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MasterThesis
Discussingthedurabilityofpeace:willitprevailinColombia?M.A.PeaceandDevelopmentStudies
(4FU42E)
Author:DavidBroo
Tutor:ManuelaNilsson
Date2017-08-18
2
Abstract
Thisthesiscontributestothedebateonwhatmakespeacedurablebydevelopingan
analyticaltoolthat,basedonthecurrentresearchstatusonwhatmakespeace
agreementslast,intendstoevaluatepeaceagreementsontheircapacitytomaintain
peace.Theresearchwasdonethroughaqualitativedeskstudy,usingtheColombian
peaceagreementwhichwassignedin2016.Theagreement,asitisfinallynegotiated,is
accordingtotheanalyticalframeworkestimatedtohaveareasonablygoodchanceto
beingdurable.
Keywords:Peacedurability,Peaceagreements,Colombia,Casestudy
Wordcount:18241
3
Acknowledgements
IwillthankmysupervisorManuelaNilssonforverygoodsupportduringtheworkwith
thethesis,andtheinstitutionofPeace&DevelopmentatLinnaeusUniversityfora
reallyinterestingyear.
4
ListofAnnexes
Annex:MapofColombia………………………………………………………………………………………………70
5
ListofAbbreviations
ACC AutodefensasCampesinasdeCórdobayUrabá/TheSelf-Defencegroupsof
CórdobaandUrabá
AUC AutodefensasUnidasdeColombia/UnitedSelf-DefenceForcesofColombia
CELAC ComunidaddeEstadosLatinoamericanosyCaribeños/CommunityofLatinand
CaribbeanStates
CFHBDCesealFuegodeHostilidadesBilateralYDefinite/BilateralandDefinite
CeasefireandcessationofHostilities
CNR ConsejoNacionaldeReincorporation/aNationalreincorporationcouncil
CSVR Comisiondeimplementacion,seguimientoyverificaciondelacuerdofinaldepaz
ylaresoluciondediferencias/ACommissionforfollow-up,verificationandadispute
resolutioncommissionforthefinalagreement
DA Dejaciondearmas/Deportationofweapons
ELN EjércitodeLiberaciónNacional/NationalLiberationArmy
EPL EjércitoPopularLiberación/PopularLiberationArmy
EU TheEuropeanUnion
FARC FuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia/RevolutionaryArmedForcesof
Colombia
MAS MuerteaSecuestradores/DeathtoKidnappers
MM&VMechanismodeMonitoreoyVerificacion/Mechanismsofmonitoringand
verification
6
M-19 Movimiento19deAbril/19AprilMovement
OASOrganizationofAmericanStates
UNASURUnióndeNacionesSuramericanas/UnionofSouthAmericanNations
UKTheUnitedKingdom
UN TheUnitedNations
PDETProgramasdeDesarrolloconEnfoqueTerritorial/DevelopmentProgramswitha
TerritorialApproach
PND PlanNacionaldeDesarrollo/Thenationaldevelopmentplan
PNIS ProgramaNacionalIntegraldeSubstituciondeCultivosdeUsoIllicito/
NationalComprehensiveProgramforSubstitutionofIllicitCropCrops
PTN PuntosTransitoriosdeNormalizacion/TransientPointsofNormalization
RRI ReformaRuralIntegral/IntegralRuralReform
UNHCRUnitedNationsCommissiononHumanRights
WOLATheWashingtonOfficeOnLatinAmerica
ZRCZonasdeReservaCampesina/Farmerenterprisezones
ZVTNZonasVeredalesTransitoriasdeNormalizacion/TransitionalStandardizationZones
UNASURUnióndeNacionesSuramericanas/UnionofSouthAmericanNations
7
ListofContent
1.Introduction……………………….………………………………………………………………………………..10
1.1 Researchproblemandrelevance.…………………….………..….………………..………………10
1.2 Researchobjectiveandquestions……………………………………………..………………….…11
1.3 Colombiaasacasestudy…………………………………………………………………………………11
1.4Methods………….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…………………….….…….………12
1.5AnalyticalandTheoreticalFramework……………………………………….…………….………12
1.6Thesisstructure…………….…….…….…….…….…….…………………….……..…….…….…….…12
2.Analyticalframework………….…………………………………………..…….…………………..……..…13
2.1Factorsforsustainablepeace:Thestateoftheliterature…..……………………………14
2.1.1NaturalResources……………….…………………………………..…….…………………………13-14
2.1.2Spoilers…….……………………………………..…….……….………….……………………..………….14
2.1.3Power-sharing…..………………………………………………………….….……..………….……15-16
2.1.4InclusionvsExclusion……..………………………………………………………….…..….…….……16
2.1.5Informationasymmetries……………………….………..…………………………..…….…………17
2.1.6Thirdpartyinvolvementanddisarmament……………………….…….…….…..…….17-18
2.1.7Democratizationandinstitutionaldesign………….………………………….……….…18-19
2.1.8Outcome,causes,intensityanddurationoftheconflict……..……………………19-20
2.2Theanalyticalframework:Factorsneededfordurablepeace…..…………..…………20
2.2.1Politicalfactors……..…………………………..……..…….………………….…………………………21
2.2.2Securityfactors……..…………………………………..………….………………………………………21
2.2.3Justicefactors……..……………..…………………..…….………………………………………………22
2.2.4Historicalfactors……..…………………………………..…….………….………………………………22
3.Methodologicalframework………………...……………………………………………………………….23
8
3.1Casestudy………….…….………………………….………………………………………………………..…23
3.2Textanalysis………….…….………………………………………..……………………………….……23-24
3.3Sources…….…….……………………………………….……………….………………………..….……24-25
3.4Limitationsanddelimitations………………….……………………………..…………………...……25
3.5Ethicalconsiderations………………………………………………………………….……………………25
4.BackgroundtothecaseoftheColombianconflict…………………………………………………26
4.1Historyandoriginsoftheconflict……………………………….……………..……..……..…26-27
4.2Theprocesstowardspeace50sto00s………………………………………………………………27
4.2.1LaViolencia………………………………………………………….……………………………..…………27
4.2.2Theemergenceofleft-wingguerrilla……………..………………………………….….….……28
4.2.3Drugtrafficking………………………………………………………….……………………..……………29
4.2.4Lackofinstitutionaltrust…………………………………….…………………………………………29
4.2.5Thegrowthofright-wingparamilitaries……………….………………………..………………30
4.2.6Attemptsofpeacetalkswiththeguerrillas………….………………………………..………31
4.2.7Peacetalkswiththeguerrillas………………………………..…………………………..……31-32
4.2.8Disarmamentofparamilitaries……………………………………………………….……..………32
4.2.9TheUribeera……………………………………………………….……………………………..……32-33
4.3TheSantoserabegin……………………………………………..………..……………….........………33
4.4.Thecurrentpeaceprocess…………………..…………………………….…………………….…34-35
4.5 Thelastmonthsofthepeaceprocesses…………..………………………………………….35-36
4.6 Thecriticlaunchedagainsttheagreement………….……………………………………………37
9
5.Findings………………………..…………………………………………..………………………………….………38
5.1SummaryoftheAugustpeaceagreement..………….……………………………………..……40
5.1.1Item1-Rurallandreform………….……………………………….……………………………39-40
5.1.2Item2-PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels………………….……………40-41
5.1.3Item3-CeasefireandDisarmamenttoendviolence……................…………..41-43
5.1.4Item4-Combatingdrug-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs………..….…..…43-44
5.1.5Item5-Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict…….……………………………………………44-45
5.1.6Item6-Implementationandverification.……………………..………………………………45
5.2Thereferendum………………………………………………………………..…………………..……48-49
5.4ComparisonbetweentheAugustandNovemberagreements..…..………………47-48
5.4.1Item1-Rurallandreform………….……………………………….…………………………………48
5.4.2Item2-PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels………………….………...……..48
5.4.3Item3-CeasefireandDisarmamenttoendofviolence……......................……..48
5.4.4Item4-Combatingdrug-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs………………………..49
5.4.5Item5-Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict…….………………………………..….………..…49
5.4.6Item6-Implementationandverification.……………………..…………………..………….50
5.5Item6–Thecurrentstatusonimplementationofthefinalagreement………..….50
6.Analysis…………………………………………..……………………………………................................51
6.1.Politicalfactors….……………………………………..………………………..……….………….….51-54
6.2Securityfactors……………..…………………………….………………………….…………..….…..54-56
6.3Justicefactors…………..…………………………………………………………………..……..……..56-58
6.4Historicalfactors…………..…………………………………………………………………………..…58-59
6.5ComparisonondurabilityoftheAugustandNovemberagreements.......……59-60
6.5ThedurabilityofthefinalColombianpeaceagreement……………………….…..………60
7.Conclusionandrecommendationsforfurtherstudies……………………………………..……61
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………62-69
Annex:MapofColombia…………………………………….………………………………………….........70
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1.Introduction
1.1Researchproblemandrelevance
Achievingdurablepeaceinpostwarenvironmentsischallenging,andmanyagreements
relapseintoviolence,particularlyinthecaseofnegotiatedagreementsintendedtoend
intra-stateconflicts.Of125intra-stateconflictsthatoccurredbetween1945and2005,
almosthalfofthemreturnedtowar(Druckman&Wagner,2016).Borjaetal(2012)also
arguethattherearemanyhistoricalexamplesoffailurestomakepeacedurable.Walter
(1999)claimsthat17of41civilwarsthatoccurredinthe19thcenturywassolved
throughpeacenegotiations,but9ofthoseconflictsrelapsedintoviolenceagain.
Thissituationhastriggeredanumberofresearcherstolookintoconditionsthatfurther
orobstaculizesustainablepeace.However,DruckmanandWagner(2016)claimthatthe
durabilityofpeaceagreementsishardtomeasure.Albin&Druckman(2011)alsoargue
thatdespiteanincreasedinterestinthesubjectinrecentyears,thereisnoclear
definitionofwhatconstitutesadurableagreement,althoughthereareseveralfactors
thatseemtocontributetoincreasingthechances.Hartzelletal.(2001)pointoutthat
hypothesesregardingthelong-rundeterminantsofpostconflictpeaceawaitfurther
testing.Thus,thereisnoconsensusonwhatworksandwhatdoesnotwork,andthusa
potentialgaptoevaluatefurther.Investigatingthenotionofdurabilitywillassisttothe
debateonwhatmakespeacedurablebyprovidingananalyticaltoolthatisbasedonthe
currentstatusofresearchonpeaceagreementsandmightbeabletobeusedinfuture
researchtopredictifpeaceagreementsfulfilthenecessarybasicconditionstolaythe
basisfordurablepeace.Thismeansthesavingoflives,moneyandlesssuffering,
contributingtoworldpeace.Iftheabilityisgiventopointouttheweaknessesinpeace
agreementsinadvance,thosepartscanbeadjustedmakingagreementsmoredurable.
SincetheColombianagreementhadarenegotiationitisanidealcaseforthe
developmentofananalyticalframework.
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1.2Researchobjectiveandquestions
Theobjectiveofthisresearchistocontributetothediscussionondurabilityofpeace
agreementsbycreatingananalyticalframeworkofwhathasbeendonesofarregarding
whatmakespeacedurable,andthenapplyingthattothecaseoftheColombianpeace
agreement.Ihavethenchosenthefollowingresearchquestion:
Discussingthedurabilityofpeace:willitprevailinColombia?
1.3Colombiaasacasestudy
ThebackgroundofthecivilwarinColombiaisoverfivedecadesoldwithmanydifferent
peaceprocessesdevelopedovertime(Crisisgroup,2017).Theconflictwasgoingonfor
almost50yearswithmorethan45,000deathsand3milliondisplacedasaresultofthe
warbetweenthearmy,left-wingguerrillas,right-wingparamilitaries,drugcartelsand
criminalgangs(MSB,2016).In2016after52yearsofconflicttheColombian
governmentandthebiggestguerrillagroupFARCreachedanhistoricalagreement
(HRW,2016).Thefinalagreementconsistsof310pageswithsixkeypointsregarding
Ceasefire,Disarmament,Justiceforvictims,DrugTrade,Formerrebelsinpoliticsand
Landreform(FARC-EP,2017).ThechallengeforColombiaisnowtomakesurethatthe
newbornpeacegetsdurable(DN,2016).TheColombianexampleisseenasanewand
inclusivewaytodopeacenegotiations,andcanthenbestatedasapotentialforerunner
forfurtherpeaceagreements(McAlevey,2016).
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1.4Methods
Thisresearchisaqualitativedeskstudy.Thetopicistreatedasasinglecasestudy,since
itisthengiventheopportunitytogetadeepunderstandingofthespecifictopicin
formsoftheColombianpeaceagreement.Themethodologicaltoolusedintheanalysis
istextanalysis,andmaterialconsultedaresecondarysourcesaswellastheoriginal
peaceagreementdocumentinitstwodifferentversions.Regardingresearchethics,
thereisnoethicalissuestobeforeseen.
1.5Analyticalandtheoreticalframework
Themainframeworkforthisstudyisconstructedfromtheliteraturethatoutlines
differentfactorsofwhatmakespeaceagreementsdurable.Theresearchwillbe
operationalizedthroughalookintotheexistingliteratureregardingpolitical,security,
justiceandhistoricalfactorsfordurability,andthenseeiftheColombianagreement
fulfilsthosecriteria.
1.6Thesisstructure
Following this introductory chapter, the discussion regarding the durability of peace
agreementsisintroducedinchaptertwo.Thechapterconsistsofamorein-depthreview
oftheexistingliteratureregardingthedebateconcerningdurabilityofpeaceagreements,
tosketchoutofwhathassofarbeendeterminedbydifferentresearcherstomakepeace
durable.Thecircumstancesforthisresearchprescribeaqualitativedeskstudywiththe
methodoftextanalysis,whichisfurtherdescribedinthemethodschapterthree.Chapter
fourconsistsofthehistoryandbackgroundoftheColombiancase.Chapterfivepresents
the findings. In the analysis chapter it will be investigated factor by factor if the
Colombianagreementfulfilthecriteriaofwhatmakespeacedurable,accordingtothe
developed analytical framework. The last chapter presents conclusions and
recommendationsforfurtherstudies.
