Disaster Risk: From Research to Practice –

A Summary of the IRDR Programme

Jane E. RovinsExecutive Director

Beijing, China

Key question:Why, despite advances in the natural and social

science of hazards and disasters, do losses continue to increase?

How do we address the lack of sustainability in current disaster practices?

The Science Plan

Addressing the challenge of natural and human-induced environmental hazards

An integrated approach to research on disaster risk through: an international, multidisciplinary (natural, health, engineering and social sciences, including socio-economic analysis) collaborative research programme

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IRDR Science Plan at: http://www.irdrinternational.org/

Scope of IRDR• Geophysical and hydro-meteorological trigger

events• Earthquakes – tsunamis – volcanoes – floods –

storms (hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons) – heat waves – droughts – wildfires – landslides – coastal erosion – climate change

• Space weather and impact by near-Earth objects• Effects of human activities on creating or enhancing

disasters, including land-use practices

NOT technological disasters, warfare

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Research Objectives

1. Characterization of hazard, vulnerability and risk

2. Effective decision-making in complex and changing risk context

3. Reducing risk and curbing losses through knowledge-based actions

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Cross Cutting Themes

• Capacity building• Case studies and demonstration projects• Assessment, data management and monitoring

Partners • National and

international science institutions

• National and international development assistance agencies and funding bodies

• Other research organizations

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• ICSU Unions • ISSC Unions• Regional Offices• UN organizations• IRDR National

Committees• IRDR International

Centers of Excellence

Disaster Loss Data WG

• Identify what data and quality are needed to improve integrated disaster data management

• Bring together loss data stakeholders and utilize synergies for recognized standards to minimize uncertainty

• Define of “losses” and creation of methodology for assessing it

• Educate users on data interpretation and biases

• Increase downscaling of loss data to sub-national geographies for policy makers

Forensic Disaster Investigations (FORIN)

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• In depth investigations into complex and underlying cause

• Common template and methodology• Fundamental cause of disasters

• Trace out and assign causal explanation of losses and intervening conditions that increased or reduce losses

• FORIN relies upon the actual evidence found and applied scientific methodologies and principles to interpret the disaster in all its facets

Introduction• Debunking “natural” of disaster.• From nature to society; from natural construction

to social construction of risk.• Deficiency in many past efforts to understand

disaster• hazard or technological focus• sectorial or disciplinary based• emergency response

Hypothesis

New and more probing research and understanding of the reasons for increase in public vulnerability and wider exposure would enable and stimulate improved DRR

New and more integrated and participatory research required to yield more useful and effective results

The knowledge that exists about disaster risk reduction has not been communicated effectively

Responsibility for continued increase of vulnerability and exposure is locally specific and diffuse over individuals, organizations and over time

• Risk reduction hypothesis• Responsibility hypothesis• Communication hypothesis• Integration-participation hypothesis

Approaches to Research

• 20 core case specific• 10 generic questions• 6 additional questions• Grouping according to

framework concerns

Algiers Flood & Mudflow10 November 2001

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Event Info• Exceptionally high rainfall (~ 262 mm/24h) • High winds (120 KM/H) 714 Deaths• >312 Injured• 116 MISSING• ~ 10,000 HOMELESS• > 1500 housing units damaged• >350 vehicles buried w/ passengers• 2.5-10m of mud

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1M m3 of mud

$USD 250M

Water Mudflow

State of construction• Ancient Housing – state of decay• Lack of maintenance• Illegal housing• Previous flood damage• Deforestation

Causes

• No single cause• Several failures• Lack of warning system – most affected were in

transit/did not reside in impacted area• Travelling to work or school

Causes

• Good construction – no damage but deviated water onto others

• Uncontrolled urbanization• Passivity and laxness of local government• Uninformed citizens

Causes• Wild urbanization• No preparedness for effective response• Lack of knowledge of flood risk at the population

and administration levels• No warning system• Inadequate communication system• Inappropriate urban planning, legislation, etc.• Lack of a clear disaster management system• Lack of maintenance of the sewage system

Risk Interpretation and Action (RIA)• How actors attempt to make sense

of experience and information from various sources as a basis for decision

• Estimation of the likelihood, magnitude of event and vulnerability of physical infrastructure

• Social and behavioural factors leading to greater or lesser risk

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Mega Disaster in a Resilient Society The Great East Japan (Tohoku Kanto) Earthquake and Tsunami 2011

Earthquake Tsunami Nuclear Power Stations

FORINComplex disaster –

technological interface??

RIAThe role of risk interpretation – responses??

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Forensic Investigation onForensic Investigation onGreat East Japan Earthquake and Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) Tsunami (GEJET)

Meta & Longitudinal Analysis Characteristics of tsunami fatalities and

losses Comparison with historical events

Critical Cause Analysis Analysis of critical causes for human

loss expansion caused by delayed evacuation

Preparation of a question list for human loss vulnerability evaluation

Scenario Analysis Estimation of damages and losses

caused by tsunami of a similar magnitude to GEJET in central Japan.

