Upload
xxxxdadad
View
216
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
1/14
Palgrave Macmillan Journals is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of International
Business Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
Corruption and the Role of InformationAuthor(s): Cassandra E. DiRienzo, Jayoti Das, Kathryn T. Cort and John Burbridge Jr
Source: Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Mar., 2007), pp. 320-332Published by: Palgrave Macmillan JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4540422Accessed: 26-08-2014 15:39 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=palhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4540422http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4540422http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=palhttp://www.jstor.org/8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
2/14This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
3/14
Corruption
and the
role of
information
CassandraDiRienzo
t al
321
rational behavior.
In
May
2001 the US
Department
of
State released
a
report
on
global
anti-corruption
efforts
stating:
Corruption
results from a
variety
of
economic, institutional,
political,
social,
and historical factors. It flourishes when
democratic institutions
are
weak,
laws are not
enforced,
political
will is
lacking,
and when citizens and the media
are
not allowed to be
partners
n
democracy.
Park
(2003: 30)
states
that,
in order
to
combat
corruption,
an
understanding
of
'the
major
deter-
minants of this multifaceted social
and
economic
phenomenon'
is
needed.
Empirical
studies
focusing
on the causes
of
corruption
have found that
the
determinants
of
corruption ranged
from
political
institutions,
government
regulations,
legal
systems,
GDP levels, and salaries of public employees to
gender,
religious
cultural
dimensions,
and
poverty,
as well as the role of colonialism
(Husted,
1999;
Sanyal
and
Samanta,
2001;
Ali and
Said,
2003;
Davis and
Ruhe,
2003; Park,
2003).
While
all of the above factors have been
empiri-
cally proven
to affect
corruption
levels,
a factor that
has
yet
to be
investigated
is
the
impact
of
the access
to
information on
corruption
levels.
Salbu
(2001)
states that
the
Internet
offers
people
unprecedented
access to
information,
resulting
in a
more
knowl-
edgeable
society.
Specifically,
as
citizens
acquire
more access to the Internet, they should be more
aware about the conduct of
government
and
business.
The
resulting
increase
in
transparency
should be
expected
to lower
corruption
levels,
as
such
openness
discourages
corrupt
practices.
There-
fore
it
is
logical
to
contend that
increased access
to
information
should result
in
fewer
transgressions
by
individuals,
businesses,
and
government.
Further,
nternational business
could become
more
open
and
transparent.
Can
something
as
funda-
mental
as
providing
worldwide access to
the
Internet reduce
corruption
and result in a better
climate for international business? The
policy
implications
of
such
a
finding
would be
significant.
Efforts
to increase access to information
could
result
in a
country
and the businesses that
operate
in
that environment
becoming
more
responsible
global
citizens.
Using cross-country
data from 85
countries,
the
initial thrust of this
paper
is
to
empirically explore
the
general relationship
between
the access
to
information
and
the
level of
perceived
corruption
within
a
country, using
regression
analysis.
The
second
major
thrust of this
study
will
employ
the
regression analysis
results to
explore
the
possibility
of
emerging
global patterns
of
corruption,
using
cluster
analysis.
The cluster
analysis
divides
the
individual countries into
groups
based
on
factors
that
are
found
to
significantly
affect
corruption.
The
possibilities
of
global patterns
of
corrupt
behavior are then
explored.
No
empirical
study
has
attempted
to understand the
growing impor-
tance
of
the
access
to
information on the level
of
corruption
within
a
country.
Background, hypotheses,
and
presentation
of
variables
Impact
of
corruptpractices
As
international business
expands, greater
attention
is
being
focused
on the ramifications
of
corrupt
practices. Numerous studies have explored the
definition,
costs, causes,
and effects of
corruption.1
In
regard
to the
definition, Johnston
(1996)
dis-
cusses
the various
meanings
of
corruption, ranging
from
bribery
among
public
officials
(Heidenheimer,
1989;
Van
Klaveren,
1989)
to
commercial
bribery
between
two
private
parties (Klitgaard,
1988).
The
World Bank defines
corruption
as
the
abuse
of
public
power
for
private
benefit; however,
corrupt
practices
can occur
within the
private
sector as
well.
Further,
Tanzi
(1998)
acknowledges
that,
although
corruption may
be difficult to
describe,2
corrupt
practicesare generally recognized when they occur.
In
this
study,
the
Transparency
nternational
(2005)
definition
of
corruption
as
the 'misuse of entrusted
power
for
private
gain'
is used.
Defining corruption
in
this manner embodies
both
public
and
private
corrupt
practices.
Studies have
also shown that
corruption
raises
the cost to host
countries
in
the form
of
reduced
tax
revenues,
and
also
distorts
the
impact
of industrial
policy
(Ades
and
Di
Tella,
1997;
Tanzi
and
Davoodi,
1997).
Corruption
is found to be
widespread
in
countries
with a lack of
transparency
with
respect
to
operations,
process,
and laws
(LaPalombara,
1994; Tanzi,
1998).
Further,
Mauro
(1995)
and
Bardhan
(1997)
have
highlighted
the harmful
effects
of
corruption
on income
inequality.
Alter-
natively,
Haque
and
Sahay
(1996);
Tullock
(1996)
and Van
Rijckeghern
and
Weder
(2001)
justify
the
existence
of
corrupt
practices
as traditional
gift-
giving
and a substitute for undervalued
wages,
incomes,
and
prices,
as such
practices
can
be
used
to more
equitably
allocate resources
in
heavily
distorted and
regulated
markets.
Overall,
the consensus
of these theoretical
and
empirical
studies
is
that
corruption
has
a
negative
journal
of International usiness tudies
This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
4/14
Corruption
and the role of Information CassandraDiRienzot
al
322
impact
on a
country's ability
to become
a
signifi-
cant
player
in
the
global
economy.
Given that
corruption
has such
negative global
ramifications,
many
studies
have
explored
why corruption
exists
to the
degree
that it does. This
paper
extends these
past
studies
by considering
how the access to
information
in
conjunction
with
socio-economic,
institutional,
and cultural
variables affects
the level
of
corruption
within a
country.
Digital
access,
information
ransparency,
and
corruption
The
main
theoretical
argument
in this
study
is that
access to
digital
information should
provide
ordin-
ary
citizens with
knowledge regarding public
and
private
business transactions.
Increased
exposure
to
information creates a more open and free society.
Research has shown that a more
open
and trans-
parent economy experiences
a lower level
of
corruption.
