METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY PRAGUE

International Relations and European Studies

MASTER’S DISSERTATION

Military Coups in Turkey: Is Turkey Prone to Coups?

VOJENSKÉ PUČE V TURECKU: JE TURECKO NÁCHYLNÉ K PŘEVRATŮM?

Author: Daniel Čupak

Dissertation supervisor: Ing. Vít Beneš Ph.D.

2013

1

AFFIRMATION

I hereby declare that the following dissertation is my own work; I used exclusively the

sources and literature indicated in the text. All used sources are included in the bibliography. I

give my consent to Metropolitan University Prague to make this dissertation available in the

Jiří Hájek Specialized Library so that it can be used for study purposes pursuant to the

Copyright Act.

In Prague, April 29, 2013

__________________________

2

INDEX Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 4

Literature Review ................................................................................................................................ 7

Conceptualization ................................................................................................................................ 9

Coup ................................................................................................................................................ 9

Hypotheses and Theories ............................................................................................................... 12

Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 16

Coup of 1960 ......................................................................................................................................... 19

Anti-system parties ............................................................................................................................ 19

Past coup ........................................................................................................................................... 21

Grivances ........................................................................................................................................... 22

Inflation at the end of 1950’s............................................................................................................. 25

Success of 1960 ................................................................................................................................. 26

The abortive coups of 1962 1963 .......................................................................................................... 27

Anti-system parties ............................................................................................................................ 27

Grievances ......................................................................................................................................... 28

Inflation at the Beginning of the 1960’s ............................................................................................ 30

Past coups experience ........................................................................................................................ 30

Success .............................................................................................................................................. 31

Coup of 1971 ......................................................................................................................................... 31

Anti-system parties ............................................................................................................................ 31

Grievances ......................................................................................................................................... 33

Past coups experience ........................................................................................................................ 35

Success of 1971 ................................................................................................................................. 35

Inflation ............................................................................................................................................. 35

The Coup of 1980 .................................................................................................................................. 37

Anti-system parties ............................................................................................................................ 37

Grievances of 1980 ............................................................................................................................ 39

Inflation ............................................................................................................................................. 42

Past coups .......................................................................................................................................... 43

Success .............................................................................................................................................. 43

Coup of 1997 ......................................................................................................................................... 43

Anti-system parties ............................................................................................................................ 43

Grievances ......................................................................................................................................... 48

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Past coup ........................................................................................................................................... 50

Success of 1997 ................................................................................................................................. 50

Inflation of 1997 ................................................................................................................................ 50

Coup of 2007 ..................................................................................................................................... 52

Anti-system parties ............................................................................................................................ 52

Research ................................................................................................................................................ 59

4

Introduction

“Ordumuz, Türk birliğinin, Türk kudret ve kabiliyetinin, Türk vatanseverliğinin çelikleşmiş

bir ifadesidir. [Our army expresses Turkish unity, Turkish power and capability, and

patriotism.]”

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

“Her Türk asker doğar [Every Turk is born a soldier]”.

Turkish saying

The former Genelkurmay Başkanı (Chief of the General Staff) İsmail Hakkı Karadayı once by

saying that “the Turkish Armed Forces are the most effective guarantor of the Republic in

Turkey, which is a secular, social, and lawful state”1 encapsulated the role that the Turkish

armed forces has for a long time asserted and maintained.

The Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) have had a very special position in

the Turkish politics and that this position is given by a long historical development going back

to the Ottoman Empire. Army leaders, along with the Sultan had formed the Ottoman

government for decades, and thus had strong and autonomous status in the internal politics of

the country. Furthermore, the modernizing revolutionary groups such as the Young Turks had

military background and/or were graduates from the Turkish Military Academy (Mekteb-i

Fünun-u Harbiye-i Sahane) where they realized the need for reforms in order to reverse the

further decline of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, with a decisive share in the War of

Independence the Ottoman military elite became the the elite of the emerging Republican

Army. Not only became these old elite the new elite but they brought with themselves all their

experience, traditions from internal and external political struggle. Army also owes much for

a great deal of its power to Mustafa Kemal, who entrusted the military his pro-Western

reforms, which he wanted to build a new nation state on. As a result, the former soldiers such

as Kâzım Özalp (Minister of National Defence 1922-1924, 1935-1939),

1 Burak Begüm, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: To Guard Whom and From What?” European

Journal of Economic and Political Studies 4 (2011): 143, http://ejeps.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/120.pdf

5

and İsmet İnönü (Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Prime Minister and President) reached

the highest positions within the state.2

This special position gave the Army a feeling that they need to steer the politics in order to

keep the Atatürk’s republic on tracks. Thus, since the declaration of the first republic in 1923

by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Turkish military have many times intervened in Turkish

politics. So far, there were five military interventions3 in Turkey in last 80 years

4.

The first coup in the modern Turkish history was that of May 27, 1960. The Turkish army

took over the government to restore order in the country namely to end the rule of the

the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) that had been taking harsh measures against its

main opposition Republicans Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP)

since 1953. Democratic Party was also criticised for its pro-religious politics and for

“betraying the Kemalist traditions“. Furthermore, the economy was going through difficult

times as the economic boom was over, the Turkish economy hit the rock bottom, the Turkish

government started borrowing money, and the inflation rose steadily. 5

The second and third coup took place in 1971 in 1980, respectively. In the late 1960’s

violence broke out again. This time the violence was a result of the politicization of Turkish

society that reflected political structure of Turkey. The army after the experience

with the authoritative Democratic Party in the 1950’s sought to introduce the broadest

possible spectrum of opinions represented in politics. However, the result was

highly fragmented and polarized party system that transferred political conflicts into public

life, where political hatred, along with the traditional vendetta span a spiral of violence. The

Turkish army – wanting to prevent the further violence – intervened again in 1971 and 1980.6

Army intervened also in 1997 and 2007. In 1997 they made democratically elected, though

pro-Islamist Prime Minister Erbakan, resign through a campaign led by the military using the

media, NGOs and academics as a propaganda tool, rather than directly intervening in the

2 Gerasimos Karabelias, “The Evolutiuon of Civil-Military Relations in Post-war Turkey 1980-95” in Seventy-

Five Years of the Turkish Republic, ed. Sylvia Kedourie (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 130.

3 And two coup attempts by Talat Aydemir in 1962 and 1963

4 Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, “Chronology of Turkish military coups: From the 1961 young officers coup to the 2007

e-memo.” Today's Zaman, May 1, 2013, accessed February 28, 2013,

http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=109959

5 Kalaycioğlu Ersin, Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),

82.

6 Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: IB Tauris, 2004), s. 263.

6

political process. That is the reason how it its name – post modern coup. In 2007 the fifth

military intervention took place. The army issued a memorandum, or an ultimatum, on April

27, 2007 on its internet sites (namely the Office of the Chief of General Staff). This

memorandum was dubbed by many in Turkey as an “e-mail post-modern coup” or an “e-

memo”.7

All this shows us that role of the Turkish military in the Turkish politics is considerable and

that the Turkish army perceive itself as an arbiter of the Turkish politics and a guardian of the

Kemalist legacy. However, this political style has crippled not the Turkish democracy.

Therefore, the importance of this study could be high for it may not only help to understand

and uncover the causes of the coups and hopefully prevent them, and also provide others with

results for further studies.

The thesis is divided into three main parts that are further divided. The introduction includes

the theoretical concepts such as definition of a coup, theories, hypotheses, and description of

methodology used in the thesis. The second part includes the description of each conditions

and outcomes. Furthermore, there is application of Boolean algebra on the cases. The last

main part is the conclusion.

7 Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, Chronology of Turkish military coups.

7

Literature Review

Coup d’état, as Powell & Thyne say was once a hot topic in academia and numerous

works were written.8 Nevertheless, scholarship on coups has recently attracted less attention.

9

Moreover, coup studies in the past most often focused on specific regions such as Latin

America10

and Africa11

in particular (as they are the regions with a long tradition of coups),

while recent studies have taken a more general approach.12

The Likelihood of Coups from

O’Kane and Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power from Londregan and

Poole were according to Powell & Thyne among the first to use global coup data, and

subsequent cross-national research offers more general theory and comprehensive empirical

tests that tried to understand the causes and effects of coups.13

Literature dealing with Turkey, especially the English written, is vast. On the other

hand, the vast majority of articles and books mostly deal with the relations of the Republic of

Turkey and the European Union. Many political scientists also occupy their minds with the

civil-military relations14

, the future direction of Turkey in international relations, her

relationship with traditional allies and the question of Cyprus etc. Scholars have concentrated

on the internal politics of Turkey and its transformation in recent years as well.

However, there several works about Turkish coups, though not solely about them but

mostly as part of broader issues. One of them is Jenkins, who for instance, suggests that coup

of 1960 was caused by the prime minister’s persuance of populist a populist agenda, in which

policies were shaped by short-term political advantage. The result was a rise in political

8 See e.g. Edward Luttwak, Coup D’état: A Practical Handbook, Henry Bienen The Military Intervenes: Case

Studies in Political Development (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968)

9 Ozan O. Varol, “The Democratic Coup D’état.” Harvard International Law Journal 53 (2012): 292-356.

10 See e.g. Egil Fossum, “Factors influencing the occurrence of military coups d’etat in Latin America.” Journal

of Peace Research 4 (1967): 228–251.

11 See e.g. Patrick J. Mcgowan, “African Military Coups D’Etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends

and Distribution.” Journal of Modern African Studies 41 (2003): 339-370, Dorothy Nelkin, “The Economic and

Social Setting of Military Takeovers in Africa.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 2 (1963): 230-44.

12 Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne: “Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset,”

Journal of Peace Research 48 (2011), 249.

13 Ibid.

14 See e.g. Zeki Sarigil, “Civil-Military Relations Beyond Dichotomy: With Special Reference to Turkey,”

Turkish Studies 12 (2011): 265-278, Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “Transformation of Turkey’s Civil-Military

Relations Culture and International Environment,” Turkish Studies 12 (2011): 253-264.

8

instability, which was exacerbated by Menderes’s increasing authoritarianism.15

Daněk and

Kříž add to these also polarization of Turkish society due to nonexistent political experience.

Moreover, it was also Menderes’s diversion from secularism and worsening economic

situation that made the armed forces to intervene.16

Daldal offers a rather different, and to some point a fatalist, perception of the coup of

1960. He claims that the coup does not constitute a simple historical fact that might have been

avoided. The coup was actually a genuine act of modernization in line with the international

socioeconomic context; Turkey catching up with the West through the leadership of a

progressive urban coalition, i.e. the “new middle class” consisting of army, the intellectuals

later brought together in Yön journal and the manufacturing bourgeoisie. Dladal claims they

strived to pursue the Jacobin–Kemalist tradition against the regressive conservative forces and

to try to catch up with the West.17

Regarding the military intervention of 1971, Brown suggests that it was the large-scale

domestic turmoil that once again forced military to step in rather than the existence of

extremist parties, nor the country’s ideological and political polarization that had been

symptomatic not only for the 1970’s.18

The coup of 1980 was according to several scholars staged for similar reasons as the

coup of 1970 – instability and unrest in the Turkish society. Kalaycıoğlu claims that military

government was primarily concerned with establishing law and order by trying to put an end

to sectarian, ideological, and ethnic violence ravaging the country for Turkey witnessed not

only the party polarization but also terrorism influenced by Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups

and fascist nationalist groups such as the Grey Wolves fighting the leftist ones.19

15

Jenkins Gareth, “Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military relations in Turkey.” International

Affairs 83 (2007): 341.

16 Pavel Daněk and Zdeněk Kříž, “Politický vliv turecké armády.” Politologická revue 2 (2011): 37.

17 Aslı Daldal, “The New Middle Class as a Progressive Urban Coalition: The 1960 Coup D’Etat in

Turkey,” Turkish Studies 5 (2004): 75–76.

18 James Brown, “The Military and Politics In Turkey,” Armed Forces & Society 13 (1987): 240.

19 Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands, 117.

9

Conceptualization

Coup

First, we face a difficult question “What is a coup?” It is a difficult question because

there are as many definitions of a coup as there are as many articles and books about coups.

First, we need to formulate our working definition by examining what their targets and who

the perpetrators are, and what tactics they use.20

As for the targets, Janowitz suggests that the goal of the perpetrators is the existing

regime.21

This target, however, is very rare for perpetrators do not usually want to alter or

replace the existing regime but only oust the people in charge they are not satisfied with.

Further change of a given regime may be an unwanted by-product of a coup but not the primal

goal. In other words, they merely want to give politics their directions, not to change the

system fundamentally. The reason for this mere steering is that the army is a veto player22

i.e.

the army only wants to usually keep the status quo and not to lose its position in the system.

Therefore, the steering, in order to differentiate it from mere political influence, must target

the chief executive which is in our case the Turkish prime minister. Thus, for instance, Finer’s

definition of a coup where the perpetrators substitute their own policies and/or their persons,

for those of the recognized civilian authorities23

is considered imprecise for such a definition

does not draw a clear line between a political influence and a coup. This paper thus remains

consistent with most other works done by for example Thomspon24

, and Powell & Thyne25

that only attempts to overthrow the chief executive qualify as coups.

As for perpetrators our task is much easier and less contested. Various scholars

suggest various perpetrators ranging from Janowitz's organized factions26

, Ferguson’s

20

Powell and Thyne: “Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset,” 250.

21 Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Countries. (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1977), 49.

22 Veto players are political actors whose approval is necessary to change the current political settings i.e. the

status quo. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton University Press,

Princeton 2002), 2.

23 Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. (Boulder: Westview, 1988), 23.

24 William R. Thompson, “Corporate Coup-Maker Grievances And Types Of Regime Targets,” Comparative

Political Studies 12 (1980): 495 accessed April 25, 2013, doi:10.1177/001041408001200407

25 Powell and Thyne, “Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset,” 250.

26 Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Countries, 49.

10

soldiers, politicians, and mercenaries to Taylor & Jodice’s27

groups, cliques, cabals, parties

and factions either outside or inside a government, and its agencies...rebellious minorities...the

military, or conspirators backed by foreign powers.28

The broader the perpetrators range the

more blurred the line between coup and other anti government actions. As we are interested in

military coups only we will be looking at coup attempts or overthrows executed by the

Turkish armed forces only.

According to, for example, McGowan, and Powell & Thyne, the tactics leading to the

chief executive overthrow must be illegal. They claim that when it is a legal act it just another

form of a political pressure. However, the Turkish case a bit more complicated and the line

between legal and illegal is blurry and some claim that the military intervention of 1997 was

not a coup for the configuration of the National Security Council (Millî Güvenlik Kurulu –

MGK) regulated by Law No. 2945 from November 1, 1983 and the new Constitution of 1982,

in fact institutionalized the presence of the Turkish military in everyday politics. The NSC

was entitled with “protecting the public order and safety”, the “national security”, and the

military itself was able to “...also define security threats and to introduce measures to mitigate

those threats internally and externally.” The NSC than “manifested”29

its decisions to the

Cabinet and the Cabinet was to prioritize such decisions.30

In line with this procedure, the Cabinet was to take defensive action based on the

recommendations of the National Security Council, to protect national security and to realize

national goals, and these policies were enforced through the National Security Policy

Documents (NSPD), which were updated regularly, classified as Top Secret, and lacked legal

basis. As they were classified documents it was not precisely known how they were prepared.

TESEV suggests that probably The Chief of Staff authored the first draft and then the draft

was finalized at the Secretariat General of the National Security Council (SGNSC). The final

27

Powell & Clayton note that even though Taylor & Jodice did not intend to create a classical coup definition

their definition has been several times used as such. Powell and Clayton, “Global instances of coups from 1950

to 2010,” 251.

