Disarmament Weapon of Conquest Robert Morris 154pgs 1963 POL

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DISARMAMENT :WEAPONo {

CONQUEST

R o b e r t M o r r i s

BOOKMAILERNew York



Copyrigh' 1963 by Robert Morris

L i b r a r y o f C o n g r e s s C a t a l o g C a r d N u m b e r

6 3 - 2 2 6 2 8

FIRST EDITION

A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d , i n c l u d i n g t h e r i g h t t o r e p r o d u c e

t h i s b o o k o r p o r t i o n s t h e r e o f i n a n y f o r m .

P u b l i s h e d b y

Th e BOOKMAILER Inc .

New York 16 , N. Y

.

D i s t r i b u t e d b y

THE BOOKMAILER, INC .

B o x 1 0 1 , M u r r a y H i l l S t a t i o n

New York 16 , N . Y .

" T h e C o m p l e t e B o o k s t o r e - b y - M a i l S e r v i c e "

R e p r e s e n t i n g A l l U . S .

P u b l i s h e r s

M a n u f a c t u r e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a



DEDICATION

D e d i c a t e d t o m y m o t h e r , S a r a h W i l l i a m s M o r r i s ,

f o r h e r l o v i n g a f fe c t i o n a n d i n de e d t o a l l m o t h e r s

w h o y e a r n f o r r e a l d i s a r m a m e n t .



FOREWORDT h i s b o o k i s w r i t t e n b e c a u s e I f e e l t h a t v e r y

few people understa nd what our policy is as we

c o e x i s t w i t h S o v i e t p o w e r o n t h e e a r t h a n d i n t h e

u n i v e r s e .

There are enough escapi ng manifest at ions of

u n d e r l y i n g p o l i c y t o s k e t c h i t s l i n e a m e n t s s u f f i -

c i e n t l y f o r u s t o k n o w g e n e r a l l y w h e r e , u n l e s s i t i s

r e v e r s e d , w e a r e g o i n g . T h e p e o p l e c o n t r o l l i n g o u r

d e s t i n y s h o u l d , I c o n t e n d , l e t u s k n o w w h a t i s g o -

i n g o n . We may not like what t hey h ave pl anned

f o r u s . B u t , c e r t a i n l y , o p e n d i s c u s s i o n h a s a l w a y s

b e e n a h a l l m a r k o f a f r e e s o c i e t y ; a n d g r e a t c i v i l i -

z a t i o n s , f r o m G r e e c e w i t h i t s S o c r a t e s , t o m o d e r n

times, have always had the right t o examine the

f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e i r p o l i c i e s .

T h i s b o o k , t h e n , i s w r i t t e n i n t h e s p i r i t w h i c h

promp ted Socrates, who by const ant probing up -

held th e righ t t o know where he was, and where

he was going .

Our leaders are tal king a bout Dis armam ent .

Wh en we analyze what t hey m ean by "Dis arma-

m e n t " , w e f i n d i t t o b e s o m e t h i n g v e r y m u c h d i f -

f e r e n t , i n d e e d , f r o m t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l m e a n i n g o f

th at word . Let us ha ve a look, and ma ke some

comments along th e way .ROBERT MORRISAugus t 1963



CONTENTS

C h a p t e r I THE PROBLEMC h a p t e r II OUTCROPPINGS OF OUR

4OLICYh a p t e r I I I THE ROSTOWMEMORANDUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

C h a p t e r I V "DISARMAMENT" . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3

C h a p t e r

C h a p t e r

VVI

STATE DEPARTMENT

DOCUMENT 72778U . S . ARMS CONTROL6

C h a p t e r V I I W E OFFER A TREATY 3 9

C h a p t e r V I I I IT IS FOR REAL5C h a p t e r IX ADLAI STEVENSON

CARRIES IT FORWARD 4 7

C h a p t e r

C h a p t e r

X THE PRESIDENT'S

XI

SPEECH AT AMERICAN

UNIVERSITY0"THE INTERNATIONAL

C h a p t e r

RULE OF LAW" 5 4

X II UNESCO7C h a p t e r X III WHAT IS WRONG WITH

THIS POLICY?7C h a p t e r X IV W HOSE INTERNATIONALLAW?0C h a p t e r XV THE SECRETARIAT 7 2

C h a p t e r XVI HOW CAN DISARMAMENT

Chapter XVII

BE ACHIEVED0 4

THE STEP AHEAD2 6

C h a p t e r X V I I I THE HARVEST3 5

APPENDIX4 0



I THE PROBLEMT h e p r i n c i p a l p r o b l e m , f r o m o u r p o i n t o f v i e w

o n t h e w o r l d s c e n e , s t e m s f r o m S o v i e t p o w e r . T h i s

force has declared war on us, aga in and a gai n .

K h r u s h c h e v h a s o f t e n s a i d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

w i l l b e S o v i e t i n t h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n . E v e r y a u t h o r i -

t a t i v e S o v i e t r e s o l u t i o n , d e c l a r a t i o n a n d u t t e r a n c e

sp eaks of victory of World Communism over us .

S o v i e t l e a d e r s w o r k d a y a n d n i g h t f o r t h e d e f e a t

o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a .

T h e s e S o v i e t l e a d e r s a r e a c h i e v i n g s p e c t a c u l a r

s u c c e s s . D u r i n g W o r l d W a r I I , t h e y h a d o n e c o u n t r y

and one ba se of p ower. They now ha ve ext ended

t h e i r c r u e l d o m i n a t i o n o v e r o n e t h i r d o f t h e e a r t h ' s

c o n v e n t i o n a l s u r f a c e a n d h a v e m a d e g r e a t i n r o a d s

i n t h e s e c o n d , o r n e u t r a l t h i r d o f o u r s p h e r e . I n

o u t e r s p a c e t h e y h a v e d o n e e v e n b e t t e r . T h i s s u c -

c e s s h a s r e s u l t s t h a t e x t e n d i n t o e v e r y p h a s e o f o u r

e x i s t e n c e .

Actuall y, when you examine the ingredients,

the Soviets are waging World War III against us

a n d o u r a l l i e s . T h e y h a v e k i l l e d m i l l i o n s o f m e n o n

t h e b a t t l e f i e l d s , i n t h e s t r e e t s , a n d o n t h e t o r t u r e

r a c k s . T h e y h a v e t a k e n m o r e t e r r a i n t h a n t h e G e n -

g h i s K h a n s , t h e A t t i l l a s , t h e H i t l e r s a n d t h e T o j o s

comb ined . R e c e n t l y , t h e y h a v e m o v e d a n e x p e d i t i o n -

a r y f o r c e a c r o s s t h e A t l a n t i c t o o u r d o o r s t e p a n d e s -

t a b l i s h e d a m i s s i l e b a s e i n C u b a , a s w e l l a s a n a i r

b a s e , a s u b m a r i n e b a s e , a n d a b a s e f o r s a b o t a g e a n d

i n f i l t r a t i o n . From Cub a, a ll Sout h America now i s

u n d e r s i e g e .

1



A s I w r i t e t h i s , C o m m u n i s t s a r e m a k i n g t h e i r

way down th e Ho Chi Minh tra il into Laos wh ere

t h e y a r e p u t t i n g t h e f i n i s h i n g t o u c h e s t o t h e c o n -

quest of tha t h ub of Southeast Asia . They are

wagi ng wa r and commit ti ng t error in South ern

Viet Nam . T h e y h o l d t h e h u n d r e d s o f m i l l i o n s o f

C h i n e s e i n b o n d a g e . T h e i r d o m i n a t i o n e m b r a c e s t h e

v a s t n e s s o f S i b e r i a , S a k h a l i n , M a n c h u r i a , M o n g o l i a

a n d T i b e t .

N o s u c h m a r t i a l b l i g h t h a s s t r u c k h u m a n i t y i n

modern ti mes .

T h e e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

s h o u l d b e a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e e l e m e n t a l f a c t s.

Y e t , a s f a r a s s u c c e s s f u l a c t i o n h a s b e e n c o n c e r n e d ,

t h e s e l e a d e r s h a v e n o t e v e n r e c o g n i z e d t h e , p r o b l e m .

T h e f a l l o f C h i n a w a s a c h i e v e d l a r g e l y b y w h a t

our own policy pla nners and di plomat s wrough t .

The Unit ed Stat es Senat e had a t wo-yea r dam ag e

s u r v e y m a d e , a n d i t e s t a b l i s h e d a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y , b y

a u n a n i m o u s r e p o r t , t h a t A m e r i c a n s w e r e , i n l a r g e

m e a s u r e , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c o n q u e s t o f C h i n a .

W i t h r e s p e c t t o C u b a , i t h a s b e e n q u i t e c o n -

c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t C a s t r o , t h e C o m m u n i s t ,

r e c e i v e d h e l p f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w h e r e p o l i c y

p l a n n e r s w o r k e d t o u n d e r m i n e t h e g o v e r n m e n t t h a t

C a s t r o w a s s t a l k i n g . W h e n t h e s e p l a n n e r s l e v e l e d

t h a t g o v e r n m e n t , t h e y r e c o g n i z e d C a s t r o , t h e C o m -

m u n i s t , i g n o r i n g o t h e r a v a i l a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s .

Aft er Cas tro came to p ower, th ese m en who

should ha ve been thwarting Soviet power brought

hi m to the United States, enhanced his presti ge

a n d p r o c e e d e d t o s u b s i d i z e h i s f l e d g l i n g g o v e r n m e n t .

Wh en Khru sh chev moved tanks, MIGs and elec-

t r o n i c e q u i p m e n t t o t h e i s l a n d b a s e , o u r g o v e r n m e n t

s p o k e s m e n m i n i m i z e d , a n d e v e n d e n i e d , t h a t t h e s e

2



weapons of war were brough t a lmost to our very

s h o r e s . W hen the troops came, t hey were call ed

" t e c h n i c i a n s " , n o t b y C a s t r o , b u t b y o u r o w n g o v -

ernment sp okesmen who sh ould ha ve b een sounding

t h e a l a r m i n s t e a d o f p u t t i n g o u r p e o p l e t o s l e e p .

W h e n i t b e c a m e a p p a r e n t t h a t a n e x p e d i t i o n a r y

f o r c e h a d , i n d e e d , l a n d e d , w e w e r e t o l d t h a t i t w a s

p u r e l y a d e f e n s i v e m o v e , m a d e b e c a u s e C a s t r o w a s

weak and needed s horing up . W h e n t h e m i s s i l e s a p -

p e a r e d t h e y w e r e " d e f e n s i v e " m i s s i l e s .

T h e s e p l a n n e r s h a v e b e e n w o r k i n g , o b v i o u s l y ,

t o p u t u s t o s l e e p . W h y ?

I n l i t t l e L a o s , t h e s i t u a t i o n i s m u c h t h e s a m e .

While Soviet power moves forward remorseles sly,

w e s t r u g g l e , n o t t o r o l l i t b a c k , b u t t o c o e x i s t w i t h

i t i n a c o a l i t i o n g o v e r n m e n t . A n d , w h i l e w e n e u t r a l -

i z e a n d s p i k e t h e g u n s o f L a o t i a n s w h o w a n t t o d e -

fend t heir la nd, Communists move on with th eir

c o n q u e s t s , t h e i r k i l l i n g s , a n d t h e i r a c t s o f t e r r o r .

W h i l e t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h a v e b e e n m o v i n g a g -

g r e s s i v e l y a h e a d , w e h a v e p e r s i s t e d i n a t t r i b u t i n g

t o t h e m o u l r n o r m s o f m o r a l i t y , o u r s t a n d a r d s o f

r i g h t a n d w r o n g , a n d o u r r e s p e c t f o r t h e s o l e m n i t y

o f t h e p l i g h t e d w o r d .

T h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h a v e a

slogan expressi ng their att it ude toward these

t h i n g s : " T r e a t i e s , l i k e p i e c r u s t s , a r e m a d e o n l y t o

b e b r o k e n. " T h e y l i v e u p t o t h i s s l o g a n - a n d , o n t h e

b a s i s o f t h e r e c o r d , a S o v i e t p r o m i s e i s w o r t h l e s s .

N o t s o l o n g a g o , i t w a s s a i d t h a t o u r p o l i c y w a s

one of "containment . " W h i l e i t w a s l a r g e l y u n s u c -

c e s s f u l , a t l e a s t c o n t a i n m e n t w a s t h e g o a l . T h e f a i l -

u r e w a s i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d i n t h e a c t i o n s o f

t h e p e r s o n n e l r e s p o n s i b l e . N o w , h o w e v e r , o u r g o a l i s

q u i t e d i f f e r e n t - d i f f e r e n t , a n d y e t , s c a r c e l y k n o w n .

3



I I OUTCROPPINGS OF OURPOLICYF o r y e a r s , i n t h e s e m i - o f fi c i a l a n d o f fi c i a l c i r c l e s

o f W a s h i n g t o n , w e k e p t h e a r i n g w h a t w e d i s c e r n e d

t o b e t h e o u t c r o p p i n g s o f a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y p o l i c y .

The p eople responsi ble for pl anning would, from

t i m e t o t i m e , s a y t h a t w e s h o u l d n o t d i r e c t l y o p p o s e

Communist power or Communist instit uti ons, b ut

r a t h e r t r y t o p e r s u a d e S o v i e t l e a d e r s t o t o n e d o w n

t h e i r c o n s p i c u o u s l y a g g r e s s i v e u t t e r a n c e s a n d a c -

t i o n s . T h e y s a i d t h a t s i n c e C o m m u n i s t i n s t i t u t i o n s ,

s u c h a s f o r c e d - l a b o r c a m p s , w e r e h e r e t o s t a y , o n e

s h o u l d n o t i n v e i g h a g a i n s t t h e m l e s t t h a t f u t i l e a c -

t i o n l e a d t o u n n e c e s s a r y a g g r a v a t i o n s . C o n f r o n t a -

ti on bet ween Commu nis t a nd Free World f orces

became a d irty word . E s c a l a t i o n , t h e w o r d u s e d t o

d e s c r i b e t h e g r o w t h o f a s m a l l c o n f l i c t i n t o a l a r g e r

o n e , b e c a m e t h e f a v o r i t e w o r d o f t h e p l a n n e r s w h o

c o u n s e l l e d r e t r e a t o r i n a c t i o n i n t h e f a c e o f t h e

Soviet movement forward .

The Korean War, which was t o mark the firs t

t i m e t h a t t h e n a t i o n w a s d e n i e d a v i c t o r y t h a t i t s

h i g h l y c o m p e t e n t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s s a i d c o u l d a n d

s h o u l d h a v e b e e n a c h i e v e d , r a i s e d t h e s p e c t e r , t o

some, tha t victory for freedom was not the goal

o f o u r p o l i c y .

Then the p aralys is, or worse, of th e migh ty

U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h e n t h e s e l f - e m a n c i p a t e d H u n g a r -

i a n p e o p l e w e r e r u t h l e s s l y c r u s h e d b y t h e " B u t c h e r s

o f B u d a p e s t " , s h o w e d t h a t o u r t a l k o f " l i b e r a t i o n "

o f t h e c a p t i v e p e o p l e s w a s h o l l o w , i n d e e d .

4



I t w a s n o t t h e t h r e a t o f n u c l e a r w a r t h a t c a u s e d

our retreat in Korea, because wh en General Mac-

A r t h u r w a s r e c a l l e d i n 1 9 5 1 t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w a s

not a nuclear p ower. In 19 56, when Hungary was

c r u s h e d , t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d n o t h a v e h e l d a c a n d l e

t o u s i n n u c l e a r p r o w e s s .

T h u s , w h i l e w e b e g a n t o s e e a l a p s i n g i n p o l i c y

away from contai nment, t he new sub st itu te was

n e v e r s p e l l e d o u t . I n 1 9 6 1 , t h e F u l b r i g h t M e m o r a n -

dum s aw the lig ht of day and a fragm ent was re-

v e a l e d . W e learned th en, of th e dangers of Cuba

and Laos . T h e s e , w e w e r e t o l d , w e r e d a n g e r s , n o t

b e c a u s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t e d S o v i e t v i c t o r i e s a n d t h e

e n s l a v e m e n t o f m o r e m i l l i o n s o f p e o p l e , b u t r a t h e r

b e c a u s e t h e y s e t i n m o t i o n a " d e s i r e " i n t h e A m e r i -

c a n p e o p l e " t o h i t t h e C o m m u n i s t s w i t h e v e r y t h i n g

w e ' v e g o t . "

T h i s n e w e m e r g i n g p o l i c y n e v e r w a s s e t f o r t h

c l e a r l y , h o w e v e r , u n t i l t w o e v e n t s b r o k e i n t o t h e

news-our Dis armam ent Program and th e Rostow

Memora ndu m .

5



I I I THE ROSTOWMEMORANDUMLet us look first at t he Rostow Memorandum

a l t h o u g h i t w a s n o t t h e f i r s t o f t h e t w o r e v e a l i n g

d o c u m e n t s t o b r e a k f o r t h , i n p o i n t o f t i m e .

W a l t W . R o s t o w i s t h e C h i e f P o l i c y P l a n n e r o f

th e Unit ed Sta tes Sta te Depa rtment . For many

y e a r s h e w o r k e d o n c o v e r t C I A p r o j e c t s a t M a s s a -

c h u s e t t s I n s t i t u t e o f T e c h n o l o g y a n d e l s e w h e r e . H e

i s a l s o C o u n s e l t o t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . H e s p e a k s

w i t h a u t h o r i t y .

W e a r e f o r t u n a t e t o h a v e i n W a s h i n g t o n t o d a y

a n e n t e r p r i s i n g r e p o r t e r , W i l l a r d E d w a r d s o f t h e

Chicago Tribune . Mr. Edwards has had ext ensiv e

e x p e r i e n c e ; h e h a s e x c e l l e n t s o u r c e s . T h r o u g h h i m ,

we were ab le t o learn ab out t he "Memorandum "

whi ch Mr . R o s t o w h a s r e f u s e d t o g i v e t o t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s S e n a t e , c l a i m i n g " e x e c u t i v e p r i v i l e g e . "

I h a v e c h e c k e d t h e a c c u r a c y o f t h e E d w a r d s a c -

c o u n t o f t h i s i m p o r t a n t p o l i c y p a p e r w h i c h S e n a t o r

Everet t McKinley Dirks en ma de t he ob ject of a

S e n a t e i n q u i r y , a n d I a m g o i n g t o l e t t h e C o n g r e s -

s i o n a l R e c o r d o f J u n e 1 8 , 1 9 6 2 t e l l t h e s t o r y o f t h i s

c h a p t e r: ( p a g e s 9 9 6 6 , 9 9 6 7 , 9 9 6 8 )

WALT W. ROSTOW'S DRAFT OF STRATEGYMR . DIRKSEN . Mr . P r e s i d e n t , o v e r t h e p a s t

weekend t here ap pea red in th e Sunday and Monda y

m o r n i n g e d i t i o n s o f t h e C h i c a g o Trib une t w o l e n g t h y

s t o r i e s u n d e r t h e b y l i n e o f W i l l a r d E d w a r d s p u r -

p o r t i n g t o d i g e s t t h e s o - c a l l e d R o s t o w d r a f t o f a

6



b l u e p r i n t f o r f u t u r e s t r a t e g y i n t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t

commu nis m .

For many month s now we hav e been told th at

t h i s d o c u m e n t h a s b e e n i n a s t a t e o f p r e p a r a t i o n

under the gui ding hand of Wal t W . R o s t o w , S t a t e

Department counselor and cha irman of its Policy

Planning Board .

O n s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s t h e r e h a v e a p p e a r e d i n t h e

p r e s s o t h e r s t o r i e s d i s c u s s i n g t h i s d r a f t o f s t r a t e g y ,

b u t n o n e h a s p r e s e n t e d s o m u c h i n s u c h d e t a i l a sMr. E d w a r d s ' s t o r y a n d I a m i m p e l l e d t o b e l i e v e

t h a t i t i s p r o b a b l y a c c u r a t e .

Many of u s wh o are not unfami li ar wit h Ros-

t o w ' s t h i n k i n g h a v e a w a i t e d t h e b i r t h o f t h i s n e w

m a s t e r s t r a t e g y w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e t r e p i d a t i o n . Mr .

R o s t o w h a s n e v e r b e e n a v e r y d e v o t e d d i s c i p l e o f

t h e t o u g h p o l i c y l i n e t o w a r d R u s s i a . I t n o w d e v e l o p s ,

o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e C h i c a g o T r i b u n e a r t i c l e s , t h a tMr. R o s t o w h o l d s s o m e u n i q u e i d e a s a b o u t t h e S o -

v i e t U n i o n t h a t a r e c o n s i d e r a b l y c l o s e r t o t h e f u z z y

t h i n k i n g o f t h e l a t e a n d l a m e n t e d " L i b e r a l P a p e r s "

th an even th e most li beral Member of thi s body

w o u l d b e w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t .

The core of Mr. R o s t o w ' s p r o p o s a l i s a n a s -

s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d i t s C o m m u n i s t

mast ers are "mellowing" ; t h a t R u s s i a i s b e c o m i n g

a mature state ; t h a t i f w e a r e o n l y n i c e t o t h e

S o v i e t s t h e y w i l l d r o p a l l o f t h e i r s u s p i c i o n s o f t h e

f r e e w o r l d a n d p e a c e w i l l f i n a l l y b l o o m .

T h e m o s t a m a z i n g R o s t o w t h e s i s i s t h i s : Tha t

b o t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d R u s s i a a r e l o s i n g p o w e r

a n d a u t h o r i t y i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e w o r l d s a n d t h a t

a n a r e a o f " o v e r l a p p i n g i n t e r e s t s " i s d e v e l o p i n g i n

which meaningfu l a greements may be conclud ed

bet ween th e Communis t and non-Comm unist worlds .

7



Mr. R o s t o w s e e s n o v i c t o r y b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

o v e r t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . Mr. R o s t o w s e e s n o v i c t o r y

by capi tali sm over communism . I n f a c t M r . Rost ow

i s a m a n o f l i t t l e h o p e a n d t h e l a s t p e r s o n i n m y

o p i n i o n w h o s h o u l d h a v e b e e n c h o s e n f o r t h e a l l -

i m p o r t a n t t a s k o f d i r e c t i n g t h e c o n t i n u i n g r e v i e w

o f o u r f o r e i g n p o l i c y .

T h e b a s i c p h i l o s o p h y o f s u c c e s s f u l c o n f l i c t i s

alwa ys to purs ue a winning course and al ways

change a losing ga me . E v e r y h i g h s c h o o l c o a c h ,

every b ig league ma nager knows t his . But ap -

pa rentl y our Sta te Depa rtment p lanners do not .

If Mr . Rostow's ass umpt ion tha t the Soviet

U n i o n i s s o f t e n i n g i s c o r r e c t , t h e n w h a t m a y I a s k

c a u s e d i t t o m e l l o w ? T o m e t h e a n s w e r i s o b v i o u s .

The only ti me we hav e ever gotten anywhere wit h

t h e S o v i e t U n i o n - t h e o n l y t i m e s t h e S o v i e t U n i o n

ha s ever mell owed-h ave b een when th e Unit ed

S t a t e s w a s t o u g h .

S o l o g i c w o u l d s a y t h a t i f M r . R o s t o w ' s b a s i c

a s s u m p t i o n w e r e c o r r e c t a n d t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n

i s s o f t e n i n g , M r . R o s t o w i s r e c o m m e n d i n g a c o u r s e

e x a c t l y d i a m e t r i c t o A m e r i c a n i n t e r e s t s .

B u t t h e d i s c o n c e r t i n g p a r t o f t h e w h o l e p i c t u r e

i s t h i s : O u r i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s s a y t h e r e i s l i t t l e

o r n o e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a n y s u c h a s s u m p t i o n a s

th at mad e by Mr. Rost ow .

How does Mr . R o s t o w e x p l a i n t h e r e c e n t R u s -

s i a n c o u r s e o f b r e a k i n g t h e m o r a t o r i u m o n n u c l e a r

t e s t i n g ? H o w d o e s h e e x p l a i n t h e i r r e c e n t a n n o u n c e -

m e n t t h a t t h e y a r e n o w g o i n g t o t e s t a 1 0 0 - m e g a t o n

b o m b i n r e t a l i a t i o n f o r o u r r e s u m p t i o n o f t e s t i n g ?

Does t he p res ence of our Armed Forces i n

Thailand indicate the Communist s are mellowing?

D o e s t h e p r e s e n c e o f o u r A r m e d F o r c e s i n V i e t n a m

8



indicate the Communist s are mellowing?

I t h i n k t h e S e n a t e i s e n t i t l e d t o k n o w - p e r h a p s

t h r o u g h q u e s t i o n i n g b y t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o m m i t t e e

-wh at intell ig ence informati on Mr . Rost ow pos-

s e s s e s t o s u p p o r t h i s b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n . Mr . E d -

w a r d s ' a r t i c l e s i n d i c a t e t h a t M r . R o s t o w h a s h e l d

t h i s o p i n i o n f o r a t l e a s t 1 0 y e a r s . I f i t i s o n l y o p i n i o n ,

I would sug gest tha t i t i s not p roper ground on

w h i c h t o s t a k e t h e e n t i r e f u t u r e o f t h e A m e r i c a n

p e o p l e .

I a s k u n a n i m o u s c o n s e n t t o i n c l u d e a s p a r t o f

m y r e m a r k s Mr . E d w a r d s ' a r t i c l e s , s o t h a t t h e

Senat e may exami ne them i n detai l .

T h e r e b e i n g n o o b j e c t i o n , t h e a r t i c l e s w e r e o r -

d e r e d t o b e p r i n t e d i n t h e R e c o r d , a s f o l l o w s

[From th e Chi cag o T r i b u n e , J u n e 1 7 , 1 9 6 2 ]

Draf t Foreign Policy Revi si on Bowing t o Reds

(By Wil lard Edwards . )

Was hingt on, June 16 . - A m a s t e r p l a n f o r h i s -

t o r i c c h a n g e s i n U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y h a s b e e n r e a d i e d

f o r P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

I t e m b r a c e s t h e t h e m e t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ' s

domest ic and foreign policies are mell owing and

t h e w a y i s o p e n f o r m e a n i n g f u l a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n

th e Communist and non-Communist world s .

T h i s p r o p o s e d g u i d e f o r f u t u r e d e c i s i o n s b y t h e

P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , t h e

Nati on's hig hest strat egy group, adva nces th ese

t h e o r i e s

R u s s i a ' s l e a d e r s a r e b e g i n n i n g t o r e a l i z e t h a t

n e i t h e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s n o r t h e S o v i e t U n i o n c a n

d e f e a t t h e o t h e r i n t h e w o r l d o f t h e f u t u r e .

FIND NO BASIS FOR IT

B o t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d R u s s i a a r e l o s i n g

p o w e r a n d a u t h o r i t y i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a r e a s a n d

9



a n a r e a o f o v e r l a p p i n g i n t e r e s t s i s d e v e l o p i n g i n

which mu tual ly p rofit abl e agreements may be ne-

g o t i a t e d .

Envis ioning, as it does, Commu nis t aba ndon-

m e n t o f t h e g o a l o f w o r l d c o n q u e s t , t h i s b l u e p r i n t

for future strategy has aroused heated disp ute

f r o m m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s a n d i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s w h o

c a n d e t e c t n o e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t i t s a s s u m p t i o n s .

T h e y q u a r r e l w i t h t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t c o n c i l i -

a t i o n c a n b e a s i m p o r t a n t a s a s t r o n g d e f e n s e i n

f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e K r e m l i n .

Leading s ponsor of t he plan, which h as been

more than a year in preparation, is Walt W . R o s -

tow, Sta te Department counselor and Cha irm an of

i t s P o l i c y P l a n n i n g B o a r d . He acknowledges th at

a strong educational campaign will be needed to

s e l l C o n g r e s s a n d t h e p u b l i c i f t h e p r o p o s a l s a r e

g i v e n o f f i c i a l s a n c t i o n .SHAPED CAMPAIGN SPEECHESCompi led u nder Rostow's s upervi si on, th e

s t r a t e g y p l a n r e p r e s e n t s t h e w o r k o f m a n y o f f i c i a l s

i n t h e W h i t e H o u s e , S t a t e , T r e a s u r y , a n d D e f e n s e

Depart ments . I t h a s b e e n s t e a d i l y r e v i s e d a n d e d i t e d

down, from an origi nal volume of 285 p ages to a

s h o r t e r d r a f t .

D e s p i t e a h o s t o f c o n t r i b u t o r s , t h e p l a n s b e a r s

th e Rostow stam p . A f o r m e r m e m b e r o f t h e f a c u l t y

o f M a s s a c h u s e t t s I n s t i t u t e o f T e c h n o l o g y , R o s t o w ,

4 5 , i s t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s t o p f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i s e r . H e

p l a y e d a m a j o r r o l e i n s h a p i n g K e n n e d y ' s f o r e i g n

p o l i c y s p e e c h e s i n t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l c a m p a i g n a n d

w a s d e p u t y s p e c i a l a s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t u n t i l

h e t o o k o v e r h i s p r e s e n t S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t p o s t l a s t

Decemb er 6 .

R o s t o w ' s b r a n d o f p h i l o s o p h y , n o t c o n c e a l e d i n

1 0



b o o k s , a r t i c l e s , t h e s e s , a n d s p e e c h e s i n r e c e n t y e a r s ,

ha s al ways envisioned the "evolut ion" of Soviet

Russ ia into a "mat ure" state whi ch wil l come to

r e a l i z e t h e o u t d a t i n g o f t h e M a r x i a n t h e o r y o f t h e

c l a s s s t r u g g l e a s t h e m o v i n g f o r c e i n h i s t o r y .FOR A NEW YOUNG PRESIDENTA s l o n g a g o a s 1 9 5 6 , h e v o i c e d c o n f i d e n c e t h a t

Communist leaders in the next decade would mend

t h e i r w a y s a n d i n 1 9 5 8 h e w a s d e p i c t i n g R u s s i a a s

about ready to enter "the ag e of hig h m ass con-

s u m p t i o n " r e a c h e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a q u a r t e r

c e n t u r y e a r l i e r .

H e h a s n o w t r a n s l a t e d t h i s o p t i m i s t i c c o n v i c -

t i o n i n t o a b l u e p r i n t f o r b a s i c n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y

p o l i c y , d e s i g n e d t o g o v e r n f u t u r e d e c i s i o n s a t t h e

h i g h e s t l e v e l s .

I t i s a c o n c e p t i o n c a l c u l a t e d t o s t i m u l a t e a n d

e n t h u s e a n e w , y o u n g P r e s i d e n t w h o c o u l d i n s u r e a

s e c u r e p l a c e i n h i s t o r y a s t h e A m e r i c a n l e a d e r w h o

brough t peace to the world, ending not only the

d r e a d p o t e n t i a l i t i e s o f n u c l e a r c o n f l i c t , b u t t h e

h a r a s s m e n t s o f c o l d w a r c o n f l i c t s w h i c h d r a i n t h e

economy . NOT A SHRED OF PROOFI t i s a l s o a t h e o r y w h i c h h a s s t i r r e d m a n y i n

th e Government' s intelli gence ag encies to alarm .

T h e y r e p o r t n o t a s c r a p o f h a r d d a t a t o s u p p o r t t h e

r o s e a t e a s s u m p t i o n s o f t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t p l a n -

n e r .

T h e y n o t e n o l e s s e n i n g o f C o m m u n i s t i n t r a n s i -

g e n c e n o r o f g r i m d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o " b u r y " t h e f r e e

world . They see in th e Rostow recommendat ions a

t o t a l m i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e C o m m u n i s t

c o n s p i r a c y ; a n a i v e b r u s h i n g o f f o f i t s t r e a c h e r y a s

e v i d e n c e d i n a l o n g h i s t o r y o f b r o k e n t r e a t i e s a n d

1 1



ag reements w h i l e steadily pursuing th e goal of

w o r l d c o n q u e s t .

