DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES · 2015-06-30 · DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES . POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS . Institutional

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND

CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

Institutional and Constitutional aspects of Special Interest Representation

STUDY

Abstract

The European Parliament is lobbied by growing numbers of special interests; their activity is greater in Committees dealing with issues on integration & regulation, and procedures under OLP, CNS and INI. Significantly, the density and diversity of accredited interests across committees mirrors patterns observed in registered groups across Commission DGs. Based on a survey of MEPs the report notes variation in the activity of interest groups across the policy cycle while influential groups are considered those that provide a mix of European level technical and political expertise; overall the Transparency Register is considered to improve the behaviour of interest representatives.

PE 519.229 EN

DOCUMENT REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

AUTHORS

Professor David Coen, School of Public Policy, University College London Mr Alexander Katsaitis, School of Public Policy, University College London

RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR

Mr Petr Novak Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs European Parliament B-1047 Brussels E-mail: [email protected]

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS

Original: EN

ABOUT THE EDITOR

Policy Departments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny.

To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its monthly newsletter please write to: [email protected]

Manuscript complete in June 2015. © European Union, 2015.

This document is available on the Internet at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/supporting‐analyses‐search.html

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/supporting-analyses-search.html

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

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Institutional & constitutional aspects of special interest representation

CONTENTS

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................... 5

LIST OF DEFINITIONS.......................................................................................................... 7

LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................... 8

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. 9

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....................................................................................................11

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................17

1 SPECIAL INTERESTS’ SUPPLY & THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT .............................18

1.1 Special interests & the European Parliament .............................................................. 18

1.2 The growth of Special Interests & the Transparency Register .............................. 20

1.3 A Profile of Accredited Interests....................................................................................... 22

1.3.1 Which interests groups are accredited? ........................................................................ 22

1.3.2 Accredited Organizations & Head Offices .................................................................... 26

1.4 Interim Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 28

2 SPECIAL INTEREST ACTIVITY & THE NATURE OF POLICY FIELDS ...........................30

2.1 Accredited Interests & Policy Fields ................................................................................ 30

2.2 Accredited Interests & Policy Field Clustering ............................................................ 32

2.2.1 5 clusters of special interest activity ............................................................................... 33

2.3 Special Interests across the European Parliament & the European Commission ............................................................................................................................................... 35


3 SPECIAL INTERESTS & COMMITTEES OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ...............40

3.1 Accredited Interests & Committees. ............................................................................... 40

3.2 Clustering of Committees ................................................................................................... 43

3.2.1. In-House clustering across committees ........................................................................ 44

3.2.2. NGO clustering & committees .......................................................................................... 45

3.3 Committee Activity & Special Interests ......................................................................... 47


4 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT & MEPs PERSPECTIVES ON SPECIAL INTERESTS ...53

4.1 Special Interests & Hearings .............................................................................................. 53

4.2 Rapporteur Interactions with Special Interests; Committee Reports ................ 56

4.3 Survey of Members of European Parliament .............................................................. 59

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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs

4.3.1 Frequency of Lobbying ....................................................................................................... 59

4.3.2 Lobbying Policy Cycle .......................................................................................................... 61

4.3.3 Influence & Information and Expertise .......................................................................... 64

4.3.4 MEPs & the TR .......................................................................................................................... 68


CONCLUSIONS, OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................71

Key Observations ..................................................................................................................................... 71

Key Considerations ................................................................................................................................. 72

Recommendations .................................................................................................................................. 73

REFERENCES...................................................................................................................... 75

APPENDIX.......................................................................................................................... 79

Special interest activity across EP committees; Methodology ............................................... 79

Special interest activity across EP committees *tmax version ............................................... 81

Total Output Per Committee Per Procedure; 7th EP.................................................................... 82

Correlation Analyses ............................................................................................................................... 83

Questionnaire ........................................................................................................................................... 89

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

ACI Inter institutional Agreement procedure

AFCO Constitutional Affairs Committee

AFET Foreign Affairs Committee

AGRI Agriculture & Rural Development Committee

APP Consent Procedure

AVC Assent Procedure

BUD Budgetary Procedure

BUDG Budgets Committee

CNS Consultation Procedure

COD Ordinary Legislative Procedure

CONT Budgetary Control Committee

COS Strategic Document procedure

CULT Culture & Education Committee

DCE Written declaration, Rule 116

DEC Discharge Procedure

DEVEL Development Committee

DG Directorate General

DROI Human Rights Committee

ECON Economic & Monetary Affairs Committee

EMPL Employment & Social Affairs Committee

ENVI Environment, Public Health & Food Safety Committee

EP European Parliament

FEMM Women’s' Rights & Gender Equality Committee

IMCO Internal Market & Consumer Protection Committee

INI Own Legislative Procedure Committee

INI Own Initiative Report procedure

INL Legislative Initiative Procedure

INS Institutional Procedure: appointment or motion of censure

INTA International Trade Committee

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Industry, Research & Energy CommitteeITRE Legal Affairs CommitteeJURI Lobbying FootprintLF Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs CommitteeLIBE Member StateMS Non-legislative EnactmentsNLE Ordinary Legislative Procedure OLP Fisheries CommitteePECH Petitions Committee PETI Regional Development CommitteeREGI Regulatory Procedure with ScrutinyRPS Security & Defence Committee SEDE Cooperation ProcedureSYN Transparency Register TR Transport & Tourism Committee TRAN

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LIST OF DEFINITIONS

Accredited Organization: Organizations with individuals authorized to access the premises of the European Parliament. The authorization is for specific individuals of the organization that must undergo a security check before obtaining it, and lasts one year. These organizations are listed on the Transparency Register and have at least one individual with an authorization.

Accredited Individuals/ Persons: Individuals of Organisations authorized to access the premises of the European Parliament, the authorization lasts one year and is non-transferable. These individuals are listed on the Transparency Register as accredited persons.

Registered Organizations: Organizations that are registered on the Transparency Register. These organizations are interested in lobbying the European Parliament and/ or the European Commission. However, they do not necessarily have accredited individuals. These organizations are de facto primarily interested in European Commission activities.

Transparency Register: Online register set up in June 2011 by the European Parliament and the European Commission where special interests lobbying these EU institutions must provide detailed information regarding their organization including name, type of organization, relevant activities, number of staff involved and financial disclosure of lobbying budget. Organizations with accredited individuals (see above) are also on the Transparency Register.

For more information please go to: http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?locale=en#en

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Correlation of Accredited Persons and Committee Output ............................................................. 50

Table 2 Speakers invited at Hearings per Committee per EP legislature.................................................... 54

Table 3 Special Interests Appearing in Hearings across the 6th and 7th EP ................................................. 55

Table 4 Reports per Committee and those containing LF Annex.................................................................. 57

Table 5 Number of Reports with LF per Political Group, per MS of Rapporteur ...................................... 58

Table 6 Q7 Responses as a percentage of total .................................................................................................... 65

Table 7 Q10 Responses as a percentage of total.................................................................................................. 69

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Accredited organizations & persons per type of interest.................................................................. 12

Figure 2 Distribution of groups registered and accredited (*).......................................................................... 13

Figure 3 Accredited Persons per Committee (mid-2012 to mid-2014) ......................................................... 14

Figure 4 Q6 Responses as a percentage of total: When are you contacted most often by interest groups during the policy cycle? .................................................................................................................. 15

Figure 5 Accredited organizations & persons per type of interest.................................................................. 23

Figure 6 Accredited organizations per type of interest; percentage ............................................................. 23

Figure 7 Percentage of accredited persons per type of organization ........................................................... 25

Figure 8 Accredited In-House groups with a head office in Brussels; percentage.................................... 26

Figure 9 Accredited NGO groups with a Head Office in Brussels; percentage ........................................... 27

Figure 10 Accredited organizations per type per policy field ............................................................................. 31

Figure 11 Cluster analysis of accredited interests (average between linkages) ........................................... 34

Figure 12 Distribution of different types of registered interest groups .......................................................... 36

Figure 13 Distribution of different types of accredited interest groups.......................................................... 36

Figure 14 Registered vs. Accredited Interests (*) ...................................................................................................... 37

Figure 15 Special interest activity across EP committees (accredited groups) ............................................. 41

Figure 16 Accredited Persons per Committee (mid-2012 to mid-2014). ........................................................ 42

Figure 17 In-House groups cluster analysis ................................................................................................................ 45

Figure 18 NGO groups cluster analysis......................................................................................................................... 46

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Figure 19 Output across 9 categories for all 20 Committees of the 7th EP .................................................... 48

Figure 20 Number of accredited individuals & Total Output per Committee ............................................... 49

Figure 21 Hearings per Committee per EP ................................................................................................................. 54

Figure 22 Q2 Responses as a percentage of total .................................................................................................... 60




Figure 26 Q4 responses as a percentage of total ..................................................................................................... 64

Figure 27 Q7 Responses in absolute numbers .......................................................................................................... 65



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study provides an assessment of special interest activity in the European Parliament. The information presented is an extensive analysis of accredited interest activity across policy fields and committees drawing from data on the Transparency Register of the European Parliament and European Commission, a content analysis of committee hearings and lobbying footprint annexes accessible through the EP’s online archive, and an original survey of MEPs’ attitudes to interest groups and the TR.

Part 1 presents the context of the study and information on the overall special interest activity faced by the European Parliament. It analyses a total of 1,549 accredited organizations and 4,171 accredited persons active at the time of data collection.

Part 2 examines the distribution and clustering of different types of accredited interests across 36 policy fields and compares special interest activity across 18 central policy fields, between the EP and the European Commission as a proportion of their activity.

Part 3 analyses the activity of special interests across the committees of the EP by assessing the distribution of 10,000 accredited persons from mid-2012 to mid-2014. It evaluates the correlation between type of committee procedures (output) and lobbying activity. Finally this section examines how different types of interests tend to cluster across committees.

Part 4 explores MEPs perspectives on special interest activity and attitudes to transparency through an original survey sent out between October 2014 and March 2015. This section also assesses the interaction between rapporteurs and interest groups through a content analysis of 595 committee reports (from AGRI, ECON, ENVI, IMCO, LIBE). Finally, the report identifies large stakeholders through an examination of special interests invited to committee hearings across the 6th and 7th EP.

Special interests aim at influencing EU policy primarily through the supply of information to institutions. To make best use of their resources and maximize their impact, interest organisations target actors, institutions and stages in the policy cycle that offer greater opportunity to influence. Thus, the more powerful and accessible the policymaker the more attention he/ she will receive from interest groups. The European Parliament has acquired a more powerful role within the institutional architecture of the EU. In particular the Lisbon Treaty shifted almost all remaining policy areas under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. Consequently, the EP has become a central target for special interests, observing heightened focus during the committee amendment phase.

In part 1 we show the overall distribution of different types of interests and create a profile of interests.

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The TR offers one of the most wide-ranging lobbying databases in the world.

Based on the above we provide the following recommendations

1. The EP could consider further supporting public interests (civil society), both at the national and European level.

2. Enhancing cross-committee activity of special interests could increase the quality of the policymaking process and safeguards against the creation of interest group insiders within specific committees.

3. The EP could consider enhancing the European Parliament Research Service’s resources and the resources of committee secretariats in order to lessen the dependency on special interest expertise or the risk of capture by monopolies of information.

4. The EP could consider re-examining the practice of legislative footprints. Currently a voluntary practice, there are few reports which annex such a footprint and the variation in models used illustrates a need to reassess this practice and its value.