28 Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III, 1948–

1982. doi:10.3886/ICPSR07761.v2

29 During the period between 1961 and 1982 the NSC could only “advise” the Cabinet.

30 Hale Akay, “Security Sector in Turkey: Questions, problems, and solutions” (TESEV Democratization

program policy report series): 10, accessed April 29, 2013,

http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/guven_rapor_dunya_duzelti.pdf

11

paper was then handed to the Prime Minister, who was almost obliged to sign. 31

In sum, the

NSC on a basis of ambiguous concepts of e.g. “protecting the public order and safety” made

the Cabinet adopt a policy that lacked legal basis. Hence, it was neither illegal nor legal and in

this manner the argument of the legality of the coup of 1997 does not seem correct.

Second, there is no need for violence. As Powell & Thyne say many coup attempts

have sparked civil wars, however, most coups are bloodless events.32

In Turkey the situation

is very similar to what Powell & Thyne claim and thus the author of this paper stated no

threshold or a body count for a coup. The truth is that the events such as arrests, trials, and

executions following the Turkish coups were several times present the actual overthrow was

in most cases bloodless and smooth.

Powell & Thyne than argue that coup attempts must be ‘overt’ in a sense that there has

been a visible movement to claim power and ‘actual’ in a sense that the events are not alleged

ex post facto in some kind of trial proceeding in order to exclude plots and rumours. Plots and

rumours must be left out for at least two reasons. First, they are difficult to spot and second,

they can be manufactured in order not only to take preemptive measures to prevent a coup but

also to justify sever measures taken to suppress the population. The ongoing Ergenekon case

investigation and Bayloz (Sledgehammer) coup plan exposure could hypothetically add more

cases to our research. However, even if the judge proved the plotters guilty we would not

know whether it is the entire truth or not therefore the author rule these alleged attempts out.

To summarize our concept, a successful coup is “a removal of the recognized chief

executive which was preceded or is accompanied by the threat to use, display or actual use of

force.”

31

Hale Akay, “Security Sector in Turkey: Questions, problems, and solutions” (TESEV Democratization

program policy report series): 10, accessed April 29, 2013,

http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/guven_rapor_dunya_duzelti.pdf

32 Powell and Clayton, “Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010,” 251.

12

Hypotheses and Theories

This thesis tries to answer the question What leads to a succesfl coup? Literature on

causes of coups is vast. Each author offers its own coup causes and/or its combinations

ranging from Hibbs’s, Luttwak’s, and Finer’s domestic political crisis, Feit’s and Bienen’s

military size, Fossum’s economic crisis or decline to Thompson’s, Farcau’s , and Decalo’s

officers’ personal grievances.

We are going to look at the last sixty three years of the Turkish republic namely from 1950

which marked the first free and fair elections since the establishment of the republic in 1923

and also ended the twenty seven years of a single-party regime led by the Republican People's

Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP).

Same as Belkin & Schofer in Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk we are going

to divide causes into two categories – triggering and structural ones. Belkin & Schofer states

that the structural causes – deep and longer-term structural causes i.e. governmental

organisation, societal arrangement, political culture, and state-society relations make coups

possible – are of the greatest importance for us for they prepare ground for a coup risk but not

necessarily lead to a coup. Triggers such as short-term crises accelerate coups but triggers

alone do not lead to coups.33

However, we are trying to find causes of the Turkish military

coups thus we are going to try find a possible combinations of conditions that lead to coups

i.e. combinations of both structural causes and triggers at the same time.

Therefore, the first condition is military grievances. However, as every coup or coup

attempt showed some kind of disfavour of an incumbent regime expressed by either

memorandum or by addressing the nation government on its web sites common sense tells us

there is always some level of military disappointment present within the military command.

Therefore it is necessary to further specify this concept. According to Colton, officers

intervene against civilian authorities when their perceived interests are being denied or

threatened by civilian policy.34

In other words, grievances document the desire of the Armed

Forces as an organisation to keep and/or expand its privileged position in the Turkish political

system and society. Thompson calls it corporate military grievances and further divides them

33

Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk.’’ Journal of Conflict

Resolution 47 (2003), 600.

34 Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military

Politics (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1979), 240.

13

into three levels of concern. The first level involves corporate grievances concerned with

protecting and enhancing the positions and resources of the military organization. The second

or “not-so-corporate” cluster involves the same concerns, however, only of competing elites,

factions, and ethno-regional groups within the military. The third the “societal residual”

concentrates on efforts primarily designed to preserve or alter the prevailing societal

distribution of positions and resources.35

This perceived threat in form of corporate military grievances is further divided into

two categories. The first is Corporate Positional Grievances and includes perceived threats to

its autonomy, monopoly, honour, and political position. The second is Corporate Resource

Grievances with concerns of pay, promotions, appointments, assignments, and or retirements;

budget allocations, training facilities/arrangements, and/or inter-service favouritism; and

general military policy and/or the level and nature of support for military operations.36

Thus, we can assume that corporate grievances are behind a successful coup as they

include the whole military organization and in this sense it is in every soldier’s interest to take

action.

Hence, we can assume that:

H1: When the Armed forces perceive threats to their corporate interests i.e. interests

shared by every soldier such as autonomy, monopoly, honour, and political position it

is likely they will stage a successful coup.

Other condition that is included in many researches is economic crisis or decline. Not

only Fossum includes this trigger among his causes but also for instance Gürsel claims that

each military coup that took place in Turkey after the 1950’s profited from similar economic

conditions such as high inflation and lack of hard currency to pay for the imported goods.37

It is widely believed that economic crisis, usually marked by high inflation has direct

psychological effect on population for their purchasing power decreases as they have literally

less money in their pockets. This dissatisfaction tends to create tensions as the population

35

William R. Thompson, “Corporate Coup-Maker Grievances And Types Of Regime Targets,” Comparative

Political Studies 12 (1980): 488, accessed April 25, 2013, doi:10.1177/001041408001200407

36 Ibid., 490.

37 Seyfettin Gürsel, “Economic background of military coups.” Today’s Zaman, April 22, 2012, accessed April

25, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com.

14

usually accuse the incumbent government of incapability to tackle the worsening economic

situation. What is worsening economic situation? In other words, how to conceptualize

worsening economic situation? Several studies have been conducted with various outcomes. It

is widely known that hyperinflation, for instance, has a direct destructive effect on people as it

makes their savings disappear and randomly redistribute resources. However, as Turkey has

never experienced a hyperinflation we need to look further. Khan and Senhadji, for example,

conducted a study that included 140 countries from period 1960-1998 and concluded that

inflation higher than 7-11% has a negative effect on the economic growth of developing

countries.38

Nevertheless, this study only tells us when the economy stops to grow; therefore, the

following study of Michael Bruno and William Easterly is of higher importance to us. Bruno

and Eastrely found out in their empirical study of 26 countries during the period between

1961 and 1992 that the inflation crisis starts when a critical threshold of 40% is crossed at

least in two consecutive years.39

Another threshold, set by a Nobel Prize-winning economist,

Paul Samuelson, claimed that the economy highly suffers when prices rise by double or triple

digit numbers per annum for some time. The situation, termed as Galloping Inflation, is

marked by prices rising higher than 20% but less than 1000% per annum.40

This 20%

threshold seems somewhat more right than the aforementioned 40% as the Turkish inflation

median was 20.40% during the period between 1950 and 2007. Thus, it can be said that the

Turkish economy has been “used to” a higher inflation rates and consequently numbers above

20% seems to be the threshold that when crossed it starts to suffer. Hence my second

hypothesis is as follows:

H2: A high inflation marked by numbers over 20% over a period of at least two years

leads to vulnerable society and makes the incumbent government look incompetent.

This enables the Armed Forces to “step in” and “clean out the mess” and restore the

order by staging a successful coup a successful coup.

38

Khan, M. and A. Senhadji, “Threshold effects in the relationship between inflation and growth.” ( paper

prepared for the IMF Staff Papers, 2001): 1-21. http://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/imfstp/v48y2001i1p1.html.

39 Michael Bruno and William Easterly, “Inflation crises and Inflation crises and long-run growth” Journal of

Monetary Economics 41 (1998): 3-26.

40 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill 1998), 581.

15

The next often mentioned cause, and the most mentioned cause when it comes to

Turkey, is a domestic socio-political crisis that makes a regime vulnerable and paves the way

for a coup. This crisis is an expression of a lack of consent with the regime. This lack of

consent is caused by the inability of a given government address the needs of its population or

parts of its population. Such crises are thus crises of political legitimacy of a given regime and

are usually accompanied by frequent change of governments, rapid birth and disappearance of

political parties that is connected to high volatility, and/or presence of a large anti-system

party or parties in the party system. People take part in mass rallies, strikes, they vote with

their feet i.e. they flee the country, etc. Therefore, political instability is can be caused by a

presence of a subversive party or parties.

However, the mere presence is insufficient as the only presence can signalize

disappointment of a part of society. On the other hand, presence of at least one relevant anti-

system party can have far-reaching consequences as Sartori declared these parties operate

within the system whose values they do not share. They can block the coalition formation and

thus cause a stalemate; they can block the legislation process, or even change fundamental

laws when in power etc. Hence, army is able to act as a deus ex machina that can saves the

free political competition from the outside.

The time limit for duration in a system should not apply since the relevant anti-system

party can block the initial coalition formation right after the elections.

Based on this, I posit the following relationship:

H3: A presence of at least one relevant anti-system party makes a party system

vulnerable and thus enables the Armed Forces to “step in” and “clean out the mess” by

staging a successful coup.

The next widely accepted, and in this case a structural cause of coups, is a past history

of coups. As Zimmermann puts it “The likelihood of coups is severely increased if coups have

occurred in the past.”41

In other words, the more coups there are in a given country the more

probable it is that there will occur one in future for the more often army resorts to this chief

executive removal the more normal it seems to wider public and this extraconstitutional

method is accepted almost as a norm whilst the distance between coups is irrelevant.

41

Ekkart Zimmermann, Political violence, crises and revolutions: Theories and research (Boston: G. K. Hall &

Co, 1983), 276.

16

However, empirical findings of Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller suggest only 10

years.42

Nevertheless, the idea behind this condition is that past coup experience is accepted

by people who experienced this extraconstitutional method. In this logic, only when the old

generation is replaced by the new one there is a hope for a resistance to the tradition of coup

politics. Otherwise, it is assumed that the old one would accept it again. The assumption

should also include the Armed Forces for it is easier to stage a coup when one has a previous

experience with one. From this, I posit:

H4: There is high probability of a successful coup in a regime that experienced another

successful coup whilst the gap between them is not more than 20 years.

Methodology

Still rather young and not a frequently applied method – The Quantitative

Comparative Analysis – will be used in this research. Though Charles C. Ragin laid the

foundations of a QCA in 1987 in The Comparative Method it started to be widely used only in

the late 1990’s and for journal articles even several years later (2003 and 2004) and yet event

there has been a sharp increase in recent years the number of articles do not exceed 320

mainly English written articles.43

As the founding father of this method puts it in simple words, QCA attempts to bridge

the qualitative and quantitative analysis. Ragin aimed at developing a “synthetic strategy” that

would “integrate the best features of the qualitative (case-oriented) approach with the best

features of the quantitative (variable-oriented) approach.”44

As it is in the middle ground

between quantitative and qualitative methods opinions about number of case selection differs

– from very few to even thousands of cases.45

Although the current trend is to use QCA

mainly in medium-N designs Ragin’s QCA can be usefully applied to research designs

involving small and intermediate-size Ns (e.g., 5-50). It was until recently when researches

used QCA for all three ranges – small-N (less than 10), medium-N (between 10 and 50 cases)

42

Bueno de Mesquita, B., R. M. Siverson and G. Woller, “War and the fate of Regimes; a Comparative

Analysis, American Political Science Review 86 (1992), 638-46.

43 Benoît Rihoux, Priscilla Álamos-Concha, Damien Bol, Axel Marx and Ilona Rezsöhazy, “From Niche to

Mainstream Method? A Comprehensive Mapping of QCA Applications in Journal Articles from 1984 to 2011.”

Political Research Quarterly 66 (2013), 175.

44 Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method (Berkley: University of California Press, 1989) 84.

45 Rihoux et. al.,: From Niche to Mainstream Method? 178.

17

and large-N (more than 50 cases) – equally. Medium-N applications have become preferred

by scholars only after 2006 and are now the most predominant.46

As for the case-oriented part, the QCA, unlike most of the statistical methods, provides

space for complex causality meaning that different constellations of factors may lead to the

same result i.e. equifinality.47

This “multiple conjunctural causation” is a complex

combination of necessary and sufficient conditions (INUS), or in other words conditions that

are “insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for

the result”.48

In simpler words, a necessary condition X itself does not lead to an outcome Y

hence we can observe X without Y. On the other hand, a sufficient condition X itself directly

leads to an outcome Y, i.e. X is sufficient to produce that outcome. However, this path is not

always necessary, as some other alternative paths (with different conditions, at least partly)

could very well lead to the same outcome – once mentioned equifinality .49

Here comes the quantitative part in play when we use Boolean algebra to find

sufficient configurations of necessary conditions by converting conditions into truth values

(0)’s and (1)’s where (0)’s represent full set non-membership of condition and (1)’s represents

a full set membership. A common example is division of countries due to their economic

performance. GDP of Norway for example is one of the highest thus this country falls under

well performing economies and would get (1) in a truth table. Analogously, GDP of Lesotho

is one of the lowest and therefore it would fall under (0).

One can see that a simple division to either ‘present’ or ‘not present’ or (0) or (1)

respectively would be neat and well-arranged but would not embrace the complexity of a

given issue. An example usually given is a democratic nature of state. When researching the

conditions of democracy in the ‘Old Europe’ the researcher has an easier job than the one

doing a research on wider variety of states say both the ‘Old’ and ‘New Europe’. Switzerland

as well as Norway fall under democratic countries. However, imagine we have Norway,

Switzerland, Bulgaria and Romania. All of them are without doubt democratic countries but

some of them to a greater as well as to a lesser degree.

46

Rihoux et. al., From Niche to Mainstream Method? 178.

47 Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Gisèle De Meur, Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin, Qualitative Comparative Analysis

(QCA) as an Approach (New York: SAGE Publications, 2008), 18.

48 Julian Reiss, “Empirical Evidence: Its Nature and Sources” in The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of

Social Science, ed. Ian C. Jarvie and Jesus Yamora-Bonilla (New York: SAGE Publishing, ), 568.

49 Dirk Berg-Schlosser et. al., Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an Approach., 10

18

Having this in mind Charles Ragin, a major scholar dealing with this research method,

replaced this imperfect dichotomous ‘crisp set’ QCA (csQCA) method with more

sophisticated ‘fuzzy set’ one (fsQCA). The researcher is not forced to decide between (0)’s

and (1)’s anymore but can calibrate the conditions on a scale from the full nonmembership (0)

to the membership (1). As is the decision in a csQCA whether to assign one condition with (1)

or (0) and thus influence the outcome of a given research so is the calibration in the fsQCA.

The researcher can unconsciously put in deformed or wrong data and thus influence the

outcome of a given research as well. Such calibration is possible only through the use of

theoretical and substantive knowledge. Once a researcher knows his case it is essential to

determine the three qualitative breakpoints (also known as anchor points): full membership

(1), full nonmembership (0), and the cross-over point, where there is maximum ambiguity

regarding whether a case is more “in” or more “out” of a set (.5).50

Fuzzy membership scores address the varying degree to which different cases belong to a

set51

Then, it is up to each and every researcher how precise scale he or she is going to use.

One can use a simple three-value fuzzy set {0, 0.5, 1} which is crisp set QCA taken a step

further or four-value fuzzy set {0, 0.33, 0.67, 1} six-value fuzzy set {1, 0.9 0.6, 0.4, 0.1, 0}, or

use a continuous fuzzy set ranging from (0) to (1).52

50

Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-set social science (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000), 161.

51 Charles C. Ragin, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” in Configurational Comparative Analysis, ed. Charles

Ragin and Benoit Rihoux, (New York: SAGE Publications, 2007), 3.