R o s t o w b e l i e v e s t h a t P r e m i e r N i k i t a K h r u s h c h e v

o f R u s s i a a n d h i s a s s o c i a t e s d o n o t w a n t a m a j o r

wa r . H e c o n c e d e s t h e i r d e s i r e f o r a t o t a l v i c t o r y f o r

communism but he gli mps es changes beneath t he

s u r f a c e o f o l d C o m m u n i s t o b j e c t i v e s a n d . a w i l l i n g -

n e s s a m o n g s o m e i n R u s s i a t o m o d i f y o l d i d e o l o g i c a l

f o r m u l a i n t h e l i g h t o f c h a n g i n g r e a l i t y .UNITED STATES ON WANE, HE SAYSN e i t h e r R u s s i a n o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s g o i n g

t o d o m i n a t e t h i s c e n t u r y , h e c o n t e n d s . T o t h o s e w h o

s p e a k o f a " v i c t o r y " o r " w i n " p o l i c y i n t h e c o l d

w a r , h e r e t o r t s t h a t n e i t h e r o f t h e g r e a t l e a d i n g

n a t i o n s w i l l w i n o v e r t h e o t h e r . R a t h e r , t h e v i c t o r y

w i l l b e o n e o f " m e n a n d n a t i o n s " v o l u n t a r i l y c o -

o p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e U n i t e d N a -

t i o n s C h a r t e r .

" A n d w e d e e p l y b e l i e v e t h i s v i c t o r y w i l l c o m e -

o n b o t h s i d e s o f t h e I r o n C u r t a i n , " h e c o n c l u d e s .

T h e p o l i c y o u t l i n e p i c t u r e s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

a n d R u s s i a a s t w o a g i n g c o m b a t a n t s , b o t h s h o w i n g

si gns of waning presti ge and power . T h e r e i s a

dif fus ion of power away f rom Moscow wit hin th e

Communis t b loc, it a sserts , and away from the

U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h i n t h e f r e e w o r l d .

I n l e s s e r d e g r e e , t h e " e v o l u t i o n " t h e o r y i s a l s o

a p p l i e d t o R e d C h i n a a n d t h e s a m e c o n c i l i a t o r y t a c -

t i c s a r e a d v o c a t e d . The Chi nese Commu nis ts can

b e e n c o u r a g e d t o " e v o l u t i o n " i n t o a p e a c e f u l s t a t e

b y s h o w i n g t h e m w e h a v e n o a g g r e s s i v e i n t e n t i o n s .

P o s s i b i l i t i e s s h o u l d b e e x p l o r e d f o r e x p a n d i n g

c o n t a c t w i t h R e d C h i n a , p l a c i n g i t , a c c o r d i n g t o

o n e o b j e c t o r , i n t h e s a m e p o s i t i o n a s Y u g o s l a v i a a n d

Pola nd .

1 2



CAN'T PROMOTE A SPLITThere i s no final ba r to entrance of Commu -

nis t China i nto more normal relati ons wi th th e

U n i t e d S t a t e s i f t h e y a r e p r e p a r e d t o m o d i f y p r e s -

e n t p o l i c i e s , t h e p o l i c y p a p e r a s s e r t s . I n t h e m e a n -

t i m e , u n n e c e s s a r y p r o v o c a t i o n s s h o u l d b e a v o i d e d

a n d i n f o r m a l n e g o t i a t i o n s p u r s u e d .

T h e r e i s l i t t l e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c a n d o

t o p r o m o t e a S i n o - S o v i e t s p l i t , t h e p a p e r c o n t e n d s .

The p roposed foreign policy gu id e book does

n o t s u g g e s t a n y w e a k e n i n g o f n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e a n d

includ es recommendat ions for a greater bui ldu p

o f t h e n a t i o n ' s c a p a c i t y t o w a g e c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r -

f a r e .

I t e s t i m a t e s S o v i e t p o l i c y a s d e s i g n e d t o a v o i d

a n y a c t i o n s w h i c h w o u l d b r i n g a b o u t a n u c l e a r w a r ,

r u l i n g o u t t h e b e l i e f o f m a n y m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s t h a t

th e Communists will s trike whenever they t hink

t h e y c a n d e s t r o y u s .WE WILL WAIT TO BE HITAny idea of t he Unit ed Sta tes contem pl at ing

a " fi r s t s t r i k e " i s r u l e d o u t . P l a n n i n g i n t h a t d i r e c -

t i o n i s n o t r e l e v a n t s i n c e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d o e s

n o t p l a n t o i n i t i a t e a n u c l e a r a t t a c k o n C o m m u n i s t

n a t i o n s . M i l i t a r y m e n a s s a i l t h e s e c t i o n a s a g a i n s t

al l sound princip les of war for which p lanning

a g a i n s t a l l c o n t i n g e n c i e s i s e s s e n t i a l .

D e s p i t e a l l r e b u f f s t o d a t e , s t r e n u o u s e f f o r t s

s h o u l d b e c o n t i n u e d t o g e t a n a g r e e m e n t o n l i m i t e d

arms control, the policy pa per recommends . I t i s

s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m i g h t a d v a n c e a

p r o g r a m n o t r e q u i r i n g f o r m a l n e g o t i a t i o n s .

Aga in, objectors to th is recommendat ion ar-

g u e d , t h e p r o p o s a l t o t a l l y d i s r e g a r d s t h e n a t u r e

of th e Communist enemy . Any i nformat ion fur-

1 3



n i s h e d t o C o m m u n i s t s w i l l b e u s e d a g a i n s t u s a n d

a n y s u c h a c t i o n w i l l n e v e r c h a n g e t h e i r b a s i c a i m s .REDS GOING PEACEFULS i n c e b o t h a r m s c o n t r o l p l a n n i n g a n d r e s e a r c h

a n d m i l i t a r y p l a n n i n g a r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d n a t i o n a l

s e c u r i t y , t h e s t r a t e g y o u t l i n e a s s e r t s , t h e y s h o u l d b e

i n t e g r a t e d . General a nd comp lete d is armam ent is

a g o a l w h i c h m u s t n e v e r b e o b s c u r e d .

T h e r e w a s o b j e c t i o n f r o m m i l i t a r y m e n t o i n c l u -

s i o n o f t h i s s e c t i o n . T h e y a r g u e d t h a t t h e n a t u r e

o f c o m m u n i s m i s d i s r e g a r d e d i n a p r o c e s s o f r e a s o n -

i n g w h i c h c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l b e

s e c u r e i n a d i s a r m e d w o r l d .

In seeming answer to these contentions, t he

p r o p o s e d p o l i c y e m p h a s i z e s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e

S o v i e t p o l i c y w i l l e v o l v e i n t o a p e a c e f u l s t a t e .

Even if Communist leaders are unwill ing to

sha re the U . S . i m a g e o f t h e w o r l d ' s f u t u r e i n t h e

degree necessa ry to negotiate major arms reduc-

t i o n p r o g r a m s , t h e y m a y c o m e t o r e a l i z e t h e d a n -

g e r s o f a c c i d e n t , m i s c a l c u l a t i o n , a n d f a i l u r e o f c o m -

m u n i c a t i o n s a n d t h u s b e w i l l i n g t o j o i n t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s i n l i m i t e d m e a s u r e s t o r e d u c e t h o s e d a n g e r s .

[From t he Chi cag o Trib une, June 18 , 19 62]

Soft Red Line Mus t Be "Sold "-Rostow

(By Wi llard Edwards)

Was hi ngt on, Ju ne 17 . - A s y s t e m a t i c p u b l i c i t y

c a m p a i g n w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o s e l l C o n g r e s s a n d t h e

A m e r i c a n p e o p l e o n t h e m e r i t s o f a b o l d n e w f o r e i g n

p o l i c y a d v o c a t i n g c o n c i l i a t i o n o f R u s s i a , a S t a t e D e -

p a r t m e n t p l a n n e r h a s a d v i s e d .

The problem of t hi s g ap b etween Government

a n d p o p u l a r t h i n k i n g i s t a c k l e d w i t h c a n d o r b y W a l tW. Rostow, cha irm an of th e Sta te Depa rtm ent' s

1 4



p o l i c y p l a n n i n g b o a r d i n h i s d r a f t o f a m a s t e r p l a n

w h i c h a w a i t s P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

The new poli cy, t he work of a num ber of ex-

p e r t s i n G o v e r n m e n t u n d e r R o s t o w ' s s u p e r v i s i o n , i s

based upon the t heory t hat Russ ian domestic andforeign policies hav e mellowed d uring the post-

S t a l i n p e r i o d . I t h o l d s t h e w a y h a s b e e n o p e n e d f o r

cooperati on between the Comm unis t and non-Com-

munist worlds .EDUCATION IS NEEDEDSince the evidence in the form of deeds and

w o r d s b y S o v i e t l e a d e r s , r u n s d i r e c t l y c o n t r a r y t o

t h i s a s s u m p t i o n , C o n g r e s s a n d t h e p e o p l e , t h e R o s -

t o w o u t l i n e c o n f e s s e s , m u s t b e e d u c a t e d t o a c c e p t -

a n c e o f a f r e s h a p p r o a c h .

I n t y p i c a l S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t p a r l a n c e , t h i s c a n

b e a c c o m p l i s h e d b y " s y s t e m a t i c e x p o s i t i o n i n f o r m s

a p p r o p r i a t e f o r p u b l i c p r e s e n t a t i o n . " T h e t e r m " i n -

d o c t r i n a t i o n " i s a v o i d e d .

O n e o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e m e t h o d s o f p u b l i c e n -

lig ht enment, fav ored hig hly by t he Kennedy ad -

m i n i s t r a t i o n , i s t h e n e w s p a p e r " l e a k . " T h i s i n v o l v e s

f u n n e l l i n g o f s e l e c t e d i n f o r m a t i o n t o f a v o r e d r e -

p o r t e r s . CITE "OUTMODED" POLICIESAlth ough t he Rostow document is p resumed

t o b e c o n f i d e n t i a l a n d d e s c r i b e d b y a S t a t e D e p a r t -

m e n t s p o k e s m a n a s a " w o r k i n g d r a f t , " h i n t s o f i t s

c o n t e n t s h a v e b e e n l e a k e d i n t h e l a s t 3 m o n t h s t o

t h r e e n e w s p a p e r s , a n e w s m a g a z i n e , a n d a s y n d i c a t e d

colum n . T h e r e s u l t i n g a r t i c l e s i n t h e m a i n , f e a t u r e

it as "a premise, balanced, and compl ete mast er

plan of global objectiv es and strat egies" which

w o u l d r e p l a c e " o l d p o l i c i e s , " m a n u f a c t u r e d u n d e r

c r i s i s c o n d i t i o n s .

1 5



T h e s e i n s p i r e d s t o r i e s l a c k e d d e t a i l , i n m o s t i n -

s t a n c e s , b u t s t r e s s e d t h e n e e d f o r r e p l a c e m e n t o f

p o l i c i e s " l e f t o v e r " f r o m t h e E i s e n h o w e r a d m i n i -

s t r a t i o n . T h e e x i s t e n c e o f " a m b i g u i t i e s " h a s p e r -

m i t t e d d i s p u t e b e t w e e n p a r t i s a n s o f d i f f e r e n t c o n -

c e p t s a n d c o n t r i b u t e d t o v a r y i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f

p o l i c y , t h e y n o t e d .HINT ON A-STRATEGYO n e " l e a k " w a s d e f i n i t e , h o w e v e r , i n r e p o r t i n g

a p rovisi on th at th e Unit ed Stat es would never

s t r i k e t h e f i r s t n u c l e a r b l o w u n l e s s i t w e r e f a c e d

w i t h a m a s s i v e c o n v e n t i o n a l a s s a u l t , s u c h a s a f u l l -

s c a l e i n v a s i o n o f W e s t e r n E u r o p e .

A n o t h e r r e v e a l e d p r o p o s e d n e w p o l i c i e s f o r d e a l -

ing with the problem of th e "two Chinas" on the

ma inland and Formosa .

Speeches a nd s tat ements by admi nist ration

sp okesmen to condi ti on Congres s and th e pub lic

t o t h e n e w p o l i c y a r e a l s o s u g g e s t e d i n t h e R o s t o w

docum ent . R o s t o w h a s s e t a g o o d e x a m p l e i n t h i s

r e s p e c t . I n a n u m b e r o f a d d r e s s e s , h e h a s s t a t e d

h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t n e i t h e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s n o r

R u s s i a c a n w i n t h e c o l d w a r , t h a t c a p i t a l i s m w i l l

n o t t r i u m p h o v e r c o m m u n i s m , a n d t h a t t h e f a t e o f

t h e w o r l d w i l l b e s e t t l e d b y f o r c e s n o w a t w o r k o n

b o t h s i d e s o f t h e I r o n C u r t a i n .SEES NEW LINEUPIn a s peech Ju ne 3 at Minneap oli s, Rost ow

s a i d

" I t i s s o m e t i m e s a s k e d i f o u r p o l i c y i s a n o - w i n

p o l i c y . Our answer is th is -we do not expect this

p l a n e t t o b e f o r e v e r s p l i t b e t w e e n a C o m m u n i s t b l o c

a n d a f r e e w o r l d . W e e x p e c t t h i s p l a n e t t o o r g a n -

i z e i t s e l f i n t i m e o n t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f v o l u n t a r y c o -

operat ion among independent n a t i o n s t a t e s d e d i -

1 6



cat ed to hu ma n freedom . W e e x p e c t t h e p r i n c i p l e

t h a t ` g o v e r n m e n t s d e r i v e t h e i r j u s t p o w e r s f r o m t h e

c o n s e n t o f t h e g o v e r n e d ' t o t r i u m p h o n b o t h s i d e s

o f t h e I r o n C u r t a i n .

" I t w i l l n o t b e a v i c t o r y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

o v e r R u s s i a . I t w i l l b e a v i c t o r y o f m e n a n d n a t i o n s

o v e r t h e f o r c e s t h a t w i s h t o e n t r a p a n d t o e x p l o i t

t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y a s p i r a t i o n s . "

I n a n o t h e r s p e e c h t o t h e s p e c i a l w a r f a r e s c h o o l

a t F o r t B r a g g , N. C . , h e v o i c e d t h e s a m e s e n t i m e n t s

a n d a d d e d " I t w i l l n o t b e a v i c t o r y o f c a p i t a l i s m

o v e r s o c i a l i s m . "

T w o y e a r s a g o , i n a C a l i f o r n i a s p e e c h , h e o u t -

l i n e d R u s s i a ' s f e a r s t h a t o t h e r n a t i o n s w o u l d g e t

t h e n u c l e a r b o m b , c a l l i n g t h e p r o s p e c t o f n u c l e a r

w e a p o n s i n C h i n e s e h a n d s " a l a t e n t n i g h t m a r e " f o r

th e Kremlin . RUSSIA OUR ALLYH e s a w i n t h i s a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t R u s s i a m i g h t

f i n d " t h e o n l y l o g i c a l c o u r s e i s t o m a k e a c o m m o n

c a u s e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o e s t a b l i s h a m i n i -

mum framework of order . "

T h u s , R o s t o w ' s p o l i c y d r a f t c o n t a i n s f e w s u r -

p r i s e s t o s t u d e n t s o f h i s r e c o r d . H e i s a w a r e o f t h e

i n i t i a l l a c k o f p o p u l a r a c c e p t a n c e w h i c h w i l l g r e e t

i t s u n f o l d i n g . S u g g e s t e d i n t h e d r a f t i s a s h i f t i n g

o f e m p h a s i s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e p u b l i c c o n s c i o u s -

n e s s , f r o m t h e p r o b l e m o f o p p o s i n g C o m m u n i s t a g -

g r e s s i o n t o e x p l o i t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n b u i l d i n g a n d

extending "a communit y of free nations . "

T h e s e " o p p o r t u n i t i e s " a r e d e s c r i b e d i n t h e d o c u -

m e n t a s g r o w i n g f r o m a g a t h e r i n g h i s t o r i c a l t r e n d

toward frag mentat ion in the Commu nis t b loc and

s o m e r e l a x a t i o n o f i n t e r n a l c o n t r o l s i n t h e S o v i e t

U n i o n a n d i t s s a t e l l i t e s .

1 7



Thu s, Communist regi mes a nd peoples are to

b e d e a l t w i t h i n t e r m s o f " o v e r l a p p i n g i n t e r e s t , " a

p h r a s e w h i c h i s a l s o p o p u l a r w i t h R o s t o w i n p u b l i c

s t a t e m e n t s .

The Unit ed Stat es Informa ti on Agency m us t

b e u s e d a b r o a d t o d e f i n e a n d d r a m a t i z e t h e " l i m i t e d

b u t r e a l a r e a s o f o v e r l a p p i n g i n t e r e s t s " b e t w e e n t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s a n d p e o p l e s ,

t h e p a p e r a s s e r t s .

S t u d e n t s o f C o m m u n i s t p o l i c y e y e t h i s a l l e g e d

i n t e r t w i n i n g o f i n t e r e s t s w i t h s t r o n g d o u b t , n o t i n g

t h a t C o m m u n i s t s h a v e n e v e r a d m i t t e d a n y i n t e r e s t

w h i c h l i e s o u t s i d e w o r l d d o m i n a t i o n .

O n e t h e m e i s c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e p r o p o s e d s t r a t e g y

pl an-conti nuing comm unicat ion wit h Rus si a, in-

formal and formal, direct and indirect, must be

m a i n t a i n e d i n o r d e r t o d i s p e l i t s f e a r s o f t h e U n i t e d

States a nd give it a clear understanding of our

p e a c e f u l i n t e n t i o n s .

R i s i n g t e n s i o n s o r t h e p l e a s o f o u r a l l i e s o r o f

t h e A m e r i c a n p u b l i c m u s t b e i g n o r e d i n a n y c r i s i s

with Russ ia . The tempta tion must be avoided to

p r o l o n g o r e x p a n d a n y c r i s i s i n a n e f f o r t t o d e g r a d e

o r e m b a r r a s s t h e S o v i e t s i n t h e e y e s o f t h e w o r l d .

T h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e p a p e r a d v i s e s , m u s t b e

g r a n t e d i t s s t a t u s a s a g r e a t p o w e r a n d i n d u c e d , b y

w o r d a n d d e e d , t o f u l l e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d i n f l u e n c e

i n t h e c o m m u n i t y o f f r e e n a t i o n s i f i t s l e a d e r s s h o w

a g e n u i n e i n t e r e s t a n d w i l l f o r s u c h c o n s t r u c t i v e

c o n s i d e r a t i o n .EASY ON SATELLITESG e n t l e t r e a t m e n t o f t h e s a t e l l i t e n a t i o n s i s a d -

v o c a t e d . N o o f f i c i a l a t t a c k s s h o u l d b e m a d e a g a i n s t

t h e i r r e g i m e s , w h a t e v e r t h e p r o v o c a t i o n , a n d e v e n

c r i t i c i s m s h o u l d b e s o f t e n e d . W est ern Europe, a t

1 8



t h e s a m e t i m e , m u s t b e e n c o u r a g e d t o c l o s e r r e l a -

t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e s a t e l l i t e s a n d u r g e d t o f u r n i s h

a i d t o t h e m .

E a s t G e r m a n y , t h e p o l i c y d r a f t s a y s , c a n n o t b e

forever insula ted from deali ngs wi th t he UnitedS t a t e s a n d b u s i n e s s m u s t b e t r a n s a c t e d w i t h t h e m .

Above all , no encouragement or su pp ort must

be g iven to armed up risi ngs in eastern Europe .

T h i s i s a c o n t i n u a n c e o f p o l i c y i n e x i s t e n c e f o r s e v -

e r a l y e a r s .

T h e s e p r o p o s a l s , o n e c r i t i c n o t e d , w i l l i n e f f e c t

r e c o g n i z e t h e s a t e l l i t e s , i n c l u d i n g E a s t G e r m a n y , a s

l e g i t i m a t e r e g i m e s , d i s r e g a r d t h e p r i n c i p l e o f s e l f - d e -

t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d c a u s e t h e c a p t i v e p e o p l e s t o l o s e a l l

hope of freeing thems elves from Communist rule .A POPULAR WORLDThe p lan is concerned wi th th e promoti on of

r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h a n d f u l l e m p l o y m e n t i n t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s . U n l e s s t h e r e i s g r e a t p r o s p e r i t y h e r e ,

i t n o t e d , i t w i l l b e e x t r e m e l y di f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n c o n -

g r e s s i o n a l a n d p o p u l a r c o n s e n t f o r a l l o c a t i o n o f r e -

s o u r c e s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l p u r p o s e s o r l i b e r a l t r a d e

a d j u s t m e n t s .

The word "modernizat ion" ap pears frequentl y

i n t h e p l a n i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f n a t i o n s .

T h e s t r e n g t h o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i s m , i t s t a t e s ,

c a n b e s t b e s a p p e d b y s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e p e r f o r m -

ance of th e free communit y th rough "m oderniza -

t i o n . " O p p o n e n t s o f t h e p o l i c y d r a f t h a v e s u g g e s t e d

t h a t " m o d e r n i z a t i o n " m a y b e a s y n o n y m f o r " D e m o -

c r a t i c s o c i a l i z a t i o n . "

T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m u s t e x p a n d i t s p a r t i c i p a -

t i o n i n i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s " w h i c h t r a n -

s c e n d t h e i n d e p e n d e n t p o w e r s o f t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , "

t h e o u t l i n e p r o p o s e s .

1 9



I t s e e k s p r o g r e s s i v e m o v e s t o w a r d a l e g a l o r -

d e r w h i c h l a y s d o w n a n d e n f o r c e s e s s e n t i a l r u l e s o f

c o n d u c t i n i n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s w h i c h w i l l " p r o v i d e

s u r e a n d e q u i t a b l e m e a n s f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f i n -

t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s . "

A g a i n , i n a r g u m e n t s o v e r t h i s p r o p o s a l , i t w a s

noted th at i t p resup poses Communist subm iss ion

t o t h e l a w . O n e e x p e r t r e c a l l e d t h e s a r d o n i c c o m -

ment ma de by th e lat e Andrei Y. V i s h i n s k y , c h i e f

d e l e g a t e t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . H e o n c e t o l d t h eU. N . .

"What laws? We m ake our own . W e do not

abi de by bourgeoise law . "SEEKS MODERN ALLIESO n b a l a n c e , t h e d r a f t a s s e r t s , A m e r i c a n i n t e r -

e s t s w i l l b e b e t t e r s e r v e d b y l e a n i n g t o w a r d n a t i o n s

w i t h m o d e r n i d e a s r a t h e r t h a n s t i c k i n g t o o l d a l l i e s

w i t h o u t m o d e d n o t i o n s . T h e p a p e r i d e n t i f i e s n e i t h e r

t h e m o d e r n s t a t e s n o r t h e o l d f r i e n d s , c o n c e d i n g n o

g e n e r a l r u l e c a n c o v e r t h i s s i t u a t i o n .

A s a f i n a l t o u c h , t h e p o l i c y p a p e r s u g g e s t s t h a t

d e n i a l o f f o r e i g n a i d c a n b e a s u s e f u l a s s u p p l y i n g

i t . In Laos, wh ere aid was wit hd rawn to force a

c o a l i t i o n w i t h C o m m u n i s t s , t h i s p o l i c y h a s a l r e a d y

been implemented, i t was noted .MR . DIRKSEN . M r . P r e s i d e n t , I m i g h t a d d , a s

a p o s t s c r i p t , t h a t I b e l i e v e a g r e a t d e a l m o r e w i l l

b e s a i d a b o u t t h i s s u b j e c t b e c a u s e w i t h o u t d o u b t i t

w i l l b e o n e o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t c h a l l e n g e s b e f o r e

the American people and thi s country as we deal

with th is comment up on th e so-call ed policy or

s t r a t e g y t h a t w e a r e t o e m p l o y i n t h e d a y s a h e a d .

More than a year has p assed since this dis -

c l o s u r e , a n d u n f o l d i n g e v e n t s c l e a r l y r e v e a l t h e a c -

2 0



c u r a c y o f t h e E d w a r d s a r t i c l e s .

B r i e f l y , t h e c o n t e n t i o n o f M r . R o s t o w w a s t h a t

S o v i e t p o w e r w a s " m e l l o w i n g " a n d t h a t t h e S o v i e t

Union was "evolvi ng" into a "ma tu re" sta te and

t h a t w e s h o u l d h e l p t h i s p r o c e s s . F o r t h i s r e a s o n w e

h a d t o r e j e c t a n y d e s i r e f o r a v i c t o r y o v e r S o v i e t

power. I n s t e a d , w e w e r e t o w o r k f o r a v i c t o r y o f

"men and nat ions" coopera ti ng under th e ba nner

o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .

A c c o r d i n g l y , w e w e r e t o e x t e n d " g e n t l e t r e a t -

m e n t " t o w a r d t h e s a t e l l i t e s . W e w e r e n o t t o b e h o s -

t i l e t o t h e s e S o v i e t r e g i m e s , n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e

p r o v o c a t i o n ; u n d e r n o c i r c u m s t a n c e s s h o u l d w e e n -

c o u r a g e a r m e d u p r i s i n g s o n t h e p a r t o f t h e c a p t i v e

p e o p l e s . The Chi nese Comm unist s, ev en, were to

b e e n c o u r a g e d t o w a r d t h i s e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s b y

our showing t hem th at we ha ve no aggressi ve in-

tenti ons toward them .

According t o th e Rostow memorandum we were

to work, strenuously, always toward t he goal of

g e n e r a l a n d c o m p l e t e d i s a r m a m e n t , d e s p i t e a l l r e -

b u f f s , " e v e n t o t h e e x t e n t o f a d v a n c i n g a p r o g r a m

n o t r e q u i r i n g f o r m a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . " (Emph asi s m ine)

E v e n t s o f t h e p a s s i n g y e a r h a v e r e v e a l e d t h a t

t h i s i s , i n d e e d , o u r p o l i c y t o d a y .

B u t , i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , n o t o n e p e r s o n i n a

th ousand knows th at t hi s is our foreign policy .

S o m e p e o p l e h a v e h e a r d t h e e x p r e s s i o n t h a t w e h a v e

a " n o w i n " p o l i c y , b u t " n o w i n " t e l l s o n l y p a r t o f

t h e s t o r y . W h e n a l l t h e p i e c e s a r e p u t i n t o p l a c e , o u r

p o l i c y c a l l s f o r a n a f f i r m a t i v e d r i v e t o w a r d a m a m -

moth "accommodat ion" with Soviet power . T h e r e -

f o r e , t h e e n e m y i s n o t K h r u s h c h e v , o r h i s c r o n i e s , b u t

t h o s e p e o p l e h e r e a n d a b r o a d w h o a r e a g a i n s t w h a t

w i l l b e s h o w n t o b e a m e r g e r w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n .

2 1



Becau se Americans do not know tha t t hi s i s

Sta te Depa rtment policy, th ey cannot understand

w h y w e w i l l n o t r a i s e a f i n g e r f o r t h e C u b a n e x i l e s

b u t , i n s t e a d , a r r e s t t h e d e t e r m i n e d f r e e d o m f i g h t e r s

who want to f ree Cub a . N o r c a n t h e y u n d e r s t a n d

why t he State Depart ment iss ues a report on the

s a v a g e a n d b l o o d - s o a k e d B u d a p e s t r e g i m e t h a t r e a d s

like a product of Kada r's own propag anda ag ency.

For the same reas on Americans do not understand

w h y w e l a v i s h b i l l i o n s o n t h e c r u e l d i c t a t o r s T i t o ,

Gomul ka and Sukarno .

Last y ear, when the United States sent g uns

a n d p l a n e s t o s h o o t d o w n P r e s i d e n t T s h o m b e ' s s u p -

porters who wanted a certain amount of autonomy

i n t h e i r l a n d , p l a i n c i t i z e n s c o u l d n o t u n d e r s t a n d

why we would commi t s uch nonsensical deed s . I f

th ey could h ave read th e Rostow report, or had

s t u d i e d o u r s o - c a l l e d " d i s a r m a m e n t " p o l i c y , i t w o u l d

h a v e b e c o m e c l e a r .

W h e n w e f o r c e d G e n e r a l N o s a v a n a n d t h e l o y a l

L a o t i a n s i n t o a f o r c e d c o a l i t i o n w i t h t h e C o m m u -

n i s t s i n L a o s , p e o p l e w e r e p e r p l e x e d . T h e y s h o u l d

not ha ve been . O u r w h o l e p o l i c y r e f l e c t s , d e s p i t e

s t e a d f a s t S o v i e t i n t r a n s i g e n c e , a d e t e r m i n e d d r i v e

t o e f f e c t w h a t h a s b e e n c a l l e d a " p e a c e f u l m e r g e r

w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . "

2 2



IV "DISARMAMENT"I n 1 9 5 9 , K h r u s h c h e v , r i n g e d b y U n i t e d S t a t e s

d e f e n s i v e b a s e s i n A l l i e d c o u n t r i e s , a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e

i n o u r S t r a t e g i c A i r f o r c e C o m m a n d a n d i n o u r N a v y

w i t h i t s P o l a r i s s u b m a r i n e s , e n o u g h p o w e r t o d e -

s t r o y h i m s e v e r a l t i m e s o v e r , t o o k a n a s s e s s m e n t o f

where he st ood . H e k n e w t h a t t h e r e w a s o n l y t h i s

mig ht y force between him and hi s dream, and the

d r e a m o f L e n i n a n d o f S t a l i n b e f o r e h i m , t h e d r e a m

of world dominati on. So, he moved aga inst th is

m i g h t y f o r c e - n o t a s H i t l e r m o v e d , b u t b y a s t r a t e -

gem wh ich he call ed "Dis arma ment . "

S p e a k i n g o n S e p t e m b e r 1 8 , 1 9 5 9 , a t t h e U n i t e d

Nat ions General Assemb ly , Khru sh chev proposed

t h a t " o v e r a p e r i o d o f f o u r y e a r s , a l l s t a t e s s h o u l d

e f f e c t c o m p l e t e d i s a r m a m e n t , a n d s h o u l d n o l o n g e r

ha ve any means of wagi ng war . "

The reacti on to t hi s wa s s oon forthcoming .

The New York Tim es c o m m e n t e d e d i t o r i a l l y t h e

next d ay : " T h e S o v i e t s s t i l l s e e k a o n e - s i d e d W e s t -

e r n d i s a r m a m e n t , b a s e d o n p a p e r p a c t s , t h e s c r a p s

o f w h i c h l i t t e r t h e i r p a t h t o e m p i r e . "

Speaki ng t o the U . S . S . R . Supreme Sovi et on

O c t o b e r 3 1 o f t h a t y e a r , K h r u s h c h e v s a i d : "We pro-

p o s e t o e f f e c t a s q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e , a p p r o x i m a t e l y

i n f o u r y e a r s , g e n e r a l a n d c o m p l e t e d i s a r m a m e n t o f

s t a t e s . T h i s m e a n s t h a t a l l a r m e d f o r c e s a r e t o b e

d i s b a n d e d , a l l a r m a m e n t l i q u i d a t e d , w a r p r o d u c t i o n

d i s c o n t i n u e d , a n d n u c l e a r , c h e m i c a l , b a c t e r i o l o g i -

c a l , a n d r o c k e t w e a p o n s b a n n e d a n d d e s t r o y e d f o r

2 3



good ; t h a t w a r m i n i s t r i e s a n d g e n e r a l s t a f f s s h o u l d

b e a b o l i s h e d ; t h a t f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y b a s e s o n f o r e i g n

t e r r i t o r y s h o u l d b e l i q u i d a t e d , t h a t n o b o d y w o u l d

r e c e i v e m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g a g a i n , a n d t h a t e x p e n d i -

tures for milit ary pu rposes of any kind s hould

c e a s e . "

T h e s k e p t i c i s m w h i c h h a d b e e n e x p r e s s e d b y T h e

N e w Y o r k T i m e s , a n d v i r t u a l l y e v e r y o t h e r m a j o r

newspa per in th e country, di d not long prevai l .

W a l t W . R o s t o w a n d J e r o m e W i e s n e r , a d v i s e r s t o

t h e n e w l y - e l e c t e d P r e s i d e n t , J o h n F . K e n n e d y , w e n t

t o M o s c o w i n l a t e 1 9 6 0 a n d r e t u r n e d a m i d r u m b l i n g s

about s ome kind of a greement on disa rmament .