5. Member State and regional representatives appear to be particularly active in contacting MEPs. The activities of government/ national/ regional representatives could be logged in a separate register.

6. Inclusion of the Council of the EU in the Inter Institutional Agreement on the TR would assist the mapping and understanding of inter-institutional lobbying.

7. Special interests could be further encouraged to record in the TR through which other organizations they access the policy process for specific files. In addition information about networks created between interest groups could also be made available.

8. The EP could require its administrators to communicate primarily with special interests registered on the TR, in a similar fashion to the Commission incentive.

9. The European Parliament and the European Commission could become leaders in the field of transparency and good governance by making information already accessible, such as participants at hearings or the lobbying footprint, more easily available.

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INTRODUCTION

In April 2014 the European Parliament awarded University College London the tender entitled “Institutional and constitutional aspects of special interest representation”. The terms of reference of the call focused on the activity (density & diversity) of special interests (interest groups) across the EP, its policy fields & committees, and their relationship with MEPs.

A team from the School of Public Policy, University College London, provided a research design that carried out: a quantitative analysis of the activity of special interests available on the TR, across 36 policy fields and 20 Committees; a content analysis of legislative footprints available and examined EP hearings; and finally designed and conducted an original survey of MEPs’ perceptions of special interest groups and the TR.

This report is composed of four parts:

Part 1 presents the context of the report and an overview of the activity of special interests across the EP using a data-set of 1,549 accredited interests and 4,171 accredited persons; it offers a profile of special interests.

Part 2 provides an examination of the activity of special interests across policy fields and compares this information with similar data on the European Commission. It provides a fine grained analysis of interest group distribution across EU policy fields.

Part 3 assesses the activity of special interests across committees using data on 10,000 accredited persons from mid-2012 to mid-2014. Moreover, it inspects the relationship between special interest activity and committee output under different procedures. It offers an in depth examination of interest group activity across EP committees and the impact of the procedure. There is also an analysis of the networks of committees special interests lobby.

Part 4 is based on primary data collected through a survey sent out to MEPs, in addition it analyses secondary data on committee reports and hearings. This section offers a unique analysis of special interests in the EP, from perceptions on influence to lobbying across the policy cycle.

Part 5 presents the conclusions of the study, observations and recommendations.

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1 SPECIAL INTERESTS’ SUPPLY & THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

KEY FINDINGS

Business interests, such as associations (trade, business, professional) and companies, represent the largest grouping in the EP, taking up more than 50% of accredited organizations and accredited persons. Public interests such as NGOs are at 23% for both categories.

Professional consultancies cover 14% accreditations and 18% of accredited persons; their ratio of accredited persons per organization surpasses that of NGOs.

NGOs are the 2nd largest category of accredited interests and have more head offices in Brussels as a percentage (54%) than business interests (37%)

The EP is at the receiving end of intense lobbying activity, which raises questions about the type of groups it interacts with and their characteristics. This first part of the report provides the general research frame of the study and describes the relationship between the EP and special interests. Information on accredited interests, profile and activities of the interest groups are provided.

1.1 Special interests & the European Parliament

Special interests aim at influencing EU policy primarily through the supply of information and expertise to institutions (Coen & Richardson 2009, Weale 2011). Acting as rational actors they aim for optimal use of their resources to maximize their impact. The more powerful and accessible the policymaker the more attention she/ he will receive from special interests. Over the years the European Parliament has acquired an influential role within the EU’s institutional architecture. This empowerment started with the introduction of the co-decision (COD) procedure in the Treaty of Maastricht and continued with the expansion of its scope across policy fields with proceeding treaties. The Lisbon Treaty shifted almost all policy fields into the renamed COD: Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP). This has turned the EP in a co-legislating institution that impacts Commission proposals through amendments with the power to veto proposals. In addition both the political and administrative sections of the EP have seen their resources, their experience and their networks expanded; augmenting the policymaking strength of the EP beyond the strictly constitutional/ formal level. As a co-legislating institution embedded into the formal and informal aspects of the policy cycle along with the Council of the European Union and the Commission; the EP has significant power to shape and influence the EU agenda. This has made the Institution an important lobbying target.

The EP is the directly elected institution for the EU’s 500 million people and the world’s largest trading block. In order to remain a legitimate institutional actor the EP must produce policy that is both representative and of high quality (Bellamy 2010). Thus it demands information and expertise from policy stakeholders across the multiple policy areas it covers. At the same time because of the policymaking power it yields the EP experiences a supply of information and expertise from an array of interests that try to monitor and influence proceedings. Examples of this activity can be found in recent files such as Online Data Protection or GMOs; special interests that contacted MEPs included organized groups of constituents, associations, companies and NGOs. Until recently, academic research has assumed that the EP receives a disproportionate amount of interest

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group representation from diffuse and public interests (civil society) such as NGO type groups (Bouwen 2009, Sauruger 2009).

Despite the breadth of research examining special interest activity around the European Commission (Coen 1997; 2007, Chalmers 2011, Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009, Beyers and Kerremans 2007, Bunea 2013, Kluver 2011; 2013, Mahoney 2004), scholars only recently started shifting their attention to the EP (Chalmers 2013, Marshall 2010, Lehmann 2009, Rasmussen 2014); while enlightening, this line of research has two limitations. First, less work has been conducted examining the extent of special interest activity across the EP and within it through quantitative-statistical analyses. Without an overview of the EP’s interest group population we lack a piece of the EU lobbying puzzle. Thus it becomes difficult to discuss and compare interest group activity (density and diversity) that MEPs face, as well as examine the variables that impact this phenomenon. Second, most of the qualitative work conducted treats the relationship between special interests and the EP as a one-off information exchange, focusing on interest group perspectives. This leaves unexamined the long-term relationship between the two actors, which is comprised of multiple exchanges of communication over a broad and stable timeframe. Moreover, the views of MEPs on the subject are not addressed beyond the rapporteur level (Marshall 2012).

In order to assess the functional relationship between the European Parliament and special interests this report conducts a quantitative and qualitative assessment that cuts across four levels of analysis. Each level of investigation explores through a different angle the link between the EP and special interests. The triangulation of data collection improves both the validity and reliability of the study. However, it should be noted that activity is not the same as influence; and this report does not examine explicitly the influence of special interests on the EP. The report provides an assessment of the interaction between the Institution and special interests.

First, it examines the supply of special interests through an analysis of accredited organizations and persons across policy fields and committees. The data were collected from the Transparency Register (TR) database. We inspect in detail groups accredited to enter the EP and construct an interest group profile; we look at their variation across types, number of accredited persons, whether they have offices in Brussels and their policy fields of interest. We quantify central patterns of their movement, the variables that impact them, and identify central locations of activity. To identify whether there are similar and cross-institutional patterns of activity we also compare their density and diversity per policy field across the EP and the European Commission. The report explores special interest activity across committees and the network of committees they cluster around, and analyses the correlation between the supply of accredited persons and committee output. The study firstly examines 1,549 special interest organizations and 4,171 accredited persons, and secondly data on approximately 10,000 (+/-) accredited persons from mid-2012 to mid-2014.

Second, the report examines the institutional demand side of information and expertise in order to assess which interest groups have an active role in supplying information to the EP. We look at representatives of interest groups invited as speakers to events for the 6th and 7th European Parliament isolating those invited specifically at hearings. Committees often invite speakers to public hearings in order to contrast positions, involving institutional actors such as the Commission and the Council. Other events such as workshops are organized to provide additional technical expertise. The number of these events varies across committees, depending on their resources, numbers of MEPs, their leadership and the challenges they face that play a defining role. Thus committees addressing challenges such as the financial crisis (e.g. ECON) or highly technical

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issues (e.g. JURI) will have a number of events taking place, aiming to supply further expertise. This section focuses on five committees selected for this study that act as case studies; AGRI, ECON, ENVI, IMCO and LIBE. We go through more than 2,000 invitees and focus on non-institutional actors in order to identify recurrent sources of information and expertise by noting how often each speaker appeared. In addition, we conducted interviews with representatives of special interests identified as central actors (top 9) in order to better understand types of information and expertise that act as an access good.

Third, the study explores the formal and informal interaction of rapporteurs and special interests by conducting a content analysis of 595 reports from the five committees above. Following the Friedrich report (see Stubb 2008), MEPs have the option to provide an annex/ list of special interests that have supplied information used in the report; also known as the legislative footprint or lobbying footprint. We examine when and where there the lobbying footprint is used and if there is variation across committees. Moreover, we conducted a content analysis on the introductory clauses and explanatory statements of the reports, assessing which special interests and/ or reports are referenced.

Fourth, we carried out an original survey of MEPs of the 8th EP, from October 2014 to March 2015 to observe their perspective on special interest activity; we received 59 complete responses to the survey (8%). The survey looks at MEPs perceptions on lobbying activity, frequency, influence, the value of the information they receive and the role of the TR. We measure different variables such as the type of special interests or the phase of the policy cycle.

Finally there is a dedicated section that brings together the results and interim conclusions of the different parts of the study; we provide final conclusions, observations and recommendations. Despite a drastically increasing supply of special interests, the EP observes a competitive pluralism with different types of groups active across its committees. Nonetheless, the activity of these groups is impacted by the nature of the policy field, the committee and their output. Moreover, this activity seems to be converging with the Commission’s rather than diverging. It is noted however that special interests that gain access, provide information, and are considered influential, are those that are increasingly professional and able to deliver technical expertise primarily at the European and the national level.

Significantly, the EP has managed to maintain a high level of transparency through the TR and the availability of information on its policymaking. Nonetheless, there are areas where further improvements can be made both in terms of transparency and information/ data availability.

1.2 The growth of Special Interests & the Transparency Register

Undoubtedly, the growth of special interests surrounding EU institutions over the past 20 years has been remarkable. Where in the mid-90s there were a few hundred companies and associations (Coen 1997, Commission 2002), there are currently more than 25,000 lobbyists based in Brussels alone (Commission 2013, Greenwood 2007). The Transparency Register set up in June 2011 merged the Commission’s Register for Interest Representatives (RIR) with the EP’s Register of Accredited Organizations and laid down a Code of Conduct for interest representatives covering their relations with the EU institutions. This action followed research that indicated that

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approximately 2/3 of all organizations accredited and on the EP’s register were found on the Commission’s RIR. The TR along with the associated Code of Conduct have helped increase transparency at the EU level in terms of special interest activity, by making the database available to the broader public and by providing annual reports on the registration of special interest groups in the register. Since mid-2012, the Joint Transparency Register Secretariat monitors the information provided by registered organisations to help improve the quality of the information available. Though the register is voluntary, it has grown over the years to include a majority of relevant actors. A study by Justin Greenwood found that approximately 75% of business interests and 60% of NGO type groups in Brussels were registered on the TR (Greenwood and Bergen 2013). The TR has this year (2015) been re-launched, in accordance with a revised Inter Institutional Agreement aiming to further improve it; first, by providing incentives for groups to register, requiring more precise data, further monitoring of the data supplied and improving access and availability of the data. At the time of data collection for this study, the register had approximately 6,500 registered organisations. We address this in more detail in our final section that examines the issues that might need to be addressed in the future in relation to the TR.