13
2.Analyticalframework
2.1Factorsforsustainablepeace:Thestateoftheliterature
Whatmakespeacedurableandhowshouldanagreementlookliketoincreasethe
possibilitiesfordurablepeace?Theliteraturereviewbelowconsistsofadiscussion
regardingthedebateconcerningdurabilityofpeaceagreements,tosketchoutwhat
makespeacedurable.Thiswillprovideananalyticalframework,tobeappliedinthe
analysistoevaluateiftheColombianagreementfulfilsthosecriteria.Thefollowing
sectionoutlinesthemajorfactorsoutlinedinthecurrentliteratureasinfluentialforthe
durabilityofpeaceagreements.Theselectionofauthorswasmadecarefully,withfocus
onnewerarticlesfromwell-knownscientificsources.Thestateoftheliteraturedoes
notaimtoproveiftheyarerightorwrong,butinsteadtohelpestablishacommon
platformfordiscussion.Thissincetherearesomanydifferentfactorsoutlinedinthe
literature,andjustthemajoroneswerechosen.
2.1.1Naturalresources
Naturalresourceshighlyaffectthedurabilityofpeacenegatively.Druckman&Wagner
(2016)pointoutthatthedistributionofincomesfromnaturalresourceshavetobe
equallydistributed,otherwiseitaffectsdurabilityinanegativeway.Accordingto
Stedman(2001)implementationofpeaceagreementsbecomesmoredifficultifwarring
partieshaveaccesstodisposablenaturalresources,sincethoseresourcesprovide
armieswithameansforcontinuedfighting,becometherewardagainstwhichthey
weighthebenefitsofpeaceandemboldenspoilerbehaviour.Whenitinoppositeisa
lackofaccesstosuchresources,itiseffectivelylimitedthebenefitsofreturningtowar
fortheparties.Ross(2004)claimsthatnaturalresourcesandcivilwararehighly
correlated.Oil,nonfuelminerals,anddrugsarecausallylinkedtoconflict,butlegal
agriculturalcommoditiesarenot.Binningsbø&Rustad(2012)arguethatnatural
resourcesinformsofoilanddiamondsincreasetheconflictrisk,prolongcivilwar,and
negativelyaffectpeaceprocessesanddurability.AccordingtoUNEP(2017)40%ofall
14
intrastateconflictsthatoccurredforthelast60yearswerelinkedtonaturalresources,
anditalsodoublestheriskofaconflictrelapseinthefirstfiveyears.
2.1.2Spoilers
Implementersofpeaceagreementshavetolookcarefullyatthethreatsforpeacein
termsofspoilersofthepeaceprocess.AccordingtoStedman(1997)thedifference
betweensuccessfulandunsuccessfulimplementationofapeaceagreementcanbethe
strategyofaggressivemanagementofspoilers,sincethereareusuallyspoilerproblems
inthepeaceafterapeaceagreementisreached.Thesituationisoftenvulnerableand
citizens,internationalactorsandpeacemakershavetolookcarefullyatthethreatsfor
peaceintermsofspoilers.Guardiansofpeacemustconstantlyseektheintentionsof
thewarringpartiestoreachagreementandsearchforevidencetoensurethatthe
signatoriestothepeaceagreementaresincereintheircommitment,andtoseekand
takeadvantageoftheintelligenceofthewarringpartiesobjectives,strategiesand
tactics.Custodiansshouldjudgewhatisright,justandfairinthepeaceprocess.Thiscan
bedoneeitherexpresslyorthroughinternationalconsensusonwhatisappropriatefor
thewarringparties,orbynottakingthemeasuresinviewoftheviolentattacksand
spoilerbehaviour.Furthermore,Stedman(1994)underlinethatsomecivilwarscannot
endthroughnegotiations,sincesomepartieswillusenegotiationsasatactictodefeat
theopponents.Thereisalwaysariskofspoilersusingceasefirestrengthenthemselves
toprepareforreturntowar.Regardingmoralconcernstheconcernforsavinglives
musttakepriorityoverthemoralconcernregardingjusticeforvictims.Ifnegotiation
cansucceed,accountabilityforwarcrimeswillhavetobeabandoned.
15
2.1.3Power-sharing
Agreementsbasedonpower-sharingseemtoincreasethedurabilityofpeace
agreements,butitdifferswhichformofpower-sharingisused.AccordingtoSimonset
al.(2013)researchershavequestionedwhetherpower-sharingisaneffectivetoolof
conflictmanagement,andifitsgrowingpopularityisjustifiedbytheresults.Joshi&
Mason(2011)arguethatthelargerthesizeofthegoverningcoalition,thegreaterthe
opportunitiesareforanyonegrouptobecomeapartofagoverningcoalition.Thiswill
theninfluencethepolicyprocessinwaysthatenhanceitsinterests,whichincreasethe
chancesfordurablepeace.Alargergoverningcoalitionismorelikelytoemerge
followingnegotiatedagreements.Ontheotherhand,peaceismorelikelytofailwhere
thegoverningcoalitionissmaller,andexcludedgroupsthenhavelittletolosefrom
resumingtoconflict.Termsofpower-sharingagreementsbetweenformerrivals
structurethecompositionofthegoverningcoalitioninthepost–civilwarstateandthe
rulesofthegamebywhichthosegroupspursuetheirowninterests.Especially
territorialpower-sharingexpandingthegoverningcoalition,positivelyaffectingthe
durability.Expandingthesizeofthegoverningcoalitioncreatesstrongerincentivesfor
formerrivalstosustainthepeacebecausetheycanpursuetheirpoliticalobjectives
throughmeansthatarelesscostlyandlessriskythanreturningintoarmedconflict.
Furthermore,Nilsson(2012)arguesthatpeaceagreementsthatcontainahigherdegree
ofprovisionsforpower-sharingaremorelikelytogetsustainablepeace,independently
iftheagreementcontainsmilitary,territorialorpoliticalformsofpower-sharing.Albin&
Druckman(2011)pointoutthatpeaceagreementsbasedonmilitaryandterritorial
power-sharingprobablyincreasedurability.Joshi&Mason(2011)arguethatdurable
peacecanbeestablished,ifformerrivalsagreetoformalizedpoliticalandterritorial
power-sharingarrangementsinanegotiatedsettlement.Hartzelletal.(2001)claimthat
power-sharingistorecommend,sincetheabilityofterritorialautonomyandthird-party
assurancestomitigateopponent’ssecurityconcernsmaybeweakensovertime.Simons,
etal(2013)arguethatthereishardlyanyevidencetoclaimthatincludinglocalpower-
16
sharinginnationalagreementsincreasedurabilityofpeace,atleastinashort-term
perspective.Theimportanceofthesub-nationallevelisoftenoverestimated,sinceit
mightevenmakethepeaceprocessweaker,andcanactuallyleadtorenewedconflict
insteadofamelioratingthesituation.Issuesthatinsteadneedtobeconsideredarethe
historyofspatial-politicallinks,thecentralisedpoliticsofcaringabouttheperipheryas
wellastheestablishmentoflocalbalancesormonopoliesofpower.AnIssuesthatneed
tobetakenintoaccountarethehistoryofspatial-politicalrelations,thecentralized
policytotakecareoftheperipheryandtheestablishmentoflocalbalancesormonopoly
power.
2.1.4Inclusionvs.exclusion
Thereisadebateifinclusionorexclusionistopreferinapeaceagreement.Nilsson
(2012)pointsoutthattheinclusionofcivilsocietyactorsinpeaceagreementsaremost
importantforpositiveeffectsonthedurationofpeaceagreements.Paffenholz(2014)
agrees,butalsounderlinethatitneedstobetakenintoaccounthowandunderwhat
circumstancesitcanbeaccomplishedmosteffectively.Civilsocietyshouldthereforebe
seenasanownactorintheprocess.However,itisalsoimportanttolookatother
potentiallyexcludedactorssuchasforexamplepoliticalpartiesandbusiness
organizations,aswellasthecontextoftheconflict.Civilsocietyisgenerallyseenasan
importantactorinpeaceprocessesandmostresearchersarguethatcivil
societyparticipationmakestheprocessmoresustainableanddemocratic.However,itin
thesameturnmakesitmoredifficulttoreachanagreement.Analysisofthesemodels
suggeststhatitwillbepossibletobroadentheparticipationofcivilsocietyinpeace
negotiationswithoutdecreasingthenegotiations.
17
2.1.5Informationasymmetries
Thereisadebateamongauthorsregardinghowinformationaffectthewarringparts
andchancesforcreatingastableagreement.Informationsymmetrieshavetobeavoid,
andtransparencyistoprefertoincreasethedurabilityofapeaceagreement.Joshi&
Mason(2011)arguethatwhenbothsidesknowtheirrivalhasthesameincentive,they
cannottrusttheothersidescommitmenttodisarmanddemobilizeunderthetermsofa
settlement.Mattes&Savun(2010)claimthatpeaceagreementsthatincludes
provisionstorevealinformationaboutthedifferentfighter’smilitaryresources,
increasesthelikelihoodfordurability.Therefore,avoidingofinformationasymmetries
canplayanimportantroleinpeaceagreementswhereuncertaintybetweenpartshave
tobereduced.Furthermore,theriskofarenewedcivilwarsignificantlycanbereduced,
whenfightingpartiesreporttheirmilitaryinformationtothirdparties,forsecurity
guarantees.Reachingasettlementinacivilwarandestablishingpeaceimplythatrebels
havetobedisarmedwhichcanbehardtomanage,wheninformationasymmetries
betweenformerdisputantsregardingmilitarycapabilitiesmaystillpersist.This
especiallyifthecivilwarendedinanegotiatedsettlementratherthanamilitaryvictory.
Themoreuncertainty-reducingprovisionsincluded,thebetterchancesfordurable
peace.Commitmentproblemsareviewedastheleadingrationalisttheoretical
explanationforcivilwarespeciallyinlongdurationcivilwars,althoughcertaintypesof
informationasymmetriesalsoplayarole(Blattman&Miguel,2010).
2.1.6Thirdpartyinvolvementanddisarmament
Thirdpartyinvolvementseemstobeimportantforthedurabilityofpeace.Walter
(1999)statesthatoutsidehelpbyathirdpartythathasthepoliticalwilltoverifyand
enforcethedemobilizationmakethechancesfordurablepeacebetter.Hartzell,etal
(2001)arguethatthirdpartysecurityassurances,suchasstatesorregionalor
internationalorganizations,haveastabilizingeffectsincetheyoffersecurityassurances
topartiesaspartofthenegotiatedagreement.Ifthirdpartiesinterveneearlyintoa
18
conflictthatservestoreducethecasualtyrate,italsomaycontributetoamoredurable
peace.Furthermore,Nilsson(2012)claimsthatthirdpartiesoftenspendalotof
resourcesandeffortinpeaceprocesses,inordertocreatesustainablesolutionstocivil
warsbyprovidingsupporttovariousactors.Joshi&Mason(2011)pointoutthatwhen
thirdpartiessuchasUNprovidesecurityguaranteesduringthedisarmingand
demobilizingphase,peaceagreementsaremorelikelytobedurable.
2.1.7Democratizationandinstitutionaldesign
Therearedifferentviewsbetweenauthorsintheexistingdebateregardingthe
correlationbetweendemocratizationandthedurabilityofpeaceagreements.However,
stateswithademocracytraditionhaveeasiertoreachsustainablepeaceaftercivilwar,
thanthosewithnotraditionofdemocracy.Senese(1997)underlinethatthereis
inconclusiveevidenceregardingregimetypeandnationalconflictinvolvement.Walter
(1999)arguesthatstatesemergingfromcivilwarshallbecarefulintheir
democratizationprocess,whenpromisingfreeandfairelectionsasameansto
introducedemocracy.Furthermore,combatantsthatarelikelytobecomeinsecureas
theydemobilize,cangainasenseofsafetyiftheyarenotforcedtodisarmfully,
especiallybeforethepoliticaltermsofanagreementhavebeenfulfilled.Animportant
deterrentagainstattemptsbysomeofthegroupstoestablishdictatorialrule,isby
offeringgroupscarrotssuchasterritorialautonomy,openborders,andasylum
provisions.Militaryforcemightberequiredfordemobilization,buttheinstitutional
designmattersmoreforthesustainabilityofthepeace.Nilsson(2012)arguesthat
inclusionofcivilsocietyactorsinpeaceagreementsincreasesthedurabilityofpeace,
butthatit`salsodependsifthecountryisdemocraticornot.Incombinationwith
democraticpoliticalparties,thepeaceagreementsgetevenbetterchancestobe
durable.Civilsocietyactorssuchaswomen’sorganizationsandreligiousactorsare
preferablytobegivenaroleinpeacesettlements.Forbuildinglegitimacytothepeace
process,peacemakersshouldalsostrivetoinvolveactorsfromawidespectrumofthe
societyaspossible.Thissinceit,whenawiderspectrumofsocietybecomesinvolveina
19
peaceprocess,itincreasesthelegitimacyoftheprocess,whichinturncontributeto
durability.Hartzell,etal(2001)addsthatdurabilityseemstobepositivelyaffectedby
peaceagreementsthatconcernstatesinwhichthepreviousstableregimewasa
democracy.Furthermore,itispositiveifthepeaceagreementincludesprovisionsfor
theterritorialautonomyofthreatenedgroups.Thedesignofnewinstitutional
arrangementsforthemanagementoftheconflictalsoseemstosignificantlystabilizing
thepeace.Ontheotherhand,civilwarresolutionsforstateswithalackofdemocracy
experiencenegativelyaffectingthedurability.Itisalsoworthwhiletofocusonthe
securityconcernsofcivilwaradversaries.Devisinginstitutionalmeanstoenhancethe
securityofformeropponentsmayproveamoreproductiveandstabilizingpeacethan
attemptingtoidentifyandaddresscomplexoriginsofdisputes.Blattman&Miguel
(2010)arguethattheextensionofnationalcontroldowntothecommunitylevelare
essentialstateresponsibilitiesforincreasingofpeacedurabilitysincesuccessfulstates
doso,includingtheuseofforce.
2.1.8Outcome,causes,intensityanddurationoftheconflict
Conflictswithhighintensitythatoccurredforalongtime,negativelyaffectthechances
fordurablepeace.However,itisnotclearifapeaceagreementbetweentwopartsis
actuallytobepreferred,comparedtoamilitaryvictorybyonesidewhenitcomesto
durabilityofpeace.Joshi&Mason(2011)arguethatthedurabilityofpeaceaftercivil
wardependsontheconflictoutcome,whetheritendedbyadecisivemilitaryvictoryor
anegotiatedagreement.However,someresearchstatesthatmilitaryvictoryincreases
thechancesfordurablepeace,comparedtopeacethroughanagreement.Nilsson
(2012)alsoclaimsthatthecharacteristicsoftheconflictaffectthedurabilityofpeace.