B i l a t e r a l t a l k s b e t w e e n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d

the Unit ed States then took place in Wash ington

from June 19 to June 30 ; in Moscow from July 1 7

to 29, and in New York from Sept emb er 6 t o 19 .

By Septemb er 20, 1 961 , we had a ctua lly come to

a n a g r e e d s e t o f e i g h t p r i n c i p l e s o n d i s a r m a m e n t

w i t h S o v i e t d e l e g a t e t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , V a l e r i n

Z o r i n . T h e y a p p e a r a s f o l l o w s , i n t h e R e p o r t o f t h eU . S . Arms Cont rol and Di sa rma ment Agency :

1 . T h e g o a l o f n e g o t i a t i o n s i s t o a c h i e v e a g r e e -

m e n t o n a p r o g r a m w h i c h w i l l i n s u r e t h a t ( a ) d i s -

arma ment i s g eneral and complete and war i s no

longer an instrument for sett ling international

problems, and (b) such di sarmament is accompan-

i e d b y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f r e l i a b l e p r o c e d u r e s f o r

t h e p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s p u t e s a n d e f f e c t i v e

a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f p e a c e i n a c -

c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s

Cha rter .

2 . T h e p r o g r a m f o r g e n e r a l a n d c o m p l e t e d i s -

a r m a m e n t s h a l l i n s u r e t h a t s t a t e s w i l l h a v e a t t h e i r

d i s p o s a l o n l y t h o s e n o n n u c l e a r a r m a m e n t s , f o r c e s ,

2 4



f a c i l i t i e s , a n d e s t a b l i s h m e n t s a s a r e a g r e e d t o b e

n e c e s s a r y t o m a i n t a i n i n t e r n a l o r d e r a n d p r o t e c t

t h e p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y o f c i t i z e n s ; a n d t h a t s t a t e s

sha ll sup port and p rovide a greed manpower for a

U. N . p e a c e f o r c e .

3 . To thi s end, the p rogram for general and

c o m p l e t e d i s a r m a m e n t s h a l l c o n t a i n t h e n e c e s s a r y

p r o v i s i o n s , w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h -

ment of every nati on, for-

( a ) D i s b a n d i n g o f a r m e d f o r c e s , d i s m a n t l i n g

o f m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g b a s e s , c e s s a -

t i o n o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f a r m a m e n t s a s w e l l a s

t h e i r l i q u i d a t i o n o r c o n v e r s i o n t o p e a c e f u l u s e s ;

( b ) E l i m i n a t i o n o f a l l s t o c k p i l e s o f n u c l e a r ,

c h e m i c a l , b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l , a n d o t h e r w e a p o n s o f

m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n a n d c e s s a t i o n o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n

of su ch wea pons ;

( c ) E l i m i n a t i o n o f a l l m e a n s o f d e l i v e r y o f

weapons of mass d estruction ;

( d ) A b o l i s h m e n t o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d i n -

s t i t u t i o n s d e s i g n e d t o o r g a n i z e t h e m i l i t a r y e f -

f o r t o f s t a t e s , c e s s a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g , a n d

c l o s i n g o f a l l m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s ;

( e ) D i s c o n t i n u a n c e o f m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s .

4 . The dis armament p rogram s hould be i mple-

m e n t e d i n a n a g r e e d s e q u e n c e , b y s t a g e s u n t i l i t i s

c o m p l e t e d , w i t h e a c h m e a s u r e a n d s t a g e c a r r i e d o u t

w i t h i n s p e c i f i e d t i m e l i m i t s . T r a n s i t i o n t o a s u b s e -

q u e n t s t a g e i n t h e p r o c e s s o f d i s a r m a m e n t s h o u l d

t a k e p l a c e u p o n a r e v i e w o f t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f

m e a s u r e s i n c l u d e d i n t h e p r e c e d i n g s t a g e a n d u p o n

a d e c i s i o n t h a t a l l s u c h m e a s u r e s h a v e b e e n i m p l e -

m e n t e d a n d v e r i f i e d a n d t h a t a n y a d d i t i o n a l v e r i -

f i c a t i o n a r r a n g e m e n t s r e q u i r e d f o r m e a s u r e s i n t h e

n e x t s t a g e a r e , w h e n a p p r o p r i a t e , r e a d y t o o p e r a t e .

2 5



5 . A l l m e a s u r e s o f g e n e r a l a n d c o m p l e t e d i s -

a r m a m e n t s h o u l d b e b a l a n c e d s o t h a t a t n o s t a g e o f

t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e t r e a t y c o u l d a n y s t a t e

o r g r o u p o f s t a t e s g a i n m i l i t a r y a d v a n t a g e a n d t h a t

s e c u r i t y i s i n s u r e d e q u a l l y f o r a l l.

6 . A l l d i s a r m a m e n t m e a s u r e s s h o u l d b e i m p l e -

m e n t e d f r o m b e g i n n i n g t o e n d u n d e r s u c h s t r i c t a n d

e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l ' a s w o u l d p r o v i d e f i r m

a s s u r a n c e t h a t a l l p a r t i e s a r e h o n o r i n g t h e i r o b l i g a -

t i o n s . D u r i n g a n d a f t e r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f g e n -

e r a l a n d c o m p l e t e d i s a r m a m e n t , t h e m o s t t h o r o u g h

c o n t r o l s h o u l d b e e x e r c i s e d , t h e n a t u r e a n d e x t e n t

o f s u c h c o n t r o l d e p e n d i n g o n t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r

v e r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e d i s a r m a m e n t m e a s u r e s b e i n g c a r -

r i e d o u t i n e a c h s t a g e . T o i m p l e m e n t c o n t r o l o v e r

and inspection of disa rmament, an Internati onal

D i s a r m a m e n t O r g a n i z a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a l l p a r t i e s t o

t h e a g r e e m e n t , s h o u l d b e c r e a t e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e -

w o r k o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h i s I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i s -

armament Organizati on and its inspectors sh ould

b e a s s u r e d u n r e s t r i c t e d a c c e s s w i t h o u t v e t o t o a l l

p l a c e s a s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f e f f e c t i v e

v e r i f i c a t i o n .

7 . Progress in di sa rmament should b e accom-

p a n i e d b y m e a s u r e s t o s t r e n g t h e n i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r

m a i n t a i n i n g p e a c e a n d t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f i n t e r n a -

t i o n a l d i s p u t e s b y p e a c e f u l m e a n s . D u r i n g a n d a f t e r

t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e p r o g r a m o f g e n e r a l a n d

complete di sarmament, t here should be taken, in

a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e U n i t e d N a -

t i o n s C h a r t e r , t h e n e c e s s a r y m e a s u r e s t o m a i n t a i n

i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y , i n c l u d i n g t h e o b l i -

g a t i o n o f s t a t e s t o p l a c e a t t h e d i s p o s a l o f t h e U n i t e d

Nations agreed manpower necess ary for an inter-

national peace force to be equipped with agreed

2 6



typ es of armaments . A r r a n g e m e n t s f o r t h e u s e o f

t h i s f o r c e s h o u l d i n s u r e t h a t t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s

c a n e f f e c t i v e l y d e t e r o r s u p p r e s s a n y t h r e a t o r u s e

o f a r m s i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e p u r p o s e s a n d p r i n c i p l e s

o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .

8 . S t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s s h o u l d

s e e k t o a c h i e v e a n d i m p l e m e n t t h e w i d e s t p o s s i b l e

a g r e e m e n t a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d a t e . E f f o r t s

s h o u l d c o n t i n u e w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n u n t i l a g r e e -

ment up on th e total p rogram has been achieved,

a n d e f f o r t s t o i n s u r e e a r l y a g r e e m e n t o n a n d i m p l e -

mentat ion of measures of disarm ament sh ould be

u n d e r t a k e n w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c i n g p r o g r e s s o n a g r e e -

m e n t o n t h e t o t a l p r o g r a m a n d i n s u c h a w a y t h a t

t h e s e m e a s u r e s w o u l d f a c i l i t a t e a n d f o r m p a r t o f

that program .

Here was th e transiti on from the Khrus hchev

demand of 19 59 t o our own policy of today . T h e

w o r l d w a s g e n e r a l l y s c o f f i n g a t K h r u s h c h e v i n 1 9 5 9

w h e n h e p r o c l a i m e d t h i s g o a l . I t s h o u l d h a v e k n o w n

from p ast performances th at thi s new strata gem

p o r t e n d e d g r e a t c h a n g e s , n o t i n t h e S o v i e t E m p i r e

b u t h e r e i n t h e h e a r t l a n d o f c a p i t a l i s m . T h e w h o l e

Soviet ap pa rat us went to work on us .

2 7



V STATE DEPARTMENTDOCUMENT 7277B y S e p t e m b e r 2 5 , 1 9 6 1 , t h e r e w a s p r e s e n t e d t o

t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' o w n " P r o -

g r a m f o r G e n e r a l a n d C o m p l e t e D i s a r m a m e n t . " T h i s

p r o v i d e d a s f o l l o w s

FREEDOM FROM WARTHE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FORGENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENTIN A PEACEFUL WORLDSUMMARYDISARMAMENT GOAL AND OBJECTIVEST h e o v e r - a l l g o a l o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s a f r e e ,

s e c u r e , a n d p e a c e f u l w o r l d o f i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e s

a d h e r i n g t o c o m m o n s t a n d a r d s o f j u s t i c e a n d i n t e r -

n a t i o n a l c o n d uc t a n d s u b j e c t i n g t h e u s e o f f o r c e t o

t h e r ul e o f l a w ; a w o r l d w h i c h h a s a c h i e v e d g e n e r a l

a n d c o m p l e t e d i s a r m a m e n t u n d e r e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a -

t i o n a l c o n t r o l ; and a world in which adjustment

t o c h a n g e t a k e s p l a c e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r i n -

c i p l e s o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .

I n o r d e r t o m a k e p o s s i b l e t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f

t h a t g o a l , t h e p r o g r a m s e t s f o r t h t h e f o l l o w i n g

s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s t o w a r d w h i c h n a t i o n s s h o u l d d i -

r e c t t h e i r e f f o r t s :

T h e d i s b a n d i n g o f a l l n a t i o n a l a r m e d f o r c e s a n d

t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f t h e i r r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n a n y f o r m

w h a t s o e v e r o t h e r t h a n t h o s e r e q u i r e d t o p r e s e r v e

i n t e r n a l o r d e r a n d f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a U n i t e d N a -

t i o n s P e a c e F o r c e ;

2 8



T h e e l i m i n a t i o n f r o m n a t i o n a l a r s e n a l s o f a l l

a r m a m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g a l l w e a p o n s o f m a s s d e s t r u c -

t i o n a n d t h e m e a n s f o r t h e i r d e l i v e r y , o t h e r t h a n

th ose required for a Unit ed Nations Peace Force

and for ma intaining internal order ;

T h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f e f f e c t i v e m e a n s f o r t h e e n m •

f o r c e m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s , f o r t h e s e t -

tlement of dis pu tes, and for the ma intenance of

p e a c e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e U n i t e d

Nat ions ;

T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d e f f e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n o f

a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i s a r m a m e n t O r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n

t h e f r a m e w o r k o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s t o i n s u r e c o m -

p l i a n c e a t a l l t i m e s w i t h a l l d i s a r m a m e n t o b l i g a -

t i o n s . TASK OF NEGOTIATING STATEST h e n e g o t i a t i n g s t a t e s a r e c a l l e d u p o n t o d e -

v e l o p t h e p r o g r a m i n t o a d e t a i l e d p l a n f o r g e n e r a l

and comp lete d is armam ent and to continue t heir

e f f o r t s w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n u n t i l t h e w h o l e p r o g r a m

h a s b e e n a c h i e v e d . T o t h i s e n d , t h e y a r e t o s e e k t h e

w i d e s t p o s s i b l e a r e a o f a g r e e m e n t at t h e e a r l i e s t p o s -

s i b l e d at e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , a n d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e

t o p r o g r e s s o n t h e d i s a r m a m e n t p r o g r a m , t h e y a r e

to seek agreement on those imm ediat e measu res

th at would contribute to the common securit y of

n a t i o n s a n d t h a t c o u l d f a c i l i t a t e a n d f o r m p a r t o f

t h e t o t a l p r o g r a m .GOVERNING PRINCIPLESThe program s ets f orth a s eries of general

p r i n c i p l e s t o g u i d e t h e n e g o t i a t i n g s t a t e s i n t h e i r

work . T h e s e m a k e c l e a r t h a t :

A s s t a t e s r e l i n q u i s h t h e i r a r m s , t h e U n i t e d N a -

t i o n s m u s t b e p r o g r e s s i v e l y s t r e n g t h e n e d i n o r d e r t o

i m p r o v e i t s c a p a c i t y t o a s s u r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y

2 9



a n d t h e p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s p u t e s ;

Disa rmament mu st proceed as rapi dly as p os-

s i b l e , u n t i l i t i s c o m p l e t e d , i n s t a ge s c o n t a i n i n g b a l -

a n c e d , p h a s e d , a n d s a f e g u a r d e d m e a s u r e s ;

E a c h m e a s u r e a n d s t a g e s h o u l d b e c a r r i e d o u t

i n a n a g r e e d p e r i o d o f t i m e , w i t h t r a n s i t i o n f r o m

o n e s t a g e t o t h e n e x t t o t a k e p l a c e a s s o o n a s a l l

m e a s u r e s i n t h e p r e c e d i n g s t a g e h a v e b e e n c a r r i e d

o u t a n d v e r i f i e d a n d a s s o o n a s n e c e s s a r y a r r a n g e -

m e n t s f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e n e x t s t a g e h a v e b e e n

m a d e ;

I n s p e c t i o n a n d v e r i f i c a t i o n m u s t e s t a b l i s h b o t h

t h a t n a t i o n s c a r r y o u t s c h e d u l e d l i m i t a t i o n s o r r e -

d u c t i o n s a n d t h a t t h e y d o n o t r e t a i n a r m e d f o r c e s

a n d a r m a m e n t s i n e x c e s s o f t h o s e p e r m i t t e d a t a n y

s t a g e o f t h e d i s a r m a m e n t p r o c e s s ; a n d

D i s a r m a m e n t m u s t t a k e p l a c e i n a m a n n e r t h a t

w i l l n o t a f f e c t a d v e r s e l y t h e s e c u r i t y o f a n y s t a t e .DISARMAMENT STAGEST h e p r o g r a m p r o v i d e s f o r p r o g r e s s i v e d i s a r m a -

m e n t s t e p s t o t a k e p l a c e i n t h r e e s t a g e s a n d f o r t h e

s i m u l t a n e o u s s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i -

t u t i o n s .

FIRST STAGE

T h e f i r s t s t a g e c o n t a i n s m e a s u r e s w h i c h w o u l d

s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e d u c e t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f n a t i o n s t o

wage aggressive war . I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h i s s t a g e

would mean tha t :

THE NUCLEAR THREATWOULD BE REDUCED :

A l l s t a t e s w o u l d h a v e a d h e r e d t o a t r e a t y e f -

f e c t i v e l y p r o h i b i t i n g t h e t e s t i n g o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s .

T h e p r o d u c t i o n o f f i s s i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l s f o r u s e

in weapons would b e s t o p p e d a n d q u a n t i t i e s o f s u c h

3 0



m a t e r i a l s f r o m p a s t p r o d u c t i o n w o u l d b e c o n v e r t e d

t o n o n - w e a p o n s u s e s .

Sta tes owning nuclear weapons would not re-

l i n q u i s h c o n t r o l o f s u c h w e a p o n s t o a n y n a t i o n n o t

owning th em a nd would not t ransm it to any s uch

n a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n o r m a t e r i a l n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e i r

manufacture .

Sta tes not owning nuclear weap ons would not

m a n u f a c t u r e t h e m o r a t t e m p t t o o b t a i n c o n t r o l o f

such weap ons b elonging t o other ' s t a t e s .

A C o m m i s s i o n o f E x p e r t s w o u l d b e e s t a b l i s h e d

t o r e p o r t o n t h e f e a s i b i l i t y a n d m e a n s f o r t h e v e r i -

f i e d r e d u c t i o n a n d e v e n t u a l e l i m i n a t i o n o f n u c l e a r

w e a p o n s s t o c k p i l e s .STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLESWOULD BE REDUCEDS t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r w e a p o n s d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s o f

s p e c i f i e d c a t e g o r i e s a n d w e a p o n s d e s i g n e d t o c o u n -

t e r s u c h v e h i c l e s w o u l d b e r e d u c e d t o a g r e e d l e v e l s

b y e q u i t a b l e a n d b a l a n c e d s t e p s ; t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n

w o u l d b e d i s c o n t i n u e d o r l i m i t e d ; t h e i r t e s t i n g w o u l d

b e l i m i t e d o r h a l t e d .ARMS AND ARMED FORCESWOULD BE REDUCEDT h e a r m e d f o r c e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e

S o v i e t U n i o n w o u l d b e l i m i t e d t o 2 . 1 m i l l i o n m e n

e a c h ( w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l s n o t e x c e e d i n g t h a t

a m o u n t f o r o t h e r m i l i t a r i l y s i g n i f i c a n t s t a t e s ) ;

l e v e l s o f a r m a m e n t s w o u l d b e c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y r e -

d u c e d a n d t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n w o u l d b e l i m i t e d .

An Experts Commis si on would b e esta bli sh ed

t o e x a m i n e a n d r e p o r t o n t h e f e a s i b i l i t y a n d m e a n s

o f a c c o m p l i s h i n g v e r i f i a b l e r e d u c t i o n a n d e v e n t u a l

e l i m i n a t i o n o f a l l c h e m i c a l , b i o l o g i c a l a n d r a d i o l o g i -

cal weapons .

3 1



PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACEWOULD BE PROMOTEDT h e p l a c i n g i n o r b i t o r s t a t i o n i n g i n o u t e r

s p a c e o f w e a p o n s c a p a b l e o f p r o d u c i n g m a s s d e s t r u c -

t i o n w o u l d b e p r o h i b i t e d .

S t a t e s w o u l d g i v e a d v a n c e n o t i f i c a t i o n o f s p a c e

v e h i c l e a n d m i s s i l e l a u n c h i n g s .U.N. PEACE-KEEPING POWERSWOULD BE STRENGTHENED :

Measu res would b e taken to develop and

s t r e n g t h e n U n i t e d N a t i o n s a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r a r b i -

t r a t i o n , f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w ,

a n d f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n S t a g e I I o f a p e r m a -

nent U. N . P e a c e F o r c e .

AN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENTORGANIZATION WOULD BE ESTABLISHEDFOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OFTHE DISARMAMENT PROGRAM :

I t s f u n c t i o n s w o u l d b e e x p a n d e d p r o g r e s s i v e l y

a s d i s a r m a m e n t p r o c e e d s .

I t w o u l d c e r t i f y t o a l l s t a t e s t h a t a g r e e d r e d u c -

t i o n s h a v e t a k e n p l a c e a n d t h a t r e t a i n e d f o r c e s

a n d a r m a m e n t s d o n o t e x c e e d p e r m i t t e d l e v e l s .

I t w o u l d d e t e r m i n e t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m o n e

s t a g e t o t h e n e x t .STATES WOULD BE COMMITTED TOOTHER MEASURES TO REDUCEINTERNATIONAL TENSION AND TOPROTECT AGAINST THE CHANCE OF

W AR BY ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION,OR SURPRISE ATTACK :

S t a t e s w o u l d b e c o m m i t t e d t o r e f r a i n f r o m t h e

t h r e a t o r u s e o f a n y t y p e o f a r m e d f o r c e c o n t r a r y

t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e U .N. C h a r t e r a n d t o r e f r a i n

3 2



f r o m ' i n d i r e c t a g g r e s s i o n a n d s u b v e r s i o n a g a i n s t

any country .

A U . N . p e a c e o b s e r v a t i o n g r o u p w o u l d b e a v a i l -

a b l e t o i n v e s t i g a t e a n y s i t u a t i o n w h i c h m i g h t c o n -

s t i t u t e a t h r e a t t o o r b r e a c h o f t h e p e a c e .

S t a t e s w o u l d b e c o m m i t t e d t o g i v e a d v a n c e n o -

t i c e o f m a j o r m i l i t a r y m o v e m e n t s w h i c h m i g h t c a u s e

alarm ; o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t s w o u l d b e e s t a b l i s h e d t o r e -

p o r t o n c o n c e n t r a t i o n s a n d m o v e m e n t s o f m i l i t a r y

f o r c e s . SECOND STAGET h e s e c o n d s t a g e c o n t a i n s a s e r i e s o f m e a s u r e s

which would bring wit hin sig ht a world in which

th ere would b e freedom from war. I m p l e m e n t a t i o n

o f a l l m e a s u r e s i n t h e s e c o n d s t a g e w o u l d m e a n

Furth er subs tanti al reductions in the armed

f o r c e s , a r m a m e n t s , a n d m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t s o f

s t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r w e a p o n s d e l i v e r y

v e h i c l e s a n d c o u n t e r i n g w e a p o n s ;

F u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f m e t h o d s f o r t h e p e a c e -

f u l s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s p u t e s u n d e r t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ;

Est ab lis hment of a permanent internati onal

p e a c e f o r c e w i t h i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ;

D e p e n d i n g o n t h e f i n d i n g s o f a n E x p e r t s C o m -

m i s s i o n , a h a l t i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f c h e m i c a l , b a c -

t e r i o l o g i c a l , a n d r a d i o l o g i c a l w e a p o n s a n d a r e d u c -

t i o n o f e x i s t i n g s t o c k s o r t h e i r c o n v e r s i o n t o p e a c e -

f u l u s e s ;

O n t h e b a s i s o f t h e f i n d i n g s o f a n E x p e r t s C o m -

m i s s i o n , a r e d u c t i o n o f s t o c k s o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s ;

T h e d i s m a n t l i n g o r t h e c o n v e r s i o n t o p e a c e f u l

u s e s o f c e r t a i n m i l i t a r y b a s e s a n d f a c i l i t i e s w h e r -

e v e r l o c a t e d ; a n d

T h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g a n d e n l a r g e m e n t o f t h e I n -

t e r n a t i o n a l D i s a r m a m e n t O r g a n i z a t i o n t o e n a b l e i t

3 3



t o v e r i f y t h e s t e p s t a k e n i n S t a g e I I a n d t o d e -

t e r m i n e t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o S t a g e I I I .THIRD STAGEDuring t he th ird st age of the p rogram, th e

s t a t e s o f t h e w o r l d , b u i l d i n g o n t h e e x p e r i e n c e a n d

c o n f i d e n c e g a i n e d i n s u c c e s s f u l l y i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e

m e a s u r e s o f t h e f i r s t t w o s t a g e s , w o u l d t a k e f i n a l

s t e p s t o w a r d t h e g o a l o f a w o r l d i n w h i c h

S t a t e s w o u l d r e t a i n o n l y t h o s e f o r c e s , n o n - n u c -

l e a r a r m a m e n t s , a n d e s t a b l i s h m e n t s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e

p u r p o s e o f m a i n t a i n i n g i n t e r n a l o r d e r ; t h e y w o u l d

als o supp ort a nd provid e agreed manpower for aU.N . P e a c e F o r c e .

Th e U. N . Peace Force, equipped with agreed

t y p e s a n d q u a n t i t i e s o f a r m a m e n t s , w o u l d b e f u l l y

f u n c t i o n i n g .

The ma nufa cture of a rmaments would be p ro-

h i b i t e d e x c e p t f o r t h o s e o f a g r e e d t y p e s a n d q u a n t i -

t i e s t o b e u s e d b y t h e U . N . P e a c e F o r c e a n d t h o s e r e -

q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n i n t e r n a l o r d e r . A l l o t h e r a r m a -

m e n t s w o u l d b e d e s t r o y e d o r c o n v e r t e d t o p e a c e f u l

p u r p o s e s .

T h e p e a c e - k e e p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e U n i t e d N a -

t i o n s w o u l d b e s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g a n d t h e o b l i g a t i o n s

o f a l l s t a t e s u n d e r s u c h a r r a n g e m e n t s s u f f i c i e n t l y

f a r - r e a c h i n g a s t o a s s u r e p e a c e a n d t h e j u s t s e t t l e -

m e n t o f d i f f e r e n c e s i n a d i s a r m e d w o r l d .

H e r e i s o u r p o l i c y s e t f o r t h . O u r p l a n n e r s b e g a n

t o m o v e , n o t t o e x t e n d f r e e d o m o r t o t h w a r t S o v i e t

a g g r e s s i o n , b u t t o b r i n g a b o u t t h e r e d u c t i o n o f m i l i -

t a r y f o r c e s a n d t o b u i l d u p a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e

Force under the Unit ed Nat ions which woul d rule

t h e w o r l d . T h a t b e c a m e t h e m a i n p r e o c c u p a t i o n w h i l e

3 4



Khrus hchev maintained hi s power drive . T h e S o -

v i e t s w e r e , i n t h e i r o w n w o r d s , t h e " l o c o m o t i v e " o f

h i s t o r y , w h i l e w e , p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , w e r e p r e p a r i n g

for accommoda ti on and dis arma ment . W e w e r e b e -

i n g p u t o f f b a l a n c e .

3 5



VI U . S . ARMS CONTROLTo implement thi s d isa rmament p rogram, th e

Unit ed Sta tes Arms Control a nd Dis arma ment

A g e n c y w a s s e t u p b y A c t o f C o n g r e s s . H e r e i s t h e

b a c k g r o u n d a n d t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a s

i t a p p e a r s i n t h e A g e n c y ' s o w n f i r s t a n n u a l r e p o r t

( p a g e 3 )

T h e a c t e s t a b l i s h e s t h e U . S . Arms Control and

Dis arm am ent Agency . I t d e f i n e s " a r m s c o n t r o l " a n d

" d i s a r m a m e n t " t o m e a n t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , v e r i f i c a -

t i o n , i n s p e c t i o n , l i m i t a t i o n , c o n t r o l , r e d u c t i o n , o r

e l i m i n a t i o n , o f a r m e d f o r c e s a n d a r m a m e n t s o f a l l

k i n d s u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t i n c l u d i n g t h e

n e c e s s a r y s t e p s t a k e n u n d e r s u c h a n a g r e e m e n t t o

e s t a b l i s h a n e f f e c t i v e s y s t e m o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l ,

o r t o c r e a t e a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a -

t i o n s f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f p e a c e . T h e a c t a s s e r t s

t h a t t h e A g e n c y m u s t h a v e s u c h a p o s i t i o n w i t h i n

t h e G o v e r n m e n t t h a t i t c a n p r o v i d e t h e P r e s i d e n t ,

t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , o t h e r o f f i c i a l s o f t h e E x e c u -

t i v e b r a n c h , a n d t h e C o n g r e s s , w i t h r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

concerning U . S . a r m s c o n t r o l a n d d i s a r m a m e n t p o l -

i c y . I n a d d i t i o n , i t d e s c r i b e s i n g e n e r a l t e r m s t h e

n a t u r e a n d q u a l i t y o f t h e s t a f f w h i c h t h e D i r e c t o r i s

r e q u i r e d t o a s s e m b l e . I t p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e o r g a n i -

z a t i o n m u s t h a v e t h e c a p a c i t y t o p r o v i d e e s s e n t i a l

s c i e n t i f i c , e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , p s y c h o l o g i -

c a l a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n u p o n w h i c h r e a l i s -

t i c a r m s c o n t r o l a n d d i s a r m a m e n t p o l i c y mu st be

3 6



b a s e d . T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n m u s t a l s o b e a b l e t o c a r r y

o u t t h e s e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n s :

( a ) T h e c o n d u c t , s u p p o r t , a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n o f

r e s e a r c h f o r a r m s c o n t r o l a n d d i s a r m a m e n t p o l i c y

f o r m u l a t i o n

(b) The preparat ion for and m anagement ofU. S . p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s i n

t h e . a r m s c o n t r o l a n d d i s a r m a m e n t f i e l d ;

(c) The dis semination and coordinat ion of

p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g a r m s c o n t r o l a n d

dis armament ; a n d

( d ) T h e p r e p a r a t i o n f o r , o p e r a t i o n o f , o r , a s

a p p r o p r i a t e , d i r e c t i o n o f U . S . p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s u c h

c o n t r o l s y s t e m s a s m a y b e c o m e p a r t o f U . S . a r m s

c o n t r o l a n d d i s a r m a m e n t a c t i v i t i e s .

T h e l a w a l s o p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e D i r e c t o r s h a l l

s e r v e a s p r i n c i p a l a d v i s e r t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e

a n d t o t h e P r e s i d e n t o n a r m s c o n t r o l a n d d i s a r m a -

ment mat ters . T h e D i r e c t o r , u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n o f

t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , h a s p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

within the Government for arms control and d is -

armament matt ers .

NEW ORGANIZATIONI n c o m m e n c i n g o p e r a t i o n s , t h e n e w a g e n c y t o o k

o v e r t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ' s U . S . Dis arma ment Ad-

m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g i t s p e r s o n n e l a n d i t s f u n c -

t i o n s .

I n a n t i c i p a t i o n . o f e x p a n d e d s t a f f a c t i v i t y , a n d

i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f n e w d u t i e s

i m p o s e d b y l a w , a n e w p a t t e r n o f i n t e r n a l o r g a n i -

z a t i o n w a s e s t a b l i s h e d .

A general adv is ory commit tee, aut horized by

s t a t u t e , w i l l b e c o m p o s e d o f n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s i n d i -

v e r s e f i e l d s , s o m e o f w h o m h a v e s e r v e d a s s e n i o r

3 7



o f f i c i a l s o f G o v e r n m e n t . I t w i l l m e e t p e r i o d i c a l l y t o

a d v i s e t h e D i r e c t o r .

The Unit ed Nat ions, too, was working t oward

"Dis armam ent . " A t e n - n a t i o n c o m m i t t e e o n d i s a r m -

a m e n t w a s s e t u p , c o m p o s e d o f f i v e w e s t e r n n a t i o n s

a n d f i v e S o v i e t n a t i o n s . L a t e r t h i s g r o u p w a s e x -

p a n d e d t o e i g h t e e n , w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g " n e u t r a l s "

being ad ded : B r a z i l , B u r m a , E t h i o p i a , I n d i a , M e x -

i c o , N i g e r i a , S w e d e n a n d t h e U n i t e d A r a b R e p u b l i c .

I t w i l l b e r e a d i l y s e e n t h a t t h i s s e l e c t i o n v e e r s d i s -

t i n c t l y t o K h r u s h c h e v ' s s i d e .

I n a s m u c h a s G e n e r a l d e G a u l l e r e j e c t s t h e g o a l

of th e plan-a merger of forces under th e United

N a t i o n s , h e d i d n o t d e i g n t o s e n d a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e

t o m a n y o f t h e c o n f e r e n c e s , s o t h a t , i n e f f e c t , i t

is a seventeen-nation commit tee, list ing toward

K h r u s h c h e v ' s l e f t .

3 8



V I I WE OFFER A TREATY

O n A p r i l 1 8 , 1 9 6 2 , w e o f f e r e d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a

t r e a t y t o i m p l e m e n t o u r P r o g r a m f o r G e n e r a l a n d

C o m p l e t e D i s a r m a m e n t b e f o r e t h e 1 7 - n a t i o n D i s -

a r m a m e n t C o m m i t t e e a t G e n e v a . I t w a s d u r i n g t h i s

p e r i o d t h a t K h r u s h c h e v m o v e d h i s e x p e d i t i o n a r y

f o r c e a c r o s s t h e A t l a n t i c t o C u b a .

T h e f o u r - p a g e s u m ma r y o f t h i s " t r e a t y " ma d e

b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m s C o n t r o l a n d D i s a r m a -

m e n t A g e n c y r e a d s

OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS

OF A TREATY ON GENERAL AND

COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A

PEACEFUL W ORLD

SUMMARYPRINCIPLES AND PROCESS

OF DISARMAMENT

D i s a r m a m e n t w o u l d b e i m p l e m e n t e d p r o g r e s -

s i v e l y a n d i n a b a l a n c e d m a n n e r s o t h a t a t n o s t a g e

c o u l d a ny s t a t e o r g r o u p o f s t a t e s o b t a i n m i l i t a r y

a d v a n t a g e . C o mp l i a n c e w i t h o b l i g a t i o n s w o u l d b e

e f f e c t i v e l y v e r i f i e d . A s n a t i o n a l a r m am e n t s w e r e r e -

d uc e d , t h e U ni t e d N a t i o ns w o u l d b e p r o g r e s s i v e l y

s t r e n g t h e n e d .

