchy).

To obtain a fully understanding of the concept of autonomy we also need to have a look at self-

government, the Oxford Dictionary states that self-government is the “2. Administration by a people or

state of its own affairs without external direction or interference.”

9.2 Citizenship

The Oxford Dictionary portrays citizenship as “the position or status of being a citizen, with its rights and

privileges.” Before understanding what citizenship is, we need to know what is considered to be a citizen.

The same dictionary asserts that a citizen is:

1. An inhabitant of a city or (often) of a town; esp. one possessing civic rights and privileges, a burgess or freeman of a city.

2. A member of a state, an enfranchised inhabitant of a country, as opposed to an alien; in U.S., a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of voting for public offices, and is entitled to full protection in the exercise of private rights.

The Encyclopaedia Britannica also adds that having been granted citizenship

implies a relationship between an individual and a state in which an individual owes allegiance to that state and in turn is entitled to its protection. Citizenship implies the status of freedom with accompanying responsibilities. Citizens have certain rights, duties, and responsibilities that are denied or only partially extended to aliens and other non-citizens residing in a country. In general, full political rights, including the right to vote and to hold public office, are predicated upon citizenship. The usual responsibilities of citizenship are allegiance, taxation, and military service.

Citizenship is the most privileged form of nationality. This broader term denotes various relations between an individual and a state that do not necessarily confer political rights but do imply other privileges, particularly protection abroad.

It is important, especially in relation to this work and to the Chagos Islanders' (or Îlois') understanding of

their identity, what the Encyclopaedia Britannica adds to the definition of citizenship when regarding on

how to obtain it

The principal grounds for acquiring citizenship (apart from international transactions such as transfer of territory or option) are birth within a certain territory, descent from a citizen parent, marriage to a citizen, and naturalization. There are two main systems used to determine citizenship as of the time of birth: jus soli, whereby citizenship is acquired by birth


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within the territory of the state, regardless of parental citizenship; and jus sanguinis, whereby a person, wherever born, is a citizen of the state if, at the time of his birth, his parent is one. The United States and the countries of the British Commonwealth adopt the jus soli as their basic principle; they also recognize acquisition of nationality by descent but subject it to strict limitations.

9.3 Conspiracy

The Encyclopaedia Britannica explains conspiracy in the field of common law as:

An agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means [...] Generally, there is no particular form that the agreement must take to constitute conspiracy. Although many statutes now require an overt act as proof of an agreement to commit a felony, conspiracy is still largely inferred from circumstantial evidence. Thus, individual conspirators need not even know of the existence or the identity of all the other conspirators. Two persons may be found to have conspired with each other simply by making separate agreements with a third party.

The Oxford Dictionary on its conspiracy entry remarks the illegal or non-moral features of the term: “2. a.

(with a and pl.) A combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose; an agreement between two or

more persons to do something criminal, illegal, or reprehensible (especially in relation to treason, sedition,

or murder); a plot.”

Related to conspiracies we can find the existence of conspiracy theories that try to explain a series of

events and their consequences using the act of conspiring as basis. As David Coady (Coady, 2006: 117) says

A 'Conspiracy Theory' is a proposed explanation of a historical event, in which conspiracy (i.e. agents acting secretly) in concert has a significant causal role. Furthermore, the conspiracy postulated by the proposed explanation must be a conspiracy to bring about the historical event which it purports to explain. Finally, the proposed explanation must conflict with an official explanation of the same event.

Lee Basham remarks Coady affirmations by saying that “A “Conspiracy Theory” is an explanation of

important events that hypothesizes the intentional deception and manipulation of these involved in,

effected by or witnessing these events. (Coady 2006: 61).

We conclude that conspiracy and conspiracy theories unite the act of deceiving the public opinion and

hiding the means to achieve, usually political, military or economic, goals.

9.4 Manipulation

Even if most of the entries under manipulation in the Oxford Dictionary are related to medical, chemical or

hand-craft practices, entry number 4 reads that manipulation is “The action or an act of managing or

directing a person, etc., esp. in a skilful manner; the exercise of subtle, underhand, or devious influence or

control over a person, organization, etc.; interference, tampering.” This meaning can be easily related to


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social and mental domination through illegitimate means. As Van Dijk explains in Discourse and

manipulation, the act of manipulating should be seen from different sociological perspectives but always

remarking it illegitimacy in democratic societies.

Socially, manipulation is defined as illegitimate domination confirming social inequality. Cognitively, manipulation as mind control involves the interference with processes of understanding, the formation of biased mental models and social representations such as knowledge and ideologies. Discursively, manipulation generally involves the usual forms and formats of ideological discourse, such as emphasizing Our good things, and emphasizing Their bad things. At all these levels of analysis it is shown how manipulation is different from legitimate mind control, for instance in persuasion and providing information, for instance by stipulating that manipulation is in the best interest of the dominated group and against the best interests of dominated groups (Van Dijk 2006: 359)

9.5 Public Opinion Public Opinion is described in the Encyclopaedia Britannica as

An aggregate of the individual views, attitudes, and beliefs about a particular topic, expressed by a significant proportion of a community. Some scholars treat the aggregate as a synthesis of the views of all or a certain segment of society; others regard it as a collection of many differing or opposing views.

Writing in 1918, the American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley emphasized public opinion as a process of interaction and mutual influence rather than a state of broad agreement. The American political scientist V.O. Key defined public opinion in 1961 as “opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed.” Subsequent advances in statistical and demographic analysis led by the 1990s to an understanding of public opinion as the collective view of a defined population, such as a particular demographic or ethnic group.

The main point about public opinion is that it refers to a community, usually to the citizens of a country,

who are supposed to share a point of view about a certain topic. But it also can be seen as an abstract

resource which combines the social norm of a certain historical moment within a specific community. If

public opinion should be understood as something that can be created outside the mind of each citizen and

not as a shared consciousness, then we find Foucault's definition of “regimes of truth”. Foucault (quoted in

Bormann, 2008: 102) claims:

Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

Taking as a starting point the existence of these “regimes of truth”, we can not only talk about public

opinion but also of its manipulation. Van Dijk refers to this when he speaks about ideologies, beliefs and

mental and social contexts of those minor social groups oppressed by the elites. These elites, either official


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or not, shape citizens' opinion throughout public discourse. Manipulation, including the one of public

opinion, is nothing different than power abuse, and

power abuse, requires special access to, or control over, scarce social resources. One of these resources is preferential access to the mass media and public discourse, a resource shared by members of ‘symbolic’ elites, such as politicians, journalists, scholars, writers, teachers, and so on (Van Dijk, 1996). Obviously, in order to be able to manipulate many others through text and talk, one needs to have access to some form of public discourse, such as parliamentary debates, news, opinion articles, textbooks, scientific articles, novels, TV shows, advertising, the internet, and so on.” (Van Dijk, 2006: 362)

9.6 State

The Encyclopaedia Britannica reads under the entry state

political organization of society, or the body politic, or, more narrowly, the institutions of government. The state is a form of human association distinguished from other social groups by its purpose, the establishment of order and security; its methods, the laws and their enforcement; its territory, the area of jurisdiction or geographic boundaries; and finally by its sovereignty. The state consists, most broadly, of the agreement of the individuals on the means whereby disputes are settled in the form of laws.

Nevertheless, the concept of state should be related to policies, and therefore to the international and

foreign policies that each state enforces. When talking about foreign policies we should not forget that they

are built upon Foucault´s assumption of a set of discourses and mechanisms that function as commonly

assumed statements. Foreign and international policies have been also for a long time built upon the

restricting discursive idea of “us” and the “others”. As Natalie Bormann (Bormann, 2008: 20) states

realist models in international relations theory have been built on the assumptions of rigid boundaries between inside and outside, anarchy and order. The outside is portrayed in terms of dangerous spaces where violence occurs unsanctioned. This threat of violence must be guarded against, contained and controlled if security inside the state is to prevail.

9.7 Self-determination

It is of the main words that have vital importance in relation with the Îlois claims over their former territory

and their rights as British or Mauritius citizens.

Oxford Dictionary states as self-determination “2.The action of a people in deciding its own form of

government; free determination of statehood, postulated as a right”. The Encyclopaedia Britannica expands

the term and explains its political origins in addition to the two meanings that today it has for the United

Nations (UN), where it has become a strategic issue:

Self-determination, the process by which a group of people, usually possessing a certain degree of national consciousness, form their own state and choose their own government. As a political principle, the idea of self-determination evolved at first as a by-product of the doctrine of nationalism, to which early expression was given by the French and American revolutions. In World War I the Allies accepted self-determination as a peace aim. In his


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Fourteen Points—the essential terms for peace—U.S. president Woodrow Wilson listed self-determination as an important objective for the postwar world.

After World War II, one of the chief goals of the United Nations was to promote “self – determination”

among the world. Even if in the League of Nations was once mentioned as an action to take in

consideration, it was not developed until the foundation of the UN. The Encyclopaedia continuous saying

that:

The UN Charter clarifies two meanings of the term self-determination. First, a state is said to have the right of self-determination in the sense of having the right to choose freely its political, economic, social, and cultural systems. Second, the right to self-determination is defined as the right of a people to constitute itself in a state or otherwise freely determine the form of its association with an existing state. Both meanings have their basis in the charter (Article 1, paragraph 2; and Article 55, paragraph 1). With respect to dependent territories, the charter asserts that administering authorities should undertake to ensure political advancement and the development of self-government (Article 73, paragraphs a and b; and Article 76, paragraph b).

As we will see along the project, abiding or not Article 73 of the UN charter was an important issue through

all the second half of the 20th century, especially in the decolonization process and when it came to British

and U.S relations regarding the Indian Ocean islands and their political status.

9.8 Special Relationship

The shared international interests among United States, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth since

the Second World War, are known as “special relationship”. After the Second World War, England intended

to protect three potential areas of influence, Commonwealth, British Empire and United States.

Nevertheless the idea was not to control one specific area but being indispensable in all of them. Great

Britain was focused in politic and economic international affairs. According to William and Schaub (quoted

on Dumbrell 2001: 8) the special relationship:

it is based on a broad congruence of outlook and interest on most security issues and on expectation on the part of both Britain and the United States that, on any issue of mutual concern, each government will have ample opportunity to make its views and preferences known to the other – and can generally expect to get a sympathetic hearing

Many governmental power pairs (UK Prime Minister and US President) have been analysed throughout the

years as we can find in A Special Relationship: Anglo – American Relations in the Cold War and After by John

Dumbrell (2001).


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10 Enclosure 3 – Collection of pronouns Table 2 - collection of pronouns

Pronoun Times it appears

We 92

It 81

I 61

Their 57

Our 53

Your 52

They 41

Its 39

Them 24

You 23

His 19

My 15

us 13

He 14

Us 13

Her 5

Him 4

Me 3

She 0

Pronouns in all 609


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11 Enclosure 4 - British and American spelling Table 3 - British and American spelling

British times American Times Honour 21 Honor 16 Labour 2 Labor 6 Labourers 7 Laborers 2 Honourable 2 Honorable 2 Defence 39 Defense 29 Authorise(d) 6 Authorize(d) 7 Recognise(d) 2 Recognize(d) 2 Behaviour 1 Behavior 0 Manoeuvre 1 maneuver 0 unfavourable 2 Unfavorable 0 Favour(s) 1 Favor(s) 1 refuelling 0 refueling 2 License(s) 1 Licence(s) 5 rumoured 1 rumored 0 fulfil 2 fulfill 0 Endeavour(s) 1 Endeavor(s) 1 Minimise 1 Minimize 1 Centre(s) 4 Center(s) 6 Re-evaluation 0 Reevaluation 1 Fulfilment 0 Fulfillment 1


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13 Enclosure 5 - Geographical location Table 4 - Geographical location

Location Times

United States 276 Diego Garcia 181 United Kingdom 137 BIOT & British Indian Ocean Territory 110 Mauritius 73 United States of America 49 London 38 Great Britain 37 Northern Ireland 37 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

34

Chagos Archipelago 31 Seychelles 26 Washington 10 Aldabra 7 (the) Indian Ocean 6 Peros Banhos 5 Salomon Island (or Atoll) 5 World(wide) 4 Whitehall 4 New York 4 Farquhar 3 Desroches 3 East Africa 3 Global 2 Agalega 2 Indian Ocean territories 2 Los Angeles Air Force Base, California 2 Mahe 2 Port Louis 2 Suez (east and west of Suez) 2 India 1 Africa 1 Gan 1 Ascension Island 1 The British Antarctic Territory 1 The non-Chagos part of BIOT 1 Indian Ocean littoral 1 Onizuka Air Force Station, California 1 Schriever Air Force Base (AFB), Colorado 1 TCS Oakhanger 1 References to a geographical location 1107


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14 Enclosure 6 - Chagos Archipelago discourse Table 5 - Chagos Archipelago discourse

Expression Times Documents

Chagos Archipelago 31 Memo June 12 1965, Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966, Letter of February 3 1969, Minute April 21 1969, Memorandum March 16 1971, UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982, Supplement December 13 1982,Letter June 21 2000, Letter November 16 2004,

Diego Garcia 180 Memo March 3 1964, Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966, Secret side note to Agreement December 30 1966, Minute July 25 1968, Letter of February 3 1969,Minute April 21 1969, Letter November 13 1970, Memorandum March 16 1971, Memorandum September 14 1972, Exchange of notes October 24 1972, Exchange of notes February 25 1976, Supplement December 13 1982, Letter of November 16 1987, Agreement June 18 1999, Letter June 21 2000,Exchanges of letters 2001-2004, Letter November 16 2004

The islands 38 Memo March 3 1964, Memorandums May 1964, Minute October 20 1964, Memo July 28 1965, Notes November 1965, Note February 25 1966, Minute June 1966, Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966, Agreed Confidential Minutes December 30 1966, Secret side note to Agreement December 30 1966, Letter of February 3 1969, Supplement December 13 1982, Letter June 21 2000, Letter November 16 2004

the area 5 Memo March 3 1964, Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966, Letter of February 3 1969, Exchange of notes February 25 1976

the Dependencies 1 Memorandums May 1964

the various territories concerned

1 Memorandums May 1964

Indian Ocean Territories 2 Memorandums May 1964, Agreement June 18 1999

Copra plantations of a number of islands

1 Memo July 28 1965

BIOT 72 Note February 25 1966, Minute June 1966, Minute October 23 1968, Minute July 25 1968, Letter of February 3 1969, Advisory opinion January 16 1970, Minute January 11 1971, Memorandum March 16 1971, Exchange of notes October 24 1972, Exchange of notes February 25 1976, Agreement June 18 1999, Exchanges of letters 2001-2004,

British Indian Ocean Territory 38 August 1966, Note August 24 1966, Fejl! Henvisningskilde ikke fundet., Agreed Confidential Minutes December 30 1966, Secret side note to Agreement December 30 1966, Letter November 13 1970, Memorandum March 16 1971, Exchange of notes


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October 24 1972, Exchange of notes February 25 1976, Exchange of notes June 22 1976, UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982, Letter of November 16 1987, Agreement June 18 1999,

the Territory 61 Memo July 28 1965, Notes November 1965, Note February 25 1966, Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966, Agreed Confidential Minutes December 30 1966, Advisory opinion January 16 1970, Supplement December 13 1982

some rocks 1 Note August 24 1966

an island 2 Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966

certain Indian Ocean islands 2 Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966, Secret side note to Agreement December 30 1966

part of an island 1 Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966

the islands of Diego Garcia and the remainder of the Chagos Archipelago

2 Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966, Letter June 21 2000,

the required sites 1 Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966

the Indian Ocean islands 2 Secret side note to Agreement December 30 1966

the islands constituting the British Indian Ocean Territory

1 Secret side note to Agreement December 30 1966

other islands in Chagos group

2 Telegram September 4 1968

Diego 3 Letter of February 3 1969, Exchanges of letters 2001-2004

the two northern islands 1 Letter of February 3 1969,

the Archipelago 8 Letter of February 3 1969, Letter June 21 2000, Letter November 16 2004

Chagos 4 Minute April 21 1969, Advisory opinion January 16 1970, Memorandum March 16 1971,

the whole of the Chagos Archipelago

1 Minute April 21 1969,

The non-Chagos part of BIOT 1 Advisory opinion January 16 1970

Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory

1 Memorandum March 16 1971

the atoll 3 Memorandum March 16 1971, Exchange of notes October 24 1972, Exchange of notes February 25 1976

Diego Garcia itself and the remainder on the two other inhabited atolls of Peros Banhos and Salomon


"Diego Garcia" means the atoll of Diego Garcia, the lagoon and the three islets at the mouth of the lagoon

2 Exchange of notes October 24 1972, Exchange of notes February 25 1976

British possession 1 UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982

the islands of the Chagos Archipelago, even those at some distance from Diego Garcia

1 Letter June 21 2000

the centrality of the islands 1 Letter June 21 2000


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the outer islands 9 Letter June 21 2000

Diego Garcia‟s desirability as a location


Diego Garcia and other islands of the archipelago


The Chagos Archipelago's geographic location, isolation and uninhabited state

1 Letter November 16 2004

References in all 484 Memo March 3 1964-Letter November 16 2004


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15 Enclosure 7 - Chagossian people discourse Table 6 - Chagossian people discourse

Clause times Document(s)

local inhabitants 2 Memo March 3 1964, Proposal July 5 1968

permanent residents 2 Memorandums May 1964

contract labourers 4 Memorandums May 1964, Memo July 28 1965, Letter November 13 1970

those persons now living and working in 1 Memorandums May 1964

those people on present on the islands 1

permanent inhabitants 7 Memo July 28 1965, Note February 25 1966, Minute June 1966

the inhabitants 14 Notes November 1965, Note February 25 1966, Minute June 1966, Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966, Minute October 23 1968, Minute July 25 1968, Minute April 21 1969, Advisory opinion January 16 1970, Letter November 13 1970, Memorandum March 16 1971,

a civilian population 2 Notes November 1965, Letter June 21 2000

the people 8 Note February 25 1966, Minute April 21 1969, Advisory opinion January 16 1970, Memorandum March 16 1971

the people in the islands as Mauritians and Seychellois

1 Note February 25 1966

belongers of either Mauritius or the Seychellois 1 Note February 25 1966

contract labour employed by the estate owners or commercial concerns

1 Note February 25 1966

inhabitants of BIOT 3 Note February 25 1966, Minute October 23 1968

temporarily resident in BIOT 2 Note February 25 1966, Minute June 1966

“belongers” of Mauritius or the Seychelles 1 Minute June 1966

“permanent inhabitants” 1 Minute June 1966

a population 3 Minute June 1966, Advisory opinion January 16 1970,Memorandum March 16 1971

current population 1 August 1966

no permanent population 1 August 1966

Few Tarzans or Men Fridays 1 Note August 24 1966

no indigenous population 3 Note August 24 1966, Minute July 25 1968, Advisory opinion


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January 16 1970

any inhabitants 2 Agreed Confidential Minutes December 30 1966

Chagos-born laborers 1 Letter of February 3 1969

copra workers 3 Letter of February 3 1969, Memorandum March 16 1971, Memorandum September 14 1972

Diego workers 2 Letter of February 3 1969

local unskilled labor 1 Letter of February 3 1969

The people are working in the Chagos under contract and own no property or fixed assets there

1 Minute April 21 1969

some of them have established roots in Chagos 1 Minute April 21 1969

the inhabitants of Chagos are not a permanent or semi-permanent population

Advisory opinion January 16 1970

the local people 1 Advisory opinion January 16 1970

the inhabitants of Chagos 1 Advisory opinion January 16 1970

the local people are only a floating population 1 Advisory opinion January 16 1970

most of the people are Seychellois labourers and their families. However, the longer that such a population remains

1 Advisory opinion January 16 1970

such labourers and their families 1 Advisory opinion January 16 1970

these contract labourers 1 Letter November 13 1970

small number of contract labourers from the Seychelles and Mauritius engaged to work on the copra plantations on the Island.

1 Letter November 13 1970

the present population on Diego Garcia 1 Letter November 13 1970

the people from the Chagos Archipelago 1 Memorandum March 16 1971

the Inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago 2 Memorandum March 16 1971

the entire population of the atoll 1 Memorandum March 16 1971

50 Ilois or mono-Mauritian families 1 Memorandum March 16 1971

Ilois 6 Memorandum March 16 1971

the Ilois 2 Memorandum March 16 1971

the present population, who are essentially migrant workers


the former copra workers on Diego Garcia 1 Memorandum September 14 1972

those living or working there 1 UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims

Agreement July 7 1982

the Îlois 11 UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims

Agreement July 7 1982

a permanent civilian population 1 Letter June 21 2000

a resident civilian population 2 Letter June 21 2000


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small and scattered populations 1 Letter June 21 2000

uninhabited 1 Letter November 16 2004

Times referred to in all to the Chagossians 10911 Memo March 3 1964- Letter November 16 2004

11 We have to be careful whether this is the exact number, since some of the clauses are overlapping each other

for instance ‘the inhabitant’ (14 times) and ‘inhabitants of BIOT’ (3 times). In that case it is ‘the inhabitants of BIOT’ 2 out of 3 times. A fair estimate would be that the Chagossians are referred to between 90-100 times, based on the experience we gained analyzing the corpus.


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16 Enclosure 8 - analysis of 'we'

Table 7 - analysis of 'we'

Qoute Analysis

The UK strongly favors development of an airfield on Aldabra which we would share, in order to anticipate inability to over fly Africa from Ascension Island, and to provide a staging area for actions in East Africa . . . They understand we envisage development of austere air and harbour facilities over a long term and that except for a communications station on Diego Garcia, firm decisions as to the future have yet to be made in the USG. (Memo March 3 1964)

Exclusive WE: it only refers to America in relation with United Kingdom actions. It only refers to how US Government and military forces would behave in relation with the facilities on Diego Garcia and their sharing with the UK.

We12 made clear we preferred exclusive control, preferably without employing local inhabitants in islands where we might install facilities, while of course being willing to share these facilities with the UK . . . The UK delegation agreed that the UK should be responsible for acquiring land, resettling the population and compensating them therefore at HMG’s expense, while the US would be responsible for construction and maintenance costs. Memo March 3 1964

Exclusive WE: As long as the main use of the facilities in Diego Garcia would be done by the US army and their agreements with UK were that UK will take care of the depopulation of the archipelago is clear that this “we” refers only to the desires that US Government expressed to their UK counterparts. Also the second “we” refers to what US will do, not to what both Governments (US+UK) will do in the island.

Sir P. Dean draws attention to the difficulties we are likely to have to face in the United Nations if these proposals became known at the present time. In connections with our proposals for placing the various territories concerned under the direct UK administration, he draws attention to paragraph 6 of Resolution No. 1514 (of 14 December 1960) which reads: --“any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” He also suggest that we might face demands for separate transmission of information about these territories under article 73 of the Charter which requires members “to transmit regularly to the secretary General... statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are responsible.” (p. 88, Memorandums May 1964

Exclusive WE: In this paragraph, the use of “we” relates only to the UK Government and the possible results of their actions in relation to the depopulation of Diego Garcia and its hiding to the UN

These steps (ie, the depopulation) should be ordered and timed to attract the least attention and should have some logical cover where possible worked out in advance. Even if these steps are taken with the utmost discretion and careful planning we must anticipate that they will become known and arouse suspicions as to their

Exclusive WE: If we just consider that this paragraph includes both US and UK Governments as that they would have to face together the consequences of the affair if it was made public. Even if the

12

The use of we in the sentence is remarkable, because it could have been used the impersonal “it”, as has been used previously in this document.


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purpose. (p. 88, Memorandums May 1964)

depopulation actions would be taken by UK, the consequences will be suffered by both. But if we consider the kind of document we are analysing we can observe that “we” functions as an “exclusive” pronoun due to the fact that the memorandum would only be available to people within the UK Government.

On the grounds that ‘the ante has gone up’ they now ask that we contribute one half of the anticipated detachment costs. (p. 89, Memo June 12 1965)

Exclusive WE: As long as the half of the funds for the removal of the population on Diego Garcia will come from the US Defence budget it is clear that, in this paragraph, “we” refers, exclusively to the US Government.