Schroth and
Sharma
(2003)
state
that both tech-
nology
and
legal
means can be used
and,
if
deployed
synergistically,
should
significantly
reduce
corrup-
tion. Forms
of
digital
access
including
the Internet
and mobile
technology
can be
effectively deployed
to
allow
the
dissemination of
news
concerning
corruptpractices
as
well
as
providing
access. Further-
more,
Tanzi
(1998)
highlights
the
transparency
of
rules, processes, and laws as important weapons in
the war
against corruption.
Ades and
Di
Tella
(1999),
Treisman
(2000),
and Wei
(2000)
show that
more
open
and
transparent
economies
aspiring
to become
players
in
the
global economy experience
lower
levels of
corruption.
Thus this research
ndicates that
governments
and societies
desiring
to be
significant
players internationally
should strive
to
improve
access to information to create a more
open
and
transparent
society.
The
importance
of information
transparency
in
governmental
affairs is now
impacting
on
China,
one of the more information-restricted countries.
Scholars,
government
officials,
and members
of the
business
community
are
calling
for
greater
open-
ness in order to assist economic
development
and
to thwart
official
corruption.
Guangzhou
has made
history
in
China
by being
the first
jurisdiction
to
legislate
and
institutionalize
government
transpar-
ency.
Since
1
January
2003 the
Guangzhou
muni-
cipal government
has disclosed
government
information
that
complies
with the
World Trade
Organization
(WTO)
requirements,
and has
made
nondisclosure
the
exception
rather than
the rule
(Horsley,
2003).
Access
to information has been
recognized
as a
tool for
fighting corruption
in
Indonesia as well.
Schroth
and Sharma
(2003)
stated
that,
in
the mid
1990s,
Indonesian
journalists reported
the
corrupt
practices
of the Suharto
government
in
various
unofficial,
web-based
journals.
Even
though only
200,000
of Indonesia's
210 million
people
had
Internet
connections,
these web-based
publications
aided in
the
dismantling
of the Suharto
govern-
ment
in
1998. Schroth and Sharma state:
'in
short
the
Internet has
emerged
as a
powerful
tool to
fight
corruption.'
The
availability
of information
by
means of
digital
access can
create more
transparent
rules,
laws and
transactions,
resulting
in
greater
accountability.3
This
theory
is
supported by
Bhatnagar
(2000),
who
finds that increased access to the Internet and the
prevalence
of
e-government
raises
transparency
and
accountability,
and lowers unethical
practices.
Thus
openness
in
public
and
private
institutional
opera-
tions should reduce the
prevalence
of
corrupt
practices. Digital
access
provides
better
delivery
of
services
to
citizens,
and
improves
the interactive
effects
between
all
stakeholders,
while
giving
indi-
viduals
a sense of
empowerment through
access
to
information. Therefore
building
information infra-
structures and
increasing digital
access results
in
increased revenue and
lower transaction
costs,
and
can also reduce corruption levels. As stated by
Norris
and
Zinnbauer
(2002),
widespread
Internet
access and an
independent
free
press
are often
associated
with nations that
experience
greater
administrative
efficiency, improved
social and eco-
nomic
conditions,
and
lower
corruption.
Thus
it can be
argued
that access
to information
lowers
corruption
levels. The main
hypothesis
tested in
this
paper
is:
Hypothesis
1: The
higher
the access
to informa-
tion
and
technology
in
a
country,
the lower the
degree of corruption in that country.
Control variables
Before
a
statistical
analysis examining
the relation-
ship
between the
level of
corruption
and the
availability
of
information within a
country
can
be
performed,
the other factors
(socio-economic,
institutional,
and cultural
variables)
affecting
cor-
ruption
need to be controlled
in
order
to
prevent
a
model
mis-specification.
It is
necessary
to control
for these variables
in
an effort
to illuminate the true
relationship
between
corruption
and information.
The
socio-economic
and institutional factors are
Journal
f International usiness tudies
This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
5/14
Corruption
and
the role
of
information
Cassandra
DiRienzot al
323
proxied
by
economic
freedom
and
development,
while cultural
factors
are
representedby
Hofstede's
four
main
cultural
attributes.
Each
of these
control
variables
will be
briefly
discussed.
Economic
reedom
nd
development
An
economically
free
nation
is considered
to have
a
government
that
promotes
a stable
legal
system,
provides
sound
money,
has
efficient
labor
and
product
markets,
and
does not
limit trade
and
investment,
thus
providing
an environment
for
growth.
Global businesses
thrive
in these
environ-
ments
in
which
institutions
and
policies
are
consistent,
providing
an
infrastructure
to
protect
individuals
and businesses
from
corruption
and
coercion.
Rose-Ackerman
1978),
Alam
(1995),
and
Tanzi (1998) state that unwieldy government
institutions
tend
to
increase
the chances
of officials
becoming
corrupt,
while
Ades and
Di
Tella
(1999)
and
Treisman
(2000)
point
to the
fact
that
more
open
economies
tend
to have
lower
corruption.
This research
has
found
that
countries
with a
higher
level of economic
freedom
are
generally
less
corrupt.
Furthermore,
n
regard
to economic
devel-
opment,
Mauro
(1995),
Husted
(1999),
and
Ali
(2003)
have
provided
empirical
support
that
coun-
tries
with
higher
levels
of economic
development
tend
to
have
lower levels
of
corruption.
Cultural
actors
Many
studies4
have
concluded
that
corruption
within a
country
is
very
much a
cultural
phenom-
enon.
It is
therefore
necessary
to
control
for the
cultural
make-up
of
a
country
when
considering
its
level
of
corruption.
Most
empirical
studiess
explor-
ing
the role
of cultural
values
use
Hofstede's
(1980,
2001)
four
dimensions
characterizing
cultures
across
the
world.
A discussion
of each
of
Hofstede's
work-related
values
and
their
relationship
to a
country's
corruption
levels
follows.
In
regard
to Hofstede's power distance, Takyi-
Asiedu
(1993),
Cohen
et
al.
(1996),
and
Husted
(1999)
state
that cultures
with
an
unequal
distribu-
tion
of
power
tend
to
discourage questioning
authority,
and,
as a
result,
citizens
of
such societies
tend
to
shy
away
from
whistle-blowing
activity
when
confronted
with
corrupt
behavior.
Thus
it has
been
found
that the
greater
the
power
distance,
the
higher
the
degree
of
corruption
in
the
country.