52 Ibid.

19

Coup of 1960

Anti-system parties

The Republic of Turkey was founded in as early as in 1923 and so was its

parliamentarism. Nonetheless, the period from establishment of the Republic in the

1920’s until 1960 is marked by the rule of only one party at a time. The first of these was the

Atatürk’s and later İnönü’s Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP)

and later, in the first free elections in 1950, the CHP was replaced by the Democratic Party

(Demokrat Parti, DP) led by Adnan Menderes.53

Throughout the 1950’s there were no other relevant parties but the DP and CHP. DP

was able to secure the majority in all three elections in the 1950’s and to rule alone due to the

election system. Even though the parties were both close to the ideological center the

ideological gap between them widened throughout the 1950’s due to intense conflicts between

the DP and the CHP over the practice of democracy. The Democratic Party, a democratic

alternative to the CHP in the elections of 1950, soon became self-confident with its electoral

victories and adopted even the less democratic political style of governance than the CHP.54

The DP chose confrontation rather than cooperation and compromise, with the

opposition whilst the CHP adopted the same political style in order to undermine the

legitimacy of Menderes’ government. The tension between the DP and CHP had been rising

rapidly after the elections of 1957. The DP staged attacks against CHP politicians such as the

one in town of Uşak where a stone flew out of the crowd and hit İnönü in the head. Another

incident happened when İnönü was on the way from the Istanbul airport and his car was

attacked by a violent mob.55

Furthermore, the DP decided to restrain the opposition officially

and consequently political leaders. None but those from the Demokrat Parti, were not allowed

to hold meetings and give public speeches. For instance, İsmet İnönü when campaigning in

53

Kemal H. Karpat, “Military interventions: Army-civilian relations in Turkey before and after 1980,” in

State, democracy, and the military. Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin-New York: de

Gruyter, 1988), 144–147.

54 Sabri Sayari, “The Changing Party System,” in Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey, ed. Sabri Sayari and

Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 12.

55 Cihat Göktepe, “May 27 from the perspectives of envoys.” Today’s Zaman, June 3, 2012, accessed April 29,

2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=282387

20

1959 was stopped by the gendarmerie56

at the doorsteps of Kayseri, a city in Central Anatolia

and was later let in only after a fierce debate with the gendarmerie officers.57

At the end of the 1950’s the radio was broadcasting violent attacks against the

opposition at a daily basis calling them, among other things, “political bandits”, “anarchists”,

and “intriguers”.58

The Turkish radio also read hours-long lists of individuals (mostly fictional

or dead) who had left the opposition parties and had joined the ranks of the DP. Additionally,

the Democratic Party was also criticised for its pro-religious politics and for betraying the

Kemalist revolution.59

In addition, in the spring of 1960 university students’ protests spread to all major

university campuses of the country, in Ankara, and Istanbul asking for university autonomy,

freedom of speech, and freedom of the press which were also constrained by the DP

government.60

Surprisingly, Menderes’s government set up the Inquiry Commission of

Assembly (Tahkikat Komisyonu)61

in April which was inspired by the infamous U.S. House

Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). Inönü being aware of a considerable support

of the Armed Forces spoke in 1959 in the Parliament in a reaction to the establishment of the

aforementioned commission as follows:

"If you continue on this road, even I will not be able to save you."

This "warning" actually followed his earlier statement:

"When the conditions compel it, revolution is the legitimate right of nations."62

56

Gendarmerie or Jandarma is a branch of the Turkish Armed Forces assigned police duties responsibilities in

rural areas.

57 Metin Heper, İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 202.

58 Haluk Şahin, “Broadcasting Autonomy in Turkey: Its Rise and Fall, 1961-1971.” Journalism Quarterly 58

(1981): accessed February 28, 2013, doi:10.1177/107769908105800307.

59 Umut Azak, “Secularism in Turkey as a Nationalist Search for Vernacular Islam,” Revue des Mondes

Musulmans et de la Méditerranée 124 (2008): accessed February 28, 2013, doi:10.4000/remmm.6025.

60 Ersin Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),

83.

61 Cihat Göktepe, “The Menderes Period (1950-1960),” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, accessed April 29, 2013,

http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/60/the-menderes-period-1950-1960-.html

62 Cihat Göktepe, “1960 "Revolution" In Turkey And The British Policy Towards Turkey " in The Turkish

Yearbook of Internatioanl Relations, ed. İlhan Uzgel, Atay Akdevelioğlu, Nuri Yeşilyurt (Ankara: Ankara

University Press, 1960), 157.

21

Meanwhile, Menderes also closed down People's Houses63

at which women and girls

attended, azan, a call to prayer, was sung once again in Arabic. Although this was a part of a

policy aiming at a broadening of religious freedom it was seen as anti-secular move since it

was Atatürk himself who changed the language of azan from Arabic to Turkish in the 1920’s.

This situation was getting more and more out of control. Hence, menders in order to get the

country under control declared martial law on May 1, 1960. Nonetheless, it was too late as the

incident form May 5, 1960 proves. Menderes, after having given a speech luckily escaped the

lynching of 3,000 citizens demanding more freedom.

Although the DP was moving towards more authoritarian style of governance it is not

possible to say that the DP was an anti-system party. The Democratic Party never desired to

fundamentally change the nature of the Turkish Republic. Therefore, the condition is not

present.

Past coup

On May 27, 1960 at 3.00am soldiers left the barracks and seized the power for the first

but not the last time in the history of modern Turkey without firing a single bullet. These

predominantly young and officers of lower ranks took over the entire country within a few

hours. As Kemal Karpat noted, this intervention was an unprecedented act for the armed

forces departed from an ancient Ottoman tradition of influencing the Turkish politics (as

janissaries did) and took over the administration instead.64

Nevertheless, younger officers saw it differently and even though it was their first

coup they felt obliged to exercise their “constitutional duty” enshrined in the Article 34 of the

Military’s Internal Organisational Code. This Article, which was on January 4, 1961

incorporated in the Armed Forces Internal Service Law (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri İç Hizmet

Kanunu) no. 211, states that military’s duty is to “look after/watch for and protect [kollamak

63

People's House or Halkevi was an institution set up by the Atatürk’s CHP out of the need of enlightened and

educated population. Halkevleri were to provide facilities for all-round education, for men and women, old and

young, open to all without distinction of class or status. The activities included popular lessons and lectures,

social assistance, exhibitions, concerts and drama plays, etc. “The Halkevi: The Turkish people's house.”

Scottish Geographical Magazine 60 (1944): 21.

64 Kemal H. Karpat, “Recent Political Developments in Turkey and Their Social Background,” International

Affairs 38 (1962): 304, accessed February 28, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2609442

22

ve korumak] the Turkish homeland and the Republic as defined by the Constitution” and

because (according to them) the Republic was being altered they felt that it is legally and

lawfully right to step in. Captain Muzaffer Özdağ, later a member of the junta said:

“If the administration in the country fails to provide leadership, if there is not a

constitutional court, a senate, who is going to defend the Republic? Naturally the

army. Those who established the first republic thought of the army as its sole

guarantor, and expressed this idea in Article 34 of the military organizational code. In

this sense the revolution is not only legal but also lawful.”65

This Prussian relic66

then hung over the heads of the Turkish politicians for several

decades such as the sword hung over the Damocles’ head in ancient times.

Even though being it the first it was welcomed with a relief. However, as the popular

vote on the constitution, drafted by the junta in 1961, showed the support was not as

overwhelming as it could have seemed in the largest cities. People from the countryside

affected by the golden years cared less about events having taking place in Ankara and

Istanbul in the late 1950’s. Thus, unlike the constitutional referendum of 1982 approved by

91.37% of the votes, the draft constitution of 1961 was approved only by 61.7% of the

votes.67

Grivances

As for the corporate grievances, it seems that it had been a decline of officers’ prestige

i.e. their collective self-esteem and the declining political position role of the armed forces in

the society that set the entire revolutionary process among military personnel in motion.

Nevertheless, it can be assumed that it was also the desire to reclaim the political

position that had been maintained by the state bureaucracy in late Ottoman era (and in the

new Republic as well) and the Armed Forces. With the lack of aristocratic and bourgeois

65

Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays (Leiden – Boston:

Brill, 2004) 252.

66 This article was borrowed from the Prussian military code. Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society,

252.

67 Rabia Bahar Üste and Berrin Güzel, “Referendums and E-Voting in Turkey.” International Journal of E-

Business and E-Government Studies 3 (2011), 151.

23

classes in the Ottoman Empire the army and state bureaucrats formed a coalition pushing

forward the modernization process that later resulted in the birth of the Republic. The modern

Turkish Republic, however it declared the opposite, inherited many features from the

Ottoman Empire and the unity of state bureaucracy and army as the state elite was one of

them.68

However, social changes, such as population growth after the World War II and

Menderes’ reforms bore a new union of large landlords, religious officials and the DP. This

“peripheral” union was seen by the military elite as a counterrevolutionary in a Kemalist

sense and thus a threat their elitist postion.

The formation of the group, which planned and carried out the 1960 coup, seems to

have started as early as in 1955 when two young officers, Dündar Seyhan and Faruk

Güventürk, began to form a cell of radically-minded officers. The following lines suggest that

corporate positional grievances (honour) were in particular deep that first intention was to

name the group Society for the Restoration and Respect (İade-i İtibar Cemiyeti). The

following words from an officer and one of the founders of the first organizations seem to

confirm this assumption:

“The prestige of the army was declining. Money seemed to have become everything.

An officer no longer had status in society. It hurt me to see officers forced to take jobs

of all kinds and wear civilian clothes and feel proud in them. ... I was on leave in Izmir

with a friend at a restaurant filled with well-heeled politicians and businessmen who

received adulation and respect while we were ignored. I looked at my friend and told

him that things could not go on like this. ... It was not that we needed money, for

officers had always been ill-paid. But we had had honour and respect in the past. Now

these were gone. I asked my friend what we were waiting for and he nodded

significantly. I soon discovered that most of my colleagues shared my feelings. From

there on the question was one of organisation, planning, and waiting for the right

moment to act since the Democrats had already prepared the groundwork of the

Revolution.”69

68

Erhat Umit Ozkan, “Creation of Modern Nation State,” Multiculturalism in Turkey, accessed April 21, 2013,

http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/re/k-rsc/lcs/kiyou/18-3/RitsIILCS_18.3pp.59-77ozkan.pdf

69 Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society, 247.

24

Nevertheless, they decided to call themselves the Revolutionary Committee, or just the

Committee and expanded their activities throughout 1957 and 1958. The Ankara group

formed at the end of 1956 by Talat Aydemir, Osman Koksal, Sezai Okan and Adnan

Çelikoğlu, and Istanbul committee decided to merge their networks in 1958.70

The Constitution of 1961 also confirms the political position concern as the

constitution established the National Security Council (Millî Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) a

political body that consisted of high military personnel and the highest executive. This

institution was from now on to discuss the national security threats and declare them to the

Cabinet. MGK was also to assist in the decision-making process and provide coordination.

Moreover, the officers also secured their families with affordable food by creation of Military

cooperatives (ORKO) and the dignity of their retired fellow soldiers by establishing the

Armed Forces Assistance Agency (Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu, OYAK).

Therefore, the condition of corporate positional grievances is present.

Table 1: Real Wages, Consumer Price Index, and Inflation in Istanbul, 1952-2006.

Source: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü

70

Cihat Göktepe, “1960 "Revolution" In Turkey And The British Policy Towards Turkey,” 146.

-30%

-10%

10%

30%

50%

70%

90%

110%

130%

19

52

19

54

19

56

19

58

19

60

19

62

19

64

19

66

19

68

19

70

19

72

19

74

19

76

19

78

19

80

19

82

19

84

19

86

19

88

19

90

19

92

19

94

19

96

19

98

20

00

20

02

20

04

20

06

Real Wages CPI Inflation in Istanbul

25

Inflation at the end of 1950’s

Due to the fact that Turkey became consumer-oriented society dependent on imports

caused that imports exceeded exports by more than a billion dollars in the late 1950’s and

Turkey did not have enough of its hard currency to pay its foreign debt. Menderes’s politics of

turning Turkey into küçük Amerika71

by creating her mahallede ve köyde bir milyoner 72

was

in rubble. Indeed, foreign loans that followed Marshall Plan did spark economics at the

beginning of the 1950’s.

However, bad crops, urbanisation, and growth of the population that was much faster

than the growth of the agriculture sector resulting in e.g. 20% less rice and 10% wheat and

barley in 1959/60 than in 1958/59.73

Moreover, the checks for foreign debt were overdue.

Not only did this mean no imported consumer goods but also empty shelves at grocery stores.

Lacking hard currency Turkey was unable to import food that was missing and thus

compensate for the shortage. Very soon Turkey started lacking staple foods. Shortening,

butter, cheese, and even the famous coffee, disappeared from the shelves by the end of 1958.74

Foreign countries, namely the biggest creditor the United States, in order to make the

Turkish Lira valuable again, pushed Menderes’s government to devaluate the currency for the

parity set in 1946 of the Turkish Lira at 2.8 to the U.S. dollar was not corresponding to the

current situation.75

In July 1958, the Western powers offered Menderes 359 million dollars

and the consolidation of Turkey's 400 million dollar debt76

in exchange for a better exchange

71

Tur. little America

72 Tur. a millionaire in every village and quarter

73 “The State of Food and Agriculture, 1960,” Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations,

accessed April 23, 2013, http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap648e/ap648e.pdf.

74 Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 82.

75 Mükerrem Hiç, and Ayşen Hiç Gencer, Turkish Economy and Politics. From 1923, the Foundation of the

Republic until 2002. (Istanbul: Beykent University Press, 2009) 106.

76 Hikmet Özdemir, “The Turkish-American Relations Toward 1960 Turkish "revolution," in The Turkish

Yearbook of Internatioanl Relations, ed. İlhan Uzgel, Atay Akdevelioğlu, Nuri Yeşilyurt (Ankara: Ankara

University Press, 1960), 172.

26

rate. Menderes had no other option than to accept and in August of 1960 the rate leaped from

initial 2.8 to 9 Turkish Liras for a dollar overnight.77

As a consequence the inflation rose from 8% in July to 25% in December 1958 and

rose by seven percentage points to 32% in July 1959 it dropped down to 17% by the end of

the year. The trend continued until the coup of 1960 in May when inflation fell to 12%.

However, the annual inflation passed the critical threshold of 20%78

only in 1959 therefore

this condition is not present.

Success of 1960

As stated in the introduction, a successful coup is a removal of the recognized chief

executive which was preceded or is accompanied by the threat to use, display or actual use of

force. This coup was, without a doubt a great success, the Armed Forces took over the entire

country within a few hours without firing a single bullet. The military “step-in” from 1960

was largely welcomed for it ended the severe measures the DP’s government had put upon the

people. The Democratic Party was banned from the politics and Prime Minister Adnan

Menderes, together with President Bayar and many other DP politicians were imprisoned and

later tried on Yasiada, an island not very far away from Istabul. The DP elite received heavy

prison sentences. Prime Minister Menderes together with Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and

Minister Hasan Polatkan two ministers were hanged. President Bayar was only pardoned due

to his deteriorating health.

In conclusion, the coup of 1960 is considered a success as the chief executive was

removed from the office after the use of force.

77

“Kurlar-Döviz Kurları (Günlük). (USD) ABD Doları,” Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası, accessed April

19, 2013, http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/cgi-

bin/famecgi?cgi=$ozetweb&DIL=TR&ARAVERIGRUP=bie_dkdovizgn.db.

78 “Statistical Indicators 1923-2011,” Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed April 15, 2013,

http://www.turkstat.gov.tr.

27

The abortive coups of 1962 1963

Anti-system parties

The late 1960’s witnessed a huge and rapid increase of socio-economic unrest and

political turmoil for the new constitution drafted by the National Union Committee was more

liberal than the earlier ones. The reason for that was to prevent the situation from the 1950’s

and to prevent the return of the undemocratic era. The granting of extensive rights to civil

society made it possible for people to first organise themselves around different political

ideologies. Additionally, the simple majority electoral system in multimember constituencies

was changed into proportional representation using d’Hondt method in order to prevent the

tyranny of parliamentarian majority.