In the absence of permanent inhabitants the obligations of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter will not apply to the territory and we shall not transmit information on it to the Secretary-General. (p. 89, Memo June 12 1965)

Exclusive WE: As in the previous case (Memorandum May 1964) it is possible that the addresser refers to the receiver of the memo when he is writing and that the “we” should include both of them. But, as long as it is as “memo” the same situation as before arises, it would only be available to the people within the cabinet.

With these objectives in view we propose to avoid any reference to “permanent inhabitants,” instead, to refer to the people in the islands as Mauritians and Seychellois... We are... taking steps to acquire ownership over the land on the islands and consider that it would be desirable... for the inhabitants to be given some form of temporary residence permit. We could then more effectively take the line in discussion that these people are Mauritian and Seychellois;[....] We understand from a recent discussion with Mr Robert Newton”—who had visited the islands—“that, in his opinion, the people on the islands cannot be regarded as permanent inhabitants but are in fact in the category of contract labour employed by the estate owners or commercial concerns ... Against this background we assume that there would be unlikely to be any undue difficulty with the inhabitants of BIOT themselves in moving over to a position in which they all held temporary residence permits on the basis of which their presence in the Territory would be allowed. (p. 89, Note February 25 1966)

Exclusive WE: This paragraph contains several “exclusive we”. All the pronouns are related only to the UK Government and its attitudes and understandings about the population of Diego Garcia and the other Chagos Archipelago islands. It cannot be forgotten that the UK Government was the one in charge of the depopulation of the islands.

It would be highly embarrassing to us if, after giving the Americans to understand that the islands in BIOT would be available to them for defence purposes, we then had to tell them that we proposed to

Exclusive WE: It would be embarrassing to the UK that they will not fulfill their deal with the US Government. Taking on


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admit that they fell within the purview of the UN Committee of Twenty-Four. (p. 91, Minute June 1966)

account what the text says, “we” should be exclusive, the only ones who will be embarrassed would be the British.

[...]we could not accept the principles governing our otherwise universal behaviour in our dependent territories, e g we could not accept that the interests of the inhabitants were paramount and that we should develop self-government there. We therefore consider that the best way in which we can satisfy these objectives, when our action comes under scrutiny in the United Nations, would be to assert from the start, if the need arose, that this territory did not fall within the scope of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter.” (p. 92, August 1966)

Exclusive WE: British are defending their position of why they cannot accept some of the Charter of the United Nations rules regarding Diego Garcia. Again, this use of “we” is exclusive because the only ones in charge of the depopulation were the British.

Unfortunately along with the Birds go some few Tarzans or Men Fridays whose origins are obscure, and who are being hopefully wished on to Mauritius etc. When that has been done I agree we must be very tough and a submission is being done accordingly. (p. 92, August 1966)

Exclusive WE: Even if it includes both Mr. du Boulay and Dennis A. Greenhill, the addresser and the receiver, the use of “we” can be seen as exclusive because nobody except the people from their departments.

A provision to this effect is contained in Protocol No. 4 to European Convention on Human Rights but that has not been ratified by us, and thus we do not regard the UK as bound by such a rule. In this respect we are able to make up the rules as we go along and treat the inhabitants of BIOT as not “belonging” to it in any sense. (p. 106 Minute October 23 1968)

Exclusive WE: UK representatives are talking, in this paragraph, exclusively about themselves and about the rules their Government will make in relation to the inhabitants of BIOT Territory due to their “supposed” freedom.

As a bare minimum we consider that British flag should fly over facility and that UK liaison officer would need to be appointed in order to establish necessary relations with other HMG officials and local inhabitants. (p. 106, Minute July 25 1968)

Exclusive WE: The US representatives are proposing their British counterparts what they think it should be suitable and desirable for Diego Garcia regarding political and public status on the island. They are offering a point of view from their own side, making “we” become exclusive.

The UN General Assembly may object that the interest of the local population are being ignored, but we have been able to resist such arguments by pointing out that the inhabitants consist mostly of migrant workers from Mauritius and Seychelles. p. 106, Minute July 25 1968)

Exclusive WE: It relates to the depopulation of the islands, one of the main topics that arise when analysing the use of “we” in the correspondence between UK and US Governments. This “we” refers, exclusively, to the UK Government. Exclusively, in this case is being talked about how the UN had been persuaded to believe that there was no population in the islands.

We have been informed that the proposed project for a naval facility on Diego Garcia was included (without identification) in the

Exclusive WE: US representatives are talking about technical details of the base


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FY 1970 Department of Defense military construction budget request presented to Congress last week. The proposal envisages construction of the 26 million dollar facility as outlined to you last July, plus 11 million dollars for procurement of communications equipment. As we advised Robin Johnstone in October, the Diego Garcia proposal will be identified as a classified line item when the military construction budget request is presented to the House Armed Services Committee. We fully recognize the need to consult closely with your Government regarding the Diego Garcia project, and intend to do so in detail when our plans are firm. You will understand, of course, that we cannot undertake actual construction without Congressional approval, and some of the details of our planning will perforce remain undetermined until the House Committee has held its hearings and given its approval. (Lines in bold emphasized in the original) (p. 107, Letter of February 3 1969)

within US government. The US tells the British that until the construction planning of the base would not be approved by the Congress, anything can be done. In this document we find several references, all used in the same way. All of them refer only to US officials.

As long as only part of BIOT is evacuated the British Government will have to continue to argue that the local people are only a floating population. This may be easier in the case of the non-Chagos part of BIOT ... where most of the people are Seychellois labourers and their families. However, the longer that such a population remains, and perhaps increases, the greater the risk of our being accused of setting up a mini-colony about which we would have to report to the United Nations under Article 73 of the Charter. Therefore strict immigration legislation giving such labourers and their families very restricted rights of residence would bolster our arguments that the territory has no indigenous population. (p. 111, Advisory opinion January 16 1970)

Exclusive WE: UK Government is portraying the maintenance of its strategies regarding the denial of a regular population on the islands. They did not want the islanders to stay for a very long period because that would mean that they would have to report on them to the UN. British would diminish their rights in order to confirm that there was no indigenous population.

We shall continue to try to say as little as possible (particularly until the Congressional hearings are concluded, probably around mid-December at the latest) to avoid embarrassing the United States administration. Apart from our overall strategic and defence interests we are also concerned at present not to have to elaborate on the administrative implications for the present population on Diego Garcia of establishment of any base there. We would not wish it to become general knowledge that some of the inhabitants have lived on Diego Garcia for at least two generations and could, therefore, be regarded as “belongers”. We shall therefore advise Ministers in handling supplementary questions about whether Diego Garcia is inhabited to say that there is only a small number of contract labourers from the Seychelles and Mauritius engaged to work on the copra plantations on the Island. Should a Member ask about what would happen to these contract labourers in the event of a base being set up on the Island, we hope that, for the present, this can be brushed aside as a hypothetical

Exclusive WE: On these paragraphs it would seem that of the “inclusive we” was used several times because they are contained in a letter from the FCO (Foreign Commonwealth Office) to the Governor of Seychelles. But we must also notice that the Seychelles did not become an independent state until 1976, for this reason, it was still under the law of Great Britain and the Seychelles Governor was still a British employee. This way the letter would remain always within the same official institutions and the “we” that was seen as inclusive in a first moment would become an “exclusive” one.


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question at least until any decision to go ahead with the Diego Garcia facility becomes public.” (p. 112, Letter November 13 1970)

The time has come to implement arrangements agreed in principle by the previous Administration by which, in view of the construction of an American naval communication facility on Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), we should resettle the population of the Chagos Archipelago, of which Diego Garcia forms part, partly in Seychelles and partly, subject to negotiations with Mauritius Government, in Mauritius. I recommend that officials be authorised now to implement the policies described in paragraphs 1 and 2 above; and that we open negotiations with the Mauritius Government about resettlement there, ad referendum to Ministers. We have known since 1965 that if a defence facility were established we should have to resettle elsewhere the contract copra workers who live there. (p. Memorandum March 16 1971)

Exclusive WE: Here the act of depopulating the island arises again, as a task that belongs only to UK Government. UK talks about what they should do with the population of Diego Garcia now that the construction of the base has been approved. That is the reason why the use of “we” on this paragraph is completely exclusive.

We anticipate that our commitment of resources to the island will grow in the years ahead in order to develop the necessary infrastructure to sustain, should it become necessary, intensified military operations. Moreover, as resources for defense diminish in other areas, the centrality of the islands for ensuring U.S. and British security interests will only increase. (p. 146 Letter June 21 2000

Exclusive WE: Despite the fact that British and American Governments had certain shared interests on the island of Diego Garcia , the main military forces belonged to the American Army. This is the reason why this “we” turns out to be “exclusive” because the only troops concerned by the development of new facilities would be the American ones.

We believe that an attempt to resettle any of the islands of the Chagos Archipelago would severely compromise Diego Garcia's unparalleled security and have a deleterious impact on our military operations, and we appreciate the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to prevent such resettlement. (p. 154Letter November 16 2004)

Exclusive WE: In this paragraph US thanks the UK for the effort they are doing in maintaining the island isolated. This action remark the exclusive use of “we”. In general, the only military forces that were on the island were American, but the US Government had agreed with several countries to allow their troops to use the facilities of the island, and some of the troops are British.


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18 Enclosure 9 - depopulation discourse Table 8 - depopulation discourse

phrase type times documents Nominalisation

resettling verb 4 Memo March 3 1964, Agreed Confidential Minutes December 30 1966, Memorandum March 16 1971

No

the repatriation or resettlement of persons currently living on the islands selected

Noun clause

1 Memorandums May 1964

Yes- repatriaterepatriation Resettle resettlement

repatriation noun 2 Memorandums May 1964, Memorandum March 16 1971

Yes- repatriaterepatriation Resettle resettlement

Resettlement noun 29 Memorandums May 1964, Telegram September 4 1968, Minute July 25 1968, Memorandum March 16 1971, Memorandum September 14 1972, UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982, Letter November 16 2004

Yes – resettle resettlement

be evacuated verb 2 Memorandums May 1964, Memo July 28 1965

No

removal noun 6 Memorandums May 1964, Telegram September 4 1968, Letter of February 3 1969, UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982,

Yes – remove removal

The depopulation noun 1 Memorandums May 1964

removed verb 1 Notes November 1965 no

are given fair and just treatment

adjective clause

1 Note February 25 1966 Yes-treattreatment

enactment of appropriate immigration legislation for the Territory itself

noun clause 1 Note February 25 1966 Yes- enactenactment

in dealing with the people

Prepositional phrase

1 Note February 25 1966 No

be resettled in Verb 2 Note February 25 1966 No


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Mauritius or Seychelles

Our action noun 1 August 1966 Yes- actaction

freedom of manoeuvre

Adjective clause

1 August 1966 Yes – manoeuvre manoeuvre

These steps noun 1 August 1966 No

The object of the exercise

noun 1 Note August 24 1966 Yes – exercise exercise

to deport verb 2 Minute October 23 1968, Letter November 13 1970

No

relocate verb 2 Letter of February 3 1969

no

suggest that copra production on Diego Garcia be continued until we are in a position, later this Spring, to establish a construction timetable

verb 1 Letter of February 3 1969

No

the return noun 2 Minute April 21 1969, Letter June 21 2000

Yes- return return

Move(d) verb 5 Telegram September 4 1968Letter of February 3 1969Memorandum March 16 1971Letter June 21 2000

No

As long as only part of BIOT is evacuated

Prepositional phrase

1 Advisory opinion January 16 1970

No

The event(s) noun 4 Letter November 13 1970, UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982

No

To settle verb 2 Memorandum March 16 1971

No

In returning Prepositional 1 Memorandum March 16 1971

No

means the evacuation and resettlement of several hundred people

noun 1 Memorandum March 16 1971

Yes- evacuateevacuation Resettleresettlment

evacuation noun 2 Memorandum March 16 1971

Yes – evacuate evacuation

resettle verb 4 Memorandum March 16 1971, Letter November 16 2004

No


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clearing verb 1 Memorandum March 16 1971

No

The relocation noun 1 Memorandum September 14 1972

Yes – relocaterelocation

their departure or removal from the Chagos Archipelago after November 1965

noun 1 UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982,

Yes- departdeparture Removeremoval

Reference to depopulation in all

82 Memo March 3 1964 - Letter November 16 2004

Some interesting examples of the expressions used to refer to the depopulation are below. We have attached them here due to limited space.

politically unwise to relocate Diego workers on Mauritius where there are serious unemployment problems, and have therefore agreed to the use of Peros Banhos and Saloman Island to relocate them and others in the archipelago who may in the future have to be moved.(Letter of February 3 1969)


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19 Enclosure 10 - SUBJECT: HMG OUTLINES NEW PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING

INTEL FLIGHT CLEARANCES (Wikileaks)

Friday, 18 April 2008, 15:31

S E C R E T LONDON 001115

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM ACTION TEAM

EO 12958 DECL: 04/18/2018

TAGS MOPS, MARR, PINR, PREL, UK

SUBJECT: HMG OUTLINES NEW PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING INTEL FLIGHT CLEARANCES

REF: A. LONDON 1064

B. TREMONT-PM ACTION TEAM EMAIL APRIL 16

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly, reason 1.4, a/b/c/d.

1. (S/NF) Summary and Action Request. The UK Ministry of Defense summoned PolMilOff April

15 to receive the letter in para 2 on new procedures for requesting HMG permission to use UK

territory to launch intelligence flights. This letter, evidently what DG Mariot Leslie was referring to

in her April 14 meeting with DCM (ref a), requests that ALL future requests to use UK territory for

intel flights be conveyed by Embassy London and be accompanied by enough information that

ministers can fully consider whether sensitive missions might put the UK at risk of being complicit

in unlawful acts. We understand that these additional precautionary measures stem from the

February revelation that the USG transited renditioned persons through Diego Garcia without UK

permission and HMG's resultant need to ensure it is not similarly blindsided in the future. Embassy

London invites relevant USG agencies to convey concerns or questions that should be brought to

MOD's attention in an initial meeting on the issue April 22. End Summary.

2. (S/Rel UK) Begin Text of Letter (note internal numbering):

9 April 2008

Dear Ms. Tremont,

UK INTELLIGENCE GATHERING FLIGHTS FROM UK BASES

1. I am grateful for your help in resolving the current issues regarding UK Government

authorisation of U2 sorties flown from RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus, over Lebanon. While I am not

suggesting that established procedures were not followed in this case, events have demonstrated that

we need to set up a more formal mechanism for seeking agreement to the use of UK bases for

intelligence flights which will enable any legal and political concerns to be addressed and resolved.

This is particularly important for sensitive intelligence gathering operations, for example where

information is passed to third parties. We would like to have a single US point of contact through

which the requests would be routed. Given that flight missions may be directed by either State

Department or the Pentagon (or possibly other agencies), it would seem sensible for all requests to

be passed through the US Embassy in London to me.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/cyprus

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/lebanon


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2. We have a very good working relationship with EUCOM which uses well-established procedures

for identifying and discussing the regular intelligence flights that the US undertakes from RAF

Akrotiri and from RAF Mildenhall. MOD seeks approval of these missions from Foreign and

Commonwealth Office as well as Defence Ministers, every four months (and we clear similar UK

flights through the same process). To date, the details of these flights have been discussed at desk

level, any concerns have been highlighted and resolved, and staffing action taken here to put the

cases to Ministers along with any necessary supporting advice. In many respects, these flights have

become routine, and the issues raised have not normally proved complex or overly sensitive.

3. However, recent U2 flights over Turkey/Northern Iraq, and the Lebanon, have highlighted

important legal and political issues which require much more careful consideration by HMG. In

both cases, intelligence product is intended to be passed to third party governments, and it is

important for us to be satisfied that HMG is not indirectly aiding the commission of unlawful acts

by those governments on the basis of the information gathered through the assistance we provide to

the US. This is a very important point for UK Ministers, and it is now clear that the approvals

procedures must be robust enough to capture and deal with these issues at an early stage. There are

further forms of risk that we need to assess in putting the case for agreement to our Ministers,

including the political risk that other governments become aware of, and potentially object to, the

flights (hence our need to know flight profiles). In

particular, there are sensitivities with Government of Cyprus regarding the use of Sovereign Ba se

Areas in Cyprus.

4. In the light of this, we feel that a formal approach should be made from the US Government to

MOD, seeking approval for specified intelligence gathering flights using UK bases. We envisage

this approach setting out the flight programmes, with sortie profiles and the other information

provided by EUCOM, but also setting out in as much detail as possible: the purpose and scope of

the mission; whether it is a national task or in support of a bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreement;

which other nations have been informed of the mission and -- if the intelligence gathered is to be

passed to a third party -- the purpose for which this is happening, the expected use to which the

information will be put (and by which agencies of the third party), and an assessment of any legal or

human rights implications. We would need to be informed of any changes to this information prior

to revised missions being flown in order to ensure we had the required Ministerial approvals in

place. As now, most if not all such flights can be captured in the current four-monthly approval

cycle, but we stand ready to receive additional requests between each cyclical submission should

flight profiles and/or missions be amended or added at short notice.

5. We will continue to liaise at the military-to-military level with EUCOM over flight details, but

also wish to receive political and legal input, via the Embassy, from the appropriate USG agency.

Naturally, approaches need to be made as early as possible to allow time for clearing queries and

UK staffing (though we can and do turn round most requests very quickly).

6. I have attached a schedule of the missions that EUCOM have informed us that they would like to

fly in the period 1 May - 31 August 2008. In order to start the new process I would be grateful if

you could approach the relevant USG authorities to provide the additional information that I have

mentioned for each mission type. I recognise that this may be a complex task but I think it will

establish a firm foundation for the new procedure I have described.


Page 73 of 158

7. I am sure you will understand the sensitivities involved in the use of UK bases for covert or

potentially controversial missions, and hence our desire to formalise the approvals process in this

way. I would be happy to discuss mechanics in more detail. We would, however, like to set up the

new process as quickly as possible, and in time for the next four-monthly approval due at the end of

April. I would welcome a meeting with you and your colleagues to assist in the setting up of the

new process.

Yours sincerely,

W M Jessett (Director Counter-Terrorism and UK Operations (Policy))

Annex

A. Flights requested by EUCOM from 1 May - 31 August 2008 (In ref B)

End Text.

3. (S/NF) Comment. Embassy London would welcome other agencies' comments and questions for

MOD on these new procedures; our first meeting to discuss this is scheduled for April 22. At first

glance, we find them rather burdensome. For starters, we are reluctant to make Embassy London

the POC on these requests, which had been worked successfully in mil-mil channels at EUCOM

before now; this seems to be an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. We further believe that the

request to provide this amount of additional information for well-established missions scheduled to

continue May 1, is an extremely tight deadline and we will push back on this requirement. Embassy

London POCs for this issue are Pam Tremont ([email protected]), and Col. Jeff Hosken

([email protected]).

Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom

LEBARON

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/150435



Page 74 of 158

20 Eclosure 11 - SUBJECT: HMG FLOATS PROPOSAL FOR MARINE RESERVE

COVERING (Wikileaks)

Friday, 15 May 2009, 07:00

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001156

NOFORN

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 05/13/2029

TAGS MARR, MOPS, SENV, UK, IO, MP, EFIS, EWWT, PGOV, PREL

SUBJECT: HMG FLOATS PROPOSAL FOR MARINE RESERVE COVERING THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO (BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY)

REF: 08 LONDON 2667 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills for reasons 1.4 b and d

1. (C/NF) Summary. HMG would like to establish a "marine park" or "reserve" providing

comprehensive environmental protection to the reefs and waters of the British Indian Ocean

Territory (BIOT), a senior Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) official informed Polcouns on

May 12. The official insisted that the establishment of a marine park -- the world's largest -- would

in no way impinge on USG use of the BIOT, including Diego Garcia, for military purposes. He

agreed that the UK and U.S. should carefully negotiate the details of the marine reserve to assure

that U.S. interests were safeguarded and the strategic value of BIOT was upheld. He said that the

BIOT's former inhabitants would find it difficult, if not impossible, to pursue their claim for

resettlement on the islands if the entire Chagos Archipelago were a marine reserve. End Summary.

Protecting the BIOT's Waters

----------------------------

2. (C/NF) Senior HMG officials support the establishment of a "marine park" or "reserve" in the

British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), which includes Diego Garcia, Colin Roberts, the Foreign

and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) Director, Overseas Territories, told the Political Counselor May

12. Noting that the uninhabited islands of the Chagos Archipelago are already protected under

British law from development or other environmental harm but that current British law does not

provide protected status for either reefs or waters, Roberts affirmed that the bruited proposal would

only concern the "exclusive zone" around the islands. The resulting protected area would constitute

"the largest marine reserve in the world."

3. (C/NF) Roberts iterated strong UK "political support" for a marine park; "Ministers like the

idea," he said. He stressed that HMG's "timeline" for establishing the park was before the next

general elections, which under British law must occur no later than May 2010. He suggested that

the exact terms of the proposals could be defined and presented at the U.S.-UK annual political-

military consultations held in late summer/early fall 2009 (exact date TBD). If the USG would like

to discuss the issue prior to those talks, HMG would be open for discussion through other channels

-- in any case, the FCO would keep Embassy London informed of development of the idea and next

steps. The UK would like to "move forward discussion with key international stakeholders" by the

end of 2009. He said that HMG had noted the success of U.S. marine sanctuaries in Hawaii and the

Marianas Trench. (Note: Roberts was referring to the Papahanaumokuakea Marine National


Page 75 of 158

Monument and Marianas Trench Marine National Monument. End Note.) He asserted that the Pew

Charitable Trust, which has proposed a BIOT marine reserve, is funding a public relations

campaign in support of the idea. He noted that the trust had backed the Hawaiian reserve and is

well-regarded within British governmental circles and the larger British environmental community.

Three Sine Qua Nons: U.S. Assent...

-----------------------------------

4. (C/NF) According to Roberts, three pre-conditions must be met before HMG could establish a

park. First, "we need to make sure the U.S. government is comfortable with the idea. We would

need to present this proposal very clearly to the American administration...All we do should

enhance base security or leave it unchanged." Polcouns expressed appreciation for this a priori

commitment, but stressed that the 1966 U.S.-UK Exchange of Notes concerning the BIOT would,

in any event, require U.S. assent to any significant change of the BIOT's status that could impact the

BIOT's strategic use. Roberts stressed that the proposal "would have no impact on how Diego

Garcia is administered as a base." In response to a request for clarification on this point from

Polcouns, Roberts asserted that the proposal would have absolutely no impact on the right of U.S.

or British military vessels to use the BIOT for passage, anchorage, prepositioning, or other uses.

Polcouns rejoined

that designating the BIOT as a marine park could, years down the road, create public questioning

about the suitability of the BIOT for military purposes. Roberts responded that the terms of

reference for the establishment of a marine park would clearly state that the BIOT, including Diego

Garcia, was reserved for military uses.

5. (C/NF) Ashley Smith, the Ministry of Defense's (MOD) International Policy and Planning

Assistant Head, Asia Pacific, who also participated in the meeting, affirmed that the MOD "shares

the same concerns as the U.S. regarding security" and would ensure that security concerns were

fully and properly addressed in any proposal for a marine park. Roberts agreed, stating that "the

primary purpose of the BIOT is security" but that HMG could also address environmental concerns

in its administration of the BIOT. Smith added that the establishment of a marine reserve had the

potential to be a "win-win situation in terms of establishing situational awareness" of the BIOT. He

stressed that HMG sought "no constraints on military operations" as a result of the establishment of

a marine park.

...Mauritian Assent...