In
regard
to
individualism-collectivism,
Triandis
(1994)
and
Husted
(1999)
found
that
countries
with
high
levels
of individualism
maintain
a
belief
system
in which
individual
achievement
is
the
ideal:
people
are
responsible
for their
individual
actions,
and
they
are
not
emotionally
dependent
on
organizations
or
groups.
Conversely,
collectivist
societies
identify
with
group
membership
and
decision-making,
where
the
group protects
the individual
in
exchange
for
loyalty.
Thus
more
individualistic
countries
generally
have
lower levels
of
corruption.
Regarding
masculine-feminine
cultural
values,
a
masculine culture
emphasizes
power,
wealth,
and
status,
while
feminine
cultures
emphasize
the
quality
of
life,
sometimes
over
productivity
(Adler,
2002).
Vitell
et al.
(1993)
and Cohen
et
al.
(1996)
all
state
that
higher
levels
of
corruption
are
found
in
more
masculine
societies.
Finally,
with
regard
o the
degree
of
uncertainty
avoidance,
societies
that have
a
high
uncertainty
avoidance
are those
in which
people feel uncomfortable in unpredictable situa-
tions,
which often
results
in an
unwillingness
to
challenge
authority
and
rules.
Although
there is
not
a consensus
in the
literature,6
it is
generally
believed
that
individuals
in
high
uncertainty
avoidance
countries
tend
to be
more
prone
to
corruption.
Data and
regression
analysis
Data
description
The
Corruption
Perception
Index7
or
CPI
(Trans-
parency
International, 2005)
is selected
as
the
means for measuring corruption, as it is the most
comprehensive
quantitative
indicator
of
cross-
country
corruption
available.
The CPI
assesses
the
degree
to
which
officials
and
politicians
are
believed
to
accept
bribes
or
illicit
payments
in
public
procurement,
embezzle
public
funds,
or
commit
offenses,
making
the
measurement
of
corruption
perceptual
rather
than
absolute.
The
CPI
is a continuous
scale
from
1 to
10
(1
=
high
corruption,
10
-
no
corruption).
Despite
some
of
its
limitations,
noted
by
Husted
(1999),
this
index
has
been
used
in several
academic
studies.8
Further-
more, Lancasterand Montinola (1997) conclude in
their
study
that,
while
no index
or measure
is
perfect,
Transparency
International's
Corruption
Index
is
robust.
This
index is
not
based
upon
information
from
the
organization's
own
experts,
but
is
constructed
as a
weighted
average
of different
indexes from
10 different
organizations,
and
it
reflects
the
impressions
of business
people
and
risk
analysts
who
have been
surveyed.9
The
Digital
Access
Index or
DAI 2002
is used10
as
a
proxy
for
access to
information.
The
DAI
measures
the
overall
ability
of
individuals
across
178
countries,
to not
only
access but also use
Journal
f International
usiness
Studies
This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
6/14
Corruption
and the role of Information
CassandraDiRienzot
al
324
information and
communication
technology.
It
consists of
eight
variables
organized
into five
categories.
The overall
country
score is based
upon:
*
infrastructure
(fixed
telephone
subscribers and
mobile cellular ubscribers,oth
per
100inhabitants);
*
affordability
of access
(Internet
access
price
as a
percentage
of GDP
per
capita);
*
knowledge
(adult
literacy,
and combined
primary,
secondary
and
tertiary
school enrolment
levels);
*
quality
of ICT services
(international
Internet
bandwidth
per capita,
Broadband
subscribers
per
100
inhabitants);
and
*
usage
(Internet
users
per
100
inhabitants).
The
DAI
index
is
represented
on a scale of 0
(low
access)
to 1
(highest
access).
The Economic Freedom of the World(EFW)ndex
is used to
measure
a
country's degree
of economic
freedom. This index is
published by Gwartney
et al.
(2002)
and
co-published by
the Fraser
nstitute.
This
index consists of five
categories:
*
size of
government
(government expenditure,
taxes,
etc.);
*
legal
structure and
security
of
property rights
(level
of
judicial independence,
protection
of
intellectual
property, military
interference
in
the
rule of
law,
etc.);
* access to sound money (growth of money supply,
freedom to own
foreign
currency,
etc.);
*
freedom to
exchange
with
foreigners
(level
of
tariff
and non-tariff
barriers,
nternational
capital
controls,
size of
the trade
sector,
etc.);
and
*
regulation
of
credit, labor,
and
business,
specifi-
cally
the ease of
entry
of a
new business.
The scale
ratings
for the Economic
Freedom
Index
range
from
0 to
10,
with 10
being
most
free,
representing
countries
with advanced socio-
economic
structures,
and 0
being
least
free,
representative
of countries with
less-developed
socio-economic
structures.
GDP
per capita
(2002)
from the World
Develop-
ment
Report
is used to measure the level of
economic
development
within a
country,
and
Hofstede's four measures of culture are used as
control
variables.11
With
the
exception
of
culture
variables,12
the
digital
access and control variables
are
lagged approximately13
two
years
behind the
CPI data.
Digital
access and the control variables are
lagged
in an effort to allow time for their values to
affect
a
country's perceived
level of
corruption.
Table
1
summarizes the data used
in
this
analysis.14
Regressionanalysis
A
set of 85 countries is used to test the
previously
stated
hypotheses.
Table
2
provides
the
descriptive
statistics
and the correlation matrix for all the
variables. As
expected,
CPI has a
positive
relation-
ship
to
DAI, IDV, EFW,
and
GDP,
and a
negative
Table
1
Variable
ummary
Variable
Proxy
name,
year
reported)
Corruption Corruption Perception Index
(CPI, 005)
Access to information
Digital
Access Index
(DAI, 2002)
Power distance Hofstede's Power Distance
(PDI)
Individualism-collectivism Hofstede's Individualism
IDV)
Masculine-feminine Hofstede's
Masculity
(MAS)
Uncertainty
avoidance Hofstede's
Uncertainty
Avoidance
(UAI)
Economicreedom EconomicFreedom f the World
Economic
development
GDP
per capita
(GDP, 2002)
Table
2
Descriptive
tatisticsand
correlationsa
or
the model
Variable Mean
s.d. CPI
DAI PDI
IDV MAS UAI EFW GDP
CPI 4.98 2.43
1
DAI 0.53 0.21
0.880**
1
PDI
61.69
20.84 0.682** 0.584** 1
IDV 40.05
22.26 0.604** 0.589** 0.597**
1
MAS
48.58 18.30 0.059
0.021 0.096 0.169
1
UAI 65.14 22.10 0.083 0.031 0.176 0.170 0.006 1
EFW
6.71
0.87 0.795** 0.649** 0.580 0.458**
0.008 0.269* 1
GDP
9,783 11,492
0.878**
0.954**
0.657** 0.614** 0.087 0.056 0.725**
1
aUsing he
Jarque-Bera
est, all
variables ere
ested
or
normality. t
95%
confidence,he
CPI, DV, ndGDPwere ound o be non-normal. sa
result,
all
paired
orrelationsor
these variables
epresent
he
Spearman
ank orrelations. he
paired
normal orrelations
epresent
he Pearson orrelation
coefficients.