However, this new electoral system made it difficult for political parties to win the

absolute parliamentary majority and forced them to look for coalition partners. Consequently,

even though İnönü’s CHP was the strongest party between 1961 and 1965, it was unable to

form a government alone. Hence, CHP first formed a big coalition with its rival and a DP

successor party – the Justice Party (Adalet partisi, AP). Nevertheless, their animosities

prevented them from common governance soon. It was their different economic and political

outlook that made this coalition last only seven months before it fell apart.79

However, the elections of 1961 introduced new relevant parties into the Turkish

political system. The first was center-right New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, YTP) and

right wing Republican Peasant Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, CKMP). The

YTP was like the aforementioned Justice Party a successor party of the DP. Nevertheless,

YTP included the anti-Menderes and anti-Bayar DP lower rank politicians while the majority

was in the Justice Party. Unlike other parliamentary parties, the CKMP was a new party

formed following a merger between two minor parties.

It is obvious that the grievances of the Turkish society were not as deep as at the end

of the 1960’s as 96.3% people voted in the elections of 1961 and identified itself (largely)

either with the DP or CHP (together more than 2/3 of all votes).80

Moreover, the new

electoral system introduced two more relevant parties in 1961 none of them was an anti-

system one. Therefore, the condition of the anti-system party is not present

79

Mükerrem Hiç, and Ayşen Hiç Gencer, Turkish Economy and Politics, 43.

80 “Statistical Indicators 1923-2011,” Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed April 15, 2013,

http://www.turkstat.gov.tr.

28

Grievances

Unlike in the Turkish society where there was no popular reaction to the overthrow of

Adnan Menderes’ government, the situation in the army was somehow different as some

officers were not satisfied with the outcomes of the coup of 1960. As Kalaycıoğlu claims,

there emerged two irreconcilable tendencies in the ranks of the armed forces. The first

segment thought that the 1960 coup was not over yet, or as Captain Muzaffer Özdağ said,

they were “forced to go further than Atatürk, and complete what he left uncompleted.”81

The

other wanted to help consolidate parliamentary democracy. The former seemed to be

motivated by socialist ideas intertwined with ardent ethnic nationalism. It also seemed as if

this part of the armed forces, represented by an ambitious colonel Talat Aydemir, had held

beliefs that democracy needed to be postponed for an indefinite period of time.82

Meanwhile, a parallel group of lower rank officers emerged under a name of the Union

of Armed Forces (Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği, SKB) being unsatisfied with the performance of

the official junta i.e. the National Unity Committee (Millî Birlik Komitesi, MBK). Its goal was

to balance the MBK since the power within the MBK was held mostly by the land army which

held almost 95% of seats whilst other branches of the military held considerably less power.83

Talat Aydemir together with Dündar Seyhan, two of the main figures of the Revolutionary

Committee saw a unique chance of expressing their own views via SKB since they, for having

gone to Korea in 1959, were left out the original National Unity Committee. Together with

other hard-liners in SKB planned a new coup that would install their 25-man junta and would

apply reforms which the 27 May failed to realise. Nevertheless, this plan was accepted only

under one condition – the coup would only go ahead if the senior commanders give their

approval to it which they did not. Moreover, the commanders started removing the

prospective rebels from crucial positions. Fearing to be later arrested and tried, Aydemir and

Seyhan decided to go into action at 3.00pm on February 22, 1962. He, as a Commandant at

the Turkish Military Academy (Kara Harp Okulu, KHO) in Ankara, led a group of loyal

cadets. They were joined by the Gendarmerie College, the Tank Battalion, and some other

units. However, the support was limited only to Ankara. As the sun set, Aydemir and his

myrmidons realised the situation is a stale mate. In order to avoid a potential bloodshed İnönü

81

Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sirman, Turkish State, Turkish Society (New York: Routledge, 1990), 60.

82 Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 98.

83 Army 32 seats , air force three, navy two, and gendarmerie one seat. Kemal Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics

and Society: Selected Articles and Essays. p. 258

29

contacted the rebels at 1.20am and gave them his word that they would not be court-martialed

if they put down their weapons. Aydemir and his accomplices capitulated at 6.20am.

They were all pardoned and let go home for the Prime Minister İnönü adhered to his promise

he had given them earlier that day. The only punishment was the retirement of all the rebels

that took part in the coup attempt. 84

Nevertheless, Kurmay Albay85

Talat Aydemir, the enfant terrible of the Turkish

Armed Forces, rolled out of the barracks once again, this time on May 21, 1963. Although

having been discharged from the military, Aydemir was still fairly popular among War

Academy cadets. At 00.00 the operation broke out under a secret harbiyeli86

codename. Soon

after this signal a group of insurgents seized the Ankara radio station and aired Aydemir’s

confident communiqué that heard as follows:

“Attention! You are now listening to the Revolutionary General Headquarters of the

Turkish Armed Forces! ”87

However, a nearby living Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Elverdi having heard this announcement

waited for no commands and rushed immediately to the radio station. Elverdi overcame the

rebels’ roadblocks and single-handedly recaptured the radio station.

Even though there were no troops at a standby ready to storm the rebels it worked.

Colonel’s brothers in arms fell for this trick and right after this counter-communiqué one

officer after another started leaving the revolutionary base at the War Academy. At 8.00am

Aydemir and a handful of the faithful realized that the situation is hopeless and left their

headquarters at the Kara Harp Okulu and left for their homes in taxis. Later that day they at

noon, they were all arrested. Unlike in 1962 when İnönü feared a possible bloodshed they

were tried and in most cases received heavy prison sentences. Talat Aydemir together with

Fethi Gürcan, were hanged in 1963.88

Thus, Aydemir’s coup attempts were not driven corporate interests but by his own

interests for the Armed Forces succeeded and strengthen their position in the system by

84

Finkel and Sirman, Turkish State, Turkish Society, 67.

85 Tur. Staff Colonel

86 Tur. cadet

87 Önay Yilmaz, “'Mağlubiyetimizin sebebi radyodur'.” Radikal, May 28, 2010, accessed April 29, 2013,

http://www.radikal.com.tr

88 Finkel and Sirman, Turkish State, Turkish Society, 68.

30

creating the aforementioned MGK, OYAK, and ORKO whilst he himself even though he had

been one of the coup plotters in the late 1950’s was left out.

Therefore, the condition of corporate positional grievances is not present.

Inflation at the Beginning of the 1960’s

The constitution of 1961 introduced The State Planning Organization (Devlet

Planlama Teşkilatı, DPT)89

entitled with a five-year economy-wide planning in order to

protect the Turkish economy by limiting the imports and encouraging exports, the strategy of

the import-substitution industrialization (ISI)90

The ISI economic policy introduced by the

resulted in a calmer economic situation. The inflation following the coup of 1960 dropped to

1.3% in 1961. Even though it later rose to 3.8% and 6.5% in 1962 and 1963 respectively it

was until 1971 when it crossed the critical threshold of 20% again (see Table 1). As a

consequence, the condition of high inflation was not present either in 1962 or in 1963.

Therefore, the condition of high inflation is not present.

Past coups experience

The first coup from 1962 and the second from 1963 came only after three years after

the previous one. According to the hypothesis stated in the introduction there should have

been a great chance in succeeding in 1963 and even greater in 1962 as. Nevertheless, the

condition is present, since the coup attempt of 1962 and 1963 happened only two and three

years after the coup of 1960 respectively.

89

In 2011 reorganized as the Ministry of Development. “About us,” Republic of Turkey. Ministry of

Development, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.mod.gov.tr.

90 An economic theory employed by developing or emerging market nations that wish to increase their self-

sufficiency and decrease their dependency on developed countries. Implementation of the theory focuses on

protection and incubation of domestic infant industries so they may emerge to compete with imported goods and

make the local economy more self-sufficient. “Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI),” Investopedia,

accessed January 29, 2013, www.investopedia.com.

31

Success

Not only did Talat Aydemir not succeeded in toppling the government he was later

even imprisoned and hanged. Aydemir was unable to remove the chief executive even though

he both displazed and used force (as several shots were fired). Therefore, the outcome of both

coup attempts of 1962 and 1963 is failure i.e. success is not present.

Coup of 1971

Anti-system parties

The electoral system introduced in 1961 was once more amended before the elections

of 1965. The district quota (Hare) introduced in 1961 elections was changed. From now on

the “wasted” votes were transferred to the national district were they were allocated to

reminding seats. As a result, not only was this electoral system the most proportionate in the

modern Turkish history it also gave birth to a majority government of the Justice Party.91

Surprisingly, the AP aimed at changing the electoral system even though it enabled

them to form a majority government. The reason why Justice Party did not favour this system

is that it was not their idea and it favoured smaller parties.

Even though the AP, having secured its position by changing the electoral system, won the

majority in the Turkish parliament the elections of 1965 witnessed a new phenomenon – the

emergence of the Workers’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye İçşi Partisi, TİP) the Turkish first

genuine anti-system party.

As said above, The National Union Committee by liberalising the new regime in 1961

let also for the first in the modern Turkish history the socialist organisations and parties

emerge.92

Political groups that would not be allowed to be established in the 1950’s, being it

social democrats, trade unionists, or Marxists, occurred, and began to criticise the Turkish

system for its class inequalities, while also questioning the domination of the West. 93

The first and only socialist party of this era was the aforementioned Workers’ Party of

Turkey. Even though there were countless of other groups, associations, etc. they were,

91

Ersin Kalaycioğlu, “Elections and Governance,” in Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey, ed. Sabri Sayari

and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 60.

92 Only The Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP) founded in 1920 stayed outlawed.

93 The anti-American sentiment in particular was very strong.

32

however, not able to unite themselves due to clashes between numerous ideological and

political concepts.94

The leader of the TİP Ali Aybar held unlike the other party faction that National

democratic revolution and socialistic revolution are indivisible and that pursuit of a socialist

revolution would lead to the national liberation. Aybar explained his concept by stating that:

“... In present-day Turkey the struggle for independence and democracy has become

transformed into the struggle for socialism. The party of the working class and of all

labouring people – the TİP – is fighting for this in the most decisive and consistent

fashion. In Turkey the struggle for independence is united with struggle for

socialism.” 95

However, fragmentation caused by ideological disputes, translations of Marx, Engels

and Lenin, foreign political events such as Mao’s Cultural Revolution, revolutionary struggles

(e.g. Cuba), the student revolts in the West in 1968 also radicalized these fragments. As a

result the, not being able to mobilize its supporters received only 2.7% in the elections of

1969. The TİP’s failure was understood as a failure of a strategy to pursue socialism by

democratic means. The groups that sprang out (mainly) from at the end of the 1970’s,

perceived TİP’s strategy and tactics ineffective. New groups, recruiting mainly from Dev-

Genç96

believed that only way is terror.

Furthermore, another relevant but ideologically distant party emerged at the end of the

1960’s and were successful in getting enough votes in the elections of 1969. Alparslan

Turkeş, one of the leading figures of the coup of 196097

founded a far-right Nationalist Action

Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). The MHP was putting forward an ultranationalist,

anti-communist (or anti-left in general), ethno-Turkish or pro-lahasümüt98

agenda.

94

Igor Lipovsky, The Socialist Movement in Turkey: 1960-1980 (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 96-97.

95 Ibid., 34.

96 Revolutionary Youth Federation of Turkey (Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu) was a group that

associated much of the left-wing revolutionary (mainly university) youth of that time and where the main radical

left-wing parties and terrorist organizations sprouted from.

97 It was Turkeş who read the announcement of the power seizure by the military in 1960 on the Turkish radio.

98 Lahasümüt is an abbreviation of a secular Hanefi Sunni Muslim Turk (laik Hanefi Sünni Müslüman Türk). The

term was coined by a Turkish political scientist and politician Baskın Oran.

33

Even though the first anti-system parties entered the Turkish political arena for the first time

none of them was a relevant party. Neither the TİP nor the MHP were able to cross 3% in

national elections and the AP was able to rule from 1965 until the memorandum of 1971

alone. Therefore, the condition of an anti-system party is not present.

Grievances

The rise of left-wing terrorism namely perpetrated by the two most notorious groups

the Turkish People's Liberation Front (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu-Cephesi, THKP-C) and

the Turkish People's Liberation Army (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, THKO) together with

students’ mass protests, strikes and clashes between police and trade unions must have

reminded the Armed Forces Ali Faik Cihan’s lines from his book The Socialist Turkey:

“The sound is beginning to be heard of the march of millions of feet.”99

This time, it was mostly the Turkish armed Forces’ political postion in the system that they

were afraid of. Radical-left groups in the society would definitely disrupt the status quo they

acquired after the coup of 1960. Nihat Erim, prime minister during the military interregnum,

indirectly confirmed they feared the communist revolution:

“The situation which had worsened gradually after 1963, entered a new phase in 1968

when student protests degenerated into armed fights between rightist and leftist

extremists. Professional agents, trained armed and directed from outside Turkey, were

able to transform some leftist student organizations into urban guerrilla units, ...

preparing for the establishment of a Communist People’s Republic of Turkey.”100

Recently declassified confidential documents of the U.S. Department of State also show the

Armed Forces’ disapproval of the AP’s desire to amend the Constitution of 1961 in 1969 and

thus let the old DP elite in the political arena again. The intelligence information cable from

May 19, 1969 states that several meetings between the government and the military took place

and it had been decided within the Turkish General Staff to assume control of the government

of Turkey if the legislation is passed on May 20, 1969. Meanwhile, all political leaders,

99

Ali Faik Cihan, Sosyalist Türkiye (Ankara: Toplum Yayınevi, 1965), 175.

100 Dietrich Jung, and Wolfgango Piccoli, Turkey at the crossroads: Ottoman legacies and a greater Middle East

(London: Zed Books, 2001), 92.

34

including Prime Minister Demirel, were notified that the military would act on the night of

20/21 May.101

The further anxiety and corporate grievances were later encapsulated in the following

three-point text written by Chief of General Staff General Memduh Tağmaç expressing the

fear of the military that the current government is not strong enough to avert the going

anarchy. The text was given to President Cevdet Sunay on March 12, 1971 and read on the

radio at 1.00pm.

1. “The parliament and the Government, through their sustained policies, views and

actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and

economic unrest. They have caused the public to lose all hope of rising to the level of

contemporary civilization which was set for us by Atatürk as a goal, and have failed to

realize the reforms stipulated by the Constitution. The future of the Turkish Republic is

therefore seriously threatened.

2. The assessment by the Parliament, in a spirit above partisan considerations, of the

solutions needed to eliminate the concern and to eliminate the concern and

disillusionment of the Turkish Armed Forces, which have sprung from the bosom of

the Turkish nation, over this grave situation; and the formation, within the context of

democratic principles, of a strong and credible government, which will neutralize the

current anarchical situation and which, inspired by Atatürk’s views, will implement the

reformist laws envisaged by the Constitution, are considered essential.

3. Unless this is done quickly, the Turkish Armed Forces are determined to take over the

administration of the State in accordance with the powers vested in them by the laws to

protect and preserve the Turkish Republic.

Please be informed.”102

101

“Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Volume Xxix, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean,

1969–1972, Document 423,” U.S. Department of State, accessed April 22, 2013,

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d423.

102 Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (London: Lynne

Rienner, 2000), 33-34.

35

Past coups experience

This coup happened approximately eleven years later after the first coup in the modern

Turkish history therefore the condition is present. Moreover, the Parliament was dissolved

after the chief of General Staff General Memduh Tağmaç delivered the Armed Forces’

memorandum to the Parliament. Once again, there was no popular upheaval against this

move, no shots were fired.

Success of 1971

The Parliament was called for an extraordinary meeting on a Saturday morning March

13, 1971 so that the memorandum could be read. After the memorandum had been read in the

Grand National Assembly and only Hasan Korkmazcan from the AP opposed it the Prime

Minister Süleyman Demirel realized that there was nothing else to do than to leave so he

replied with a laconic Şapkamı alır giderim103

and left the Parliament. In other words, the

chief executive resigned to the military after threat to use force. Hence, this coup was a

success.