----------------------

6. (C/NF) Roberts outlined two other prerequisites for establishment of a marine park. HMG would

seek assent from the Government of Mauritius, which disputes sovereignty over the Chagos

archipelago, in order to avoid the GOM "raising complaints with the UN." He asserted that the

GOM had expressed little interest in protecting the archipelago's sensitive environment and was

primarily interested in the archipelago's economic potential as a fishery. Roberts noted that in

January 2009 HMG held the first-ever "formal talks" with Mauritius regarding the BIOT. The talks

included the Mauritian Prime Minister. Roberts said that he "cast a fly in the talks over how we

could improve stewardship of the territory," but the Mauritian participants "were not focused on


Page 76 of 158

environmental issues and expressed interest only in fishery control." He said that one Mauritian

participant in the talks complained that the Indian Ocean is "the only ocean in the world where the

fish die of old age." In HMG's view, the marine park concept aims to "go beyond economic value

and consider bio-diversity and intangible values."

...Chagossian Assent

--------------------

7. (C/NF) Roberts acknowledged that "we need to find a way to get through the various Chagossian

lobbies." He admitted that HMG is "under pressure" from the Chagossians and their advocates to

permit resettlement of the "outer islands" of the BIOT. He noted, without providing details, that

"there are proposals (for a marine park) that could provide the Chagossians warden jobs" within the

BIOT. However, Roberts stated that, according to the HGM,s current thinking on a reserve, there

would be "no human footprints" or "Man Fridays" on the BIOT's uninhabited islands. He asserted

that establishing a marine park would, in effect, put paid to resettlement claims of the archipelago's

former residents. Responding to Polcouns' observation that the advocates of Chagossian

resettlement continue to vigorously press their case, Roberts opined that the UK's "environmental

lobby is far more powerful than the Chagossians' advocates." (Note: One group of Chagossian

litigants is appealing to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) the decision of Britain's

highest court to deny "resettlement rights" to the islands' former inhabitants. See below at paragraph

13 and reftel. End Note.)

Je Ne Regrette Rien

-------------------

8. (C/NF) Roberts observed that BIOT has "served its role very well," advancing shared U.S.-UK

strategic security objectives for the past several decades. The BIOT "has had a great role in assuring

the security of the UK and U.S. -- much more than anyone foresaw" in the 1960s, Roberts

emphasized. "We do not regret the removal of the population," since removal was necessary for the

BIOT to fulfill its strategic purpose, he said. Removal of the

population is the reason that the BIOT's uninhabited islands and the surrounding waters are in

"pristine" condition. Roberts added that Diego Garcia's excellent condition reflects the responsible

stewardship of the U.S. and UK forces using it.

Administering a Reserve

-----------------------

9. (C/NF) Roberts acknowledged that numerous technical questions needed to be resolved regarding

the establishment and administration of a marine park, although he described the governmental

"act" of declaring a marine park as a relatively straightforward and rapid process. He noted that the

establishment of a marine reserve would require permitting scientists to visit BIOT, but that

creating a park would help restrict access for non-scientific purposes. For example, he continued,

the rules governing the park could strictly limit access to BIOT by yachts, which Roberts referred to

as "sea gypsies."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/human-rights


Page 77 of 158

BIOT: More Than Just Diego Garcia

---------------------------------

10. (C/NF) Following the meeting with Roberts, Joanne Yeadon, Head of the FCO's Overseas

Territories Directorate's BIOT and Pitcairn Section, who also attended the meeting with Polcouns,

told Poloff that the marine park proposal would "not impact the base on Diego Garcia in any way"

and would have no impact on the parameters of the U.S.-UK 1966 exchange of notes since the

marine park would "have no impact on defense purposes." Yeadon averred that the provision of the

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea guaranteed free passage of vessels, including military

vessels, and that the presence of a marine park would not diminish that right.

11. (C/NF) Yeadon stressed that the exchange of notes governed more than just the atoll of Diego

Garcia but expressly provided that all of the BIOT was "set aside for defense purposes." (Note: This

is correct. End Note.) She urged Embassy officers in discussions with advocates for the

Chagossians, including with members of the "All Party Parliamentary Group on Chagos Islands

(APPG)," to affirm that the USG requires the entire BIOT for defense purposes. Making this point

would be the best rejoinder to the Chagossians' assertion that partial settlement of the outer islands

of the Chagos Archipelago would have no impact on the use of Diego Garcia. She described that

assertion as essentially irrelevant if the entire BIOT needed to be uninhabited for defense purposes.

12. (C/NF) Yeadon dismissed the APPG as a "persistent" but relatively non-influential group within

parliament or with the wider public. She said the FCO had received only a handful of public

inquiries regarding the status of the BIOT. Yeadon described one of the Chagossians' most

outspoken advocates, former HMG High Commissioner to Mauritius David Snoxell, as "entirely

lacking in influence" within the FCO. She also asserted that the Conservatives, if in power after the

next general election, would not support a Chagossian right of return. She averred that many

members of the Liberal Democrats (Britain's third largest party after Labour and the Conservatives)

supported a "right of return."

13. (C/NF) Yeadon told Poloff May 12, and in several prior meetings, that the FCO will vigorously

contest the Chagossians' "right of return" lawsuit before the European Court of Human Rights

(ECHR). HMG will argue that the ECHR lacks jurisdiction over the BIOT in the present case.

Roberts stressed May 12 (as has Yeadon on previous occasions) that the outer islands are

"essentially uninhabitable" and could only be rendered livable by modern, Western standards with a

massive infusion of cash.

Comment

-------

14. (C/NF) Regardless of the outcome of the ECHR case, however, the Chagossians and their

advocates, including the "All Party Parliamentary Group on Chagos Islands (APPG)," will continue

to press their case in the court of public

opinion. Their strategy is to publicize what they characterize as the plight of the so-called

Chagossian diaspora, thereby galvanizing public opinion and, in their best case scenario, causing

the government to change course and allow a "right of return." They would point to the

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/chagos-islands


Page 78 of 158

government's recent retreat on the issue of Gurkha veterans' right to settle in the UK as a model.

Despite FCO assurances that the marine park concept -- still in an early, conceptual phase -- would

not impinge on BIOT's value as a strategic resource, we are concerned that, long-term, both the

British public and policy makers would come to see the existence of a marine reserve as inherently

inconsistent with the military use of Diego Garcia -- and the entire BIOT. In any event, the U.S. and

UK would need to carefully negotiate the parameters of such a marine park -- a point on which

Roberts unequivocally agreed. In Embassy London's view, these negotiations should occur among

U.S. and UK experts separate from the 2009 annual Political-Military consultations, given the

specific and technical legal and environmental issues that would be subject to discussion.

15. (C/NF) Comment Continued. We do not doubt the current government's resolve to prevent the

resettlement of the islands' former inhabitants, although as FCO Parliamentary Under-Secretary

Gillian Merron noted in an April parliamentary debate, "FCO will continue to organize and fund

visits to the territory by the Chagossians." We are not as sanguine as the FCO's Yeadon, however,

that the Conservatives would oppose a right of return. Indeed, MP Keith Simpson, the

Conservatives' Shadow Minister, Foreign Affairs, stated in the same April parliamentary debate in

which Merron spoke that HMG "should take into account what I suspect is the all-party view that

the rights of the Chagossian people should be recognized, and that there should at the very least be a

timetable for the return of those people at least to the outer islands, if not the inner islands."

Establishing a marine reserve might, indeed, as the FCO's Roberts stated, be the most effective

long-term way to prevent any of the Chagos Islands' former inhabitants or their descendants from

resettling in the BIOT. End Comment.




Page 79 of 158

21 Enclosure 12 - SUBJECT: U.S.-UK CLUSTER MUNITIONS DIALOGUE (Wikileaks)

Thursday, 21 May 2009, 19:12

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 052368

EO 12958 DECL: 05/19/2019

TAGS MOPS, PREL, PGOV, NATO, UK

SUBJECT: U.S.-UK CLUSTER MUNITIONS DIALOGUE REF: A. 2008 LONDON 3082 B. 2008 STATE 229199

Classified By: PM/WRA DEPUTY DIRECTOR STEVEN COSTNER For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------

1. (C) Summary: In the latest bilateral consultation on the cluster munitions issue, Department and

DoD representatives met with representatives from the United Kingdom Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO) on May 6 to discuss progress on their national legislation

implementing the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), timeline for ratification, outstanding

issues related to interoperability, CCM discussion at NATO, and on-going cluster munitions

negotiations in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The UK's primary focus at this

meeting was to inform Washington of an accelerated date for the request of the removal of U.S.

munitions from UK territory and to seek reactions to the latest version of the draft letter from

Foreign Minister Miliband to Secretary Clinton. They also expressed concerns with our position

regarding the treatment of the cluster munitions system excluded from the CCM definition of

cluster munitions in the CCW negotiations. End Summary.

2. (C) Nicolas Pickard, head of the FCO Security Policy Group accompanied by his deputy Andrew

Ford and Clare Bloomfield from the UK Embassy, visited PM/WRA on May 6. PM/WRA Deputy

Director Steven Costner headed the U.S. representation that included David Hodson (OSD),

Stephen Mathias (L), Mark Melamed (EUR/RPM), Lindsay Gardner (PM/WRA), and Katherine

Baker (PM/WRA). This meeting was a continuation of close bilateral consultations on cluster

munitions. The last formal meeting was held in London in December 2008 (ref A), and the group

also met on the margins of a multilateral meeting in February 2009 (ref B).

-------------------------------

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

-------------------------------

3. (C) Pickard informed the group that the Convention on Cluster Munitions has been put on the

draft Parliamentary agenda for the next session (November 2009 to May 2010). Although the

Parliamentary agenda will not be final until the Queen makes her speech to Parliament in November

and this session will be short due to the May 2010 general elections, it is likely that the CCM will

be ratified during the session. Pickard confirmed that the recommended legislation is in line with

and does not go beyond the UK legal interpretation of the CCM -- with one exception: UK

personnel, even if embedded in non-State Parties' armed forces, will be prohibited from firing

cluster munitions. (At the February consultations UK representatives stated that from a legal

perspective, UK pilots embedded in U.S. units could fire cluster munitions, but forewarned that the


Page 80 of 158

policy position may not allow this.) The prohibition would not apply to other personnel in the chain

of command or headquarters positions.

4. (C) Pickard also noted a gap between the UK interpretation of the CCM and its policy decision

regarding removal of cluster munitions stockpiles from UK territory. In relation to this request,

Pickard stated that the Ministers would like to accelerate the time frame for removal so that all U.S.

cluster munitions currently in permanent storage on UK territory would be moved out by the time

the UK MOD completed destruction of its own stockpiles in 2013. Originally the FCO had

previewed that U.S. armed forces would have until about 2018 to complete the action, in line with

the transition period provided in the CCM once the treaty enters into force. Costner noted that the

new timeline may have little practical effect on our primary concerns related to operations at Diego

Garcia because most of the cluster munitions there are permanently stored on ships, but must transit

the base. (Pickard reconfirmed that off-shore storage on U.S. ships would still be permitted.) That

said, DoD needs to review the request because, among other factors, resources have not been

allocated to remove the munitions in this time frame.

5. (C) In answer to queries about the case-by-case temporary storage exception for specific

missions, Pickard and Ford confirmed that the concept was accepted at highest levels of the

Government, as that idea has been included in the draft letter from Minister Miliband to Secretary

Clinton. The operation-by-operation definition of "case-by-case" is being put forward for approval

at the Ministerial level, backed up by precedent in other agreements for U.S. use of UK bases for

specific operations. Further discussion clarified that, under the latest UK proposal, any U.S. cluster

munitions currently stored on British territory (either UK territory proper, Diego Garcia, or

elsewhere) would be permitted to stay until 2013, while any new cluster munitions the USG wanted

to bring to those sites after the treaty's entry into force for the UK -- either before or after 2013 --

would require the temporary exception. Any movement of cluster munitions from ships at Diego

Garcia to planes there, temporary transit, or use from British territory also would require the

temporary exception after entry into force. Pickard noted that it would be better for the USG and

HMG not to reach final agreement on this temporary agreement understanding until after the CCM

ratification process is completed in Parliament, so that they can tell Parliamentarians that they

have requested the USG to remove its cluster munitions by 2013, without complicating/muddying

the debate by having to indicate that this request is open to exceptions.

6. (C) Costner requested that Pickard provide confirmation that the requests for temporary storage

would be considered on an operation-by-operation basis when it is clear this approach been

approved. Pickard requested clarity from DoD on the process for moving munitions at Diego Garcia

from the ships where they're stored to the planes, a reaction to the 2013 deadline and specifics as to

why the 2013 deadline could not be met if in fact it cannot, and U.S. reaction to the revised draft

letter from Foreign Minister Miliband to the Secretary. This draft incorporates changes that we

suggested (ref A) as well as the request that U.S. stockpiles be removed by 2013. Pickard requested

comments on the letter as soon as possible so that the Government can report that it has been done

well in advance of any Parliamentary debate. Costner recommended waiting until this summer to

put the letter forward, when appropriate officials within the Department are in place.

-----------

CCM AT NATO


Page 81 of 158

-----------

7. (C) Hodson outlined our concerns about potential proposals at NATO related to next steps on

CCM and interoperability. He stressed that we did not think that this was an appropriate issue for

the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and that agreement on detailed obligations for NATO members

did not seem possible. The most that we could accept - and, likely, the most that could be achieved -

would be a simple statement referring to the obligations in the treaty itself, including Article 21, but

without interpretation. The note to ROE 38 related to the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel

landmines could be an acceptable model. In particular, the ideas Germany floated with U.S.

representatives on the margins of the last round of CCW negotiations - including that the NAC

recognize that: CCM States Party request the Alliance not use cluster munitions; the CCM has a

different definition of cluster munitions; and CCM states have taken certain obligations related to

the Convention - are viewed as unhelpful. Pickard agreed that a NAC ruling on cluster munitions

would not be helpful and noted that they were satisfied with the October 2008 military advice. They

did not think the subject should be discussed at NATO until closer to the CCM entry into force and

stated that any iscussion should be kept as brief as possible. Pickard noted that they could probably

accept something along the lines of the note in ROE 38.

---

CCW

---

8. (C) Ford expressed UK support for concluding a Protocol on cluster munitions in the CCW, but

doubted that it would be possible given extreme positions on both sides of the negotiation. Mathias

noted that we have some hope that some progress could be made. Both sides agreed that the input

the ICRC provided in advance of the last negotiating session was not constructive or objective. The

conversation then focused on treatment of the weapon systems excluded from the CCM definition

of cluster munitions in the CCW draft text. The UK noted that it placed additional restrictions on

the CCM-excluded weapon making it "CCM plus", rather than "CCM minus" which is how they

have come to view the CCW process. Mathias verified that the UK interpretation is correct and that

the intent of the provision is to ensure that CCM-excluded weapons are restricted in the same way

that CCW protocol-permitted cluster munitions would be. Mathias stressed that there is no

conceptual difference in the two types of weapons systems and therefore they should have the same

restrictions. He confirmed that we are willing to take on the obligations of the Protocol for our

future cluster munitions systems, even those which may meet the CCM exclusions. Ford indicated

that accepting additional restrictions on the CCM-excluded weapon would be difficult for the UK

because their ministers pledged to ban all cluster munitions upon the UK's signing of the CCM. It

would be difficult to explain why additional restrictions were needed on a "safe" weapon. That said,

he noted that this was not a red line and is open to on-going consultations. Pickard and Ford

additionally voiced concerns that prolonged negotiations could cause states to lose interest in the

CCW process, particularly after entry into force of the CCM, to which Costner and Mathias

responded that they felt many states did not want to be blamed for negotiations falling apart and are

therefore willing to allow discussions to continue without progress.

-----------

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/military


Page 82 of 158

WAY FORWARD

-----------

9. (C) Regarding our bilateral conversation, the Department will work with DoD to answer the

questions posed about the accelerated timeline and operations at Diego Garcia as well as comments

on the latest draft letter. Regarding possible discussions at NATO, the Department recommends that

USNATO remain in close contact with UK counterparts on this issue, as they will need to work

together to minimize unhelpful initiatives. On CCW, the U.S. delegation will continue close

consultations with the UK on the CCM-excluded weapons issue.

CLINTON




Page 83 of 158

22 Enclosure 13 - Letter to Joanne Yeadon

Joanne Yeadon Head of Section BIOT & Pitcairn Overseas Territories Directorate Foreign & Commonwealth Office King Charles Street London SW1A 2AH 19 May 2010 Dear Ms Yeadon, I am writing at the request of the Board of Directors of the United Nations Association of the UK (UNA-UK) to relay the concerns of our members regarding the decision announced on 1 April 2010 to establish a ‗no-take‘ Marine Protected Area (MPA) in the British Indian Ocean Territory, which includes the Chagos Islands. While UNA-UK welcomes the efforts to protect the Chagos archipelago and notes that in his announcement, former Foreign Secretary David Miliband described the decision as ―without prejudice to the outcome of the current, pending proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)‖, we are disappointed that neither his statement nor the consultation document made reference to the representations by members of the Chagossian diaspora for recognition of their ‗right to return‘. The UN Human Rights Committee, which monitors implementation of the UK‘s obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, has twice recommended (most recently in 2008) that the UK should uphold the right of the Chagos Islanders to return. This position was echoed in a 2008 Foreign Affairs Select Committee Report on Overseas Territories, and reiterated several times by MPs and Lords from the three main political parties in the 6 April parliamentary debates. The UK government has long recognised the plight of the Chagossians. Former FCO Minister Chris Bryant repeatedly stated during the 6 April Commons debate how much the UK regrets the ‗shameful‘ treatment of the Chagossians in the 1960s and 1970s. In a letter to the UK Chagos Support Association just prior to the general election, the new Foreign Secretary, William Hague, said that ―if elected to serve as the next British government, we will work to ensure a fair settlement of this long-standing dispute‖. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg also made a strong statement, saying ―[the Liberal Democrats] have actively supported [the Chagossian] cause in the past and we will continue to aid their campaign to see justice done. We have been appalled that the [previous] government has wasted time, money and effort defending the indefensible‖.

UN Association of the UK 3 Whitehall Court

London S W1A 2EL T: +44 (0) 20 7766 3451 F: +44 (0) 20 7930 5893 E: [email protected]

W: www.una.org.uk


Page 84 of 158

UNA-UK believes that the environmental and human rights objectives pertaining to Chagos are not necessarily incompatible, and that it is vital to ensure that the Chagossians are fully involved in the process of fleshing out the details of the MPA. We therefore urge the new UK government to:

- work with the Chagossians (and all other relevant parties) on an MPA solution that takes into account their right to self-determination as set out in the two International Covenants and the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and simultaneously provides adequate protection for a very precious marine ecosystem;

- consider, once the outcome of the ECHR decision is known, the recommendations made by the UN Human Rights Committee on the right of Chagossians to return; and

- report on the situation in the UK‘s next periodic report to the UN Human Rights Committee.

Yours sincerely, Natalie Samarasinghe

Head of Communications


Page 85 of 158

23 Enclosure 14 – Corpus

The Corpus: UK and US internal and exchanged documents


Page 86 of 158

24 Description of collection of document In this section we intend to give a brief description of how we have organised all the items we have

collected during our research. The method we have use are “as-much-as-possible” since researching in the

field of the American Army base on Diego Garcia is quite difficult, hence the documents are former

declassified or leaked except for the notes of exchange (agreements) which where reported to the the

United Nations, though not everything was an example is the December 30 1966 Secret Side note.

To help the reader, and give him or her a way on which everything could be easily understood, we have

given the largest heading to full material. So, under heads like “UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims

Agreement July 7 1982” the reader will find a complete document, with no parts missing. Smaller

headings have been given to texts that are, in anyway, incomplete. This applies to pieces of letters, notes or

agreements. In addition, to help the reading, all our documents have been placed in chronological order,

stretching from 1964 to 2004. This has been done also with the intention of making clear how institutional

positioning towards certain topics has been evolving along the years.

Nevertheless, due to the presence of full texts (especially contracts and agreements) and somehow

incomplete documents, the quality of our corpus, at first sight, can be seen as unbalanced. We consider

that both full texts and de-clasiffied pieces of letters and notes should go together as this way they would

give a broader vision of the events between which happened 1964 and 2004.

The documents present in this corpus have a wide range of sources. Some of them were originally

published by scholars, while others have been found through court cases. It must be said also that some of

the documents have been made available after the “US Freedom of Information Act” in 2005 (Pilger,

Stealing a Nation, 2007, p. 44) It is remarkable that some of the maps that we have attached to our

collection of official communications have their origin on the United Nations (UN) and have been retrieved

through the United Nations Treaties webpage. The documents to which they refer can also be found in P. H.

Sand’s United States and Britain in Diego Garcia: The Future of a Controversial Base (2009), but the scholar

did not include any representation of the island. This is the reason why we saw the necessity of including

also de maps in our data collection. In additon, we have attached a bibliography on the last page of the

corpus where all the sources we had used to collect the documents can be found.

The following tables would give also a broader comprehension of what it is included in the corpus.

Table 9 - Sender - addressee

From To Internal/external Times

United States Government United Kingdom Government External 14

United Kingdom Government United States Government External 12

United States Government United States Government Internal 3


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United Kingdom Government United Kingdom Government Internal 16

United Kingdom Government Mauritius Government External 1

Documents in all 46

Table 10 - Communication categorisation

Type of communication Times

Letter 513

agreement 3

Note 814

Memo 4

Memorandum 3

Telegram 1

Minute 6

Proposal 1

Advisory opinion 1

document 1

supplement 2

In all 35

As one can see, it’s quite a variaty of documents, though there are some over representations, because of

our method of collecting. Therefore we need to admit that there are quite some over representation in the

case of internal written communication within the UK Government, though are a lot of these documents

parts of text. Not to create any confusion we would like to make clear the the use of external and internal

in the table refers to whether it is documents addressed within the respective governement (internal) or

between the two governments (external), so it will not be mixed with Fairclough’s use of internal and

external in the case of CDA tools. Further we have tried to categorise the documents or create orders of

discourse15, even though in some cases it has not been totally clear, which kind it was in the cases of

samples of texts. Please do not be confused by the two different numbers (35 and 46) since it is explained

in the footnotes. The most significant categories are notes, minutes and letters. In the samples of texts we

have added sender and addressee and it is only the text in the quotation position (indentation), that are

the text to be understood to be the corpus and analysed part. Consider the additional information as an

help as it was to us. Further on next page is a collection of the abbreviation in the corpus.

13

Including the sections that contain a collection of items like ”Exchanges of letters” (2001-2004) 14

Including the sections that contain a collection of items like ”Exchange of notes” (October 24, 1972; February 25, 1976; June 22, 1976) 15

Understood as the configuration of all the types of discourses used within Britsh and American Governments in terms of communication.


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24.1 Memo March 3 1964

Memo - UK's position Date: March 3, 1964 From: Jeffrey Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs To: Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, U.S.

It was clear that the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence were pleased at the US initiative and that they wished to be as cooperative as feasible, having in mind their own interests. They noted they intended to remain in the area in force, and that our presence would complement theirs, rather than substitute for it. British strategic concepts are similar to our own in that they envisage development of islands as supplementing existing bases or staging facilities on the Indian Ocean littoral, and as reinforcement in depth for mainland commitments. For example they favour US development of the Chagos Archipelago for a central communications station and austere supporting facilities. The UK would like to share use of oil storage depot if their position on Gan became untenable . . . The UK strongly favors development of an airfield on Aldabra which we would share, in order to anticipate inability to over fly Africa from Ascension Island, and to provide a staging area for actions in East Africa . . . They understand we envisage development of austere air and harbour facilities over a long term and that except for a communications station on Diego Garcia, firm decisions as to the future have yet to be made in the USG.

With regard to our present and funded requirement for a communication station, it was agreed a joint survey of Diego Garcia should take place quickly, the timing being dependent on British decisions when and how to transfer the administration of DG from Mauritius. Here, despite Colonial Office reservations and desire to consult local authorities, the Foreign Office clearly indicated that control over the Chagos Archipelago should be transferred in such a way as to minimize substantially or remove the possibility that use of the islands could be hampered by external pressures for self-determination . . . Colonial Office representatives, while sympathetic to US interests tried unsuccessfully to obtain some indications that the US could help with aid programs or by large employment operations to benefit local economies. We made clear we preferred exclusive control, preferably without employing local inhabitants in islands where we might install facilities, while of course being willing to share these facilities with the UK . . . The UK delegation agreed that the UK should be responsible for acquiring land, resettling the population and compensating them therefore at HMG’s expense, while the US would be responsible for construction and maintenance costs.