D i s a r m a m e n t w o u l d b e a c c o m p l i s h e d i n t h r e e

s t a g e s - t h e f i r s t t o b e c a r r i e d o u t i n 3 y e a r s ; t h e

s e c o n d , a l s o i n 3 y e a r s ; a n d t h e t h i r d , a s p r o m p t l y a s

p o s s i b l e w i t h i n a n a g r e e d p e r i o d o f t i m e . S t a g e I

w o u l d b e i n i t i a t e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e S o v i e t

U n i o n , a n d o t h e r a g r e e d s t a t e s . A l l m i l i t a r i l y s i g n i f -

3 9



i c a n t s t a t e s w o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e i n S t a g e I I ; a n d a l l

s t a t e s p o s s e s s i n g a r m a m e n t s a n d a r m e d f o r c e s , i n

S t a g e I I I . DISARMAMENT MEASURESA. ARMAMENTS. D u r i n g S t a g e I , i n v e n t o r i e s

o f m a j o r c a t e g o r i e s o f b o t h n u c l e a r d e l i v e r y v e h i -

c l e s a n d c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m a m e n t s w o u l d b e r e d u c e d

b y 3 0 p e r c e n t . F i x e d l a u n c h i n g p a d s w o u l d b e r e -

d u c e d w i t h a s s o c i a t e d m i s s i l e s . H a l f o f t h e r e m a i n -

i n g i n v e n t o r i e s w o u l d b e e l i m i n a t e d d u r i n g S t a g e I I ,

and final reductions would b e made in Stage III.

U p o n t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f S t a g e I I I , s t a t e s w o u l d h a v e

a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l o n l y a g r e e d t y p e s o f n o n n u c l e a r

a r m a m e n t s f o r f o r c e s r e q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n i n t e r n a l

o r d e r a n d p r o t e c t t h e p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y o f c i t i z e n s .

P r o d u c t i o n o f a r m a m e n t s d u r i n g S t a g e I w o u l d

b e l i m i t e d t o a g r e e d a l l o w a n c e s a n d w o u l d b e c o m -

p e n s a t e d f o r b y t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l a r m a -

m e n t s t o t h e e n d t h a t r e d u c t i o n s w o u l d n o t b e i m -

p a i r e d . I n S t a g e I I , p r o d u c t i o n o f a r m a m e n t s w o u l d

b e h a l t e d e x c e p t f o r p a r t s f o r m a i n t e n a n c e o f r e -

tai ned a rmaments . A n y f u r t h e r p r o d u c t i o n o f n a -

t i o n a l a r m a m e n t s w o u l d b e e n d e d i n S t a g e I I I e x -

c e p t f o r p r o d u c t i o n o f a g r e e d t y p e s o f n o n n u c l e a r

a r m a m e n t s f o r i n t e r n a l f o r c e s .

Mil it ary research, development, and testi ng

w o u l d b e s u b j e c t t o i n c r e a s i n g l i m i t a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e

disarmament process . D u r i n g S t a g e I I I , a p p r o p r i a t e

a c t i o n w o u l d b e t a k e n t o i n s u r e t h a t n e w s c i e n t i f i c

d i s c o v e r i e s a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n v e n t i o n s o f m i l i t a r y

s i g n i f i c a n c e w e r e n o t u s e d f o r m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e s .

B . ARMED FORCES . F o r c e l e v e l s o f t h e U ni t e d

Sta tes and Soviet Union woul d b e reduced to 2 . 1

m i l l i o n a t t h e e n d o f S t a g e I . H a l f o f t h e r e m a i n i n g

f o r c e s o f t h e s e t w o s t a t e s w o u l d b e d i s b a n d e d d u r -

4 0



i n g S t a g e I I , a n d f i n a l r e d u c t i o n s w o u l d b e m a d e i n

S t a g e I I I . O t h e r s t a t e s w o u l d a l s o p r o g r e s s i v e l y r e -

d u c e t h e i r f o r c e l e v e l s . B y t h e e n d o f S t a ge I I I, s t a t e s

w o u l d h a v e a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l o n l y t h o s e a g r e e d f o r c e s

a n d r e l a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s r e q u i r e d

t o m a i n t a i n i n t e r n a l o r d e r a n d p r o t e c t t h e p e r s o n a l

s e c u r i t y o f c i t i z e n s .

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS. P r o d u c t i o n o f f i s -

s i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l s f o r u s e i n n u c l e a r w e a p o n s w o u l d

b e h a l t e d i n S t a g e I , a n d l i m i t a t i o n s w o u l d b e i m -

p o s e d o n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f f i s s i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l s f o r

o t h e r p u r p o s e s . T h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f f i s s i o n a b l e m a -

t e r i a l s f o r u s e i n n u c l e a r w e a p o n s w o u l d b e r e d u c e d

d u r i n g S t a g e I a n d s u b s e q u e n t s t a g e s b y s a f e g u a r d e d

transf ers to nonnuclear weapons purposes .

I f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s t e s t s h a d n o t a l r e a d y b e e n

h a l t e d u n d e r e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l , a r r a n g e -

m e n t s t o t h i s e n d w o u l d b e u n d e r t a k e n i n S t a g e I .

Sta tes wh ich ha d ma nufa ctu red nuclear weapons

w o u l d a g r e e i n S t a g e I n o t t o t r a n s f e r c o n t r o l o v e r

n u c l e a r w e a p o n s t o s t a t e s w h i c h h a d n o t m a n u f a c -

t u r e d t h e m o r t o a s s i s t s u c h s t a t e s i n t h e i r m a n u f a c -

t u r e . Stat es whi ch h ad not manufa ctured nuclear

weapons would refrain from s eeking th em . T r a n s -

f e r s o f f i s s i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l s b e t w e e n s t a t e s w o u l d

b e l i m i t e d t o p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s a n d w o u l d b e s a f e -

guarded .

B e g i n n i n g i n S t a g e I I , n o n n u c l e a r c o m p o n e n t s

and ass embl ies of nuclear weapons would be de-

s t r o y e d a n d l i m i t a t i o n s w o u l d b e i m p o s e d o n f u r t h e r

p r o d u c t i o n o r r e f a b r i c a t i o n o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . A t

th e end of Stage II, rema ining nuclear weap ons

w o u l d b e r e g i s t e r e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t o a s s i s t i n v e r i -

f y i n g t h e f a c t t h a t b y t h e e n d o f S t a g e I I I s t a t e s

w o u l d n o t h a v e s u c h w e a p o n s a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l.

4 1



D. OUTER SPACE . T h e p l a c i n g o f w e a p o n s o f

m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n i n o r b i t w o u l d b e p r o h i b i t e d i n

S t a g e I , a n d l i m i t a t i o n s w o u l d b e i m p o s e d o n t h e

p r o d u c t i o n , s t o c k p i l i n g , a n d t e s t i n g o f b o o s t e r s f o r

s p a c e v e h i c l e s. S t a t e s w o u l d s u p p o r t i n c r e a s e d c o -

o p e r a t i o n i n p e a c e f u l u s e s o f o u t e r s p a c e .E. MILITARY BASES . R e d u c t i o n o f m i l i t a r y

b a s e s , w h e r e v e r t h e y m i g h t b e l o c a t e d , w o u l d b e i n i -

t i a t e d i n S t a g e I I , a n d f i n a l r e d u c t i o n w o u l d b e m a d e

i n S t a g e I I I .F. MILITARY EXPENDITURES . M i l i t a r y e x -

p e n d i t u r e s w o u l d b e r e p o r t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e d i s -

arma ment process .VERIFICATIONT h e v e r i f i c a t i o n o f d i s a r m a m e n t w o u l d b e t h e

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i s a r m a m e n t O r -

g a n i z a t i o n , w h i c h w o u l d b e e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n t h e

fram ework of t he Unit ed Nati ons . R e d u c t i o n s o f

armaments and armed forces would be verifi ed at

a g r e e d l o c a t i o n s ; a n d l i m i t a t i o n s o n p r o d uc t i o n , t e s t -

i n g , a n d o t h e r s p e c i f i e d a c t i v i t i e s , a t d e c l a r e d l o c a -

t i o n s . A s s u r a n c e t h a t a g r e e d l e v e l s o f a r m a m e n t s

a n d a r m e d f o r c e s w e r e n o t e x c e e d e d a n d t h a t a c t i v i -

t i e s s u b j e c t t o l i m i t a t i o n o r p r o h i b i t i o n w e r e n o t b e -

ing condu cted cla ndest inely would b e provid ed

through arrangements which would relate the ex-

t e n t o f i n s p e c t i o n a t a n y t i m e t o t h e a m o u n t o f d i s -

a r m a m e n t b e i n g u n d e r t a k e n a n d t o t h e r i s k t o t h e

d i s a r m i n g s t a t e s o f p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s .

S u c h a s s u r a n c e m i g h t , f o r e x a m p l e , b e a c c o m -

pli shed through arrangements under which s tat es

would div ide t hems elves i nto a numb er of zones

through which inspection would be progressi vely

e x t e n d e d . B y t h e e n d o f S t a g e I I I , w h e n d i s a r m a -

m e n t h a d b e e n c o m p l e t e d , a l l p a r t s o f t h e t e r r i t o r y

4 2



o f s t a t e s w o u l d h a v e b e e n i n s p e c t e d .REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WART o p r o m o t e c o n f i d e n c e a n d r e d u c e t h e r i s k o f

w a r d u r i n g t h e d i s a r m a m e n t p r o c e s s , s t a t e s w o u l d ,

b e g i n n i n g i n S t a g e I , g i v e a d v a n c e n o t i f i c a t i o n o f

major mili tary m ovements and maneuvers, estab -

l i s h o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t s t o r e p o r t o n c o n c e n t r a t i o n s

a n d m o v e m e n t s o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , a n d i n s u r e r a p i d

a n d r e l i a b l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a m o n g h e a d s o f g o v e r n -

m e n t s a n d w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l o f t h e U n i t e d

Nat ions .

An Internati onal Commis si on on Redu cti on of

t h e R i s k o f W a r w o u l d e x a m i n e p o s s i b l e e x t e n s i o n s

a n d i m p r o v e m e n t s o f s u c h m e a s u r e s a s w e l l a s a d -

d i t i o n a l m e a s u r e s t o r e d u c e t h e r i s k o f w a r t h r o u g h

a c c i d e n t , m i s c a l c u l a t i o n , f a i l u r e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,

o r s u r p r i s e a t t a c k .ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPINGTHE PEACEI n S t a g e I , s t a t e s w o u l d u n d e r t a k e o b l i g a t i o n s

t o r e f r a i n f r o m t h e t h r e a t o r u s e o f f o r c e o f a n y

ty pe contrary to t he Unit ed Nat ions Charter .

T h r o u g h o u t t h e t h r e e s t a g e s o f d i s a r m a m e n t , s t a t e s

w o u l d u s e a l l a v a i l a b l e m e a n s f o r t h e p e a c e f u l s e t -

t l e m e n t o f d i s p u t e s , w o u l d s e e k t o i m p r o v e p r o c e s s e s

f o r t h i s p u r p o s e , a n d w o u l d s u p p o r t m e a s u r e s t o i m -

p r o v e t h e c a p a b i l i t y o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s t o m a i n -

t a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y .

A Unit ed Nati ons Peace Obs erva t ion Corps

w o u l d b e e s t a b l i s h e d i n S t a g e I , a n d a U n i t e d N a -

t i o n s P e a c e F o r c e , i n S t a g e I I . T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s

P e a c e F o r c e , w h i c h w o u l d b e e q u i p p e d w i t h a g r e e d

typ es of armaments a nd would be sup plied agreed

m a n p o w e r b y s t a t e s , w o u l d b e p r o g r e s s i v e l y s t r e n g -

t h e n e d u n t i l , i n S t a g e I I I , i t w o u l d b e f u l l y c a p a b l e

4 3



o f i n s u r i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n a d i s a r m e d

world .

We see here imp lementat ion of the p olicy t o

t r a n s f e r m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h f r o m n a t i o n a l a r m i e s t o

a n a l l - p o w e r f u l U n i t e d N a t i o n s a r m y . S t a g e I a n d

s t a g e I I a r e t o b e o f t h r e e y e a r s ' d u r a t i o n .

A n a l l - p o w e r f u l W o r l d C o u r t w i t h a b s o l u t e j u r -

i s d i c t i o n a l s o i s p r o p o s e d . T h e t r e a t y r e a d s

" 1 . P e a c e f u l S e t t l e m e n t o f D i s p u t e sA. I n l i g h t o f t h e s t u d y o f p e a c e f u l s e t t l e -

m e n t o f d i s p u t e s c o n d u c t e d d u r i n g s t a g e I .

t h e P a r t i e s t o t h e T r e a t y w o u l d a g r e e t o

s u c h a d d i t i o n a l s t e p s a n d a r r a n g e m e n t s a s

w e r e n e c e s s a r y t o a s s u r e t h e j u s t a n d p e a c e -

f u l s e t t l e m e n t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s ,

w h e t h e r l e g a l o r p o l i t i c a l i n n a t u r e .B. T h e P a r t i e s t o t h e T r e a t y w o u l d u n d e r -

t a k e t o a c c e p t w i t h o u t r e s e r v a t i o n , p u r s u a n t

t o A r t i c l e 3 6 , p a r a g r a p h 1 o f t h e S t a t u t e o f

t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t o f J u s t i c e , t h e c o m -

p u l s o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h a t C o u r t t o d e c i d e

i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l d i s p u t e s . "

T h i s , o f c o u r s e , m e a n s t h e r e v o c a t i o n o f t h e C o n -

n a l l y R e s e r v a t i o n . ( * )

T h e S o v i e t s s u b m i t t e d t h e i r o w n v e r s i o n o f t h a t

t r e a t y w h i c h p r o v i d e d t h a t e a c h o f t h e f i r s t t w o

s t a g e s b e o f t w o y e a r s ' d u r a t i o n a n d c o m p l e t e d i s

armament be achieved in four years .

( * ) W h e n T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b e c a m e a s i g n a t o r y t o t h e U . N .

T r e a t y , t h e U . S . S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e , u n d e r

th e Cha irm ansh ip of Senator Tom Connally (Dem . - T e x a s )

s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d s u b m i t t o t h e U . N .

j u d i c i a l a r m , t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t o f J u s t i c e , o n i n t e r n a -

t i o n a l m at t e r s , w i t h d o m e s t i c i s s u e s , a s d e c i d e d by t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s , r e s e r v e d f o r t h e U . S . C o u r t s . T h i s q u a l i f i c at i o n h a s

been known as th e Connally Reservati on .

4 4



V I I I IT IS FOR REAL

D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d c l u s t e r s o f c i t i z e n s a r o u n d

t h e c o u n t r y w e r e b e g i n n i n g t o l e a r n w h a t o u r d i s -

armam ent p olicy was . T h e y d i d n o t l i k e w h a t t h e y

l e a r n e d . C o n c e r n b e g a n t o s p r e a d .

S o m e o f o u r l e a d i n g c i t i z e n s , n o t i n g t h i s t r e n d ,

h a d i n q u i r e d o f o u r W a s h i n g t o n o f f i c i a l s , i n c l u d i n g

C a b i n e t o f f i c e r s , a b o u t t h e f o l l y o f t u r n i n g o u r d e -

fense est ablish ment over to th e United Nations .

O u r f e l l o w - c i t i z e n s w e r e a s s u r e d b y t h e W a s h -

i n g t o n o f f i c i a l s ( w h o w e r e n o t d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n e d

w i t h d i s a r m a m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s ) t h a t w e w o u l d n o t

dis arm-t hat we were only g oing th rough th e mo-

ti ons in th e U . N . t o m o l l i f y t h e n e u t r a l s . I h a d

h e a r d e a r l i e r t h a t S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t o f f i c i a l s w e r e

also telling top newspapermen the s ame t hing .

L e t u s l o o k a t w h a t s o m e o f o u r o f f i c i a l s d i -

r e c t l y c o n c e r n e d w e r e , h o w e v e r , a c t u a l l y s a y i n g f o r

t h e r e c o r d : H e r e i s W i l l i a m C . F o s t e r , D i r e c t o r o f

th e Unit ed States Arms Control a nd Disa rmam ent

Agency : "U. S . Dis armam ent p roposal s a re, most

e m p h a t i c a l l y , n o t i n t e n d e d f o r p r o p a g a n d a p u r p o s e s .

T h e y a r e a s o b e r s t a t e m e n t o f a c t i o n p o l i c y w h i c h ,

i f a g r e e d t o b y t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , c o u l d r e s u l t i n

a w o r l d f r e e f r o m t h e s c o u r g e o f w a r a n d t h e d a n -

g e r s a n d b u r d e n s o f a r m a m e n t s i n w h i c h t h e u s e o f

f o r c e h a s b e e n s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e r u l e o f l a w a n d

i n w h i c h i n t e r n a t i o n a l a d j u s t m e n t s t o a c h a n g i n g

w o r l d a r e a c h i e v e d p e a c e f u l l y . . . t h e p r o b l e m i s n o t

what would ha pp en if U . S . dis armament proposals

4 5



w e r e a c c e p t e d . T h e p r o b l e m i s t o g a i n s u p p o r t f o r

t h e s e p r o p o s a l s a n d t o n e g o t i a t e t h e n e c e s s a r y d e -

t a i l s o f t h e m i n t o s p e c i f i c a g r e e m e n t s . "

Here i s Adl ai Stev enson, Unit ed Sta tes Am-

b a s s a d o r t o t h e U. N . , s p e a k i n g i n a n o f f i c i a l U . S .

bul leti n enti tl ed "Dis armam ent-t he New U. S . I n i -

t i a t i v e " : " I n s h o r t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o g r a m c a l l s

f o r t h e t o t a l e l i m i n a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y c a r -

r i e d o u t b y e a c h s i d e , e v e r y s t e p o f t h e w a y , t h e

p l a n c a l l s f o r t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i s -

arma ment Orga niza ti on wit hi n th e fram ework of

th e Unit ed Nati ons . . . I t i s p r e s e n t e d i n d e a d

e a r n e s t . "

Arth ur H . D e a n , o u r C h i e f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o

t h e G e n e v a D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e s t a t e d o f f i c i -

a l l y : " F r a n k l y , i n s p i t e o f m y d a i l y p r e o c c u p a t i o n

w i t h t h e a f f a i r s o f o u r c o n f e r e n c e , I s t i l l r e m a i n

i n a w e o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w h i c h w e h a v e s e t b e f o r e

o u r s e l v e s i n G e n e v a . W e a r e n o t p r i m a r i l y d i s c u s -

s i n g m e a s u r e s t o c a l m t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c e n e o r

t o f a c i l i t a t e p a r t i a l d i s a r m a m e n t , a l t h o u g h t h e r e

i s s o m e o f t h i s . O u r m a i n a t t e n t i o n i s f o r t h e r e t e n -

t i o n o f l i m i t e d i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y f o r c e s i n s i d e e a c h

country and for the m aintenance of a Unit ed Na-

t i o n s P e a c e F o r c e . "

4 6



IX ADLAI STEVENSONCARRIES IT FORWARDI n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 2 , A d l a i S t e v e n s o n , s p e a k i n g

b e f o r e t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ,

c a r r i e d t h e t h e m e f o r w a r d . H e s a i d :

" A g r e a t a c h i e v e m e n t o f o u r l a s t s e s s i o n w a s

t o e n d o r s e a n a g r e e m e n t o n a s e t o f p r i n c i p l e s

for general a nd comp lete d is arma ment in a

p e a c e f u l w o r l d . But we-whi le we have made

some progress, we ha ve not mad e enough to-

ward transpla nting t hese ag reed princip les

into an agreed p lan-to move by mu tua l a c-

t i o n s i n r a p i d s t a g e s t o w a r d t o t a l d i s a r m a m e n t

a n d e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e k e e p i n g . The

U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s p r o p o s e d s u c h a p l a n . I t h a s

s u b m i t t e d i t s p r o p o s a l s t o t h i s A s s e m b l y a n d t o

th e 18 nat ion Dis armament Conference at Ge-

neva . "Mr. S t e v e n s o n t h u s a f f i r m e d i n S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 6 2 ,

th at our "Disa rmament Plan" sub mit ted a year

e a r l i e r s t i l l r e p r e s e n t e d t h e p o l i c y o f t h e U n i t e d

Sta tes of America .

T h a t p l a n w a s n o t a " d i s a r m a m e n t " p l a n a t a l l .

Disarmament takes place when all the nations of

w o r l d d e s t r o y t h e i r a r m s a n d e f f e c t i v e l y a g r e e t o

arm no more . O u r p l a n a d v o c a t e d t h e t r a n s f e r o f

m i l i t a r y s u p r e m a c y f r o m w h e r e i t i s n o w , l a r g e l y

w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t o t h e n a t i o n s m a k i n g u p

th e General Assembl y of the Unit ed Nat ions . T h e

f o r c e w h i c h w i l l , i n t h r e e s t a g e s , p o s s e s s a l l t h e

w e a p o n s o f t h e w o r l d , e x c e p t f o r i n t e r n a l p o l i c i n g ,

4 7



i s c a l l e d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s P e a c e F o r c e .

O n p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n s , M r . S t e v e n s o n h a d s a i d ,

a n d t h i s w a s a n e c e s s a r y c o r o l l a r y o f h i s 1 9 6 2 p o -

s i t i o n , t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g U . N . P e a c e F o r c e s h o u l d

b e s t r o n g e r t h a n a n y c o m b i n a t i o n o f n a t i o n s i n t h e

world . Clearly, he intends t hat the U. N . s h o u l d

s u p e r c e d e h i s o w n g o v e r n m e n t i n m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h .

U n d e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o p o s a l " N o s t a t e ( i s ) t o

h a v e t h e m i l i t a r y p o w e r t o c h a l l e n g e t h e p r o g r e s -

siv ely s trength ened U. N . Peace Force . "

Hist ory and g ood s ense demonstrat e th at the

f o r c e w h i c h h a s a l l t h e w e a p o n s a n d t h e m i l i t a r y

p o w e r r u l e s t h e w o r l d . C l e a r l y , w h a t A d l a i S t e v e n -

s o n a d v o c a t e d w a s a U n i t e d N a t i o n s s o s t r o n g t h a t

it would ef fecti vely rul e the world- th e Unit ed

S t a t e s i n c l u d e d . T h a t i s w h a t e v e r y o n e i n t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s s h o u l d k n o w , f o r i t i s o u r e x p r e s s e d p o l i c y .

S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e R u s k s a i d r e c e n t l y t h a t " e a c h

a d d i t i o n t o t h e l i s t o f n u c l e a r p o w e r s w i l l m a k e m o r e

c o m p l i c a t e d a n d d i f f i c u l t t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s o f e f f e c -

t i v e c o n t r o l - a r r a n g e m e n t s t h a t w e m u s t s o o n e r o r

l a t e r a c h i e v e , i f w e a r e t o a v o i d t h e u l t i m a t e d i s a s t e r

o f n u c l e a r i n c i n e r a t i o n . " A t t h i s p o i n t , G e n e r a l d e

Gaul le and Sir Winston Churchill express ed deep

c o n c e r n a b o u t g i v i n g u p t h e i r n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t s a n d

bei ng s wept a way b y Dean Rus k and Khru sh chev,

a s t i n y d w a r f s , i n a m a s s i v e " s y n t h e s i s " , a s U T h a n t

c a l l s t h e p r o c e s s o f m e r g i n g w i t h S o v i e t p o w e r .

The h onest acknowledgment th at th is "accom-

m o d a t i o n " i s o u r p o l i c y i s l o n g o v e r d u e . T h e R o s t o w

report shoul d ha ve been released, not hi dden by

" e x e c u t i v e p r i v i l e g e . " T h e t r e a t y t h a t w e h a v e p u t

o n t h e t a b l e a t G e n e v a , c a l l i n g f o r t h e d i s m e m b e r -

m e n t o f o u r n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t , s h o u l d

h a v e b e e n d r a m a t i z e d , n o t s l y l y d e n i e d , w h e n c o n -

4 8



c e r n e d c i t i z e n s a s k e d i f i t w a s r e a l - a s , i n d e e d , i t i s .

W e h a v e a r i g h t t o k n o w t h e s e t h i n g s b e c a u s e

t h e y a l l a d d u p t o t h e s u r r e n d e r o f o u r h e r i t a g e .

The chi merical ass ump tion th at Khrushchev, Mao,

a n d t h e s o - c a l l e d n e u t r a l s l i k e S u k a r n o w o u l d a l l o w

u s , a s m a l l m i n o r i t y , t o h o l d o n t o o u r w a y o f l i f e i n

t h e r e s u l t i n g c o n c e n s u s i s u n r e a l . T h e f a c t o f t h e

m a t t e r i s t h a t C o m m u n i s m i s n o t m e l l o w i n g a t a l l .

I t i s e v e n m o r e i n t r a n s i g e n t a s i t c a l l s o v e r a n d o v e r

f o r " v i c t o r y " f o r w o r l d C o m m u n i s m w h i l e i t s d e e d s

a n d t h r e a t s t o " p u l v e r i z e " u s i m p l e m e n t t h o s e n e v e r -

e n d i n g c h a n t s .

T h e m i s s i l e s i n C u b a , t h e t e r r o r c a m p a i g n s i n

V i e t N a m a n d A n g o l a , t h e s h o o t i n g s a t t h e B e r l i n

Wall , th e imp lacable drive i n South America-al l

make Wal t Rostow sound fantas tic .

I t w a s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , a l m o s t w h i l e A m b a s -

s a d o r S t e v e n s o n s p o k e , t h a t K h r u s h c h e v w a s m o v i n g

m i s s i l e s i n t o C u b a , p u t t i n g h i m s e l f i n a p o s i t i o n t o

t h r e a t e n n u c l e a r b l a c k m a i l f r o m t h a t v a n t a g e p o i n t .

S o v i e t m i s s i l e s i n C u b a w o u l d t a k e a w a y t h e t h i r t y -

m i n u t e - o r - s o w a r n i n g t i m e t h a t w e n o w h a v e a g a i n s t

m i s s i l e s l a u n c h e d f r o m t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . Th i s t h i r t y

m i n u t e s i s v i t a l b e c a u s e i t e n a b l e s u s t o g e t o u r

d e t e r r e n t f o r c e o f f t h e g r o u n d .

P r o b a b l y n o t w o e v e n t s b e t t e r p o i n t u p t h e f u -

t i l i t y o f o u r p r e s e n t p o l i c y t h a n t h e s e t w o - t h e m o v -

i n g o f S o v i e t m i s s i l e s t o C u b a i n t h e d a y s a f t e r w e

p u t a t r e a t y o n t h e t a b l e a t G e n e v a o f f e r i n g t o d i s -

s o l v e o u r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y d e f e n s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t .

4 9



X THE PRESIDENT'SSPEECH AT AMERICANUNIVERSITY

O n J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 6 3 , t h e u n d e r l y i n g s t o r y r e a c h e d

the s urface. Thi s time, it came, not indirectly

t h r o u g h a n e n t e r p r i s i n g r e p o r t e r a s d i d t h e R o s -

t o w m e m o r a n d u m , b u t i n t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s o w n w o r d s

at a commencement sp eech a t American Universi ty

in Was hi ngt on .

H e r e i s w h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t s a i d : "Our pri ma ry

l o n g - r a n g e i n t e r e s t i n G e n e v a , h o w e v e r , i s g e n e r a l

and complete disa rmament-desi gned to take place

b y s t a g e s , p e r m i t t i n g p a r a l l e l p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s

t o b u i l d t h e n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s o f p e a c e w h i c h w o u l d

t a k e t h e p l a c e o f a r m s . "

O n t h e w o r l d o r d e r , t h e P r e s i d e n t , t o o , r e a f -

f i r m e d w h a t o u r p o l i c y p a p e r s h a d a l l r e c o m m e n d e d

-the s trengt hening of th e United Nations into a

world government . His exact words were : "Mean-

w h i l e , w e s e e k t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ,

t o h e l p s o l v e i t s f i n a n c i a l p r o b l e m s t o m a k e i t a m o r e

e f f e c t i v e i n s t r u m e n t f o r p e a c e , t o d e v e l o p i t i n t o a

genuine world security sys tem-a sys tem capable

o f r e s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s o n t h e b a s i s o f l a w , o f i n s u r -

i n g t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e l a r g e a n d t h e s m a l l , a n d o f

c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a r m s c a n f i n a l l y

b e a b o l i s h e d . "

This speech was a most important reaffirma-

t i o n o f o u r p o l i c y t h a t h a d , u p u n t i l t h e n , b e e n r e -

l e a s e d p i e c e m e a l . I t w a s n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e t o d e n y

t h a t o u r p o l i c y w a s t o w o r k t o w a r d a n a c c o m m o d a -

t i o n w i t ht h e S o v i e t U n i o n o n t h e b a s i s o f a m e r g e r

5 0



w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n u n d e r t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .

T h o s e p o r t i o n s o f t h e R o s t o w r e p o r t w h i c h h a d

s t a t e d t h a t o u r g o a l w a s a " v i c t o r y " n o t o f t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s o v e r t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , a " v i c t o r y " n o t o f

C a p i t a l i s m o v e r S o c i a l i s m b u t r a t h e r a v i c t o r y o f

" m e n a n d n a t i o n s " u n d e r t h e b a n n e r o f t h e U n i t e d

N a t i o n s , h a v e b e e n o f f i c i a l l y c o n f i r m e d . T h e P r e s i -

dent u sed t he t erm "Pax Americana" to dis avow

t h e h i t h e r t o t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

t o e x t e n d l i b e r t y a n d f r e e d o m a s c i v i l i z a t i o n h a s

known these concepts . T h i s w a s a m i l e s t o n e .

R e f l e c t i n g t h e m o r e d i r e c t w o r d s o f t h e R o s t o w

Memorandum, the Presid ent also said : "We mus t,

t h e r e f o r e , p e r s e v e r e i n t h e s e a r c h f o r p e a c e i n t h e

h o p e t h a t c o n s t r u c t i v e c h a n g e s w i t h i n t h e C o m m u -

n i s t b l o c m i g h t b r i n g w i t h i n r e a c h s o l u t i o n s w h i c h

now seem b eyond u s . W e m u s t c o n d u c t o u r a f f a i r s

i n s u c h a w a y t h a t i t b e c o m e s i n the Communist s'

i n t e r e s t t o a g r e e o n a g e n u i n e p e a c e . A n d a b o v e a l l ,

w h i l e d e f e n d i n g o u r o w n v i t a l i n t e r e s t s , n u c l e a r p o -

w e r s m u s t a v e r t t h o s e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w h i c h b r i n g

a n a d v e r s a r y t o a c h o i c e o f e i t h e r a h u m i l i a t i n g r e -

t r e a t o r n u c l e a r w a r . T o a d o p t t h a t k i n d o f c o u r s e

` i n t h e n u c l e a r a g e w o u l d b e e v i d e n c e o n l y o f t h e

b a n k r u p t c y o f o u r p o l i c y - o r o f a c o l l e c t i v e d e a t h -

w i s h f o r t h e w o r l d .

" T o s e c u r e t h e s e e n d s , A m e r i c a ' s w e a p o n s a r e

n o n - p r o v o c a t i v e , c a r e f u l l y c o n t r o l l e d , d e s i g n e d t o

d e t e r a n d c a p a b l e o f s e l e c t i v e u s e . O u r m i l i t a r y

f o r c e s a r e c o m m i t t e d t o p e a c e a n d d i s c i p l i n e d i n

s e l f - r e s t r a i n t . O u r d i p l o m a t s a r e i n s t r u c t e d t o a v o i d

u n n e c e s s a r y i r r i t a n t s a n d p u r e l y r h e t o r i c a l h o s -

t i l i t y . "

T w o d a y s a f t e r t h i s c o n c i l i a t o r y t a l k , K h r u s h -

c h e v d e t o n a t e d t w o n u c l e a r b l a s t s a n d f o l l o w e d w i t h

5 1



a n o t h e r a w e e k l a t e r , o n J u n e 1 9 .