Registered organisations on the TR provide information on their structure, such as legal status, persons responsible, mission statement, head and secondary offices’ address, a list of relevant activities, as well as the number of staff (FTE) and the costs attributed to these activities. Moreover, they provide information on what type of special interest they are by selecting between 6 categories (or sections) of organization (and 15 sub-categories/ sub-sections)). The six sections are: Professional Consultancies that include organisations such as Public Affair Consultancies, Law Firms, and independent Consultants; In-House groups that include sub-sections such as companies, associations, trade unions and similar; NGO groups; Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, such as universities or research centres; Religious groups; and, Regional, Municipal and Local groups such as the offices of regions or municipalities.

In addition, registered groups provide information on which policy fields they are interested in, selecting as many of the 36 policy fields as appropriate. They can only register in one section (and sub-section) but can choose as many policy fields of interest as they wish. Special interests that want to enter the European Parliament on a more permanent basis apply for an access authorisation that requires a basic security screening for specific individuals from their organization, i.e. the access card is not transferable. This provides them with a card that allows them to enter the EP without an invitation from an MEP. The card is valid for one year after which it expires. Persons interested in continuing to enter the EP without MEPs invitations must re-apply; this is available online on the TR website.

At the time of data collection the TR had approximately 6,500 groups registered and 1,549 special interest organizations with at least one person accredited to enter the EP. Furthermore, quantitative data on the committees of interest for all accredited persons between mid-2012 and mid-2014 was analysed. Previous to 2015, accredited persons were requested to provide up to 3 committees of interest. We have used these two sets of data to examine the activity of accredited interests within the EP and across its committees. We provide our analysis and results in the following sections.

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1.3 A Profile of Accredited Interests

This part of the report is aimed at creating an overall profile of the special interests that have authorisation to enter the EP with access cards. We look at accredited organizations and accredited persons per type of organization, their head office address, and whether they have an office in Brussels.

By examining accredited organizations we gain an understanding of the types of groups that actively aim to enter the EP and how many they are. This offers an overview of which types of special interests are in greater supply within the EP. The number of accredited persons per type of organization offers a quantification of the resources spent and focused on the EP by different special interests. The contrast of these two perspectives is interesting; while there might be fewer accredited organizations that are Professional Consultancies in comparison to NGOs, in terms of accredited persons their activity rivals them. The head office address provides an assessment on how Europeanized and/ or international is the attention from interest groups faced by the EP. Finally, the comparison of primary and secondary offices provides data on two levels; first, if some groups are more Europeanized than others and according to which categories; second, the amount of resources mobilized by different types of groups that aim to lobby the EP.

1.3.1 Which interests groups are accredited?

Utilizing information on accredited special interests on the TR we examine the distribution of organizations and persons for the entire population of 1,549 accredited organizations and 4,171 accredited persons per type of group as available. As such, this study is the first to provide a detailed overview of active accredited special interests entering the EP.

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comparison to private interests. Furthermore, as MEPs and rapporteurs demand for information and expertise is mostly in areas of private goods, we logically observe more accredited private interests aiming to supply it.

Second, MEPs and rapporteurs require technical expertise in order to engage in constructive negotiations with other MEPs and with the Council and the Commission during trialogues. The EP must negotiate with the other two institutions as a necessary condition of the debate conducted in Brussels in particular as more legislation is pushed through under 1st readings (Reh et al. 2013, Reh 2014). Reports and amendments require informed opinions in order to have an impact either during trialogues or to gain traction in the Commission policy formulation process. This has resulted in increased demand for technical information and expertise. Large companies and associations, rather than NGOs, are often most able and visible in producing research and presenting the technical information necessary to enter the policy debate (Coen 2009, Eising 2010). This does not mean that NGOs do not have technical expertise only that large firms are more numerous and often better resourced to prepare such political and technical briefings. However, for SMEs with limited resources it is expected that they utilise European and national trade association for representation.

It is worth noting that special interests that started as NGOs are now professional associations or have taken similar organizational forms to those of private interests as they have become more professionalized to address their members’ increasing demands in a growing EU market (Interviewee A); BEUC, an EU level consumers’ association is such an example. Greenpeace, while still an NGO, is highly professionalized, has staff across the globe and a large EU presence and is well placed to provide technical responses. Furthermore, pan European groups in Brussels largely act as peak organizations of national bodies and thus carry political expertise that is needed to form broad EU coalitions (Greenwood 2007, Coen and Richardson 2009, Eising 2007).

Third, NGOs are largely not-for-profit organizations and the nature of their group carries fewer negative connotations regarding the appropriateness of contacting institutions. This gives them smaller incentive to become accredited as they are less likely to receive negative comments from the public and members of EU institutions when entering the EP; in contrast to private for-profit organizations. It is possible that accreditations are not showing the full range of NGOs that enter the EP as it is easier for them to enter through an MEP’s invitation (Interviewee E; F). A recent analysis seems to agree with this argument as fewer Brussels-based NGOs seem to be registered (Greenwood and Dreger 2013). Nevertheless the nature or type of the interest group should not act as an excuse for groups not to register or get accredited. All groups for reasons of transparency and accountability should be registered and accredited (if they enter the EP) according to the Code of Conduct, when performing relevant activities.

Finally, the EP is by nature a representative institution elected by the EU public. As such, it carries a public mandate that by default requires smaller input by NGOs and similar public interests groups, in sharp contrast to executive institutions such as the Commission. This does not mean that MEPs have only public interests within their constituency. Arguably, private interests are also a part of it (Interviewee A; B; C; G). However, a public mandate provides the Institution with enough (input) legitimacy to place more demand on private interest input.

The third largest group of accredited organizations is Professional Consultancies. This category includes public affairs’ consultancies, law firms and self-employed consultants. Although a large number of consultancies and self-employed consultants are registered on the TR, the number of law firms registered is particularly low. The number of law firms with access cards to the EP is even

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A combination of the size of Germany’s economy, population and polity structure gives its interest groups more incentive and resources as well as know-how on moving within a multi-level EU structure that resembles that of federal Germany. France is a large EU economy but its statist interest group strategy promotes “national champions” that find their way to Brussels. While the UK is a large EU economy with numerous multinationals, its pluralist polity structure produces competitive interest groups that if they manage to compete and survive at the national level, can and do move successfully to the European/ international level.

Interestingly we observe that Italy (44) and the USA (41) both place in fourth place (as a percentage). This highlights growing ties between the US and the EU in light of the current Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, but demands attention as US companies have experience in lobbying from the much more competitive Washington D.C. environment (Mahoney 2004). Please note that the breakdown of the groups contains an “Other” section (15%). The section has not been further broken down into smaller percentages as many countries included would take less than 1% and would provide little value for the analysis. Needless to say, the EP observes a great variation of accredited interest groups from different countries, ranging from other EU member states to countries across the globe.

We observe similar results for the NGO category with a small change that pushes the UK and France into the top places. This is attributed to two factors linked to the national environments. The UK has one of the most advanced legal systems for not-for-profit organizations, such as NGOs, that work in a very competitive environment and are thus likely to lobby at the EU level as well. Germany, with its corporatist style of interest intermediation, places greater weight on associations (similar to France) rather than NGOs, which is reflected in the numbers of groups that arrive to lobby in Brussels. France, though observes a boost mostly because of groups in the humanitarian and development sector.

1.4 Interim Conclusion

The EP visibly notices more associations and companies rather than NGOs, at least in terms of accreditations (50% vs.24%) either because the nature of the policy debates skews the clustering of groups closer to those types of interests, and/ or because private interests have greater incentive to try to actively engages with the Institution. As the EU deals primarily with market integration & regulation which affects the constituency of private rather than public interest groups, it is also possible that NGOs engage in more informal lobbying of MEPs or have less of an incentive to become accredited as they are viewed with less suspicion than companies or private associations.

NGOs have more primary offices based in Brussels than In-House groups (52% v. 37%) this reflects the resource issues that public interests face rather than a strengthening of their position. Private groups such as companies have their head offices at the national level in addition to opening offices in Brussels and paying membership fees for EU level associations that represent at the EU level. NGO groups with their primary offices in Brussels either represent peak-level public interest networks that gather resources (or are EU-funded), or offices of international NGOs that have independent offices for EU affairs in Belgium. Finally, the top 3 countries that supply accredited NGOs and In-House groups are Germany, France and the UK.

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Greater active mobilization by private interests rather than public interests carries possible repercussions for the public’s perception of the EP. There is also a potentially higher risk of institutional capture when the ratio between private and public interests is highly skewed (Katsaitis 2015). However, activity explained through accreditations does not necessitate or show influence. Therefore, because we observe multiple private interests with accreditations does not mean that they influence more than public interests or other groups and vice-versa. We examine the question at greater depth as we move into a detailed examination of the role of policy characteristics in the supply of interests groups.

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2 SPECIAL INTEREST ACTIVITY & THE NATURE OF POLICY FIELDS

KEY FINDINGS

Special interest activity (density & diversity) across the entire EP sees more In-House groups than NGOs across most of the 36 policy fields examined. Humanitarian Aid and Youth are the only exceptions.

The nature of policy seems to be driving activity, with private interests clustering closer to policy fields that deal with market integration & regulation, while they are less likely to cluster around policy fields that engage with distributive and legal issues.

Across almost the entirety of the policy fields examined, there are more NGO interests clustering around the European Commission rather than the European Parliament. As such, the Commission appears to have created a stronger circle of public interests surrounding it than the EP.

This section provides detailed analysis of accredited interests on the TR across 36 policy fields. We assert that the characteristics of policy fields impact the distribution of different types of interest groups across EP committees. Building on this primary analysis, we also explore how interest groups types cluster around groupings of EP committees and establish policy networks. Finally, section 2 presents a comparative examination of the distribution of the largest categories of special interests (In-House, NGO) across the European Parliament Committees and the Commission DGs.

2.1 Accredited Interests & Policy Fields

Although we observe a greater concentration of private interests overall (previous section), it is possible that public interests are more active and in greater numbers in specific fields where their expertise is in greater demand and where they have an incentive to supply it (Coen and Katsaitis 2013, Kröger 2013). The absence of such quantitative research focusing on the EP has not permitted us to observe activity at a more fine-grain level or to test whether empirical and theoretical arguments that apply at the Commission apply at the EP.

To obtain a detailed overview of the activity of special interests within the EP we gathered information on which policy fields (from the 36 available on the TR) each of the 1,549 accredited interest groups selected. Special interests' activities cut across multiple policy fields even if they might be interested in one specific file. As research links policy fields’ characteristics and different interest groups’ activity (density & diversity), variation in the distribution of different types of interest across policy fields was expected. The research expected to observe that policy fields active mostly in areas of distribution and public goods are more likely to face activity from NGO type groups that provide political information and expertise. Conversely, In-House type groups were expected to be more likely to be found around policy fields that deal with regulation and private goods as they provide more technical information and expertise and assist with the (technical) quality of the output.

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Development. However, this is not the case when it comes to the examination of the population of accredited organizations at this level of analysis.

The most popular policy fields are those that impact common market issues, for example, Internal Market, Consumer Affairs or Enterprise, Research & Technology. Those that impact both public and private spheres draw more attention, for example, in Environment.

The difference between private and public groups is smaller in policy fields that are considered to deal with public goods and/ or values. Conversely, in policy fields that are primarily regulatory, the difference between private and public interests grows. For example, observe and compare more distributive/ public goods’ fields, such as Agriculture and Rural Development, Environment, Development or Fisheries & Aquaculture or Youth with the more regulatory Customs, Economic and Financial Affairs or Taxation fields.

The activity of Professional Consultancies largely follows the movement of In-House groups. This further supports the assertion made in section 1 that PCs are highly likely to be representing private interests rather than public interests.