Identification of issues and proposal of measures to tsunami of an unexpected magnitude

Event SummaryEvent SummaryM9.0 earthquake occurred on

March 11, 2011 at 14:46 Massive ground motion was

observed throughout JapanMega-tsunami of about 1,000 year

return period and subsidence led to enormous damages

Complex disaster (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear accident)

Historic Tsunami Events in the region

• 1897: [M8.5] 21,959 dead• 1933: [M8.1] 3,064 dead or

missing

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Japan Meteorological Agency

Seismic Intensity

Iwate

Miyagi

Fukushima

Hirono(0)

Kuji(4)Noda(38)

Fudai(1)Tanohata(31)

Iwaizumi(7)Tarou(180)

Miyako(362)

Yamada(823)Otsuchi(1,397)Kamaishi(1,091)

Ofunato(452)Rikuzentakata(1,951)

Kesennuma(1,405)

Minamisanriku(901)Ishinomaki(3,959)Onagawa(963)

Higashimatsushima(1,145)Matsushima(2)

Rifu(50)Shiogama(21)Tagajou(189) Shichigahama(71)

Miyagino-ku, Sendai(293)

Wakabayashi-ku, Sendai(332)Taihaku-ku, Sendai(53) Natori(984)

Iwanuma(184)Watari(270)Yamamoto(691)Shinchi(110)Soma(459)

Minamisoma(663)Namie(184)Futaba(35)Okuma(81)Tomioka(25)Naraha(13)Hirono(3)

Iwaki(347)

Overview of DamagesOverview of Damages• Inundated area by tsunami ：

561km2

• Human casualties: 15,829 dead, 3,745 missing, 5,942 injured (as of Oct 25)

• Building damages: 118,790 completely destroyed, 184,343 half destroyed, 280 burned down, 10,961 inundated (above floor), 13,867 inundated (below floor)

• Agricultural land losses: 23,600ha• Direct damages to infrastructure

stock ： approx. 16.9 trillion yen (US$200 billion)

27Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011)

National Police Agency （ As of Oct 25, 2011)2011 White Paper on Disaster Management

Dead or Missing

1～9

10～99

100～499

500～999

1000～

Human losses in coastal municipalities

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Population ofIwate, Miyagi & Fukushima

（As of Oct 2010）

People killed in the GEJET（As of 8 Aug 2011）

0～910～1920～2930～3940～4950～5960～6970～7980～

Human LossesHuman Losses92.4% of people died in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima due to tsunami.

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Tsunami was the main cause of death

Death causes in GEJET(Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima)

Age structure of population and people died in GEJET（ Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima ）

65% of fatalities were 60 years or older

Source: 2011 White paper on disaster management

Tsunami92.4 ％

Fire 1.1%

Crushed by buildings, etc

4.4%Unknown 2%

Critical cause analysis of human Critical cause analysis of human losses due to delayed evacuationlosses due to delayed evacuation

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Why were so many people not able to escape from the tsunami? Why were so many people not able to escape from the tsunami?

Strong ground motion (seismic intensity of 6 or greater)

Large tsunami attack could have been conceivable by people?

Quake occurred during the day. 30 minutes to 2 hours of time available before tsunami arrived.

Evacuation actions could have been easily taken?

Tohoku region (especially Iwate) have experienced tsunami disasters repeatedly in the past

Lessons learned in the past not effectively utilized?

Coastal levees had been constructed along much of the coast line

Misperception about tsunami safety existed (people thought tsunami disaster will never occur)?

The critical points for human losses and delayed evacuation were analyzed by reviewing various reports published after GEJET.The critical points for human losses and delayed evacuation were analyzed by reviewing various reports published after GEJET.

Effectiveness of Structural MeasuresEffectiveness of Structural Measures

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Coastal levee (T.P.+12.0m ） was higher than the tsunami height (tsunami run-up height T.P.+9.5m)

Hirono, Iwate

Source: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake

Structural measures proved to be effective & protected lives in areas

City located far from the coast was protected by the gate.

Fudai, Iwate

No inundationTown center

Inundated area

Fudai Gate

Fudai Gate

Upstream of the gate

Levee height T.P.+12.0m

Tsunami height T.P.+9.5m

Estimated overflow depth 7.2m

Inundation height near the gate T.P.+22.6m

Gate height T.P.+15.5m

ImmediateImmediate recognition of necessity recognition of necessity to evacuateto evacuate

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57%31%

11% 1%

TotalN=870

Immediately evacuated

Evacuated after completing other

actions

Evacuated only after noticing that

tsunami was approaching

Did not evacuate(already in safe

area)

Timing of Evacuation

Source: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake

About half of the people who survived tsunami evacuated immediately after the earthquake.

About half of the people who survived tsunami evacuated immediately after the earthquake.