Then, by way of emphas izing his point, he

s p o k e b e f o r e t h e P l e n a r y M e e t i n g o f t h e C o m m u n i s t

Part y of th e Soviet Union on June 21, two day s

l a t e r , a n d s a i d

"We mus t know that th e enemy i s now sha rp-

e n i n g h i s p o i s o n o u s i d e o l o g i c a l w e a p o n f o r m o r e

b i t t e r c l a s h e s w i t h u s . I t i s r e m i n i s c e n t o f w h a t

th e Red Army men sai d du ring t he Civ il W ar

w e h a v e o n e o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e w i t h t h e W h i t e

Guards on which we cannot ag ree, the s imple

q u e s t i o n o f l a n d . The Wh it e Guards want t o

b u r y u s i n i t a n d w e w a n t t o b u r y t h e m . W h o

w i l l b u r y w h o m f i r s t - t h i s i s t h e l i t t l e o u t s t a n d -

i n g q u e s t i o n w i t h c a p i t a l i s m .

" W e h a v e a s i m i l a r o u t s t a n d i n g q u e s t i o n w i t h

c a p i t a l i s m . I t w a n t s t o b u r y t h e s o c i a l i s t s y s -

tem a nd we want-and not only want but hav e

d u g q u i t e a d e e p h o l e , a n d s h a l l e x e r t e f f o r t s

to dig t his hole deeper-to bury forever the

c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m , t h e s y s t e m o f e x p l o i t a t i o n ,

w a r s , a n d p l u n d e r . Th a t c a p i t a l i s m w i l l c o l l a p s e ,

o f t h i s t h e r e i s n o d o u b t . B u t i t w i l l n o t c o l -

l a p s e o f i t s e l f .

" O u r s u c c e s s e s w i l l i n s p i r e t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s o f

a l l t h e c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s t o m o r e d e c i s i v e a n d

a c t i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c l a s s s t r u g g l e . And we

h a v e h e l p e d a n d w i l l c o n t i n u e t o h e l p t h e m b y

our exam pl e of bu ild ing communis m . T h e p e o -

p l e s o f t h e v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s f i g h t i n g f o r t h e i r

freedom a nd i ndep endence are receiv ing a s-

si st ance from us today , and tomorrow th ere

w i l l b e e v e n g r e a t e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r r e n d e r i n g

a s s i s t a n c e o f a n o t h e r c h a r a c t e r . "

S t i l l m a k i n g h i s p o i n t , K h r u s h c h e v h a d t h e f u l l

5 2



t e x t o f h i s r e m a r k s p r i n t e d i n t h e M o s c o w New s o f

J u l y 6 . ( N o . 2 7 ( 6 5 4 ) p a g e 8 . )

I n s o f a r a s I c o u l d d i s c e r n , t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t

g a v e c u r r e n c y n e i t h e r t o t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n n o r t o t h e

d e t o n a t i o n o f t h e n u c l e a r t e s t s . A p p a r e n t l y t h i s n e w s

d i d n o t f i t t h e i m a g e o f a " m e l l o w i n g " K h r u s h c h e v

w h i c h t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t i s t r y i n g t o s e l l t o t h e

American people .

5 3



XI "THE INTERNATIONALRULE OF LAW"T h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l r u l e o f l a w h a s b e e n a n i d e a l

o f m a n s i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t i m e . N o m a n o f g o o d -

w i l l o p p o s e s t h i s l o n g - s o u g h t d r e a m .

The fra mework which our pla nners are us ing

t o r e l a t e t h i s d r e a m t o r e a l i t y i s f r a u g h t w i t h f r a i l -

t i e s a n d i n f i l t r a t i o n b y a f o r c e t h a t i s i n h e r e n t l y

a n t i - l a w .

The Unit ed States Stat e Department, a nd now

t h e P r e s i d e n t , a r e o f f e r i n g t o d i s b a n d o u r m i l i t a r y

e s t a b l i s h m e n t s i n t h r e e s t a g e s , i f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n

a n d o t h e r n a t i o n s d o t h e s a m e . W e a r e o f f e r i n g t o

w o r k f o r t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s c r e a t i o n o f a n I n t e r n a -

t i o n a l P e a c e F o r c e t h a t w i l l b e c o m e p r o g r e s s i v e l y

s t r e n g t h e n e d s o t h a t b y S t a g e I I I , i t w i l l b e , i n t h e

l a n g u a g e o f t h e t r e a t y s u b m i t t e d a t G e n e v a " f u l l y

c a p a b l e o f i n s u r i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n a d i s -

armed world . "

T h u s , " D i s a r m a m e n t " i s b e i n g u s e d a s a c o v e r

f o r t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l " r u l e o f l a w "

o r w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t , w i t h d i s p u t e s r e f e r r e d t o a n

a l l - p o w e r f u l w o r l d c o u r t . O f c o u r s e , a s w e o b s e r v e d

e a r l i e r , t h i s i s n o t d i s a r m a m e n t a t a l l . T h e r e s u l t o f

t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f e x i s t i n g a r m i e s a n d t h e s i m u l -

t a n e o u s c r e a t i o n o f a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e F o r c e

i s r e a l l y t h e t r a n s f e r o f mi l i t a r y s t r e n g t h f r o m w h e r e

i t i s n o w t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s u n d e r U T h a n t . W i t h

t h i s t r a n s f e r , K h r u s h c h e v w i l l h a v e a c h i e v e d h i s

g o a l e x p r e s s e d i n 1 9 5 9 , o f r e m o v i n g t h e l a s t b a r r i e r

b e t w e e n h i m s e l f a n d w o r l d d o m i n a t i o n - t h e m i l i t a r y

5 4



s t r e n g t h o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .

S h o u l d t h i s p l a n b e e n a c t e d a n d c a r r i e d o u t , t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d d i s a r m . I f t h e r e w e r e a n y d r a g -

g i n g o f f e e t o n t h e p a r t o f o u r l e a d e r s , o r c h e a t i n g ,

t h e r e w o u l d b e v o c a l f o r c e s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o

p r o c l a i m t o t h e w o r l d w h a t e v e r d e l a y o r l a p s e o n o u r

p a r t t h e r e m i g h t b e . B u t i n t h e c o n t r o l l e d p r e s s o f

t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , e v e n i f t h e r e w e r e l i m i t l e s s i n -

s p e c t i o n r i g h t s , w e w o u l d n e v e r l e a r n t h e f a c t s i f

t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y h i d c a c h e s o f n u c l e a r a r m s i n

t h e v a s t n e s s o f S i b e r i a , C h i n a , M a n c h u r i a , M o n g o l i a ,

T i b e t o r E u r a s i a . A l l o n e n e e d d o i s t o l o o k a t t h e

e x t e n s i v e a r e a s o f t h e S o v i e t E m p i r e , w i t h a l l i t s

r u g g e d , m o u n t a i n o u s t e r r a i n o f c a v e s a n d d a l e s , t o

k n o w t h e p r a c t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n s p e c t i n g S o v i e t

t e r r i t o r y .

During Sta ge II, a ccording t o th e proposed

t r e a t y , a l l n a t i o n s w i l l h a v e t o s u b m i t t o t h e c o m -

p u l s o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t o f

J u s t i c e .

T h i s i s w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t i n e v e r y s e n s e o f t h e

word . A n a l l - p o w e r f u l i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r m y , w i t h a n

a l l - p o w e r f u l c o u r t u n d e r t h e s a m e a u s p i c e s , c a n b e

c o n s i d e r e d n o t h i n g e l s e b u t w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t . W h a t

e l s e d o e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r u l e o f l a w i m p l y ?

On June 29, 1 96 3, The New York Tim es sa id

e d i t o r i a l l y o n t h i s p o i n t : " T h e d i f fi c u l t y i s t h a t t h e

e s s e n c e o f l a w i s n o t o n l y j u s t i c e ; i t i m p l i e s c o m -

ma nd . T o b e b i n d i n g , w o r l d l a w n e e d s a s u p r a n a -

t i o n a l b o d y w i t h p o w e r t o e n f o r c e t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l

l a w s t h a t a r e a g r e e d u p o n . O t h e r w i s e , t h e y a r e n o t

` l a w ' ; t h e y a r e p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r a c t i c e s t h a t w o u l d

b e ` o b e y e d ' o n l y b y t h o s e n a t i o n s w h i c h h a v e a c -

c e p t e d t h e l a w s . "

When the i dea of a n internat ional army was

5 5



p r o p o s e d d u r i n g W o r l d W a r I I , i t w a s r e j e c t e d b y

t h e t h e n l e a d e r s o f t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t b e c a u s e

i t n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d " i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f p r o -

d u c t i o n , o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d

e v e n l a b o r s u p p l y . "

T o s h o w h o w p l a n s a r e b e i n g l a i d f o r t h e f a r -

r e a c h i n g a p p l i c a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f a l l

p h a s e s o f h u m a n e n d e a v o r , l e t t h e U n e s c o C o n v e n -

t i o n A g a i n s t D i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n E d u c a t i o n s p e a k .

5 6



XII UNESCOO n D e c e m b e r 1 4 , 1 9 6 0 U N E S C O , a s p e c i a l i z e d

a g e n c y o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s d r a f t e d , u n a n i m o u s l y ,

t h e f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n s :

B. CONVENTIONAND RECOMMENDATIONSADOPTED BY THEGENERAL CONFERENCEAT ITS ELEV ENTH SESSION

ARTICLE 1

I. C o n v e n t i o n A g a i n s t D i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n E d u c a t i o n

1 . F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s C o n v e n t i o n , t h e t e r m

` d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ' i n c l u d e s a n y d i s t i n c t i o n , e x c l u s i o n ,

l i m i t a t i o n o r p r e f e r e n c e w h i c h , b e i n g b a s e d o n r a c e ,

c o l o u r , s e x , l a n g u a g e , r e l i g i o n , p o l i t i c a l o r o t h e r

o p i n i o n , n a t i o n a l o r s o c i a l o r i g i n , e c o n o m i c c o n d i -

t i o n o r b i r t h , h a s t h e p u r p o s e o r e f f e c t o f n u l l i f y i n g

o r i m p a i r i n g e q u a l i t y o f t r e a t m e n t i n e d u c a t i o n a n d

i n p a r t i c u l a r

a . O f d e p r i v i n g a n y p e r s o n o r g r o u p o f p e r s o n s o f

a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n o f a n y t y p e o r a t a n y l e v e l ;

b . O f l i m i t i n g a n y p e r s o n o r g r o u p o f p e r s o n s t o

e d u c a t i o n o f a n i n f e r i o r s t a n d a r d ;

c . S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f A r t i c l e 2 o f t h i s C o n -

v e n t i o n , o f e s t a b l i s h i n g o r m a i n t a i n i n g s e p a r a t e

e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m s o r i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r p e r s o n s o r

g r o u p s o f p e r s o n s ; o r

d. O f i n f l i c t i n g o n a n y p e r s o n o r g r o u p o f p e r s o n s

5 7



c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e d i g n i t y

of man .

2 . F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s C o n v e n t i o n , t h e t e r m

` e d u c a t i o n ' r e f e r s t o a l l t y p e s a n d l e v e l s o f e d u c a -

t i o n , a n d i n c l u d e s a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n , t h e s t a n d a r d

a n d q u a l i t y o f e d u c a t i o n , a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r

w h i c h i t i s g i v e n .

ARTICLE 2

W h e n p e r m i t t e d i n a S t a t e , t h e f o l l o w i n g s i t u a -

t i o n s s h a l l n o t b e d e e m e d t o c o n s t i t u t e d i s c r i m i n a -

t i o n , w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f A r t i c l e 1 o f t h i s c o n -

v e n t i o n

a . T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o r m a i n t e n a n c e o f s e p a r a t e e d u -

c a t i o n a l s y s t e m s o r i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r p u p i l s o f t h e

t w o s e x e s , i f t h e s e s y s t e m s o r i n s t i t u t i o n s o f f e r e q u i -

v a l e n t a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n , p r o v i d e a t e a c h i n g s t a f f

w i t h q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e s a m e s t a n d a r d a s w e l l a s

s c h o o l p r e m i s e s a n d e q u i p m e n t o f t h e s a m e q u a l i t y ,

and af ford the opportunity t o take the sam e or

e q u i v a l e n t c o u r s e s o f s t u d y;

b . T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o r m a i n t e n a n c e , f o r r e l i g i o u s

o r l i n g u i s t i c r e a s o n s , o f s e p a r a t e e d u c a t i o n a l s y s -

t e m s o r i n s t i t u t i o n s o f f e r i n g a n e d u c a t i o n w h i c h i s

i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e w i s h e s o f t h e p u p i l ' s p a r e n t s o r

l e g a l g u a r d i a n s , i f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s u c h s y s t e m s o r

a t t e n d a n c e a t s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s i s o p t i o n a l a n d i f

t h e e d u c a t i o n p r o v i d e d c o n f o r m s t o s u c h s t a n d a r d s

a s m a y b e l a i d d o w n o r a p p r o v e d b y t h e c o m p e t e n t

a u t h o r i t i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r e d u c a t i o n o f t h e s a m e

l e v e l ;

c . T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o r m a i n t e n a n c e o f p r i v a t e e d u -

c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , i f t h e o b j e c t o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s

i s n o t t o s e c u r e t h e e x c l u s i o n o f a n y g r o u p b u t t o

p r o v i d e e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e

p r o v i d e d b y t h e p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s , i f t h e i n s t i t u -

5 8



t i o n s a r e c o n d u c t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h a t o b j e c t ,

a n d i f t h e e d u c a t i o n p r o v i d e d c o n f o r m s w i t h s u c h

s t a n d a r d s a s m a y b e l a i d d o w n o r a p p r o v e d b y t h e

c o m p e t e n t a u t h o r i t i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r e d u c a t i o n o f

t h e s a m e l e v e l .

ARTICLE 3

I n o r d e r t o e l i m i n a t e a n d p r e v e n t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n

w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h i s C o n v e n t i o n , t h e S t a t e s

P a r t i e s t h e r e t o u n d e r t a k e

a . T o a b r o g a t e a n y s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s a n d a n y a d -

m i n i s t r a t i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s a n d t o d i s c o n t i n u e a n y a d -

m i n i s t r a t i v e p r a c t i c e s w h i c h i n v o l v e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n

i n e d u c a t i o n ;

b . T o e n s u r e , b y l e g i s l a t i o n w h e r e n e c e s s a r y , t h a t

t h e r e i s n o d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e a d m i s s i o n o f p u p i l s

t o e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ;

c . N o t t o a l l o w a n y d i f f e r e n c e s o f t r e a t m e n t b y t h e

p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l s , e x c e p t o n t h e

b a s i s o f m e r i t o r n e e d , i n t h e m a t t e r o f s c h o o l f e e s

and the grant of scholars hi ps or other forms of

a s s i s t a n c e t o p u p i l s a n d n e c e s s a r y p e r m i t s a n d f a -

c i l i t i e s f o r t h e p u r s u i t o f s t u d i e s i n f o r e i g n c o u n -

t r i e s ;

d . N o t t o a l l o w , i n a n y f o r m o f a s s i s t a n c e g r a n t e d

b y t h e p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s t o e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ,

a n y r e s t r i c t i o n s o r p r e f e r e n c e b a s e d s o l e l y o n t h e

g r o u n d t h a t p u p i l s b e l o n g t o a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p ;

e . T o g i v e f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s r e s i d e n t w i t h i n t h e i r

t e r r i t o r y t h e s a m e a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n a s t h a t g i v e n

t o t h e i r o w n n a t i o n a l s .

ARTICLE 4

T h e S t a t e s P a r t i e s t o t h i s C o n v e n t i o n u n d e r t a k e

f u r t h e r m o r e t o f o r m u l a t e , d e v e l o p a n d a p p l y a n a -

t i o n a l p o l i c y w h i c h , b y m e t h o d s a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e

c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d t o n a t i o n a l u s a g e , w i l l t e n d t o

5 9



p r o m o t e e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y a n d o f t r e a t m e n t i n

t h e m a t t e r o f e d u c a t i o n a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r

a . T o m a k e p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n f r e e a n d c o m p u l s o r y ;

m a k e s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n i n i t s d i f f e r e n t f o r m s g e n -

e r a l l y a v a i l a b l e a n d a c c e s s i b l e t o a l l ; make higher

e d u c a t i o n e q ua l l y a c c e s s i b l e t o a l l o n t h e b a s i s o f i n -

d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y ; a s s u r e c o m p l i a n c e b y a l l w i t h t h e

o b l i g a t i o n t o a t t e n d s c h o o l p r e s c r i b e d b y l a w ;

b . T o e n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d s o f e d u c a t i o n a r e

e q u i v a l e n t i n a l l p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o f

t h e s a m e l e v e l , a n d t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o

t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e e d u c a t i o n p r o v i d e d a r e a l s o e q u i v -

a l e n t ;

c . T o e n c o u r a g e a n d i n t e n s i f y b y a p p r o p r i a t e m e t h -

o d s t h e e d u c a t i o n o f p e r s o n s w h o h a v e n o t r e c e i v e d

any prim ary education or who ha ve not completed

t h e e n t i r e p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n c o u r s e a n d t h e c o n t i n -

u a t i o n o f t h e i r e d u c a t i o n o n t h e b a s i s o f i n d i v i d u a l

c a p a c i t y ;

d . T o p r o v i d e t r a i n i n g f o r t h e t e a c h i n g p r o f e s s i o n

w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .

ARTICLE 5

1 . T h e S t a t e s P a r t i e s t o t h i s C o n v e n t i o n a g r e e

t h a t :

a . E d u c a t i o n s h a l l b e d i r e c t e d t o t h e f u l l d e v e l o p -

m e n t o f t h e h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y a n d t o t h e s t r e n g t h -

e n i n g o f r e s p e c t f o r h u m a n r i g h t s a n d f u n d a m e n t a l

freedoms ; i t s h a l l p r o m o t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t o l e r a n c e

a n d f r i e n d s h i p a m o n g a l l n a t i o n s , r a c i a l o r r e l i g i o u s

g r o u p s , a n d s h a l l f u r t h e r t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e U n i t e d

N a t i o n s f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f p e a c e ;

b . It i s e s s e n t i a l t o r e s p e c t t h e l i b e r t y o f p a r e n t s a nd ,

w h e r e a p p l i c a b l e , o f l e g a l g u a r d i a n s , f i r s t l y t o

c h o o s e f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n i n s t i t u t i o n s o t h e r t h a n

t h o s e m a i n t a i n e d b y t h e p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s b u t c o n -

6 0



f o r m i n g t o s u c h m i n i m u m e d u c a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s a s

may be lai d down or approved by th e competent

a u t h o r i t i e s a n d , s e c o n d l y , t o e n s u r e i n a m a n n e r c o n -

s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o l l o w e d i n t h e S t a t e f o r

t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f i t s l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e r e l i g i o u s a n d

m o r a l e d u c a t i o n o f t h e c h i l d r e n i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h

t h e i r o w n c o n v i c t i o n s ; a n d n o p e r s o n o r g r o u p o f

p e r s o n s s h o u l d b e c o m p e l l e d t o r e c e i v e r e l i g i o u s

i n s t r u c t i o n i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s o r t h e i r c o n v i c -

t i o n s ;

c . I t i s e s s e n t i a l t o r e c o g n i z e t h e r i g h t o f m e m b e r s

o f n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s t o c a r r y o n t h e i r o w n e d u -

c a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f

s c h o o l s a n d , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e e d u c a t i o n a l p o l i c y

o f e a c h S t a t e , t h e u s e o r t h e t e a c h i n g o f t h e i r o w n

language, provided however

( i ) T h a t t h i s r i g h t i s n o t e x e r c i s e d i n a m a n n e r

w h i c h p r e v e n t s t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e s e m i n o r i t i e s f r o m

u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c u l t u r e a n d l a n g u a g e o f t h e c o m -

m u n i t y a s a w h o l e a n d f r o m p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n i t s a c -

t i v i t i e s , o r w h i c h p r e j u d i c e s n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y ;

( i i ) T h a t t h e s t a n d a r d o f e d u c a t i o n i s n o t l o w e r

th an the general st andard lai d down or approved

b y t h e c o m p e t e n t a u t h o r i t i e s ; a n d

( i i i ) T h a t a t t e n d a n c e a t s u c h s c h o o l s i s o p t i o n a l .

2 . T h e S t a t e s P a r t i e s t o t h i s C o n v e n t i o n u n d e r -

t a k e t o t a k e a l l n e c e s s a r y m e a s u r e s t o e n s u r e t h e

a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s e n u n c i a t e d i n p a r a -

g r a p h 1 o f t h i s A r t i c l e .

ARTICLE 6

I n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s C o n v e n t i o n , t h e S t a t e s

P a r t i e s t o i t u n d e r t a k e t o p a y t h e g r e a t e s t a t t e n -

t i o n t o a n y r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s h e r e a f t e r a d o p t e d b y

t h e G e n e r a l C o n f e r e n c e o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s E d u -

c a t i o n a l , S c i e n t i f i c a n d C u l t u r a l O r g a n i z a t i o n d e -

6 1



f i n i n g t h e m e a s u r e s t o b e t a k e n a g a i n s t t h e d i f f e r e n t

f o r m s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n e d u c a t i o n a n d f o r t h e

purpose of ensuring equali ty of opportunity and

t r e a t m e n t i n e d u c a t i o n .

ARTICLE 7

T h e S t a t e s P a r t i e s t o t h i s C o nv e n t i o n s h a l l i n t h e i r

p e r i o d i c r e p o r t s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e G e n e r a l C o n f e r -

ence of t he United Nat ions Educational , Scien-

t i f i c a n d C u l t u r a l O r g a n i z a t i o n o n d a t e s a n d i n a

m a n n e r t o b e d e t e r m i n e d b y i t , g i v e i n f o r m a t i o n o n

t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o v i s i o n s w h i c h

t h e y h a v e a d o p t e d a n d o t h e r a c t i o n w h i c h t h e y h a v e

t a k e n f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s C o n v e n t i o n , i n c l u d -

i n g t h a t t a k e n f o r t h e f o r m u l a t i o n a n d t h e d e v e l o p -

m e n t o f t h e n a t i o n a l p o l i c y d e f i n e d i n A r t i c l e 4 a s

w e l l a s t h e r e s u l t s a c h i e v e d a n d t h e o b s t a c l e s e n -

c o u n t e r e d i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h a t p o l i c y .

ARTICLE 8

Any di sp ute which may a rise between any two

o r m o r e S t a t e s P a r t i e s t o t h i s C o n v e n t i o n c o n c e r n -

i n g t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s C o n -

v e n t i o n , w h i c h i s n o t s e t t l e d b y n e g o t i a t i o n s h a l l a t

t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e d i s p u t e b e r e f e r r e d ,

f a i l i n g o t h e r m e a n s o f s e t t l i n g t h e d i s p u t e , t o t h e

I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t o f J u s t i c e f o r d e c i s i o n .

ARTICLE 9

R e s e r v a t i o n s t o t h i s C o n v e n t i o n s h a l l n o t b e

p e r m i t t e d .

ARTICLE 1 0

T h i s C o n v e n t i o n s h a l l n o t h a v e t h e e f f e c t o f

d i m i n i s h i n g t h e r i g h t s w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s o r g r o u p s

may enjoy by virtue of ag reements conclud ed be-

t w e e n t w o o r m o r e S t a t e s , w h e r e s u c h r i g h t s a r e n o t

c o n t r a r y t o t h e l e t t e r o r s p i r i t o f t h i s C o n v e n t i o n .

6 2



ARTICLE 11This Convention is drawn up in English, French,

Russian and Spanish, the four texts being equally

authoritative .

ARTICLE 121 . This Convention shall be subject to ratifica-

tion or acceptance by States Members of the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-

ganization in accordance with their respective con-

stitutional procedures .

2. The instruments of ratification or acceptance

shall be deposited with the Director-General of the

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization .

ARTICLE 131 . This Convention shall be open to accession by

all States not Members of the United Nations Edu-

cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization which

are invited to do so by the Executive Board of the

Organization .

2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of

an instrument of accession with the Director-Gen-

eral of the United Nations Educational, Scientific

and Cultural Organization .

ARTICLE 14This Convention shall enter into force three

months after the date of the deposit of the third in-

strument of ratification, acceptance or accession, but

only with respect to those States which have de-

posited their respective instruments on or before

that date. It shall enter into force with respect to

any other State three months after the deposit of

its instrument of ratification, acceptance or acces-

sion .

63



ARTICLE 15The States Parties to this Convention recognize

that the Convention is applicable not only to their

metropolitan territory but also to all non-self-gov-

erning, trust, colonial and other territories for the

international relations of which they are respon-

sible ; they undertake to consult, if necessary, the

governments or other competent authorities of these

territories on or before ratification, acceptance or

accession with a view to securing the application of

the Convention to those territories, and to notify

the Director-General of the United Nations Edu-

cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization of the

territories to which it is accordingly applied, the

notification to take effect three months after the

date of its receipt .

ARTICLE 161. Each State Party to this Convention may de-

nounce the Convention on its own behalf or on be-

half of any territory for whose international rela-

tions it is responsible .

2. The denunciation shall be notified by an in-

strument in writing, deposited with the Director-

General of the United Nations Educational, Scien-

tific and Cultural Organization .

3. The denunciation shall take effect twelve

months after the receipt of the instrument of de-

nunciation .

ARTICLE 17The Director-General of the United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

shall inform the States Members of the Organiza-

tion, the States not members of the Organization

which are referred to in Article 13, as well as the

United Nations, of the deposit of all the instruments

64



of ratification, acceptance and accession provided

for in Articles 12 and 13, and of the notifications

and denunciations provided for in Articles 15 and

16 respectively .

ARTICLE 181. This Convention may be revised by the Gen-

eral Conference of the United Nations Educational,

Scientific and Cultural Organization . Any such re-

vision shall, however, bind only the States which

shall become Parties to the revising convention .

2. If the General Conference should adopt anew convention revising this Convention in whole

or in part, then, unless the new convention other-

wise provides, this Convention shall cease to be

open to ratification, acceptance or accession as from

the date on which the new revising convention en-

ters into force .

ARTICLE 19In conformity with Article 102 of the Charter

of the United Nations, this Convention shall beregistered with the Secretariat of the United Na-

tions at the request of the Director-General of the


Organization .

Done in Paris, this fifteenth day of December,

1960, in two authentic copies bearing the signatures

of the President of the eleventh session of the Gen-

eral Conference and of the Director-General of the


Organization, which shall be deposited in the ar-

chives of the United Nations Educational, Scien-

tific and Cultural Organization, and certified true

copies of which shall be delivered to all the States

65



referred to in Articles 12 and 13 as well as to the

United Nations .

While this Convention and these resolutions

have not been submitted to the United States Senate

for ratification, this plan looking to the making of

the education of all men over the world monolithic,

is now actually in the wings .

66



XIII WHAT IS WRONG WITHTHIS POLICY?

This blending or "merger" of nations underthe United Nations might be a thrilling concept if

the United Nations were made up of idealistic men

and nations. The fact is that it is not . It is an ad-

mixture of power politicians, many of them ruth-

less and lawless .

The Soviet Union, with twelve disciplined satel-

lites, stands right in the middle of the organization .

It has, to start with, 12 votes out of 111 in the Gen-

eral Assembly and a minimum of 2 in the 11 nations

Security Council .

Furthermore, U Thant has insisted that bristl-

ing Red China, still at war with the U .N . i t s e l f , b e

admitted to the world body. With Khrushchev andMao constituting two of the five permanent mem-

bers of the Security Council, the Soviet base would

be formidable indeed .

Moreover, there is a whole string of left-lean-

ing "neutrals" who regularly vote with Khrushchev,

in concert with his campaigns of conquest through

"peaceful coexistence" and "decolonialization ." In-

donesia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Cambodia,

United Arab Republic, Burma, Afghanistan, Laos,Yemen and Brazil are consistent supporters ofKhrushchev's programs in the United Nations .

Further, the bizarre success of the Soviet Union

in infiltrating Western and neutral delegations, and

the Secretariat itself, has made the news over and

over. Alger Hiss, the first Secretary General at San

67



Francisco, was shown conclusively to have engaged

in Soviet espionage . The head of the Canadian dele-

gation to the U .N. in the 1950's was shown to have

had important Communist links, and the SenateCommittee on Internal Security put into the record

testimony concerning his Communist membership,as well as a security report that had severe reper-

cussions .

Khrushchev and Mao, and for that matter Go-mulka, Castro and Tito do not use the instruments

of world peace to work for peace as we know it .

"Peace" to a Communist exists when all resistance

to Communism has been broken . That is the mostfundamental concept in the Communist lexicon .

Where Communists are, intrigue will prevail .

For the idealistic West or the non-Communist East

to shut its eyes to this established fact is to court

disaster .

An even more fundamental defect in this plan

is the incredible assumption that Khrushchev and

his confederates will allow an international peace

force to be operational at all . The plan presumesthat the Soviet military will disarm and not con-

ceal, deep in the recesses of Siberia and Eurasia,

sufficient nuclear strength to bring us to bay while

we go through with the disarmament process . Com-

petent military men and responsible observers of

Soviet strategy have told us that if we had a verit-

able army of inspectors with limitless inspection

rights, we could never properly cover the vastness

of the Soviet territory .

Even if the Soviet Union should wait for the

United States to disarm and for the International

Peace Force to come into being and gain enoughmilitary strength to be operational under the terms

68



of our proposals, the U . S . S .R. would retain an enor-

mous advantage. For, with substantial representa-tion, and with additional infiltration into the "Peace

Force" itself, it could easily work to thwart the

discovery of its own concealed military strength .

There can be no doubt that the Soviets have a

plan to control the resulting combine . Failing that,

as the record already has demonstrated on several

occasions, they certainly will have enough power

within the "Peace Force" to nullify any repressive

action against them .

In short, this whole plan will be successful only

with permanent Soviet good faith and Communistcooperation every step of the way . Not only is this

being taken for granted, but there is an equally

naive assumption that Communist nature will change

when we reach the merger stage and that thesehardened Communists will abandon their goals of

a lifetime and work for what is basically a bour-

geois way of life-the international rule of law as

civilized men have envisioned it .

I submit that the record simply does not sup-

port the idealistic conclusions of our policy leaders .

This, indeed, is a very dangerous game they are

playing .

69



XIV WHOSEINTERNATIONALLAW?

The idealistic search for international law is

rhapsodic and inviting . But, practically speaking,

there are certain elemental facts that cannot be

wished awayOnly a handful of the nations in the United Na-

tions have a common-law heritage . These are mostly

in the British Commonwealth . Of course, we have it .

We, alone, have the very thrilling Bill of Rights

with its solemn guarantees of individual protection .

Only a minority of nations now have the free

enterprise system . Many are either Socialist or out-

right Soviet When men of the West talk of "the

international rule of law" we conjure up the utter-

ances of the Cokes and the Blackstones, our Bill of

Rights, our Constitution or the French Declaration

of the Rights of Man .

However, Khrushchev, Mao, Castro and Titoand their allies have never been students of Coke or

Blackstone . They effectively and consistently flout

the principles of the Bill of Rights .

International Law would not be law as we have

known it but would become an homogenized medleyof the contributions of the Khrushchevs, the Maos,

the Castros, the Nassers, the Titos, the Sukarnos

and the Adlai Stevensons .

This admixture would be substituted for ourConstitution, our Bill of Rights, our Common Law .

Certainly state laws would be diluted beyond recog-

nition .

70



Is that what our people want? The United States

would be an ineffectual minority in this combine

while the Khrushchevs, the Maos, the Nassers, the

Sukarnos, the Nkrumahs would have much to sayin setting the new codes of law . They would also go

far toward dominating the creation, the disposi-

tion and the utilization of the world army . Theywould help to staff the world court .