(Snoxell, 2009, pp. 127-128)

24.2 Memorandums May 1964

Memorandum: ―Defence interest in the Indian Ocean‖ Date: May 11, 1964 Written by: C. M. Rose

In his telegram No 977 Sir P. Dean draws attention to the difficulties we are likely to have to face in the United Nations if these proposals became known at the present time. In connections with our proposals for placing the various territories concerned under the direct UK administration, he draws attention to paragraph 6 of Resolution No. 1514 (of 14 December 1960) which reads: --“any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” He also suggest that we might face demands for separate transmission of information about these territories under article 73 of the


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Charter which requires members “to transmit regularly to the secretary General... statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are responsible.”

(Laws & Gibbs, 2003, p. 562) Memorandum Date: May, 1964 Title: ―UK/US memorandum of May 1964 (Indian Ocean Territories)‖

… the repatriation or resettlement of persons currently living on the islands selected...

The line taken with regard to those persons now living and working in the dependencies would relate to their exact status. If, in fact, they are only contract labourers rather than permanent residents, they would be evacuated with the appropriate compensation and re-employment. If, on the other hand, some of the persons now living and working on the islands could be considered permanent residents, i.e., their families have lived there for a number of generations, then the political effects of their removal might be reduced if some element of choice could be introduced in their resettlement and compensation.

(Laws & Gibbs, 2003, p. 562)

A Foreign Office "memorandum of guidance" of May 1964 noted that:

These steps (i.e., the depopulation) should be ordered and timed to attract the least attention and should have some logical cover where possible worked out in advance. Even if these steps are taken with the utmost discretion and careful planning we must anticipate that they will become known and arouse suspicions as to their purpose.

(Pilger & Curtis, Stealing a Nation: A special report by John Pilger, 2004, p. 6)

24.3 Minute October 20 1964

Minute: Date: October 20, 1964 Written by: Colonial Office Minister

It would be unacceptable to both the British and the American defence authorities if facilities of the kind proposed were in any way to be subject to the political control of ministers of a newly emergent independent state (Mauritius is expected to become independent some time after 1966)... it is hoped that the Mauritian Government may agree to the islands being detached and directly administrated by Britain.

(Laws & Gibbs, 2003, p. 562)

24.4 Memo June 12 1965

Memo From: John McNaughton, assistant secretary of defense, US To: Robert McNamara, secretary for defence, US

As a result of joint surveys last summer, the British are willing to detach the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches from Seychelles. On the grounds that ‘the ante has gone up’ they now ask that we contribute one half of the anticipated detachment costs (estimated up to £10 million, US share about $14million). The British are anxious to complete the detachment proceedings before the following events later this summer:


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(1) The constitutional conference on the future of Mauritius, sometime between August-October

(2) Renewed hostile debate in the UNGA on colonial administration and

(3) The UK Defense Policy Review which could expose the project to attack by the ‘West of Suez’ group.

To accomplish speedy detachment the British feel they must provide various forms of compensation that could amount to £10 million (Mauritius £5.5 m; Seychelles £3 m; private property owners £1.5 m). The British now state that the full detachment costs would be a burden on their defense budget and have asked for a US contribution of approximately half).

…that you approve a US contribution of one half of the British detachment costs. This contribution would be premised on the explicit understanding that the British would continue their responsibilities east of Suez and that the contribution would be arranged as a set-off against R&D surcharges owed by the UK to the US. That you not approve the Air Force proposal to construct a US base at Aldabra, but that you authorise working out an arrangement that would keep the British in the lead in building a British facility at Aldabra.

(Snoxell, 2009, pp. 129-130)

Memo July 28 1965

Memo Date: July 28, 1965 Written by: Mr T. C.D. Jerrom of the FO unveiled the FO‘s intentions:

Our understanding is that the great majority of [those people on present on the islands] are there as contract labourers on the copra plantations of a number of islands; a small number of people were born there, and in some cases, their parents were born there too. The intention is, however, that none of them should be regarded as being permanent inhabitants of the islands. Islands will be evacuated as and when defence interests require this. Those who remain, whether as workers on those copra plantations which continue to function or as labourers on the construction of defence installations, will be regarded as being there on a temporary basis and will continue to look either to Mauritius or Seychelles as their home territory... In the absence of permanent inhabitants the obligations of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter will not apply to the territory and we shall not transmit information on it to the Secretary-General (cf. The British Antarctic Territory).

(Laws & Gibbs, 2003, p. 563)

24.5 Notes November 1965

A note of 12 November 1965 read:

I agree that there is an awkward problem here which the Secretary of State should know about. The present idea is that the inhabitants (1,500 altogether) would not be removed from any of the islands until they are required for defence purposes. This is going to make it very difficult to avoid having to report on the new territory under Article 73(e) of the Charter.

Then on 15 November 1965, in the words of another official:

the territory is a non-self-governing territory and there is a civilian population even though it is small. In practice, however, I would advise a policy of ‘quiet disregard’ – in other words, let’s forget about this one until the United Nations challenge us on it.

(Harwood Jr., The U.K. Court judgment, 2002, p. ¶ 12)


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24.6 Note February 25 1966

Confidential note: Date: February 25, 1966 From: Frank Pakenham (later 7th Earl of Longford, KG PC), UK secretary of state for the colonies To: Julian Asquith (later 2nd Earl of Oxford and Asquith, KCMG), BIOT Commissioner

our primary objective in dealing with the people who are at present in the Territory must be to deal with them in the way which will best meet our future administrative and military needs and will at the same time ensure that they are given fair and just treatment... With these objectives in view we propose to avoid any reference to “permanent inhabitants,” instead, to refer to the people in the islands as Mauritians and Seychellois... We are... taking steps to acquire ownership over the land on the islands and consider that it would be desirable... for the inhabitants to be given some form of temporary residence permit. We could then more effectively take the line in discussion that these people are Mauritian and Seychellois; that they are temporarily resident in BIOT for the purpose of making a living on the basis of contract or day to day employment with the companies engaged in exploiting the islands; and that when the new use of the islands makes it impossible for these operations to continue on the old scale the people concerned will be resettled in Mauritius or Seychelles. We understand from a recent discussion with Mr Robert Newton”—who had visited the islands—“that, in his opinion, the people on the islands cannot be regarded as permanent inhabitants but are in fact in the category of contract labour employed by the estate owners or commercial concerns ... Against this background we assume that there would be unlikely to be any undue difficulty with the inhabitants of BIOT themselves in moving over to a position in which they all held temporary residence permits on the basis of which their presence in the Territory would be allowed ... Whatever arrangements are made to establish the status of the people in the BIOT as belongers of either Mauritius or Seychelles, there will in any case be a need for the enactment of appropriate immigration legislation for the Territory itself.

(Sand, 2009, p. 16) (Harwood Jr., The U.K. Court judgment, 2002, p. ¶ 12 )

24.7 Minute June 1966

Minute Date: June, 1966 Written by: Julian Asquith (later 2nd Earl of Oxford and Asquith, KCMG), BIOT Commissioner

they *i.e., the Colonial Office+ wish to avoid the term “permanent inhabitants” in relation to any of the islands in BIOT because to recognise that there are permanent inhabitants will imply that there is a population whose democratic rights will have to be safeguarded and which will therefore be deemed by the UN committee of Twenty-Four to come within its purview... It is... of particular importance that the decision taken by the Colonial Office should be that there are no permanent inhabitants in BIOT. First and foremost it is necessary to establish beyond doubt what inhabitants there are at present in the islands, how long they have been resident there and whether any were born on the islands. Subsequently it may be necessary to issue them with documents making it clear they are “belongers” of Mauritius or the Seychelles and only temporarily resident in BIOT. This device, though rather transparent, would at least give us a defensible position to take up in the Committee of Twenty-Four... It would be highly embarrassing to us if, after giving the Americans to


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understand that the islands in BIOT would be available to them for defence purposes, we then had to tell them that we proposed to admit that they fell within the purview of the UN Committee of Twenty-Four.

(Sand, 2009, p. 16)

24.8 August 1966

Document entitled: ―Presentation of British Indian Ocean Territory in the United Nations‖ Date: after August 12 1966 Written by: ?

The primary objective in acquiring these islands from Mauritius and the Seychelles to form the new ‘British Indian Ocean Territory’ was to ensure that Her Majesty’s Government had full title to, and control over, these islands so that they could be used for the construction of defence facilities without hindrance or political agitation and so that when a particular island would be needed for the construction of British or United States defence facilities Britain or the United States should be able to clear it of its current population. The Americans in particular attached great importance to this freedom of manoeuvre, divorced from the normal considerations applying to a populated dependent territory. These islands were therefore chosen not only for their strategic location but also because they had, for all practical purposes, no permanent population.

It was implied in this objective, and recognised at the time, that we could not accept the principles governing our otherwise universal behaviour in our dependent territories, e g we could not accept that the interests of the inhabitants were paramount and that we should develop self-government there. We therefore consider that the best way in which we can satisfy these objectives, when our action comes under scrutiny in the United Nations, would be to assert from the start, if the need arose, that this territory did not fall within the scope of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter.”

(Harwood Jr., The U.K. Court judgment, 2002, p. ¶ 14)


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25 Note August 24 1966

Confidential

Mr. Greenhill

British Indian Ocean Territory

The Permanent Under-Secretary has seen UKMIS New York telegram No. 1751 of 23

August and has minuted as follows:

―We must surely be very tough about this. The object of the exercise was to get some rocks

which will remain ours; there will be no indigenous population except seagulls who have

not yet got a Committee (the Status of Women Committee does not cover the rights of

Birds).

{Signature}

(P. R. H. Wright)

24 August 1966

Copy to: Mr. du Boulay

{Handwritten „minute‟}:

Unfortunately along with the Birds go some few Tarzans or Men Fridays whose origins are

obscure, and who are being hopefully wished on to Mauritius etc. When that has been

done I agree we must be very tough and a submission is being done accordingly.

{Signature}

DA Greenhill 24/8 {Dennis A. Greenhill}

1 Mr. du Boulay {initials} 24/viii

2 Mr. W{?}

Confidential

(Harwood Jr., d30: 3 secret letters 1969-1971, 2002)


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26 Exchanges of Notes December 30 1966

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes Signed at London December 30, 1966;

Entered into Force December 30, 1966.

__________

The American Ambassador

to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Note No. 25

30 December 1966

SIR, I have the honor to refer to recent discussion between representatives of the Government of the

United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland concerning the availability, for the defense purposes of both Governments as they may arise, of

the islands of Diego Garcia and the remainder of the Chagos Archipelago, and the islands of Aldabra,

Farquhar, and Desroches constituting the British Indian Ocean Territory, hereinafter referred to as

“the Territory”. The United States Government has now authorized me to propose an Agreement in

the following terms:

(1) The Territory shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty.

(2) Subject to the provisions set out below the islands shall be available to meet the needs of both

Governments for defense. In order to ensure that the respective United States and United Kingdom

defense activities in the islands are correlated in an orderly fashion:

(a) In the case of the initial United States requirement for use of a particular island the

appropriate governmental authorities shall consult with respect to the time required by the United

Kingdom authorities for taking those administrative measures that may be necessary to enable

any such defense requirement to be met.

(b) Before either Government proceeds to construct or install any facility in the Territory, both

Governments shall first approve in principle the requirement for that facility, and the appropriate

administrative authorities of the two Governments shall reach mutually satisfactory arrangements

concerning specific areas and technical requirements for respective defense purposes.

(c) The procedure described in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) shall not be applicable in emergency

circumstances requiring temporary use of an island or part of an island not in use at that time for

defense purposes provided that measures to ensure the welfare of the inhabitants are taken to the

satisfaction of the Commissioner of the Territory. Each Government shall notify the other promptly

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of any emergency requirements and consultation prior to such use by the United States Government

shall be undertaken as soon as possible.

(3) The United Kingdom Government reserves the right to permit the use by third countries of

British-financed defense facilities, but shall where appropriate consult with the United States

Government before granting such permission. Use by a third country of United States or jointly-

financed facilities shall be subject to agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the

United States Government.

(4) The required sites shall be made available to the United States authorities without charge.

(5) Each Government shall normally bear the cost of site preparation, construction, maintenance, and

operation for any facilities developed to meet its own requirements. Within their capacities, such

facilities shall be available for use by the forces of the other Government under service-level

arrangements. However, there may be certain cases where joint financing should be considered, and

in these cases the two Governments shall consult together.

(6) Commercial aircraft shall not be authorized to use military airfields in the Territory. However, the

United Kingdom Government reserves the right to permit the use in exceptional circumstances of

such airfields, following consultation with the authorities operating the airfields concerned, under

such terms or conditions as may be defined by the two Governments.

(7) For its defense purposes on the islands, the United States Government may freely select United

States contractors and the sources of equipment, material, supplies, or personnel, except that—

(a) the United States Government and United States contractors shall make use of workers

from Mauritius and Seychelles to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with United States

policies, requirements and schedules; and

(b) the appropriate administrative authorities of the two Governments shall consult before

contractors or workers from a third country are introduced.

(8) The exemption from charges in the nature of customs duties and other taxes in respect of goods,

supplies and equipment brought to the Territory in connection with the purposes of this Agreement

by or on behalf of the United States Government, United States contractors, members of the United

States Forces, contractor personnel or dependents, and the exemption from taxation of certain

persons serving or employed in the Territory in connection with those purposes, shall be such

exemption as is set out in Annex I to this Note.

(9) The arrangements regarding the exercise of criminal jurisdiction and claims shall be those set out

in Annex II to this Note.

(10) For the purpose of this Agreement:

(a) “Contractor personnel” means employees of a United States contractor who are not ordinarily

resident in the Territory and who are there solely for the purpose of this Agreement;













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(b) “Dependents” means the spouse and children under 21 years of age of a person in relation to

whom it is used; and, if they are dependent upon him for their support, the parents and children

over 21 years of age of that person;

(c) “Members of the United States Forces” means

(i) military members of the United States Forces on active duty;

(ii) civilian personnel accompanying the United States Forces and in their employ who are not

ordinarily resident in the Territory and who are there solely for the purpose of this Agreement; and

(iii) dependents of the persons described in (i) and (ii) above;

(d) “United States authorities” means the authority or authorities from time to time authorized

or designated by the United States Government for the purpose of exercising the powers in relation

to which the expression is used;

(e) “United States contractor” means any person, body or corporation ordinarily resident in the

United States of America, that, by virtue of a contract with the United States Government, is in the

Territory for the purposes of this Agreement, and includes a sub-contractor;

(f) “United States Forces” means the land, sea and air armed services of the United States,

including the Coast Guard.

(11) The United States Government and the United Kingdom Government contemplate that the

islands shall remain available to meet the possible defense needs of the two Governments for an

indefinitely long period. Accordingly, after an initial period of 50 years this Agreement shall

continue in force for a further period of twenty years unless, not more than two years before the

end of the initial period, either Government shall have given notice of termination to the other, in

which case this Agreement shall terminate two years from the date of such notice.

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, I have the honor to propose that this Note and its Annexes, together with your reply

to that effect, shall constitute an Agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into

force on the date of your reply.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DAVID BRUCE,

American Ambassador

The Right Honorable GEORGE BROWN, M.P.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W.1.

Annex I. — Customs Duties And Taxation

1. CUSTOMS DUTIES AND OTHER TAXES ON GOODS

(1) No import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or impost shall be charged on:


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(a) material, equipment, supplies, or goods for use in the establishment, maintenance, or

operation of the facilities which are consigned to or destined for the United States authorities or a

United States contractor;

(b) goods for use or consumption aboard United States public vessels or aircraft;

(c) goods consigned to the United States authorities or to a United States contractor for the use

of or for sale to military members of the United States Forces, or to other members of the United

States Forces, or to those contractor personnel and their dependents who are not engaged in any

business or occupation in the Territory;

(d) the personal belongings or household effects for the personal use of persons referred to in

sub-paragraph (c) above, including motor vehicles, provided that these accompany the owner or are

imported either— (i) within a period beginning sixty days before and ending 120 days after the

owner’s arrival; or (ii) within a period of six months immediately following his arrival;

(e) goods for consumption and goods (other than personal belongings and household effects)

acquired after first arrival, including gifts, consigned to military members of the United States Forces,

or to those other members of the United States Forces who are nationals of the United States and are

not engaged in any business or occupation in the Territory, provided that such goods are: (i) of

United States origin if the Commissioner so requires, and (ii) imported for the personal use of the

recipient.

(2) No export tax shall be charged on the material, equipment, supplies or goods mentioned in

paragraph (1) in the event of reshipment from the Territory.

(3) Article 1 of this Annex shall apply notwithstanding that the material, equipment, supplies or goods

pass through other parts of the Territory en route to or from a site.

(4) The United States authorities shall do all in their power to prevent any abuse of customs privileges

and shall take administrative measures, which shall be mutually agreed upon between the appropriate

authorities of the United States and the Territory, to prevent the disposal, whether by resale or

otherwise, of goods which are used or sold under paragraph (1)(c), or imported under paragraph (1)(d)

or (1)(e), of Article 1 of this Annex, to persons not entitled to buy goods pursuant to paragraph (1)(c),

or not entitled to free importation under paragraph (1)(d) or (1)(e). There shall be cooperation

between the United States authorities and the Commissioner to this end, both in prevention and in

investigation of cases of abuse.

2. MOTOR VEHICLE TAXES

No tax or fee shall be payable in respect of registration or licensing for use for the purposes of this

Agreement in the Territory of motor vehicles belonging to the United States Government or United

States contractors.



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3. TAXATION

(1) No members of the United States Forces, or those contractor personnel and their dependents who

are nationals of the United States, serving or employed in the Territory in connection with the

facilities shall be liable to pay income tax in the Territory except in respect of income derived from

activities within the Territory other than such service or employment.

(2) No such person shall be liable to pay in the Territory any poll tax or similar tax on his person, or

any tax on ownership or use of property which is situated outside the Territory or situated within the

Territory solely by reason of such person’s presence there in connection with activities under this

Agreement.

(3) No United States contractor shall be liable to pay income tax in the Territory in respect of any

income derived under a contract made in the United States in connection with the purposes of this

Agreement, or any tax in the nature of license in respect of any service or work for the United States

Government in connection with the purposes of this Agreement.

Annex II. — Jurisdiction and Claims

1. (a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraphs (b) to (l) of this paragraph,

(i) the military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise within the

Territory all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by United States law over all

persons subject to the military law of the United States; and

(ii) the authorities of the Territory shall have jurisdiction over the members of the United

States Forces with respect to offenses committed within the Territory and punishable by the law in

force there.

(b)(i) The military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive

jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of the United States with respect to offenses,

including offenses relating to security, punishable by the law of the United States but not by the law

in force in the Territory.

(ii) The authorities of the Territory shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over

members of the United States Forces with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to security,

punishable by the law in force in the Territory but not by the law of the United States.

(iii) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), an offense relating to official secrets or

secrets relating to national defense.

(c) In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:

(i) The military authorities of the United States shall have the primary right to exercise

jurisdiction over a member of the United States Forces in relation to

(aa) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely

against the person or property of another member of the United States Forces; and

(bb) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.


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(ii) In the case of any other offense the authorities of the Territory shall have the primary right

to exercise jurisdiction.

(iii) If the authorities having the primary right decide not to exercise jurisdiction, they shall

notify the other authorities as soon as practicable. The United States authorities shall give

sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the Territory for a waiver of their

primary right in cases where the authorities of the Territory consider such waiver to be of particular

importance. The authorities of the Territory will waive, upon request, their primary right to exercise

jurisdiction under this paragraph, except where they in their discretion determine and notify the

United States authorities that it is of particular importance that such jurisdiction be not waived.

(d) The foregoing provisions of this paragraph shall not imply any right for the military

authorities of the United States to exercise jurisdiction over persons who belong to, or are ordinarily

resident in, the Territory, or who are British subjects or Commonwealth citizens or British protected

persons, unless they are military members of the United States Forces.

(e)(i) To the extent authorized by law, the authorities of the Territory and the military

authorities of the United States shall assist each other in the service of process and in the arrest of

members of the United States Forces in the Territory and in handing them over to the authorities

which are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph.

(ii) The authorities of the Territory shall notify promptly the military authorities of the United

States of the arrest of any member of the United States Forces.

(iii) Unless otherwise agreed, the custody of an accused member of the United States Forces

over whom the authorities of the Territory are to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of

the United States authorities, remain with the United States authorities until he is charged. In cases

where the United States authorities may have the responsibility for custody pending the completion

of judicial proceedings, the United States authorities shall, upon request, make such a person

immediately available to the authorities of the Territory for purposes of investigation and trial and

shall give full consideration to any special views of such authorities as to the way in which custody

should be maintained.

(f)(i) To the extent authorized by law, the authorities of the Territory and of the United States

shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses, in providing

for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including the

seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offense. The handing

over of such objects may, however, be made subject to their return within the time specified by the

authorities delivering them.

(ii) The authorities of the Territory and of the United States shall notify one another of the

disposition of all cases in which there are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.

(g) A death sentence shall not be carried out in the Territory by the military authorities of the

United States.


Page 100 of 158

(h) Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph and has

been acquitted or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been

pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offense within the Territory. Nothing in this

paragraph shall, however, prevent the military authorities of the United States from trying a military

member of the United States Forces for any violation of rules of discipline arising from an act or

omission which constituted an offense for which he was tried by the authorities of the Territory.

(i) Whenever a member of the United States Forces is prosecuted by the authorities of the

Territory he shall be entitled

(i) to a prompt and speedy trial;

(ii) to be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against him;

(iii) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;

(iv) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor if they are within the

jurisdiction of the Territory;

(v) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to have free or assisted

legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the Territory;

(vi) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and

(vii) to communicate with a representative of the United States and, when the rules of the

court permit, to have such a representative present at his trial which shall be public except when the

court decrees otherwise in accordance with the law in force in the Territory.

(j) Where a member of the United States Forces is tried by the military authorities of the United

States for an offense committed outside the areas used by the United States or involving a person, or

the property of a person, other than a member of the United States Forces, the aggrieved party and

representatives of the Territory and of the aggrieved party may attend the trial proceedings except

where this would be inconsistent with the rules of the court.

(k) A certificate of the appropriate United States commanding officer that an offense arose out of

an act of omission done in the performance of official duty shall be conclusive, but the commanding

officer shall give consideration to any representation made by the authorities of the Territory.

(l) Regularly constituted military units or formations of the United States Forces shall have the

right to police the areas used by the United States. The military police of the United States Forces

may take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security within these

areas.

2. (a) The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom

respectively waive all claims against the other of them–

(i) for {sic: For} damage to any property owned by it and used by its land, sea or air armed

services if such damage—

(aa) was caused by a member of the armed services or by an employee of a Department with

responsibility for the armed services of either Government in the execution of his duties or


Page 101 of 158

(bb) arose from the use of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft owned by either Government and

used by its armed services provided either that the vehicle, vessel or aircraft causing the damage was

being used in connection with official duties, or the damage was caused to property being so used.

(ii) For injury or death suffered by any member of its armed services while such member was

engaged in the performance of his official duties.

(iii) For the purpose of this paragraph “owned” in the case of a vessel includes a vessel on bare

boat charter, a vessel requisitioned on bare boat terms and a vessel seized in prize (except to the

extent that the risk of loss or liability is borne by some person other than either Government).

(b)(i) The United States Government shall, in consultation with the Government of the Territory,

take all reasonable precautions against possible danger and damage resulting from operations under

this Agreement.

(ii) The United States Government agrees to pay just and reasonable compensation, which

shall be determined in accordance with the measure of damage prescribed by the law of the Territory,

in settlement of civil claims (other than contractual claims) arising out of acts or omissions of

members of the United States Forces done in the performance of official duty or out of any other act

or omission or occurrence for which the United States Forces are legally responsible.