Forexample,theconflictissue,intensityanddurationoftheconflict.Hartzell,etal
(2001)pointoutthatItispositiveforthepossibilitiesofsustainabilityiftheagreement
concludescivilconflictsoflowintensity,whichhavelastforextendedperiodsoftime.In
oppositesettlementsareleastlikelytoendure,whentheyfollowintenselyviolent
conflicts.Albin&Druckman(2011)alsounderlinethatchancesfordurablepeace
20
dependsoftheconflictintensity,sincehighintenseconflictstendtonegativelyaffect
thedurability.
Furthermore,thememoryofhistoricalviolenceoftheconflictanditscauseshavetobe
addressedinthepeaceprocess,sincethisplaysacentralroleinanationoranethnic
group’sculturalidentity.Tojustforgetaboutthepastdoesnotworkasasolutionfor
peaceandhistoricaldialoguehastobecomepartofpeacebuildingandconflict
resolution.TheColombianexperiencemayprovideaninsightregardingtheprocessof
validatingpluralisticnarrativesandmultipleperspectivescontributingdirectlyto
confidencebuildinginthepeacenegotiationstohavepotentialrepresentingagrowing
nationalpoliticalculture.Similartohumanrightsadvocacy,thereisnoreasontoexpect
aquicksolutionthroughhistoricaldialogue,butitcanstillprovideaframeworkfor
cooperation,aspartofresolvingitstensionwithconflictresolution.Thereisaneedto
dealwiththepastandtreathistoryaspartofthepoliticalagendaduringconflict
resolution.Itisalsopreferabletoincorporateitasanintegralpartintopeace
negotiationsandpostconflictinstitutions(Barkan,2016).
2.2Theanalyticalframework:Factorsneededfordurablepeace
Whencomparingthefactorsneededfordurablepeace,researcherscomeupwithmany
points,butdonotnecessarilyagree.Theframeworkbelowsummarizesandcategorizes
thefactorsoutlinedintheliteraturedebateonfactorsthatinfluencesustainablepeace
agreements and is used as an analytical framework for this research. When factors
overlappingeachother,theyareputintheboxwheretheymakemostsense.Thefactors
willbeusedforresearchandaredividedintofourcategories.However,itwasnoteasy
tocategorize,sincemanyfactorsareoverlappingeachother.Ashortexplanationisgiven
forall four categorieshowdefining thedifferent factorsandwhy thoseare choosing.
Somefactorsoverlap,othersactuallydisagree.Thereisnoconsensusbelongallauthors
fornofactor.
21
Thegraphbelowiscreatedbytheauthor,fromtheaboveliteraturereview.
Politicalfactors Securityfactors
Justicefactors Historical
factors
Institutional
Design
Third
Parties
Power
Sharing
Outcome
Democratization Spoilers
Justice Causes
Inclusion Information
Asymmetries
Natural
Resources
Intensity
Exclusion Disarmament Victim
Policy
Duration
2.2.1Politicalfactors
Politicalfactorsaredefinedasfactorsrelatedtogovernmentpolicies,suchas
institutionaldesign,democratisationandinclusionorexclusionofpoliticalactors.Those
factorsarechosen,sincetheyarehighlyimportantforstableconditionsinthebuilding
ofastate.Regardingdemocracy,itcanalsobeseenasahistoricalfactor,affecting
durabilityofpeacebutitmademostsensetoputthisfactorinthisbox.Institutional
designisofcoursealsoimportantforsecurity,andoverlappingthatboxaswell.
2.2.2Securityfactors
Securityfactorsaredefinedasfactorsneededforastableandsecureenvironmentsuch
asthird-partyinvolvementbyotherorganisationsorstates,whichalsooverlappingthe
boxofpoliticalfactors.Regardingtheavoidingofinformationasymmetriesandspoilers
theycouldalsobeseenaspoliticalfactors.Theimportanceofdisarmamentbythefighting
partieswascleartoputinthesecurityfactorbox,sinceithighlyaffectingsecurity.
22
2.2.3Justicefactors
Justice factors are defined as power sharing, justice, equal distribution of natural
resourcesandvictimpolicy.Regardingnaturalresources,itcouldofcoursehavebeenput
inaseparateboxofeconomicfactors.Itishoweverputintheboxofjustice,sincethe
relationtoequaldistributionofresources.Powersharingalsofitsintheboxpoliticalor
securityfactors,butmakemoresenseasafactorforjustice.Victimpolicyalsooverlapping
thesecurityfactorbox.Naturalresourcesareanotherfactorhighlyaffectingsecurityas
well.
2.2.4Historicalfactors
Historicalfactorsaredefinedasfactorsconcerningconflicthistorysuchasoutcome,
causes,intensityanddurationoftheconflict.Thoseactuallyalsooverlappingwith
justiceandpoliticalfactors,butaremostlycorrelatedtothehistoryandthenput
togetherintheboxofhistoricalfactors.
23
3.Methodologicalframework
3.1Casestudy
Aclassiccasestudyconsistsofanin-depthinquiryintoaphenomenonthatiscomplex
andspecificinitsreal-worldcontext.Itshouldexaminethelikelyinteractionwhenthe
caseisinitscontext(Yin,2013).Thebasiccasestudyentailsthedetailedandintensive
analysisofasinglecaseorevent,andoftenfavourqualitativemethods(Bryman,2012).
Thecircumstancesforthisresearchprescribeaqualitativedeskstudyoverafieldstudy.
Itisqualitativesincetheresearchstrategyusedemphasizewordsratherthan
quantification.Adeskstudyfitsbest,sincetheaimisatheoreticalcontributionofan
analyticalframework,andthereisthennoneedgoingintothefield.Ijustapplyittoa
case.ThisiswhyIdoadesk,andnotafieldstudy.Thetopicistreatedasasinglecase
study,sinceitisthengiventheopportunitytogetadeepunderstandingofthespecific
topic,comparedlookingintomanycases.Itcouldhavebeenanideadoingso,butthen
ithadnotbeenpossiblegoingintodepthonallthecases.ThechoiceoftheColombian
peaceagreementasasinglecasemakesense,sinceitisthenewest,highly
transparentlysignedagreementgivenmuchattentionrecently.Furthermore,Colombia
isademocracy,andalotofinternationaladvisorswereincludedintheprocess.Ithen
assumethattheagreementwasmadebypeoplethatwereconsultingaboutthepeace
agreement,andwhoactuallyknowaboutthedebate.Itisalsothemostpossible
advancedcase,withanAugustandNovemberagreementandarenegotiation.
3.2Textanalysis
Themethodologicaltoolusedtoprocesstheinformationfromthesourcesistext
analysis.Frey,etal(1999)definetextanalysisasamethodtodescribeandinterpretthe
characteristicsofamessage,withthepurposetodescribethecontent,structure,and
functionsofthemessagescontainedintexts.Theselectionoftextstobestudied,
acquiringappropriatetexts,anddeterminingwhichparticularapproachtoemployin
24
analysingthemhavetobeconsideredwhenusingtextualanalysisasamethod.McKee
(2003)definetextanalysisasaway,methodologyanddatagatheringprocessfor
researcherstogatherinformationhowotherhumanbeingsmakesenseoftheworld.
Blattman&Miguel(2010)arguethatcasestudiesarecrucialtodecipherwar’scauses,
conduct,andconsequences.
3.3Sources
ApartfromtheAugustandNovemberPeaceagreementsitselfinSpanish,AcuerdoFinal
andAcuerdoNuevoFinal,therearenotanyprimarysourcesused.Thematerial
consultedarerelevantliterature,electronicsources,variouspress,journalsand
newspapers.Thechoiceofthosesecondarysourcesfocusedonthosestakeholderswho
wereinvolvedduringthepeaceprocess,suchastheColombianGovernment,WOLAand
CrisisGroup,thelatterwhichitspolicyrecommendationswereusedbybothFARCand
theColombianGovernment.ReportsfromCrisisGroup(2016)named“Reassembling
Colombia`srejectedpeacedeal”,“IntheshadowofNoPeaceafterColombia`s
plebiscite”and“Colombia`sFARCendits53-yearinsurgency”andfromWOLA(2016)
“Keychangestothenewpeaceaccord”contributedwithimportantbackground
information.Furthermore,factsregardingtheColombianconflictwereprovidedfrom
thecrediblesourcesofUppsalaConflictDataProgram,UCDP(2016)andtheSwedish
CivilProtectionandPreparednessAuthority,MSB(2016)aswell.Reportsfrom
internationalorganizationsHRW(2017)“Worldreport2017:Colombia”andUN(2016,
2017)named“AgreementontheBilateralfromPeacetoDemocratization:Lessonsfrom
CentralAmerica,andDefinitiveCeasefireandCessationofHostilities,andtheLaydown
ofWeaponsbetweentheNationalGovernmentandtheFARC-EP”and“Buildingsolid
FoundationforPeaceinColombiaand“Conflictandresources”Regardingsourcesinthe
debateondurability,thatservedasgroundfortheanalyticalframeworkdevelopedin
thisthesis,thosefocusedonpeer-reviewed,scientificarticlesbyprominent,
internationalauthors,PhD`sandprofessorsinthefieldofinternationalrelations,
negotiationsandpeaceandconflictresearchasfollowing:Albin&Druckman(2011),
25
Barkan(2016),Beharetal(1989),Borja(2012),Blattman&Miguel(2010),Druckman&
Wagner(2016),Freyetal(1999),González(2004),Gray(2008),Hartzell(2001),Joshi&
Mason(2011),Mattes&Savun(2010),Nilsson(2012),Paffenholz(2014),Pinzon(2017),
Rozema(2008),Rustad&Binningsbø(2012),Senese(1997),Simonsetal(2013),
Stedman(1994,1997,2001)andWalter(1999).Allthosesourcestogetherbroughta
solidgroundfortheresearch.
3.4Limitationsanddelimitations
SincealargepartofthematerialontheColombianpeaceagreementiswrittenin
Spanish,thelanguagebarrierisaweaknessandrisk.However,thearticlesusedinthe
debateregardingwhatmakespeacedurableareallwritteninEnglish,whichgetasolid
base.Thecircumstancesprescribeadeskstudywhenoperationalisingtheresearch.
However,usingjustthesingleColombiancaseisadelimitation,andalimitationinterms
ofgeneralizabilityoftheresults,butitisthengiventhepossibilitytogomorein-depth.
Furthermore,assaidoneobviouslimitationinthisresearchisthelanguagebarrier,
sincethepeaceagreementsiswritteninSpanishandmymothertongueisSwedish.
However,theagreementistranslatedbutitisanywayarisktodonotgettheright
context.Thiswillbebalancedthroughagoodtheoreticalandin-depthunderstandingon
thedebateondurabilityofpeaceagreementsasthemaincontributionoftheresearch.
SincewecannotactuallyseeifpeacewillprevailinColombia,thisthesisislimitedto
providingananalyticalframehatcanhelptoprovidethatservice.Wecannottoday
reallyprovethefactorsasrightorwrongondifferentcasesonforehandeither.
However,thiscanbedoneandevaluatedbyfutureresearch.Theotherauthors,those
whocameupwiththefactorsinthefirstplace,usedpeaceagreementsinorderto
providetheirfactors.Basedonthatthisthesisprovideapredictivetool.
3.5Ethicalconsiderations
Regardingresearchethics,thereisnoethicalissuestobeforeseenwhencarryingout
thisdeskstudyresearch.Thereisnotanypersonalinterviewsorethnographicstudies.
26
4.BackgroundtothecaseoftheColombianconflict
4.1Historyandoriginsoftheconflict
Thecolonizationofpresent-dayColombiabeganat1525.ThenamewasGranColombia
andincludedtodaysEcuador,VenezuelaandPanamauntil1819whentheygot
independencefromSpain(Gonzales,2004).ThenorthernpartofSouthAmerica
constitutedtheformerSpanishColonyNewGranada.In1830itcollapsedintothestates
ofColombia(Panamaincludeduntil1903)VenezuelaandEcuador.Therehassincethen
beenclashesbetweentheoppositepoliticalpartiesinColombia,theconservativesand
theliberals(UCDP,2017).Colombiagotit`snamein1886.TheConservativeandLiberal
partieslaunchedit`spoliticalprogramsin1848and1849,andtheConservatives
dominatedthepoliticsfrom1885to1930.Inthe1930stheLiberalPartylaunched
social,economicandpoliticalreformsaimedtomodernisethesociety.Buttheresult
wentouttheoppositeway,sincethosereformsinsteadcreatedanatmosphereof
polarisationthatpreparedthewayfortheexplosionoflaterviolenceinColombia.
DespiteitsdurationthereisnoconsensusonthecausesofthecomplexColombian
conflict,sinceithaschangedovertimeandarenotjustabouttwoopposingpartsora
singleissue.Theconflictinvolvesanumberoflocal,regionalandnationaldynamics,
differenthistoricalprocesses,structuralfactorssuchaspoliticalexclusionandsocio-
economicinequality,landsettlement,statebuilding,geographicdifferencesandthe
cocaproduction.Furthermore,twohistoricalphenomenaarefundamentalto
understandingtheColombianconflictwhichbothhavetheirrootsinthehistoryofthe
settlementofthecountryfromcolonialtimestillnowadays.Thefirstisthesocalled
campesinocolonisationofotherareas,whereColombiafailedtoimplementagrarian
reformtoredistributelandownership.Thepresenceofthecentralstate'sinstitutions
andinteractionwiththerestofsociety,andthenationaleconomywasthenminimal.
Secondly,thisdynamicwasreflectedinagradualstate-buildingprocess,wheredelayed
transpositionofterritoriesandpopulationsresultedinanunequalstatepresencein
27
theseregions.Sincethebeginningofthe16thcentury,itisthemostisolatedand
unavailableterritoriesweresettledbymarginalisedgroupsandtheorganisationof
socialrelationsthenwaslefttoindividualsandsocialgroups,sincethestatelackedto
makeit.Thecombinationofthecolonisationprocesswithit`sdependencyonlocal
powersmadetheintegrationofrecentlysettledterritoriesintotherestofthecountry
highlyconflictual.FromtheendofSpanishruleuntiltheconsolidationoftodays
Colombia,manyoftheruralandpoliticalstructuralproblemsthatcamefromfromthe
yearsofSpanishcolonydeepened(Gonzáles,2004).Therehavebeensomekeyfactors
thathavebeenfuellingtheviolentconflictinColombiasuchaseconomicforces,state
weakness,U.S.policies,long-durationandspin-offviolence,andmaliciousopportunism
bynon-combatants(Gray,2008).