Necessarily, this is the end of our thrilling heri-

tage for which our forefathers and fathers fought .

It is the direct opposite of that for which two mil-

lion Americans gave their lives and blood in World

War II and in Korea .

71



XV THESECRETARIAT

It will be seen that an important control tower

of this stupendous merger will be the Secretariat

of the United Nations, headed by the Burmese, UThant.

The Secretariat may be compared to the staff

or management of a corporation, the board of di-

rectors of which is the General Assembly or the

Security Council . The General Assembly is advisory

to the Security Council, but, with the passage of

time, is acquiring more and more power of action .

In the General Assembly, the United Stateshas one vote in the one-hundred-eleven-member as-

sembly. In a year or so that number will go to 126 .

In the Security Council, we have one vote in eleven .

At the head of the Secretariat is the Secretary

General U Thant. He has been elected to serve until1966 .

The Secretary General, under the Charter,should be the "chief administrative officer of the

United Nations" and should be responsible to that

body. "The Secretary General and the staff shallnot seek or receive instructions from any govern-

ment or from any other authority external to the

organization . "

The Charter of the United Nations gives as the

purposes of the organization the following two pro-

visions

"To develop friendly relations among nations

based on respect for the principle of equal72



rights and self-determination of peoples, and

to take other appropriate measures to strength-

en universal peace ;

"To achieve international cooperation in solv-

ing international problems of an economic, so-

cial, cultural or humanitarian character, and,

in promoting and encouraging respect for hu-

man rights and for the fundamental freedoms

for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-

guage or religion . "

U Thant has made no effort whatsoever to de-

velop relations based on respect for the principle of

equal rights and self-determinations of peoples . To-

day, more than a billion human beings are in Soviet

bondage, without fundamental rights and with noth-

ing whatsoever to say toward their self-determina-

tion .

You will search in vain for any effort on the

part of U Thant in behalf of the right of self-de-

termination for the captive people under Soviethegemony. On the other hand this so-called neutral

works day and night to dismantle western "colonial-

ism" which is far less repressive than Soviet "col-

onialism . "

While U Thant presses vigorously against the

Belgians, the Portuguese, or the French, he works

equally vigorously to "normalize" Hungarian rela-

tions with the U.N. and all the nations of the world .

When the "Butchers of Budapest" moved tanks from

the Soviet Union to crush the Hungarian people,world opinion forced the U.N. to conduct an in-quiry into that act of genocide. Kadar has defied

every U.N. effort to arrive at the truth, or to imposecensure or sanctions . Yet U Thant works to wipethe slate clean of this sanguinary record, obviously

73



for the advantage of Khrushchev and Kadar .

Hungary is far more repressive of humanrights than is, for example, Portuguese Angola .

They cannot even be compared . Yet the doublestandard of U Thant is marked . Rather than workfor sanctions against Kadar, he works to forgemore securely the chains that bind the Hungarian

people . He does this as well to Cuba and every other

Soviet colony .

Instead of upholding his obligations under the

charter, U Thant represents himself as the mediator

between the bondage of the East and the freedom of

the West which he equates . In fact, he is not even

neutral between these disparate forces .

For instance, when he made his first speechafter being elected permanent Secretary General

he said that he was convinced that Premier Khrush-

chev did not want war and was sincere in his calls

for peaceful coexistence. He chided the western na-

tions for apparently failing to recognize the "full

significance" of the changes in Moscow's thinking

since the death of Josef Stalin. Thant, however,

praised President Kennedy for agreeing to neutral-

ization of Laos and thus admitting, wisely, that the

"attempt to create a pro-Western government inAsia" had failed . The fact was, of course, that our

effort had been to defend Laos against aggression .

Here is what U Thant said

"Mr. Khrushchev, who is now in control of thereins of government, belongs to a different cate-

gory of leaders, with a coherent philosophy of the

world based on the thesis, not of the inevitability of

war, but of the imperative of competive coexistence .

We may or may not agree with his philosophy or

74



with his aims, but we have very good reasons to be-

lieve that he does not want war.

"The West does not seem to appreciate the full

significance of this obvious change of political climate

in the Soviet Union. Throughout the fifties most

Western leaders saw the world as a battlefield be-

tween two antagonistic systems militantly expres-

sing the principles of good and evil. Hence com-

promise was betrayal : evil could be held at bay only

by iron-clad alliances, held together by mutual fear

and backed by the constant threat of nuclear war .

While this attitude could be criticized as a modern

version of Hobbesian pessimism, it neverthelessprovided a stable and fixed frame of reference in

which decisions could be taken .

"This concept of iron-clad alliances and this view

of the world purely in terms of black and white

was, in essence, the Western response to Stalinism .

However, this attitude persisted even when the char-

acter of Soviet challenge was already changing .

This view of the world scene was perhaps partlyresponsible for many newly-independent countries

pursuing a policy of nonalignment . President Ken-

nedy proved himself to be a leader of vision and

imagination when, early last year, he proposed a

neutral Laos in return for a cease-fire . Thus the

President wisely admitted that the attempt tocreate a series of pro-Western governments in Asia

had failed . He accepted the view that the best the

West could hope for in Asia-and for that matterAfrica-is governments which fear outside inter-ference and subversion as much as they hate colonial-

ism ; and that the function of Western policy should

be the creation of a framework within which they

can exercise their own freedom of choice . "

75



Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence is not a mys-

tery. It is defined in the Communist manifesto of

1960, in the draft platform of the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union of 1961, the most authoritative

Soviet source, and in official Soviet journals as a

means to achieve world wide victory. The Commu-nist manifesto of 1960 referred to it as an "intensi-

fication" of the world struggle . Assurances weregiven that "peaceful coexistence" does not mean, of

course "peace" in the class struggle between socialism

and capitalism or reconciliation of the Communist

with the bourgeois ideology . Peaceful coexistence

means not only the existence of states with different

social systems, but also a definite form of world-

wide class struggle between socialism and capitalism .

Khrushchev assured the comrades in 1961 that

it involved "no compromise" in Soviet principles,

but was, instead, an "intensification" of the world

struggle .

Under "peaceful coexistence" Khrushchev hasmoved an expeditionary force across the Atlantic,

with missiles, tanks, MIG's, submarines and electronic

paraphernalia . He is now mounting from his estab-

lished base in Cuba a campaign of terror, subver-

sion and infiltration against South America . He is

waging a terror campaign in Angola. He is mov-ing forces down the Ho Chi Minh trail. He is at-tacking in Laos, and South Vietnam. He has built a

wall in Berlin and shoots down human beings asthey try to escape to freedom . He has human beings

on torture racks in Budapest and in Havana . He is

executing children and forceably taking others from

their families to indoctrinate them in Communism .

Indeed, there is nothing "peaceful" about

76



Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence ." Certainly U

Thant knows this. His staff, with hundreds of re-

search assistants knows it well . He is not a neutral

at all. Directly behind U Thant is Assistant Secre-

tary General Vladimir P. Suslov, Assistant Secre-

tary General in charge of Security Council andPolitical Affairs. Trygve Lie called the post the

"premier" Assistant Secretary Generalship because

of its functional importance . The U.N. Handbook

describes his duties in this fashion

"The UN Secretariat has eight departments,each under an Under-Secretary. The first is the

very important Department of Political and Security

Council Affairs . The Under-Secretary in charge is

one of the senior advisers to the UN Secretary Gen-

eral. Within this Department are the General Po-

litical Division, the Administrative and General Di-

vision and the Disarmament Affairs Group, and the

latter includes the Atomic Energy Section and the

Conventional Armaments and Enforcement Meas-ures Section .

"The Department provides services for the Se-

curity Council and its subsidiary organs, including

the Committee on Admission of New Members, the

Disarmament Commission and the Peace Observa-tion Commission . It prepares papers relating to peace

materials relevant to the work of the Disarmament

Commission ; advises on security aspects of Trustee-

ship Agreements for strategic areas ; participates

with the Military Staff Committee Secretariat in the

application of military enforcement measures ; pro-

vides Principal Secretaries and Deputies and Assis-

tant Secretaries for Committees created by the UN

for investigation or conciliation ; and performs addi-

tional work that may be assigned by the Secretary

77



General." (see UN Yearbook 1952, p . 46 . )

When Suslov took the post in April, 1963, he left

the post of first assistant to Soviet Foreign Minister

Andrei Gromyko. Suslov has been in the Soviet dip-lomatic service since 1953. His predecessors had held

similar posts in the Soviet Foreign Office . It is fan-

tastic to assume that these hardened Soviet diplo-

mats could be dedicated Communists, subject to se-

vere Communist discipline, one day, and objective

international civil servants the next .

All one need do is read, for instance, "TheMoulding of Communists" by Frank S. Meyer, to

understand the amount of concentrated and exhaus-

tive training that goes into making the human being

fit into the Communist mould, to realize that this

naive concept of an objective Soviet International

civil servant has no foundation in fact .

The predecessor of Suslov was the late Evgeni

Kiselev . ( * )

Suslov's predecessors in this key post have been

1946-49 Arkady S. Sobelov, USSR1950-53 Konstantine Zinchenko, USSR

(*)Kiselev held the following posts before moving into thisimportant U.N. p o s t :

He was Soviet Consul General in New York during WorldWar II, and our intelligence agencies learned that he carried

on extensive organizational work with Communist frontgroups in this country . Later, he was political adviser to

Soviet Marshal Ivan S . Konev, commanding Red forces in

Austria . The Associated Press story out of United Nations

in New York describing his appointment as Assistant Secre-

tary General stated that "his career has been filled with tough

assignments. He was Soviet Ambassador to the United Arab

Republic during the Suez crisis . He was regarded as the man

who engineered the Soviet-U.A.R. arms deal and demon-strated to President Nasser, Soviet sympathy for his aims .

He was Ambassador to Hungary 1949-54, when Stalinismwas at its height in that country . In 1948-49 he headed the

Department of Balkan Countries in the Soviet Foreign Min-

istry ."

78



1954-57 Ilya Tchernyshev, USSR

1957 Dragoslav Protitch, Yugoslavia

1957-60 A. Dobrynin, USSR1960-62 George P. Arkadev, USSR1962-63 Eugveni D. Kiselev, USSR

Trygve Lie, in his volume, "In The Cause of

Peace", wrote that the so-called big five had entered

into an agreement to give this post to a Soviet na-

tional. He interpreted the agreement to be binding

only during his term as Secretary General, but a

glance at the actual holders of the post would in-

dicate that it probably was of longer duration .

Actually, the underlying situation is worse than

this. Alger Hiss, who was subsequently convictedfor perjury involving his acts of Soviet espionage,

was the organizing Secretary General of the U .N .

at San Francisco . He put his proteges into many of

the key posts in the organization, and many -of them

are there today .

The fact is that Ralph Bunche, Suslov and the

Indian Narasimhan form a troika of assistants that

runs the Secretariat right behind U Thant .

When the United States Senate Internal Sub-

committee held its short inquiry into the Commu-

nist political activity of the U . S . citizens in the Sec-

retariat, it found it to be heavily infiltrated .

I was the counsel to the Internal Security Sub-

committee then. We surveyed the Soviet penetra-tion into the United States representation only in

the Secretariat. We assumed that we had no author-

ity to investigate the Secretariat itself, although the

Headquarters Agreement permitting the U .N. oper-

ation in New York never has been properly ratified .

Yet, what we uncovered was, to say the least,

shocking, by our standards. I summarized these

79



hearings for my book "No Wonder We Are Losing" .

Let me use this summary here, as well as a sum-mary of the conclusions of the Subcommittee

The first witness to appear before us in open

session was Alfred J . Van Tassell, who held the po-

sition of Chief of the Economic Section of the Tech-

nical Assistance Administration . Van Tassell hadentered Government service through the NationalResearch Project of the WP.A . , gone on to theWage-Hour Division of the Department of Laborand from there to the War Production Board andthe Senate Small Business Committee . His last gov-

ernment post before moving to the United Nations

was Director of Reports Division of the War Assets

Administration .

We had received evidence in executive session

that during this period Van Tassell was a Commu-

nist. When we asked him about this evidence, heinvoked, extensively, his privilege against self-in-

crimination. He was to be the first of 26 United

Nations officials who pleaded the Fifth Amendment

when asked about the evidence of their participa-

tion in the Communist conspiracy .

It should be pointed out that our Subcommittee

had employed no investigators . The evidence that

we turned up was evidence that had been readilyavailable. As we were to learn later, it had been al-

ready disseminated by the FBI through all the se-

curity agencies .

Before the Grand Jury on April 1, Van Tassell

had also invoked his privilege under the FifthAmendment. He told our Subcommittee that he had,first orally and later in writing, given a full report

of his conduct to his superiors at the Secretariat,

80



A. H. Feller and Byron Price (both American) and

H. L. Keenleyside, (a Canadian) . Not only did Van

Tassell stay on his job after telling his superiors

about his claim of privilege but, according to his

testimony, Keenleyside had given him an expres-sion of support . Keenleyside continued as head of

UN Technical Assistance. Only after Van Tassellappeared before the Subcommittee in open session

did Secretary General Trygve Lie act against him .

Some of the more important United Nationsofficials who could not deny the Committee evidence

of their Communist membership were Joel Gordon,Chief of the Current Trade Analysis Section, Divi-

sion of Economic Stability and Development ; Jack

Sargent Harris, Senior Officer, Research Section,

Division of Trusteeship of the Department of Trus-

teeship and Information for Non Self-GoverningTerritories ; Irving Kaplan, Economic Affairs Officer,

Division of Economic Stability and Development ;

Frank Bancroft, Editor, Document Control Divi-sion ; Stanley Graze, Project Officer, Technical As-

sistance Administration and Julia Older Bazer, Edi-

tor of the Editorial Control Section of the Bureau

of Documents. All of these people drew large salariesand were i n positions to hire and direct the activities

of scores of other individuals . The Subcommitteewas fortunate in receiving evidence about these par-

ticular officials. It lacked the staff facilities to in-

quire of others beyond the 26 it brought to the sur-

face .

Probably the most important case during this

series of hearings was Frank V. Coe. He was notassociated with the Secretariat but was the Secre-

tary of International Monetary Fund, a specialized

agency of the UN. Coe's salary when he was sub-81



poenaed was $20,000. Coe had entered GovernmentService in the Treasury Department ; he was the

financial Advisor to the Federal Security Admin-

istrator ; he was Assistant Director of the Division

of Monetary Research, National Advisory DefenseCouncil ; he was executive secretary of the Joint

War Production Committee and Assistant to theEconomic Director of the Board of Economic War-fare ; he was Economic Administrator of the For-eign Economic Administration ; Secretary of theNational Advisory Council on International andMonetary Problems ; and Technical Secretary-Gen-

eral of the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference .

All were positions of tremendous administrativepower and great control over personnel .

Whittaker Chambers, we learned, had told the

FBI in 1942 that Coe was involved in the Commu-nist underground. In 1945, Elizabeth Bentley cameforward and told the FBI that Frank Coe had been

a Communist subordinate of hers .

The FBI had prepared thirteen security re-ports through the years, detailing this and other

evidence to the various Government agencies . Andyet Coe was able to climb higher and higher in the

United States Government and then in the Inter-national Monetary Fund until December 2, 1952,when we questioned him and he testified

"MR. MORRIS. I see you were the technicalsecretary at the Bretton Woods Conference?""MR. COE. That is correct . "

"MR. MORRIS. Now, would you describe theduties of the technical secretary at that time?"

"MR. COE. The duties of the technical secre-tary were to see that papers were in order and ready

for the committees, that the meeting places for the

82



committees were arranged, and that all of the ad-

ministrative work of the Conference proceeded . "

"MR. MORRIS. Well now, during that periodof time, were you the member of an espionage ring,

Mr. Coe?""MR. COE. Under the protection afforded me

by the Fifth Amendment, Mr . Chairman, I respect-

fully decline to answer that question . "

"MR. MORRIS. Well, you will not tell this com-mittee whether you, while acting as the technical

secretary of the Bretton Woods Conference, werethen a member of an espionage ring?"

"MR. COE. I think that is the same question . "

"MR. MORRIS. I just wanted to be sure that

you understood the question that you were refusing

to answer . "

The next day, December 3, Coe was dismissed as

Secretary of the Fund. The Committee had pro-

duced no evidence that had not been available for

years to the appropriate Government agencies, while

Coe was receiving higher and more important as-signments. The FBI, Navy Intelligence and other

security agencies knew who the Communists were,but were helpless to do anything . A Congressional

Committee made remedial action possible .

In three cases, the action of the Subcommittee

was later nullified by an UN Administrative Tri-

bunal, which voted cash indemnifications to Jack

S. Harris, Julia Older Bazer and Frank Bancroft .

Harris during the war was an OSS Military In-

telligence Officer in South Africa . At the time of

the hearings he was Senior Officer of the Research

Section in the UN Trusteeship Division . When called

by the Subcommittee, Harris refused to answerquestions about his Communist membership. Julia

83



Older Bazer, an editor in the Document Control Di-

vision, also refused, under the Fifth Amendment .

After our hearings, the three officials, together

with eight others, were dismissed by Secretary Gen-

eral Trygve Lie. Subsequently, however, the UN

Administrative Tribunal ruled the Secretary Gen-

eral's action illegal and awarded $40,000 to Harris,

$27,500 to Mrs. Bazer and to Bancroft .

The Subcommittee elected to look into the cir-

cumstances surrounding these awards. We learnedthat the Tribunal had based its award to Harris on

the following facts

"(a) Applicant's òutstanding professional com-

petence' as consistently referred to in his annual

reports ;

"(b) The very limited and specialized nature

of his profession as anthropologist and Africanspecialist whereby the opportunities of further em-

ployment are rare ;

"(c) The fact that he joined United Nations at

the special request of Mr. Ralph Bunche, Director

of the Trusteeship Division, thereby terminating

his previous career ;

"(d) His age is now 41 years ;

"(e) The fact that his review at the end offive years' service was due on May 2, 1952, and, had

the work of review been up to date, might have ex-

pected a clear indication that his position was safe-

guarded until May 2, 1957 ;

"(f) The adverse comment was made by theState Department in May 1950 but was not such

as to cause any action by the United Nations ;

"(g) His base salary was $11,690 per annum . "

The Subcommittee recalled Harris to the stand .

Our rather precise questions elicited these answers

84



"MR. MORRIS. Will you answer this question?Have you been a member of branch 1, third part of

the Second Assembly District, New York City Com-

munist Party?"

"MR. HARRIS. In answer to all similar ques-

tions I have declined to answer on the grounds

stated, and I continue with the same answer . "

"MR. MORRIS. Were you an organizer for theCommunist Party during this period?"

"MR. HARRIS. The same period, the same re-ply, Mr . Morris . "

"MR. MORRIS . . . Were you a special assistant

to the American Consul General at Lagos, Nigeria,

in the years 1942 and 1943?"

"MR. HARRIS. I was, Mr . Morris. Whether itwas 1942 and 1943, I wouldn't recall, but sometime

during that period . "

"MR. MORRIS: Were you a Communist at that

time?"

"MR. HARRIS. Questions of this sort I have

already declined to answer, and I decline now on all

grounds mentioned. "

"THE CHAIRMAN. Sustained on the FifthAmendment."

"MR. MORRIS. Were you from the years 1943to 1945 a special assistant to the American Consul

General at Pretoria and Capetown in the Unionof South Africa?"

"MR. HARRIS. I have replied affirmatively onother occasions to this committee, and I do so now . "

"MR. MORRIS. Were you a Communist at thattime?"

"MR. HARRIS. To that question I have re-fused to reply . "

"MR. MORRIS. After leaving the OSS, at that85



time did you become assistant professor of social

sciences at the University of Chicago in 1946?"

"MR. HARRIS. That is true ."

"MR. MORRIS. Did you, on July 18, 1945, ap-ply for a position in the Division of Dependent Area

Affairs, in the Office of Special Political Affairs

(of the State Department, an office headed by Alger

Hiss) ?"

"MR. HARRIS. My answer is the same, Mr .

Morris. I decline to answer on the ground stated .

11

"MR. MORRIS. Are you a Communist Partymember now, Mr. Harris?""MR. HARRIS. I give exactly the same answer

I just gave . "

Frank Bancroft was also recalled by the Sub-

committee and the testimony taken during this ses-

sion included the following :

"SENATOR WELKER. Now, from the year1943 until the year 1946, were you a member of the

Communist Party?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer, sir, on

the grounds that it might tend to incriminate ." . . .

"MR. MORRIS. Mr . Bancroft . . . Did you not

hold in 1944, and through the subsequent period

described by Senator Welker, Communist PartyCard No. 93158?"

"MR. BANCROFT. Sir, I decline to answer on

the ground that it might tend to incriminate me . . ."

"MR. MORRIS. Well, you say that and manyof the other witnesses say that, Mr . Bancroft, but

this Committee simply wants to know if you held

Communist Party registration certificate No . 93158 ."

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer the86



question on the basis of my rights under the Fifth

Amendment . "

"MR. MORRIS. Do you know Roy Hudson,who has been a member of the National Committee

of the Communist Party?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer on thegrounds given . "

"MR. MORRIS. Do you know Al Rothbart, anorganizer for the seamen's branch of the waterfront

section of the Communist Party?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer on the

grounds given ."

"MR. MORRIS. Mr. Bancroft, have you everresided at 1008 Webster Street, New Orleans, La.?""MR. BANCROFT. I have sir . "

"MR. MORRIS. Were Communist Party meet-ings held at your home at that address?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer on the

grounds given ."

"MR. MORRIS. Did David Carpenter, the sec-retary and district organizer of district 20 of the

Communist Party of Texas, visit your residence

on March 20, 1945?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer, sir, on

the grounds given . "

Julia Older Bazer, the recipient of the $27,500

award, gave the following responses to the Subcom-

mittee

"MR. MORRIS. Mrs. Bazer, isn't it a fact thatyou stayed in Moscow from 1934 to 1937?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion . . ."

"MR. MORRIS. Isn't it true that you had Com-munist training during that period?"

87



"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds ."

"MR. MORRIS. Isn't it a fact that while youwere in Moscow you resided with Anna LouiseStrong, roomed with Anna Louise Strong?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds"MR. MORRIS. Have you not been a writerfor the Moscow Weekly News?"

"MRS. BAZER. Same answer . "

"MR. MORRIS. Did you take an oath at thetime you were an employee of the United States

Government that you were not a member of an or-

ganization that advocated the overthrow of the

United States government by force and violence?"

"MRS. BAZER. May I confer with my coun-sel?"

"SENATOR JENNER. You may. "

"MRS. BAJER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment ."

"MR. MORRIS. Isn't it a fact, Mrs. Bazer, that

you became employed as the public-relations di-

rector of the Russian War Relief at 11 East 30th

Street, New York City, in November 1943, and held

that position through June of 1944?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same grounds . "

"MR. MORRIS. Were you not the managingeditor of the publication called the American Re-view o f the Soviet Union which was a publication

of 'the American-Russian Institute during 1944 and

1945 ?"


88



"MR. MORRIS. Did you marry a Dr . NathanHelfgott." . . .

"MRS. BAZER. I n 1 9 4 7 . . . That is correct . "

"MR. MORRIS. To your knowledge, was notDr. Helfgott the doctor for the Soviet Embassy in

Washington?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-tion on the same groundsMR. MORRIS. To your knowledge, was notDr. Helfgott a member at large of the Communist

Party over a long period of time prior to his death

on February 20, 1948?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that ques-t i o n . " . . .

"MR. MORRIS . Did you apply for employment

with the Soviet Embassy in 1946?


"MR. MORRIS. Did you ever work for theSoviet Embassy in 1946?"


"MR. MORRIS . Mrs. B a z e r , d i d y o u n o t i f y t h e

Secretary General on December 4, 1952, that you

were not and never had been a member of the Com-

munist Party?"

"MRS. BAZER. I must refuse to answer thatquestion on the same grounds . "

The U . S . delegation to the UN protested the

granting of these three awards as well as the other

e i g h t t o t a li n g i n a l l $ 1 7 9 , 1 2 0 . B u t i t w a s t o n o a v a i l .

The awards were nevertheless granted .

Here was a Communist victory accomplished

with the sanction of free delegations. T h e d e c i s i o n

established, in effect, that even if UN authorities

89



discovered secret Kremlin agents in their employ,

they could do nothing about it . Let it be remem-

bered that these were not Soviet-appointed officials,

but part of the U . S . quota .

Trygve Lie knew they were Communists and

acknowledged that some of them were giving himplenty of trouble . He had appointed a Special Ad-

visory Commission to rule on their invocation of

the Fifth Amendment, and was advised that theirposition was inconsistent with their positions of

trust. Lie thereupon discharged them . But from that

point on the Communists had little effective opposi-

tion on the real merits of the case, and proceeded

to score a series of legal victories .

One of the more important witnesses to testify

at our series of hearings on subversion in the United

Nations was Whittaker Chambers. I visited him athis farm in Westminster during that fall and learned

from him that he had known David Zablodowsky,who was head of the Publications Division of the Sec-

retariat. He also had had an experience with David

Weintraub, Director of the Economic Stability and

Development Division of the Secretariat, and with

Irving Kaplan, Weintraub's assistant . Accordingly,

I asked Chambers to testify before us . He dutifully

agreed to be subpoenaed and come to New York onthe morning of October 23 .

Chambers testified that in the late 1930's, in

the course of breaking with the Communist under-

ground, he decided to establish a name and a real-

life personality by taking employment with the U .

S. Government . Otherwise he was simply Carl of the

Communist underground, who could have been dis-patched by the Soviet secret police without anyoneknowing of his demise .

90



Chambers went on to testify that J . Peters, his

superior in the espionage network, not knowing his

design, offered to help him with this employment

and sent him to the National Research Project of

the WPA. Peters told Chambers that Weintrauband Kaplan, then co-directors of the National Re-

search Project, were both secret Communists. Sowas Weintraub's sister, Rose . Chambers went tothe project, saw Kaplan, and got the desired job .

Later, by way of corroborating Chambers' story,the Subcommittee asked Rose Alpher, Weintraub'ssister, if she were a Communist at the time . She in-

voked the Fifth Amendment. Kaplan had alreadydone the same .

Later, we acquired evidence of Communistmembership with respect to three other assistants

of Weintraub . When subpoenaed, they invoked their

privilege under the Fifth Amendment . The three

were Sidney Glassman, Marjorie Zap and HerbertS. Schimmel. We had no facilities to investigate

further and brought to the surface only what wecould in the few weeks available to us .

As for David Zablodowsky, head of the Publi-

cations Division, Chamber testified that, back in

1930's, Zablodowsky had done some work for theSoviet underground . This fact was not denied byZablodowsky .

Another important division that was, accord-

ing to our evidence, rather seriously infiltrated was

the Technical Assistance Division under Keenley-

side. In addition to Van Tassel, Herman Zap, a train-

ing officer, and Stanley Graze, a project officer, in-

voked their privilege under the Fifth Amendment . I

asked Graze : "Are you presently engaged in espion-

age against the United States?" "Have you ever in

91



the past engaged in espionage against the United

States?" He declined to answer both questions . Sig-

nificantly enough, in 1950 Graze was one of Senator

McCarthy's original 87 cases, all having been cleared

by the Tydings Committee over minority protests .

After the hearings on December 2, 1952, werealized that we had to come to a temporary halt .

Accordingly the Subcommittee drew up anotherunanimous report which it issued for the benefit of

the new Senate .

This report read, in part :

"The subcommittee sought to determine how it

was that so many officials of questionable loyalty

to the United States could be hired and charged to

the United States quota at the Secretariat . The sub-

committee called as witnesses Carlisle Humelsine,

Deputy Under Secretary of State in Charge of Se-

curity, John D . Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of

State of U.N . Affairs, and Adrian S . Fisher, Legal

Adviser for Department of State .

"These State Department officials testified that,

although the United Nations was set up in 1946, they

knew of no arrangement undertaken by the StateDepartment prior to the autumn of 1949 to give to

the Secretary-General derogatory security infor-

mation concerning United States citizens at theSecretariat . Late in 1949, in response to a request

from the Secretary-General, an informal agree-ment was worked out whereby officials of the Secre-

tariat gave to the State Department, for security

checks, a list of United States citizens working for

the Secretariat . Thereupon the State Departmentundertook to assemble such derogatory security in-

formation as was available in the United StatesGovernment's files (but undertook no field investi-

92



gation), to have it evaluated by certain State De-

partment officers (but not the Department's regu-

lar Security Division evaluation officers) and orally

to communicate to unnamed officials of the United

Nations a conclusion, arrived at by State Depart-

ment officials on a basis determined within the De-

partment, as to whether the Department desired to

object to the continued employment of any such

person by the UN .

"A conclusion that the Department would so

object was communicated as an ̀ Adverse' report .

In no case was any distinction made, in reporting to

the United Nations, between persons concerningwhom there was no derogatory information, andthose concerning whom there was derogatory in-formation, but to whose continued employment by

the UN the State Department did not at that

time desire to object .

"In nine of the eighteen cases the State Depart-

ment, belatedly, made adverse comments and theUnited Nations officials took no action until the

subcommittee hearings. In one case the State De-

partment made no adverse comment until after the

Grand Jury investigation ; and in two cases until

after the officials had appeared before the Senate

subcommittee. In six UN Secretariat cases the StateDepartment made no adverse comment .

"This subcommittee feels that the evaluation

made by the State Department in the eight cases

( i . e . , the six upon whom no adverse comment wasmade and the two whom comment was made onlyafter the appearance before the Senate Subcommit-

tee) was so faulty and so delinquent from a security

standpoint, as prima facie to justify, if not actually

require, an interrogation to determine if it was the

93



result of any subversive influence . Accordingly, the

State Department officials Messrs . Hickerson andHumelsine were asked to give the subcommitteethe names of the evaluating officials and other De-

partment officers involved so it could interview them

in connection with efforts to determine what fur-

ther steps need be taken toward investigating the

possible influence of subversive forces in this con-

nection . Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Humelsine refusedto name the State Department officers involved .

They refused on the ground that the Secretary of

State had directed them to withhold the names . . . .

"For a period of approximately three years-between the time of the formation of the United

Nations in 1946 and sometime in 1949-there wasno safeguard whatsoever, from the standpoint ofthe United States, against employment by the

United Nations of United States citizens who were

disloyal to their country, or were actively engaged

in espionage on behalf of some foreign power . . . .

We are now confronted with the fact that duringthe years from 1946 to 1949 a number of American

nationals of doubtful loyalty have secured lodg-

ment and tenure with the United Nations Organiza-

tion. We are in no position to assess the injury

which they may have dealt to American interestsand security during this period . . .

"When the United States Department of Statefinally took cognizance of the situation respecting

possible disloyalty of United States nationals em-

ployed by the United Nations, it was fully at the

instance of the United Nations and not even par-

tially as a result of any security officials within the

State Department .

"The agreement then entered into between the

94



State Department and the United Nations has been

variously portrayed . Both oral evidence and writ-

ten testimony before the subcommittee indicatesthat the State Department undertook to make acheck on persons whose names were submitted by

the United Nations as employees or prospective em-

ployees thereof, and as a result of its check to make

a report to the United Nations . . . .

"Even within the narrow limits of what theState Department undertook to do, it appears to the

subcommittee that the Department did not perform

in accordance with its commitment. The Depart-

ment failed, over lengthy periods of time, to make

any reports with respect to certain employees of the

United Nations, whose names had been submitted

under the agreement referred to, in spite of the fact

tfiat security reports on such employees were heavy

with derogatory information . . .

"There is no evidence before us that the State

Department has taken any disciplinary actionagainst any of those who may have been guilty of

any errors of omission or commission in connection

with this matter . . . "

One of the U.N. Security Officers once told meduring the hearings that they were surprised at the

particular individuals we surfaced . They had other

security cases, he said,. which they would havethought to be the "real" ones .

Considerably later, In 1961, the Senate Internal

Security Subcommittee had another fortuitous look

at the makeup of the Secretariat . The occasion was

the case of Povl Bang-Jensen, the internationalcivil servant who was found dead in New York in1959. He had been approached at the time of theHungarian revolt in 1956 by a cluster of Soviet of-

95



ficials who made an abortive attempt to defect to

the West .