(iii) Any such claim presented to the United States Government shall be processed and settled

in accordance with the applicable provision of United States law.

__________

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

to the American Ambassador

Foreign Office, London S.W.1.

From the Minister of State

No. AU 1199

30 December, 1966

(Harwood Jr., d16b1: U.S./U.K. BIOT Agreements,1966-1987, 2003)

27 Agreed Confidential Minutes December 30 1966

Agreed Confidential Minutes, London, December 1966

Confidential Agreed Minute

In the course of discussions leading up to the Exchange of Notes of 30 December 1966, constituting an Agreement between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the use of the islands in the British Indian Ocean Territory for defence purposes the following agreement and understandings were reached:

I. With reference to paragraph (2)(a) of the Agreement, the administrative measures


Page 102 of 158

referred to are those necessary for modifying or terminating any economic activity then being pursued in the islands, resettling any inhabitants, and otherwise facilitating the availability of the islands for defence purposes.

Where any United States requirement is for land owned by the United Kingdom Government but in the possession of a lessee of that Government and it will be necessary for notice of termination of the lease to be given by or on behalf of that Government to the lessee, there will be adequate notice of the United States Government to give the lessee six months' notice of termination of the lease or such less period of notice as may be specified in the lease. That paragraph shall not, however, apply in the circumstances envisaged in paragraph (2)(c) of the Agreement.

II. With reference to paragraph (2)(b) of the Agreement, the approval in principle by both Governments before either constructs or installs any facility is required only for construction or installation of major new developments. Such developments would be of the order of an air staging base, a fleet support installation, or a space tracking station. The mutually satisfactory arrangements between appropriate administrative authorities would be sufficient for improvement or reasonable expansion of approved facilities already constructed or installed.

III. With reference to the paragraph (2)(c) of the Agreement, the types of measures considered appropriate by the British authorities during periods of emergency use by the United States will be indicated to the United States authorities and will be reflected by the latter in any planning for emergency use. In the event of such emergency use of an inhabited island, the implementation of measures taken by the United States authorities to ensure the welfare of any inhabitants may be monitored by British personnel.

When temporary emergency use is required, the administrative authorities of the two Governments will agree upon the arrangements (if any) regarding such temporary use which may in the circumstances be appropriate.

IV. With reference to paragraph (6) of the Agreement, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom agree to define the terms and conditions for use in exceptional circumstances by commercial aircraft or military airfields in the Territory, as follows: -

1. Such use shall be limited to technical stops by British and United States commercial aircraft only;

2. the United States Government has indicated its agreement to such use following consultation on an expedited basis at the time, provided for in paragraph (6) of the Agreement, for the purpose of making practical arrangements;

3. if, however, a third government should in the view of the United Kingdom make an effective challenge, in pursuance of international instruments relating to civil aviation, to the United Kingdom's action as sovereign power in denying the use of an airfield, then it is agreed that civil use by British and United States commercial aircraft shall be suspended for such time as in the view of the United Kingdom Government the effective challenge is maintained;

4. the above provisions would not preclude the use of military airfields by civil aircraft operated by or on behalf of either Government for governmental purposes which is covered by the service – level arrangements provided for paragraph (5) of the Agreement.

2. Paragraph (2(b)(iii) of Annex II to the agreement does not debar any person who has a civil


Page 103 of 158

claim against the United States Government or any person for whose acts or omission that government is responsible from bringing a civil claim in a British court under British law in any circumstances in which it would otherwise be open for him to do so.

3. In the light of circumstances prevailing in the Territory at the commencement of the Agreement and the use to which it is contemplated the islands will be put, no formal provision has been included to cover the status of the members of the United States Forces and other personnel (except with regard to jurisdiction, custom duties, and taxes) and certain defence activities of the United States authorities. If at any time during the continuance of the Agreement it appears to the United Kingdom Government or the United States Government necessary, having regard to any change in the use of [sic; or?] any development in the circumstances of the islands, to make formal provision for those matter, an Agreement will be concluded containing such of the provisions of the Seychelles Tracking Facility Agreement as appear necessary to the two Governments, with any necessary modifications, and such other provisions as appear necessary to the two Governments.

London, 30 December 1966 [signed: David Bruce] [signed: Chalfont] (Sand, 2009, pp. 81-83)

28 Secret side note to Agreement December 30 1966

UK-U.S Secret Side-Note to Agreement on Diego Garcia, 1966

I

Secret

Note No.26 30 December 1966

From David K.E. Bruce,

U.S. Ambassador to London.

To the Right Honorable George Brown, M.P.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W.1.

Sir,

I have the honor to refer to the Agreement concluded today between our two Governments concerning the availability of certain Indian Ocean islands for such defense need of either of our two Governments as may arise. I wish to confirm the following financial arrangements which have been


Page 104 of 158

reached regarding the detachment of these islands from colonial administration and the acquisition of the lands thereon:

1. The United Kingdom will assume all costs pertaining to the administrative detachment of the Indian Ocean islands in question and to the acquisition of the lands thereon so that they may be available over the indefinite future to meet the defense needs of either Government at these needs arise.

2. Under the POLARIS Sales Agreement signed by our two Governments at Washington on April 6, 1963, the United Kingdom is obliged to make certain payments as participation in expenditures incurred by the United States after January 1, 1963, for research and development of the POLARIS missile system (hereinafter "R&D surcharge"). Since the United Kingdom is assuming the costs of the administrative detachment of the Indian Ocean islands and of the acquisition of the lands thereon, the United States will forego the R&D surcharge to the extent of $14 million, or one half of the foregoing Indian Ocean islands costs incurred by the United Kingdom, whichever is less. The amount of the R&D surcharge so foregone is referred to below as the contribution.

3. The procedure proposed for effecting the contribution is described in the following subparagraphs.

a. As of 30 September 1966 the United Kingdom has paid into the Trust Fund established pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XI of the POLARIS Sales Agreement the aggregate sum of $14.3 million in respect of:

(i) the R&D surcharge;

(ii) the agreed overhead costs of the POLARIS program (hereinafter "Overhead"); and

(iii) the agreed charge for use all United States Government furnished facilities (hereinafter "Facilities")

Of this aggregate sum $14 million will be applied to meet current charges against the United Kingdom for the POLARIS procurement. In consequence, the next practicable quarterly payment by the United Kingdom into the Trust Fund for such current procurement charges will be reduced by the aforementioned amount of $14.0 million. If the next quarterly payment otherwise due for such current procurement charges is less than $14.0 million, the difference between the $14.0 million and the amount of that quarterly payment otherwise due will be deducted from the succeeding quarterly payment or payments made by the United Kingdom.

(b) Beginning as of the last day of the quarter following the quarter in which this exchange of notes is signed and ending as of March 31, 1969, the United Kingdom will pay, in equal quarterly installments, the entire amounts of the Overhead and Facilities called for by paragraph 2 of the Classified Minute relating to Article XI of the POLARIS Sales Agreement, less those amounts exceeding $14.0 million paid into the Trust Fund as of the date of signature of these arrangements in respect of the R&D surcharge and in respect of the Overhead and Facilities, which balance will be applied against the first quarterly payment or payments for Overhead and Facilities.

(c)When the cumulative amount of the R&D surcharge which would have been payable except for these arrangements equals the contribution, the United Kingdom will commence payments in respect of the R&D surcharge at the rate specified in subparagraph 1.b of the Article XI of the


Page 105 of 158

POLARIS Sales Agreement. Should payments in respect of the R&D which would have been payable except for these arrangements prove insufficient to meet the contribution, the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom will consult in order to determine how the United States' obligation to provide the contribution can best be satisfied.

I have the honor to request you to confirm the foregoing financial arrangements on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[signed: David Bruce]

American Ambassador

II

Secret

No. AU 1199 30 December 1966

From the Minister of State, Foreign Office

London

To H.E. The Honourable David K. E. Bruce, CBE

Embassy of the United States of America, London

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Note No. 26 of the 30th of December, 1966, concerning the financial arrangements which have been reached between the two Governments in respect of the detachment of the islands constituting the British Indian Ocean Territory from colonial administration and the acquisition of the lands thereon.

I have the honour to confirm on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom the financial arrangements set out in Your Excellency's Note.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, Your Excellency's obedient Servant.

(For the Secretary of State)


Page 106 of 158

[signed: Chalfont]

(Sand, 2009, pp. 6-8)

28.1 Minute October 23 1968

Minute - Comment (unknown date) Date: October 23, 1968 Written by: Anthony I. Aust (later CMG), assistant legal adviser of the FCO, UK

there is nothing wrong in law or principle to enacting an immigration law which enables the Commissioner to deport inhabitants of BIOT. Even in international law there is no established rule that a citizen has a right to enter or remain in his country of origin/birth/nationality etc. A provision to this effect is contained in Protocol No. 4 to European Convention on Human Rights but that has not been ratified by us, and thus we do not regard the UK as bound by such a rule. In this respect we are able to make up the rules as we go along and treat the inhabitants of BIOT as not “belonging” to it in any sense

(Sand, 2009, p. 23)

28.2 Proposal July 5 1968

From: US Embassy, London To: FCO, UK

As a bare minimum we consider that British flag should fly over facility and that UK liaison officer would need to be appointed in order to establish necessary relations with other HMG officials and local inhabitants.

(Snoxell, 2009, p. 132)

28.3 Telegram September 4 1968

From: US Embassy, London To: State Department

… administrative details of project will need to be subject of detailed negotiations before construction is due to begin. These negotiations will encompass use of Mauritian and Seychellois labor, and question of resettlement of migrant population. Brooke Turner (FO) suggests two possibilities might be considered: Removal of population altogether to some locale outside territory, or on to other islands in Chagos group. In order to approach this question, FO wishes to know US views on whether all should move, or whether some of them will be offered employment during the construction phase. FO also wishes further info about eventual size of facility and which, if any, of other islands in Chagos group might be required for further development.

Most difficult question likely to be how and when to make project public knowledge. It will clearly be necessary for both governments to concert closely over this. It is essential to preclude unfavourable reactions by governments of India and Mauritius by taking them into our confidence before there is any possibility of project becoming publicly known or rumoured. UKUN [UK Mission to UN in New York] would prefer no public announcement before end of coming session of General Assembly.

(Snoxell, 2009, p. 132)

28.4 Minute July 25 1968

From: Michael Stewart, Foreign Office Secretary


Page 107 of 158

To: Harold Wilson, Prime Minister, UK, defence secretary, commonwealth secretary and chancellor of the exchequer,

The UN General Assembly may object that the interest of the local population are being ignored, but we have been able to resist such arguments by pointing out that the inhabitants consist mostly of migrant workers from Mauritius and Seychelles… Resettlement will involve some small expense but it is not expected that there will be any financial difficulty with this. When the arrangements are complete, and they may be complicated by a recently completed survey which found that 128 individuals (about 34 % of the total population of 389) are second generation inhabitants of Diego Garcia, we would propose, as agreed at the time of the creation of BIOT, to deny, if necessary, the competence of UN to concern itself with a territory which has no indigenous population… The matter will be easier to handle at the UN if the proposal to develop the island does not become publicly known… until after the end next end of the UN General Assembly.

(Slessor, 2004, pp. 54-55) & (Snoxell, 2009, p. 133)

29 Letter of February 3 1969

SECRET

EMBASSY

OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA London, England

February 3, 1969

Richard A. Sykes, Esq., C.M.G., M.C.

Defence Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Whitehall, S.W.1.

Dear Richard:

We have been informed that the proposed project for a naval facility on Diego Garcia

was included (without identification) in the FY 1970 Department of Defense military

construction budget request presented to Congress last week. The proposal envisages

construction of the 26 million dollar facility as outlined to you last July, plus 11 million

dollars for procurement of communications equipment.

As we advised Robin Johnstone in October, the Diego Garcia proposal will be identified

as a classified line item when the military construction budget request is presented to the


Page 108 of 158

House Armed Services Committee. Committee hearings, which will be in Executive

Session, are not expected to be held until March or April.

We fully recognize the need to consult closely with your Government regarding the Diego

Garcia project, and intend to do so in detail when our plans are firm. You will understand,

of course, that we cannot undertake actual construction without Congressional approval,

and some of the details of our planning will perforce remain undetermined until the House

Committee has held its hearings and given its approval. For example, many of the

administrative planning details will depend upon the method of {p.2} construction, i.e.,

whether we use a private U.S. contractor or Naval Construction Forces. If the latter are

available, both the foreign exchange costs and construction time would be reduced, and

our need for local unskilled labor would be minimal or non-existent. This and other key

questions cannot be answered until the hearings are completed.

In the meantime, however, it may be useful to give you Washington‘s present views on a

number of questions of mutual concern.

1. As indicated in my letter to Robin Johnstone of November 22 {handwritten marginal

note, a file/document reference: ―DP15/527/1‖}, we have no plans for the use of Peros

Banhos and Salomon Islands, with the proviso that the absence of current plans does not

preclude consideration of using other islands in the Chagos Archipelago should this

become desirable at some later time. On this understanding, we have no objection to your

proposal to request Moulinie to draw up plans for expanded development of the two

northern islands. We are mindful of our obligation under the BIOT Agreement to use

Mauritian and Seychellois labor to the maximum extent consistent with our requirements

and construction schedules. Our best present estimate is that we still desire ultimate

removal of all migrant laborers from Diego Garcia after giving six month‘s notice to the

lessees in accord with the confidential agreed minutes to the BIOT Agreement, but no

firm decision has been made at this stage. We share your view that it would be politically

unwise to relocate Diego workers on Mauritius where there are serious unemployment

problems, and have therefore agreed to the use of Peros Banhos and Saloman Island to

relocate them and others in the archipelago who may in the future have to be moved.

However, we hope that no action will be taken on the status of Diego workers until the

basic decisions outlined above have been made. We will then endeavor to open

meaningful discussions as soon as possible. {p.3}

On this point, we have recently had a report of a request by the BIOT Administrator to

hire 50 Chagos-born laborers now living on Mauritius, and to transport them and their

families to Diego Garcia. In view of our desire to transfer most or all of the copra workers

elsewhere, we are somewhat concerned about the possibility of continued movement of

additional workers to Diego. I wonder if you can provide us with any clarification of this

report and your views on the subject.



Page 109 of 158

2. In the course of our conversations during Bob Remole‘s visit here last December,

you put to us a number of points concerning BIOT problems. I have been asked to give

you the following responses or comments:

(a) We are puzzled by the request of Sir Hugh Norman-Walker that future activities in

BIOT should be ―mounted‖ out of the Seychelles. Although the presence of the USAF

tracking station on Mahe does give us a reliable communications point for the Indian

Ocean area, we wonder whether this suggestion is intended to apply to activities which

would otherwise be staged through Mauritius, or directly from east coast ports. In any

event, we would prefer to await the message you expected to give us soon on the general

question of communications before taking any position.

(b) We will henceforth be particularly careful to keep the U.S. Commander of the

Mahe tracking station fully informed regarding all activities undertaken in the BIOT. We

fully agree that this is desirable; I am sure it is understood that he is not a diplomat and

does not represent the U.S. Government.

(c) Regarding the general question of advance notice, we will of course give you as

much notice as possible of our intentions in BIOT, consistent with the sometimes difficult

problems inherent in reaching timely internal decisions. {p.4}

(d) With regard to the physical layout of the proposed Diego installation, our plans are

based on the 1967 survey report. We have not received details of Sir Hugh Norman-

Walker‘s reservations concerning the layout, but would be happy to consider any

additional information he may have submitted that might be useful to us.

(e) Our requirement (if any) for local labor in the construction of the facility, as

explained above, will not be known until after the House Armed Services Committee

hearings.

(f) We would suggest that copra production on Diego Garcia be continued until we

are in a position, later this Spring, to establish a construction timetable.

(g) J/PM (formerly G/PM) in the Department of State is now the primary point of

contact for BIOT matters, and coordinates with other interested bureaus within the State

and Defense Departments.

3. When and if a facility on Diego Garcia comes into operation, the current Mauritian

meteorological service now being provided from Diego would apparently become

redundant, since a comparable service could be furnished to the Mauritian Government by

the U.S. Navy. Alternatively, the present meteorological station could possibly be moved

elsewhere in the archipelago and continue to furnish the same kind of weather information.

4. We concur with your rejection of applications from private firms for mineral

exploration of Diego Garcia. We would have no objection to such exploration in other

islands of the archipelago on the clear understanding that all such activity would be halted

immediately if a future US/UK decision were made to use the islands in question for

defense purposes under the 1966 agreement. In this connection, we would appreciate any

information on the current status of the question of exploration and exploitation {p.5} of


Page 110 of 158

mineral rights. Has there been any recent clarification of this question, and are there any

outstanding differences between your Government and the Government of Mauritius

regarding mineral rights?

5. We will, of course, consult with you regarding notification to other interested

Governments in the area, but we do not wish to take such a step at this time. We believe it

would be most appropriate to do so in connection with the Department of Defense

presentation to the House Armed Services Committee.

6. Notwithstanding our desires, we recognize there is a danger of premature leakage

before the Committee hearings are held. To preserve our general credibility, we believe

that any public statement we find it necessary to make at this time should take into

account the facts previously given out, and, to the extent that security permits, prepare the

ground for an eventual announcement of the decision to proceed with facilities in the BIOT.

In the event that a public statement becomes unavoidable, therefore, we propose using

the following:

―Since concluding an agreement (subsequently published) with the United Kingdom in

1966, we have been in a continuing review with British authorities about the possible use

for refueling and communications facilities of a number of islands in the Indian Ocean.

Additional review and decisions have yet to be made prior to the implementation of any

plans.‖

(The U.S. representative in the United Nations Committee of 24 made a statement on July

19, 1967, acknowledging that the U.S. and U.K. had an agreement permitting the

establishment of ―refueling and communications facilities‖ in the BIOT, but disclaiming

plans to build a “military base”.)

Please let me know if this press guidance is acceptable to your Government. {p.6}

7. Finally, if asked about the Geodetic Satellite teams now in Diego Garcia, we would

respond with the form of words agreed last August (beginning ―The UK has authorized the

US to place a temporary NGSP station on Diego Garcia ...‖), as amended in November

with an additional paragraph on the composition and schedules of the three teams. I would

appreciate it if you will confirm that this agreed line continues to be acceptable.

Yours sincerely,

{Signature}

Gerald G. Oplinger

Politico-Military Affairs



Page 111 of 158

SECRET


29.1 Note February 21 1969

From: FCO To: UK Delegates in UN General Assembly

We agree that there is a prospect that the ignorance and confused thinking prevailing on the matter could enable us to dodge the real issues.

(Slessor, 2004, p. 49)

29.2 Minute April 21 1969

From: Michael Stewart, Foreign Office Secretary To: Harold Wilson, Prime Minister

The problem of the future of these people exists independently of America’s plans but the decision to proceed with a Communications Facility on Diego Garcia has brought it to a head . . . The people are working in the Chagos under contract and own no property or fixed assets there. However some of them have established roots in Chagos and I should naturally have wanted to consult at least these in advance of any decision about their future, if this had been possible. Officials have examined closely the possibility of giving them some elements of choice, but have advised that this would seem wholly impracticable . . . In short I ask my colleagues to agree that . . . we should aim at the return of the inhabitants of the whole of the Chagos Archipelago to the Seychelles and Mauritius and should enter into negotiations with the Mauritian Government to that end.

(Snoxell, 2009, p. 133)

29.3 Advisory opinion January 16 1970

Advisory opinion on purpose of Immigration Ordinance Date: January 16, 1970 Written by: Anthony I. Aust (later CMG), assistant legal adviser of the FCO, UK

Purpose of Immigration Ordinance

(a) To provide legal power to deport people who will not leave voluntarily;

(b) to prevent people entering;

(c) to maintain the fiction that the inhabitants of Chagos are not a permanent or semi-permanent population. I will consider these separately.

“Maintaining the fiction”:

As long as only part of BIOT is evacuated the British Government will have to continue to argue that the local people are only a floating population. This may be easier in the case of the non-Chagos part of BIOT ... where most of the people are Seychellois labourers and their families. However, the longer that such a population remains, and perhaps increases, the greater the risk of our being accused of setting up a mini-colony about which we would have to report to the United Nations under Article 73 of the Charter. Therefore strict immigration legislation giving such labourers and their families very restricted rights of residence would bolster our arguments that the territory has no indigenous population.

(Sand, 2009, p. 24) & (Harwood Jr., The U.K. Court judgment, 2002, p. ¶ 18)


Page 112 of 158

29.4 Letter November 13 1970

Letter - marked: ―secret and personal‖ Date: November 13, 1970 From: Eleanor J. Emery, Head of the Pacific and Indian Ocean Department, FCO To: Sir Bruce Greatbatch, Governor of the Seychelles

As you will have gathered from Washington Tel. No. 3229 to the F.C.O., from the ‘Times Diary’ of 9 November, and from the two P.Q.s in our telegram B.I.O.T. 22 of 10 November, there has recently been a revival of public interest in the British Indian Ocean territory.

The two questions in our telegram received written answers as follows– ...

Mr Dalyell is not, however, giving up. He has tabled a further series of questions for the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. ...

We shall continue to try to say as little as possible (particularly until the Congressional hearings are concluded, probably around mid-December at the latest) to avoid embarrassing the United States administration.

Apart from our overall strategic and defence interests we are also concerned at present not to have to elaborate on the administrative implications for the present population on Diego Garcia of establishment of any base there.

We would not wish it to become general knowledge that some of the inhabitants have lived on Diego Garcia for at least two generations and could, therefore, be regarded as “belongers”.

We shall therefore advise Ministers in handling supplementary questions about whether Diego Garcia is inhabited to say that there is only a small number of contract labourers from the Seychelles and Mauritius engaged to work on the copra plantations on the Island.

Should a Member ask about what would happen to these contract labourers in the event of a base being set up on the Island, we hope that, for the present, this can be brushed aside as a hypothetical question at least until any decision to go ahead with the Diego Garcia facility becomes public.”

(Sand, 2009, p. 18) & (Hardwood Jr., Diego Garcia: U.K. Parliament debates and statements (2000-2002), 2002)

Minute January 11 1971

Minute Date: January 11, 1971 Written by: Anthony I. Aust (later CMG), assistant legal adviser of the FCO, UK

the ordinance would be published in the BIOT Gazette, which has only very limited circulation both here and overseas, after signature by the Commissioner. Publicity will therefore be minimal.

(Sand, 2009, p. 24)


Page 113 of 158


SECRET

Mr. D.A. Scott {Signature} /2.2

Sir L Monson

Mr. Kerby (received 4th February)

British Indian Ocean Territory

Resettlement of the Inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago

Problem

1 The time has come to implement arrangements agreed in principle by the previous

Administration by which, in view of the construction of an American naval communication

facility on Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), we should resettle the

population of the Chagos Archipelago, of which Diego Garcia forms part, partly in

Seychelles and partly, subject to negotiations with Mauritius Government, in Mauritius.

2 It is also desirable to reaffirm our refusal to issue licences for oil and other mineral

exploration within BIOT.

Recommendations

3 I recommend that officials be authorised now to implement the policies described in

paragraphs 1 and 2 above; and that we open negotiations with the Mauritius Government

about resettlement there, ad referendum to Ministers.

Background and Argument

4 A map of BIOT is at A and a Background Note on Diego Garcia prepared for the

British delegation to the Commonwealth Conference is at B.

Position of the United States

5 The United States Government have recently confirmed that their security

arrangements at Diego Garcia will require the removal of the entire population of the atoll

by July if possible. This is no surprise. {p.2} We have known since 1965 that if a defence

facility were established we should have to resettle elsewhere the contract copra workers

who live there. It is desirable moreover, to arrange for the total evacuation from the

Chagos Archipelago of the present population, who are essentially migrant workers. If

BIOT is to fulfil the defence purposes for which it was created, there should be no

permanent or even semi-permanent population in respect of which we might in time incur,

under Chapter XI of the UN Charter, a variety of obligations including the ―sacred trust ...

to develop self-government.‖

6 In April 1969 the then Secretary of State obtained the concurrence of the then Prime

Minister for the resettlement of the inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago on the lines now

http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapt11.htm

http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html


Page 114 of 158

recommended. This was done in the expectation that the US authorities were about to go

ahead with their facility. Congress however rejected the proposal, and further action on

resettlement was necessarily deferred until American intentions became clear. When the

proposal was again submitted to Congress, no approach was made to the Mauritian

authorities about resettlement plans in deference to representations by the United States

authorities that no overt action should be taken which might prejudice the outcome of

Congressional hearings. Now, Congressional approval has been obtained, and the US

Government are anxious to begin work.