4.2Theprocesstowardspeace50sto00s
4.2.1LaViolencia
WhenliberalleaderandpresidentaspirantJorgeEliécerGaitánwasassassinatedin
1948,violentfightingbrokeout.Theclashedwerebetweenthetwomajorpolitical
parties,theConservativesandtheLiberalsinparticular,butdifferentnon-statearmed
groups,socialists,privatearmiesoflandowners,bandit’speasantorganizations,and
liberalself-defencegroupsaswell(UCDP,2017).Intheperiodfrom1946to1953Itis
estimatedthat200,000werekilled,whichbecameknownasLaViolencia.Colombia
thengotaperiodofmilitaryrule,whengeneralGustavoRojasPinillatookpowerin
1953.HisgovernmenttriedtopacifythecountrythroughanamnestyfortheLiberal
fighters,butitsanti-communistattitudeinsteaddrewitintoconfrontationwiththe
guerrillas(Gonzales,2004).In1958ConservativesandLiberalsagreedonasystemof
powersharing,andaJointBoardnametheNationalFrontwasestablished.Butthe
powerdivisioncreatedpoliticalproblems,sinceallothergroupswereexcludedandthe
twomajorpoliticalpartiesnolongerneededtocompeteforpower.(MSB,2016).
28
4.2.2Theemergenceofleft-wingguerrilla
Theneedtoendtheconflictandthemilitarydictatorshipthatledtoanagreement
betweenthetwotraditionalparties,theConservativesandLiberals,wasfollowedby16
yearsofpowersharingtogether.Colombiathengotaperiodofstability,buttheprice
washigh.Thissincethepoliticalexpressionofnewlocalpowerswasprevented,which
ledtomoretensionsandtheappearanceofleft-wingguerrillamovementsinthe1960s
(Gonzales,2004).Thedifferentguerrillagroupsexpresseddemandsforsocialreforms,
andstartedarmedstruggleagainstthestate.(UCDP,2017).Theself-defencegroups
influencedbytheCommunistPartyinouterareasofcampesinocolonisation,werein
1966transformedintotheleft-wingFARCguerrillagroup(Gonzalez,2004)FARCwasthe
largestguerrillagroup,developedfromtheself-defencegroupsinruralareasunderthe
periodofLaViolencia.Theguerrillawithit`sheMarxist-Leninistideology,wereearly
supportedbytheCommunistregimeinMoscow.ThegoalofFARCwastooverthrowthe
regime,limitUSinfluenceinthecountryandimplementreformsintheagricultural
sector.However,itwasnotuntilthe1980sthatFARCwasconsideredaseriousthreat,
withstrengthenedmilitarycapabilitiesandabiggerrecruitment.Afterthefallofthe
SovietUnionin1991,FARC'sideologicalmotivationincreasinglydiminished(MSB,
2016).Duringthe1990sthesupportforFARCeroded,andmoreofthegroup'sfinances
werecomingfromthecocasectorandkidnapping(Gray,2008).Otherleft-wingguerrilla
groupsemergedinthe60`swereELN,foundedin1965,withitsoriginsinthegroupof
radicaliseduniversityInspiredbytheRevolutioninCubaandannouncingitsgoalof
overthrowingtheregime(MSB,2016).TheMaoist-influencedEPLwascreatedasthe
armedwingoftheLeninistCommunistPartyin1967.In1972,themoreurbanM-19was
formedinreactiontoperceivedelectoralfraudinthe1970elections.(Gonzales,2004).
29
4.2.3Drugtrafficking
ThemagnitudeofdrugcartelshasacentralroleinColombia'sviolenthistory.Alreadyin
thelate1960s,ColombiawasanimportantsupplierofmarijuanausedintheUnited
States.Thecentreofmarijuanaproduction,however,wasduringthistimeinMexico.
Duringthe1970sColombiatookoverMexico’sexportofMarijuanawith70%of
marijuanasmuggledtotheUnitedStates.WhenUSdemandforCocaineincreasedthe
tradedramaticallychangedthedrugindustry.Duringthe1980sand1990stherewere
twomajorassociationsofdrugcartelsinColombia,inMedellinandCali.Thecartelsalso
declaredwaronthegovernmentandthousandsofpeoplelosetheirlivesinthefighting.
OneofthemostnoticedattackswaswhentheMedellincartelbombedapassenger
planeintheairoverthecapitalBogotáinNovember1989killingall107passengers
(MSB,2016).Thecartelsweredefeatedinthemid-1990sbytheColombiangovernment,
withUSmilitarysupport.
4.2.4Lackofinstitutionaltrust
Theexpansionofillicitcropsinthe80`sledtothetransformationoftherelationship
betweentheguerrillasanddrugtrafficking.Somearguethattheviolenceafter1980
representsafundamentalrupturewithpreviousviolence.FARCwaslatercontrollingthe
productionandtraffickingofcocaandtheincomederivedfromillicitcropsincreased
theFARC’sautonomy,whichnolongerdependedonitsintegrationintotherural
communities.Atthesametime,thepenetrationofdrug-traffickinginColombiansociety
hascontributedtowidespreadcorruption.Theinfiltrationofthedrugtradefurther
deepenedthefragmentationofstatepowerandthecrisisoflegitimacy.Intheabsence
ofthestatetheconflictwasfurtherdevelopedandthepopulationwereleftwithouta
fixedsystemofinstitutionalreferences.Theythereforeresorttotheuseofterrorin
ordertoensuretheloyaltyofthecivilianpopulationandtodenytheadversarysupport.
TheColombianconflictcanthenbedescribedasawarthroughthirdparties,and
characterisedasawaragainstthecivilianpopulation(Gonzales,2004).
30
4.2.5Thegrowthofright-wingparamilitaries
Intheearly80`stheleft-wingguerrillasbegantoexpandtowardsricherareasmore
integratedintonationaleconomicandpoliticalstructures,andincreasedtheuseof
kidnappingandextortionasoneofit`smainfinancing.Inthisenvironmentright-wing
paramilitarygroupsemerged,inoppositetotheguerrillas(Gonzales,2004).The
Paramilitaryforceswerecreatedbylargelandownersanddruglordsinprotection
againsttheguerrillas.Tosomeextent,thosegroupsreceivedsupportfromlocal
politiciansandpeoplefromthearmy.(UCDP,2017).Theparamilitariesquickly
strengthenedtheirpowerandgotcontroloverincreasinglandsincentralColombia.
Frombeingaloosenetworkparamilitariesbegantogatherintoacommonorganization
inthe1990sandin1997,theColombianunitedself-defence,AUC,wasformed(MSB,
2016).TheaimwithAUCwasasanumbrellagroupforparamilitariesacrossColombia
(Gonzales,2004).Withinthedrugindustry,therewasalotofmoneyandtheAUCgrew
frombeinganorganizationwith850membersin1992toanarmedgroupwithmore
than8000membersin2001andwithpresenceinalmostallofColombia.TheAUChas
longbeenanimportantpartoftheconflictandwasresponsibleforalargepartofthe
violenceagainstcivilians(MSB,2016).AUCattackedandtriedtoaffectthethe
government,especiallyinthecaseofnotextraditingdruglordstoUSA.(UCDP,2017)
However,therehavebeenallegationsandstrongsuspicionsthat,infact,theysupported
theAUCandtheirstruggleagainsttheleft-handerssinceitwasfoundthatanumberof
politicians,policeandmilitaryworkerscollaboratedwiththeAUC(MSB,2016).Another
groupofparamilitariescreatedin1982,inresponsetoguerrillakidnappings,wasthe
groupnamedMAS.Itwascreatedbylandowners,politicians,militarypersonnel,
ranchers,businessmenandalargeoil-company.Thephenomenonofparamilitary
groupsbegantoextendacrossthecountryafter1984whenothergroupswerecreated
suchastheACCU(Gonzales,2004).Duringthe90´sparamilitarygroupsrose
dramatically.Theirobjectivesweretocontrolbusinesseswheretheycouldextractlarge
rents,andtodenytheleft-wingguerrillasaccesstothesameareas,targetingtheoil
refineryindustry,bananaexportandtheagriculturalbusiness(Gray,2008).
31
4.2.6Attemptsofpeacetalkswiththeguerrillas
Intheearly1980s,thegovernmentattemptedtonegotiatepeacetalkswiththe
guerrillagroupsinColombia(MSB,2016).ThisbytheformerColombianpresidents
AlfonsoLopezMichelsen(1974-1978)andJulioCesarTurbayAyala(1978-1982).
However,whenguerrillaattacksintensified,thelackofcredibilityofPresidentTurbay`s
effortsmadeanymeaningfulprogressimpossible.OnlyafterBelisarioBetancur(1982-
1986)wontheelection,comprehensivepeaceeffortswereundertaken,atatimewhen
thelegitimacyofthegovernmenthadsufferedseriously(Behar,etal,1989).However,
theinterestinceasefirewascoolamongtherebelgroupsandaseriousbacklashcame
in1985whentheM-19groupattackedthehighestcourtinBogotaandtookabout300
peoplehostage.Dramaendedsincethemilitaryintervenedandover100peoplelost
theirlives.Amongthedeadwere11prominentjudges.Thesmallerguerrillagroups
concludedpeacetalkswiththegovernmentintheearly1990s,buttheconflictescalated
yetuncontrolled.FARCandELNdidnotsignedanagreementandinsteadtheygrew
stronger.Atthesametime,theylosttheirmotivationinpeacetalkswhentheysaw
whathappenedtothearound5,000rebelsfromotherorganizationsdemobilizedinthe
early1990s.Thepoliticalpartiesformedfromthedemobilizedguerrillagroupshad
difficultyinreceivingsupportandthedisarmedrebelsbecametargetsforparamilitaries.
HundredsofdisarmedmembersfromColombianminorguerrillagroupswerekilledin
the1990s(MSB,2016).
4.2.7Peacetalkswiththeguerrillas
WhenAndrewPastranawaselectedPresidentof1998,hewasconvincedthathewould
resolvetheconflictinColombia,sincehealreadyhadestablishedgoodcontactswith
FARCleaderMarulandabeforehewaselectedaspresident.Anewperiodofpeacetalks
thenbetweenleadersofFARCandPastrana.Althoughthepeacetalksbetweenthe
FARCandthegovernmentweremorecomprehensivethanever,violencecontinuedto
increasesharplyinColombia,andtherewerealsobattlesbetweentheparamilitaryAUC
32
andFARC.Thereweremassacresofciviliansbybothgroups(MSB,2016).Political
violenceinColombiatookthousandsoflife’sandleavedmillionsdisplaced,andinthe
1990`sthetermcivilwarwereused(Gray,2008).Apeaceagreementwassignedby
presidentPastranaandFARCinJanuary2002,supervisedbyformerUNGeneral
SecretaryKofiAnnan.However,itsooncollapsedsincethepromisedstopof
kidnappingsandceasefireremained.PastranaaccusedFARCofbeingaterrorist
organizationandwithhelpfromthearmyhetookcontroloverthedemilitarizedzone
thatwereearlierestablishedduringthepeaceprocess.TheELNthenalsoleftthe
negotiations.(MSB,2016)TowardtheendofthePastranaadministrationin2002the
negotiationpositionprevailed,andtalkswiththeFARCwereended(Gray,2008).
4.2.8Disarmamentofparamilitaries
In2003,theAUCsignedanagreementwiththegovernmentwheretheypromisedtolay
downtheirweapons.Duringthethreeyearsofthedisarmamentprocess,about30,000
paramilitariesweredemobilized(MSB,2016).
4.2.9TheUribeera
ColombiagotanewpresidentwhenAlvaroUribewasvotedinthe2002election,with
promisestomakingwaragainstFARCtoimprovenationalsecurity.Aftersixyearsof
Uribe'shardlinerpoliciesitseemedthatthestrategysucceeded,sincetheFARCwere
weakerandsecurityimproved(Gray,2008).In2003UribeinitiatedaDDR-processwith
theparamilitaries,whichwasanewdeal,sincenegotiationsinthepastwereheldonly
withguerrillagroups(Rozema,2008).Uribepromisedthatthefightagainsttheguerrilla
wouldbeintensified,andasecuritytaxwasintroducedtofinanceit.Butparallelwith
thebattleagainsttheguerrilla,thegovernmentcontinuedtonegotiateasolution.A
prerequisitefornegotiationswasthatthegroupspromisedceasefire.(MSB,2016).
EveryColombianpresidentsince1982hasattemptedtoreachapeaceaccordwith
FARC.In2002Uribeinitiatedaseriesofoffensivemilitaryactionsthatledtoarecovery
ofterritorialcontrol,andarebuilttrustofcitizensintheirPublicForcesacrossColombia
33
(Pinzon,2017).TheAUCjoinedaceasefireinDecember2002andagreedtoto
demobilizein2003.However,FARCdidnotseemedtobeinterestedinnegotiations
withtheUribegovernment.AftertheAUCdemobilized,thenumberofdeadclearly
decreasedevenifsomemembersinsteadjoinedcriminalgangsdoingbusinessindrug
traffickingandoilsmuggling.InMay2004JanEgelandfromUNdescribedthesituation
inColombiaasthelargesthumanitariandisasterintheWesternHemisphere,since
manyofthedeathvictimsintheconflictcontinuedtobecivilians.Bothleft-wingersand
paramilitariesalsolargelyusedchildsoldiers,accordingtoreportsfromHumanRights
Watch.WhenColombiaexpandeditsmilitarycooperationwiththeUnitedStatesduring
thesummerof2009,itcontributedtoincreasedtensionsintheregion.Venezuelan's
formerPresidentHugoChavezsaidthatthepresenceoftheUnitedStatescouldleadto
warintheregion.TherewerestrugglesintheVenezuelanandEcuadorianborder
territory.ChavezwasinturnaccusedbyColombiaandUSAinautumn2009of
supportingFARCandrebuilditsmilitarycapacitybyimportingmilitarymaterialfrom
Russia.TheUnitedStatesgaveitssupporttotheColombiangovernmentthrough
millionsofdollarsinmilitaryaidtocombatdrugtrafficking(MSB,2016).
4.3TheSantoserabegin
WhenColombianpopulationreturnedtopresidentialelectionsin2010,thethreatof
waragainstChavezwasheavy.TheformerColombianministerofdefenceJuanManuel
SantoswontheelectionsandtookuphispresidencyinAugustthesameyear.Thefirst
actionwastodealwiththecurrentcrisiswithVenezuela.Hesolvedthecrisisthrough
negotiations,entrustedbyUNASUR.Thecountriesagreedtopeaceandinsteadwork
togethertoreduceFARC'spresence.However,theColombiangovernmentwerestill
fightingwiththeguerrillas,butwithreducedregionalpressurehecouldfocuson
domesticproblems.Inorderfornegotiationstobegin,thegovernmenthasmaintained
thatFARChastoreleasekidnappedprisoners.Anewmilitarystrategywasalsousedby
theColombiangovernment,whichaimedateliminateFARCleadersonmiddlelevel,
ratherthanaspreviouslylookingforseniorleaders.Thisledtothedeathofseveral
FARCleaders.Inaddition,FARCreleasedsomeprisonersfromthehostage(MSB,2016).