*P
8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
7/14
Corruption
and
the
role of Information
Cassandra
DiRienzo
t
al
325
relationship
to
PDI,
MAS,
and UAI. These relation-
ships suggest
that
higher
levels of
digital
access,
individualism,
and economic freedom and devel-
opment
yield
lower levels
of
corruption.
Further,
greater power
distances,
masculinity,
and uncer-
tainty
avoidance
imply higher
levels of
corruption.
To further
examine
the
relationship
between the
degree
of
corruption
within a
country
and
these
variables,
two
ordinary
least
squares
(OLS)
regres-
sion
analyses
were
performed.
The first
regression
analysis
uses CPI as the
dependent
variable and the
six
control
variables as the
independent
variables,
and is
referred o as Model
1.
The second
regression
is the same as the first with the
exception
of the
inclusion
of
DAI,
and is
referred o as
Model
2. The
analyses
are
presented
in this
manner
in order to
highlight the additional explanatory power of DAI.
Model 1 and Model 2 are
respectively
defined:
Model
1:
CPI
=
flo
-
JIPDI
+
/2IDV
-
/3MAS
-
f4UAI
+
/f5EFW
f6GDP
+
Model 2:
CPI
=
flo
-
LlPDI
+
f2IDV
-
f3MAS
-
14UAI
+
/sEFW
+
fl6GDP
+
J7DAI
+
e
The regressionresults forboth models areprovided
in
Table 3.
The
Adjusted
R2
values and the
F
statistics indicate that the both
regression
models
provided
a
good
fit
to the data.
In an effort to
validate
these
results and test the
significance
of the
coefficients,
a series of tests for
heteroskedasticity,
normality
of the error
term,
and
multicollinearity
were carried out
for
both
models. White's
(1980)
test for
heteroskedasticity
indicated that the resi-
duals from both
regression
models were homo-
skedastic.
Further,
the residuals were tested for
normality using
the
Jarque-Bera
test,s15
nd at the
95% confidence level results indicated that
the
residuals from
both models were
normally
distrib-
uted.
Finally,
a test of
multicollinearity
for each
of
the
independent
variables
using
the variance-infla-
tion factor
(VIF)
was
performed.16
As shown
in
Table
3,
the
VIF
values
ranged
from 1.05 to 2.73
in
Model
1 and
from 1.05
to
3.63
in
Model 2. Since
VIFvalues
greater
than 5.3 have been
suggested17
as
cutoffs for
multicollinearity,
it does not
appear
that
multicollinearity
is a
problem
in this
analysis
using
the VIFs as the criterion.
However,
as shown
in
Table
2,
DAI
and GDP
are
correlated at 0.95.
Strong
correlations between
explanatory
variables
are
evidence of
multicollinearity
even if
the corre-
sponding VIFs are low. The presence of multi-
collinearity
can make the
regression
results
sensitive to
the
data used.
Further,
changes
in the
model
specification
may
result
in
significant
changes
in the coefficient estimates.
However,
the
classic
signs
of
multicollinearity
are not
present
in
the final
regression
results.18
Given
that
the
regression
results were
generally
supported
by
the tests discussed
above,
an inter-
pretation
of the coefficients and tests of
the
research
hypothesis
can be considered.
In
regres-
sion Model
1,
two of the four cultural variables
-
individualism (IDV) and masculinity (MAS)- are
significant.
The
coefficient
on IDV is
positive,
suggesting
that more individualistic societies tend
to have lower levels
(see
footnote
14)
of
corruption,
which is consistent with
existing
literature.
The
negative
coefficient on
MAS
indicates that
econo-
mies that are
more
masculine
suffer from
higher
levels19
of
corruption,
which
also adheres
to
the
existing
literature.
In
regard
to economic freedom
and
development,
the
analysis
results
show
sig-
Table
3
Regression
results
(dependent
variable
CPI
05)
Int.
PD IDV MAS UAI EFW GDP DAI
R2
F
Model 1
Estimate -1.683 -0.009 0.017* -0.018** 0.002 0.930** 0.0001**
0.847 77.64**
St. error
(1.445)
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
(0.174) (0.00001)
VIF 0
2.2 2.32 1.05 1.09
2.1 2.73
Model
2
Estimate -1.258 -0.008 0.01 -0.017** -0.006 0.711** 0.00007**
4.032** 0.882 90.08**
St. error
(1.27) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
(0.005)
(0.159) (0.00002)
(0.819)
VIF 0 2.2
2.46 1.05 1.24
2.28 3.63 3.39
*P
8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
8/14
Corruption
and
the
role
of
information
CassandraDiRienzo
t
al
nificant
and
positive
coefficients on both EFWand
GDP. Since
higher
values
of the EFW index
represent
countries
that are
freer and
less
regulated,
the
positive
coefficients on
EFW
and GDP
support
previous
theoretical and
empirical
research.
Regression
Model
2
contains the
same
control
variables,
but
includes the
main
variable of
interest,
DAI. In
regard
to
the control
variables,
the
regres-
sion results are similar to
those
in
Model
1,
with
the
exception
that
IDV
becomes
insignificant
in
Model 2. Most
importantly,
the
coefficient
on DAI
is
positive
and
significant.
Given that
higher
values
of the
corruption
index indicate lower levels
of
corruption,
and
higher
values of
the
DAI index
imply
increased access to information and technol-
ogy,
the
positive
coefficient on DAI indicates that
higher levels of digital access suggest lower levels of
corruption,
thus
supporting Hypothesis
1,
which is
the main
hypothesis
of this
study.