Inflation

The annual inflation at the end of the 1970’s never got higher than 7%. Even the

inflation of 1970 was relatively low – 11.80%. Usually, inflation drops after a coup is staged

as it did for instance after the coup of 1960 due to measures usually taken by junta to mitigate

economic difficulties but in 1971. Surprisingly, inflation almost doubled five after the coup to

25%.104

(see Table 1).

Even though the constitution of 1961 introduced The State Planning Organization

(Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, DPT)105

entitled with a five-year economy-wide planning, the

Turkish economy was once again facing balance of payments problems such as at the end of

103

Tur. I am taking my hat and leaving.

104 “Statistical Indicators 1923-2011,” Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed April 15, 2013,

http://www.turkstat.gov.tr.

105 In 2011 reorganized as the Ministry of Development. “About us,” Republic of Turkey. Ministry of

Development, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.mod.gov.tr.

36

the 1950’s. The strategy of closed economy, import-substitution industrialization (ISI)106

with

fixed exchange rates having been implemented in order to restrict the influx of imports and

encourage the exports, did not solve the prevailing problems. Consequently, this

interventionist and protectionist strategy led to over-valued currency, quantitative import

restrictions particularly on consumer goods, high custom taxes, and export premiums to

alleviate export difficulties in view of low foreign exchange rates. In sum, there was not

enough hard currency to pay for the foreign debt as lira was not as valuable, to pay for the

imports in general.107

Consequently, Demirel’s government, in order to avert an approaching

payment crisis, introduced an IMF-supported stabilization program in August 1970, involving

leap devaluation.108

106

An economic theory employed by developing or emerging market nations that wish to increase their self-

sufficiency and decrease their dependency on developed countries. Implementation of the theory focuses on

protection and incubation of domestic infant industries so they may emerge to compete with imported goods and

make the local economy more self-sufficient. “Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI),” Investopedia,

accessed January 29, 2013, www.investopedia.com.

107 Hiç, and Gencer, Turkish Economy and Politics, 82.

108 Merih Celâsun and Dani Rodrik, “Turkish Economic Development: An Overview,” in Developing Country

Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 3. Country Studies -Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey, ed. Jeffrey

D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 621.

37

The Coup of 1980

Anti-system parties

The Turkish politics and society changed very little after the coup of 1971. The society

and politics were further mutually affecting each other and together further fragmenting and

polarizing each other. Fragmented and polarized party politics together with proportional

representation greatly influenced the party politics of the 1970’s. New electoral formula

enabled several other political parties enter the National Assembly.

To illustrate the politically difficult situation in the National Assembly in the 1970’s

one need not to look further but at the situation right after the elections of 1973. The very first

elections after the military memorandum sent to the National Assembly in 1973 now left-of-

the-centre, secular and pro-modern CHP109

and CHP’s biggest opponent, archenemy, and a

successor party of the DP from the 1950’s the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP). Among the

new political parties was another anti-system and also the first genuinely Islamist party – The

National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) founded by Professor Necmettin

Erbakan in 1972. Although, the very first Islamist party was the National Order Party (Milli

Nizam Partisi, MNP) from 1971, however, it was ephemeral for it was banned after the

military coup in 1971. The MSP was a revivalist, and thus anti-secular and anti-modern party.

To top it all, the conservative offshoot of the Justice Party the Democratic Party (Demokratik

Parti, DemP) received 11.9% of votes whilst former CHP members having not agreed upon

the party’s new political inclination broke away and formed The Republicanist Reliance Party

(Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi, CGP) and received 5.3%.110

As there were many parties and none of them was able to form a majority government

they were forced to form coalition governments. Coalition governments would not be ipso

facto problematic; however, personal animosities between party leaders, ideological distance

and from that stemming a lack of consensus produced seven governments during seven years

(1973-1980) with an average duration of 346 days.111

Sometimes was it not only impossible to

form a government but also to receive a vote of confidence from the National Assembly such

109

CHP was at that time moving towards the western style social democratic concept.

110 Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 96.

111 Kalaycioğlu, “Elections and Governance,” 66.

38

as in 1974 when Sadi Irmak’s government stayed in power for more than four months even

though 358 out of 450 deputies were against his government.112

The first try to form a government came from the CHP as it was the winner of the

elections, although the victory was a Pyrrhic victory. It took CHP 104 days to form a coalition

that lasted less than a year for the only partner that was willing join them was the Islamic

MSP. However, the ideological distance was too wide and the coalition broke away. This

experience helped MSP a lot to get rid of their stigmatisation and was from now on a possible

coalition partner. Now it was the AP’s time to try forming a government. After approximately

four months of negotiation a new government named National Front

(Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümeti) consisting of the MSP, the AP, and MHP with the AP leader

Süleyman Demirel as the prime minister. Although talking about coalition is not very precise

because the style of their governance was not based on a mutual cooperation, negotiation, and

common stance. Every member of The National Front received its ministerial positions and

ruled them separately. Essentially, there were three governments putting forward their three

agendas at the same time and when there was need for cooperation the government as whole

was deadlocked. Thus, every party followed its agenda and used state resources to boost their

support by allocating state recourses and hiring the loyal to the respective state institutions

they had under control or influence. In this manner Islamists and ultranationalists infiltrated

state bureaucracy.113

It was in this era when MHP placed its supporters in the security

apparatus and MSP tried to put through many religious-concerning bills such as moving a day

off from Sunday to Friday, as it is in other Muslim countries, or making an insult of Allah,

whether verbal or in behavioural, a felony. With some proposals they succeeded. The number

of religious officials increased as well as the time reserved for religious broadcasts on state

radio increased which MSP used to target gambling, obscenity, drinking and selling of

alcohol.114

Nevertheless, a new wave of violence broke out and together with high oil prices

caused by the global oil crisis swept this government away in 1977. CHP won once again and

was even able to expand their share of votes in the National Assembly. On the other hand, the

112

Ibid., 65-66.

113 Ersin Kalaycioğlu, “Elections and Governance,” 114.

114 Jacob M. Landau, “Turkey between Secularism and Islam,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs:

The Jerusalem Letter and Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints (1997), accessed April 22, 2013,

http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp352.htm.

39

was not, once again, enough to form a majority government and after he had not received a

vote of confidence the Second National Front (İkinci Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümeti) with

Demirel once again as the prime minister. Unlike the first National Front, the second one

lasted only about six months115

since several months after the elections 11 deputies left the AP

ranks and joined the CHP. In this manner, Ecevit was able to form his own government

which, however, acted as a coalition of CHP and 11 other parties for each of the former AP

deputy became a minister and behaved as if they were leaders of 11 different parties. In 1979,

after unsuccessful elections to Senate, Bülent Ecevit stepped down and president Körötürk

appointed Süleyman Demirel once again as a prime minister of Turkey. Demirel formed a

minority government with support of MSP and MHP and stayed in power until the coup of

1980.116

In sum, the condition of anti-system parties between is present as both the MHP and

the MSP were relevant and formed the coalition governments several times. Their acting

when in power was as if there were separate parties in power and not a consensual coalition

and every time there was a need for joint decision the coalition was deadlocked. Therefore,

these governments were used by the far-right MHP and the Islamist MSP to boost their

support by allocating state resources to their supporters. In other words, these ant-szstem

parties only bit a big chunk out of the state resources while the responsible and consensual

politics were needed.

Grievances of 1980

Such as at the end of 1960’s and the end of 1970’s the country was in chaos for not

only did two anti-system parties enter the Turkish assembly they also participated in several

governments which legitimized them and their extra-parliamentary activities. In this manner,

the MHP used its ministries to support their far-right extremists known as Grey Wolves

(Bozkurtlar) and the MSP to support their religious groupings accordingly. The

aforementioned far-right groupings understood themselves as protectors of the indivisibility

of the Turkish republic and in this manner not only did they attack radical left but also Alevis

115

Ersin Kalaycioğlu, “Elections and Governance,” 66.

116 Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 114.

40

and Kurds such as in Maraş in 1978 where there were hundreds of Alevis slaughtered.117

Surprisingly, the MSP’s Raiders Organization (Akıncılar Teşkilatı) did not take part in the

ongoing violence. Nevertheless, they did take part in a disturbing of public order such as in

Konya in 1980 where they organized a “Saving Jerusalem” rally to protest against Israel’s

decision to proclaim Jerusalem as its capital city. The demonstrators dressed in traditional

Muslim robes and turbans, holding green flags were marching through the city of Konya

shouting, i.a., “Rebellion to the system,” “Sharia or death,” “We are ready for jihad,” “We

want unlimited, classless Islamic state.”118

Moreover, Turkey also witnessed new wave of red terror in 1970’s that was

incomparable with anything the modern Turkish republic has ever experienced. Even though,

the radical-left terrorism fell silent from 1972 to 1974 for their members were either hanged119

or killed by police in 1972120

it was resurrected by the amnesty of 1974. The amnesty freed a

lot of left-wing radicals from the 1960’s which gave life to a new wave of radical-left

violence. Furthermore, as the old Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups were being resurrected

they were joined by new groupings such as Armenian Secret Army of Liberation of Armenia

(ASALA), and Kurdish separatist and Marxist-Leninist The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya

Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK).

Soon after the spiral of violence drove country in chaos and the average number of

people killed a day soon reached 25.121

Unlike at the end of the 1960’s, this time not only did

the terror plague the big cities and university campuses but the entire country due to a massive

spread of radio and TV broadcast. Consequently, whole cities and city quarters all around the

country were divided into various camps fighting each other. Some cities, as for instance

117

Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “Why was the commemoration for the Maraş massacre banned?” Today's Zaman,

December 25, 2012, accessed February 28, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-302207-why-was-the-

commemoration-for-the-maras-massacre-banned.html.

118 Banu Eligur, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010),

87-88.

119 e.g. THKO top members Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Huseyin Inan were hanged on May 6, 1972.

120 e.g. a THKP-C top member Mahir Cayan.

121 4,500 dead and more than 15,000 injured in total between 1975 and 1980. Sabri Sayari, Generational

Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case (Sanata Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1985), 15.

41

citizens of a Black Sea town of Fatsa decided in 1979 to boycott the central government in

Ankara and govern themselves directly through neighbourhood committees and meetings.122

Accordingly, this time not only was the Turkish Armed Forces afraid of the communists but

also other radicals who could possibly destroy the Republic they “inherited” i.e. they were

once again afraid of their political position within the system. In December 1979, Evren wrote

a letter to president Körötürk, warning bluntly that:

“Our nation no longer has the patience for people who sing the communist

international instead of our national anthem; who invite the Sharia; who want to bring

all sorts of fascism by replacing the democratic regime; and who want anarchy,

destruction, and separatism by misusing freedoms that are provided by our

Constitution.”123

As he later said after the coup on October 30, 1980 he was also afraid that the fragmentation

could plague and disintegrate the Armed Forces:

“...they made the mistake of thinking they could infiltrate the Armed Forces, divide

them, and so realize their detestable goals.”124

In order to prevent these things to happen again in the future, the role of the National

Security council was further strengthened. From now on it was a body with military majority

that was to deal with security concerns and after a discussion decide what to do and manifest

these conclusions to the Cabinet. The Cabinet was to put these manifestations on the top of its

agenda and put it in practise.

Therefore, the condition of corporate positional grievances is present in the coup 1980 as

well.

122

Yeseren Elicin, “Social Capital, Leadership and Democracy: Rethinking Fatsa.” International Journal of

Social Sciences and Humanity Studies 3 (2011): 516.

123 Eligur, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey, 87.

124 Ibid., 88.

42

Inflation

The situation before the coup of 1980 was dramatically different than ever before. The

inflation had been high and volatile since 1972125

, however, the steady rise in inflation started

in 1977. By the end of the year the inflation rose by approximately 31 percentage points from

16% in January to 47% in December. This steady growth stopped for moment at 72% in

august of 1978 and it fell later to numbers close to 50% for the next several months. However,

from June 1979 we observe a steady and steep increase of inflation reaching 82% at the end of

1979 and reaching 120% in March 1980.126

Moreover, such as at the end of the 1950’s and 1960’s the Turkish economy was once

again facing problems with balance of payments for the aforementioned interventionist and

protectionist strategy led, once again, to over-valued currency, quantitative import

restrictions, high custom taxes, and export premiums to alleviate export difficulties in view of

low foreign exchange rates. In sum, there was not enough hard currency again to pay for the

foreign debt as lira was not as valuable, to pay for the imports in general.127

To top it all, not only consumer goods, but also oil prices having increased fivefold between

1973-1975, iron and other raw and intermediary materials that Turkey was dependent on,

were scarce.128

These economic conditions together boosted black market and gave life to

high inflation at the end of the 1970’s.

125

Yüksel Görmez, and Serkan Yiğit, The Economic and Financial Stability in Turkey: A Historical Perspective.

(paper prepared for the Fourth Conference of Southeast Europe Monetary History Network (SEEMHN),

http://www.nbs.rs/export/sites/default/internet/latinica/90/SEEMHNkonferencija/SEEMHN_15_Turska.pdf

126 “Inflation Turkey 1980 (CPI),” Inflation.eu, accessed Arpil 24, 2013, http://www.inflation.eu.

127 Hiç, and Gencer, Turkish Economy and Politics, 82.

128 Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 115.

43

Past coups

This time only years divided the coup from 1971 and the coup of 1980

and as in previous coups, the resistance to the military coup was slight, even though a great

deal of the Turkish society was heavily armed. There was only one incident during which an

army captain was machine-gunned in Adana, in south eastern Turkey. The reign of terror in

the society on one hand created an atmosphere in which some people welcomed the coup

whilst others deemed it necessary. The level of acceptance of the coup can be demonstrated

on the referendum that overwhelmingly approved the new military constitution with 91.37%

of the votes.

Success

Once again, the chief executive was removed after the use of force. Furthermore,

martial law was declared, thousands of people were imprisoned, radical political parties,

groups and their leaders were banned.

Coup of 1997

Anti-system parties

When the Armed forces took over the country in 1980 they banned all political figures

and parties from the 1970’s for ten years in order not to let the history repeat itself. Old

cadres, however, soon regrouped under new names and through proxy leadership and joined

the Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). Former CHP partisans first

established the Social Democrat Party (Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, SODEP) and Social

Democrat Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP), respectively, which later

merged in 1995 with again lawful CHP. Bülent Ecevit, feeiling left out, established his own

party under the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi, DSP). The situation on the

right side of the political spectrum was very similar as two parties emerged. The first was the

aforementioned the Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party and the other was a new Süleyman

Demirel’s the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP).129

Moreover, the aforementioned

anti-system Islamic and ultranationalist parties were restablished. The former was revived by

Professor Erbakan under a name of a Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) whilst the latter was

129

Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 132-133.

44

revived under a new name of Nationalist Work Party (Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi, MÇP) but

later returned to the old MHP name when the retired Colonel Alparslan Türkeş became the

leader again.

Even though, the military had added a 10 percent national threshold to already existing

d’Hondt formula the desired effect of having only very few relevant parties did not occur.

Surprisingly, the Turkish political party system was experiencing a further fragmentation.

Furthermore, both parties and electorate started moving away from the ideological centre and

moving more towards right as the left in general was being devastated, i.a., by the events in

the Soviet camp, military suppression, and by a popular mistrust caused by the earlier

inability of capable governance. In sum, the Turkish party system found itself fragmentized

and polarized such as in the 1970’s. Only this time the right a far-right pole was much

stronger.

After the elections of 1995 the most probable coalition of ANAP and DYP was formed.

Nevertheless, after 114 days the partnership ended as they were constantly accusing each

other of not being the genuine end legitimate successor of the Demirel’s original party and

trying to eradicate each other.130

To almost everyone's surprise, the next coalition was formed by Demirel’s DYP and

Erbakan’s Welfare Party. Once again, Erbakan happened to be in a government only this time,

having won the general elections with 21.4 %131

in December 1995, he became the Prime

Minister. Thus, Necmettin Erbakan happened to be the first Islamistic Prime Minister of

Turkey in history, a prime minister with an agenda combining Islamism with neo-Osmanism

– an ideological revival of the old Ottoman glory and ideas of panturkism.132

Moreover,

Erbakan was known for his antipathy towards the European Union, claiming that it is a

joint Christian-Zionist project designed to assimilate and de-Islamize Turkey. In 1991 he

uttered the following condemnation:

“I regard the application of Turkey for the full membership in the EC as treason to

our history, civilization, culture, and sovereignty.”133

130

Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 156.