The Subcommittee took the testimony of the

widow of Mr . Bang-Jensen, and this read

THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. BANG-JENSENMR. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge

respecting an approach made to your husband by an

individual member of the Soviet delegation to the

United Nations or of the Secretariat respecting the

desire of one or more members of that delegation

or of the Secretariat to defect to the West?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Y e s , i n a g e n e r a l w a y I

do .

MR. SOURWINE. This knowledge comes toyou from communications made to you by your

husband?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Oral c ommunication .

MR. SOURWINE. Yes .

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes .

MR. SOURWINE. You have no knowledge ofit except what he told you?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Only what he told me,yes .

MR. SOURWINE. And what was it that hetold you about this?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. He told me that therewere several members of the United Nations Secre-

tariat who would like to defect . They were unwill-

ing to do it through the normal channels because

one of the bits of information which they told my

husband was that there was infiltration in the se-

curity agencies of the U .S . Government, in the CIA

and in the State Department, and that they were

unwilling to approach anyone in those particular

96



organizations. They asked my husband if he would

take this information for them to the President .

MR. SOURWINE. Of the United States?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Yes .

MR. SOURWINE. Now, by "infiltration," did

you understand your husband to mean, or did he

make it clear that he meant Soviet infiltration?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Y e s , a n d t h e y w e r e w i l l -

ing to bring some evidence of that, and also evi-

dence of some control of the 38th floor, which is

t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c e s o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , b y

Russians when they were given asylum .

MR. SOURWINE. T o b e s u r e I u n d e r s t a n d t h i s ,

your husband was approached by a single member

of the Soviet delegation or the U .N. S e c r e t a r i a t?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. The information camefrom an individual speaking on behalf of several .

MR. SOURWINE. Y e s . Do you know if the in-

dividual was, himself, one of the group who wished

to defect?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Y e s , y e s .

MR. SOURWINE. The presumption wouldnecessarily be that that was so .

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. It is more than a pre-

sumption. I know that .

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband said this toyou?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Yes .

MR. SOURWINE. A n d t h i s g r o u p o f d e f e c t o r s ,

through the intermediary who approached your hus-

band, said that they had information respecting

Soviet infiltration of security in the United Na-

tions-

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. Not security in

97



the United Nations, but the workings of the United

Nations.

MR. SOURWINE. R e s p e c t i n g S o v i e t i n f i l t r a -

t i o n t o t h e 3 8 t h f l o o r , w h i c h y o u s a y i s t h e a d m i n i -

s t r a t i v e f l o o r ?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. And respecting Soviet in-

filtration of agencies of the Government of the

United States?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. Were those agencies speci-f i e d ?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I understood that they

were the CIA and the State Department .

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband told you this?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. And the reasonfor the reluctance of the men who wanted to defect,

to defect through the normal channels, was because

t h e r e w a s t h i s i n f i l t r a t i o n .

MR. SOURWINE. They were afraid that their

desire to defect would become Soviet knowledge be-

fore they had achieved safety and there would be

r e p r i s a l s ?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes .

MR. SOURWINE. And they offered, through

the intermediary who contacted your husband, to

bring this information about this infiltration-

bring it over and give it to the American authori-

ties if their defection could be accomplished and

they could be promised safety?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Y e s . T h e y d i d n o t g i v e

it to my husband . My husband's role was only that

of an intermediary there .

MR. SOURWINE. He was only told they had

such information?

9 8




MR. SOURWINE. Not what it was?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . No .

'MR. SOURWINE. Not the nature of the in-

filtration?


MR. SOURWINE. Did your husband assent to

their desire to have a contact directly to the Pres-

ident of the United States?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. No . He felt that thatwould be impractical and not the way to do it, and

he gave the matter some thought and told them that

he would try to find some way in which he could

bring this information to the attention of the proper

American authorities .

MR. SOURWINE. And did he find such a way?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . He d id.MR. SOURWINE. Did he tell you about it?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Yes. He gave this in-

formation to a friend who was a member of theUS . mission to the United Nations .

MR. SOURWINE. Who was this man?MRS. BANG-JENSEN. It was Mr. James

Barco .

MR. SOURWINE. B-a-r-c-o?


MR. SOURWINE. What did Mr. Barco agreeto do with the information, if you know?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . My husband gave this

information to Mr . Barco orally, in the middle of

the delegates' lounge at the United Nations . He

asked Mr. Barco to transmit it to the proper Ameri-can authorities-with one restriction, and that was

that this information was not be put on paper in

any form whatsoever .

99



MR. SOUR WINE. Did Mr . Barco agree to this?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . He did . He said that

he would give this information to Mr . Lodge. He

asked my husband to go with him later that day to

give the information to Mr . Lodge . *

My husband was reluctant to do it . He thought

Mr. Barco could transmit the information himself,and he didn't .

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband told you all

that?

MRS. BANG- JENSEN. Yes, he did .

MR. SOURWINE. Did he tell you that he was

satisfied with Mr . Barco's proposal to give this in-

formation to Mr. Lodge?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Yes. He presumed Mr .

Lodge, as a member of the Cabinet, would take it

to the proper authorities .

MR. SOURWINE. As a member of the Cabinet?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Well, isn't he? I'm cor-

rect-I believe he is a member of the Cabinet . I s n ' t

he?

MR. SOURWINE. I think the technical situa-

tion is that he is not a member of the Cabinet ; he

sits with them .

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Attends Cabinet meet-

ings. Excuse me. But, in effect, he is very close to it .

MR. SOUR WINE. Do you know what Mr . Barco

did with this information?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . I did not know at the

time. We had since heard that this information was

put in a memorandum and transmitted to the State

Department.

MR. SOURWINE. How did you hear this?

*The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, then U .S. Ambassadorto the United Nations and head of the U.S. delegation .

100



MRS. BANG-JENSEN. That we heard fromjournalists and from people in the United Nations .

We did not hear it directly or from Mr . Barco .

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband heard thisand told you about it?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Yes, he did . Yes .

MR. SOURWINE. Did the defectors in factdefect?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Pardon me?MR. SOURWINE. Did these prospective de-

fectors in fact defect?


MR. SOURWINE. Do you know why not?MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Well, I presume that

this effort which they made came to nothing, so it

was not possible for them .

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know what hap-pened to them, or any of them?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . I know that one went

back to Russia, but I know no more than that about

him .

MR. SOURWINE. Who was the one that went

back to Russia?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . I don't know his name .

MR. SOURWINE. But your husband told you

that one had gone back to Russia?


MR. SOURWINE. That indicates he knew the

name of at least one of the defectors ; did he not?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . Of course he knew the

name of the man with whom he had talked .

MR. SOURWINE. That was the man that went

back to Russia?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN . I believe he also knew

the names of the others, but he did not tell me the

101



names, nor did I want to know .

THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MORRISIn the summer of 1958, Bang-Jensen also told

his story of the potential defectors to Judge Morris,

whose account parallels that of Mrs . Bang-Jensen

on all essential points .

Judge Morris said, in his statement of March

15, 1960, to the subcommittee, that Bang-Jensenhad never identified the number of would-be de-fectors, but that he was convinced it was plural be-

cause Bang-Jensen had spoken in one case about"the principal one

. "

When the "principal defector" spoke of Soviet

control over the 38th floor and Soviet infiltration

in American intelligence, Bang-Jensen was at first

skeptical . The defector, or defectors, finally con-

vinced him by showing him intercepts of three coded

messages coming through from the Soviets to the38th floor .

On November 20, 1956, Bang-Jensen discussedthe matter with Mr. James Barco, counselor of theAmerican delegation, whom he had come to knowwell in consequence of his service as secretary of

the Palestine Conciliation Commission .

He asked Mr. Barco's assistance in setting upa meeting with Allen Dulles . According to JudgeMorris' account, Bang-Jensen specifically requested

that Mr. Barco convey his request orally and thatnone of the information be committed to paper .

Bang-Jensen further informed Judge Morristhat, all told, he met with Mr . Barco eight times

'from November 20, 1956, to June 8, 1957, in aneffort to arrange the meeting with Allen Dulles-

but that no word ever came back and that the meet-

102



ing was never arranged.

Judge Morris reported that he had met with

Mr. Barco on August 18, 1958, in an effort to check

out this information . Mr. Barco, in the course ofthis conversation, apparently indicated that he had

received some information from Bang-Jensen cor-responding with the information that Bang-Jensen

had later given Judge Morris . He also agreed that

there had been a number of meetings and that he

would not challenge the figure eight .

Here was evidence that the guiding hand of the

proposed merger was actually under Soviet control

at the time of the Hungarian suppression . Yet this

significant evidence did not even slow up the plan-

ners in their mad rush to turn all military power

over to these people at the helm of the instrument

of merger

I have been urging responsible people in Wash-

ington that one of the most elemental preconditions

of this "synthesis" as U Thant calls it, would be a

thorough investigation of the extent of Communist

infiltration into the control tower itself, the Secre-

tariat. On the record, it has been substantial .

103



XVI HOW CAN DISARMAMENTBE ACHIEVED

It will be recalled that in his account of the

Rostow Memorandum, Willard Edwards points out

that disarmament is to be pursued even without a

formal agreement .

"Any idea of the United States contemplating

a `first strike' is ruled out. Planning in that di-

rection is not relevant since the United States

does not plan to initiate a nuclear attack on

Communist nations . Military men assailed the

section as against all sound principles of war

for which planning against all contingencies is

essential .

"Despite all rebuffs to date, strenuous efforts

should be continued to get an agreement onlimited arms control, the policy paper recom-

mends. It is suggested that the United Statesmight advance a program not requiring formal

negotiations . "

There is good reason to believe that we are, in-

deed, beginning to disarm unilaterally . We are with-

drawing our B-47s from Europe. We have dis-

mantled our missile bases in Turkey. We have with-

drawn our B-52s from Italy and England .

Let the U S . News and World Report of August5, 1963 speak on this

WHERE U. S. HAS CUT BACKNUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEM

Radical cutbacks, as a result, have been put

104



into effect where nuclear weapons systems are con-

cerned. What the record shows

B.47 bomber . Already cut back from 1,100 to

650. Will be down to 300 by next summer, entirely

abandoned by 1966. Power of the B-47 bomb load is

more than 10 megatons-that is, equal to more than

10 million tons of TNT.

B-52 bomber . Production was halted despitecongressional desire to continue and the operational

fleet was frozen at 630 planes . Some models will be

scrapped inside five years ; other presumably can

be kept flying a few years after that. In the latest

model, the H series, the B-52 will carry more than

50 megatons over a 10,000-mile range .

B-58 bomber . The production line was shut down

last autumn-also over congressional , opposition-after about 80 planes were earmarked for combat-

type duty . This plane carries a 15-megaton load at

supersonic speeds .

RS-70 bomber . Planned by the Air Force asbomber of the 1970s, but held up in developmentstage. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and many mem-

bers of Congress want to see it in production, but

chances are slim .

Thor missile . Four bases in England, with 60medium-range missiles capable of reaching into Rus-

sia, were ordered dismantled shortly after Soviet

Russia withdrew its missiles from Cuba .

Jupiter missile . Bases in Italy and Turkey, with

a total of 45 missiles, were ordered abandoned . They

had just become operational at a cost -of 555 mil-

lions .

Skybolt missiles . Designed to extend the life of

the bomber force well into the 1970s, this project

was killed, although Britain, which was to share

105



the missile, protested strongly .

Nike-Zeus "missile killer . " Army requests to

put this antimissile missile around U . S . cities were

refused, over strong protests from Gen . Maxwell

D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .

The project has been scrapped in the search for a

substitute .

Military satellites . The Midas "spy satellite"

was killed after a decision that 15 extra minutes'

warning of missile attack was not worth the millions

still required to perfect it. Numerous other military

space projects have been abandoned or delayed .

Navy carriers . Signs point to a cut of as much

as one third in the Navy's fleet of 15 attack carriers .

Construction is being delayed on an additional new

carrier authorized by Congress last year .

Overseas bases . Flying bases in England, Mor-

occo, Spain, France, Guam and elsewhere have been

or will be shut down . Prospects are for further with-

drawals from overseas, possibly involving one of the

two Army divisions in Korea and some 50,000 men

in EuropeAtomic production . The aim is to shut down

half of the nation's 14 major plants manufacturing

nuclear materials for weapons . The Administration

feels that the present stockpile is bigger than any

demand it can foresee .

Nuclear-test ban . The U. S . alone took the initia-

tive in suspending atmospheric tests in June as evi-

dence of good faith before formal test-ban talks

with Russia. Military requests to continue testingwere set aside .

VIEWS OF MILITARY LEADERS-WORRIES ABOUT FUTURE

What does this add up to?

106



Testimony released after closed-door hearings

of Congress tells one part of the story. Worry about

the future U .S. military position is being expressed

on a scale not equaled in recent years .

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff,challenged Secretary of Defense Robert S . McNa-mara on the new strategy. He disclosed also that

he had appealed directly to Mr. Kennedy-to no

avail-after almost 5 billions was cut from the orig-

inal Air Force budget .

Service rivalries were set aside by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in opposing cuts by the Administra-

tion's top civilians in the Pentagon .

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, told

Congress that he had recommended continuing both

the Air Force's RS-70 and the Skybolt. He was not

"horse trading" with the Air Force in giving this

support, he said. These were "purely military judg-

ments. "

Adm. George W. Anderson, then Chief of NavalOperations, supported Air Force programs and the

Army's Nike-Zeus. He favored extending the life

of bombers, he explained, because of doubts about

the reliability of missiles .

It was General LeMay who came forward withthe most emphasis. He disclosed that the budgetas sent to Congress had been shorn by the Admini-

stration of 321 million dollars sought for 100 more

Minuteman missiles, 543 millions for the RS-70 and

454 millions for the Skybolt .

This exchange then took place before the House

Subcommittee on Defense Department Appropria-

tions

Representative Gerald R. Ford (Rep .) , of Mich-

igan : "With the decision on the RS-70 and with the

107



decision on Skybolt, with the decision in the Minute-

man area as you look down the road, General Le-

May, to 1968 and years thereafter, do you feel our

strategic posture will be as strong, relatively speak-

ing, as it i s today?"

General LeMay : "You have to visualize whatthe threat is going to be at that time . At this mo-

ment, I would say no, and that is what worries me .

. . . You cannot buy back time, Mr. Ford . "

Representative Ford "Do you accept the phil-

osophy that mutual deterrence or nuclear stalemate

is inevitable?"

General LeMay : "No, I do not accept thatphilosophy at all .

"I think it is a dangerous philosophy to say :

Well, a stalemate is going to exist, we cannot do

anything about it ; therefore we do nothing . If we

accept mutual deterrence, this will, I think, inevit-

ably lead to defeat . . . . "

Retired Admiral Chester Ward, former JudgeAdvocate General of the United States Navy wasmore emphatic in his speech of April 8, 1963 before

the Hawaii Foundation for American Freedoms inHonolulu. He said

"We are in much more danger this year thanwe were in Cuba last year because of the greater

interval since the Soviets first broke the test ban

in September of 1961. They began preparing theCuban adventure early last year . They had not then

had time to completely rework their nuclear stock-

piles and to manufacture their new warheads with

the more efficient techniques . This year we're getting

further and further from the original development

of their new efficiency, so they now have not only

108



these more powerful weapons, but many more of

them. In this connection, we need to know how

we're being fooled on the "numbers racket" and on

the firepower aspects of nuclear weapons. Under the

guise of "modernization" of our defense we are cut-

ting down, and even scrapping, our massive nuclear

capability. Consider the removal of the U .S. missiles

from Turkey and Italy. You'll remember during the

Cuban crisis, Khrushchev said, "I'll pull these mis-

siles out of Cuba if you pull yours out of Turkey and

Italy." And the Administration immediately said,

for domestic publication, in effect : "No deal, no deal,

we don't make deals under pressure." The Admin-istration still denies that we made any such AGREE-

MENTS. Nevertheless, as you know, we are nowpresently engaged in pulling those missiles out of

Turkey and out of Italy. Actually, this illustrates

another technique of avoiding telling absolute lies

to deceive the people ; we don't make AGREE-MENTS any more, we engage in UNILATERIAL

ACTION"The best illustration of the new technique of

substituting unilateral action for agreements, is in

the extended nuclear test ban negotiations presently

going on. These negotiations cover the de factodisarmament of the U .S. which is actually takingplace. In other words, after all these centuries some-

body has finally discovered a useful purpose for

disarmament negotiations . They are wonderful cover

for de facto unilateral disarmament .

"Here is how it, works. We debate furiouslyand continuously on whether we will have seven

inspections under a test ban, in Russia, or only two .

We came down from 20 to ten to eight to seven .

The Soviets three years ago said they'd grant one

109



or two, and they're still saying that . They withdrewthat for a while and re-instated it with great fan-

fare . The honest American people tend to think that

if we are debating so vigorously the necessity for

seven inspections instead of just two, that we cer-

tainly wouldn't do anything dangerous in the way

of nuclear disarmament or actual disarmament"Actually, every time we pull one of those mis-

siles out of Turkey we are cutting down our nuclear

firepower by a tremendous factor ; worse than that,

we are now even withdrawing the B-47 bombersfrom Europe. Intermediate range bombers. When

one says ìntermediate range' bomber, it doesn't

sound nearly so impressive as ìntercontinental'

bombers. From published figures, however, a B-47

can carry about 40 megatons of explosive power to

dump on the Soviets .

"How much does our most modern missilecarry? Minuteman was originally designed to carry

six-tenths of a megaton, just a little more than one

half of a megaton . It's probably been stepped upnow, so it can carry perhaps one megaton and they

hope to increase it some day to two . Same with Po-

laris. Polaris carried eight-tenths of a megaton ;

they hope to build that also up to one megaton or

maybe two. But, they talk about replacing our SAC

bombers with Polaris, and Minuteman missiles .

Every time you replace a B-52-a B-52 can carry60 megatons-with a Minuteman you lose 59 mega-

tons, and "replace" it by one megaton. Now the

danger in all this, is that we are withdrawing, scrap-

ping our massive nuclear strike capability. The rea-

son for the Skybolt scrapping, of course, was not

merely to render prematurely obsolete the British

110



Royal Air Force, with its 170 bombers. The primary

target was the Strategic Air Command of the

United States with its several thousand bombers .

"These U. S . SAC bombers worry Khrushchev .

It was these bombers which actually saved our necks

in the Cuban crisis. Once the U-2 photographs had

given the warning of the Soviet offensive missiles

in Cuba, Strategic Air Command bombers went on

airborne alert, or a so-called "slingshot alert," and

we were capable of delivering upon the Soviet Union

something like 30 kilo-megatons of destructivepower. Now a kilo-megaton is a thousand-million

ton equivalent. Thirty-thousand million tons equiva-

lent of destruction on Russia. Now you can begin to

see why it was that Khrushchev withdrew his mis-

s i l e s . This is why the only attack which will be made

in the nuclear age is a surprise attack .

"Khrushchev pulled those missiles back, not be-

cause he was afraid of the United States' `superior

power,' not because of our `boldness' and our ap-

parent `readiness to fight a nuclear war .' He pulled

them back simply because he didn't want 30 kilo-

megatons of destruction-30 thousand million tons

of destruction rained on Russia . It would destroy

Russia. In point of fact, even 20 kilo-megatonswould probably destroy 90% of the Russian popula-

tion, all of its industry and military potential . "

Despite this unilateral disarmament (along the

lines of the Rostow Memorandum) I know that in-dividual Senators are being given assurances byleaders of the State Department that they will not

put our overall plan into effect without a formal

treaty to be submitted to the Senate for ratification .

111



The legislation passed by Congress setting up the

US . Arms Control and Disarmament Agency so

provides .

Nevertheless, the Administration has a sub-stantial majority in the Senate, and an effort to ob-

tain ratification would be accompanied by a surging

emotional backdrop. We are seeing this now (inAugust 1963) in connection with the campaign to

get the Test Ban Treaty negotiated in Moscow byUnder-Secretary Averell Harriman ratified .

If the announcement should ever be made that

Nikita Khrushchev is prepared to sign a specific

disarmament agreement, there will be diffused over

the whole world such an emotional outpouring of

optimism that the pressures on individual Senators

for ratification will be enormous .

But let us look at the disarmament already

engaged in, and then at the two basic elements of

the planned disarmament and the simultaneousbuild-up of an international peace force .

As we have shown, we are disarming, and Con-

gress has nothing to say about it . The RS-70 bombers

which the military leaders tried to put into produc-

tion were amply supported by the Senate and theHouse of Representatives, but they were success-

fully vetoed by the Secretary of Defense who con-

tended they were not needed .

The fact of the matter is that the President of

the United States, as Commander-in-Chief of allarmed forces, has the power to reduce forces-dras-

tically, if so inclined. Without consulting Congress,

President Truman built up a powerful U . S . Armythat marched under the banner of the United Na-tions and subsequently President Eisenhower dis-

banded much of it, also without consulting Congress .

112



The President is almost daily making decisions dis-

banding a certain combat or service unit, activating

or inactivating National Guard divisions, or putting

units of the fleet into mothballs . There is no practi-

cable limit to this power .

With respect to the creation of an International

Peace Force, this has been done on at least three oc-

casions without a treaty .

Here are the provisions of the United Nations

Charter which make this possible under the existing

U.N. treaty which, incidentally, is the law of theland, equal to our Constitution . Read carefully Ar-

ticles 39 through 51 of the Charter

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THEPEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND

ACTS OF AGGRESSIONArticle 39-The Security Council shall deter-

mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach

of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make

recommendations, or decide what measures shall be

taken in accordance with the provisions of Articles

41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace

and security .

Article 40-In order to prevent an aggravation

of the situation, the Security Council may, before

making the recommendations or deciding upon themeasures provided for in Article 41, call upon the

parties concerned to comply with such provisional

measures as it deems necessary or desirable . Such

provisional measures shall be without prejudice to

the rights, claims, or position of the parties con-

cerned . The Security Council shall duly take ac-

113



count of failure to comply with such provisional

measuresArticle 41-The Security Council may decide

what measures not involving the use of armed force

are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,

and it may call upon members of the United Na-tions to apply such measures. These may includecomplete or partial interruptions of economic rela-

tions and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,

and other means of communication, and the sever-

ance of diplomatic relations .

Article 42-Should the Security Council con-sider that measures provided for in Article 41 would

be inadequate, or have proved to be inadequate, it

may take such action by air, sea or land forces as

may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-

tional peace and security . Such action may include

demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by

air, sea or land forces of members of the United

Nations.

Article 43-1 . All members of the United Na-tions, in order to contribute to the maintenance of

international peace and security, undertake to make

available to the Security Council, on its call and in

accordance with a special agreement or agreements,

armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including

rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of main-

taining international peace and security .

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern

the numbers and types of forces, their degree of

readiness and general location, and the nature of

the facilities and assistance to be provided .

3. The agreement or agreements shall be nevo-

tiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the

Security Council. They shall be concluded between

114



the Security Council and groups of member states

and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory

states in accordance with their constitutional pro-

cesses .

Article 44-When the Security Council has de-

cided to use force it shall, before calling upon a

member not represented on it to provide armedforces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed un-

der Article 43, invite that member, if the member

so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Se-

curity Council concerning the employment of con-

tingents of that member's armed forces .

Article 45-In order to enable the United Na-

tions to take urgent military measures, membersshall hold immediately available national air force

contingents for combined international enforce-

ment action. The strength and degree of readinessof these contingents and plans for their combined

action shall be determined, within the limits laid

down in the special agreement or agreements re-ferred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with

the assistance of the Military Staff Committee .

Article 46-Plans for the application of armed

force shall be made by the Security Council with

the assistance of the Military Staff Committee .

Article 47-1. There shall be established a Mili-tary Staff Committee to advise and assist the Se-

curity Council on all questions relating to the Se-

curity Council's military requirements for the main-

tenance of international peace and security, the

employment and command of forces placed at itsdisposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible

disarmament .

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist

of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of

115



the Security Council or their representatives . Anymember of the United Nations not permanentlyrepresented on the committee shall be invited by

the committee to be associated with it when the effi-

cient discharge of the committee's responsibilities

requires the participation of that member in its

work .

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be re-

sponsible, under the Security Council, for the strate-

gic direction of any armed forces placed at the dis-

posal of the Security Council . Questions relating to

the command of such forces shall be worked outsubsequently .

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the auth-

orization of the Security Council and after consul-

tation with appropriate regional agencies, may

establish regional subcommittees .

Article 48-1 . The action required to carry out

the decisions of the Security Council for the main-

tenance of international peace and security shall

be taken by all the members of the United Nations,

or by some of them, as the Security Council may de-

termine .

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the

members of the United Nations directly and through

their action in the appropriate international agencies

of which they are members .

Article 49-The members of the United Nations

shall join in affording mutual assistance in carry-

ing out the measures decided upon by the Security

Council .

Article 50-If preventive or enforcement meas-

ures against any state are taken by the Security

Council, any other state, whether a member of the

United Nations .or not, which finds itself confronted

116



with special economic problems arising from the

carrying out of those measures shall have the right

to consult the Security Council with regard to a

solution of those problems .

Article 51-Nothing in the present charter

shall impair the inherent right of individual or

collective self-defense, if an armed attack occurs

against a member of the organization, until theSecurity Council has taken the measures necessary

to maintain international peace and security . Meas-

ures taken by members in the exercise of this right

of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the

Security Council and shall not in any way affect the

authority and repsonsibility of the Security Coun-

cil under the present charter to take at any time

such action as it may deem necessary in order to

maintain or restore international peace and security .

At the time of the Korean War we moved anarmy under these provisions . Congress was neverasked to ratify that bloody war that was waged for

four years. The U.N. Army in Korea was a power-ful military force, and, while it operated under a

United Nations that was then generally pro-West-

ern in orientation, it can serve as a precedent for

another "Peace Force" doing battle in the yearsahead, without ratification by the Congress .

In 1962 U Thant, with the backing of theUnited States State Department, pressed two in-vasions into Katanga and made good use of "armed

forces, assistance and facilities" supplied by the

United States without ratification by the Congress .

In 1963 U Thant sent a force into Yemen tobolster up the Soviet-Nasser-supported regime of

Al-Salal against "attacks" by the pro-Western117



"royalists" as they are termed in U .N . c i r c l e s .

With these experiences i n mind, when we readthe statements of Ambassador Adlai Stevenson open-

ing the General Assembly meetings in New York,

asking for a "strengthened peace-keeping force" we

can see this avenue being paved . In this way, the goal

of an all-powerful military force may be approached

under the existing U.N. Treaty already signed .

Congress need never be consulted .

Obviously, what the people who are directing

the Secretariat have done has been to go beyond the

Charter of the United Nations to convert the ideal-

istic U.N. into an instrument of world governmentwithout authority . What they have done has never

been legally sanctioned. Listen to U Thant himself

on this subject before the Harvard Alumni Associa-

tion on June 13, 1963 :

"There has been a tacit transition from the con-

cept of collective security as set out in Chapter

VII of the United Nations Charter, to a more

realistic idea of peace-keeping . "

This, of course, has been accomplished without

ratification of any kind by the Congress .

It is often forgotten that the United Nations

went into the Congo in the summer of 1960 at the

specific request of Patrice Lumumba, an outspoken

Khrushchev sympathizer

Let us pause here for a moment to look morecarefully at the Yemen adventure . The United States

quickly recognized the new pro-Soviet regime after

it overthrew the "Royalists ." U Thant sent a force

at once supporting the regime's control over the

country . The New York Times of July 30, 1963 car-

ried the following page one story :

WASHINGTON, July 29-"The Soviet Union

118



i s building a modern jet airport for Yemen . The

United States fears that the Russians are planning

to use the airport as a stepping-stone to Africa .

"The project is part of an extensive Soviet cam-

paign to develop access to Africa and to find a means

of hopping across that continent to reach Cuba by

air .

"About 500 Soviet technicians are at work on

the Yemeni airport, which will have an 11,500-foot

runway that can handle the largest four-engine So-

viet jet aircraft .

"Although the project was requested by the new

republican Government of Yemen, that barren Mid-

dle Eastern country has little use for such a modern

facility.

"Washington is watching the project with con-

cern. Analysts here believe the Soviet Union iscounting on the airport to provide access to East

Africa, improve air connections with India and help

open shorter routes across Africa to Latin America .

"The importance of African air routes to the

Soviet Government was brought home to the Ken-

nedy Administration during the Cuban missile crisis

last fall.

"At that time Guinea refused to give the Soviet

Union permission to land planes on her territory

en route to Cuba with personnel and supplies . This

action helped reinforce the United States naval

blockade of Cuba .

"In the intervening months, Soviet diplomats

have been engaged in a major effort to extend So-

viet air routes into Africa .

"Guinea, Algeria and Morocco have been under

pressure to let the Soviet commercial airline, Aero-

flot, land on flights to Havana . Ethiopia and Soma-

119



lia have been urged to permit Soviet planes to land

and proceed down the east coast of Africa .

"The Sudan, which now permits Soviet planes

to land and fly westward, has been asked to let the

planes fly south from Khartoum. None of these coun-

tries has yielded to Soviet demands .

Vital to Plans

"Yemen is vital to Soviet plans because of her

location on the Red Sea opposite East Africa and

about 1,000 miles south of Cairo .

"As long ago as June 10, 1962, Izvestia, the

Soviet Government newspaper, published a mapshowing a proposed Soviet air route from India to

Madagascar via Yemen .

"Officials here also believe the Soviet Govern-

ment could link its India route with its route into

Egypt and the Sudan if it could use Yemen . Yemencould also provide an alternate landing point to the

Sudan for a Soviet air route across Africa .

"The Soviet Government has been trying to get

an air agreement with Yemen. The proposal wasturned down last year by the royalist Government

before it was overthrown .

"Officials here assume that the new republican

Government will sign such an agreement when thenew airport is completed . The Soviet Union is pro-

viding manpower to build the airport and it is be-

lieved to be providing the funds from a $20,000,000

development loan recently extended to Yemen . "

Earlier, the same newspaper carried this story

on June 16, 1963 :

"WASHINGTON,. June 15-The number of So-viet military technicians and instructors in Yemen

is reported to have increased sharply in recent weeks

to about 900 or 1000 . United States and other dip-

120



lomatic sources agree on this estimate .

"They also have received similar reports that

some of the Russians have flown combat missions

against rebellious royalist tribesmen, presumably

in Soviet aircraft brought to Yemen by the United

Arab Republic .

"The Soviet personnel have been brought in by

the antimonarchist regime of President Abdullahal-Salal, apparently to support him and a United

Arab Republic force of 28,000 troops against the

royalists .

"Most of the Russians are said to have arrived

since March, when the United States persuaded the

United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia to agree to

"disengage" from the Yemen civil war . United Na-

tions observers are due in Yemen in the next few

days to patrol the Saudi frontier against furtive

aid to the royalists. Simultaneously, Egyptian forces

are supposed to begin to withdraw .

60 Present in September"Last September, when President al-Salal de-

posed the Imam, Prince Mohamad Saif al-Islam al-

Badr, there were about 60 Soviet technicians in

Yemen, the remnants of a group of 150 stationedthere in the monarchist days of 1961 . By April, the

number of Russians was said to have increased to

450. The number has doubled since then . "

How long will this basically illegal trend con-

tinue? It is illegal because the United Nations Char-

ter never was ratified as a framework for worldgovernment. In fact, when it was ratified in 1945,Secretary of State Edward Stettinius formally as-

sured the Senate that it was specifically not world

government that was involved .

121



The syndicated columnist Edith Kermit Roose-

velt in her column that appeared in The Wandererof January 10, 1963 put in one place the statements

that are attributed to writers for several govern-

ment-supported projects . She wrote :

WASHINGTON, D.C.-In an era of news man-

agement the best way to learn about Governmentpolicy is at the think factories financed openly or

secretly by Government funds . Here university pro-

fessors from all over the country receive grants

which enable them to learn and then promote theGovernment line. Under the auspices of these "in-dependent, scientific research groups," studies and

books are published to mold "mature" or "informed

public opinion . "

A key think factory is the Institute for De-

fense Analysis, 1666 Connecticut Avenue N .W. Sev-en-year-old IDA, a non-profit organization whose

contracts are solely with the Federal Government,

was founded by a $500,000 grant from the FordFoundation. Its president is-not unexpectedly-Richard M. Bissel, former Deputy Director of theCentral Intelligence Agency .