As further
evidence,
a
partial
F
test indicated that the inclu-
sion of DAI
significantly
increases the
explanatory
power
of the
regression
at 99% confidence.20 This
result can also be
observed
by
noting
the
change
in
the
Adjusted
R2
value from Model
1
(0.847)
to
Model
2
(0.882),
suggesting
that DAI adds
approxi-
mately
3.5% additional
explanatory power
to the
regression.
In
summary,
the results of the
regression
analysis
indicate that countries with
more mascu-
line cultures with lower levels of economic freedom
and
development
and
less access to information are
more
likely
to
exhibit
high
levels
of
corruption.
The
regression
results show the
general
relation-
ship
between the level of
corruption experienced
in
a
country
and
the
cultural,
socio-economic,
institu-
tional,
and
digital
access variables.
In the
next
section,
the
analysis
is extended
to
consider how
specific
countries can be
grouped by
the
indepen-
dent
variables,21
and how
these
country
groups
differ
in
regard
to their
corruption
levels. To address
this
issue,
a
country-based
cluster
analysis
is
performed.As a consequence of the cluster analysis,
potential emerging regional
and/or
global
trends
across the
85
countries
can be illuminated.
Cluster
analysis
A cluster
analysis
is
used
to
group
the 85
countries
into distinct
clusters
using
the
cultural,
socio-
economic,
institutional,
and
digital
access
variables
found to be
statistically
significant
in
the
regression
analysis
as the criteria.
In
particular,
the
MAS, EFW,
GDP,
and
DAI
variables are used as the
country
characteristics
upon
which the clusters are formed.
A cluster
analysis groups
objects,
in this case
countries,
into
groups
such that the
objects
within
a
group
are most similar to each other with
respect
to
specified
characteristics and least similar
to
objects
in
the
other
groups.
In other
words,
the
cluster
analysis groups
the individual countries
based on how
similar or 'close'
they
are
in
regard
to
their
masculinity,
economic freedom and devel-
opment,
and
digital
access.
Segmenting
the coun-
tries
into
clusters
provides
a
more
meaningful
and
intuitive
description
of the countries
in
the
dataset,
as
one
is
able
to see how
specific
countries can be
grouped by
the
independent
variables,
and how
these
groups
differ
in their
corruption
levels.
A
non-hierarchical
cluster
analysis
is
preformed
using
the
squared
Euclidean
distance22
as
the
measure of how 'close' or similar two countries
are in regardto the four variables. Non-hierarchical
cluster
analysis
requires
that the number of
clusters
to be
created
in the
analysis
be
set
prior
to
performing
the
analysis.
There are no hard
guide-
lines
for
determining
the number of clusters to be
created
in
an
analysis,
and this is
generally
an
exploratory
process.
After
considering
many
differ-
ent cluster
analysis
results,
a
grouping
of four
countries clusters was
chosen,
and
the
results
are
presented
in
Table
4. The cluster
analysis
results
can
be
interpreted
as follows.
Country
cluster
1
repre-
sents
the
group
of countries
that
are
most
homo-
geneous in regard to their masculinity, economic
freedom
and
development,
and
digital
access,
and
most
heterogeneous
to
the
other
country
clusters
(clusters
2, 3,
and
4)
in
regard
to these
variables,
and so forth
for
the
remaining
clusters.
In
order to
gain
a more
in-depth understanding
of the
different
country
clusters,
the means
of each
of
the four variables used
to create the
clusters
are
presented
in Table 5. Table 5
shows that
the
countries
belonging
to Cluster
1
have the
highest
mean access
to
information,
level of economic
freedom and
development.
However,
compared
with the other clusters, the countries in Cluster 1
also
have a more masculine culture on
average.
It
should be noted
that this
average
is influenced
by
the inclusion
of a few countries with
exceptionally
higher
levels
of
masculinity
such
as
Japan
(95)
and
Austria
(79).
Alternatively,
Cluster
4
has the lowest
mean access
to
information,
level
of
economic
freedom
and
development.
Unexpectedly,
the
countries
in Cluster
4
tend to have a more
moderate
degree
of
masculinity
within their
cul-
tures.
Again,
this result can be
explained
by
a few
outliers
within the
cluster,
such as Sri
Lanka,23
with
exceptionally
low levels of
masculinity
within their
journal
of
International
usiness
Studies
This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
9/14
Corruption
and the role
of
information
CassandraDiRienzot
al
327
Table 4 Cluster
analysis
resultsa
Cluster Cluster
Cluster Cluster
Australia Brazil
Argentina Angola
Austria
Bulgaria
China
Bangladesh
Belgium
Chile Colombia
Egypt
Canada Costa Rica Dominican
Republic Ethiopia
Denmark
Croatia
Ecuador Ghana
Finland Czech
Republic Hungary
Guatemala
France El
Salvador
Jamaica
Honduras
Germany
Estonia
Mexico India
Hong Kong
Greece
Philippines
Indonesia
Iceland Israel Poland Iran
Ireland
Jordan
Slovakia
Kenya
Italy
Korea
South Africa
Malawi
Japan
Kuwait Venezuela
Morocco
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Namibia
Netherlands
Malta
Nigeria
New Zealand Panama Pakistan
Norway
Peru Romania
Singapore Portugal
RussianFederation
Sweden
Slovenia
Senegal
Switzerland
Spain
Serbia
United
Kingdom
Thailand
Sri Lanka
United States
Trinidad
and
Tobago Syria
Uruguay
Tanzania
Turkey
Vietnam
Zambia
aCluster
'Least
Corruption',
luster
'Moderately
ow
Corruption',
luster
'Moderately ighCorruption',
nd Cluster
'HighCorruption'.
Table
5
Independent
variablemeans
by
cluster
Table
6
CPI
means
by
cluster
Cluster DAI
MAS
EFW
GDP
Cluster Mean
CPI) Sample
ize
Cluster
1
0.76 49.00 7.70
27,053.91
Cluster
1
Least
corruption
8.42
22
Cluster
2
0.58
41.00 6.85
6,874.15
Cluster
2
Moderately
ow
corruption
5.01 23
Cluster 3 0.49
70.23 6.21
3,380.15
Cluster 3
Moderately
high
corruption
3.43
13
Cluster
4
0.29
44.23 5.97
944.22 Cluster
4
High corruption
2.77 26
culture.
Compared
with
the
other
clusters,
clusters
2 and 3 fall into the middle
ranges
in
regard
to their
mean
access to information and
levels of economic
freedom and
development.
The
primary objective
of
the
cluster
analysis
is
to
explore
how
these countries differ in their
levels
of
corruption
levels.