131 “Milletvekili genel seçimi,” Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu Başkanlığı, accessed July 22,

2013, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul.

132 Bassam Tibi, “Turkey’s Islamist Danger. Islamists Approach Europe.” Middle East Quarterly,

http://www.meforum.org/2047/islamists-approach-europe#_ftn13

133 Necmettin Erbakan, Türkiye'nin temel meseleleri (Ankara: Rehber Yayıncılık, 1991), 27.

45

Instead, he called for a closer economic cooperation with other Muslim countries as his

manifesto Milli Görüş defines it.134

The National Outlook (Milli Görüş) manifesto issued by

Necmettin Erbakan in 1975 spoke only in the broadest sense of moral and religious

upbringing, but it also mentioned importance of industrialization, development and economic

independence warning against further rapprochement with Europe. Moreover, he also

suggested replacing capitalism with what he called a “just economic order” (Adil Ekonomik

Düzen), an alternative to both capitalism and socialism based on Islamic principles.

Hoca Erbakan maintained, as the following interview from 2010 proves, also his anti-

Israel/anti-Israelis and anti-Semitic views until his death in 2011 when he said:

“For 5,700 years the Jews have ruled the world. It is a rule of injustice, cruelty and

violence. They have a strong faith, a religion that tells them that they should rule the

world... They rule the world with the capitalist world order. (...) The state of Israel

would have never been founded under the Ottoman Empire. (...) The establishment of

Israel was the real goal of the crusades. ...if the Israelis want to live in peace it would

be better if they lived in e.g. America.”135

Even though the Refah Partisi had obtained 21% in the 1995 elections it represented only a

minority of the population due to a fragmented political scene in Turkey at that time. The rest

of the society was scared by the Erbakan government’s daring performance,136

his open call to

reinstate Sharia, such as he had expressed in his speech on April 13, 1994 when he said that:

“Sharia or the Islamic regime would be brought to Turkey either by ‘soft ways’ or by

‘shedding blood’.”

134

Bruinessen Martin van, “Milli Görüş in Western Europe ” (paper presented at the ISIM workshop, Leiden,

January 9, 2004).

http://www.let.uu.nl/~Martin.vanBruinessen/personal/conferences/Milli_Gorus_workshop_report.htm

135 "Erdogan ist ein Kassierer des Zionismus," Die Welt, November 8, 2010, accessed April 2, 2013,

http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article10769062/Erdogan-ist-ein-Kassierer-des-Zionismus.html.

136 It should be noted here that in contrast to his rhetoric Erbakan was not really able to put through any really

revolutionary bills as he was still in a coalition with DYP and the “secular” checks and balances would not let it

come to life. National Security Council would “advise” them not to do it, the President would not sign it, and the

Constitutional Court would annul it.

46

Likewise, they were scared by the violent manifestation of intolerance against

minorities, such as the Sivas massacre137

of Alevis from July 1993138

in which several local

RP politicians played a major role and later escaped the prosecution.

Even though the Welfare Party recognised the significance of the customs union to the

Turkish economy, the party changed its policy and discourse towards the EU and the West

very little during this period. Moreover, Erbakan worked on his D-8 project that was supposed

to bring together and established an economic union of eight developing countries (hence the

name) with predominantly Muslim population.139

This project was supposed to be the first

step towards a cultural and political union among Muslim countries, a new world order that

would elevate justice above raw force (in international affairs). Refah Partisi, however, stirred

political waters the most with its religious proposal such as rearranging of working hours of

state servants in accordance with Islamic prayer times during the holy month of Ramazan and

with a proposal to let women wear an Islamic headscarf in State schools and buildings

occupied by public administrative authorities140

even though the law forbade it.141

Furthermore, on November 3, 1996, several months after the establishment of the RP-

DYP or the Refahyol,142

the coalition was shaken by a car accident that happened near a small

district town of Susurluk. A car loaded with weapons, silencers, fake ID’s and ammunition

crashed accidentally into a truck and left three people dead on a spot and one passenger

seriously injured. Nonetheless, it was rather the company in the car that was of a wide interest

137

A central Anatolian town of Sivas witnessed an attack against a Madımak hotel where Alevis were taking part

in a cultural festival. More than 30 people burnt to death after an angry mob of religious extremists, surrounded

the hotel and set it ablaze, being infuriated by a presence of self-proclaimed atheist, and translator of Salman

Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, Aziz Nesin. The crowd shouting "the Republic began in Sivas, and in Sivas it will be

destroyed", "death to secularists", and "long live the Shariah", included also RP local politicians and later

defendants such as Yılmaz Bağ or Cafer Erçakmak, a top suspect and a member of the Sivas municipal

council who escaped and went into hiding. “Suspect in 1993 Madımak Massacre dies after 14 years in hiding,”

Hürriyet Daily News, July 11, 2011, accessed April 12, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com.

138 Michelangelo Guida, “The New Islamists’ Understanding of Democracy in Turkey: the Examples of Ali

Bulaç and Hayreddin Karaman,” Turkish Studies 11 (2010): 350.

139 D-8 includes Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan.

140 Saban Taniyici, “Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey : Islamist Welfare Party's Pro-EU.” Party

Politics 9 (2003): 474.

141 Act No. 2547 on Higher Education as amended by the Act, No.3670 in 1990 for the purpose of protection of

the principle of secularism

142 lit. welfare path

47

and later shock for the first body belonged to Abdullah Çatlı, a Grey Wolf and hit man wanted

by Interpol, the other dead was Hüseyin Kocadağ, the head of Istanbul Police academy and

the last corpse was identified as Gonca Us, Abdullah Çatlı’s girlfriend. The only survivor was

Sedat Edip Bucak, a DYP deputy and leader of powerful Kurdish Bucak tribe fighting

alongside the Turkish government the PPK.

Almost immediately after the accident, the parliament set up a commission to find out

why there was such a strange mixture of people in the car. Investigation, as awaited, produced

some disturbing findings. As Hanefi Avcı, an assistant director of the General Security

Directorate Intelligence, testified, some in the state security apparatus deserted lawful means

of combating the PKK as ineffective and rather used extrajudicial ones whatever those might

be.143

Susurluk scandal stirred a public debate because for many people it proved existence of

the “deep state (derin devlet)” i.e. the existence of a connection between the state apparatus

and the Turkish organized crime. The Turkish public, in the mean time, started a protest

called “One minute of darkness for perpetual light (Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika

Karanlık)” in which people were asked to turn off their lights for one minute at 9.00pm every

day as the investigation was not as thorough as promised earlier. Soon after, this protest later

evolved into a mass protest with people blowing their car horns, banging on pots and pans all

around the country every day.144

The evolution and expansion of the protest movement was sped up by the mockery

and negligence from the Refahyol coalition. The prime minister made both fun of the

protesters by saying that they are merely “glu glu dancing” but also addressed them as

“parasites and conspirators...who have nothing to do but create intrigues.” The Minister of

Justice Sevket Kazan said that this “childish playing with the lights will not clean up the

country and that they are playing “candles blown off (mum söndü) by this action.” As there

are countless fallacious beliefs about traditions and ways of lives of all minorities around the

world, there are also many of them about Alevite community in Turkey, one of them being

the aforementioned a “candles blown off” one. The story tells that after the Alevi men and

women get together at night and after the candles are blown off a sexual orgy breaks out. As

expected, not only were people angry by defamations that they understood as an attempt to

143

“VI. Violence Against Journalists. Political Killings.” Human Rights Watch, accessed April 15, 2013,

http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/turkey/turkey993-05.htm.

144 Asli Tunç, “Pushing the Limits of Tolerance. Functions of Political Cartoonists in the Democratization

Process: The Case of Turkey.” International Communication Gazette 64 (2002): 61.

48

cover up the truth but also by the leading figures of the numerous Alevi community protested

against the “candles blown off ” remark. 145

Moreover, these crowds were soon joined by the feminist and middle-class civic

associations that feared that their lifestyle was in danger by the recent and more and more

frequent proclamations from Islamists such as in Kayseri where the local mayor called upon

the faithful not to let revenge and hatred die toward the secular Republic. Another RP mayor

was forced to step down by military tanks in a town of Sincan after having rallied people and

delivered speeches about converting to the path of Sharia and making convert those who

would resist. To top it all, all five major interest groups, representing the employees and

employers of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB), Turkish

Confederation of Small Business (TESK), Turkish Confederation of Business Associations

(TİSK), Turkish Workers’ Unions (TÜRK-İŞ), Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’

Unions (DİSK) announced a common platform to battle the government. 146

In conclusion, this time was not only anti-system party part of a government such as in

the 1970’s but it was the winner of the elections and its leader became the first Islamist Prime

Minister of Turkey. However, the political style and the fact that only approximately 20% of

people voted for his party further divided both the political and sphere. Therefore, the

condition of an anti-system party is, without a doubt, present.

Grievances

The military was this time afraid only of radical Islam and its possible influence on

development of the status quo i.e. the political position within the system. The 18-point

decision of the Turkish National Security Council from February 28, 1997 later handed to

Erbakan and his cabinet summarizes that by stating that:

“1. There shall be no compromise to the anti-regime activities that target the Turkish

Republic, which is a democratic, secular, social, and law-based state. (...) It is

government’s duty to make its policies compatible with the Revolution Laws.

2. (...) The tariqas147

that violate the Revolution Laws should be closed. (...)

145

Zafer F. Yoruk, “One Minute Darkness Leads to Daylong Controversy.” Turkish Daily News, February 14,

1997, accessed April 1, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com.

146 Kalaycioğlu, Turkish Dynamics, 158.

147 Sufi orders.

49

3. It is observed that wearing turban (sarık) and cloak is encouraged. Those who

dresses contradict the Revolution Laws should not be honoured.

4. The abolishment of the article 163 of the Constitution created a legal vacuum and

that resulted in the strengthening of Islamic reactionary movements. (...)

8. There is an ongoing fundamentalist infiltration into the state bureaucracy and

municipalities, the government should stop this infiltration. (...)

9. Iran’s attempts that aim to destabilize the regime in Turkey should be closely

watched. ” (...)

13. Recently, there has been a huge increase of provocations that target the members

of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). These provocations have resulted in discontent in

the TAF. (...)”148

As the Commander of the Navy Güven Erkaya later explained in an interview, armed

force tried to help people realize the threat and second mobilize them against this threat.

Having said earlier that did not want to make a coup d’état and that the coup was to be made

by the civilians he later uttered:

“We thought, if some people want to make Turkey Iran and desire to bring a

theocratic regime instead of democracy, we should first try to deter them by

“rhetoric“.“149

The abolition of the party Welfare Party by the Constitutional Court followed shortly

after the coup, precisely on May 21, 1997. Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation

applied to the Turkish Constitutional Court to have Refah Partisi dissolved on the grounds

that it was a “centre” (mihrak) of activities contrary to the principles of secularism. In support

of his application, he referred to the seven acts and remarks by certain leaders and members of

Refah Partisi. Among others, Erbakan was to make proposal tending towards the abolition of

secularism in Turkey, and advocated the wearing of Islamic headscarves in State schools and

buildings occupied by public administrative authorities. Hoca Erbakan was also to call on

Muslims to join Welfare Party, saying that only his party could establish the supremacy of the

148

Alper Y. Dede, “Islamism, State Control over Religion and Social Identity: Turkey and Egypt” (PhD diss.,

Western Michigan Univesrity, 2008), 388.

149 Azlinn Güney, Aylin, and Petek, Karatekelioğlu, “Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations:

Challenges and Prospects,” Armed Forces & Society 31 (2005): 449, accessed February 28, 2013,

doi:10.1177/0095327X0503100306.

50

Koran through a holy war. The application also mentioned Welfare Party’s representatives

such as Mr. İbrahim H. Celik who was to say in front of journalists in the corridors of the

Parliament that blood would flow if an attempt was made to close the imam-hatip150

schools.

The Constitutional Court then ruled in favour of the Chief Public Prosecutor and dissolved the

Welfare Party as it further existence opposed Article 69 of the Constitution.151

Past coup

The coup of 1997 came seventeen years later than the last one from 1980. However,

not even this time was there a popular resistance to it. As the Refah Partisi was unpopular due

to Islamistic policies and the Refahyol as a whole due to the Susurluk scandal and their

reaction to it the wide public, once again welcomed the military action. The Armed Forces

only invited Erbakan to the meeting of the National Security Council to manifest their

national security concerns to him. Shortly after this meeting Erbakan resigned.

Success of 1997

On February 28, 1997 the government resigned due to military intervention – due to

the so-called postmodern coup d'état. In other words, the chief executive was removed after

the display of force (tanks in Sincan) and the threat to use force in the 18-point decision of the

NSC. The sentence warning that “There shall be no compromise to the anti-regime activities

that target the Turkish Republic, which is a democratic, secular, social, and law-based state”

must have been clear to everzbody.

Inflation of 1997

The worst economic performance, later nicknamed as a ‘lost decade‘, that Turkey has

faced so far occurred in the 1990’s. Inflation again rose to 50% in 1987 and before it reached

120% by the end of 1994 it had been fluctuating between 60% and 70% (see Table 1). In May

150

Secondary educational institutions under the control of the Turkish state to train prayer-readers (imams) and

preachers (hatips).

151 Ergun Özsunay, “The Permissible Scope Of Legal Limitations On The Freedom Of Religion Or Belief In

Turkey,” Emory International Law Review 19 (2005): 1114, accessed February 28, 2013,

http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/eilr/19/19.2/Ozsunay.pdf.

51

of 1995 it dropped down again to around 80%152

where it stayed until the 1997 events. Also

the average growth performance was the worst ever, reaching less than 4 percent of GDP,

which is below the performance during the 1930’s.153

The ‘lost decade‘ of the 1990’s was born out of neoliberal reforms implemented by the

first post-coup Prime Minister Turgut Özal who, influenced by the economic development of

the East Asian countries, wanted to turn Turkey into a modern liberal economic country and

an economic tiger as well. Having won the elections of 1983, he soon started to work on a

plan of reconstructing the Turkish economy by eliminating the protectionist and

interventionist policies and at the same time liberalizing the Turkish market and integrating

the Turkish market into the world economy. 154

However, this strictly market-oriented approach failed greatly and led to the

aforementioned economic crisis later nicknamed the ‘lost decade‘. As well as in Latin

America, the neoliberal “one-size-fits-all” concept concentrated on macroeconomic figures

itself did not bring about the desired prosperity. Additionally, the unregulated and clientelistic

environment gave life to a rent-seeking coalition of state, banks, and enterprises. Political

manipulation of loans orchestrated by this coalition together with irresponsible fiscal policy

led to a high public debt that later resulted in the crisis.155

152

“Statistical Indicators 1923-2011,” Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed April 15, 2013,

http://www.turkstat.gov.tr.

153 Yüksel Görmez, and Serkan Yiğit, The Economic and Financial Stability in Turkey, 16.

154 M. A. Chaudhary, and Levent Koch, “February 2001 Crisis in Turkey: Causes and Consequences.” The

Pakistan Development Review 40 (2001): 467-468, accessed January 14, 2013,

http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/2001/Volume4/467-486.pdf

155 Caner Bakir, and Ziya Öniş, “The Emergence of the Regulatory State: The Political Economy of Turkish

Banking Reforms in the Age of Post-Washington Consensus.” Developement and Change 41 (2010): 81-84,

accessed January 14, 2013,

http://home.ku.edu.tr/cbakir/public_html/Docs/emergence_limits_regulatory_state.pdf.