34
4.4Thecurrentpeaceprocess
AfterFARCforaperiodoftimesignallingtothegovernmentthattheywerewillingto
initiatepeacetalks,itbecamepublicinSeptember2012thatsecretnegotiationswere
takingplacebetweengovernmentandFARC.Afirstroundofnegotiationswas
establishedinOslo,Norway(MSB,2016).
In2012presidentSantosannouncedthatFARChadformallyagreedtonegotiatea
peacedealbasedonfivepoints:
• Rurallandreform
• PoliticalparticipationbyFARC
• Drugtraffickingandillicitdrugs
• Victim’srights
• Endoftheinternalarmedconflict
ThenegotiationswereholdinHavana,Cuba(Pinzon,2017).
Inlate2012thepeaceprocessisaccelerating,sinceitbecamepublicthatsecret
negotiationshadtakenplacebetweenthegovernmentandFARCinSeptember2012.
FollowingafirstroundofnegotiationsinOslo,theyweremovedtoHavana.InMay2013
itwasannouncedthatthenegotiationshadledtoabreakthrough,alandreform
agreement.InNovember2013,thenextsuccesscamewhenthepartiesagreedon
FARC'spoliticalrepresentation.Thenegotiationscontinuedin2014withtheissueof
illegaldrugtrafficking.Aspartoftheongoingnegotiations,FARCcalledforaone-sided
ceasefireinDecember2014.Inthebeginningof2015itresultedinreducedviolence
(MSB,2016).WhentheColombiangovernmentstruckarebelbaseinMay2015,FARC
declaredthattheceasefirewasbroken.Thisledtotheresumptionofbattlesbetween
thepartiesforafewmonths,untilanewceasefirewasestablishedinJulythesame
year.SantoswaselectedaspresidentforasecondruninJune2014,stillstrugglingfora
peaceagreementwithFARC.Duringthistimepreparatorytalksalsowereheldwiththe
left-wingguerrillagroupofELN,toagreeonanagendaforthesenegotiations.In2016,
35
thetalksfinallyledtoanagreementbetweenthepartiesonanagendaforfuture
negotiations.FurthernegotiationsbetweenthegovernmentandtheFARCinthe
autumnof2015ledtotheconclusionoftwoagreements.Oneonhowthejudicial
reviewofthoseinvolvedintheconflictisgoingtotakeplace,andanotherregarding
compensationofvictims.AdeadlinewasthensetforthefinalagreementuntilMarch
23,2016(MSB,2016).However,ittookuntil23June2016theColombiangovernment
andFARCannouncedaplantogather15.000formerFARCfighterstoaceasefire,
disarmingandbeingdemocraticintegratedinthesociety.Apeaceagreementwasthen
presentedonAugust242016,whichresolvedtherecentdisputesandintroduced
agreementspreviouslyestablishedtolaunchanambitioustransitionalsystem.It
addressedtoreduceareasinruralColombiafrominequalities,tofurtheropenupthe
country’sdemocracyand,withFARChelp,beginaprogramtoreplacecocawithlegal
crops.AnotheragreementbetweenFARCandtheColombiangovernmentwaslaunched
inOctober2016butitfailed.Anewandfinalagreementwasthenannouncedon12
November2016,includingnumerouschangesbasedonoppositionproposals.Contrary
totheoppositionchanges,therevisionswerebeyondcosmetic.However,numerous
implementationproposalswereadded,includingtheaccord’sfinancialstability,the
equalrightsbetweenmenandwomenandexplicitrespectforreligiousliberty.The
governmentandFARCarguedtheymadechangesto56ofthediscussed57topicswith
theopposition,excepttheFARCpoliticalparticipation.Afterfivedecadesofconflict
withmanydifferentpeaceprocessestheColombiangovernmentandtheformerFARC
guerrillasfinallysignedanagreement(Crisisgroup,2017).
4.5Thelastmonthsofthepeaceprocesses
InJanuary2016FARCwasaskingEUtoberemovedfromthelistofterroristgroups.
Colombia’scongressunanimouslyvotedinfavourofthecreationofspecialareaswhere
FARCguerrillascouldconcentrateintheeventofdemobilization,andUSthen
guaranteedprotection.TheFARCalsoinvitedColombia’sformerpresidentAlvaroUribe
36
tojointhepeacetalks.Publicsupportforapendingpeacedealhavecontinuedtogrow.
ColombianpresidentSantosandFARCleaderTimochenkosignedthedefinitebilateral
ceasefire,effectivelyending52yearsofhostilities.US,UNSecretaryGeneralBan-Ki
MoonandfiveLatinAmericanpresidentsattendedtheceremony.Colombianmilitary
thenbeguntakingcontroloftraditionalFARCterritoryintheareasaroundthecamps
wheretheguerrillaswereexpectedtodemobilizeanddisarm.InJuly2016multiplepolls
indicatedthatColombianswerevote“Yes”totheFARCpeacedeal.Thegovernmentand
theFARCkickedofapilotprojectthataimingtosettingthestandardforthecrop
substitutionprograms.InAugust2016presidentSantosandthegovernmentcoalition
formallykickedofthe“Yes”campaign.Ex-presidentUribeandhisDemocraticCentre
partyinthesametimelaunchedtheir”No”campaign.However,thefirstpollreleased
byDatexconowindicatedthatamajorityofColombianswereagainstthepeacedeal
withtheFARC.TheceasefirebetweenthestateandtheFARCthateffectivelytookeffect
oninJune,formallycameintoforce,whichwasmarkedtheformalendofhostilities
betweenthewarringparties.InSeptemberPresidentSantosannouncedthattheformal
signingofthepeaceaccordshouldbeonSeptember26inCartagena.Apollreleasedby
DatexcorevealedthatacomfortablemajorityofColombiansagainwerelikelytosay
“Yes”tothepeacedealintheOctober2referendum.Santosformallyhandedinthe
peaceagreementwiththeFARCtoUNsecretaryGeneralBanKi-mooninNewYork.
Worldleadersfromaroundtheglobecometogethertowitnessthesigningpfpeace
betweenthestateandtheFARCbyPresidentJuanManuelSantosandTimochenko,who
fromthencouldbecalledbyhisrealname,RodrigoLondoño(Colombiareports,2016).
37
4.6Thecriticlaunchedagainsttheagreement
The“No”-sideledbyColombianformerpresidentUribe,complainedaboutnothaving
anopportunitytoweighinmoreonthenewNovemberversionofthepeaceagreement.
TheSantosgovernmentarguedthatitwasnecessarytoquicklygettheun-demobilized
FARC-membersoutoftheirlegallimbo(WOLA,2016).The“No”supportersledbyUribe
accusedtheColombiangovernmentofgivingawaytoomanyrightstoFARC(The
WashingtonPost,2016).ThemaincriticismfromUribeandthe“No”-sidewerethe
impunityandpolitical-participationbyformerFARC-rebels,whoinmanycaseshave
committedseriouscrimesinthewar,butdespitethisfromnowonbeingabletositon
thesametable.TherewerealsocriticizedthatFARCwouldgettoomuchcontrolover
statelawsinColombia,andifitisreallyfeasiblemakingjusticeforvictimsanddisplaced
persons,sincetherearetoomanyofthemaffectedbythislongdurationconflict
(HuffingtonPost,2016).Furthermore,Uribe`sexpressedcriticsthatthepeaceaccord
wouldhurttheprivatesector,andwarnedaboutthattheamnestyofFARC-members
couldleadtothetakingoverofthecountrybyMarxistrebels(NewYorkTimes,2016).
38
5.FindingsThefollowingchapterconsistsofthekeypointsfromthe297-pageAugustPeace
AgreementnamedAcuerdoFinal(FinalAccord)andthemainchangesinthe310-page,
FinalNovemberAgreementNuevoAcuerdoFinal(NewFinalAccord).Summariesin
EnglishfromtheColombianGovernment,theindependentorganizationWOLAand
citationsfromtherealpeaceagreementtextswritteninSpanisharepresented.
5.1Summaryoftheaugustpeaceagreement
AccordingtotheFARC-EP(2017)thepeaceagreementwillledto“theterminationofthe
conflict,andtheconstructionofastableandlastingpeace”consistingofsixkeypoints.
• Item1:Rurallandreform
(AcuerdoFinal,2016,8-29).
• Item2:PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels
(AcuerdoFinal2016,30-49).
• Item3:CeasefireandDisarmamenttoendofviolence
(AcuerdoFinal,2016,50-87).
• Item4:CombatingNarcho-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs
(AcuerdoFinal,2016,88-111).
• Item5:Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict
(AcuerdoFinal,2016,12-170).
• Item6:Implementationandverification
(AcuerdoFinal,2016,171-192).
39
5.1.1Item1-Rurallandreform
TheComprehensiveruralreformaimsatstrengtheningtheColombiancountrysideand
isnamedReformaRuralIntegral(RRI)andanagreementtoprovideland,loansand
basicservicestoruralpoorpopulation.Itincludesthreemillionhectaresoflandduring
thefirsttenyearsofcreation(AcuerdoFinal,2016:1.1.1,12).Itseekstoassurestate
presenceacrossthecountryandclosethegapbetweenthecountrysideandtheurban
areas.Furthermore,itwillimprovetheagriculturalindustry,protectenvironmentand
ensurefood.Thelandreformwillbeundertakennationwide,andcoverallruralareas,
butwithpriorityonzoneswithhigherpovertylevels,institutionalweaknessand
presenceofillicitcrops.Thespecifiedareasmainlytargetedisasbelow.
Landaccessanduse,creatingalandfundwith3millionhectaresoflanddisposalfora
10-yearfreedistributionforruralpeoplewithoutland,prioritizingruralwomen’s,
femaleheadsofhouseholdsanddisplacedpersons.(Colombiangovernment,2016).It
alsogivesanimprovedaccessforcredits,includesaplanforlandregistrationto
formalize7millionhectaresofland(AcuerdoFinal,2016:1.1.5,13).Furthermore,it
includesalandaccessprogrammewithroadways,healthcare,education,marketaccess
andhousing.Theprogrammewillalsopromotecitizenstoparticipateinthecreationof
territorialregulations(Colombiangovernment,2016).Farmerenterprisezonesnamed
ZonasdeReservaCampesina(ZRC)willstrengthenruraleconomyandfamily-run
business(AcuerdoFinal,2016:1.1.10,17).Alandregistrywillbeputinplace,for
productiveuseofland.Citizenparticipationwillbepromotedinthecreationof
territorialregulations.(Colombiangovernment,2016).Furthermore,itincludes
Territorial-baseddevelopmentprogrammesnamedProgramasdeDesarrollocon
EnfoqueTerritorial(PDET)willbeestablishedinareasthataremostaffectedbythe
conflictanddrugtrafficking,aimingtostrengtheninstitutions(AcuerdoFinal,2016:
1.2.1,17).ItalsoincludesNationalplansthatwillbeimplementedtoeradicating
extremepovertyandreduceruralpovertyby50%.Italsoaimstoreducingoverall
inequalitywithin10years(AcuerdoFinal,2016:1.3,19).Socialdevelopmentisalso
takenintoaccount,suchasinvestmentsininfrastructure,reconstructingoftherural
40
roadnetwork,powerandinternetservices,education,drinkingwaterservicesand
housing.Itaimingagreaterruralinclusioninthenationaleconomy(AcuerdoFinal,
2016:1.3.1,20).Aspecialisedsystemontherighttofoodfortheruralpopulation,
aimingstrengtheninglocalproductionandmarketsarealsointheagreement
(Colombiangovernment,2016).
5.1.2Item2-PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels
ThereintegrationofformerFARCrebelsinpoliticsaimstobuildpeaceandrequiresthe
democraticopportunitytostrengthenpluralismandpromotecitizenparticipationto
outlawviolenceasapoliticaltool.Acommissionwillbecreatedtodefineguidelinesfor
politicalpartiesormovementsinopposition.Furthermore,acomprehensivesecurity
systemfortheexerciseofpoliticswillbeestablishedforpreventionandprotection
measures.Anationalforumwillalsobecreatedtodiscussguidelinesforcitizen
participationinforexamplecommunityradioprojects,andguaranteesforsocial
protestsanddemonstrationsaswell.Anationalcouncilforreconciliationand
coexistenceWillaassistthegovernmentintheimplementationphaseoftheagreement
andforpublictransparency.Citizenparticipationwillbeexpandedthroughthe
compositionofterritorialplanningcouncils.Electoralparticipationandtransparencywill
alsobemeasuredwiththeaimtogreaterelectionparticipationandtransparency.
Finally,16new,temporarilyelectoraldistrictswillbeestablished,forthehouseof
representatives’elections,tomakesurethatzoneshardlyaffectedbytheconflictwill
getbetterparticipationwithstrengtheninstitutionalpresence.Insummary,thekey
pointsareasbelow(Colombiangovernment,2016).Guaranteesandrightsforexercising
politicaloppositionaregiven,withthepurposedefiningguidelinesforpoliticalparties
ormovementsinopposition.Promotionofpoliticalpluralism(AcuerdoFinal,2016:
2.3.1,44).TherearealsoSecuritywarrantiesfortheexerciseofpolitics,withregulatory
andinstitutionalamendments,measuringandfollow-up(Colombiangovernment,
2016).Furthermore,Democraticmechanismsthatpromotingparticipationofcitizens,
withguaranteesforparticipationinsocialprotestsanddemonstrationsareconsidered
41
(AcuerdoFinal,2016:2.3.5,47).Transparencywillbepromoted,andeffectivemeasures
forgreaterpoliticalparticipation,enhancingeducationalprogrammesanddemocracy
(AcuerdoFinal,2016:2.3.3,45).
5.1.3 Item3-CeasefireandDisarmamenttoendviolence
Theagreementonthebilateralanddefinitiveceasefire,cessationofhostilesandlaying
downofarmsconsistsofsevenkeypointsandisnamedCesealFuegodeHostilidades
BilateralYDefinite(CFHBD)ydejaciondearmas(DA).Thepurposeistoensurenational
securityandprepareforinstitutionalframeworkandreintegrationofformerFARC
rebelsintocivilianlife.TheDAprocedurewillbetransparentandcertificatedbyUN,
whichwillreceivetheweaponsfromformerFARCrebelsandthosewillinturnbeused
toconstructpeaceinColombia.WhenitisneededUNHCRwillalsocontributeon
securityissues.Furthermore,20transitionallocalzonesfornormalisationbeing
establishednamedZonasVeredalesTransitoriasdeNormalizacion(ZVTN)and6
transitionallocalpointsfornormalisationnamedPuntosTransitoriosdeNormalizacion
(PTN).Themainpointsareasbelow(Colombiangovernment,2016).