In terms of accreditations, the EP appears to observe more private interests rather than public interests across policy fields. This becomes clearer when one considers together In-House groups and Professional Consultancies. However, because this examination breaks down the activity of interest group organization to the finest level of analysis (policy field), it becomes easier to observe which groups have an incentive to claim additional policy fields of interest.

This figure offers a view of where different types of groups are active at the micro level. In later sections, this activity is presented slightly differently as we examine the activities that cover often more than one policy field of accredited persons at the Committee level.

2.2 Accredited Interests & Policy Field Clustering

In order to better understand the activity of special interests the report assesses how interest groups can create networks of policy fields through their activity. This section provides information on which groups active in one specific policy field (such as Environment) are more likely to be found active in others (such as Energy and/ or Culture). Therefore, while we observe which policy fields are more popular this analysis provides information as to whether similar groups appear across these fields. We conducted a cluster analysis based on information on each of the 1,549 accredited interest groups of the population and their preferred policy fields.

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2.2.1 5 clusters of special interest activity To have a better understanding of the results of our analysis we visualized the different clusters with a dendrogram. The closer the vertical line linking policy fields is to 0 the stronger the cluster is between two or more policy fields. Therefore, MEPs addressing policy that falls under clusters closer to each other can expect similar groups attempting to contact them. In order for the analysis to provide more valid results we examined the total number of accredited interests without controlling for type of group. However the following section provides a much more detailed analysis for In-House groups and NGOs at the committee level.

The analysis suggests that there are 5 central groupings of policy fields.

1. There is a grouping between Agriculture, Fisheries and Food & Safety, as special interests linked to food production and health cover are active across all three policy fields. Note that the overall food-market cluster is much more closely linked to the budgetary policy cluster, but surprisingly not to the environment cluster.

2. Competition, Internal Market, Enterprise, Economic & Financial Affairs, and Consumer Affairs, form a strong cohort of tightly linked policy fields. Note that these are also amongst the most popular policy fields (Figure 10) for all types of groups but specifically In-House. This is perhaps less surprising as these are the committees that drive forward EU market integration and regulation.

3. Education, Youth and Culture are tightly linked. This is a result of institutional architecture as these policy fields are under similar committees and DGs. Moreover, this social policy cluster sits closely with the clusters of Justice and Fundamental Rights, Home Affairs and Employment and Social Affairs which notably have a diverse supply of interest groups other than NGOs.

4. The Energy policy clusters with Climate and is closely linked to Environment. This is driven by both NGO and business interests that overlap because of the interrelated nature of the policy domains. Unsurprisingly, the general energy/ climate cluster shares an overlap of interest groups with Trade, with this being driven primarily by business interests.

5. Finally, there is a foreign affairs’ cluster that connects External Relations, Foreign Policy and Security & Defence, along with Humanitarian Aid and Development. Public interests focus in particular on these policy fields.

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Figure 11: Cluster analysis of accredited interests (average between linkages)

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Based on these results three main points are made:

Despite the plethora of policy fields, interest group movement is concentrated across a smaller number of fields. This does not mean that they are not active in other policy fields only that the same groups are more likely to be found in these policy clusters. MEPs should be aware of the spill-over of interests from one policy field onto another (The study returns to this in the committee level of analysis in section 3).

The strongest cluster of policy fields is linked to EU market creation, integration & regulation. Moreover, policy fields addressing public goods such as Environment are linked to fields addressing private goods such as Energy and Trade. Thus, economic and highly regulatory policy fields are tightly knitted together.

Specific categories of policy fields are more likely to form clusters with others, depending on the nature of the policy; those managing files related to private goods have fewer links to those managing files linked to public goods. This raises potential concerns as interest groups that are more active around specific clusters will naturally aim to ring-fence their positions within their groupings (Maloney et al. 1993). While this clustering potentially creates insider groups with high levels of information, expertise and experience that can assist policymakers, it potentially also reduces the scope and breadth of the policy debate.

2.3 Special Interests across the European Parliament & the European Commission

While research is becoming more aware of the strategies of interest groups used specifically in the EP and the EC, few studies examine the activity of interests across the two institutions. Without a comprehensive comparative analysis of the lobbying activity across the EU legislative process it becomes difficult to access influence and impact of interest intermediation (Coen 2007, Schaprf 2009). Subsequently, monitoring and regulating lobbying across EU institutions become more difficult.

To conduct a comparison, we examine interest group activity across both institutions looking at registered and accredited groups on the TR as a proportion. Registered groups are special interests that follow the Code of Conduct for lobbyists and are, at the very least, interested in EU policy. By registering, they express their interest in EU policy and are likely to move on to do some form of lobbying, from monitoring activity and emailing MEPs and bureaucrats, to submitting reports in open consultations. A significant portion of the 6,500 registered groups are interest groups and individual organisations that actively lobby EU institutions (Commission 2013). In exchange for their registration, these groups receive relevant emails from DGs whose policy fields they have selected. We compare the proportion of these groups to those accredited in order to examine whether there are similar or different patterns of activity. We accept that not all registered groups are active lobbyists, but they do form a great proportion. Recent analysis of the TR’s registered groups argues that approximately 75% Brussels’ business interests are registered, and between 60% of all NGOs (Commission 2013). Moreover, the TR conducts regularly checks and deletes groups that provide false information.

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At the policy field level, the EP seems to observe more private interest activity than the Commission (as a proportion). Specifically, In-House groups gain further ground vis-à-vis NGO type groups across the entirety of policy fields. This further raises discussions surrounding business spill-over from the Commission to the EP (Marshall 2010). That is to say, private interests are a visible constituency that spends resources to lobby both the Commission and the EP. These results agree with the system level analysis indicating a reduction in the number of accredited public interests and an increase of business groups active around the EP in comparison to the EU’s executive.

Significantly, variation of groups surrounding the Commission is slightly greater than those found around the EP. As such, in addition to business groups we observe more Thinks Tank, Regional groups and greater variety of NGOs. This increased activity may be the direct result of the fact that the Commission has the right of initiative on many policy domains and sets the policy agenda in the proposal stage and attracts a wider range of both technical formulators and policy initiators.

As the figures above show, the difference between accredited interests and registered interests monitoring the Commission is great in absolute numbers (as expected), even across policy fields. We find a ratio where groups registered are 2 to 3 times more than those accredited (note the numbers on the bars).

There are three central conclusions behind these results.

The Commission remains the primary target for special interests. This explains the richer variation of types of groups and their greater (absolute) numbers. Public interests face on the whole larger resource constraints than private interests, so they aim for the institution that will maximize returns on their lobbying activity. As such, public interests focus their activity on the Commission because it has the right to make legislative proposals and acts as an agenda-setter. As such, if they manage to successfully place a point on its proposal or agenda they have achieved the largest part of their lobbying objectives. Thus, accepting that many NGOs have limited resources and accepting the uncertainty of lobbying the EP, most groups will place the greatest or all of their lobbying resource into influencing the Commission.

Second, the Commission has created a core of public interests that are active around it through direct/ indirect funding. Recent analysis of the TR finds that approximately 40% of registered NGOs receive some form of EU funding (Greenwood and Dreger 2013) most of which is managed by the EC rather than the EP. Thus, public interests in the EU are mostly focused on the Commission either directly as monitors/ advisors or indirectly due to the funding of their activities and to justify and/ or extend their funding.

The EP by comparison has not provided a near equivalent of funding for public interests to create a similarly sized permanent constellation around it. However, as the EP gets involved increasingly earlier in the policy debates and formulations via OLP and trialogues, we are seeing more pressure to get balanced information and expertise. Thus, in response to the plethora of private interest groups that have been lobbying on technical financial regulation in recent years, the EP has help with the creation of Finance Watch as a counter balance.

Finally, some under-countering of interest representation in the EP may result from the fact that getting accredited requires more effort than registering on the TR. Registration on the TR offers a transparency badge to special interests along with emails of news on their policy fields of

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interest. Though this can be classified as monitoring, an activity lobbyists conduct, it does not necessitate direct lobbying activity with the Commission. Accredited organizations are by default interested in being in close proximity to MEPs. The accreditations are stronger indicators of activity than registrations. That is to say, private accredited interests will be registered but not all private registered groups are accredited.

Interestingly the data suggest a different picture from earlier academic and policy-maker assumptions on interest group activity in the EC and EP. First, it has always been assumed that the EP was more open to public interest than the EC, but as the results show, private interests overtake public interests and proportionally more firms are active in the EP than in the EC in comparison to NGOs. However, it should be noted that this is not the case across all policy fields assessed. Overall we observe a pluralist environment where a large range of actors navigate between the EC and EP following the policy cycle. Perhaps more significant is that looking beyond variations, the activity of special interests mobilisation across the two institutions appears to be merging rather than diverging; that is to say, activity is more similar than different.


This section found that the system level analysis in the previous section follows on to the subsystem level with In-House groups dominating other interest group categories and in particular NGOs across all policy fields. The only policy exceptions are Humanitarian Aid and Youth. In-House groups have more resources, come in larger numbers and have a greater incentive to get accredited than NGOs. We find that Professional Consultancies activity is similar to that of In-House groups as their activity largely mirrors the activity of their private interests’ clients. NGOs have fewer resources and are by default focused on fewer policy fields than companies or associations.

The cluster analysis showed five central groupings of policy fields, with the strongest one bringing together Competition, Internal Market, Enterprise, Economic & Financial Affairs, and Consumer Affairs. This highlights the argument that EU policymaking is largely involved in issues linked to market creation, integration & regulation and as such has a very big private interest constituency, reflected in the intense activity of In-House groups.

Finally, our comparison of special interests active around the Commission and the EP across policy fields focused on the two largest groups In-House and NGOs, as a proportion. The results show that the activity of the two categories of groups follows identical patterns across EP and EC policy fields. However, private interest activity is higher in the EP rather than the Commission and/ or public interest activity is lower in the EP rather than the Commission.

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3


SPECIAL INTERESTS & COMMITTEES OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

KEY FINDINGS

Committees facing greater activity from accredited special interests are ITRE, ENVI, IMCO and ECON. Activity in absolute numbers is the greatest for both In-House and NGOs.

Cluster analysis indicates different groupings of types of interests across committees. In-House groups focus on the four most popular and link foreign policy with trade. NGOs link trade with economic policy, focusing on foreign & legal affairs and development.

Special interest activity follows committee output, specifically linked to the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, Consultation Procedures and Own Initiative Reports.

The TR offers a reliable overview of special interest activity in the EP and the EU. However, a proportion of the activity remains excluded. In particular, there is little information as to who is allowed in the EP through MEPs on a one-off basis

This section provides information on the activity of special interests across committees. It provides a detailed image on the distribution of groups across committees, the group of committees they cluster around and examines the correlation between different types of procedures (output) and special interest activity.

3.1 Accredited Interests & Committees.

The activity of special interests across committees warrants attention in particular because there are few quantitative studies informing us about the extent of accredited interest distribution across committees. To conduct this assessment we utilize data collected from the TR. Based on these data sets we assess the activity of special interests around EP committees using a two-level analysis.

The first data-set utilized was constructed by collecting detailed information on 1,549 active interest group organizations from the TR. However, because there is no explicit option/ information on committee preferences per interest group on the TR, special interests’ committee preferences were constructed by considering policy field preferences under relevant committees. The detailed methodology is provided in the appendix.