52

Coup of 2007

Anti-system parties

When the Constitutional Court dissolved Refah Partisi in 1997 Erbakan founded in

1998 his third and last party the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) that was later banned in

2001 even though it was, in comparison with its predecessors, the least radical party. Among

others, it sought to extend religious freedoms, but this time only within the secular

boundaries, it spoke of a support of free trade and building of relations with the EU. Despite

its milder rhetoric this party was also closed down by the Constitutional Court. The reasons

for the ban were same as in 1997 – a possible threat to a secular nature of Turkey.156

This decision resulted in a debate within the party between the modernists

(yenilikçiler) and traditionalists (gelenekçiler), which led to party fragmentation. The party

then officially split into two new parties. The modernists set up Justice and Development

Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP)157

whilst traditionalists Felicity Party (Saadet

Partisi, SP). Felicity Party is now rather insignificant. In 2002 they gained 2.5 %, in 2007

2.3% votes and in 2011 even 1.3 %.158

Since its establishment in 2001 the AKP has been, because of Islamist past of its

members, primarily of interest to the Turkish Armed Forces. The main aim has been to

answer many questions that his party formation and its actions caused in politics. The first of

these were issues related to the aforementioned Islamist past of its members, and whether the

party itself is Islamist or not and if so, how it is a threat to the state as possible anti-system

party.

When the Turkish Justice and Development Party in November 2002, after a landslide

victory in parliamentary elections took over the government, it was a big surprise. Although

156

Bassam Tibi,, “Turkey’s Islamist Danger. Islamists Approach Europe.”

157 Originally Justice and Development Party used the whole name Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or its abbreviation

AKP. Later on they adopted widely used AK Parti form because of its positive meaning in Turkish. The word

“ak” stands for white, clean and also pure which was to contrast with old corrupt parties. The party logo (a light

bulb) resembles the “perpetual light” that was to be brought into the Turkish politics as in 1997 by the “One

minute of darkness for perpetual light (Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık)” protests. “Parti Tüzüğü,

Madde 3 – Partinin Kısaltılmış Adı, Genel Merkezi ve Amblemi.” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, accessed April

16, 2013, http://www.akparti.org.tr.

158 “Milletvekili genel seçimi.” Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu Başkanlığı, accessed April 1, 2013,

http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul.

53

polls suggested that the AKP was going to gain considerable support nobody foresaw that it

will get 34.3%159

of votes and nearly 2/3 of seats in the 550-member Turkish Grand National

Assembly of Turkey respectively. Less than a year old Ak Parti160

owed its victory to

consistent inter-class mobilization and popularity of its members who earlier worked for the

Welfare or Virtue Party, respectively. A significant share of its success was also owed to a

failure of established parliamentary parties that have not been able to cope with the economic

crisis then and have been implicated in numerous corruption scandals.

There has been little consensus about the ideological nature of the AKP. In connection

with the AKP concepts such as traditional Islamism161

and moderate political Islam162

are

being mentioned. There were also concepts created ad hoc for the AKP such as Muslim

conservatism or Muslim democracy.163

However, AKP rejects all these labels and say that

they are a conservative democratic party, as described by thy party ideologue Yalcin Akdoğan

in his book Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi [Ak Party and Conservative Democracy].164

Nonetheless, this time, unlike Refah in the 1990’s, the ruling party had the majority in

the Parliament and was able to govern alone and there was very little what the opposition

could do. Even though there has been a power struggle between the old elite and the AKP

going on within the state so far there has been no evidence whatsoever of any intention to

fundamentally alter the existing regime into a regime from the outside i.e. Islamism.

Therefore, as there are no other possibly relevant anti-system parties, the condition is not

present.

159

“Milletvekili genel seçimleri sonuçları,” Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu Başkanlığ, accessed April 15, 2013,

http://www.turkstat.gov.tr.

160 AKP was founded on August 14 2001. “History of the Justice and Development,” Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,

accessed April 15, 2013, http://eng.akparti.org.tr.

161 Hayri Abaza, and Soner Cağaptay, “Is It Islamic or Islamist?” Newsweek, October 22, 2010, accessed

February 14, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/10/22/is-it-islamic-or-islamist.print.html.

162 Ömer Çaha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Islam. Alternatives:

Turkish Journal of International Relations 1 (2003): 95, accessed February 15, 2013,

http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number1/caha.pdf.

163 Sultan Tepe, “Turkey's AKP: A Model "Muslim-Democratic" Party?”

Journal of Democracy 16 (2005): 69, accessed January 15, 2013, http://muse.jhu.edu.

164 Yalçın Akdoğan, Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi (Istanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım Dağıtım, 2004), 160.

54

Grievances

One AKP has been in more or less conflict situation with the Armed Forces since the

begging. However, one of the peaks in this relationship was reached in 2007 when the

Parliament was to elect a new President. It was obvious that the AKP as the most powerful

parliamentary party would have the biggest chance of pushing forward its candidate.

However, the Armed Forces were against as the presidential office was one of the last

bastions they created over the years in order to maintain their political position. The National

Security Council was already turned into an advisory body in 2003 with a civilian majority.

The last two bulwarks were the institution of president and the Constitutional Court. Army

Chief of Staff, General Büyükanıt, commenting on the presidential election, on 12 April 2007,

expressed his desires as follows:

“I hope a president is chosen that is sincerely dedicated to the basic values of the

Republic, the unitary structure of the state, and a secular and democratic state.” 165

On the election day of April 27, 2007 at 11.17pm General Büyükanıt, Army Chief of Staff expressed,

once again, his worries about the current situation in the so-called “midnight memorandum”, or an

ultimatum, published on the Office of the Chief of General Staff website. This memorandum

later dubbed by many in Turkey as an “e-mail post-modern coup” or an “e-memo”166

reads

that:

“It has been observed that there is a part of the Turkish society that in an ongoing

struggle to undermine the basic values of the Turkish Republic, secularism being at

the forefront and those activities have increased in the recent period. (...) Those that

are anti-Republican, with no other purpose than to erode the basic characteristics of

the state with this retrogressive approach, have expanded the scope of their activities

over the past few days with the developments and discourse of the last few days with

courage. (...) ...such behaviours and implementations are totally in contradiction with

the principle...stated by the General Chief of Staff in a press conference held on the

12th of April, 2007 and they do violate the basic qualifications and provisions of the

165

Abdullah Ural, “Results of the April 27, 2007 Turkish Military’s E-Memorandum,” Interdisciplinary journal

of contemporary research in business 4 (2012): 728, http://journal-archieves26.webs.com/727-737.pdf

166 Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, “Chronology of Turkish military coups: From the 1961 young officers coup to the 2007

e-memo.” Today's Zaman, May 1, 2013, accessed February 28, 2013,

http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=109959

55

Constitution. In recent days, the outstanding problem in the Presidential elections

has been the discussion of secularism. This situation is observed with concern by the

Turkish Armed Forces. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces is

not neutral in these discussions and is the absolute defender of secularism.

Furthermore, the Turkish Armed Forces are definitely against the ongoing

discussions and negative comments and would reveal its attitudes and behaviours

clearly and transparently when necessary. No one should ever doubt about it.

Briefly, whoever is against the philosophy of Ne mutlu Türküm diyene167

the Great

Leader Atatürk is the enemy of the Republic of Turkey and so will he stay.168

The

Turkish Armed Forces still maintains its firm determination to fully carry out its clear

duties assigned to it with laws in order to protect these qualifications and its

commitment and faith in this determination are absolute.”169

Inflation

One of the strongest growths that Turkey has experienced so far took place in

2004/2005. This growth was later followed, as a consequence of reform fatigue, political

uncertainties and the tightening of monetary policy after the exchange rate, by a certain

slowdown in 2007. However, this slow down was nowhere close to the slowdowns in late

1970’s or 1990’s. In 2003 inflation dropped to 12% and later fluctuated between 10% and

12% until 2007 when it fell to 8.7%.170

Before the election of 2002 it was not apparent what economic policy would the

Justice and Development Party would follow. The question was whether it would continue

with the harsh reforms having been implemented by the last government or not. Due to the

crisis of 2001 the economic situation was the number one topic. AKP talked only very broadly

about lowering the poverty, promised greater economic equality and fairer income

distribution.171

167

How happy is he who says I am a Turk is a famous maxim atributed to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

168 Emphasis added by the author.

169 Ural, “Results of the April 27, 2007 Turkish Military’s E-Memorandum,” 730.

170 “Statistical Indicators 1923-2011,” Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed April 15, 2013,

http://www.turkstat.gov.tr.

171 Turkish GINI coefficient in 2002 was reaching 46 on a scale ranging from 0 (most equal) to 100 (least equal).

The GINI coefficient ranged in the EU from Sweden’s 23 to UK’s 35 in 2002. “EurLIFE - Gini index.”

56

As there were many former Refah Partisi and/or Fazilet Partisi members among AKP

ranks it was definitely a surprise to many that Tayyip Erdoğan almost immediately adopted

and further broadened (esp. privatization) ongoing neoliberal reforms while still enjoying

public support. There are many reasons for that. First, the worst job was already done by

Kemal Derviş who needed to stabilize the Turkish economy as soon as possible.172

Second, in

the time of the Erdoğan’s reign the era of fundamental neoliberalism as envisaged by

Washington consensus was long gone and this time it was the “broadened” and less sever

post-Washington consensus as designed by Joseph Stiglitz. Unlike the Washington consensus,

the post-Washington consensus did not try to eliminate the role of a state but rather bring both

together in cooperation and in developing e.g. social safety nets. Second, the success of post-

Washington reforms tamed the galloping inflation (see Table 1) and Erdoğan’s government

thus looked capable in the eyes of the wide public that was suspicious about the future

economic development. Bering in mind how much this is a sensitive issue he used it against

his political CHP opponent Deniz Baykal several times during political rallies. However, not

only has he used fruits of the reforms to promote AKP verbally he used the money to e.g.

develop affordable housing units for low-income groups by redesigning the state Housing

Development Administration (Toplu Konut Idaresi Başkanliği, TOKİ).

This mix of neoliberalism and compensations have created something what Ahmet

Hasim Köse and Serdal Bahçe call a “charity state.”173

The charity state should not be

confused with a welfare state even though they pursue the same goal – the social and

economic security of its citizens. However, the support from a charity state is received either

only once or for a limited time and randomly.174

Last but not least, the AKP supporters based

changed greatly. A new class of Islamic Calvinists has supplied AKP with both human and

financial recourses for they are very similar to their Christian counterparts as described by

European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), accessed April 14,

2013, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu.

172 Hidayet Keskin, et. al.., “Economic and Political Interaction of 2001 Crisis: Implication for 2008 Recession?

(paper prepared for the International Conference on Management and Economics, Albania, Tirana, March 28-29,

2008) http://ces.epoka.edu.al/icme/14.pdf.

173 Ahmet Haşim Köse, and Serdal Bahçe, “Hayırsever, Devletin Yükselişi: AKP Yönetiminde Gelir Dağılımı ve

Yoksulluk.” in AKP Kiabi: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, ed. Ilhan Uzgel, and Bülent Duru, (Ankara: Phoenix

Yayınevi, 2010), 492-509.

174Alper Yağci, “Packaging Neoliberalism: Neopopulism and The Case of Justice and Developement Party.”

(PhD diss., Bogaziçi University, 2009), 85.

57

Max Weber. They are pious and ascetic but also diligent, frugal, solidary and investing with

an eye for the future. In other words, a considerably numerous class of religious and

successful businessmen that does not look at free market suspiciously or hatefully emerged.175

Past Coup

The last coup, the so-called post-modern coup, was staged only ten years ago when Erbakan

resigned from the office of the Prime Minister of Turkey. However, this time, when the Armed

Forces issued a warning in 2007 on their websites it was not enough to succeed as they were

met with a negative reaction from the incumbent government. Even though several hundreds

of thousands-strong rallies176

took place in support of secularism and the government later

resigned it was not due to the threat from the military but due to a legislative gridlock.

Therefore the past coup experience stigma was proven as nothing given and

irreversible. Quite contrary, the premature elections showed that something changed in the

period between 1997 and 2007 – amid the Republic Protests the military activities were for

the first time met with popular disapproval reflected by premature election results that

followed shortly after. Not only did AKP win decisively but received 46.66% of all valid

votes. In other words, this meant six millions votes more than in the elections of 2002 when

AKP received ten millions in total(!).177

175

“The Islamic Calvinist Debate,” European Stability Initative, accessed April 15, 2013,

http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=yu&id=224.

176 So-called Republic Protests (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri)

177 “Statistical Indicators 1923-2011,” Turkish Statistical Institute, accessed April 15, 2013,

http://www.turkstat.gov.tr.

58

Success

As said earlier, the AKP government did resign, however, not after the military’s

threat to use force but after a legislative gridlock.

Furthermore, the government did not, unlike preceding governments, retreat and through the

AK Parti spokesman Cemil Çiçek, announced in a rather courageous way, i.a., that:

“...We would like to express that, the fact that the General Staff which is an institution

associated to the Prime Minister uses an expression against the Government in any

subject is unthinkable in a democratic State of law. The General Staff is an institution

under the command of the Government, the functions of which are determined with the

Constitution and the related laws....”178

Nonetheless, the bravery of the AKP leadership was of little help for the opposition CHP used

its right and applied to the Constitutional Court to stop the election process in case the future

president was elected with fewer than 2/3 of all i.e. 367 deputies of the Grand National

Assembly. On April 27, 2007 CHP, DYP, and ANAVATAN boycotted the very first round,

thus there were only 357 deputies in the parliament. Immediately, CHP applied to the

Constitutional Court for it was not conducted according to the law.179

Two days later the Constitution Court declared that in order to elect a president there must be

at least 2/3 of all i.e. 367 deputies of the Assembly present during the process and thus the

first round was void.180

The AKP found itself in a stalemate and had no other option than to

resign and call early elections.

Therefore, even though the Armed Forces threatened to use force the government only

resigned after the legislative gridlock. Hence, the success was not present.

178

Abdullah Ural, “Results of the April 27, 2007 Turkish Military’s E-Memorandum,” Interdisciplinary Journal

of Contemporary Research in Business 4 (2012): 731, accessed April 22, 2012, http://journal-

archieves26.webs.com/727-737.pdf.

179 Gökhan Bacik, “The Parliamentary Elections in Turkey, July 2007,” Electoral Studies 27 (2008), 378.

180 Bacik, “The Parliamentary Elections in Turkey, July 2007,” 378.

59

Research

The abovementioned findings lead to the following table where there are seven

different conditions combinations: past coups experience (PCO), an anti-system party or

parties (ASP), high inflation (INF), corporate grievances (CG). There is also an outcome in

the table: successful coup (SC).

Data Table

PCO ASP INF CG SC

1960 0 0 0 1 1

1962 1 0 0 0 0

1963 1 0 0 0 0

1971 1 0 0 1 1

1980 1 1 1 1 1

1997 1 1 1 1 1

2007 1 0 0 1 0

The table above shows that there was a past coup experience present at the time of all

coups but in 1960 received, hence all PCO’s received (1). Accordingly, coups of 1980, and

1997 received (1) as there were the only ones with relevant anti-system political parties. Due

to high inflation over 20% only coups of 1980 and 1997 received (1). All coups received (1)

but those from 1962, and 1963 for the corporate grievances. Hence the following truth table,

having put the same conditions and outcomes together and where there are as many rows as

combinations, is as follows:

Truth Table

PCO ASP INF CG SC

1960 0 0 0 1 1

1962, 1963 1 0 0 0 0

1971, 2007 1 0 0 1 C

1980, 1997 1 1 1 1 1

The table indicates two combinations leading to a successful coup, two combinations

that do not and one contradictory combination where the same conditions, probably due to

wrong calibration produced the exactly opposite outcome. As we are interested in

combinations of conditions leading to successful coups only there are only two combinations

to our interest. Hence we create a Boolean formula where capital letters signalize presence of

a given condition and lower cases the opposite:

pco*asp*inf*CG + PCO*ASP*INF*CG → SC

60

This formula implies that a combination of no previous experience with coups, no

anti-system party in the political system and corporate grievances or that a combination of

previous experience with coups, anti-system party in the political system and corporate

grievances leads to a successful coup.