Atimelineofeventsduringthe180dayCFHBD&DAprocesseswithnecessarylogistics
andpersonneladjustmentswillbeestablished(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.1,51).
RuleswillbewrittenforthegoverningofCFHBD&DAtoavoidsituationsjeopardisethe
fulfilmentoftheagreements,andensurethatthecivilianpopulationnotareaffected.
Furthermore,theagreementpointsoutMechanismsofmonitoringandverification,
namedtheMechanismodeMonitoreoyVerificacion(MM&V)aimingtofollow-up
compliancewiththeagreementonCFHBD,DAandverifythelayingdownofarms.Itis
constitutedthroughtheruleoflawandtheoperationofstateinstitutionsacross
Colombia(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.1.1,51).Anothersecurityissueintheagreementisthe
deploymentsinthefieldandprocedureofmovementsofFARCunitstotheZVTNand
PTNzones,duringa180-dayperiod.Italsoincludescontrolofweapon,ammunitionand
explosives,settingupsectionstoensurethatnecessarysecurityconditionsare
consideredduringtheCFHBDandDAprocesses.Issusoflogisticsarealsotakeninto
42
account,accordingtotheZVTN,PTNandMM&VproceduresduringtheCFHBD&DA
(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.1.6,58).ThelayingdownofarmsinthesocalledDAprocess,
willbeverifiedbyUNinatransparentprocess,aimingafinaldisposalofalltheFARC`s
weaponsinacompletedisarmament.ReincorporationofformerFARCmembersinto
societywillbedone,inaccordancewiththeirinterestsineconomic,politicalandsocial
matters.ThisaimingstrengthenthesocialfabricandlocaldemocracyacrossColombia.
Furthermore,theapproachwillbeequity-based,inagenderperspectiveemphasizing
women’srights(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.2,61).FormerFARCmemberswillbe
reincorporatedandtransitionedintolegalpoliticallifeandstatus(AcuerdoFinal,2016:
3.2.1,61).Anannualallowanceforoperationalexpenseswillbegivenbetween2018
and2016with10%omthefundsforpoliticalpartiesandmovementsandanannual5%
allowanceforthedisclosureanddisseminationofitsplatformtill2022(AcuerdoFinal,
2016:3.2.1.1,63).Regardingtheissueofsocialsecurity,formerFARCmembersthat
fulfilthecriteriaoflayingdownofarmsandtransitionintocivilianlife,willreceive
economichelpfromtheColombiangovernmentbasedonthelistsubmittedbyFARC.
Thisprocessofeconomicandsocialreincorporationincludesafinancialsupportpackage
tostartasocially-productiveproject,withaconditionalmonthlysalaryfor2years.It
alsogivesaccesstotheColombiansocialsecuritysystem(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.2.2.7,
67).Whenthefinalagreementissigned,twomembersfromtheColombiangovernment
andtwofromFARCwillconstituteaNationalreincorporationcouncilnamedConsejo
NacionaldeReincorporation(CNR)(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.2,61,2016).Therearealso
agreementsonsecuritywarrantiesandagainstcriminalorganisations,suchasthose
criminalorganisationslabelledassuccessorstoparamilitaries(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.4,
69).ANationalcommissionregardingsecuritywarrantieswillbeestablished,anda
specialjudicialunitandelitenationalpoliceaswell.Itwillalsobeacomprehensive
securitysystemforexerciseofpoliticsincludinginstitutionalamendment’sincluding
membersofthenewpoliticalmovementemergedfromFARC.Otherfactorsaiming
securityandprotectionacrossthecountryaremeasuringandpreventioninstruments
(ColombianGovernment,2016).TherewillalsobeInstrumentsofinstitutional
43
verification,controlandtransparency,forterritorialsupervisionandpreventing
measuresagainstcorruption(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.4.11.1,86).
5.1.4 Item4-Combatingdrug-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs
IntheagreementFARChadcommittedthedefinitestopregardingdrugproductionin
areasundertheircontrol,andfarmerswillbehelpedtoearnalivingfromlegalcrops
insteadofillicit.AcommitmentbetweentheColombiangovernmentandFARCtowards
thehistoricalclarificationoftherelationshipbetweenthearmedconflictandillicitdrugs
havethemainpointsasbelow(ColombianGovernment,2016).Firstly,asolutiontothe
problemofcropsmadeforillicitdrugproductionwillbeestablishedthroughthe
creationofaprogramnamedProgramaNacionalIntegraldeSubstituciondeCultivosde
UsoIllicito(PNIS)asachaptertotheRRI(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.1.1,92).Furthermore,it
includessubstitutionandnon-replantingagreementstargetingruralfarmerscommitto
cropsubstitution,nonreplantingandnotengaginginanydrug-traffickingactivities.The
Colombiangovernmentwillimplementalternativesforgrowers,collectorsand
sharecroppersinanImmediateresponseplannamedPlandeAtencionImmediate
formulatedthroughaprocessofpublicconsultationnamedPlanesIntegralesde
SubstiticuionyDesarrolloAlternativo(PISDA)(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.1.3.5,98).Small
growerswillbegivenalternativestoillicitdrugs,throughthearrangingoflegal
alternativesforandprioritizepropertyregistrationinareaswherePNISwillbeoperating
andalsoconductingade-miningprocess(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.1.3.6,103).The
agreementalsoincludesevaluationandfollow-upofactionsforpublichealthtakenin
theareaofconsumptionofillicitdrugs,basedonahumanrightsapproachaimingpublic
awarenessthroughanewnationalprogramforcomprehensiveinterventionintodrug
use.Theprogramimplementsthestatepolicyagainstillicitdrugsonlocallevel(Acuerdo
Final,2016:4.2.1.2-3,106-107).Thefightwillbeintensifiedagainstcriminalsandasset
launderingatbothnationalandlocallevel,inasolutionagainstproductionand
commercialisationofillicitdrugs(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.3,108).Withintheframework
ofUNandthroughregionaldialoguesincludingOAS,UNASURandCELACitsupportthe
44
undertakenofaninternationalconferenceandobjectiveevaluationandconsensusof
whatisneededregardingcounternarcoticpolicies.Thisaimingstrongercontrolbythe
stateregardingchemicalsusedfordrugproduction(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.3.5,111).
5.1.5 Item5-Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict
Crimescommittedduringtheconflictwillbeaddressedinspecialcourts,andamnesty
willbegrantedforminoroffenses,butnotofmassacres,rapeandtorture.The
agreementregardingjusticeforvictimsismadeupfromjudicialandextra-judicial
mechanismsaimingachievemaximumrealisationofvictimsrights.Italsoaimstoensure
accountabilitywhathappenedintheconflict,facilitatingguaranteesfornon-repetition.
Comprehensiveness,Conditionality,UniversalityandParticipationarekeywords,where
victimswillparticipateinallprocesses.Thekeypointsareasbelow(Colombian
Government,2016).AComprehensivesystemwillbecreatedfortruth,justicenon-
repetitionandreparation,namedSistemaIntegraldeverdad,justicia,reparacionyno
repeticion(AcuerdoFinal,2016:5.1,115).Themechanismsofthesystemwillpromote
truth,coexistenceandnon-repetitionthroughacommission.Itwillhaveaterritorial-
basedapproach,seekingtherealisationandrecognitionofvictimsrights,ina
coexistenceacrossColombia.Itobjectivetocontributingtowardsthehistorical
clarificationofwhathappened(AcuerdoFinal,2016:5.1,117).Itpromotingcoexistence
acrossColombia,objectivesearchformissingindividuals,andrealisationoftruthand
rightsforvictims(ColombianGovernment,2016).Furthermore,aspecialjurisdictionfor
peacewillbeestablishednamedJurisdiccionEspecialparalaPaz(JEP)whichwill
exercisejudicialfunctionsfulfillingthedutyoftheColombianstateagainstcrimes
committedduringtheconflict(AcuerdoFinal,2016:5.1.2,131).Itisclaimedinthe
agreementthattherewillnotbeanypardonforcrimesagainsthumanity,genocide,
seriouswarcrimes,kidnappings,torture,recruitmentofminors,sexualviolence,etc.
Sanctionswillbereceivedforthosewhodecisivelyparticipatedinthemostserious
crimesandrecognisetheirresponsibilityobligatedtocarryoutpublicworksand
reparationefforts.TheJEPwillbecreatedbymagistrateschosenbyacommitteeof
45
delegatesrepresentingthecriminalchamberoftheColombiansupremecourtofjustice,
UN,theinternationalcentrefortransitionaljusticeandthepresidentoftheEuropean
courtofhumanrightsandthestateuniversitysystem.Comprehensivereparation
measuresforpeacebuildingpurposeswillbeestablishedbythestatethroughthe
Comprehensivevictimreparationprogramme.Italsoaimstostrengtheningtheprocess
ofcollectivereparationwithterritorial-baseddevelopmentprogrammes,land
restitutionprocessesandsocialcarepromotingsocialcoexistence.Commitments
regardingissuesofhumanrightsisdutybytheColombiangovernment,andFARCas
wellintheirtransitiontolegalpoliticallifeinapeacefulsocialcoexistenceacross
Colombia(Colombiangovernment,2016).
5.1.6Item6-Implementationandverification
Inordertoguaranteeimplementationandverificationoftheagreementmechanisms
areestablishedforproperimplementation,monitoring,measuringandverifyingof
compliancethroughthepointsasbelow(Colombiangovernment,2016).Itwillbea
ImplementationandmonitoringCommission,forfollow-up,verificationandadispute
resolutioncommissionforthefinalagreementnamedComisiondeimplementacion,
seguimientoyverificaciondelacuerdofinaldepazylaresoluciondediferencias(CSVR)
(AcuerdoFinal,2016:6.1.3,173).IntheCSVRprocess3memberseachfromthe
ColombiangovernmentandFARCwillcontribute.Itwillorganiseasystemofterritorial
andthematiccommissionswithbroadcitizenparticipation(AcuerdoFinal,2016:6.1.7,
175).TheCSVRcouncilwillalsoestablishaframeworkplanfortheimplementationof
theagreement,runningfor10yearsaddressingspecificneedsforwomanandapplying
anethnic-sensitiveapproach.Four-yearplansforimplementationofthefinalagreement
willbeincludedinthenationaldevelopmentplan,PlanNacionaldeDesarrollo(PND)
preparedovertwopresidentialperiods(AcuerdoFinal,2016:6.1.1,172).
46
5.2.Thereferendum
OnJuly18,2016theConstitutionalCourtinColombiaapprovedtheholdingofa
nationalplebiscitetovalidatethepeaceagreement(ElTiempo,2016).Thefirst
agreementbetweenColombiangovernmentandFARCweresignedonAugust24(Crisis
group,2016).Inaugust2016theColombiangovernmentrevealsthequestionaskedin
thereferendumthatseeksratificationoftheFARCpeacedeal:“Doyousupportthefinal
agreementtoendtheconflictandtheconstructionofastableandlong-lastingpeace?”
(Colombiareports,2016).Theaimofthevotewastogetadirectapprovalorrejection
byvotersoftheagreementssignedSeptember27,2016betweentheColombian
governmentandtheFARC(ElComercio,2016).TheColombianpeaceplebiscitewasheld
onOctober2,2016toratifythefinalagreementontheterminationoftheColombian
conflictbetweentheColombiangovernmentandtheFARCguerrillas(Elmundo,2016).
50.2%werevotingagainstitand49.8%votinginfavourfortheagreement(BBC,2016).
Theoutcomeoftheplebisciteon2Octoberclearlystrengthenedtheopposition,with
ex-presidentUribeasthefrontperson.Manyexplanationsweregivenforthevote.One
explanationwasthatUribebackersingeneralweremoreinclinedtovotethanother
groups,andthattheplebiscitewasidealformobilisinghisright-wingcommittedbase,
fearsColombiaturningintoaleft-wingruledstatelikeVenezuela.Votersconcerned
aboutthegenderideology,werealsoingeneralvotedagainsttheagreement.However,
inareaswithhigherconcentrationsofvictims,highpovertyrates,andinruralareas,the
“yes”votewerestronger.Butinbig,formerlyconflict-affectedcitiessuchasMedellin
andBucaramanga,amonginhigher-incomebracketsthe“No”sidegotvotes,sinceit
irritatedpeoplethatmembersofanillegalarmedgroupwouldreceiveoverlygenerous
benefits.TheyalsofearthatthecountrywouldbehandedovertoFARC.However,the
opposition’svictoryinthereferendummeantitsproposalsforanewagreementhadto
beseriouslytakenintoaccount,iftheprocessshouldhavethepossibilitiestogofurther,
despitetheresult.Politicalandsocialactorswhoactivelyopposedtheoriginal
agreementhandedintheirproposedchanges,shortlyaftertheplebiscite.Afterthatit
asthreerenegotiations,onthreenegotiationprocesses.Thefirstwasbetweenthe
47
oppositionandgovernment,thesecondwithcivilsocietysupportersofthepeace
agreementandthegovernmentandthethirdnegotiationwasbetweenthegovernment
andtheFARC.Thesecondandfinalagreementwasannouncedon12November
includedalotofchanges,whichwerebasedonoppositionproposals(CrisisGroup,
2016).
5.4ComparisonbetweentheAugustandNovemberagreements
AftertheresultsoftheOctoberplebiscite,theColombiangovernmentheldanumberof
meetingswithrepresentativesfromthesectorsof”No”-votersinsocietytakinginto
accounttheirconcernsonthePeaceAgreement.However,thegovernmentalsohelda
lotofmeetingswithsupportersfromthe”Yes”sideoftheagreement,includingvictims
oftheconflict,indigenouscommunities,organizationsandpeoplefromtheprivate
business.FARCalsohadaseveralmeetingswithdelegationsinHavana.Thosemeetings
resultedinanumberofimportantchanges,adjustmentsandprecisionsinthetextof
theoriginalAugustPeaceagreementtothesigningofthenewandfinalNovember
Agreement.TheColombiangovernmentbelievesthatthechanges,adjustmentsand
precisionsmadestrengthenthePeaceagreementsignificantlyandthebasetobuilda
stableandlastingpeace(Colombiangovernment,2017).