The Problems of Resettlement

7 There are now about 829 people in the Chagos Archipelago, of whom about 359 live

on Diego Garcia itself and the remainder on the two other inhabited atolls of Peros Banhos

and Salomon. Of the total, 386 are dual citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and

of Mauritius (they are known as Ilois). As far as we know, neither the Ilois themselves nor

the Mauritius authorities are aware of their dual nationality. There are {p.3} also 35 citizens

of Mauritius, and 408 citizens of the UK and Colonies from Seychelles (―Seychellois‖). A

population chart is at C.

8 There will be no difficulty in returning the Seychellois to Seychelles, but there would

be strong political objections in Seychelles to attempting to settle the Mauritians or Ilois

there.

9 In December 1965, a question in the Mauritius Legislative Assembly asked for

confirmation that certain obligations in respect of BIOT had been definitely undertaken by

the British Government, including, whether all Mauritians then living in Diego Garcia would

be resettled in Mauritius; whether the costs of repatriation would be met from the British

Exchequer; whether all costs of rehousing them would be met by the British; and finally

whether work would be found for them by the British Government. With the approval of the

Colonial Office, the Mauritius Government spokesman gave the following answer:

―The British Government has undertaken to meet the full cost of the resettlement of

Mauritians at present living in the Chagos Archipelago.‖

The reply did not refer to the place of resettlement; nor does it ever seem to have been

specifically established between the UK and Mauritius Governments that this resettlement

would be in Mauritius. But that has been the implication and understanding on our side,

and we do not expect the Mauritius Government to dispute it in principle.

10 However, with at least 40,000 men (representing 20% of the labour force) already

without work Mauritius has a formidable unemployment problem. In our High

Commissioner‘s view failure by the Mauritius Government to tackle the unemployment

could lead to outbreaks of disorder, perhaps comparable to those which in September

1970 led to appeals for British military assistance. The High Commissioner advises that,

because {p.4} of the already high level of unemployment, we must expect negotiations

with the Mauritius Government about the resettlement of the people from the Chagos


Page 115 of 158

Archipelago to be difficult and the terms demanded high. There are already about 100

families now in Mauritius whose contracts to work in Diego Garcia have not been renewed.

The Mauritius Government have been asking how we intend to fulfil our obligations to

these people. An answer has been delayed pending a decision about resettlement as a

whole.

11 Ideally, we ought to try to settle as many of these people as possible in British

territory. There would, however, as stated above, be strong political objections in

Seychelles (which has its own economic and over-population problems) to accepting back

any other than its own people. The possibilities of resettling Mauritian citizens and Ilois

elsewhere in the Indian Ocean area have been re-examined but without success, and it is

doubtful if they would wish to go anywhere but Mauritius. However, it may be possible,

subject to the concurrence of the Mauritius Government, to resettle as many as 50 Ilois or

mono-Mauritian families on the Mauritian island of Agalega, to work on copra plantations

run by Moulinie & Company the firm who manage the existing plantations in BIOT.

Whatever the result of the proposed negotiations with the Mauritius Government, it will be

necessary – if the US deadline for clearing the Diego Garcia is to be met – for the

inhabitants to be moved temporarily to plantations on Peros Banhos and Salomon, which

are also in the Chagos Archipelago. The Governor of Seychelles has confirmed that there

will be no practical difficulties in accomplishing this, and that adequate housing and

welfare facilities exist for those who are to be moved. Such a measure would, however, be

only an interim one.

Costs

12 The total cost of establishing BIOT was originally estimated at £10 million, allocated

to the Ministry of Defence Vote. (The US Government secretly contributed the equivalent

of £5 million). Of the £10 million, £3 million was originally allocated for building an airport

{p.5} in Seychelles, £3 million to Mauritius in cash, and £4 million for the purchase of

islands from private owners for resettlement and for contingencies. The allocation for the

Seychelles airport was notional and in order to build a viable international airport capable

of taking modern jet aircraft the cost has risen to over £5 million. (An analysis of

expenditure is at D). Consequently, virtually no balance now remains which could be used

for resettlement purposes. It is certain that additional funds will be required for

resettlement.

13 It is estimated that the cost of resettling the Seychellois in Seychelles may not

exceed £10,000 (including costs of termination of contracts and passages). A preliminary

figure of £55,000 has been put forward by Moulinie & Co. for the proposed scheme for

settling 50 families on the Mauritian island of Agalega. The costs of resettlement in

Mauritius are at this stage impossible to assess, as we do not know the sort of price the

Mauritius Government may ask. The High Commissioner has recommended that a Special

Adviser be appointed to examine resettlement possibilities in consultation with the

Mauritius Government.


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Oil & Minerals

14 Part of the price which the Mauritius Government may ask in any negotiations may

be a relaxation of the policy to which we have so far adhered, that no surveying or

exploration for oil or other minerals is allowed within the Chagos Archipelago, so long as

the whole area is set aside for defence purposes. Mauritian interest stems from an

assurance given in 1965 that the net benefit of any oil or minerals discovered in or near

the Chagos Archipelago would revert to the Mauritius Government. It is not thought that

there are any significant resources of oil, gas or minerals in Chagos but some foreign

companies have applied for oil {p.6} exploration licences. It seems right to maintain the

ban on mineral and oil exploration for the present, but we should review the need for it with

US officials in case it might prove to be in Britain‘s interests to allow some relaxation in the

course of negotiations with Mauritius about resettlement of the Ilois.

15 So far there has been relatively little public or Parliamentary interest in BIOT; and

such interest as has been shown has been mainly concerned with conservation on

Aldabra (where a nature reserve is being established) . But neither we nor the Americans

can conceal the fact that the creation of facilities for the US Navy in this British Colony

means the evacuation and resettlement of several hundred people; and if, as seems likely,

negotiations with Mauritius are prolonged, the episode may well attract publicity, and critics

of our Indian Ocean strategy may be expected to make the most of it.

16 This Submission has the concurrence of Defence Department, Financial Policy and

Aid Department, Finance Department, East Africa Department, UN (Policy) Department,

Oil Department, the Legal Advisers and of the ODA and the Ministry of Defence. The

Treasury have given their concurrence on the understanding that any necessary

expenditure over and above the sum of £10 million allocated for the setting up of BIOT will

be met from within existing TESC provisions, and subject also to the conditions that

resettlement costs shall be kept as low as possible and shall be charged in the first

instance to the unspent balance of the sum of £10 million. They also observe that the cost

of any further recommendations will have to be considered very carefully, coming as they

will on top of the considerable provision already made for establishing BIOT.

{Signature}

(I Watt) {Ian Watt}

Atlantic and Indian Ocean Department

*26 January 1971

Circulated Feb 2nd.

SECRET



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30.1 Memorandum September 14 1972

From: Stoddart, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, US To: Sir Bruce Greatbatch, Governor of the Seychelles, UK

the relocation of the former copra workers on Diego Garcia has worked out fairly well, with little adverse publicity, although resettlement is not yet completed and the possibility exists that unfavourable publicity may still result from this process. The UK is responsible for the resettlement, but the US cannot escape identification with the problem.

(Snoxell, 2009, pp. 133-134)

30.2 Exchange of notes October 24 1972

No. 8737. EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES OF THE BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY. LONDON, 30 DECEMBER 196616 EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT17 SUPPLEMENTING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED AGREEMENT CONCERNING A LIMITED UNITED STATES NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY ON DIEGO GARCIA, BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (WITH ANNEXED PLAN). LONDON, 24 OCTOBER 1972 Authentic text: English. Registered by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 11 April 1973.

I The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

to the Charg d'affaires ad interim of the United States of America FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 1

LONDON 24 October 1972

Note No. HKT 10/1 Sir, I have the honour to refer to the Agreement constituted by the exchange of notes dated 30 December 1966, ' between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the availability of the British Indian Ocean Territory for defence purposes. Pursuant to paragraph 2 (b) of that Agreement, I now convey the approval in principle of the Government of the United Kingdom to the construction of a limited naval communications facility on Diego Garcia and propose an agreement in the following terms: (1) Scope of the facility (a) Subject to the following provisions of this Agreement, the Government of the United States shall have the right to construct, maintain and operate a limited naval communications facility on Diego Garcia. The facility shall consist of transmitting and receiving services, an anchorage, airfield, associated logistic support and supply and personnel accommodation. For this purpose immovable structures, installations and buildings may be constructed within the specific area shown in the plan annexed to this

16

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 603, p. 273. 17

Came into force on 24 October 1972, the date of the note in reply, in accordance with the provisions of the said notes.


Page 118 of 158

note. The specific area may be altered from time to time as may be agreed by the appropriate administrative authorities of the two Governments. (b) During the term of this Agreement the Government of the United States may conduct on Diego Garcia such functions as are necessary for the construction, maintenance, operation and security of the facility. For this purpose the Government of the United States shall have freedom of access to that part of Diego Garcia outside the specific area referred to in sub-paragraph (a), but may erect or construct immovable structures, installations and buildings outside the specific area only with the prior agreement of the appropriate administrative authorities of the Government of the United Kingdom. (c) Delimitation of the specific area shall, subject to the provisions of the BIOT Agreement, in no way restrict the Government of the United Kingdom from constructing and operating their own defence facility within that area, provided that no technical interference to existing operations will result from such construction and operation. (2) Purpose The facility shall provide a link in United States defence communications and shall furnish improved communications support in the Indian Ocean for ships and state aircraft owned or operated by or on behalf of either Government. (3) Access to Diego Garcia (a) Access to Diego Garcia shall in general be restricted to members of the Forces of the United Kingdom and of the United States, the Commissioner and public officers in the service of the British Indian Ocean Territory, representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States and, subject to normal immigration requirements, contractor personnel. The Government of the United Kingdom reserves the right, after consultation with the appropriate United States administrative authorities, to grant access to members of scientific parties wishing to carry out research on Diego Garcia and its environs, provided that such research does not unreasonably interfere with the activities of the facility. The Commanding Officer shall afford appropriate assistance to members of these parties to the extent feasible and on a reimbursable basis. Access shall not be granted to any other person without prior consultation between the appropriate administrative authorities of the two Governments. (b) Ships and state aircraft owned or operated by or on behalf of either Government may freely use the anchorage and airfield. (c) Pursuant to the provisions of the second sentence of paragraph (3) of the BIOT Agreement, ships and state aircraft owned or operated by or on behalf of a third government, and the personnel of such ships and aircraft, may use only such of the services provided by the facility, and on such terms, as may be agreed in any particular case by the two Governments. (4) Protection and security Responsibility for protection and security of the facility shall be vested in the Commanding Officer, who shall maintain a close liaison with the Commissioner. The two Governments shall consult if there is any threat to the facility. (5) Shipping, navigation and aviation facilities The Government of the United States shall have the right to install, operate and maintain on Diego Garcia such navigational and communications aids as may be necessary for the safe transit of ships and aircraft into and out of Diego Garcia. (6) Radio frequencies and telecommunications (a) Subject to the prior concurrence of the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States may use any radio frequencies, powers and band widths


Page 119 of 158

for radio services (including radar) on Diego Garcia which are necessary for the operation of the facility. All radio communications shall comply at all times with the provisions of the International Telecommunications Convention.18 (b) The Government of the United States may establish such land lines on Diego Garcia as may be necessary for the facility. (7) Conservation As far as possible the activities of the facility and its personnel shall not interfere with the flora and fauna of Diego Garcia. When their use is no longer required for the purposes of the facility, the two Governments shall consult about the condition of the three islets at the mouth of the lagoon with a view to restoring them to their original condition. However, neither Government shall be under any obligation to provide funds for such restoration. (8) Anchorage dues and aviation charges Collection of dues and charges for use of the anchorage and airfield at Diego Garcia which may be levied by the Commissioner shall be his responsibility. State aircraft and ships owned or operated by or on behalf of the Government of the United States shall be permitted to use the anchorage and airfield without the payment of any dues or charges. (9) Meteorology The Government of the United States shall operate a meteorological facility on Diego Garcia and supply such available meteorological information as may be required by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Mauritius to meet their national and international obligations. (10) Royal Navy element The Royal Navy element on Diego Garcia shall be under the command of a Royal Navy officer who shall be known as the Officer-in-Charge of the Royal Navy element. He shall be the Representative on Diego Garcia of the Commissioner. (11) Finance The Government of the United States shall wholly bear the cost of constructing, operating and maintaining the facility. The Government of the United Kingdom shall be responsible for the pay, allowances and any other monetary gratuities of Royal Navy personnel, for the cost of their messing, and for supplies or services which are peculiar to or provided for the exclusive use of the Royal Navy or its personnel and which would not normally be provided by the Government of the United States for the use of its own personnel. (12) Fisheries, oil and mineral resources The Government of the United Kingdom will not permit commercial fishing in the lagoon or oil or mineral exploration or exploitation on Diego Garcia for the duration of this Agreement. Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom will not permit commercial fishing or oil or mineral exploration or exploitation in or under those areas of the waters, continental shelf and seabed around Diego Garcia over which the United Kingdom has sovereignty or exercises sovereign rights, unless it is agreed that such activities would not harm or be inimical to the defence use of the island. (13) Health, quarantine and sanitation The Commanding Officer and the Commissioner shall collaborate in the enforcement on Diego Garcia of necessary health, quarantine and sanitation provisions. (14) News broadcast station

18

United Kingdom, Treaty Series, No. 74 (1961), Cmnd. 1484.


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The Government of the United States may establish and operate a closed circuit TV and a low power radio broadcast station to broadcast news, entertainment and educational programmes for personnel on Diego Garcia. (15) Property (a) Title to any movable property brought into Diego Garcia by or on behalf of the Government of the United States, or by a United States contractor, shall remain in the Government of the United States or the contractor, as the case may be. Such property of the Government of the United States, including official papers, shall be exempt from inspection, search and seizure. Such property of either the Government of the United States or of a United States contractor may be freely removed from Diego Garcia, but shall not be disposed of within the British Indian Ocean Territory or Seychelles unless an offer, consistent with the laws of the United States then in effect, has been made to sell the property to the Commissioner and he has not accepted such offer within a period of 120 days after it was made or such longer period as may be reasonable in the circumstances. Any such property not removed or disposed of within a reasonable time after termination of this Agreement shall become the property of the Commissioner. (b) The Government of the United States shall not be responsible for restoring land or other immovable property to its original condition, nor for making any payment in lieu of restoration. (16) Availability of funds To the extent that the carrying out of any activity or the implementation of any part of this Agreement depends upon funds to be appropriated by the Congress of the United States, it shall be subject to the availability of such funds. (17) Restriction of rights The Government of the United States shall not exercise any of the above rights or powers, or permit the exercise thereof, except for the purposes herein specified. (18) Supplementary arrangements Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate administrative authorities of the two Governments may be made from time to time as required for the carrying out of the purposes of this Agreement. (19) Definitions and interpretation (a) For the purposes of this Agreement "BIOT Agreement" means the Agreement referred to in the first paragraph of this note; "Commanding Officer" means the United States Navy Officer in command of the facility; "Commissioner" means the officer administering the Government of the British Indian Ocean Territory; "Diego Garcia" means the atoll of Diego Garcia, the lagoon and the three islets at the mouth of the lagoon. (b) The provisions of this Agreement shall supplement the BIOT Agreement and shall be construed in accordance with that Agreement. In the event of any conflict between the provisions of the BIOT Agreement and this Agreement the provisions of the BIOT Agreement shall prevail. (20) Duration and termination This Agreement shall continue in force for as long as the BIOT Agreement continues in force or until such time as no part of Diego Garcia is any longer required for the purposes of the facility, whichever occurs first. 2. If the Government of the United States of America also approves in principle the construction of the facility subject to the above terms, I have the honour to propose that


Page 121 of 158

this note and the plan annexed to it, together with your reply to that effect, shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of your reply and shall be known as the Diego Garcia Agreement 1972. I have the honour to be with high consideration, Sir For the Secretary of State: ANTHONY KERSHAW


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ANNEX


Page 123 of 158

II The Charg d'affaires ad interim of the United States of America to the Secretary of State

for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON October 24, 1972

No. 22 Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note No. HKT 10/1 of October 24, 1972, which reads as follows:

[See note I] I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States of America approves in principle the construction of the facility subject to the terms set out in your note, and therefore agree that your note, and the plan annexed to it, together with this reply, shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into force on today's date and shall be known as the Diego Garcia Agreement 1972. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EARL D. SOHM Chargé d'affaires ad interim

(United Nations, 1973) & (Sand, 2009, pp. 84-90)


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31 Exchange of notes February 25 1976 1976 No. 8737. EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES OF THE BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY. LONDON, 30 DECEMBER 196619 EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT20 SUPPLEMENTING THE ABOVEMENTIONED AGREEMENT, CONCERNING A UNITED STATES NAVAL SUPPORT FACILITY ON DIEGO GARCIA, BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY AND REPLACING THE SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT OF 24 OCTOBER 197221 (WITH ANNEXED PLAN). LONDON, 25 FEBRUARY 1976 Authentic text: English. Registered by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 27 July 1976.

I Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Charg d'Affaires ad interim

of the United States of America FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON Note No. DPP 063/530/2

25 February, 1976 Sir, I have the honour to refer to the Agreement constituted by the Exchange of Notes dated 30 December 1966 1 between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the availability of the British Indian Ocean Territory for defence purposes and to the Agreement constituted by the Exchange of Notes dated 24 October 19723 between the two Governments concerning a limited United States naval communications facility on Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory. Pursuant to paragraph 2 (b) of the former Agreement, I now convey the approval in principle of the Government of the United Kingdom to the development of the present limited naval communications facility on Diego Garcia into a support facility of the United States Navy and propose an Agreement in the following terms: (1) Scope of the facility (a) Subject to the following provisions of this Agreement, the Government of the United States shall have the right to develop the present limited naval communications facility on Diego Garcia as a support facility of the United States Navy and to maintain and operate it. The facility shall consist of an anchorage, airfield, support and supply elements and ancillary services, personnel accommodation, and transmitting and receiving services. Immovable structures, installations and buildings for the facility may, after consultation with the appropriate administrative authorities of the United Kingdom, be constructed within the specific area shown in the plan attached to this Note. The specific area may be altered

19

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 603, p. 273, and annex A in volume 866. 20 Came into force on 25 February 1976, the date of the note in reply, in accordance with the provisions of the said notes. 21


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from time to time as may be agreed by the appropriate administrative authorities of the two Governments. (b) During the term of the Agreement the Government of the United States may conduct on Diego Garcia such functions as are necessary for the development, use, maintenance, operation and security of the facility. In the exercise of these functions the Government of the United States, members of the United States Forces and contractor personnel shall have freedom of access to that part of Diego Garcia outside the specific area referred to in sub-paragraph (a), but the Government of the United States may erect or constrict immovable structures, installations and buildings outside the specific area only with the prior agreement of the appropriate administrative authorities of the Government of the United Kingdom. (c) Delimitation of the specific area shall, subject to the provisions of the BIOT Agreement and after consultation with the appropriate United States authorities with a view to avoiding interference with the existing use of the facility, in no way restrict the Government of the United Kingdom from constructing and operating at their own expense their own defence facilities within that area, or from using that part of Diego Garcia outside the specific area. (2) Purpose The facility shall provide an improved link in United States defence communications, and furnish support for ships and aircraft owned or operated by or on behalf of either Government. (3) Consultation Both Governments shall consult periodically enjoint objectives, policies and activities in the area. As regards the use of the facility in normal circumstances, the Commanding Officer and the Officer in Charge of the United Kingdom Service element shall inform each other of intended movements of ships and aircraft. In other circumstances the use of the facility shall be a matter for the joint decision of the two Governments. (4) Access to Diego Garcia (a) Access to Diego Garcia shall in general be restricted to members of the Forces of the United Kingdom and of the United States, the Commissioner and public officers in the service of the British Indian Ocean Territory, representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States and, subject to normal immigration requirements, contractor personnel. The Government of the United Kingdom reserves the right, after consultation with the appropriate United States administrative authorities, to grant access to members of scientific parties wishing to carry out research on Diego Garcia and its environs, provided that such research does not unreasonably interfere with the activities of the facility. The Commanding Officer shall afford appropriate assistance to members of these parties to the extent feasible and on a reimbursable basis. Access shall not be granted to any other person without prior consultation between the appropriate administrative authorities of the two Governments. (b) Ships and aircraft owned or operated by or on behalf of either Government may freely use the anchorage and airfield. (c) Pursuant to the provisions of the second sentence of paragraph (3) of the BIOT Agreement, ships and aircraft owned or operated by or on behalf of a third government, and the personnel of such ships and aircraft, may use only such of the services provided by the facility, and on such terms, as may be agreed in any particular case by the two Governments. (5) Protection and security


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Responsibility for protection and security of the facility shall be vested in the Commanding Officer, who shall maintain a close liaison with the Commissioner. The two Governments shall consult if there is any threat to the facility. (6) Shipping, navigation and aviation facilities The Government of the United States shall have the right to install, operate and maintain on Diego Garcia such navigational and communications aids as may be necessary for the safe transit of ships and aircraft into and out of Diego Garcia. (7) Radio frequencies and telecommunications (a) Subject to the prior concurrence of the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States may use any radio frequencies, powers and band widths for radio services (including radar) on Diego Garcia which are necessary for the operation of the facility. All radio communications shall comply at all times with the provisions of the International Telecommunications Convention. (b) The Government of the United States may establish such land lines on Diego Garcia as may be necessary for the facility. (8) Conservation As far as possible the activities of the facility and its personnel shall not interfere with the flora and fauna of Diego Garcia. When their use is no longer required for the purposes of the facility, the two Governments shall consult about the condition of the three islets at the mouth of the lagoon with a view to restoring them to their original condition. However, neither Government shall be under any obligation to provide fundsfor such restoration. (9) Anchorage dues and aviation charges Collection of dues and charges for use of the anchorage and airfield at Diego Garcia which may be levied by the Commissioner shall be his responsibility. Aircraft and ships owned or operated by or on behalf of the Government of the United States shall be permitted to use the anchorage and airfield without the payment of any dues or charges. (10) Meteorology The Government of the United States shall operate a meteorological facility on Diego Garcia and supply such available meteorological information as may be required by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Mauritius to meet their national and international obligations. (11) United Kingdom Service element The United Kingdom Service element on Diego Garcia shall be under the Command of a Royal Navy Officer who shall be known as the Officer-in-Charge of the United Kingdom Service element. (12) Finance (a) The Government of the United States shall bear the cost of developing, operating and maintaining the facility. However, in relation to United Kingdom personnel attached to the facility, the Government of the United Kingdom shall be responsible for their pay, allowances and any other monetary gratuities, for the cost of their messing, and for supplies or services which are peculiar to or provided for the exclusive use of the United Kingdom Services or their personnel and which would not normally be provided by the Government of the United States for the use of its own personnel. (b) Except in relation to the United Kingdom Service personnel attached to the facility, logistic support furnished at Diego Garcia by either Government, upon request, to the other Government, shall be on a reimbursable basis in accordance with the laws, regulations and instructions of the Government furnishing the support. (13) Fisheries, oil and mineral resources