The second set of data contains information on the committee distribution of approximately 10,000 individuals given accreditations between mid-2012 and mid-2014. Each of these accredited individuals was obligated to state up to three committees of interest. Information here is broad which permits the examination of activity per committee and test variables such as committee output with respect to different interest groups’ activity. However, it does not permit the examination of committee networks. Nonetheless, data triangulation allows the study to test the validity and reliability of the overall modelling.

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in absolute numbers but focus their resources on specific policy fields/ committees and thus have greater density of accredited persons than In-House groups in those committees e.g. DEVE.

Committees that show large density of In-House groups, primarily ECON, INTA, TRAN and JURI, deal with more technical aspects of policy; while distributive committees deal with bigger numbers of NGO groups such as DEVE or AFET. This raises some concerns in terms of public interest activity in some policy fields and the need for the EP to further encourage the participation of NGOs in these fields as a way of balancing the supply of information and expertise it receives from different groups and as a way for committees to reach out to the EU public (Katsaitis 2015). At this point it should be re-iterated that interest group activity does not necessarily imply influence.

The two figures provide similar results, though they are constructed through different data-sets. This suggests that the analysis of policy fields offers a reliable and valid representation of special interest group activity. Policymaking cannot be fully compartmentalized within specific committees or DGs and as such the use of policy fields offers a good overview of lobbying activity both in the EP and in the EU. However, a breakdown of special interest activity per committee and DG explicitly offers a valuable institutional comparative perspective on their activity. This is significant information for institutional actors such as MEPs but also for the EU public in terms of transparency.

Committees dealing with policy fields that are explicitly distributive such as AGRI and PECH or clearly budgetary, BUDG and CONT, have less activity overall. This can be explained on two levels; first, committees dealing with clearly budgetary issues such as BUDG and CONT offer little space for policy alterations and thus observe less lobbying activity.

Distributive issues addressed by AGRI and PECH are dealt with primarily at the national level and within the Council of Ministers. Therefore, interest groups have little incentive to lobby MEPs in these fields/ committees. Furthermore, it is possible that being older portfolios, initial stakeholders became insiders and are therefore ring-fenced from future competition.

3.2 Clustering of Committees

In the second stage of the analysis, the report conducts a cluster analysis focusing on the two largest groups identified: In-House and NGO. While high-intensity lobbied committees have been identified this section aims to explore the network of activity across committees. That is to say, in which groups of committees are we more likely to find the same interest groups.

The analysis utilizes information collected on 850 accredited In-House groups and 365 NGO-accredited groups distributed across 16 committees. In the analyses below, the *tmin version is presented as it offers easily comparable results. After coding interest groups’ involvement in Committees we ran the cluster analysis. The dendrograms below present the results of the analyses. The closer the link to 0 between two or more committees, the stronger the network. This offers information on which committee members are likely to be approached by the same interests and the lobbying focus of special interests.

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3.2.1. In-House clustering across committees

In the case of the 850 accredited In-House groups, we observe two central tightly-knit clusters. The first includes CULT, LIBE and AFET (and its sub-committees) falling under a broader cluster, along with INTA and DEVE. This cluster indicates that associations and companies network closely across foreign policy, trade and development.

The second central cluster of committees consists of those dealing with policy on EU market integration & regulation: ECON and IMCO are linked closely and cluster along with ENVI and ITRE. This verifies the existence of a strong private interest core that runs across all committees central to market integration. Companies and associations perceive the output of these committees to be linked and that they can be impacted equally so follow them closely. ENVI stands as a link between IMCO & ECON and ITRE, indicating its position within the core of economic and business interests’ focus and its role as a tool for market integration (Stone-Sweet 1998). Furthermore, there is a large number of the same private interests that are active across all four of the most popular committees. This raises concerns about the prominence of business activity in the provision of public goods, especially when they may be using access to ENVI to potentially gain credibility and influence in ITRE (Bunea 2013).

As noted in the previous section, these distributive policy committees observe the least activity while they are tied closer together. Overall, these results indicate a distinction between groups that converge around market issues and groups with weaker networks that address distributive issues.

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Figure 17: In-House groups cluster analysis

3.2.2. NGO clustering & committees

In the case of the 365 accredited NGOs examined, a different clustering is observed. Due to resource limitations that lead to a focus across fewer committees, NGOs tick fewer policy field boxes. As a result we observe looser clusters of committees with fewer branches across committees. Active NGOs address specific committees rather than spread across multiple ones and the clusters are smaller and more tightly knit. We see three central groupings.

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Figure 18: NGO groups cluster analysis

First, AFET, CULT, DEVE and LIBE cluster with the ENVI-ITRE branch. This highlights a different policy field focus between the two categories as well as the different role that trade and development plays in EU policy. DEVE is linked more closely with legal affairs, civil rights and foreign affairs than with trade. Therefore groups that address humanitarian aid and development are closely linked.

Second, ENVI and ITRE are also closely linked but cluster nearer to justice and home affairs (LIBE) than to ECON. As such, public interests along with private interests address a common and clear thematic link between industry and the environment. However, the same public interests are more likely to be found among its civil/legal rights committees rather than its economic one.

Finally, ECON is strongly linked with IMCO, similar to In-House groups, but is tied at first hand to INTA rather than ITRE. This is most likely occurring because of the public interest activity linking consumer affairs with trade, for example, fair trade practices.

It is worth noting that the analysis of NGOs places AFCO & JURI closer to all other branches than in the case of In-House groups; another example of different lobbying priorities adopted by the two categories of groups. Moreover, while fewer NGO groups are interested in JURI (figure 16), those that are appear less networked with other committees.

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The analysis shows that the committees that observe the largest supply of accredited groups/ persons are those that address policy fields linked to market integration & regulation. Moreover, activity of special interests is impacted by policy field characteristics expressed through a function of the demand for different types of information and the expertise supplied by different types of interest groups. That is to say, we observe more In-House groups around regulatory policy fields (and committees) such as ECON because MEPs require technical expertise.

Research indicates that committee output can also impact special interest activity. In the next section the study explores the activity of interests vis-à-vis output across committees, controlling for different types of output and special interest.

3.3 Committee Activity & Special Interests

In order to examine the relationship between interest group activity and committee activity the study collected information on the output per committee on different types of output for the entire 7th EP through its online document search engine and collected information on 17 different types of output available. These fell under four categories: Legislative Procedures; Budgetary and Discharge Procedures; Non-legislative Procedures; and EP resolutions and initiatives.2. We then proceeded to remove the categories that had zero reports or close to zero as they offer little for meaningful analysis leaving 9 categories of output. We provide a figure of the 9 categories of procedures in the figure below (figure 19).

Observing the table below and bearing in mind the results from the previous section on accredited interest groups/ persons per committee it becomes unclear whether committee output correlates with interest group activity. For example BUDG and CONT observe little interest group activity. However, they have great output, specifically Budgetary and Discharge Procedures. In contrast, ITRE, which is one of the top two most lobbied committees in terms of accredited groups, comes in fifth in terms of total output. For a more concrete observation we conducted preliminary analysis on the relationship between total output and special interests.

2 Internal organisation procedures are excluded.

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Institutional & coonstitutional asspects of speci al interest repr esentation

Figure 20: Number oof accredited individuals && Total Out put per Committee

Based on the abovee analysis, different types of outp ut are likely to have a d different imppact/ link with accredited innterest grouup activity. To explore this relationship, a correlation analysis (Spearman rank ordder) was co nducted bettween the different categories of ooutput and the total number of accrediteed persons. This allows us to obser ve in greater detail the r elationship between type of ooutput and iinterest grouup activity.

We also ran the samme correlatioon analysis for In-Hous e groups and NGOs in oorder to explore the potential impact of different pr ocedures o n types of in terest groups. Files und er OLP are discussed informally; trialoguees where ra pporteurs a re increasin gly demandding technicaal expertise in order to negotiate with the Commission and the Council of Europee (Reh et aal. 2013, Reh 2013, Rasmus sen et al. 2014). As such, In-House ( private gro ups) are oftenn better equuipped to respond to this infoormational ddemand. Co nversely, Owwn Initiative Reports migght attract mmore public interests that can help to legitimize an Institutional statement by showing wide base suppport.

For an easier compaarison we prresent togetther the cen tral results oof our correlaation analys es under one table, below (seee appendix for the commplete results of the an alysis). On thhe first left-hand side column are all the vvariables examined in the correlation. On the topp of the tablee are the three types of interest group exxamined; tootal accrediteed persons coded as A CPE; In-Houuse groups coded as INHOUSE; and, NGOOs coded as NGO. Per c orrelation presented, thhe top cell iss the coeffi cient and the lower cell is the p-value.

By examining the ddata we ma ke the followwing observations. First, there is a cclear trend that links specific types of coommittee output with the activit y of accredited interestts. Howeve r, not all activity warrants atttention or d emand for innformation and expertis e, which acts as an indi cator and a warning. Output produced or created in other areas e.g. budgetary proocedure or petitions (excludeed) does nott draw inter est group activity. The EP demands eexpertise and observes lobbying in areas that impacct its legitimacy and w here it can impact policy as a co-leegislator and/ or an agenda--setter. Furthhermore, most of the o utput of the EP seems t o fall under ffour categorries; OLP, INI, CNS, and, to a smmaller extent, NLEs.

The qualitative natuure of differ ent types of ked with diff s of groups. What weoutput is lin ferent types observ e in terms of policy field characterist tics trickles down to the qualitative nnature of committee

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These results express both the constitutional policymaking power of the EP (OLP) and its ability to play a role in influencing EU policy beyond it (CNS, INI). More specifically:

In-House groups are more closely linked to output under OLP in comparison to NGOs, the difference being both in terms of its coefficient and in terms of its likelihood (p-value). This can be explained on two levels. First, as a co-legislator on a par with the Council the EP attracts a broad range of interest groups. However, private interests have resources to lobby both the Commission and the EP. Second, due to trialogues rapporteurs demand more technical information and expertise supplied largely by private interests.

Output under CNS shows a strong correlation with ACPEs and In-House but weaker with NGOs. While the EP cannot veto policy and the Council does not have to bear in mind amendments made by the Institution it can still raise the costs for both the Commission and the Council if issues it considers important are not addressed. This becomes apparent the more popular is the file under discussion by not addressing central concerns of MEPs expressed by the rapporteur in particular and shadow-rapporteurs, MEPs can turn to constituents and media outlets as well as put a break on the policy process (Reh et al. 2013, Kardasheva 2009). Files under CNS are often both particularly important to private interests and those interested in broad public-interest impact, such as the case of ACTA where the EP received heavy lobbying in particular by industry. Please also note (figures 16 and 19) that committees that have proportions of their output addressing issues on market integration & regulation under CNS such as JURI or ECON observe dense In-House interest group activity. Associations or companies must defend potential lobbying gains made at the Commission or at the EP as well, particularly in politicized files.

In the case of Own Initiative Reports (INIs), we observe a higher correlation with NGO groups. It appears that in such files rapporteurs and MEPs seek more political information and expertise as EP committees take the initiative to produce output on subjects they perceive as substantial for their constituents and/ or the broader EU public. By doing so the EP aims to either push forward an inter-institutional debate or add a point on the EU agenda. NGOs provide input legitimacy through political and technical expertise, while the broadness of their members’ base acts as leverage. In addition, this could be an expression of NGOs whose proposals have not found traction in the Commission and aim to set the agenda via the EP.