Thenewpeaceagreementwasproducedonly41daysaftertheOctober2plebiscite,by
Colombia’sgovernmentandtheFARC,releasedonNovember15,2016.The
governmentand“No”supportersledbyformerpresidentUribecameupwitha
documentoutliningmorethan500proposedchangesontheoriginal297-pagepeace
accord.Belowisasummaryofsomekeychangesinthenew310-pageagreement.
Firstly,duetoColombia’scurrentfinancialsituation,thenewaccordextendsby5years
from10to15yearsfortheruraldevelopmentplan.Therearealsochangesregarding
thecreationofspecialcongressionaldistricts,whicharenowmeanttobeoccupiedby
representativesofvictimsinsteadofformerFARCmembers.Italsoreducescampaign
financeassistancetotheex-FARCpoliticalparty.Changesregardingdrug-trafficking
48
chargesagainstformerFARCmembersarealsomade.Thosewillinthenewagreement
willbedecidedcasebycasedependinghowthemoneyearnedwerespent.
Furthermore,penaltiesforthosefoundguiltyofwarcrimesarespecifiedmoreclearlyin
thelatteragreement.Finally,theFARChadsuggestedtheaccordtobeviewedasequal
totheColombia’sconstitution.ThishadinlegaltermsworkedasaguaranteeforFARC,
thatitcouldnotbeingchangedbythegovernment.However,thefinalagreementwill
notbeapartoftheColombianinstitution,whichmeansthatFARChavetotrustthe
Colombiangovernmentholdontoitscommitment(WOLA,2016).
5.4.1Item1-Rurallandreform
Thenewaccordextendsby5yearsfrom10to15yearsasthetimetableforinvestments
inruraldevelopmentprograms(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,23).Italsospecifiesthat
thesocalledcadaster,anationwidemappingoflandholdingsforeseenintheaccord,
willhavenoeffectonpropertyvaluationsusedtocollecttaxeswhichwasanissuefor
rurallandownersinthefirstagreement(WOLA,2016).
5.4.2Item2-PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels
Changesweremaderegardingthecreationofspecialcongressionaldistrictsforzones
thatwerehithardestbytheconflict(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,54).Ex-FARCmembers
maynotrunascandidatesfortheseatsinthenewrecord,whichareinsteadmeantto
beoccupiedbyrepresentativesofvictimsandsocialmovements(WOLA,2016).
5.4.3Item3-Ceasefireanddisarmamenttoendofviolence
Thenewaccordreducescampaignfinanceassistancetotheex-FARCpoliticalparty.
(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,69).Itisreducedfrom10percentofpubliccampaign
fundingbetween2018and2026inthefirstaccord,totheaverageamountgivento
partiesandpoliticalmovementsinthelatteragreement(WOLA,2016).
49
5.4.4Item4-Combattingdrug-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs
Alldemobilizingguerrillasmustinthenewaccordprovidedetailedinformationabout
thegroup’srelationshiptothedrugtrade(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,101).However,
thiscanputthemindangerandbeingtargetedasso-calledsnitchersbycriminals
(WOLA,2016).Chargesagainstex-FARCmembers,willinthenewaccordbedecided
casebycase,todeterminewhethertheproceedstrulywenttotheguerrillawarefforts
ornot(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,190).Thenewaccordclaimsthatifthedrug-trade
onlypaidforguns,food,andsimilarneeds,participationmaybeamnestied,butifitin
oppositeisevidenceofpersonalenrichment,itwillbesubjecttocriminalprosecution
(WOLA,2016).
5.4.5Item5-Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict
Penaltiesforthosefoundguiltyofwarcrimesarespecifiedmoreclearlyinthefinal
agreement(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,164-5).TheJEPsetuptotrywarcrimeswillbe
alittlereduced.Itwillnowhave10yearstooperate,withthepossibilityofadding5
moreyears(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,145).AnothersmallchangeisthatItwillhave
noforeignjudgesamongits38magistratesand13auxiliaries,comparedwith10foreign
legalexpertsasobserversintheAugustagreement(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,016,167-9).
Thetribunaljudge’srulingscannowbeappealedtoColombia’sConstitutionalCourt
(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,160-1).Thenewaccordtightensuptheconceptof
responsibilityforwarcrimes(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,151-2).Thenewagreement
holdsresponsibleforwarcrimesallcommanderswhoshouldhaveknownaboutthe
crimes,giventhepositionheorshehad.Thenewaccordalsoexcludesfromtransitional
justicethosewhocommittedwarcrimesforpersonalbenefits(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,
2016,149).Militarypersonnelinvolvedinsocalledfalsepositivekillings,wheretheygot
bonusesforkillinginnocentpeoplethattheyfalseclaimedasguerrillas,willthroughthe
changeinthenewaccordnotgetshortersentences.Thosepersonsshouldinsteadstay
inColombia’sregularjusticesystem(WOLA,2016).Thenewaccordsharpensup
languageongenderequity(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,192).
50
5.4.6Item6-Implementationandverification
AnotherchangeisthattheNovemberaccordwillnotbecomeapartofColombia’s
constitution(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,277-8).Theoriginalaccordcontemplatedits
gainingconstitutionalstatusviaaninternational-lawmanoeuvre.Proponentsofthe
“No”voteviewedthefirstagreementasa297-pageback-doorconstitutional
amendment.Therevisedaccordinsteadonlygivesconstitutionalstatustopartson
humanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlaw.TheFARChadfirstlysuggestedthe
accordtobeviewedasequaltoColombia’sconstitution,asaguaranteeforits
commitment.(WOLA,2016).
5.5Thecurrentstatusonimplementationofthefinalpeaceagreement
TheFARChasinthemiddleof2017finishedthehandoverofover7,100weaponstothe
UNMission,makinganimportantstepintheimplementationofthepeaceagreement.
However,majorchallengesstillremain.Accordingtotheagreementthedestructionof
remotearmsdumpsshouldbedonebefore1:stofSeptember.Anotherissueisthe
reintegrationofex-combatants,andpeaceprocesseswithotherarmedgroupssuchas
ELN.Thenextstepistoensuresecurity,andthereintegrationofformerFARC
combatantsintocivilianlife.TheFARC’sproposalthatitsfightersremaininareasof
Colombiacharacterisedbypoverty,badinfrastructureandlackofmarkets.Finally,the
peaceagreementstillfacesseriouspoliticalresistance,andwiththeelectionsscheduled
nextyear,theycouldsoonhavetheopportunitytochangetheircase.Furthermore,
currenttrendsregardingcocaproductionwitnessingrecord-highcocacultivationlevels,
whichcriticstothepeaceagreementhavelinkedtothepeaceprocess.Theagreement
insteadaimedsubstitutionofillicitcropsforlegal.Thetransitionaljusticemechanismin
thesocalledSPJ-processneedstodemonstrateitismakingadifferenceandenforcing
accountability.Theupcoming2018electionswillalsoaffecttheimplementation,inone
wayoranotherdependingontheresult.Thecrisisintheneighbouringcountryof
VenezuelaisalsoariskfornegativeimpactonColombia(CrisisGroup,2017).
51
6. AnalysisIntheanalysischaptertheanalyticalframeworkisused,analysinghowthepolitical,
security,justiceandhistoricalfactorsactuallyapplytotheagreementornot.Hereitwill
begivenananswertothemainquestion:iftheColombianpeaceagreement,asitwas
finallynegotiatedinNovember,haspromisetobedurable,basedonthosefactors.It
willbeinvestigatedfactorbyfactoriftheColombianagreementaredurable,according
totheanalyticalframework.
6.1Politicalfactors
Institutional
Design
Democratization
Inclusion
Exclusion
Basedontheanalyticalframework,theinstitutionaldesigninColombiaislikelytoaffect
theconditionsfordurabilityontheColombianagreementnegatively,whilethe
democracytradition,andmanagementof,includedandexcludedactorsinthe
agreementtalksinfavourfordurability.
RegardingDemocratization,theDemocracytraditionwaspointedoutbyresearchersas
apositivefactorfordurability.Colombiahasatraditionofdemocracy,exceptofashort
periodoftime.Therewasareferendumandrenegotiation.Thisispositivefordurability.
Manyoftheoppositionsconcernswereincludedinthefinalagreementinademocratic
process.Thisispositiveforthedurabilityoftheagreement,sincetensionsprobably
decreasedthankstotherenegotiations.ThereincorporationofformerFARCmembers
intosocietyaimsatstrengtheningthesocialfabricandinstitutionsacrossColombiaand
contributetolocaldemocracy.EventhoughthepoliticalparticipationbyFARCisnot
52
popularbytheopposition,thisaccordingtotheanalyticalframeworkalsoincreasingthe
chancesfordurability.Furthermore,theinstitutionaldesignaffectsthechancesfor
durability.Governmentcontroldowntocommunitylevelistoprefer.Weakinstitutions
makeithardtoimplementanagreementandgetitsustainable.Whenlookingatthe
ColombianagreementtheRRIRurallandreformseekstomakestatespresenceacross
thecountryandclosethegapbetweenthecountrysideandtheurbanareas,and
conceivesvariouscommunitiesacrossColombiatoplayaleadingroleinthereform.Itis
apriorityonzoneswithhigherpovertylevels,institutionalweaknessandpresenceof
illicitcrops.Anotherexampleisthenew,temporaryelectoraldistrictswhichwillensure
betterparticipationwithstrengtheninstitutionalpresence.Researchersalsopointedout
thatinclusionofalargespectraofthesociety,andcivilsocietyactorssuchaswomen’s
organizationswillpreferablybegivenaroleinpeacesettlements.Thisissatisfyingfor
durabilitysincetheColombianagreementinmanypartsfocusingonwomen’srightsand
empowerment,althoughthefirstversionoftheagreementfocusedevenmore.The
empowermentofwomenhavesucceededinmanyotherpoor,conflictpartsinthe
world,soprobablyitwillinColombiaaswellifitworkasintendedintheagreement.
Therurallandreform,forexample,prioritizesruralwomen,femaleheadsofhouseholds
anddisplacedpersons.Furthermore,thereincorporationofformerFARCmembersinto
societywillhaveanequity-based,genderperspective,emphasizingwomen’srights.
Thedebateamongresearchersalsopointoutthatthereisimportanttolookatexclusion
ofactors.IntheColombiancasethiscouldbeotherguerrillagroupssuchasELNandthe
stillexistingparamilitarygroups,whichshouldbehandledcarefullynottakingover
areaspreviouslyruledbyFARC.Especiallyregardingdrugproduction,thereisariskthat
thevacuumcreatedwhenFARChopefullyquititsengagement,willleadtoviolence
amongother,excludedgroups.However,thereintegrationofformerFARCrebelsin
politicsstrengthenspluralismandpromotecitizenparticipationtooutlawviolenceasa
politicaltool.DiscussionswithELNisforexamplealsocurrentlyongoing.Inthe
Colombianagreement,acommissionwillbecreatedtodefiningguidelinesforpolitical
partiesormovementsinopposition.Thisisalsosatisfyingfordurability,sinceaconcern
53
fromtheoppositionwerethatFARCwillgrewtoostrongandtakingcontrolover
Colombia.Thenationalforumwillalsobecreatedtodiscussguidelinesforcitizen
participation,andguaranteesforsocialprotestsanddemonstration.Whenlookinginto
Colombia’shistorythisisalsosatisfying,sothesamemistakeasinthe60`swhenthe
politicaloppositionwasexcluded,tensionsincreasedandguerrillagroupsemerged,is
notrepeated.Summarizingthepoliticalfactors,thefinalpeaceagreementclearly
includescivilsocietyactors,onalocallevel.Thankstotherenegotiationtheconcerns
fromtheoppositionalsowhereseriouslytakenintoaccountaswellinthenew
agreement.TheColombiangovernmentwillprovideeconomicandsocialhelpaimedat
reincorporatingformerFARC-membersintosociety.Ifworkedasaimeditmightbe
predictedtoachievethosegoals,whichinthatcasepossiblywillhaveastabilizing
effect,strengthentheinstitutionsandthendurability,basedontheanalytical
frameworkused.However,itwillbeveryhardtoimplement,especiallyinhard-
accessible,poorruralareaswithlowstatecontrolandtrust.TheRurallandreform
includesalandaccessprogrammewithroadways,healthcare,education,marketaccess
andhousing,whichalsowillstrengtheninstitutions,ifitsucceeds.Itmightbepredicted
toachievethosegoals,basedontheanalyticalframework,butweactuallydonotknow
yet.
Thedifferentprogramsinthefinalagreementaimingstrengthentheinstitutionsin
Colombiaareprobablyverydifficulttoestablish,sinceColombia`shistorywithlackof
institutionaltrustinmanyareas.Thereisthenariskforfurtherinstitutional
weaknesses.Thisisnotgoodforthedurabilityoftheagreement.Citizenparticipation
willbepromotedinthelandregistryandcreationofterritorialregulations.The
territorial-basedPDETdevelopmentprogrammes,aimingtostrengtheninstitutions,will
contributetothedurabilityifitsucceeds,buttheimplementationwillnotbeeasy.
Thereareworriesifthisisreallygoingtowork,inforexampleruralareaswithlowstate
controlandtrust,whereformerFARCguerrillassometimeshaveruledfordecades.Even
thoughColombiainmoderntimemostlyhasahistoryofdemocracy,thecentral
54
governmentandinstitutionshasbeenweak.Tosumuptheaimingofstrengthenthe
institutionaldesignisintheagreement,butitwillbehardtoimplementinreality.This
canpossibleaffectthedurabilitynegatively.Ifthecentralgovernmentcannotgivequick
andconcreteresultsintheRurallandreforminformsofofjobs,betterinfrastructure,
economichelpandprofitablecocasubstitutioncrops,thedurabilitycouldbeonthinice
sinceitthencontributestofurtherinstitutionalweakness.Therurallandreformhasto
makequickresultsforthedurabilityoftheagreement,whichnotwillbeeasy.The2018
Colombianelectionwillbeimportantforhowthepoliticalfactorsaffectthedurabilityof
theagreement,andhowtheimplementationoftheagreementrunswillinoppositealso
affectthepoliticalfactors.Thereisalsoariskofapossiblespill-overeffectfromthe
chaosinVenezuela,affectingtheimplementationoftheColombianpeaceaccord
regardingboththepoliticalandsecurityfactors.Thecountrieshaveacommonhistory.