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The Government of the United Kingdom will not permit commercial fishing in the lagoon or oil or mineral exploration or exploitation on Diego Garcia for the duration of this Agreement. Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom will not permit commercial fishing or oil or mineral exploration or exploitation in or under those areas of the waters, continental shelf and sea-bed around Diego Garcia over which the United Kingdom has sovereignty or exercises sovereign rights, unless it is agreed that such activities would not harm or be inimical to the defence use of the island. (14) Health, quarantine and sanitation The Commanding Officer and the Commissioner shall collaborate in the enforcement on Diego Garcia of necessary health, quarantine and sanitation provisions. (15) News broadcast station The Government of the United States may establish and operate a closed circuit TV and a low power radio broadcast station to broadcast news, entertainment and educational programmes for personnel on Diego Garcia. (16) Property (a) Title to any removable property brought into Diego Garcia by or on behalf of the Government of the United States, or by a United States contractor, shall remain in the Government of the United States or the contractor, as the case may be. Such property of the Government of the United States, including official papers, shall be exempt from inspection, search and seizure. Such property of either the Government of the United States or of a United States contractor may be freely removed from Diego Garcia, but shall not be disposed of within the British Indian Ocean Territory or Seychelles unless an offer, consistent with the laws of the United States then in effect, has been made to sell the property to the Commissioner and he has not accepted such offer within a period of 120 days after it was made or such longer period as may be reasonable in the circum stances. Any such property not removed or disposed of within a reasonable time after termination of this Agreement shall become the property of the Commissioner. (b) The Government of the United States shall not be responsible for restoring land or other immovable property to its original condition, not for making any payment in lieu of restoration. (17) Availability of funds To the extent that the carrying out of any activity or the implementation of any part of this Agreement depends upon funds to be appropriated by the Congress of the United States, it shall be subject to the availability of such funds. (18) Representative of the Commissioner The Commissioner shall designate a person as his Representative on Diego Garcia. (19) Supplementary arrangements Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate administrative authorities of the two Governments may be made from time to time as required for the carrying out of the purposes of this Agreement. (20) Definitions and interpretation (a) For the purposes of this Agreement "BIOT Agreement" means the Exchange of Notes dated 30 December 1966, between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the availability of the British Indian Ocean Territory for defence purposes; "Commanding Officer" means the United States Navy Officer in command of the facility;


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"Commissioner" means the officer administering the Government of the British Indian Ocean Territory; "Diego Garcia" means the atoll of Diego Garcia, the lagoon and the three islets at the mouth of the lagoon. (b) Questions of interpretation arising from the application of this Agreement shall be the subject of consultation between the two Governments. (c) The provisions of this Agreement shall supplement the BIOT Agreement and shall be construed in accordance with that Agreement. In the event of any conflict between the provisions of the BIOT Agreement and this Agreement the provisions of the BIOT Agreement shall prevail. (21) The Diego Garcia Agreement 1972 This Agreement shall replace the Agreement constituted by the Exchange of Notes dated 24 October 1972 between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning a limited United States naval communication facility on Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory. (22) Duration and termination This Agreement shall continue in force for as long as the BIOT Agreement continues in force or until such time as no part of Diego Garcia is any longer required for the purposes of the facility, whichever occurs first. 2. If the Government of the United States of America also approves in principle the development of the facility subject to the above terms, I have the honour to propose that this Note and the plan annexed to it, together with your reply to that effect, shall constitute an Agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of your reply and shall be known as the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976. I have the honour to be with high consideration, Sir, Your obedient Servant ROY HATTERSLEY


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ANNEX


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II The Charg d'Affaires ad interim of the United States of America to the Minister of State for

Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON 25 February 1976

Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Note No. DPP 063/530/2 of 25 February 1976, which reads as follows:

[See note I] I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States of America approves in principle the development of the facility subject to the terms set out in your Note, and therefore agree that your Note, and the plan annexed to it, together with this reply, shall constitute an Agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into force on today's date and shall be known as the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

RONALD I. SPIERS Title: SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENTS22 1976

FOR DIEGO GARCIA FACILITY PREAMBLE

Pursuant to paragraph 19 of the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976 between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the United States Navy support facility on Diego Garcia, the Ministry of Defence (Navy) and the United States Navy (USN) have made the following supplementary arrangements:

Paragraph I Personnel. The USN will establish a manning level for the facility. Representatives of both administrative authorities will jointly decide which positions shall be filled by UK Service personnel. All personnel assigned to Diego Garcia will serve an unaccompanied tour of duty.

Paragraph 2 Military Command. The Officer-in-Charge of the UK Service element will, in matters relating to the operation of the facility, report to the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer and the Officer-in-Charge of the UK Service element will establish the manner in which orders and instructions will be complied with, which manner will be consistent with the concept of mutual respect for relative ranks. However, nothing in this paragraph is intented to require obedience to any command inconsistent with the obligation of their respective service laws nor to establish disciplinary power in either officer over members of the Armed Services of the other country.

Paragraph 3 Logistic Support. Subject to Paragraph 4 below, military personnel of both Governments will be entitled to use: upon the same terms and conditions, such recreational, accommodation and messing facilities as are available or as are established for military personnel by either Government. UK Service personnel serving with this facility will be

22

The two Parties agree that the Supplementary Arrangements and the related notes are not international agreements, nor part of the Agreement of 25 February 1976, and it is therefore their view that they do not qualify for registration under article 102 of the Charter. They are published for information at the request of the Government of the United States of America.


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entitled to send and receive mail through the United States Fleet postal system. The USN will, upon request, transport UK Service personnel to and from the facility from such places as may be agreed from time to time by the USN and the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom (MOD). For the purpose of such transport UK Service personnel may be accompanied by personal baggage which does not exceed a gross weight of 120 pounds per man. The USN will give sympathetic consideration to requests for transportation of official UK Service visitors. The USN will, upon request, provide such supplies and services on an equivalent basis with USN personnel as may be required by UK Service personnel serving with the facility on Diego Garcia. When these supplies and services are peculiar to the UK Services the MOD will make them available to the USN at a place or places agreed to by the MOD and the USN at the time.

Paragraph 4 Finance. The financial arrangements have been laid down in paragraph 12 of the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976, which reads as follows: "(a) The Government of the United States shall bear the cost of developing, operating and maintaining the facility. However, in relation to United Kingdom Service personnel attached to the facility, the Government of the United Kingdom shall be responsible for their pay, allowances and any other monetary gratuities, for the cost of their messing, and for supplies or services which are peculiar to or provided for the exclusive use of the United Kingdom Services or their personnel and which would not normally be provided by the Government of the United States for the use of its own personnel. (b) Except in relation to UK Service Personnel attached to the facility logistic support furnished at Diego Garcia by either Government, upon request, to the other Government, shall be on a reimbursable basis in accordance with the laws, regulations and instructions of the Government furnishing the support". Paragraph 5 Radio Frequencies and Telecommunications. The following procedures for obtaining the prior concurrence of the Government of the United Kigdom to the use of any radio frequencies, powers and band widths for radio services (including radar) on Diego Garcia which are necessary for the operation of the facility, and for international notification, will be followed: a. Prior to the assignment, or modification of an assignment, of any radio frequency on Diego Garcia, concurrence for the same will be obtained from the United Kingdom through the established military co-ordination channel. This channel is between the Joint Frequency Panel (J/FP), USMCEB and the Defence Signal Staff, Signals 2 (DSS 2) Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom. b. Upon obtaining such concurrence the United States will transmit to the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) notification of the assignment in accordance with existing US/UK frequency co-ordination procedures. Paragraph 6 Aids to Navigation and Approach Control. The United States may use and maintain existing electronic navigation and landing aids, such as airport surveillance radar, ground controlled approach (OCA), Tacan and instrument landing systems (ILS). If in the future it should be necessary to make significant changes to the present electronic navigation and landing aids or to expand them significantly, this may be done subject to agreement between the MOD and the USN.

Paragraph 7


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Scientific Research. If the Government of the United Kingdom wishes to grant access to Diego Garcia to members of scientific parties wanting to carry out research on Diego Garcia and its environs written notice will be given to the United States Department of State or the US Embassy in London at least four weeks prior to the intended visit. This notice will contain the following information: a. identification of visiting party, including nationality and names of all members of the party; b. scientific purpose; c. date of arrival and expected duration; d. areas to be utilised; e. activities to be conducted; f. equipment to be utilised; g. services requested from the facility. Such notice and the response thereto will constitute the consultation referred to in sub-paragraph 3a of the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976. Scientific parties will, where necessary, be responsible for reimbursing the Government of the United States for any goods and services supplied to them by the USN. Paragraph 8 Local Administration. The following matters have been authorised by the Commissioner BIOT: a. Drivers' Licences. United States or United Kingdom motor vehicle drivers' licences will be accepted as valid for the operation of all motor vehicles on Diego Garcia. b. Medical Services. US medical personnel may perform medical services in Diego Garcia of the same type which such persons are authorised to perform at United States military medical facilities without prior examination or revalidation of their professional certificate by the United Kingdom authorities, and such facilities will be made available to United Kingdom Service personnel. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "US medical personnel" means the physicians, surgeons, specialists, dentists, nurses and other United States personnel in Diego Garcia who perform medical services, and other doctors of United States nationality or ordinarily resident in the United States employed or contracted in exceptional cases by the United States Forces. c. Recreational Fishing. United States personnel and United Kingdom personnel are permitted reasonable recreational fishing on Diego Garcia and its environs without obtaining any licence or paying any fees. Such recreational fishing includes fishing from boats as well as from the shore. Paragraph 9 Alteration. These Supplementary Arrangements may be altered at any time by the mutual consent of the parties hereto.

Paragraph 10 Interpretation. Unless the context otherwise requires, terms and expressions used herein will have the meanings assigned to them in the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976. In the event of any conflict between the provisions of these Supplementary Arrangements and of the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976 the latter will prevail. For the Royal Navy: For the United States Navy: [Signed] [Signed] R. D. LYGO D. H. BAGLEY Vice Admiral Admiral Signed in duplicate at London, the twenty-fifth day of February 1976.


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RELATED NOTES I

No. 5 Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976, constituted by the Exchange of Notes of today's date between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America, supplementing the British Indian Ocean Territory Agreement (BIOT Agreement), effected by an Exchange of Notes between the two Governments dated December 30, 1966. In accordance with the recent discussions between representatives of our two Governments, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States of America, subject to the availability of funds, plans to undertake the following additional construction on Diego Garcia for the United States Navy support facility to be developed there: Item Approximate Capacity or Size

Expanded dredging for fleet anchorage ............................. 4,000 acres Fuel and general purpose pier ........................................... 550 feet of berthing Runway extension ............................................................... 4,000 linear feet Aircraft parking apron ........................................................ 90,000 square yards Hangar ............................................................................... 18,000 square feet Air operating building addition .......................................... 2,900 square feet Transit storage building........................................ ……………. 4,000

square feet Aircraft arresting gear ......................................................... — Storage petroleum, oil and lubricants ................................. 640,000 barrels Power plant expansion ...................................................... 2,400 kilowatts Vehicle repair hardstand .................................................... 1,200 square yards Subsistence building addition ............................................ 3,600 square feet Cold storage addition.......................................................... 4,200 square feet Armed forces radio and television station........................... 1,200 square feet General warehouse addition .............................................. 13,200 square feet Utilities................................................................................ — Ready issue ammunition magazine .................................... 2,000 square feet Protective open storage area for munitions ....................... 6,000 square yards Bachelor enlisted quarters ................................................. 277 men Bachelor officers' quarters ................................................. 32 men Receiver building addition ................................................. 1,300 square feet Recreational facilities ......................................................... (Scope to be determined) Shed storage ....................................................................... 7,100

square feet Flammable storage ............................................................. 2,700 square feet Navy exchange warehouse ................................................ 5,400 square feet Crash fire station ............................................. ……………….. 7,300

square feet Structural fire station ......................................................... 3,000 square feet Aircraft washrack ............................................. ……………….(Scope to be determined) Aircraft ready issue refueler .............................................. (Scope to be determined)

Public works shops ............................................................. 16,600 square feet The foregoing would be in addition to construction for the limited naval communications facility presently on Diego Garcia, regarding which information has previously been provided to United Kingdom authorities. In the event that further construction should be planned for the facility, it would, of course, be understood that such construction would be subject to the provisions of paragraph 2(b)


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of the BIOT Agreement as well as paragraph 1 (a) or 1 (h), as appropriate, of the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest regard.

RONALD I. SPIERS The Rt. Hon. Roy Hattersley, M.P. Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, S.W.I February 25, 1976.

II FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON 25 February 1976

Sir, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today's date concerning your Government's plans for construction in connection with the development of the present limited naval communications facility on Diego Garcia as a support facility of the United States Navy. I note the additional construction planned by your Government and your statement concerning further construction. I confirm that your statement is in accordance with the understanding of my Government. I have the honour to be with high consideration, Sir, Your obedient Servant

[Signed — Signé]23 The Honourable Ronald I. Spiers Embassy of the United States of America London (Sand, 2009, pp. 91-104) & (United Nations , 1976)

23

Signed by Roy Hattcrsley — Signé par Roy Hattersley.


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32 Exchange of notes June 22 1976 No. 8737. EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES OF THE BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY. LONDON, 30 DECEMBER 196624 EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT25 2 AMENDING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED AGREEMENT, AS SUPPLEMENTED, LONDON, 22 JUNE 1976 Authentic text: English. Registered by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 18 January 1977.

I The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

to the Ambassador of the United States of America FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON 22 June 1976

No. HKT 040/, Your Excellency I have the honour to refer to recent discussions between representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Agreement constituted by the Exchange of Notes dated 30 December 196626 concerning the availability of the British Indian Ocean Territory islands for defence purposes (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement") and to propose that the Agreement be amended by deleting the following words in the opening paragraph: " , arid the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches". If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Government of the United States of America, I have the honour to propose that this Note and Your Excellency's reply to that effect shall constitute an Agreement between the two Governments to amend the agreement of 30 December 1966 with effect from 28 June 1976. I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, Your Excellency's obedient Servant (for the Secretary of State) E. N. LARMOUR

II The Ambassador of the United States of America to the Secretary of State

for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON June 22 1976

Dear Secretary I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Note no. HKT 040/1 of June 22 which

[See note I]

24

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 603, p. 273, and annex A in volumes 866 and 1018. 25

Came into force on 28 June 1976, in accordance with the provisions of the said notes. 26

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 603, p. 273.


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In reply I have the honor to inform you that the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Government of the United States of America which therefore approves Your Excellency's suggestion that your Note and this reply shall constitute an Agreement between the two Governments to amend the Agreement of 30 December 1966 with effect from 28 June 1976. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ANNE ARMSTRONG (Sand, 2009, pp. 105-106) & (United Nations, 1977)

33 UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement July 7 1982

Exhibit 3 UK-Mauritius Îlois Claims Agreement, 1982

Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland And the Government of Mauritius.

Concerning the Îlois from the Chagos Archipelago,

signed at Port Louis on July 7, 1982, entered into force on October 26, 1982

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as the Government of the United Kingdom) and the Government of Mauritius,

-Desiring to settle certain problems which have arisen concerning the Îlois who went to Mauritius on their departure or removal from the Chagos Archipelago after November 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the Îlois”):

-Wishing to assist with the resettlement of the Îlois in Mauritius as viable members of the community:

-Noting that the Government of Mauritius has undertaken to the Îlois to vest absolutely in the Board of Trustees established under the Article 7 if this Agreement, and within one year from the date of the entry into force of this Agreement., land to the value of ₤1 million as at 31 March 1982, for the benefit of the Îlois and the Îlois community in Mauritius:

-Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. The Government of the United Kingdom shall ex gratia with no admission of liability pay to the Government of Mauritius for and on behalf of the Îlois community in Mauritius in accordance with Article 7 of this Agreement the sum of ₤4 million which, taken together with the payment of ₤650,000 already made to the Government of Mauritius should be in full and final settlement of all claims whatsoever of the kind referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement against the Government of the United Kingdom by or ion behalf of the Îlois.


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Article 2. The claims referred to in Article 1 of this Agreement are solely claims by or on behalf of the Îlois arising out of:

(a) All acts, matters and things done by or pursuant to the British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965, including the closure of the plantations in the Chagos Archipelago, the departure or removal of those living or working there, the termination of their contracts, their transfer to and resettlement in Mauritius and their preclusion for returning to the Chargos Archipelago (hereinafter referred to as “the events”); and

(b) Any incidents, facts or situations, whether past, present or future, occurring in the course of the events or arising out of the consequences of the events.

Article 3. The references in Article 1 of this Agreement to claims against the Government of the United Kingdom includes claims against the Crown in right of the United Kingdom and the Crown in right of any British possession, together with claims against the servants, agents and contractors of the Government of the United Kingdom.

Article 4. The Government of Mauritius shall use its best endeavours to procure from each member of the Îlois community a signed renunciation of the claims referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement, and shall hold such renunciations of claims at the disposal of the Government of the United Kingdom.

Article 5. (1) Should any claim against the Government of the United Kingdom (or other defendant referred to in Article 3 of this Agreement) be advanced or maintained by or on behalf of any of the Îlois, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement, the Government of the United Kingdom (or other defendant as aforesaid) shall be indemnified out of the Trust Fund established pursuant to Article 6 of this Agreement against all loss, damages or expenses which the Government of the United Kingdom (or other defendant as aforesaid) may reasonably incur or be called upon to pay as a result of any such claim. For this purpose the Board of Trustees shall retain the sum of ₤250,000 in the Trust Fund until 31 December 1985 or until any claim presented before that date is concluded, whichever is the later. If any claim of the kind referred to in this Article is advanced, whether before or after 31 December 1985, and the Trust Fund does not have adequate fund to meet the indemnity provided in this Article, the Government of Mauritius shall, if the claim is successful, indemnify the Government of the United Kingdom as aforesaid.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the paragraph (1) of this Article, the Government of the United Kingdom may authorise the board of Trustees to release all or part of the retained sum of ₤250,000 before the date specified if the Government of the United Kingdom is satisfied with the adequacy of the renunciation of claims procured pursuant to the Article 4 of this Agreement.

Article 6. The sum to be paid to the Government of Mauritius in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement shall immediately upon the payment be paid by the Government of Mauritius into a Trust Fund to be established by Act of Parliament as soon as possible by the Government of Mauritius.

Article 7. (1) The Trust Fund referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement shall have the object of ensuring that the payments of capital (namely ₤4 million), and any income arising from the investment thereof, shall be disbursed expeditiously and solely in promoting the social and


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economic welfare of the the Îlois community in Mauritius, and the Government of Mauritius shall ensure that such capital and income are devoted solely to that purpose.

(2) Full powers of administration and management of the Trust Fund shall be vested in a of Trustees, which shall be composed of representatives of the Government of Mauritius and of the Îlois in equal number and an independent chairman, the first members of the Board of Trustees to be named in the Act of Parliament. The Board of Trustees shall as soon as possible after the end of each year prepare and submit to the Government of Mauritius an annual report on the operation of the Fund, a copy of which shall immediately be passed by that Government to the Government of the United Kingdom.

Article 8. This Agreement shall enter into force on [the twenty-eighth day after] the date on which the two Governments have informed each other that the necessary internal procedures, including the enactment of the Act of Parliament and the establishment of the Board of Trustees pursuant to Articles 6 and 7 of this Agreement, have been completed.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Done in duplicate in Port Louis this 7th day of July 1982

For the Government For the Government of Mauritius

of the United Kingdom

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

J. Allan Jean Claude de l'Estrac.

(Sand, 2009, pp. 18-23)


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34 Supplement December 13 1982

Supplement Washington D.C. December 1982

Further Supplementary Agreements on Diego Garcia T.I.A.S. 10616 December 13, 1982

Preamble Pursuant to paragraph 19 of the February 25, 1976, Agreement effected by an exchange of notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the United States Navy Support Facility on Diego Garcia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland represented by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Government of the United States represented by the Department of State, desiring to make arrangements additional to those made in the Supplementary Arrangements signed on the 25 February 1976, have made the following supplementary arrangements which are to be read as one with the Supplementary Arrangements of 1976.

Paragraph 1: General In determinating the number of its personnel stationed at any one time on the island and using the islands resources, the United States will give due consideration to the limited resources of the island, in particular drinking water, ant the need to conserve the environment.

Paragraph 2: Contractor Personnel If the United States Government intends to introduce large numbers of third country nationals, it will consult Her Majesty's Government, indicating in general terms the numbers concerned, the nationalities and the expected duration of their stay on Diego Garcia.

Paragraph 3: Fresh Water From time to time, or if specially requested, the United States Commanding Officer will advise the British Government Representative of the adequacy of the fresh water supply on the island and of the arrangements for extracting drinking water. The British Government Representative will be informed of any significant fall in the level of the water table or any significant deterioration in the quality of the water, with a view to jointly agreed remedial action.

Paragraph 4: Dumping There will be no dumping of vehicles, machinery, equipment or other non -natural waste in the territory of Chagos Archipelago without the prior approval of the British Government Representative.

Paragraph 5: Dredging and Reef Blasting It will be the responsibility of the United States Commanding Officer to ensure that no dredging or reef blasting is conducted in any area where it could cause irremediable damage. Normally, a breadth of live reef of no less than 80 yards will be left intact and free of blasting operations all around the island. If, exceptionally, it is considered necessary to reduce the breadth of the live reef to less than 80 yards at any point, the British Government Representative will be consulted in sufficient time in advance of the proposed


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action to enable an assessment of the likely ecological consequences to be made by qualified authorities.

Paragraph 6: Hold – Harmless Provision Whenever, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Agreement effect by an exchange of notes of December 30, 1966, the United States Government, the United Kingdom Government will indemnify and hold – harmless the United States Government for any liability incident to the use of such facilities by the United Kingdom Government, its agencies, agents, officers, employees, contractors or other users authorized by the United Kingdom Government

December 13, 1982

[signed: Nigel Wenban – Smith] On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Sand, 2009, pp. 107-108)

[signed: Jonathan T. Howe] On behalf of the Government

America


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35 Letter of November 16 1987 No. 27519 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND And UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the British Indian Ocean Territory and operations and construction contracts on Diego Garcia. Washington, 16 November 1987 Authentic text: English. Registered by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 24 August 1990. EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING AN AGREEMENT27 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY AND OPERATIONS AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS ON DIEGO GARCIA The Secretary of State of the United States of America to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON November 16 1987

Excellency: I have the honor to refer to recent discussions between representatives of our two Governments regarding the exchange of notes between the Government of the United States of America and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the availability for defense purposes of the British Indian Ocean Territory signed in London on December 30, 196628 (hereinafter referred to as the agreement) and in particular paragraph (7) of that agreement. As a result of these discussions, and in the light of operational and security requirements, I have the honor to propose that the operations and construction contracts applicable to the United States military installations on Diego Garcia shall henceforth be awarded by United States military authorities to joint-ventures exclusively between United States and United Kingdom firms unless no qualified joint-venture firm submits a reasonable offer for such contracts, in which case they shall be opened to United States firms. In addition, the following conditions shall apply to such contracts involving any United States-United Kingdom joint-venture: (a) management control shall be vested in the United States partner or partners, (b) the percentage of participation between United States and United Kingdom firms shall be a matter for negotiations between members of the joint-venture consortium, but in no event shall United States participation be less than sixty percent, or United Kingdom participation below twenty percent, (c) a definition of a United States firm which may be more restrictive than that set forth in paragraph 10(e) of the agreement shall be provided in each contract or solicitation. 'Came into force on 16 November 1987, the date of the note in reply, in accordance with the provisions of the said notes.

27

Came into force on 16 November 1987, the date of the note in reply, in accordance with the provisions of the said notes. 28

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 603, p. 273.