Having
described the
country
clusters,
a
series of tests of
means are
now
performed
to determine
whether the
country
clusters have
statistically
different
mean
levels
of
corruption.
The
regression
results
indicate that these four
variables
influence the level of
corruption
in a
particular
country and, by clustering
the countries
by
these
variables,
differences
in their
corruption
levels
should
be detectable.
Table 6 shows the
sample
mean
corruption
index for each of the four clusters
and
the
corresponding sample
size.
In
order to
statistically
determine whether
the
mean
level
of
corruption
differs
pair-wise
across the
country
clusters,
a test of means is
required.
Given
the
sample
sizes
(each
country
cluster has a
sample
size
less than
30),
it is
necessary
to assume that the
corruption
index is
normally
distributed
in
order to
use
a
t-test
to
test
for
differences
in
the means. The
Jarque-Bera
test was used to test for
normality
of
the
corruption
index,
and the
results
indicated that
the
corruption
index is not
normally
distributed.
Given the small
sample
sizes
and
the non-normal-
lournal of International Business Studies
This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
10/14This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
11/14This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
12/14
Corruption
and
the
role
of Information CassandraDiRienzo
t
al
330
the United Nations' World
Telecommunication
Development Report
(2003).
There are other
indices,
such
as the
Networked
Readiness Index
published by
CID
(Harvard),
nd World Bank
ndica-
tors
measuring
individual
phone
line and
cellular
use,
but
DAI
s
the
largest,
most
comprehensive
ndex
thus far.
11Hofstede's
measureof national
culture
s
based
on
the
surveys
hat were
conducted
during
he
late 1960s
and
early
1970s
from more than
116,000
employees
of
72
IBM international
subsidiaries.
Initially,
Hof-
stede's
surveys
assessed
personal
values and
aspira-
tions
in
the
workplace
across53 countries.
Using
actor
analysis,
Hofstede
developed
indices
ranging
rom 0
to
100 to measure
power
distance,
individualism-collec-
tivism,
masculinity-femininity,
nd
uncertainty
avoid-
ance. The higherthe score (from0 to 100), the more
the
country
is
individualistic nd
masculine,
and has a
stronger
level of
uncertainty
avoidance
with a
greater
power
distance.
12Hofstede's
cultural
variables are not
reported
annually.
The
values for the cultural
variables
were
collected from
Hofstede's2001
text.
13Given hat the
indicesare
based
partially
n
survey
data,
the
'reported'year
for an
index is not
necessarily
the
year
in
which the data
were
collected.
For
example,
the
2005
CPI
is
based
partially
on
survey
data
collected
in
2003-2004.
14Higher
valuesfor IDVrepresentmore individualis-
tic
societies.
15sThe
arque-Bera
est
evaluatesthe
null
hypothesis
that the
residuals
are
normality
distributed
with
unspecified
mean and
variance
against
the
alternative
that the
residualsare not
normally
distributed.
16The
VIF
determines the
effects of the
correlations
among
the
independent
variablesand
their
influence
on
the variancesof the
regression
coefficients
(Mad-
dala, 1988;
Kennedy,
1992).
17
Kennedy
1992),
Studenmund
(1992),
and
Burns
and Bush
(2003)
suggest
a cutoff of
10,
and Hairet
al.
(1992)
suggest
a stricter
cutoff of
5.3.
18Some
classic
signs
of
multicollinearity
n
regression
resultsare
insignificant
oefficients n
conjunction
with
a
high
R2
and/or
signs
of
coefficients that are
inconsistent with
theory.
In
Model
2,
coefficients on
GDP and
DAIare both
significant
and have
signs
that
are
consistentwith
theory.
19Higher
values for
MAS
represent higher
levels of
masculinity.
20The
F
statistic or the
partial
F
test is 24.24
and the
critical value is
3.96,
yielding
a
P-value less
than
0.0001. This
ndicates hat the null
hypothesis
hat the
inclusion of DAIdoes not significantlyincrease the
explanatorypower
of
the
regression
model
should be
rejected.
21Jain
(2001)
suggests
using
a
multiple
variable
approach
to cluster
analysis.
22The
squared
Euclidean
istance between countries
--
EN-1
(Ci"n- jn)2,
weeNi
and
j
is
defined as
dij=
_
c,
-
cn)2,
where
N is
equal
to
6,
the number
of
country
characteristics
considered,
ci,n
represents
haracteristic for
country
,
andc/
represents
characteristic for
country j.
23Sri
Lanka
has an
MASvalue of
10.
241n
his case the
Mann-Whitney
U
test
evaluates he
null hypothesisthat the populationrelative requency
distributions or
country
clusters
i
and
j
are
identical
(the
population
mean
corruption
levels are
equal
in
clusters
i
and
j) against
the
alternative
that the
population
relative
frequency
distributionof
country
cluster
i
is shifted to the
right
(or left)
of
the
relative
frequency
distribution of
country j
(cluster
i
has a
higher
(or
lower)
corruption
evel than
cluster
j).
References
Ades,
A. and Di
Tella,
R.
1997)
'The
auses
and
consequences
f
corruption:
a
review of
recent
empirical
contributions',
Institute f
Development
tudiesBulletin
7(2):
6-12.
Ades,
A. and Di
Tella,
R.
(1999)
'Rents,
competition
and
corruption',
merican
conomic eview
9(4):
982-993.
Adler,
N.
(2002)
International
imensions f
Organizational
Behavior,
outh
Western:New York.
Alam,
M.S.
(1995)
'A
theory
of limits
on
corruption
nd some
applications',Kyklos
8(3):
419-435.
Ali,
A.M.
(2003)
'Institutional
ifferences s
sourcesof
growth
differences',
tlantic
conomic
Journal
(4):
348-362.
Ali,
A.M.
and
Said,
I.H.
(2003)
'Determinants f economic
corruption',
Cato
Journal
2(3):
449-466.
Bardhan,
P.
(1997)
'Corruption
nd
development:
a
review
of
the
issues',
ournal
f Economic
iterature
5(3):
1320-1 346.
Besley,
T.
and
McLaren,
.
(1993)
'Taxes nd
bribery:
he
roleof
wage
incentives',
Economic
Journal
03(416):
119-141.
Bhatnagar,
.
(2000)
'Social
mplications
f
information nd
communication
n
developing
countries:
essons
from Asian
success
tories',
TheElectronic
Journal
f
Information
ystems
n
Developing
Countries
1(4):
1-10,
http://www.ejisdc.org.