FindingsFindings

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• People who evacuated only after noticing that tsunami was approaching didn’t evacuate immediately because “tsunami didn’t occur in past earthquakes” or “tsunami never came up to their mind”

• In Miyagi, about half of the people survived thought tsunami wouldn’t come or didn’t think about tsunami. Only 4% had seen tsunami hazard maps.

• Many of the people that didn’t immediately evacuate were out of their homes. Instead of evacuating they went back home or went out to look for their families.

• The disaster occurred during the day time when family members were scattered. People worried about the safety of their family and moved immediately to get together with their family members.

SchoolSchool Children Children

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Source: ※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake※2: Survey Research Center “ 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート” May 2011

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

0～4

5～9

10～

14

15～

19

20～

24

25～

29

30～

34

35～

39

40～

44

45～

49

50～

54

55～

59

60～

64

65～

69

70～

74

75～

79

80～

84

85～

89

90～

94

95～

99

100～

% Human loss in inundated area

Iwate

Miyako

Ofunato

Rikuzentakata

Kamaishi

Otsuchi

YamadaVery small human loss rate in ages of 5 to 14

Evacuation Communication

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• Average time required to obtain tsunami warning or advisory was 16.4 minutes.

• In tsunami prone areas 13% did not know that tsunami warning was announced.

• Many of usual communication methods became inaccessible due to power outage, overwhelmed phone lines, etc

• Underestimated preliminary forecast was misinterpreted as “safe”.

• Due to power outage, updated information was not accessible.

• In average it took 17 minutes to begin evacuation. Almost 80% evacuated with others, 53% with their family members.

• Among people who heard evacuation warnings clearly from disaster management radio, 70 to 80% felt the necessity to evacuate.

• Many people lost their lives while convincing or guiding other people to evacuate, including over 300 fire and disaster department staffs, fire fighters and police officers delivering evacuation warnings or guiding evacuation.

Obstacles

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• 60% evacuated by cars and 1/3 were caught in traffic.

• Many used cars because they thought otherwise they wouldn’t make it, or they wanted to evacuate with family members.

• In Miyagi, many people older than 60 or women used cars. Among those caught in traffic, only 7.3% changed the mean of transportation.

• In 11 cities of Iwate prefecture 48 evacuation shelters out of 411 were inundated.

• In Onagawa Town, reinforced concrete buildings often used as evacuation shelters were collapsed from the foundation.

• Among those who evacuated from tsunami in Miyagi, 60.8% evacuated from the primary evacuation shelter to the next. Among them 55.5% said the first shelter was stricken by tsunami.

• For most people the primary evacuation shelter was “publicly designated shelter such as community centers and schools”. About 40% moved further to evacuate to higher elevation or safer facilities

City Gymnasium was a designated evacuation center but was inundated to 14m depth. 100 persons evacuated to this facility and most of them lost their lives.

Summary

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Risk or danger of tsunami and necessity to evacuate not recognized by all people. Many prioritized actions to search for their family members over evacuation. Disaster education in schools proved very effective.Accurate and most up-to-date tsunami warning information was not accessible for many people due to power outage, etc. Underestimated preliminary forecast lead to misconception that it is “safe”. Evacuation warnings and evacuation advices by neighbors and families triggered evacuation actions for many people.Use of cars during evacuation caused traffic congestion and many got trapped. Pre-installed tsunami emergency routes in schools proved very effective. Safety (location & structural) of evacuation shelters was insufficient in some sases Many evacuated to safer location regardless of the designated shelters.Human losses vary depending on the PHYSICAL SETTINGS AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS Of the communities

Risk or danger of tsunami and necessity to evacuate not recognized by all people. Many prioritized actions to search for their family members over evacuation. Disaster education in schools proved very effective.Accurate and most up-to-date tsunami warning information was not accessible for many people due to power outage, etc. Underestimated preliminary forecast lead to misconception that it is “safe”. Evacuation warnings and evacuation advices by neighbors and families triggered evacuation actions for many people.Use of cars during evacuation caused traffic congestion and many got trapped. Pre-installed tsunami emergency routes in schools proved very effective. Safety (location & structural) of evacuation shelters was insufficient in some sases Many evacuated to safer location regardless of the designated shelters.Human losses vary depending on the PHYSICAL SETTINGS AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS Of the communities

Assessment of Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (AIRDR)• First systematic and critical global assessment of

published research on disaster risk• Provide a baseline• Use to identify and support longer-term science

agenda• Provide scientific evidentiary basis in support of

policy and practice

Science Committee

IRDR Legacy

An enhanced capacity around the world to address hazards and make informed

decisions on actions to reduce their impacts.

Societies to shift focus from response-recovery towards prevention-mitigation, building

resilience and reducing risks, learning from experience and avoiding past mistakes.

Thanks

Djillali BenouarJunko SagaraIRDR JapanFORIN Working Group

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www.irdrinternational.org

jane.rovins@irdrinternational.org

Thank you