DISNI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. NO. 203335 18 FEBRUARY 2014
Abad, J. FACTS: Petitioners as taxpayers, file a Petition seeking
to nullify 21 Sections of RA 10175, otherwise known as the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, for violating their fundamental
rights protected under the Constitution; and prohibit the
enforcement of the said provisions. Some of the sections being
questioned are: 1. Section 8 on the penalties set forth by the
legislature is being questioned. 2. Petitioners also ask that the
Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Judiciary may modify or revise Section 8 on
penalties. 2. Whether or not Section 12 is unconstitutional for
violating the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth
doctrine. HELD: 1. NO. The matter of fixing penalties for the
commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here
the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what
it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to
the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties
for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at
some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another
offense or might just have been connected with another crime.
Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have
no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the
legislative department. The courts should not encroach on this
prerogative of the lawmaking body. (LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO
CONSTRUE) 2. YES. Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions
of law through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law,
dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it
intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General suggests
that "due cause" should mean "just reason or motive" and "adherence
to a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot draw this meaning
since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of
data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It just
says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of
data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the
Constitution prohibits.