(accessed
16
May
2006).
Burns,
A.
and
Bush,
R.
(2003)
Marketing
Research:Online
Research
pplications,
renticeHall:
Upper
Saddle
River,
NJ.
Cohen,
J.R.,
Pant,
W.L. nd
Sharp,
D.J.
1996)
'A
methodological
note on cross-cultural
ccounting
ethics
research',
nterna-
tional
ournal
f
Accounting
1(1):
55-66.
Davis,
D.G.
1977)
'Propertyights
and
economic
efficiency:
he
Australian
irlines
revisited',
Journal
f
Law and
Economics
20(1):
223-226.
Journal
f International
usiness
tudies
This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
13/14
Corruption
nd the role of Information
CassandraDiRienzot
al
331
Davis,
J.H.
and
Ruhe,
J.A.
(2003)
'Perceptions
of
country
corruption:
ntecedentsand
outcomes',
Journal
f
Business
Ethics
3(4):
275-288.
Gastanga,
V.M.,
Nugent,
J.B.
and
Pashamova,
B.
(1998)
'Host
country
eformsndFDI
nflows:
ow much
difference o
they
make?'World
evelopment
6(7):
1299-1314.
Getz, K.A. and Volkema, R.J. (2001) 'Culture,perceived
corruption
nd
economics',
Business nd
Society
0(1):
7-31.
Ghoshal,
S. and
Moran,
P.
(2005)
'Towards
Good
Theory
of
Management',
n
J.
Birkinshawnd G. Piramal
eds.)
Sumantra
Ghoshal n
Management:
Force
or
Good,
Upper
Saddle
River,
NJ:
Financial
imes/Prentice
all,
pp
1-27.
Global
Corruption eport
2003)
'Access o
Information',
www
document]
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/.
accessed
20
November
005).
Gwartney,
W., Lawson,
R.,Park,W., Edward,
.,
de
Rugy,
V.and
Wagh,
S.
(2002)
Economicreedomf the
World nnual
Report,
[www
document]
http://www.freetheworld.com/download.
html.
(accessed
15
June
2004).
Hair
r,
.F.,
Anderson,R.E.,Tatham,
R.L. nd
Black,
W.C.
1992)
Multivariateata
Analysis,
Macmillan: ew York.
Haque,
N.U. and
Sahay,
R.
(1996)
'Do
government
wage
cuts
budget deficits?', MFWorkingPapers96/19, International
Monetary
und:
Washington,
DC.
Heidenheimer,
.J.
1989)
'Perspectives
n the
Perception
f
Corruption',
n
A.J.
Heidenheimer,
M.
Johnston
and V.T.
LeVine
eds.)
Political
Corruption:
Handbook,
ransactions
Publishers,
ew
Brunswick,
p
141-154.
Hofstede,
G.
(1980)
Culture's
onsequences:
nternationaliffer-
ences n
Work-Related
alues,
age:
Beverly
Hills,
CA.
Hofstede,
G.
(2001)
Culture's
onsequences:
omparing
alues,
Behaviors,nstitutions,
nd
Organizations
cross
Nations,
Sage:
Thousand
Oaks,
CA.
Horsley,
J.P.
(2003)
'China's
pioneering foray
into
open
government:
a
tale of
two
cities',
[www
document]
http://www.freedominfo.org/news/guangzhou/.
accessed
15
October
2005).
Husted,
B.W.
1994)
'Honor
among
thieves:a
transaction-cost
interpretationf corruptionnthe thirdworld',Business thics
Quarterly
(1):
17-27.
Husted,
B.W.
1999)
'Wealth,
ulture nd
corruption',
ournal
f
Internationalusiness
tudies
0(2):
339-360.
Husted,
B.W.
2000)
'The
mpact
of
national
ulture n software
piracy',
ournal
f
Business thics
6(3):
197-212.
International
elecommunication nion
(2003)
'Digital
access
index',
[www document]
http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/
pressreleases/2003/30.html.
accessed
17
June
2004).
Jaeger,
A.
(1986)
'Organization
evelopment
and
national
culture:where is the
fit?'
Academy
f
Management
Review
11(1):
178-190.
Jain,
S.
(2001)
International
Marketing,
South
Western
Publishing:
Mason,
OH.
Johnston,
M.
(1996)
'The search or
definition: he
vitality
of
politics
nd the
issueof
corruption',
nternationalocial
cience
Journal49(Spring):21-335.
Kehoe,
W.J.
(1998)
'The environment
of ethics
in
global
business',
Journal
f Business
nd Behavioral
cience
2(Fall):
47-56.
Kennedy,
P.A.
(1992)
Guide
to
Econometrics,
MIT
Press:
Cambridge,
MA.
Klitgaard,
R.
(1988)
'International
cooperation
against corrup-
tion',
Financeand
Development
35(1):
3-7.
Lamsdorff,
J.G.
(2003)
'The
Transparency
nternationalCorrup-
tion
Perceptions
Index 2003: framework
document',
[www
document]
http://www.transparency.org.
(accessed
15
June
2004).
Lancaster,
T.D. and
Montinola,
G.R.
(1997)
'Toward a metho-
dology
for
the
comparative
study
of
political corruption',
Crime,
Law and Social
Change
27(3/4):
85-206.
LaPalombara,
J.
(1994)
'Structuraland
institutional
aspects
of
corruption', Social Research 1(2): 325-350.
Maddala,
G.S.
(1988)
Introduction
o
Econometrics,
acmillan:
New York.
Macrae,
J.
(1982)
'Underdevelopment
nd the economics of
corruption: game
theory approach',
World
Development
10(8):
677-687.
Mauro,
P.
(1995)
'Corruption
nd
growth',Quarterly
ournal
f
Economics10(2):681-712.
Norris,
P
and
Zinnbauer,
(2002)
'Giving
oice o the
voiceless:
good
governance,
human
development
and
mass
communications',
Human
Development Report
Office
Occasional
aper,
Backgroundaper
or Human
Development
Report
(UNDP),
pp:
1-44,
[www
document]
http://hdr.
undp.org/docs/publications/backgroundpapers/2002/Norris-
Zinnbauer_2002.pdf
accessed
27
February
007).
North,
D.C.
1990)
Institution,
nstitutional
hange,
nd
Econom-
ic
Performance,
ambridge
University
ress:
Cambridge.
Park,
H.