One of IDA's announced goals is "to returnan Ambassador (particularly a young Ph.D. orgraduate student) to industrial and professional

circles, inculcated with a view of the world's busi-

ness gleaned at first hand . "

IDA presently operates under six contracts .

Five for the Defense Department cover weaponssystems evaluation, research and engineering, com-

munications techniques, operations research andtraining people in that field for the North Atlantic

Treaty Alliance and support for the newly-formed

122



Institute of Naval Studies . The sixth contract, with

the State Department, covers studies for the U .S.

Disarmament Administration. It is in these IDA

studies that policy is spelled out . Here are somethemes to be promoted over the coming months

"Red China is to be pictured as the real threat

in order to persuade the American people of thenecessity for peaceful co-existence with Soviet Rus-

sia.

"The specter of China can be an asset in seek-

ing military and political arrangements with the

Soviets in Europe and, more signficantly, can permit

a relatively stable period of peaceful co-existence,"

writes General "X" in Reactions To A Nuclear-Armed Communist China : Europe And The UnitedKingdom . In the same IDA Study Memorandum,

September 15th, 1962, General "X" suggests thatthe United States compromise with Red China over

the fate of Quemoy and Matsu to enlarge what is

purposefully assumed to be "the existing fissure be-

tween the Soviets and the Chinese . "

The theme of unilateral disarmament is to be

made respectable. In A Proposal For A Ban On TheUse Of Nuclear Weapons, October 6th, 1961, Dr .

Morton H. Halperin suggests that even if the Rus-sians don't disarm we should do so anyway .

"Some of these steps," says Dr . Halperin, "might

be taken unilaterally either with the aim of induc-

ing reciprocation or because they are valuable in

themselves independent of the Russian response . "

In his IDA Study Memorandum, Arms Con-trol And Inadvertent War, March 10th, 1962, Dr .

Halperin says that in arms-control agreements "It

might be stressed that inspection was not absolutely

necessary" and that "the United States might, in

123



fact, want to invite the Soviets to design the inspec-

tion procedures if they seem to be interested in

them. "

A man to watch for clues to policy is Dr . Lin-

coln P . Bloomfield, formerly with the State Depart-

ment's disarmament staff and now director of the

Arms Control Project at the Center for Interna-tional Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-

ogy. In IDA Research Memorandum No . 3, ThePolitics Of Arms Control: Troika, Veto And In-ternational Institutions, October 6th, 1961, Dr .

Bloomfield points out that "short of a major catas-

trophe the difficulties in-obtaining widespread pub-

lic approval and explicit Senate ratification of a

genuine world government are obvious . "

How then can Federal Government planners

bypass the will of the American people and their

elected representatives? Through disarmament ne-

gotiations .

In A World Effectively Controlled By TheUnited Nations, March 10th, 1962, Dr. Bloomfieldexplains that "without disarmament such a system

(of world government) is probably unobtainable . "

And how can the American people be con-ditioned to accept the State Department plan toeliminate national armies and replace them with a

UN police force?

"If it (world government) came about as a ser-

ies of unnerving trips to or over the brink, it would

come about at any time," according to Dr . Bloom-

f i e l d .

World government is to be presented to theAmerican people as the only answer to a war in which

they would suffer unacceptable destruction or could

not win .

1 24



This may explain the President's pledge to

Khrushchev not to liberate Cuba ; the sending of

American strategic materials behind the Iron Cur-

tain and the other "no-win" policies . As Dr. Bloom-

field says : "If the Communist dynamic were greatly

abated, the West might lose whatever incentive it

has for world government."-(Copyright 1962 by

Edith Kermit Roosevelt Syndicate . )

I have tried to obtain the original documents

mentioned by Miss Roosevelt . When I wrote the or-

ganizations involved asking for them, the requests

were refused. In view of what these excerpts pro-

fess to say, it would certainly seem appropriate for

a Committee or a Subcommittee of the Senate of

the United States or of the House of Representa-

tives to subpoena these papers, and the authorsthereof, to determine if they are written with au-

thorization of the Defense or State Departments .

One final word. When we see how over-riding

have been the United Nations officials when they

have had only those weapons given them by themember nations, can you imagine how high-handedand arrogant they would be with all the effective

weapons in the world in their hands

125



XVII THE STEP AHEAD

As this is written (August 24, 1963) tremendous

pressure is being brought to bear on the highest

policy level for a Test Ban Treaty . This pressure

campaign is very illuminating .

In 1958, the United States unilaterally stopped

testing nuclear weapons. At that time, the United

States was far ahead of the Soviets in nuclear ar-

senals . That was a desirable situation, because we

know that weapons in our hands would be used to

insure peace .

But by our self-imposed cessation of testing

new nuclear weapons, we allowed the Soviets tocatch up in many respects . Dr . Edward Teller has

estimated that Khrushchev is ahead in some fields

of nuclear explosives. At any rate, the action on our

part in refraining from testing was disastrous as

far as our leadership in the field was concerned .

Khrushchev, being a Communist, not only didnot refrain from testing, but used our credulity as

a fitting backdrop for secret preparations for a dra-

matic series of almost fifty detonations, some of

great magnitude .

One would think that this devastating act of

folly on our part would be a lesson for our leaders

today. Apparently it is not .

Duane Thorin, a competent student of Sovietaffairs who served with the Navy for twenty-twoyears and who has recently turned his attention to

this problem of disarmament and test-ban agree-126



ments, wrote the July 1 , 1963 Washington Report

of the American Security Council . Because this ar-

ticle so concisely sets forth many of the elements

of this problem, I am quoting it herewith in its en-

tirity. It is most revealing :

WASHINGTON REPORT"If we don't get an agreement . . . now, I would

think generally that the genie is out of the

bottle and we will never get him back in. "

-President J . F. Kennedy, May 8,1963

"Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Mac-

millan and I have agreed that high-level discus-

sions will shortly begin in Moscow looking to-

ward early agreement on a comprehensive test

ban treaty. "

-President J. F . Kennedy, June 10, 1963

Why are U . S . policy-makers now placing such

special emphasis on a test ban treaty-more thanmost other elements of their disarmament plans?

None of the reasons usually given to the publicseem to explain the now-or-never attitude displayed

by Mr. Kennedy. Neither do they justify the conces-sions which U . S . negotiators have offered and seem

ready to offer in Moscow, in their efforts to entice

the Soviets into immediate agreement . In fact, some

of the more widely publicized reasons turn out to be

simply promotional propaganda, rather than an ac-

tual consideration in policy planning .

For example, one major theme of test banpropaganda has been the claim (now disproved)that continued testing would create great hazards

from radioactive fallout . However, in testimonygiven to the Senate Foreign Relations Committeeon March 11, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk dis-

127



counted this factor as a primary consideration in

our policy, except for its usefulness in promoting

the idea. Mr. Rusk said that the problem of radio-active Tallout was of "secondary importance, but

nevertheless significant . . . in large part because of

real or assumed dangers from fallout . . . " (empha-

sis added), which he said has caused nuclear test-

ing to become a "key political issue in a great many

countries . "

Executive policy-makers are not interested in

a test ban treaty primarily for any value which it

might have in itself. To them, it is a "confidence-

building" measure ; that is, policy-makers see it as

a first step along the road toward further objectives

which they have laid out for this Nation under the

label of "disarmament" . President Kennedy refer-

red to the test ban treaty as one of the "first-step

measures of arms control", in the June 10 address

wherein he announced the coming high-level ne-gotiations in Moscow . Secretary Rusk, in his March

11 statement to the Senate Committee, called is a

"necessary" first step. He explained as follows :

"What we need are arrangements on which con-

fidence can be built as a matter wholly separate

from the question of whether the Russians will

trust us or we can trust the Russians, because

the very arrangements, themselves provide abasis for growing confidence . "

This "confidence-building" function of a test

ban treaty in the overall plan for our Nation's dis-

armament was set forth even more clearly by aU S . participant in the Sixth Pugwash Conference

(Moscow, Nov.-Dec ., 1960) . Mr. Richard Leghornsaid at that meeting :

"Of overwhelming importance will be the com-

128



pletion and rapid implementation of a treaty

banning nuclear tests . This treaty will be of

more value as a confidence-building measurethan as a measure of real disarmament . . . .

Its successful completion is an absolute `must'

for progress toward the disarmament treaty. "

Walter W. Rostow, chairman of the State De-

partment Policy Planning Council, also a participant

in the 1960 Pugwash conference, endorsed and reaf-

firmed the Leghorn idea on "confidence-building" .

Thus were the Soviets informed as early as 1960 that,

from the official U . S . viewpoint, the principle pur-

pose of a test ban was to "build confidence" . Ameri-

cans, meanwhile, long subjected to diverse propa-

ganda on the "need" for a test ban for other reasons,

are only now being gradually let in on the real pur-

pose it is intended to serve . As to whose confidence

needs "building"-in announcing unilateral suspen-

sion of testing by the U . S . on June 10, President Ken-

nedy said he was doing so to "make clear our good

faith" ; as if it were the U . S ., rather than the U S . -

S.R . , who has proved unworthy of trust .

Possibly to build confidence in the minds of

Americans, Mr. Rusk and others have claimed that atest ban treaty now would be to the military advan-

tage of the U. S., because it would arrest nuclearweapons development in both camps at their present

levels. This claim presumes a present U . S . superior-

ity which is not at all certain in several key elements

of strategic capability and which, according to U . S .

weapons experts, cannot be made certain withoutfurther atmospheric testing. Opposition by military

chiefs to Mr . Kennedy's unilateral test suspension is

reportedly due largely to this consideration . More-

over, both Secretary Rusk (on March 11) and Presi-

129



dent Kennedy (on June 10) have acknowledged that

the Soviet Union cannot be relied upon to abide by a

treaty, except insofar as it might be in their own in-

terests to do so . As an offset to this recognized Soviet

duplicity, Mr. Rusk said the treaty must be designed

so that "the scope of any violation which might es-

cape detection" 'could not be so extensive as to "sub s

stantially affect the military balance ." Additionally,

he noted that we should keep ourselves prepared to

resume testing in short order (a feat of preparedness

which Mr. Kennedy called "impossible of excution",in March of 1962) .

In view of the real purpose which U . S . policy-

makers see for a treaty, could the U . S . public ever

be confident that their own officials would tell them

of any clandestine Soviet testing? Or would those

officials overlook such Soviet duplicity in order not

to jeopardize the further goals which they have set

for us in the name of disarmament? Finally, is there

any basis for American confidence in that ultimate

disarmament goal?Although U . S . policy spokesmen are generally

quite candid about their ultimate objectives in state-

ments to the public, its most significant aspect is of-

ten obscured by high-sounding talk of "world peace

-peaceful coexistence and competition of different

systems-solving the world's economic and social

problems-etc." A relatively new theme appeared inMr. Kennedy's June 10 address wherein he said, "ifwe cannot now end our differences, at least we can

help make the world safe for diversity ." At the 1960

Pugwash confrence, Mr. Rostow spoke similarly ofmaking the world "safe for ideological differences . "

(A rather preposterous notion when dealing with an

ideology dedicated to the extinction of diversity . )

130



When the emotional appeals are put aside, the

ultimate goal may well be that expressed by Mr . Ros-

tow in his book The United States in the WorldArena, in which he says

"It is a legitimate American national objective

to see removed from all nations-including the

United States-the rights to use substantial mil-

itary force to pursue their own interests . Since

this residual right is the right of national sover-

eignty and the basis for the existence of an in-

ternational arena of power, it is, therefore, an

American interest to see an end of nationhood

as it has been historically defined . "

This would seem to be borne out in the U . S ,

proposal for "Complete and General Disarmament"

(Sept ., 1961) and further evidence is contained in

Rostow's closing statement to Soviet and other par-

ticipants in the 1960 Pugwash conference . He said :

"The maximum objective is a new system of re-

lations among states based on general and com-

plete disarmament with strict international con-

trol.

"If this grand conception is to come to life there

is need to create a clearly marked turning point

. . . First, a completion of the test-ban negotia-

tions which should build confidence and open the

way to the step beyond .

"I think we all understand now that the work

done in the United States on the short run is not

designed to frustrate long run and more ambi-

tious objectives .

"I hope that the remarkable channel of commu-

nications which the Pugwash movement hasopened will be kept open and rapidly enlarged .

. . . I hope our working papers will flow steadily

131



back and forth . Some problems we face can only

be negotiated . But some of them require that

scientists work together not as negotiators but

as professional colleagues . "

"The transition to disarmament and the world

of disarmament are, if I may use the phrase, a

New Frontier. "

This is a double jeopardy to Freedom's cause in

present U. S . policy. Our unilateral suspension oftesting, plus other self-imposed restraints, while try-

ing to woo the Soviets into a test ban agreement,

leaves the way open for them to gain a decisive ad-

vantage in some key element of strategic power . The

alternate possibility-subordination of our Na-tional military power to an international authority

formed in coalition with the Communists-is but an-

other route to the world-wide totalitarian system

prescribed by Karl Marx .

The way to peace between nations and human

freedom within them is through the proper exercise

of national sovereignties, including military power .

Only when there has been a clear return to that pre-

mise in our policy planning will the American people

have any reason for confidence in the security of

their Nation and their Freedom .

The press of August 4, 1963 carried the follow-

ing story showing how correct Duane Thorin was in

his analysis

LONDON, Aug. 3-U Thant, Secretary General

of the United Nations, arrived in London tonight on

his way to Moscow to witness the signing of the

nuclear test ban treaty by the United States, Britain

and the Soviet Union . He denied that he had a per-

132



sonal disarmament plan to present .

"I am going to Moscow at the invitation of the

U S . S .R ., the U . S .A. and the U .K.," he said . "I regard

the treaty as an important and symbolic improve-

ment in international relationships, especially be-

tween East and West .

"It also creates a very congenial atmosphere for

future negotiations on other aspects of disarma-

ment. "

Mr. Thant added : "If I am given the opportunity

at Monday afternoon's ceremony, I would like to

make some brief observations on the next steps to be

taken by the big powers on nuclear disarmament. "

He declined to be more specific .

I ask the reader-isn't it all there? Walt W .

Rostow, now our Chief Policy Planner attending the

Pugwash Conference in Moscow in December 1960,

called for "First a completion of test-ban negotiation

which should build confidence and open the way to

the step beyond . "

Then, Secretary Dean Rusk called, on March

11, 1963, for the test-ban as "a necessary first step . "

The Secretary of State told the Senate on that day,

remember : "What we need are arrangements onwhich confidence can be built as a matter wholly

separate from the question of whether the Russians

will trust us or we can trust the Russians, because

the very arrangements themselves provide a basis

for growing confidence . "

Finally, there is the policy of the United States

itself, working for the dissolution of national armies

and the creation of an all-powerful world army and

an international court of justice to which all nations

must submit. I t a l l f i t s t h e formula outlined in Walt

133



W Rostow's book "The United States in the World

Arena" which contains this remarkable statement

in the summary : "t is, therefore, an Americaninterest to see an end of nationhood as it has been

historically defined . "

134



XVIII THE HARVEST

Khrushchev's record is no better now that it

ever was. In the spring of 1961, President Kennedy

and the Soviet Premier made a solemn agreement on

a peaceful, neutral and independent Laos . Not only

have the Communists shattered this agreement, but

the details of new violations of the accord are break-

ing into the newspapers alongside the glowing re-

ports of optimism generated by the signing of the

test-ban treaty . The attitude of the State Depart-

ment seems to be "Laos was last year's agreement ;

this year it will be different . "

Khrushchev and Soviet Ambassador AndreiGromyko gave President Kennedy personal assur-ances that no offensive missiles were being moved

into Cuba at the very moment that the lethal wea-

pons were, in fact, being mounted and pointed to-

ward our cities . This perfidy, perpetrated at the per-

sonal level of the President himself, is not even being

mentioned today, although less than a year haspassed since the betrayal . When we reflect on it, this

and other betrayals of confidence seem actually to

have set in motion the present series of negotiations .

Meantime, Soviet espionage is actually more ex-

tensive and more grievous than ever before . In view

of what they have been permitted to steal from us

in the past, the conclusion about Khrushchev and

his assistants "mellowing" would seem extreme . Yet

I heard our Attorney General make the statement on

television last year .

135



Only a few weeks ago, the evidence implicating

Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Erik Wennerstromwith Nikita Khrushchev's espionage network made

the news. The work of this "Disarmament Official"has been devastating . Let this Associated Press dis-

patch from Stockholm relate the extent of the Wen-

nerstrom harvest

Stockholm, Sweden, July 14 (AP) "Sweden'sarmed forces have embarked on a massive programto close the defense gap caused by the betrayal of

military secrets to the Soviet Union by Air Force

Colonel Stig Erik Wennerstrom .

"There is an atmosphere of almost wartimeurgency at the Defense Ministry .

"Lights burn far into the night as army, navy

and air force officers grapple with the task of re-

pairing the probable loss of Sweden's entire defense

strategy to the Russians .

"Officers have been recalled from vacation and

redeployment of army, navy and air force units may

already be under way .

"Security services are working day and night to

investigate other possible leaks in the military estab-

lishment or the government .

Sweden Crippled"Everyone-the government, opposition parties,

defense staffs and the newspapers-agrees that Wen-

nerstrom crippled Sweden . The tall, suave airmandiplomat has confessed that he gave military secrets

to the Russians for 15 years .

"And during that period he had access to Swe-

den's entire defense strategy. Defense sites andstrengths? Military codes? Key mobilization andcommunication plans? Wennerstrom knew all about

136



these and more . He knew a lot about the North At-

lantic Treaty Organization's defense plans and wea-

pons. He visited NATO military installations. He

was in frequent contact with Danish and Norwe-

gian military men . He was friendly with many top

Western diplomats here .

"The armed forces are reported to be acting on

the assumption that Wennerstrom ̀ gave away Swe-

den' and that the Russians now know all about its

plans to repel a possible Soviet attack .

Acute Crisis

"Stockholm's influential Expression-the larg-

est newspaper in Scandinavia-referred to à time

of acute crisis for our defense' and said editorially .

`The Wennerstrom spying has in essential parts

knocked out the Swedish defense . About this all re-

ports agree. Hectic measures are being taken to re-

pair, if possible, the damage caused .

`The armed forces face an immensely compli-

cated and costly task. Fortifications, headquarters

and battle stations, hangars, ship tunnels repair

shops and storage depots have been built into granite

accommodations at top-secret locations . Newspapers

have reported there are 500 of these .

`Two deep tunnels have been carved out of amountain to accommodate destroyers, submarines

and other naval units. Plans have called for the en-

tire navy to be provided with tunnels . These instal-

lations cannot be moved even though their locations

may now be precisely located by the Russians. Must

new ones be built?

Major Redeployment`The Swedish Royal Air Force of 1,000 all-jet,

first-line planes is said by the Swedes to be the fourth

largest in the world after the U.S. Air Force, the So-

137



viet Air Force and the British Royal Air Force . The

air force must now consider whether a major rede-

ployment to new bases underground and on the sur-

face is needed to maintain its combat effectiveness .

`For its oil supplies Sweden depends entirely

on imports. The safe storage of fuels is essential for

its military preparedness . Oil and gasoline are stored

in vast underground tanks in rock chambers andabandoned mines. Hidden pipelines link these to theberthing places of tankers and tank cars . It will take

years and vast sums of money to relocate these .

`Military expenditures now take about one-fifth-

of Sweden's national budget. According to some es-

timates, it now must spend the equivalent of hun-

dreds of millions of dollars more, and quickly, to re-

pair the damage of the loss of defense secrets. News-

papers predict taxes will be substantially increased

to pay the cost .

Ìnformed sources say Sweden probably will

face vastly increased military research costs as a

result of the Wennerstrom case. Although Swedenis neutral and not a member of NATO, the Western

powers for some time have quietly passed on to the

Swedish armed forces important technical data on

defense matters . They also sold weapons to Sweden .

The view here is that the West probably will halt

such aid in view of uncertainty about Sweden's se-

curity system . ' "

The Soviet representatives (and their satellites)

at the United Nations are committing espionage on

an extensive scale . There is absolutely no abatement

in their acts of perfidy . News reports regularly at-

test to this. Yet our trust in Khrushchev increases,

138



almost, it would seem, in proportion to the increase

of the betrayal rate .

Our "Disarmament" posture, reflecting as itdoes that we are again reposing our trust in our

enemy, makes the atmosphere far more conduciveto espionage and penetration into the policy-making

institutions of our nation . The record of World War

II when we were conclusively pressured to be allies

of the U . S . S .R . establishes this fact and the surveys

made by Congressional Committees have broughtthis out time and time again . ( * )

Thus, while we disarm, and reach into the sky

for this fantastic merger with our dedicated enemy,

committing ourselves to a minority position, Khrush-

chev pounds on to his self-appointed destiny . The at-

mosphere we are creating militates against a realistic

defense of our wonderful heritage .

Strength alone will save us .

Substituting trust in Khrushchev for our own

strength is a short-cut to destruction--or, more

l i k e l y , to nuclear blackmail .

(*)The following statement by J. Edgar Hoover appears onpage 491 of the Hearings before A Subcommittee of the Com-

mittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-

eighth Congress : "Taking full advantage of the freedomsthat exist in our open society, the Soviet Union continues to

carry out an espionage and intelligence attack against this

country on a scale unequaled in history . ̀ Communism overGod. Russia over the world' is a statement attributed to So-viet Premier Khrushchev, at the 22d Congress of the Soviet

Communist Party in October 1961. The statement accuratelydescribes the Soviet goal . world conquest . In the pursuit of

this objective Communists nreach `peaceful coexistence' but

they continue to apply and carry out an espionage effort,

characterized by treachery, deceit, and unlawful activities in

an attempt to obtain every conceivable type of information

concerning the security of this country . "

139



APPENDIX

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT MORRIS BEFORETHE JOINT COMMITTEES-FOREIGN RELA-TIONS, ARMED SERVICES, AND JOINT ATOM-IC ENERGY 5 PM August 27, 1963 .

POINT 1 :

The treaty before the Committees is expressly

made a first step toward "an agreement on general

and complete disarmament." The preamble makesthe point that the "principal aim" of the signatories

in entering into the accord is "disarmament ." Fur-

thermore, the outline of the treaty that we have put

on the table at Geneva to achieve disarmament spe-

cifically provides that this test ban treaty become an

"annex" of that treaty when signed . Our leaders

have told the Senate that indeed it is a "first step"

toward disarmament .

Thus not only is this treaty indissoluble from

the disarmament treaty, by its own preamble, by

the express wording of the disarmament treaty and

by the declaration of responsible leaders, but it is

to be a mere "annex" to the later accord .

Those military leaders, notably the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, who have reconciled the treaty to national

security, have done so on the express condition that

vigorous implementation of safeguards will be main-

tained by the defense department including "aggres-

sive and comprehensive underground testing to the

limit of the treaty." Other military leaders could not

even make this reconciliation .

140



These safeguards go beyond, in urgency, any

present posture of the Department of Defense and

are obviously prompted by the testimony of such

leaders .

As Norman Cousins has pointed out in a recent

letter to the editor of The New York Times, this

mood is completely out of the spirit of the test ban

treaty . It is directly antithetical to the disarmament

treaty to which this treaty is to be an "annex" . Ne-

gotiations will soon be continued on disarmament .

This sense of urgency will almost necessarily become

a casualty of the spirit of the U . N. as we strain, as

we have time and time in the past, to "show our good

faith."

A brief look at our treaty outline which we lave

already put on the table for negotiation at Geneva

will reveal that we have already offered to the So-

viets the dismantling, not only of testing facilities

and monitoring stations but our whole defense es-

tablishment, in its entirety, with all its personnel, in-

cluding the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves. Under

this treaty we have expressly offered to build up an

all powerful United Nations army, with ourselves

having only those forces necessary for "internal

policing" and for supply to the U . N. force that will

come into being three years after we sign that treaty .

The language of the Outline of the treaty reads

REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCESTo the end that upon completion of Stage III

they would have at their disposal only those

forces and organizational arrangements neces-

sary for agreed forces to maintain internal or-

der and protect the personal security of citizens

and that they would be capable of providing

agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace

141



Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete,

the reduction of their force levels, disband

systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded

organizational arrangements comprising and

supporting their national military establish-

ment, and terminate the employment of civilian

personnel associated with the foregoing .

It will be seen from this that not only will we

not have a monitoring system or testing facilities

but not even a reserve or as much as a Navy league .

The high resolve to maintain safeguards now ex-pressed will certainly wane as we make progress, as

our leaders are now so confident, toward this dis-

armament accord .

On this point we should read Secretary Rusk's

firm resolve of last year when he said

"In President Kennedy's words of March 2,`We know enough now about broken negotia-

tions, secret preparations, and the advantages

gained from a long test series never to offer

again an uninspected moratorium.' The samecould equally be said about an unverified treaty

obligation such as the U . S . S .R. is now propos-

ing. We do not intend to be caught again as we

were in the autumn of 1961, and there is no

reason why we should have to be caught again

by a unilateral Soviet decision to resume nuclear

weapon tests . This is a risk to national and in-

ternational security which the United States

cannot and will not take . A test ban, or any dis-

armament measure, will be acceptable to usonly when it is accompanied by adequate meas-

ures of verification . "

POINT 2:

The presidential transmission of this treaty

142



dated August 8 read : "This treaty is the whole agree-

ment . . . . The treaty speaks for itself" .

Ambiguities have already been uncovered . The

words "any other nuclear explosion" ("other" than

nuclear test explosions) on their face clearly include

detonations undertaken for self defense, to aid our

allies or for "peaceful uses of the Atom ." The uni-

lateral statement of Undersecretary George Ballcannot put any other interpretation on the clear

meaning of the words . There is nothing in interna-tional law to support a contention that the rule of

construction of a treaty is any different in this re-

spect than the rule of construction of a statute or

any legal document, namely, if the document is clear

on its face, recourse may not be had to any other

source . If, as the President expressly said in trans-

mission, the treaty "speaks for itself", there will

have to be an amendment, if we want the interpreta-

tion of the State Department to prevail . Otherwise

this is a trap and incontrovertibly does what the

Soviets have been trying to do for years-keep us

from using modern weapons to defend ourselvesand our lives .

What the State Department has done has beento invoke previous drafts of the treaty including So-

viet rejections to come to the conclusion-not possi-

bly inferable from the treaty "itself"-that detona-

tions for self defense or for defense of our Allies are

not proscribed but that explosions for peaceful con-

struction are. Obviously the State Department is not

allowing the Treaty to speak for itself as the Presi-

dent says. If the drafts and the minutes of the nego-

tiations give the answers the Senate desperately

needs, then all the minutes and all the drafts and

all the correspondence including that between heads

143



of State (Khrushchev and our President) on theinstant treaty, and the treaty of which this is to be

an "annex", should be made available to the Senate

before ratification .

POINT 3 :

From the State Department interpretation that

"Project Plowshares" and the "Peaceful use of the

Atom" are now to be shelved in so far as they in-

volve nuclear explosions, unless approved by Khrush-

chev, we have reached a most unscientific impasse .

Many people had hoped that nuclear forces were to

be harnessed for peaceful purposes . Certainly this

portion of the treaty should be amended .

POINT 4 :

The treaty could not prevent the Soviets from

testing, even in the atmosphere, if any one of its

satellites including Cuba and Red China stay out-

side its framework . The dispute between the Rus-

sians and the Red Chinese is a struggle difficult to

analyze that could be solved tomorrow as was the

"struggle" between Tito and Stalin . The Soviet could

use the sovereignty of any one of its satellites as a

cover for the illegal testing and no one could do any-

thing about it . Moreover, any one of the Satellites

could abrogate, if need be, after signing and give

them their cover .

Despite the hostile talk between the Red Chinese

and the Russians, it should be remembered that it

was the Russians who gave the Chinese their nuclear

plants and reactors, in the first place .

POINT 5Despite past assurances, there is nothing in the

treaty to prevent the Soviets, as they have in the

past, from translating the scientific information that

they gained from their spectacular high yield tests

144



into lethal weapons in the months ahead and then

abrogating as their constitution provides, at will,

and leaving us at their mercy . We could not even

expeditiously abrogate but would have to wait 90

days to withdraw as Mr. Harriman has said. Abro-

gation on our part would involve action not only

by the President, but both Houses of Congress .

The appropriate Committee of the Senate-the

Judiciary Committee through its Internal Security

Subcommittee-has previously set forth the Soviet

record on previous treaties . May I offer it for the

record at this point. The pattern of violations is in-

exorable . It leads to only one workable conclusion .

The Soviets will test again when it suits their pur-

pose . In fairness to them they do not break the

treaties . They use them as they say they will . "Trea-

ties, like pie crusts, are made only to be broken . " I t

is our foolish attribution to them of our codes, our

standards, and our respect for the plighted word

that justifies the word "broken" in this connection .

The Soviet code is clear-that which furthers Soviet

purpose is moral, legal, and just. Any other foolish

assumption flies in the face of the record and the na-

ture of this enemy . When Andrei Vishinsky entered

a debate in New York before he died he said : "Laws,

what laws? We make our own laws ."

POINT 7:

There is a feeling frequently expressed, as it was

last week by former President Harry S. Truman,

that the Soviets really cannot be trusted . Here is how

he was quoted ("The idea is to get a start on those

things and you can always amend them") . You can-

not amend them. The treaty expressly says that the"Original Parties" including the U.S. S .R. can veto

any amendment.

145



Moreover, Article Six of our Constitution ex-

pressly makes this treaty equal to our very Consti-

tution . Thus, it cannot be casual as the former Presi-

dent suggests . Has anyone thought through the sig-

nificance of the statement that "the principal aim"

of the signatories is "Disarmament"? Even though

it appears in the Preamble, the act of ratification un-

der the Constitution gives it extraordinary legal

stature. Does it thereby provide authority for legal

action not now authorized by the Constitution? Does

it perhaps set the stage for Executive action by the

President to implement this Congressional grant of

authority covering "disarmament?"POINT 8 :

There are to be negotiations after this on a non-

aggression pact. It has been said that this treaty

stands by itself. Demonstrably it does not . The State

Department is drawing on outside sources to inter-

pret it. Will the minutes and the drafts that the State

Department uses to interpret this treaty show that

there is no connection? Not only would a nonaggres-

sion pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pactfreeze us from opposing Communism in the War-saw Pact countries but it would do the same in any

country such as Cuba, British Guiana, Brazil, that

might wish to join the Warsaw Pact . What does this

do to the Monroe Doctrine, the O .A . S . treaties? It

would make dejure, the present de facto impasse .

The Senate should write in an express reservation

on this point .

POINT 9 :

These are serious commitments made by theratification of this treaty. It would seem that since

the national election is next year, these things should

become the issues so that the people of the United

146



States can speak without being committed irrevo-

cably . If there is to be another administration next

year, why commit it now to these serious risks? Let

the people, the fount of sovereignty speak .

POINT 10 :

We always hear, "But this time it is different . "

Here is what Khrushchev said to the Red Chinese in

answering their charges on July 14, 1963 :

"We (the Soviets) fully stand for the destruc-

tion of imperialism and capitalism . We not only

believe in the inevitable destruction of capitalism

but are doing everything for this to be accom-

plished as soon as possible. "

147



ROBERT MORRIS

Counsel and Chief Counsel U . S . Senate Internal

Security Subcommittee 1951-1953 ; 1956-1958.

Counsel U . S . Senate Foreign Relations Committee

1950 .

Advisor U S . Senate Rules Committee 1954 .

Officer-in-Charge Advance Psychological Warfare

Section of CINCPAC on Guam 1945 .

Officer-in-Charge Soviet Counterintelligence Third

Naval District 1941-1943 : Officer-in-Charge Coun-

terintelligence Third Naval District 1945 .

Justice Municipal Court New York City 1953-1956 .