The analysis shows that the committees observing most of the activity are those dealing with market integration & regulation; ITRE, ENVI, IMCO and ECON. ITRE and ENVI observe the largest absolute numbers for both accredited groups and individuals as they address issues that surround both private and public goods, across types of groups. Across most Committees, In-House are the most numerous accredited individuals. Furthermore, accredited individuals from Professional Consultancies outnumber those from NGOs across ENVI, ITRE, IMCO, TRAN and JURI. In contrast to the policy field and accredited groups level of analysis, we observe that in LIBE, AFET, EMPL, FEMM and CULT NGOs outnumber In-House groups. This is a result of more focused activity of NGOs in these specific committees. Focusing on the two largest groups, In-House and NGOs, we conducted a cluster analysis. There is a large number of the same private interests that are active across all four of the most popular committees. While In-House groups form clusters linked closer to ECON, NGO clusters are more closely linked to AFCO and JURI indicating a different type of lobbying strategy.

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Not all procedures correlate as strongly with interest group activity. As such, policy output under OLP, CNS and INI is much more likely to attract lobbyists. This reflects the elevation of the EP as a central cog in the EU policy machine. In-House groups correlate strongly with output under OLP and CNS while NGOs’ lobbyists are active around INIs.

Overall these results offer an understanding of where MEPs and rapporteurs might expect most lobbying activity within the EP and by which types of groups.

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4 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT & MEPs PERSPECTIVES ON SPECIAL INTERESTS

KEY FINDINGS

Following an assessment of hearings a type of elite pluralism is observed with likely invitees including specific pan-European associations, large think tanks, companies and NGOs.

Survey results show that perceived influential groups provide a balanced set of information that is European and, more importantly, a mix of Technical and Political information.

Survey results demonstrated variation in the cluster of interests across the policy cycle. In the early stages professional consultancies, legal affairs offices and think tanks contact MEPs more often.

However, businesses, unions and NGOs exert a greater voice in the more political stages where there are potentially winners and losers.

45% of respondents agree with the statement that the TR Reduces inappropriate influence caused by lobbying.

This section utilizes primary demand side data to compare with the previous supply side of the study, to form a deeper understanding of the logic of special interest activity in the EP. We do this by a detailed survey addressed to MEPs and an analysis of committee hearings and committee reports.

4.1 Special Interests & Hearings

To examine in detail the demand side of special interest activity the study examines all events organized by 5 committees across two parliamentary terms and notes which groups were observed to have been invited more often. To construct the data base we downloaded all relevant reports from the EP’s online search engine for the 7th and 6th EP. While there is a large variation in the supply of accredited interest groups, we observed a smaller range of interests groups invited to the EP committee hearings. Moreover, by examining the types of special interests that attend committee hearings we potentially note different types of demand for information and expertise. Furthermore, by comparing demand across the EP, the study aims to verify if the increasing policymaking power of the Institution has led to greater demand for information and expertise, as argued in part 3 of the report.

Information was collected, per event, on the date and title of the event as well as information on the speakers, including their name, the organization they represented and (when provided) their position within the organization. These events included Hearings (i.e, public, Joint), Interparliamentary Debates/ meetings, Inquiries, exchanges of views, workshops and other. Hearings of commissioners are largely excluded from our collection. This created an original database with 2,083 speakers across 221 events for the 5 committees across two EPs. These speakers represented both special interests and representatives from European, national and international agencies/ministries/institutions, which are MS permanent representatives. Less than half of these speakers (927) represented special interests, universities and a few agencies/

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We observe an increase in NGO presence between the 6th and 7Th EP with noticeable NGOs being highly visible (Finance Watch and Amnesty International). Significantly, both these groups provide specialist technical expertise in their respected fields. For example, Finance Watch was created in 2009 by a group of MEPs, aimed at providing financial expertise and as a way of gaining additional information beyond the private sector. This highlights two issues; first, that technical expertise rather than just membership numbers is important to gain access into the EP, just as in the Commission. Second, this shows that the EP is aware that much of the expertise is in the hands of private interests (just as it is in the Commission), and that the EP must further facilitate the creation and access of public interest groups, specifically in the hearing debates that require technical information.

A series of open-ended interviews with representatives from the largest groups on the table confirm this assessment. In fact, NGOs are increasingly professionalized and aware of the importance of expertise in influencing the EP policy debate. For example, BEUC started as an NGO almost 50 years ago and now is a particularly well- established EU-level association, with 35 officials, 7 accredited members and attending most hearings than any other group from our sample-population. This suggests that if public interests are to successfully engage and be fully represented at the EP then the Institution must, in similar fashion to the Commission, facilitate access to policy debate when appropriate.

Another issue raised by these results is the creation of expertise monopolies with regards to hearings. It is possible that by inviting one group too often a monopoly of policy expertise is created. This limits incentives for new groups to try and access the debate, especially if the monopolising group is reinforcing interest patterns observed in the EC consultations (as noted earlier in the report). To overcome this risk, an argument could be made that the EP needs to expand its administrative capacity to process information and manage access to the policy debate.

4.2 Rapporteur Interactions with Special Interests; Committee Reports

This section looks into the interaction between rapporteurs and interest groups and assesses the extent of implementation of lobbying footprint by examining 595 reports of the 7th EP across the 5 committees (AGRI, ECON, IMCO, ENVI, LIBE). We opted for a content analysis as a way of observing the “lobbying narrative” and exploring the interest group institutional interactions.

The lobbying footprint introduced under the Friedrich report gives rapporteurs the option to provide information on which special interests they have been in contact with during the creation of a report. This information is placed in a clear annex at the end of the explanatory statement of the report.

This includes interest groups such as companies and NGOs as well as member state permanent representation, embassies, Commission DGs, etc.

Data was collected by counting every lobbying footprint annex and exploring its content. In addition, the study examined the introductory clauses and explanatory statements of all the reports, noting whether special interests were named and distinct policy reports logged. Finally, we collected data on the voting results of each committee. The objective was to see if there was a

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4.3 Survey of Members of European Parliament

To further explore the institutional perspective the study conducted an email survey of all MEPs of the 8th EP. The survey covers two different sections. First, it examines interest group activity from the MEPs’ perspective. It asks how often they are contacted by different types of groups and at which stage of the policy cycle. It also requests MEPs to validate the type of information they receive, how useful they consider such information and how influential they perceive different groups to be. Second, the survey looks at how appropriate MEPs perceive lobbying activity of different groups to be and how they value the TR.

The study controls for different types of special interest and information and expertise. Moreover, the report aims to cross-examine the validity of accreditations and other sources of interest group activity by comparing them with the MEPs’ views. We used in total ten categories for interest groups, based on categories and sub-categories available on the TR. We provided more options under professional consultancies and law firms because we found small numbers of legal firms with accreditations and thus wanted to examine whether this is confirmed by primary data. We also disaggregated the In-House category into Associations and Companies, as research indicates some variation in the intensity of their activity (Eising 2007, Coen 2009, Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009). While not included on the TR, we added the category of Member State representative because of the topical discussion of lobbying in the Council and increasing informal negotiations under trialogues. In addition, interviews and content analysis revealed intense activity of permanent representatives within the EP. As such, we were interested in exploring whether the MEPs would confirm this. Finally, we provided an “other” option for types of groups we did not include or possibly did not consider, as well as space for comments. We provide the questionnaire in the annex.

The survey was sent out on the 8th of October 2014 and then sent out at regularly timed intervals until March 2015. The survey received 59 responses from 751 MEPs which translates into a 8% response rate6. This is a representative sample of the population following analysis of the respondents’ characteristics, such as Political Group, Committee, Member State and experience. The response rate is perhaps lower than hoped for as the survey had to go out to a new EP in September when MEPs were coming to terms with their new responsibilities and there were a number of new MEPs (estimated at an approximate of 50%). That said, the results of the survey are both representative and meaningful. However, we see value in repeating the survey at the end of the 8th EP to observe for changing attitudes and learning by new MEPs. Finally though there have been previous surveys of MEPs by the European Parliaments Research Group, this is the first to examine attitudes on lobbying. Below we provide the results and analysis per question and an overall assessment. All information received is presented anonymously and in aggregate form.

4.3.1 Frequency of Lobbying

Questions 2 & 3 explore which types of special interests are more often in contact with MEPs, contrasting the overall number of special interests and those explicitly from the MEPs’ constituency. Please note that activity is not the same as influence. First we ask: how often are MEPs contacted by different types of interest groups? (Q2)

6 This excludes double responses and opt-outs.

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individual firm and groups that potentially represent the collective position of an industry and broader European perspectives (Coen 1997, 2009).

Excluding MS reps and Regional/ Municipal groups, the division between the remaining groups seems to be guided by reputational costs and transparency. Companies, Law Firms and Professional Affairs Consultancies as well as Religious Groups will have clear private goals which MEPs may wish to signal they have independence from. This occurs either as a result of the lobbying strategies of these groups that can be non-transparent or because they might address sensitive issues, such as with religious groups. As such, we observe a Neutral perception that seems to signal caution of MEPs that do not wish to be perceived as too close to these interest groups with the potential for reputational costs. Thus, it is not necessarily the nature of the information transmitted, but perceptions of the vessel (type of groups) that carries it. Bearing this in mind, a point needs to be raised here.

Special interests across different types are increasingly forming lobbying coalitions and alliances (Coen and Richardson 2009, Greenwood 2007). Companies and some international NGOs found themselves on the same side in the case of the Online Data Protection directive/ regulation requesting less control over cookies. Governments may lobby against taxation in order to maintain a competitive advantage for their companies or NGOs might receive funding from allied religious groups (Interview A). It therefore becomes more important to identify the network of actors for reasons of transparency. Therefore, the next generation of transparency policy needs to aim at identifying ad-hoc networks of actors that are a public/ private/ governmental mix, rather than collecting single interest responses, e.g. Companies vs. NGOs. Obligating registered/ accredited special interests to additionally identify which legislative files they are following and providing this information publicly would be a potential solution. The Canadian registry for example utilizes this form of lobbying footprint tracking.

4.3.4 MEPs & the TR

Finally the survey asked MEPs what they thought of the TR in terms of its impact on interest group activity, lobbying and transparency (Q10). It also asked whether it is helpful for public interest groups, since the EP is overall aiming at increasing the contacts with such interests (EP 2014).

The TR scores well with MEPs regarding transparency and its helpfulness towards public interest groups: 78% agree that the TR Improves the transparency of the EU, while 66% agree that it Is helpful for public interest groups. These results are encouraging in terms of what MEPs think of the TR as a tool for transparency. 60% of the respondents Agree and Completely Agree that it Improves the behaviour of interest groups, 30% neither agree nor disagree with the statement. This indicates that MEPs and potentially the public have little point of reference or information about the impact of the TR on special interests. This does not mean that it does not have an impact but that a respectable percentage of MEPs cannot or have not judged this impact yet or are not familiar with the tool. To this extent, further action could be taken to inform MEPs (and the public) of the TR as well as utilize variables and benchmarks to quantify improvements in interest groups’ lobbying behaviour as a result of it.

The second sub-question essentially acts as a control for the first one by asking a similar question but with a different wording. While there is a core of MEPs that clearly seems to find the TR overall

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Finally, three central points that can be deducted from the survey of MEPs. First, in terms of activity of special interests, MEPs’ perceptions largely reflect those of the supply side of accreditations analysed in the first sections. However, the extent of the activity that companies and NGOs have in the process becomes much clearer. More interestingly, results show that Member State representatives are particularly active around the EP and are perceived as highly influential.