6.2Securityfactors
Thirdparties
Spoilers
Information
Asymmetries
Disarmament
Theinvolvementofthirdparties,suchasUN,inthedisarmamentprocessandthe
transparencyofthefinalpeaceagreementandthepeaceprocessitself,talksinfavour
fordurability.Inoppositethespoilerbehaviourfromtheoppositiontalksagainst,since
itislikelytoaffecttheimplementation,andthendurability,ofthepeaceaccord
negatively.
Researcherspointedoutthatmanagementofspoilersareessentialfordurability.The
Colombianagreementandpeaceprocesshavedifferentkindsofspoilers.Themost
prominentisthe“No”-voter’soppositionledbyex-presidentUribe.However,sincethe
renegotiatedagreementtakesintoaccountmanyoftheconcernsfromthespoilers,it
55
mustnotbebadforthefinalagreementsdurability.Itmayevenbesaidthatthe
renegotiated,finalagreementisstrongerthanthefirstone,thankstothespoilers.
However,itdecreasesthechancesfordurabilitywhenspoilersareinvolved,sincethere
isariskthatSpoilersnegativelyaffecttheimplementationoftheagreement,andthen
durability.Furthermore,Naturalresourcesemboldenspoilerbehaviour,whichisalsoa
riskintheColombianagreement.Anothersecurityfactorpointedoutbyresearchers
affectingdurabilityistheinvolvementofthirdpartiesgivingastabilizingeffect,helping
toverifyandenforcethedemobilization.Thisespeciallywhenthirdpartiesprovide
securityguaranteesduringthedisarmamentprocessanddemobilizingphase.When
lookingattheColombianagreementthisissatisfying,sincethefinalagreementinclude
muchofbothlocal,regionalandinternationalthird-partyinvolvement.Themost
prominentexampleofinternationalthird-partyactorinclusionisintheCHFBDandDA
agreementsonthebilateralanddefinitiveceasefire,cessationofhostilesandlaying
downofarms.ThisaimingafinaldisposalofalltheFARC`sweaponsinacomplete
disarmament,withthepurposetoensurenationalsecurityandpreparingfor
institutionalframeworkandreintegrationofformerFARCrebelsintocivilianlife.Itis
verifiedbyUN,inatransparentprocess.Despitesomedelays,thisprocesshasworked
outwell.AnotheristhehelpwithsecurityissuesfromUNHCR.TheJEPsystemforjustice
alsoincludethird-partyinvolvementfromUNandtheinternationalcentrefor
transitionaljustice,makingpressureontheimplementation,andthenpositivelyimpact
thedurabilityoftheagreement.Thehighinvolvementofinternational,thirdpartiesis
satisfyingfordurabilityoftheagreement.Researchersalsoarguethatcombatantsshall
disarmfully.ThedisarmamentofFARCisagoodexampleandthenpositivefor
durabilityoftheColombianagreement.Anothersecurityfactorthatresearcher’spoint
outasimportantfordurabilityistheavoidingofinformationasymmetriesbetweenthe
previouscombatantsoftheconflict.WhenlookingattheColombianagreementthisis
consideredsincetransparencyisakeywordusedinthefinalagreement.Forexample,
willanationalcouncilforreconciliationandcoexistencebeestablishedforpublic
transparency.Anotherexampleisthatelectoralparticipationandtransparencywillbe
56
promotedandmeasured.TheDAprocedureistransparentaswell,andcertificatedby
UN.Thisissatisfyingfordurability.
6.3Justicefactors
Powersharing
Justice
Natural
Resources
Victim
Policy
Basedontheanalyticalframework,Colombia`sbigassetsofNaturalresourcesinforms
ofillicitcropsforcocaproduction,riskstojeopardisethedurabilityofthepeaceaccord,
Inoppositethevictimpolicy,justiceandpowersharingagreementsinthefinalaccord
talksinfavourfordurability.
Researcherspointedoutthatpolitical,territorialandmilitaryformsofPower-sharing
positivelyaffectdurability.Thelargersizeofthegoverningcoalition,thegreater
chancesforpeacetobedurable.Expandingthesizeofthegoverningcoalitioncreates
strongerincentivesforformerrivalstosustainpeace,sinceitisthentoocostlyandrisky
returningintoarmedconflictagain.WhenlookingatthefinalColombianaccordthisis
promisingdurability,sinceoneofthesixcornerstonesisthepower-sharingagreement
betweentheColombiangovernmentandFARC.Italsoincludesterritorialpower-
sharing,informsofdecentralizedgovernanceinmanyways.Forexample,regardingthe
socalledCSVRprocessintheimplementationphaseoftheagreement.Anotherexample
isthePDETdevelopmentprogrammesintheRRIRuralReform.Citizenparticipationwill
alsobepromotedinthecreationofterritorialregulations.Furthermore,Justiceand
Victimpolicyareotherfactorspointedoutbyresearchersasimportantfordurabilityof
peace.OneofthesixkeypointsintheColombianagreementistheJusticeforvictims.
57
Thefinalpeaceagreementincludesjusticefactorsasoneofthesixcornerstonesinthe
so-calledJEPprocess,wherecrimescommittedduringtheconflictwillbeaddressed
throughacommissioninspecialcourts,aimingachievemaximumrealisationofvictims’
rights.ItpromotingcoexistenceacrossColombia,objectivesearchformissing
individuals,andrealisationoftruthandrightsforvictims.Italsosharpensthesentences
forwarcrimesandpersonsinvolvedindrugtradeforpersonnelenrichmentand
militariesinvolvedsocalledfalsepositivekillings.Allthosefactorstogetherare
satisfyingregardingthedurabilityoftheagreement.Thecriticsfromtheopposition
regardingthatformerFARC-membersthatcommittedseriouscrimeswillgetimpunity
tooeasily,musthoweverseriouslybeingtakentoaccountduringthejusticeprocess,in
ordernottocreatefurthertensions.Itcanalsobequestionedregardingthepossibility
ofcreatingafairjustice,sincetherearetoomanyvictims.Furthermore,researchers
pointedoutthatthereisanegativecorrelationbetweenNaturalresourcesand
durability.ThisisabigchallengefortheColombianaccord,sinceColombiahasalarge
amountofnaturalresourcesinformsofcropsusedforillicitdrugs,mainlycoca
production.FARChaveintheagreementcommittedthedefinitestopregardingdrug
productioninareasundertheircontrol.ASolutiontotheproblemofcropsmadefor
illicitdrugproductionisalsoestablishedinthesocalledPNISprogram,asachapterto
theRRIRuralReform.Substitutionandnon-replantingagreementstargetingrural
farmerscommittocropsubstitution,non-replantingandnotengaginginanydrug-
traffickingactivitiesisintheagreementinthePISDAresponseplan.Despiteallthese
plans,andwithintheframeworkofthird-partyactors,itwillbeveryhardtoimplement
andcontrolbythestateorbytheFARC.Ifpreviousgrowersofillicitcropsdonotsee
quickresults,thereisahugeriskthattheygointodrugbusinessagain,ifthereisno
betteroption.Itshallalsobetakenintoaccountthatthereisnosignsthattheworld
demandforcocadecrease.Aslongasitisademandforthisdrug,themarketwillbe
there,andwithhugeamountofdollarsinvolvedcomestheviolence,sincethereisa
priceworthfightingfor.TheColombianconflictwasoriginallynotcreatedbythedrug
trade,butithasclearlyaffected,fuelledandprolongedtheconflict.IfFARCleavesdrug
58
businessasintendedaccordingtoitscommitmentintheagreement,othergroupswill
takeover.Tosummarize,Colombia`sNaturalresourcesinformsofillicitdrugsarehighly
negativeforthedurabilityofthepeaceagreement,andalsoaffectthesecurity
negatively.Finally,theColombianhistorytalksagainstthisreformtosucceed.Avery
controversialproposalcouldmaybebesomeformoflegalisation,aimingbetterstate
control,taxincomesandlessviolence,sinceallpreviousattemptshavefailed.
6.4Historicalfactors
Outcome
Causes
Intensity
Duration
Sincethefinalagreementaimistobringuphistoricalfactorstothetable,thistalksin
favourfordurability,butthe52-yearlongdurationoftheconflictinoppositetalks
againstsustainablepeaceinColombia,basedontheanalyticaltool.
ResearcherspointoutthathistoricalfactorssuchastheOutcomeandCausesofthe
conflicthavetobebroughtupifapeaceagreementshouldbesustainable.When
lookingattheColombianagreementthisissatisfying,forexampleintheJEP-process,
withtheobjectivecontributingtowardsthehistoricalclarificationofwhathappenedin
theconflict.AnotherexampleisthecommitmentbetweentheColombiangovernment
andFARCtowardsthehistoricalclarificationoftherelationshipbetweenthearmed
conflictandillicitdrugs.Thatthehistoricalfactorsaretakenseriouslyispositivefor
durability.Itprobablyalsodecreasestensionsbetweenparts,ifthoseguiltyofwar
crimesgottheirsentences.However,itisalsoariskfortheoppositewhensomeformer
FARCguerrillasonlowerlevelsinsteadgetbenefitsfromthestates.Itisthengoodthat
thisisinvestigatedcasebycaseinthefinalagreement.RegardingtheIntensityand
Durationoftheconflict,researcherspointedoutthatashortandlowintensityconflict
59
affectthechancesfordurabilitypositively.WhenlookingattheColombianagreement
thisisbothsatisfyingandnot,sincetheconflicthasafive-decadelongdurationwhichis
negativelycorrelatedtodurability,butwithmostlythecharacteroflowintensitywhich
areinopposite.However,itispositivefordurabilitythatthehistoricalfactorsare
broughtuptothetable,sincejusticeforvictimsareoneofthesixkeypointsinthe
agreement.Colombiahasalonghistoryofviolenceandstrugglewithguerrillas,
paramilitaries,druglordsandothercriminalgroups.Tomakeafinaldealwiththepastis
thencrucialtocreateabetterfuture,decreasetensionsandcreatesustainablepeace.
6.5ComparisonondurabilityoftheAugustandNovemberagreements
WhencomparingtheAugustandNovemberagreementtheconclusionisthatthelatter
ismoredurablethantheformer.Thissincetheopponent’sconcernswereincludedin
thenewagreement.Thebroaderinclusion,thebetterchancesforpeacedurability.
Despiteconcernsregardingweakinstitutionaltrust,spoilers,drugtradeandtheviolent
Colombianhistory,thefinalagreementisestimatedtohavelargerchancesthanthefirst
forbeingdurable,accordingtotheanalyticalframework,asshowninthegraphbelow.
Thefinalpeaceagreementismoresustainable,accordingtotheanalyticalframework,
sinceitincludeschanges,adjustmentsandprecisionsthatstrengthenthechancesfor
durabilityintermsofgreaterinclusion,power-sharingandjustice.Theconcernsfrom
theoppositionweretakenseriously,includingvictimsoftheconflict,indigenous
communities,organizationsandpeoplefromtheprivatebusiness.Forexample,
regardingvictimsoftheconflictthenewcongressionaldistricts,arenowmeanttobe
occupiedbyrepresentativesofvictims,insteadofformerFARCmembers.Thecampaign
financeassistancetotheex-FARCpoliticalpartywerereducedinthefinalagreement,
whichotherwisecouldhaveledtofurthertensionsfromtheopponents.Changes
regardingpenaltiesforthosefoundguiltyofwarcrimesarespecifiedmoreclearlyinthe
latteragreement,whichmeansgreaterchancesforjustice.Anotherpositivechange
regardingfairjusticeisthatchargesagainstex-FARCmemberswillinthenewaccordbe
decidedcasebycase.However,thefinalagreementcouldmaybehavebeeneven
60
strongerifit,asFARChadsuggested,beingapartoftheColombianinstitution.Nowit
partlycanbechangeddependingontheresultintheupcoming2018elections.
6.6ThedurabilityofthefinalColombianpeaceagreement
Thegreenboxesincludefactorsthatarepositiveforthedurabilityofthefinal
Colombianagreement.TheRedboxesinoppositeincludefactorsthatarenegativefor
durabilityinthefinalColombianagreement.Tosummarize,12ofthe16factorschosen
arepositivefordurabilityofthefinalagreement.
Politicalfactors Securityfactors
Justicefactors Historical
factors
Institutional
Design
Third
Parties
Power
Sharing
Outcome
Democratization
Spoilers Justice Causes
Inclusion Information
Asymmetries
Natural
Resources
Intensity
Exclusion Disarmament Victim
Policy
Duration
61
7. Conclusions and recommendations for furtherstudies
Thisresearchhascontributedtothedevelopmentofananalyticaltool,thatpossiblecan
beusedbyotherresearcherswhenevaluatingdurabilityofpeaceagreements.The
ColombianPeaceAgreement,asitisfinallynegotiated,areaccordingtotheanalytical
frameworkestimatedhavingagreatchancetobeingdurable.Despitethistherearefour
issuesthathavetobetakenseriously,accordingtotheanalyticalframework,andthat
talksagainsttheagreement.Firstly,thedurationoftheconflictwhichgoesbackover
fivedecadesinhistory.Secondly,thelackofinstitutionaltrustandlowcontrolbythe
state,especiallyinpoor,ruralareashighlyaffectedbytheconflict.Thirdly,the
Colombianagreementandpeaceprocesshavebeenaffectedbyspoilers,mainlythe
“No”-voter’sopposition,whichalsoinfluencetoharmtheimplementationand
durabilityoftheagreement.Theresultintheupcoming2018electionsisthencrucialfor
thefurtherimplementationoftheaccord.Fourthly,naturalresourcesinformsofillicit
drugsandmainlyCoca,havebeenlinkedtoandfuelled,theconflictforalongtime.This
alsoreallychallengingtheprospectsforasustainablepeace.However,Ifpeacefailsin
Colombia,futureresearcherscanlookintothoseweaknessesthroughthisanalytical
frameworkandcheckwhichfactorsthatfailed.Futureresearchersarealsosuggested
lookingintoafewmorecases,andthentestthisanalyticalframeworkfurtherona
numberofpeaceagreements.Itwouldalsobeinterestingtoevaluatehowthis
analyticaltoolworksindifferentcontexts,forexampleinformernon-democratic
countries,andoninterstateconflictsaswell.Anotherideaforfutureresearchcouldbe
ifareferendumistopreferornot,onhighlyimportantissueslikepeaceagreements.An
interestingtopicwouldalsobetofurtherevaluatehowtheroleofwomenaffectedthe
Colombianpeaceprocessandagreement.Tosumup,thisanalyticaltoolisusefulfor
manydifferentkindsoffuturepeaceanddevelopmentresearch,preventingofconflicts
andcontributemakethechancesfordurablepeacebetter,inthisworldofuncertainty.
62
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Appendix
MapofColombia