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If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, I have the honor to propose that the present note together with Your Excellency's reply to that effect, shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of Your Excellency's reply. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State: HARRY ALLEN HOLMES

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to the Secretary of State of the United States of America

BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON 16 November 1987

Your Excellency I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note which reads as follows:

[See note I] I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland who therefore agree that Your Excellency's note and this reply, shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of this reply. I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

ANTONY ACLAND (Harwood Jr., d16b1: U.S./U.K. BIOT Agreements,1966-1987, 2003)


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36 Agreement June 18 1999 Agreement London, June/July 1999

Construction of a Monitoring Facility on Diego Garcia, BIOT

OT1083/001/99 18 June 1999 From Head of Overseas Territories Department Foreign Commonwealth Office, London To the Ambassador of the United States of America London I have honour to refer to the Agreement constituted by the Exchange of Notes dated 30 December 1966 between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the United States of America concerning the availability of the British Indian Ocean Territory for defence purposes and to the Agreement constituted by the Exchange of Notes dated 25 February 1976 between the two Governments concerning a United States Navy Support Facility on Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory. Pursuant to paragraph 2(b) of the former Agreement, I now convey the approval of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the construction on Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory, of a monitoring facility for inclusion in the International Monitoring System to be established pursuant to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty, adopted at New York on 10 September 1996, and for satisfying requirements of the United States of America, and propose an Agreement in the following terms: Scope of and responsibility for the monitoring facility

V. The Government of the United States of America shall undertake, at no expense to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to construct, maintain and operate a hydro – acoustic monitoring facility on Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory, to meet US requirements and for inclusion in the International Monitoring System to be established, pursuant to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty, by the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat. Notwithstanding that the monitoring facility shall be constructed, maintained and operated by the Government of the United States, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall be the State responsible for the monitoring facility pursuant to Section A of Part 1 of the Protocol of the Comprehensive Nuclear – Ban Treaty.

Purpose of the monitoring facility

4. The purpose of the monitoring facility shall be to provide data to the International Data Centre and, as appropriate, the Provisional or Prototype International Data Centre, established by the Preparatory Commission and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Organization in accordance with the terms of the Treaty; and directly to the United States of America may install and maintain a separate data channel for its own purposes.

Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty

3. The monitoring facility shall be surveyed, constructed, operated, and maintained in accordance with US requirements and applicable provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty, the technical specifications approved by the Preparatory


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Commission on 18 August 1998 and the associated Operational Manuals adopted by the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Organization. The two Governments shall take any measures necessary to work, as appropriate, with the Preparatory Commission or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Organization to ensure that the station will be certified to operate as an International Monitoring System [IMS] station. Given the obligation of the Organization in Article IV of the treaty and the provisional obligation of the Preparatory Commission in paragraph 5(c) of the Annex to the Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty to meet the costs of IMS facilities, the US and the UK shall cooperate in an effort to obtain funding from the Organization or the Preparatory Commission, as appropriate for some or all costs of establishing, operating, and maintaining this station. Installation, operation, maintenance, and funding of any future upgrades of the station following initial certification will be a matter for consultation and agreement between Governments.

4. The Governments shall cooperate with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Organization to provide a direct connection from the monitoring facility to the Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI) of the Treaty Organization to ensure compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty and its Preparatory Commission requirements. Continuous data from the monitoring facility will be transmitted using the GCI, uninterrupted to the International Data Centre and, as appropriate, the Provisional or Prototype International Data Centre.

Respect for British Indian Ocean Territories and regulations 5.The Government of the United States shall, with regard to the construction and operation of the monitoring facility, respect all applicable British Indian Ocean Territory laws and regulations, and shall as far as possible, minimise any adverse impact that the monitoring facility might have on the local environment. Construction of the monitoring facility

6. The plans for the construction of the monitoring facility and its precise location, shall be agreed between the two Governments, and they shall jointly review the construction plans with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission prior to commencement of construction. Prior to, and during, construction of the monitoring facility, the Government of the United States shall keep the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland informed of progress and of any significant difficulties encountered or envisaged.

Oversight

7. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall have the right to oversee planning, construction, maintenance and operation of the monitoring facility and, given its overall responsibility for the facility, will serve as the conduit of information on this facility to the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Organization.

Reduced Assessment 8. As set forth in Article IV, paragraph 22 of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test –

Ban Treaty, and the appropriate provisions of the Financial Regulations of the


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Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Organization, decisions of the Preparatory Commission (for example, CTBT/PC/III/CRP.2/Rev.2 and CTBT/PC/II/CRP.15/Rev. 1) and taking into account any subsequent decisions taken by the Preparatory Commission and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Organization, the two Governments shall have agreed on the division of any funding that each Government shall have contributed toward the establishment/upgrade of the station, and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall have informed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission or the Executive Council of the results of such agreements.

Notification

9. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall register this Agreement with the Secretary General of the United Nations and shall inform the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test – Ban Treaty Organization of its inclusion.

Availability of funds 10. To the extent that the carrying out of any activity or the implementation of any part of this Agreement depends upon funds to be appropriated by the Congress of the United States, it shall be subject to availability of such funds.

Duration 11. This Agreement shall continue in force for as long as the British Indian Ocean

Territory Agreement of 30 December 1966 continues in force, or until such time as the parties agree that no part of Diego Garcia is any longer required for the purpose of the facility as set forth in paragraph 2, whichever occurs first. After this Agreement has been in force for ten years, either party may terminate it upon one – year notice.

Options for future infrasound and radionuclide stations

12. The Governments of the United States of America or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland may subject to the availability of funds, and mutual agreement between the two Governments, later include additional monitoring facilities consisting of an infrasound station and a radionuclide station.

If the government of the United States of America is content with these proposals, I have the honour to propose that this Note together with your reply to that effect shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of your reply and shall be known as the British Indian Ocean Territory Agreement 1999. I have the honour to convey to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

[signed: CJ B White]

II

No. 045 21 July 1999 From the Ambassador of the United States of America London To H.E. C.J.B. White, Head of the Overseas Territories Department


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Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London Your Excellency: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter number OTI083/001/99 of 18 June 1999 which reads as follows:

[see Note I above] In reply I have the honor to inform you that the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Government of the United States of America which therefore approves your Excellency's suggestion that your note and this reply shall constitute an Agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of this note. Accept, Excellency, the renewal assurances of my highest consideration.

[signed: Philip Lader]

(Sand, 2009, pp. 111-115)


United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary of State

for Political-Military Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 21, 2000

Mr. Richard D. Wilkinson, CVO

Director for Americas

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London

United Kingdom

Dear Mr. Wilkinson:

I would like to take this opportunity to express the United States Government’s serious concern over

the inevitable compromise to the current and future strategic value of Diego Garcia that would result

from any move to settle a permanent resident population on any of the islands of the Chagos

archipelago. Please let me provide some detail on our concerns and on the strategic considerations on

which they rest.

In carrying out our defense and security responsibilities in the Arabian Gulf, the Middle East, South

Asia and East Africa, Diego Garcia represents for us an all but indispensable platform. For this reason,

in addition to extensive naval requirements, the USG is seeking the permission of your government to

develop the island as a forward operating location for expeditionary air force operations — one of only

four such locations worldwide. These locations, to which considerable funds have already been

committed, are intended to serve as primary staging points for defense activities in key regions for

quite some time to come. We anticipate that our commitment of resources to the island will grow in

the years ahead in order to develop the necessary infrastructure to sustain, should it become

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necessary, intensified military operations. Moreover, as resources for defense diminish in other areas,

the centrality of the islands for ensuring U.S. and British security interests will only increase. {p.2}

In addition to its other facilities, Diego Garcia currently is the home of Detachment 2, 22nd Space

Operations Squadron of the U.S. Air Force, which is the newest of eight worldwide satellite command

and control stations that constitute the Air Force Satellite Control Network. This Detachment is

essential for launch, operation, and in-orbit command, control, and mission data recovery of over 110

U.S. Department of Defense and other National and Civil Agency satellites that enhance that

capabilities of conventional forces of the U.S. and allied nations. This Detachment also provides

support to NASA’s Space Shuttle and Goddard Spaceflight Center, NATO and United Kingdom

satellites.

In looking to the future strategic importance of the Chagos archipelago, it is also worthwhile to

consider the central role the facility on Diego Garcia has in recent years played in the defense activities

and military operations of our two governments. For example, during Operation Earnest Will, which

involved protection of merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S Air

Force used Diego Garcia as a staging site for a large number of supply flights to the region by C-5 and

C-141 aircraft from the Military Airlift Command. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, over

600 combat missions were flown from the island, and facilities there housed over 2000 additional

personnel required to support those missions. During September and October of 1996, B-52, KC-135

and KC-10 aircraft operated from Diego Garcia in direct support of Operation Desert Strike. In

November 1997, B-52, KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft operated from Diego Garcia in support of Operation

Desert Thunder. In 1998, over 400 personnel reported to the Diego Garcia installation to support B-52

and KC-10 aircraft operations in support of Operation Desert Fox.

It has been suggested that military bases in Europe function close to civilian population centers, and

hence the facilities on Diego Garcia could do so as well. This assertion misses several points. Diego

Garcia’s desirability as a location for such varied past and future military operations hinges on the

combination of its strategic location and isolation, which is unique among operating locations around

the world. The settlement of a permanent civilian population on the islands of the Chagos {p.3}

archipelago, even those at some distance from Diego Garcia, would seriously diminish that isolation

and as a consequence erode the island’s nearly unparalleled strategic importance. If a resident

population were established on the Chagos archipelago, that could well imperil Diego Garcia’s present

advantage as a base from which it is possible to conduct sensitive military operations that are

important for the security of both our governments but that, for reasons of security, cannot be staged

from bases near population centers.

Settlements on the outer islands would also immediately raise the alarming prospect of the

introduction of surveillance, monitoring and electronic jamming devices that have the potential to

disrupt, compromise or place at risk vital military operations. In or near population centers in

Western Europe or the United States, efforts by other states or hostile organizations to introduce

and employ surveillance, monitoring and electronic jamming devices close to a military base carry a

considerable risk of discovery, if only because of the large number of people in the surrounding area.

By contrast, the return of small and scattered populations onto islands of the archipelago would

make introduction and use of such devices possible with much less risk of discovery because this

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would occur in an isolated and undeveloped area. In this connection, we note that the largest of the

outer islands, the Peros Banos and Salomon atolls, are located only about 140 miles north of Diego

Garcia — a location quite well-suited for monitoring military movements from Diego Garcia in

reaction to any Persian Gulf or other contingency.

We have other serious concerns as well. Introduction of settlements on the outer islands of the

archipelago would put facilities on Diego Garcia more easily within potential reach of hostile states or

terrorists operating by boat. As you know, the potential danger from such an attack on the 21

prepositioning ships located at Diego Garcia would be very serious. For the first time in the history of

our military cooperation on Diego Garcia, significant personnel and other assets would be required

solely for the purposes of protecting the forces, materials, and facilities located there. Initiation of

such requirements on the island would, beyond the considerable expense for both of our

governments, possibly {p.4} entail reconfiguration of base facilities and potential limitations on a

number of activities and operations.

In addition, in the event of hostilities during which Diego Garcia and other islands of the archipelago

were attacked, the U.S. would not be in a position to ensure the safety and welfare of any resident

civilian population on the outer islands. At the same time, however, your Government’s need to

provide for their protection or rescue in these circumstances could well require diversion of forces

from the island, complicating and possibly impeding fulfillment of other critical missions.

Finally, the suggestion that commercial or touristic projects on the outer islands could be

implemented and kept viable without ties to Diego Garcia, its airport, and its other infrastructure and

services appears to us very questionable. It strikes us as highly doubtful that the outer islands could

support a resident civilian population and be developed economically without access to an

international airport. Use of the military facility on Diego Garcia for this purpose, however, cannot be

contemplated.

Nor, in the unlikely event that an international airport were built on one of the outer islands to

support limited touristic activities, could the sensitive military facility at Diego Garcia serve as a back-

up airport. In this connection, you will recollect that applicable agreements between our two

governments restrict civilian aircraft from using military airfields in the Chagos archipelago, except in

exceptional circumstances and under such terms and conditions as may be defined by the two

governments. Moreover, the medical, resupply, and communications infrastructure on Diego Garcia

would also not be available for any touristic activities in the outer islands or indeed for any of the other

purposes of a civilian population there. Yet the absence of other practicable sources of back-up

supplies and services for the nearby civilian population is one of the most telling factors

distinguishing the situation of the military facility on Diego Garcia from U.S. bases in the United

Kingdom. {p.5}

In addition, it is important to consider the impact of military requirements on the viability and future

of any settlement. The needs of naval forces to operate through numerous and changing shipping

lanes could at any time conflict with plans to base a settlement’s economy on fishing or tourism.

Furthermore, currently unforeseeable circumstances could require the future use of the outer Chagos

islands for defense purposes. In considering the impact of such a situation on a settlement, it is useful

to recall that the 1966 Exchange of Notes stipulates that the islands of Diego Garcia and the remainder

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of the Chagos archipelago shall be available to meet the defense needs of both nations as they arise.

In sum, our view is that any settlement of a resident civilian population even on the outer islands of

the archipelago would significantly degrade the strategic importance of a vital military asset unique in

the region to both our governments. Such a step would necessitate a serious reevaluation of current

and future U.S. defense plans involving the island as well as U.S. strategic planning more generally. I

certainly hope this can be avoided.

In the spirit of the open and frank exchanges that characterize relations between our two

governments, I very much appreciate this opportunity to lay out my government’s views on this

important issue. I and my staff would be pleased to provide any additional information you would

find helpful and hope this matter can be resolved in a mutually satisfactory manner.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely,

{Signature}

(d23a: Eric Newson, Letter, June 21 2000)

Exchanges of letters 2001-2004

Infrastructure Upgrades, Bomber Forward Operation Location Diego Garcia, August/September 2001

(In a letter dated August 28, 2001 from the U.S. Ambassador to London (William S. Farish III) to the BIOT commissioner (Alan E. Huckle, head of overseas territories in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the U.S. Government proposed that the U.S. Naval Support Facility at Diego Garcia, British Ocean Territory, be designated as a “Bomber Forward Operating Location” (FOL), “such designation being consistent with the scope and purpose of the facility pursuant to paragraphs (1)and (2) of the Diego Garcia Agreement 1976.

In his response letter dated September 10, 2001, the BIOT commissioner confirmed that the arrangements so proposed (see the annex below) were acceptable to the UK Government.)

Annex

The Government of the United States of America, subject to the availability of funds, plan to undertake the following infrastructure upgrades:

Air Expeditionary Force (“AEF”) Infrastructure Upgrades

Pre-Engineered Buildings (PEBs)-USD $5m

-Construction of 100 units on existing concrete pads


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-Construction of three small masonry buildings to house the power distribution units that will provide electricity to the PEBs

-Construction of a small concrete pad for an emergency back-up power generator

-Paving of access roads within the tent area

Munitions Storage Magazine-USD $5.5m

-Conversion of four (4) open air bunkers to modular munitions storage magazines

-Current clear “safety” zone requirements would still apply

Land Mobile Radar Repeater-USD $400k

-Construction of a (7x7 foot) building adjacent to the water tower t o shelter support equipment

Upgrade of Existing Classified Storage Facilities-USD $400k

-At the present time, no further planned construction in anticipated in support of the AEF upgrade, the U.S. Government will consult with the UK Government in accordance with our agreements and understandings and past practice.

U.S. Naval Facility Infrastructure Upgrades

(not specifically related to FOL designations)

Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Facility- USD $8.15m

Physical Fitness Facility-USD (to be determined)

-Details of construction costs have not yet been provided. This project is proposed as a quality of life issue for personnel serving on Diego Garcia.

Additional Infrastructure Upgrades on Diego Garcia, July 2002

(In a letter dated 23 July, 2002, from the director, Office of International Security Operations in t he U.S. State Department´s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (Col. Charles Wilson), to the BIOT commissioner (Alan E. Huckle, head of overseas territories in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the U.S. Government-referring to the 1966 and 1976 agreements, and to the “annual U.S.-U.K. Diego Garcia talks held on May 14, 2002”- proposed additional infrastructure upgrades to the U.S. Naval Support Facility at Diego Garcia, British Indian Territory.

In his response letter dated July 29, 2002, the BIOT commissioner confirmed that the arrangements so proposed (see the annex below) were acceptable to the UK government.)

Annex: US Construction Proposals

-B2 Shelters (FOL Agreement)


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The number one issue for the US; the ability to station B2s at Diego Garcia would reduce the current 50-hour round trip from Missouri to something in the order of 15 hours.

-Improved data telephone communications system (FOL Agreement)

-Construction of an ammunition handling facility (FOL Agreement)

-Air Mobility Command Squadron Operations building (aking to an airport terminal)

-Enhancement of existing temporary living encampments (FOL Agreement)

-Transient berthing and medical facility (temporary accommodation for personnel transiting DG)

-Enhancements to the aircraft fueling system (FOL Agreement)

-Runway improvements

-Air defence radar system

-Air Traffic Control radar system.

Satellite Tracking Station on Diego Garcia November/December 2004

(In a letter dated November 29, 2004, from the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs in the U.S. State Department (Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr.) to the BIOT commissioner (Robert N. Culshaw MVO, director of the Americas and overseas territories in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the U.S. Government-referring to the “U.S.-UK Pol-Mil Talks 2004”-proposed to formalize the UK government´s (a) approval of the existing satellite tracking station and (b) approval of a U.S. request to expand the satellite tracking station “to provide enhanced capability and more flexibility in conducting maintenance.”

In his response letter dated December 7, 2004, the BIOT commissioner confirmed that the arrangements so proposed (see the annex below) were acceptable to the UK government.

Annex: U.S. Request for Expansion of

the Satellite Tracking Station at Diego Garcia

1. Foreign Operating Rights: a. Project name

Remote Tracking Station Block Change (RBC) Antenna radome, and associated core electronic/support equipment at Diego Garcia BIOT

b. Description of project


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The proposed project would install a RBC system at Diego Garcia BIOT. RBC consists of the following major components.

1. 13-meter dish antenna for satellite control, with an inflatable radome and support equipment, and ops core electronic equipment. The radome is t he outward appearance of this system, protects the antenna form the weather, and is virtually identical to what was installed at TCS Oakhanger [RAF station in Hampshire/UK] in 2000 to replace an obsolete antenna [photo omitted]

2. The project provisions for deployment of a transportable asset to serve in times of surge, contingency, and/or other operational needs. As such, the addition of a transportable pad and associated electrical and communication interfaces to/form the pad will be assessed and made as appropriate.

c. USAF requirements

USAF requires additional capability to control satellites from Diego Garcia. Although there is one Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) antenna already operating a Diego Garcia BIOT, USAF requirements for telemetry reception and commanding of satellites supporting military missions in areas of mutual strategic interest have reached the point where and additional antenna is required.

d) Method of operational

1. The antenna will operate using the same methods, and in the same frequency range and power levels as the current AFSCN antenna operating at Diego Garcia. The antenna will be active repeatedly, but not continuously throughout its 24 hour operating cycle. Antenna transmit/receive operations will be scheduled at varying power levels up to a maximum of 2000 Watts.

2. To ensure safety of operating personnel as well as t hose living in the surrounding area, the new system is being designed to strict safety guidelines, USAF will transmit commands an receive telemetry to/from satellites through control centers located at Schriever Air Force Base (AFB), Colorado, and Onizuka Air Force Station, California. Similar to today´s operation, a daily operations schedule will by provided by Schriever AFB to the AFSCN site located at Diego Garcia BIOT. For each scheduled satellite contact the following will occur:

(a) A Satellite Operations Center (SOC) in the US will be connected to Diego Garcia BIOT through communication links.

(b) Equipment will be configured and checked out

(c)Commands will be sent from the SOC via Diego Garcia

BIOT through the new antenna and up to a satellite


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(d)The satellite will send back telemetry data (such as health and status of onboard communications, thermal control or attitude control systems.) through the new Diego Garcia BIOT antenna, which will be routed back to the SOC for processing.

(e) At completion of the scheduled events, there will be an “idle period” until the next scheduled operation when the sequence described above will be repeated.

3. Equipment: A suite of approximately seven (7) racks of electronic equipment, located inside t he existing operations building, would perform equipment configuration, control, monitoring, signal conditioning and routing functions. The equipment would be introduced nt the site by commercial transportation and installed by USAF´s contractor who is developing the system. When the system is turned over for operations, the equipment will be USAF owned. Additional communications capacity will also be added.

4. AFSOC on-island contractor personnel would perform operations and normal “remove and replace” maintenance. USAF personnel, as required, would provide Level 2”depot level” maintenance.

5. The proposed location for the new antenna is between the Diego Garcia current “A” antenna and the GPS antenna near the current cement transportable pad, so as to use existing site real state, but nonetheless outside the current Diego security fence. This would require an area to reclaim lands outside the existing fence line for security clear zones.

e) Personnel involved

Current Diego Garcia BIOT staffing consists of an Air Force officer in command with a contractor support staff, which performs all operations, “remove and replace” maintenance, logistics, and support functions. Additional permanent USAF personnel are required at Diego Garcia BIOT for this new antenna, currently projected as six individuals to cover shift responsibilities. When the automated features of the system are fully evaluated and realized, some future reduction in the number of personnel if possible.

f) Special requirements

There are no special requirements for billeting, mess, or transportation for t his project. A request for Radio Frequency Authorization will be processed through the normal channels for approval.

g) Classification of project

Unclassified, releasable to UK.

h) Release of project data to host nation

Cognizant authority is SMC/AXP. Los Angeles Air Force Base, California. This office is a designated foreign disclosure authority. Project planning data required by UKMOD [United Kingdom Ministry of Defence] to act upon this request will be provided through SMC/RNA, Los Angeles Air force Base, California. Technical data will be handled through normal export control, review, and release


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procedures. Data required for UKMOD Diego Garcia BIOT personnel to operate and maintain the proposed RBC system will be provided through existing procedures.

i) Possible participation or observation by local officials

USAF encourages participation by UK representatives. Decisions on local officials participation or observation will be at the discretion of UKMOD. No aerial flight operations are expected as part of this project.

j) Potential benefit of project to the host nation

The introduction of the proposed RBC system further strengthens t he USAF-UKMOD relationship and provides an avenue of cooperation which has proven very beneficial to support special, emergency UKMOD request during past armed conflicts. An example of this is when UKMOD requested urgent access to weather data in ares not served by commercial systems. USAF responded immediately to meet UKMODD military operational needs.

k) Timeline to IOC

DGS critical design review: June 2005

DGS install period: May 2006-June 2007

DGS test period:July 2007-November 2007

DGS operational date: January 2008

(Sand, 2009, pp. 116-121)

37.1 Letter November 16 2004

Letter Date: November 16, 2004 From: Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr., Assistent Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs To: Robert N. Culshaw (MVO), Director of the Americas and Overseas Territories FCO, UK On 16 November 2004 Mr Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr the US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs wrote the following letter to Mr Robert N. Culshaw, the Director of the Americas and Overseas Territories, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office:

The discussions that you and our respective colleagues have had over the past several months have included consideration of issues related to joint facilities on Diego Garcia in Chagos Archipelago. The considerations explained in the letter of June 21, 2000, from Eric Newsom, my predecessor as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, to your predecessor have become even more cogent due to the significant events transpiring after that letter was written. The use of the facilities on Diego Garcia in major military operations since September 11, 2001, has reinforced the United States' interest in maintaining secure long-term access to them. The United States has an interest in preserving the security of the Archipelago and in protecting Diego Garcia's strategic value.


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Diego Garcia is a vital and indispensable platform for global U.S. military operations, as demonstrated by the important role it played for U.S. and coalition military forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well as by its continuing role in the Global War on Terrorism. The Chagos Archipelago's geographic location, isolation and uninhabited state make it unique among operating bases throughout the world. Our governments' facilities on Diego Garcia have exceptional security from armed attack, intelligence collection, surveillance and monitoring, and electronic jamming.

We believe that an attempt to resettle any of the islands of the Chagos Archipelago would severely compromise Diego Garcia's unparalleled security and have a deleterious impact on our military operations, and we appreciate the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to prevent such resettlement. A decline in Diego Garcia's military utility would have serious consequences for our shared defence interests. Your actions to prevent resettlement anywhere in the Chagos Archipelago have safeguarded our ability to conduct current and future military operations from the islands in support of our national security objectives.

I appreciate Her Majesty's Government's sensitivity to our common defence and security imperatives and look forward to continuing our excellent cooperation on this matter.

(2006, p. ¶96)


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