Second, while groups actively target the EP more often during the Committee Amendment phase and the Plenary Amendment phase of the policy cycle, activity is not uniform across types of groups. In particular, groups with higher levels of technical expertise, such as think tanks and law firms, are most active during the Commission Proposal Preparation phase, as are Professional Consultancies that take up a mediating role. Conversely, it is groups with a primarily political nature that are most active in the later phases of the cycle. Examining the relationship between influence and type of information, the results show perceived influential groups provide a mix between European level technical and political expertise.

Third, not all groups are perceived to be equal or appropriate to contact MEPs. The large majority of MEPs considered it Absolutely appropriate for public administration representatives such as MS reps and Regional offices to contact MEPs, followed by Think Tanks, NGO/ SMOs, Trade Unions and Associations. But MEPs took a neutral-negative stance regarding companies and religious groups and a bit less of a negative stance on law firms and consultancies. However, neutral does not entail in itself a negative opinion but rather indicates that MEPs are cautious about openly being in contact with these groups. Finally, as lobbying is becoming a much more complex game, with different types of groups joining forces, e.g. NGOs and companies, it becomes increasingly important to be able to recognize coalitions rather than single groups for reasons of transparency.

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5 CONCLUSIONS, OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The maturity of the European Parliament as an EU public policy process and the professionalization of special interests have led to high frequency and sophisticated exchanges of information and expertise. Special interest activity follows the output of Committees in particular for files under OLP, CNS and INI. Significantly the density and diversity of interest groups across committees appears to mirror the patterns seen in the DGs of the Commission.

We reach three central conclusions regarding special interest activity and the EP.

First, the European Parliament is an important lobbying target that receives intense special interest activity both across it and within its committees from a diverse set of actors. The majority of accredited organizations are private interests associations 30% (professional/ trade/ business); and companies 20%. NGOs, associated with public interests, rank second with 23%, while professional consultancies form the third largest group at 14%. This EU elite-pluralist activity is reflected in the speakers invited at committee hearings. This goes against past research that assumed the EP would face disproportionate lobbying by public interests.

Second, MEPs perceive NGOs, associations, companies, and Member State representatives as the most active lobbyists, balancing a supply of both technical and political European level information. As technical information and expertise are becoming a primary access good, special interest activity across institutions appears to be converging, with the EP and the Commission facing the same type of groups but at different phases of the policy cycle. MEPs are contacted most during Committee Amendments and the Plenary Vote by groups that are primarily not from their constituency. Thus we observe a distinction in the information supplied and the phase within the policy cycle taking place within the EP.

Third, special interests are perceived to be Moderately influential by more than half of the respondents depending on the type of group. The competitive environment among special interests in Brussels and within the EP has surged along with their numbers. This has led to an increase of the quality of information and expertise they supply as they aim to gain access into the EP. Finally the TR is largely regarded positively with 78% of respondents Agreeing or Completely Agreeing with statements that it Improves the transparency of the EU.

Key Observations

As a proportion, the EP seems to be facing a greater number of private interests than NGOs in comparison with those faced by the Commission. It is possible that the EP, unlike the Commission, has not created a similar constellation of public interests around it.

Policy/Committee characteristics impact lobbying activity: the committees facing the largest supply of accredited interests, both private and public, are ITRE, ENVI, IMCO and ECON, which address and impact issues related to EU market integration & regulation.

Different types of interests cluster across specific groups of committees: private interests cluster primarily around committees addressing market integration & regulation.

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NGOs network more around committees addressing civil rights, development and human rights; LIBE, DEVE, CULT. This suggests that the diversity of interests is defined by the policy area.

There is a strong correlation between specific types of committee output (procedures) and special interest activity: files under Consultation Procedure, Ordinary Legislative Procedure and Own Initiative Reports attract strong activity from special interests with the first two categories of output showing a strong and statistically significant correlation with all groups and In-House groups; while NGOs are strongly linked to INIs.

The growth of special interests within the EP has made lobbying more competitive, raising the quality of information and expertise supplied by special interests: MEPs overall find the information and expertise they receive from different groups at least Somewhat and Extremely Useful.

The European Parliament receives less attention from NGOs than In-House groups, not only within and across it, but also, compared to the Commission, across policy fields. Accredited interests will be registered on the TR, actively engaging with the EP and most likely with the Commission. However, special interests that are only registered (but not accredited) are less likely to be active lobbyists within the EP.

The TR does well with MEPs perceptions more than 61% of respondents Agree or Completely Agree with the statements that the TR Improves the behaviour of interest groups. While 66% of respondents Agrees or Completely Agree that the TR Is helpful for public interest groups.

The TR offers one of the most wide-ranging databases on lobbying activity in the world. However, the data in EP documents, while publicly available face issues regarding the direct accessibility of information contained within them. This hinders the positive impact of the EP transparency project and efforts made overall by the EP to be more transparent, accountable and directly linked to citizens and groups. Accessibility to relevant information is not always direct nor does it take into consideration quick and easy use across data processing systems.

Key Considerations

The EP is observing increasing lobbying activity that is likely to further increase over the coming years. This study observes that the majority of the special interests actively and visibly engaging with the EP are private interests (In-House and Professional Consultancies) followed by public interests (NGOs) while few law firms are accredited. Overall results point to a form of elite pluralism.

The Lisbon Treaty (TEU II 10) places representative democracy as a cornerstone of the EU, and goes on: every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen. As such,

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supporting representative democracy and the openness of the policymaking process is integral to the structure of the EU demos.

The TR offers a great opportunity to increase the transparency of the EU policymaking process, by making information on special interests available to all of its citizens. The improved easy access to data on the updated TR is a significant and welcomed addition that will help considerably with work on the transparency of the EU.

The voluntary nature of the TR raises questions about interests that may potentially opt not to register. Specifically regarding the EP, besides non-registered interests, nonaccredited interests may still enter the Institution through MEPs’ invitations. This information is not available to the public or EU institutions.

MEPs are contacted often by Regional and National representatives from Member States and occasionally from non-EU states. Therefore the lobbying of the EP is an activity not limited to private interests or NGOs.

Information on committee reports and events are essentially scans of the schedule and invited speakers available in pdf format. While this provides a view into the EP’s activity it does not provide an easy extraction of data that can be used for in-depth analysis.

The EP can become a leader in the field of global transparency and governance simply by making information already accessible more easily available.

Recommendations

Bearing in mind the above we provide the following recommendations.

1. The EP could consider further supporting and encouraging the activity of public interests (civil society) that actively surround it, across levels. There is already a large pool of NGO groups based in Brussels that can enrich the input of broad debates both within and outside the EP. The EP could consider funding the support of public interest groups that have problems organizing at the EU level especially in areas where there is under-representation.

2. The EP could consider setting a limit on the number of accredited persons per organization or for types of organizations such as professional consultancies in order to balance the ratio of representation and stem potential over-representation within the EP.

3. The EP could consider supporting and encouraging cross-committee activity of special interests. This would reduce the likelihood of creating permanent “insiders” and potential risks of institutional capture by interests.

4. The EP could further enhance the European Parliament Research Service in order to be less dependent on special interest expertise or captive to monopolies of information. In

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addition the EP could expand resources provided to committee secretariats to support rapporteurs and MEPs directly.

5. As democratic processes are becoming ever more direct through digital means, data contained in publicly available documents could be provided in a format that is easily extractable for direct analysis.

6. Special interests, both registered and accredited, could be given options to indicate clearly and publicly which committees and DGs they are most interested in. This would simplify lobbying activity assessments and tracing the cross-institutional lobbying footprint.

7. Special interests could be asked to log through which other organizations they access the EP policy process, per specific files they are interested in. This would show the degree of individual lobbying intensity on specific piece of legislation and would add to our understanding of the cross-institutional lobbying footprint (point 6).

8. The EP could re-examine the usefulness of the lobbying footprint. The small number of reports with a lobbying footprint annex suggests that different use of it or a re-examination of its purpose could be beneficial. In addition, information on the lobbying footprint when available could be in a format that allows for easy extraction by software.

9. The EP could further incentivize administrators across EU institutions and levels to communicate primarily with special interests registered on the TR.

10. The EP could make information regarding special interests entering the Institution and meetings with specific MEPs and administrative staff publicly available. The absence of such information provides an opportunity for unregulated lobbying with concurrent negative implications for EP legitimacy. It should be noted that the Commission has decided that Commissioners keep such logs and make them publicly available (Timmermans 2014).

11. As state and regional representatives (EU and non-EU) appear to be active in contacting MEPs, their activity could be logged potentially through a separate register and/ or by MEPs.

12. The inclusion of the Council of the EU in the TR would considerably assist the mapping and understanding of EU inter-institutional lobbying.

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APPENDIX

Special interest activity across EP committees; Methodology

The total number of policy fields available on the TR for interest groups to select from and indicate interest in is 36. This provides relatively easy access to information on the distribution of interests across different categories of policy (see previous section). But makes the examination of accredited interests’ activity across Committees or Directorate Generals more difficult as there are no such explicit options from which to select. In order to assess activity across committees we placed policy fields’ activity under specific relevant committees. The 7th EP had 20 permanent committees and 2 sub-committees. We read through the committee’s objectives and compressed 34 policy fields into 16 relevant committees. The policy fields on Communications and Trans-European Networks were excluded as they cannot be linked to any specific committee. As some of the policy fields available cut across more than one committee, while in other cases, more than one policy field responded to a committee, some committees are put together and others excluded. Overall, the assessment is a reliable and accurate depiction of interest group activity. This becomes more apparent when we compare data-sets’ results. We explain in more detail below.

The 2 sub-committees SEDE and DROI are considered as a part of AFET, while both committees deal with budgetary issues (BUDG and CONT) as one committee. Three committees are not explicitly examined as there are no relevant policy fields for interest groups to select from on the TR.

First, on the TR there was no policy field option explicitly addressing gender equality which is the main subject of the committee on gender equality (FEMM). Because its priorities fall closer to the objectives of LIBE and both committees often work together; we assumed that groups interested in gender equality policy have ticked largely Civil Rights and Home Affairs dealt by LIBE.

Second, the committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) was considered along with AFCO as the only relevant policy field for both is that on Constitutional and Institutional Affairs.

Third, the Committee on Petitions was excluded from our analysis. In this case as well, there is no similar policy field available to select from on the TR, while its work largely includes the processing of requests for EU-wide petitions which varies considerably from other committees’ objectives. However, because there are no similar explicit policy fields for registered interest groups to select from, it does not have an impact on the assessment. This created a system with 16 committees under which relevant policy fields were compressed.

Following an analysis of the distribution of accredited organizations per policy field, two types of policy field compression into committees was conducted. First, for committees that contain more than 1 policy field, the accreditation of an interest group in the committee was considered to be equal to the number of policy fields of the committee it indicated interested in or “ticked”; the *tmax is added next to committees where lobbying activity is calculated in this way (see appendix).

This method offers a proxy for interest group activity in committees that is numerical; it allows the study to observe whether a group is interested in a committee or not and by how much in terms of policy fields. Second, for committees that contain more than 1 policy field, we considered that the organization was interested in the committee as long as the interest group indicated

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interest in at least one policy field the committee addresses. The *tmin is added next to committees’ lobbying activity calculated in this way. This method offers a proxy for interest group activity in committees that is binary and nominal; either a group is interested in a committee or it is not.

For example the Committee on Environmental, Public Health and Food Safety includes four policy fields; these are: Climate Action, Environment, Food Safety and Public Health. In the *tmax method, an interest group that indicated interest in 3 policy fields is given a value of 3 out of a maximum of 4 for the specific committee, while a group that indicated interest in 2 policy fields received a value of 2 and so on.