First, the contradictory outcome of the coup of 1971 and 2007 needs a further analysis. The

reason for this opposite outcome is caused by either neglecting some other conditions or this happened

due to insensitive calibration.

Therefore, we will recalibrate the past coup experience strictly ten years as Bueno de

Mesquita, Siverson and Woller suggest based on their empirical findings. As a result we get the

table below. There is no need for a new truth table as it is obvious that there are contradictory cases.

PCO ASP INF CG SC

1960 0 0 0 1 1

1962 1 0 0 0 0

1963 1 0 0 0 0

1971 1 0 0 1 1

1980 1 1 1 1 1

1997 0 1 1 1 1

2007 0 0 0 1 0

Therefore, we need to include another condition instead of recalibrating our original

conditions. Our new condition will concern regime legitimacy such as the ASP. As the regime

legitimacy can be defined as consent between rulers and ruled we can conclude that lack of

legitimacy is accompanied with discontent. Such discontent is usually represented by the

aforementioned presence of anti-system parties or by anti-governmental violent protests

where people die after the clashes with state forces.

PCO PRO INF CG SC

1960 0 0 0 1 1

1962 1 0 0 0 0

1963 1 0 0 0 0

1971 1 1 0 1 1

1980 1 1 1 1 1

1997 1 0 1 1 1

2007 1 0 0 1 0

61

PCO PRO INF CG SC

1960 0 0 0 1 1

1962, 1963 1 0 0 0 0

1971 1 1 0 1 1

1980 1 1 1 1 1

1997 1 0 1 1 1

2007 1 0 0 1 0

The basic formula including four possible combinations is as follows:

pco*pro*inf*CG + PCO*PRO*inf*CG + PCO*PRO*INF*CG + PCO*pro*INF*CG → SC

Using a logical minimization method, similar to Mill’s method of difference, these

four combinations can be minimized to only three combinations by eliminating the differing

values whilst the others are the same. Hence the combinations are reduced as follows:

PCO*PRO*CG + PCO*INF*CG + pco*pro*inf*CG → SC

This formula suggests that previous experience with coups, violent protests and

corporate grievances or previous experience with coups, high inflation and corporate

grievances or no previous experience with coups, no violent protests and corporate grievances

are sufficient combinations of necessary combinations which together lead to coup but a coup

can occur without these combinations being present.

Nevertheless, the last combination is against almost all hypotheses stated at the

beginning of this study. Of course, hypotheses can and must be falsifiable but mere presence

of corporate grievances, no coup experience, no violent protests, and low inflation is highly

unlikely to lead to a successful coup. Therefore, a closer look at the year of 1960 is

necessary. Without a doubt, the coup of 1960 was the first coup in the modern history of

Turkey. Although the coup of 1960 was the first coup in history of modern Turkey and even

though Kemal Karpat noted that by this intervention armed forces departed from an ancient

Ottoman tradition of mere influencing the Turkish politics,181

there were several other coups

having taken place not very long ago. In fact, a military coup became somehow accepted as a

181

Kemal H. Karpat, Recent Political Developments in Turkey and Their Social Background, 304.

62

regular political mean at the end of the Ottoman Empire such as in 1913 when military

officers seized the power. Moreover, one must not forget how the Turkish republic was born

and how Mustafa Kemal rose to power. He himself a Mareşal182

and a Gazi183

when trying to

abolish the Sultanate in the autumn of 1922 resorted to a coup. The pretext for the abolition

was the “unauthorized” representation of Turkey by Sultan Mehmet VI on the Lausanne

Conference in 1922. Mustafa Kemal proposed to the national Assembly the abolition of the

Sultanate and the expulsion of the Sultan. The Assembly, cautious of possible future

consequences set up a Commission to consult historical precedents. Mustafa Kemal warned

them with a possible arrest if they delayed. The Commission later sided with the Mustafa

Kemal’s proposition of abolition and expulsion. The Assembly accepted the Commission’s

position but only after Mustafa Kemal placed armed guards over the Assembly with loaded

revolvers. The last Sultan than unceremoniously boarded a British warship and left the

country.184

As the modern Turkish republic was not born a tabula rasa on October 29, 1923 it, as

a consequence, inherited much from the Ottoman political experience and practices one of

them being a military coup as a political mean (as the absence of popular resistance against

the coups or sometimes a welcoming of the coups confirms). Additionally,

the Ottoman military elite became the elite of the emerging Republic as the reformers,

revolutionaries, and Mustafa Kemal himself were soldiers. As a result, Mustafa Kemal

became the first president, Ali Fethi Okyar one of the first Prime Ministers (1924-

1925), Kâzım Özalp the Minister of National Defence (1922-1924, 1935-1939),

and İsmet İnönü the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and later also the Prime Minister (several

times) and President of the Turkish Republic.185

Last but not least, all presidents, but Celâl

Bayar, were until Turgut Özal’s presidency in 1989, former military personnel.

182

Mil. a Marshall

183 A title given to war veterans. Mustafa Kemal received this honorary title for the War of Independence. Both

Mareşal and Gazi were given to him by the Turkish National Assembly on September 19, 1921 which today

marks the Veterans Day in Turkey. “Who is Veteran?” Turkish War Veterans Association, accessed March 15,

2013, http://muharipgaziler.org.tr/english/

184 Philips M. Price, A History of Turkey. From Empire to Republic. (New York: The Macmillan Company,

1956), 126.

185 Gerasimos Karabelias, “The Evolutiuon of Civil-Military Relations in Post-war Turkey 1980-95” in Seventy-

Five Years of the Turkish Republic, ed. Sylvia Kedourie (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 130.

63

Last but not least, the first, even though not first after a coup, fair elections took place as late

as in 1950.

Therefore even though there were no coups before 1960 we could include this

condition as present (1) in case of the coup of 1960 as the legacy of the late Ottoman

experience lived on in political culture and in the “new old” elite of the new republic.

After the minimizations we would get a neat formula of:

PCO*CG → SC

This formula implies that there is only one sufficient combination of necessary

conditions and that is experience with past coup and presence of corporate grievances.

However, this combination is irrelevant as the coup of 2007 and 1960 when both having (1)

for past coup experience lead to the opposite outcome.

Further changes to the calibration of the protest condition can be done for the protest

can be violent though not deadly and still induce a repression from incumbent government as

an overreaction and a signal of knowing what to do. There were mass protests preceding

several coups that called for curfews and other limitations of civil rights in order to tame the

violence.

PCO PRO INF CG SC

1960 0 1 0 1 1

1962, 1963 1 0 0 0 0

1971 1 1 0 1 1

1980 1 1 1 1 1

1997 1 0 1 1 1

2007 1 0 0 1 0

If we change the “protest” condition from deadly to violent we will get a formula

implying that there are two sufficient combinations of necessary conditions. The first is

presence of violent protests, low inflation, and corporate grievances or past coup experience,

high inflation, and corporate grievances.

PRO*inf*CG + PCO*INF*CG → SC

As we can change and recalibrate conditions we can also leave the condition out or

replace it with another condition as it was done here where “past coup experience” was

replaced by “relevant anti-system party.” The reason for a removal of “past coup experience”

64

is that this “tradition” is hard to prove. In 1960, almost 40 years after the last coup the Turkish

citizens accepted the coup of 1960 as if it was another constitutional mean of that time.

However, in 2007, approximately 10 years after the last coup the Turkish government and

society opposed it.

ASP PRO INF CG SC

1960, 1971 0 1 0 1 1

1962, 1963 0 0 0 0 0

1980 1 1 1 1 1

1997 1 0 1 1 1

2007 0 0 0 1 0

asp*PRO*inf*CG + ASP*INF*CG → SC

Therefore, this time no relevant anti-system party in the Parliament, violent mass

protests, low inflation, and corporate grievances or anti-system party, high inflation, and

corporate grievances are each a sufficient combination of necessary conditions.

If we leave out the omnipresent condition “corporate grievances” the table will look as

follows:

ASP PRO INF SC

1960, 1971 0 1 0 1

1962, 1963 0 0 0 0

1980 1 1 1 1

1997 1 0 1 1

2007 0 0 0 0

We get the following formula:

asp*PRO*inf + ASP*INF → SC

65

Conclusion

This thesis tried to answer the research question what conditions or sets of conditions

led to successful coups in the modern Turkish history by applying a crisp set Qualitative

Comparative method. At first, four hypotheses were formulated based on the various coup

theories in order to be tested. The first hypothesis stated that when the Armed forces perceive

threats to their corporate interests i.e. interests shared by every soldier such as autonomy,

monopoly, honour, and political position it is likely they will stage a successful coup. The

second hypothesis claimed that a high inflation marked by numbers over 20% over a period of

at least two years leads to vulnerable society and makes the incumbent government look

incompetent. This enables the Armed Forces to “step in” and “clean out the mess” and restore

the order by staging a successful coup a successful coup. The third hypothesis claimed that a

presence of at least one relevant anti-system party makes a party system vulnerable and thus

enables the Armed Forces to “step in” and “clean out the mess” by staging a successful coup

whilst the fourth and last hypothesis stated that there is high probability of a successful coup

in a regime that experienced another successful coup whilst the gap between them is not more

than 20 years.

Then, the conditions were calibrated and the outcome as a successful coup was

conceptualized. The study further looked at the empirical findings of each condition and

outcome and decided whether it was present (1) or (2). The following application of the QCA

method produced following findings.

The findings from the QCA research indicate that corporate grievances are nearly

every time in all sufficient combinations of necessary conditions. As said in the introduction,

the army elite are more or less all the time concerned with their corporate grievances. This

omnipotence of corporate military grievances distorts our final results and as there are not

more cases only assume that corporate grievances are definitely not a sufficient condition of a

successful. In other words, it is not enough for the Armed Forces to be just concerned to stage

a successful coup. It is probably a necessary condition, however more cases with “success”

i.e. more successful coups would be needed to be taken into consideration.

However, this maybe empirically true in other countries and inflation was present in several

formulas it is not a case of Turkey even though it experienced waves of inflation revolving

around 100’s for some time. The severe inflation always hit Turkey together with other

economic difficulties therefore further conceptualisation is necessary. Moreover, Turks have

66

always protested and clashed with each other such as in the 1970’s. However, the most violent

riots and battles were fought mostly for religious, ethnical and/or other reasons. Yet, there

were trade union strikes throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s. However, how to compare these

strikes as a closer look at the era after the coup of 1980, i.e. the era with highest inflation,

reveals that the legal setting of the third republic made it very difficult to assemble and

associate as new laws made it difficult if not nearly impossible. Even though the Article 33 of

the Constitution stated that “Everyone has the right to form association without prior

permission.” the Article also continued to say that “associations shall not pursue political

aims, engage in political activities, receive support from or give support to political parties,

or take joint action with labour unions, with public professional organizations or with

foundations in order to assemble needed a permission from a local assemble as

demonstrations and meetings were possible only after the prior, and form a trade union.”186

Additionally, persons aspiring to form an association had to be 18 years of age or older

and not deprived of the use of their civil rights. Furthermore, there was a list of people not

allowed to do so even though they had fulfilled the aforementioned criteria such as judges,

prosecutors, law enforcement personnel, soldiers, public servants, elementary and high school

teachers, college professors, elementary and high school students, college students, etc.187

Therefore, this new environment made the Turkish civil society atrophy.

The Constitution was later amended in 2001 and reads that “Everyone has the right to

hold unarmed and peaceful meetings and demonstration marches without prior permission”

and that they will “only be restricted by law on the grounds of national security, and public

order, or prevention of crime commitment, public health and public morals or for the

protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”188

Later, when the AK Parti got to power in

2002 the harmonization process with the EU legal framework started and as one of the

consequences of the process the reforms of 2003 further liberalized the Law on Meetings and

Demonstrations.

Yet, and it seems that the AK Parti has adopted the “civil martial law” approach when

it comes to labour movement and union activities (and some assemblies as well) and has used

186

Lois Whitman and Thomas Froncek, Paying the Price: Freedom of Expression in Turkey, Human Rights

Watch, 1989, 105.

187 Ibid., 106.

188 B. Right to hold meetings and demonstration marches. Article 34- (As amended on October 3, 2001; Act No.

4709), Constitution Of The Republic Of Turkey, http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

67

the national security argument several times. For instance, there have been nine large strikes

in factories that belong among the Turkey’s leading industrial groups during the period

between 2000 and 2007. Eight out of these nine strikes were postponed by the government for

the national security was threatened and when it was resumed or the court ruled in favour of

the protesters the government added public health concerns such as in 2004 when a strike in

Kristal-İş was held.189

Last but not least, the constitutional amendments of 2007 drafted by

the Ak parti left the Article 33 on Freedom of Association intact.

On the other hand, the terrorist attacks, now perpetrated mainly by the PKK (see Table

8), peaked in 1992 and the clashes between the PKK and the state security forces were limited

to south-eastern Turkey mostly.

The relevant anti-system party condition is also not convincing. Once it came out with

the high inflation and then with high inflation and corporate grievances. The second case was

the coup of 1997, however, the successful coup was not caused only by the presence of the

Refah Partisi, high inflation and corporate grievances but by other conditions such as tensions

in the society infuriated by the Susurluk scandal.

The theory about past coup experience is probably, at least in case of Turkey, the most

difficult to prove or disapprove. The coup of 1960 came nearly 40 years after the last coup

and yet the Turkish society welcomed it as necessary. On the other hand, the coup attempt

from 2007 shows that even though there was only a gap of 10 years between the last and the

current coup it was opposed by both government and later in the elections by the people and it

was accepted.

Therefore, also role of the civil society its attitude towards the Armed Forces should

be further examined because army needs people’s support in order to avoid civil war. Thus,

other conditions disrupting society should be also closely examined.

In sum, the research produced many possible combinations which few of them were

satisfying. There are several reasons for that. One of them is insensitive calibration. The

second is wrong choice of conditions and the last and most probable, there were too few cases

in order to fully use the potential of the csQCA.

189

Betül Urhan and Seydi Çelik, “Perceptions of “National Security” in Turkey and Their Impacts on the Labor

Movement and Trade Union Activities,” European Journal of Turkish Studies 11 (2010), accessed January 23,

2013, http://ejts.revues.org/4333.

68

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ABSTRAKT

Předkládaná práce představuje a popisuje jednotlivé události, které podle hypotéz sestavených

na základě teorií popsaných v úvodu, snaží odpovědět na otázku, co vede k úspěšným

převratům v Turecku. Práce k tomu používá metodu, která kombinuje výhody jak

kvalitativních, tak kvantitativních metod. V této práci byla konkrétně vybrána crisp set

Qualitative Comprative Analysis resp. csQCA. Podle logiky této metody jsme si nejprve

stanovili podmínky (conditions), které vedou k výstupu (outcome). Tyto podmínky byly

vysoká inflace, přítomnost anti-systémové strany, nedávná zkušenost s převraty nebo

převratem a poslední podmínkou byla organizační křivda čili corporate grievances. Jako

výsledek byl určen úspěšný převrat. Výzkum vykázal několik možných kombinací vzniku

převratu, avšak s ne moc přesvědčivě. Důvodů bylo pravděpodobně hned několik – malý

počet případů, špatná kalibrace a nevhodná volba podmínek.

ABSTARACT

This study tries to answer the research question what leads to a succesful coup in Turkey. The

method of research was a crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis or csQCA that combines

the of both qualitative and quantitative methods. As this study used csQCA first we needed to

state hypotheses that predict the possible outcome i.e. a successful coup. There were four

conditions identified. The first, presence of an anti-system party. The second, military

corporate grievances. The third, past coup experience and the fourth and the last was high

inflation. The research produced many possible combinations which few of them were

satisfying. There are several reasons for that. One of them is insensitive calibration. The

second is wrong choice of conditions and the last and most probable, there were too few cases

in order to fully use the potential of the csQCA.