(2003)
'Determinants f
corruption:
cross-national
analysis',
Multinationalusiness
eview
1(2):
29-48.
Rose-Ackerman,
.
(1978)
Corruption: Study
of
Political
Economy,
cademic
Press:New York.
Sanyal,
R.N.and
Samanta,
.K.
2001)
'Determinantsf
bribery
in
international
usiness',
Thunderbird
nternational usiness
Review6(2): 133-148.
Salbu,
S.R.
(2001)
'Information
echnology
n
the
war
against
international
ribery
and
corruption:
he next frontierof
institutional
eform',
arvard
Journal
n
Legislation
8(1):
67-102.
Schleifer,
A.
and
Vishny,
R.W.
1993)
'Corruption',Quarterly
Journal
f
Economics
08(3):
599-617.
Schroth,
P.W. and
Sharma,
P.
(2003)
'Transnationalaw and
technology
as
potential
orces
against
corruption',Manage-
mentDecision
1(3):
296-303.
Schwartz,
S.H.
(1994)
'Are there
universal
aspects
in
the
structure
and
contents of humanvalues?'
Journal
f Social
Issues
0(4):
19-45.
Smith, P.B.,
Dugan,
S. and
Trompenaars,
.
(1996)
'National
culture nd the valuesof
organizational
mployees',
ournal
f
CrossCultural
sychology
7(2):
231-264.
Sondergaard,
M.
(1994)
'Hofstede's
Consequences:
Study
of
Review, Citations,and Replications',Organization tudies
15(3):
447-456.
Studenmund,
A.H.
1992)
Using
Econometrics:Practical
uide,
HarperCollins:
ewYork.
Takyi-Asiedu,
.
(1993)
'Some
socio-cultural
actors
retarding
entrepreneurial
ctivity
in sub-saharan
Africa',
Journal
of
Business
Venturing
(2):
91-98.
Tanzi,
V.
(1998)
'Corruption
around the
world:
causes,
consequences,
scope,
and
cures',
IMF
Staff
Papers
45(4):
559-594.
Tanzi,
V.
and
Davoodi,
H.
(1997)
'Corruption,
ublic
nvestment
and
growth',
IMF
Working
Paper
97/139
International
Monetary
und:
Washington,
DC.
Transparency
nternational
2005)
'Corruption
Perceptions
Index',
www
document]
ttp://www.transparency.org/surveys/
index.html#cpi.
accessed
1
November
005).
Triandis,H.C. 1994) CulturendSocialBehavior,McGraw-Hill:
New York.
Trompenaars,
. and
Hampden-Turner,
.
(1998)
Riding
he
Waves of
Culture:
Understanding
Diversity
n Global
Business,
McGraw-Hill:New
York.
Treisman,
D.
(2000)
'The
causes
of
corruption:
a cross
national
study',
Journal
of
Public
Economics
6(3):
399-457.
Tullock,
G.
(1996)
'Corruption theory
and
practice',
Contem-
porary
Economic
Policy
14(3):
6-13.
Van
Klaveren,
J.
(1989)
'The
concept
of
corruption',
in
A.J.
Heidenheimer,
M.
Johnston
and
V.
LeVine
(eds.)
Political
Corruption:
A
Handbook,
Transaction
Publishers:
New
Bruns-
wick,
NJ,pp
83-94.
Van
Rijckeghern,
C. and
Weder,
B.
(2001)
'Bureaucratic
corruption
and the
rate
of
temptation:
do
wages
in the
civil
service
affect
corruption,
and
by
how
much?'
Journal
of
DevelopmentEconomics 5: 307-331.
Journal
f
International
usinessStudies
This content downloaded from 148.202.168.13 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 15:39:28 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp8/10/2019 DiRienzo Et Al. - 2007 - Corruption and the Role of Information
14/14
Corruption
and the
role
of
information
Cassandra
DiRienzo
t
al
332
Vitell,
.J.,
Nwachukwu,
.L.
nd
Barnes,
.H.1993)
The ffects
f
culture
n
ethical
decision-making:
n
application
f Hofstede's
typology',
ournal
f
Business thics
2(10):
753-760.
Wei,
S.-J.
(2000)
'Natural
openness
and
good government',
Unpublished
Working aper.
7765, NBER,
ambridge.
Wei,
S.-J.
(1999)
'How
taxing
is
corruption
n international
investors?' eview f Economicsnd Statistics1(4): 1-12.
White,
H.
(1980)
'A
heteroskedasticity-consistent
ovariance
matrix
estimator and direct test of
heteroskedasticity',
Econometrica
8(4):
817-838.
World Values
Survey
(2001)
'World values
survey',
[www
document]
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
accessed
15
June
2003).
Zhao,
H.J.,
Kim,
H.S.and
Du,
J.
2003)
'The
mpact
of
corruption
and
transparency
n
foreign
direct nvestment: n
empirical
analysis',Management
nternationaleview
3(1):
41-62.
About the
authors
Cassandra
E
DiRienzo
is
an Assistant Professor of
Economics at
Elon
University.
She
holds an ME
and
PhD from North Carolina State University. Her
research nterests
are
econometrics,
and the econom-
ic and business
applications
of
nonparametric
and
spatial
statistics.
She has
published
in
Challenge
nd
the
Journal
f
Global
Competitiveness,mong
others.
Jayoti
Das
is an
Associate Professorof Economics at
Elon
University.
She holds a Masters and
PhD
from
the
University
of
Cincinnati. Her
research interests
are international
trade,
global
business,
and devel-
opment.
She has
published
in
the
Journal
of
InternationalTrade and Economic
Development
and
the
Journal
of
Global
Information Management,
among
others.
Kathryn
T
Cort is an Assistant Professor of
Marketing
at North CarolinaA &T State
University.
She holds a Masters from Ohio State
University
and a
PhD
from Kent
State
University.
Her
research interests include
global marketing
and
entrepreneurship.
She
has
published
in
Market-
ing Management
and Business
Horizon,
among
others.
John J
Burbridge
Jr
is Dean of the
Love School
of
Business
at
Elon
University.
He
received
a
BS, MS,
and PhD in Industrial
Engineering
from
Lehigh
University.
He
has
published
many
articles
in
journals
such as the
Journal
f
Global
Competitiveness
and
Journal
of
Global
Information
Management,
among
others.
Accepted y
Jose'
Manuel
Campa,Departmental
ditor,
0
June
006. This
paper
has beenwiththe authors
or
three evisions.
Journal
f International usiness
Studies