In the same example, for the *tmin version both groups would receive a value of 1, as they indicate interest in the committee. The committees that include only one policy field do not have a *tmin/ *tmax symbol next to them. Following this, we compressed the interest groups per type per committee for both versions. The overall patterns of results are the same; the central difference is what the results express. The *tmax version expresses overall activity while the *tmin version expresses interest in the committee. In other words, the *tmax measurement offers evidence regarding the breadth of attention received by committees from accredited interest groups overall. The *tmin measurement offers evidence on how many accredited special interests are active around a committee.

In the case of the second data set of accredited persons, the methodology is simpler. The data contains information on the distribution of accredited persons across committees they indicated interest in. We have plotted the number of accredited persons per type of group across the committees indicated. This allows us to observe the activity of accredited persons across committees per type of group over a two year span.

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Total Output Per Committee Per Procedure; 7th EP

Committee ALL COD

ALL CNS

ALL APP

ALL NLE

ALL INL

ALL AVC

ALL SYN

ALL BUD

ALL DEC

ALL ACI

ALL INS

ALL RPS

ALL INI

ALL COS

ALL DCE

Total Output1

Total Output2

AFCO 51 5 6 28 29 0 0 26 0 16 0 0 84 0 0 527 348

AFET 130 9 3 94 3 2 0 21 30 0 0 0 352 0 0 1097 865

AGRI 212 14 3 10 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 131 0 0 600 514

BUDGET 268 29 20 62 6 0 0 468 3 10 0 0 103 0 0 1249 1260

CONT 74 2 5 75 0 0 0 21 696 0 0 0 94 0 0 1254 1303

CULT 77 6 11 2 0 0 0 15 15 0 0 0 172 0 0 422 396

DEVE 138 15 3 88 3 0 0 24 36 0 0 0 314 0 0 840 833

ECON 322 76 8 53 22 0 0 17 18 0 0 0 234 0 0 1290 990

EMPL 198 12 7 21 25 0 0 26 76 0 0 0 335 0 0 944 937

ENVI 441 13 4 34 3 0 0 15 98 0 0 0 263 0 0 1208 1125

FEMM 86 6 4 5 7 0 0 13 22 0 0 0 288 0 0 657 570

IMCO 306 6 3 2 10 0 0 16 9 0 0 0 310 0 0 893 874

INTA 254 8 3 146 0 0 0 23 2 0 0 0 196 0 0 822 864

JURI 503 64 27 48 21 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 212 0 0 1254 1152

ITRE 319 21 3 105 3 0 0 16 0 3 0 0 313 0 0 998 1031

LIBE 274 59 15 96 6 0 0 21 117 0 0 0 155 0 0 1123 984

PECH 161 10 3 67 0 0 0 19 23 0 0 0 82 0 0 515 481

PETT 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 2937 63

REGI 186 32 5 6 3 0 0 26 18 0 0 0 298 0 0 702 755

TRAN 285 6 3 43 0 0 0 13 75 0 0 0 108 0 0 704 709

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Institutional & constitutional aspects of special interest representation __________________________________________________________________________________________

Correlation Analyses

ACPE

Covariance Analysis: Spearman rank-order

Sample: 1 20 Included observations: 20

Correlation Probability TO2

TO2

-----1

TO1 NLE INL INI DEC COD CNS BUD APP ACI ACPE

TO1 0,66416 0,0014 -----

1

NLE 0,486649 0,0296

0,220467 0,3503 -----

1

INL 0,282707 0,2272

0,263985 0,2607

-0,13411 0,573 -----

1

INI 0,2977440,2023

0,029334 0,9023

0,118090,62

0,354153 0,1255 -----

1

DEC 0,319490,1697

0,127315 0,5927

0,231963

0,3251

-0,064820,786

0,206951 0,3813 -----

1

COD 0,62406 0,321173 0,263257 0,241223 0,299248 0,027191 1

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0,0033 0,1674 0,2621 0,3056 0,1999 0,9094 -----

CNS 0,514721 0,253682 0,370708 0,320019 0,349436 0,034117 0,671703 1 0,0202 0,2805 0,1076 0,169 0,131 0,8865 0,0012 -----

BUD 0,082327 -0,2025 0,257652 0,140838 0,078551 0,02959 -0,20544 0,213798 1 0,7301 0,3919 0,2728 0,5537 0,742 0,9014 0,3849 0,3654 -----

APP 0,447802 0,171489 -0,00039 0,50083 -0,03732 0,172593 0,213017 0,445984 0,175327 1 0,0477 0,4697 0,9987 0,0245 0,8759 0,4668 0,3672 0,0487 0,4597 -----

ACI 0,123365 -0,03388 0,179068 0,321297 -0,1911 -0,47383 -0,02419 0,031565 0,365702 0,19634 1 0,6043 0,8872 0,45 0,1672 0,4196 0,0348 0,9194 0,8949 0,1128 0,4067 -----

ACPE 0,425564 0,170741 0,13915 0,248137 0,583459 0,033988 0,833083 0,441513 -0,30287 0,069192 -0,12578 1 0,0614 0,4717 0,5585 0,2915 0,0069 0,8869 0 0,0513 0,1943 0,7719 0,5972 -----

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In-House




TO2

-----1

TO1 NLE INL INI DEC COD CNS BUD APP ACI INHOUSE

TO1 0,66416 0,0014 -----

1

NLE 0,486649 0,0296

0,220467 0,3503 -----

1

INL 0,282707 0,2272

0,263985 0,2607

-0,13411 0,573 -----

1

INI 0,2977440,2023

0,029334 0,9023

0,118090,62

0,354153 0,1255 -----

1

DEC 0,31949 0,1697

0,1273150,5927

0,231963

0,3251

-0,064820,786

0,206951 0,3813 -----

1

COD 0,624060,0033

0,321173 0,1674

0,2632570,2621

0,241223 0,3056

0,2992480,1999

0,027191 0,9094 -----

1

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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs _________________________________________________________________________________________

CNS 0,5147210,0202

0,253682 0,2805

0,370708 0,1076

0,320019 0,169

0,3494360,131

0,034117 0,8865

0,671703 0,0012 -----

1

BUD 0,082327 0,7301

-0,20250,3919

0,257652 0,2728

0,1408380,5537

0,078551 0,742

0,02959 0,9014

-0,20544 0,3849

0,213798 0,3654 -----

1

APP 0,4478020,0477

0,171489 0,4697

-0,00039 0,9987

0,50083 0,0245

-0,037320,8759

0,172593 0,4668

0,2130170,3672

0,445984 0,0487

0,175327

0,4597

-----1

ACI 0,1233650,6043

-0,03388 0,8872

0,179068 0,45

0,321297 0,1672

-0,19110,4196

-0,47383 0,0348

-0,02419 0,9194

0,031565 0,8949

0,365702 0,1128

0,19634 0,4067 -----

1

86


NGO




TO2

-----1

TO1 NLE INL INI DEC COD CNS BUD APP ACI NGO

TO1 0,66416 0,0014 -----

1

NLE 0,486649 0,0296

0,220467 0,3503 -----

1

INL 0,282707 0,2272

0,263985 0,2607

-0,13411 0,573 -----

1

INI 0,2977440,2023

0,029334 0,9023

0,118090,62

0,354153 0,1255 -----

1

DEC 0,319490,1697

0,127315 0,5927

0,231963

0,3251

-0,064820,786

0,206951 0,3813 -----

1

COD 0,624060,0033

0,321173 0,1674

0,2632570,2621

0,2412230,3056

0,2992480,1999

0,027191 0,9094 -----

1

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CNS 0,514721 0,253682 0,370708 0,320019 0,349436 0,034117 0,671703 1 0,0202 0,2805 0,1076 0,169 0,131 0,8865 0,0012 -----

BUD 0,082327 -0,2025 0,257652 0,140838 0,078551 0,02959 -0,20544 0,213798 1 0,7301 0,3919 0,2728 0,5537 0,742 0,9014 0,3849 0,3654 -----

APP 0,447802 0,171489 -0,00039 0,50083 -0,03732 0,172593 0,213017 0,445984 0,175327 1 0,0477 0,4697 0,9987 0,0245 0,8759 0,4668 0,3672 0,0487 0,4597 -----

ACI 0,123365 -0,03388 0,179068 0,321297 -0,1911 -0,47383 -0,02419 0,031565 0,365702 0,19634 1 0,6043 0,8872 0,45 0,1672 0,4196 0,0348 0,9194 0,8949 0,1128 0,4067 -----

NGO 0,269173 0,009026 0,20534 0,176692 0,733835 0,261332 0,42406 0,32755 -0,15635 -0,01322 -0,17416 1 0,2511 0,9699 0,3851 0,4561 0,0002 0,2657 0,0624 0,1586 0,5104 0,9559 0,4627 -----

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Questionnaire

Q1. Please state your full name as available on the European Parliament website.

Q2. How often are you contacted by different types of interest groups? Please tick the appropriate boxes below.

Never Very Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very Frequently

Public Affairs Consultancy

Legal Affairs Office/ Firm

Association

Trade Union

Company

NGO/ SMO

Think Tank

Religious Groups

Regional/ Municipal Groups

Member State Representatives

Other

Q3. How often are different types of interest groups from your constituency contacting you? Please tick the appropriate boxes below.




Association

Trade Union

Company

NGO/ SMO

Think Tank

Religious Groups

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Other

Q4. How influential do you believe different types of interest groups are in the European Parliament?

Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely influential influential influential influential influential



Association

Trade Union

Company

NGO/ SMO

Think Tank

Religious Groups


Member State Representati ves

Other

Q5. When are you contacted most often by interest groups during the policymaking cycle?


Commission Proposal Preparation

Commission Proposal

European Parliament Committee

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Amendments

Trialogue Negotiations

Plenary Amendments

Plenary Vote

Other

Q6. Do some types of interest groups contact you more often during different phases of the policymaking cycle? Please tick the appropriate boxes.

European Commission

Commission Parliament Trialogue Plenary PlenaryProposal

Proposal Committee Negotiations Amendments VotePreparation

Amendments



Association

Trade Union

Company

NGO/ SMO

Think Tank

Religious Groups



Other

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Q7. On average, what kind of information do different types of interest groups supply you with? Please tick the appropriate boxes

Technical Political European Technical National Political National

European



Association

Trade Union

Company

NGO/ SMO

Think Tank

Religious Groups



Other

Q8. How useful is the information supplied by different types of interest groups for your work?

Completely Neither Useless Somewhat Completely Mostly Useless

Useless nor Useful Useful Useful



Association

Trade Union

Company

NGO/ SMO

Think Tank

Religious Groups


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Other

Q9. Do you think it’s appropriate for different types of interest groups to contact MEPs? Please tick the relevant box.

Absolutely AbsolutelyInappropriate Neutral Appropriate

inappropriate appropriate



Association

Trade Union

Company

NGO/ SMO

Think Tank

Religious Groups



Other

Q10. In your opinion what of the following does the Transparency Register do? Please tick the appropriate boxes below.

Completely Neither Agree Completely Disagree Agree

Disagree nor Disagree Agree

Improves the behaviour of interest groups

Reduces inappropriate influence caused by lobbying

Improves the transparency of the EU

Is helpful for public interest groups

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Documents

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES · 2015-06-30 · DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES . POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS . Institutional