Distinction of Essence and Existence in Francis Suarez

8/2/2019 Distinction of Essence and Existence in Francis Suarez

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Distinction of essence and existence in the philosophy of Francis

Suarez

Author(s) Wells, Norman Joseph

Imprint [1955]Extent

Topic

Subject(s)

Language English

ISBN

Permalink http://books.scholarsportal.info/viewdoc.html?id=189015

Pages 1 to 1036


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Wells, Norman. JosephThe distinction of essence andexistence in the philosophyof Frsncis Suarez


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UNIVERSITY OF TORONTOSCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

PROGRAMME OF THE FINAL ORAL EXAMINATIONFOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of

NORMAN JOSEPH WELLS

11:00 A.M., SATURDAY, MAYMlh, 1955AT 44 HOSKIN AVENUE

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCEIN THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS SUAREZ

COAUUTTEE IN CHARGEProfessor J. R. O'Donnell, ChairmanProfessor F. H. AndersonProfessor E. GilsonProfessor I. T. EschmannProfessor J. Oh ensProfessor D. P. DryerProfessor J. A. IrvingProfessor J. M. KellyProfessor H. MehlbergProfessor D. Savan


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BIOGRAPHICAL1926 --Born, Boston, Massachusetts1950 --B.A., Boston College1952 --M.A.. University of Toronto1950-55 --School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto

THESISThe Distinction Between Essence and Existence

in the Philosophy of Francis Suarez(ABSTRACT)

The name of Francis Suarez is a famous one in the history of philosophy, notto mention the histories of theology and law. Indeed, his position on the questionof the distinction between essence and existence in creatures, the subject matterof this thesis, is especially notorious. However, though his final position on thisquestion is quite well known, the philosophical milieu surrounding that decisionand undoubtedly influencing it, is, in contrast, rather obscure. This dissertationis primarily concerned with the latter aspect of the problem.

Suarez himself is our best guide since he lists the three famous traditions onthis question up to his day and cites men and arguments on behalf of each. Thefirst tradition, that of the "Thomists", is the real distinction which maintains, forSuarez, that the essence and existence of a creature are really distinct as duae resor two beings, and mutually separable, each being able to exist apart from theother. The second tradition, that of the modal distinction, also holds for a similarreal distinction in creatures as between a res or a being and its mode which arenot mutually separable. The third tradition, the distinction of reason and the posi-tion of Suarez, rejects any kind of real distinction of essence and existence in acreature and affirms a distinction which is the work of the intellect and is not atall present in the thing.

Research into the sources of the five arguments Suarez attributes to the"Thomists" he lists has found that the first two are explicit in such "Thomists" asGiles of Rome, John Capreolus, Paulus Barbus Soncinas, Cajetan, Sylvester ofFerrara and Chrysoslomus Javellus. The other throe arguments are not found inthe texts of these men noted b.v Suarez, But the common denominator of all theargtimenls is that the.v affirm a real distinction between an uncreated esse essentiaeor essence and a created esse existentiae or existence. That is, for Suarez, thesemen distinguish what comes to be by an efficient cause, namely, existence, andwhat does nol come to be by an efficient cause, namely, essence. Thus Suarezsees that the "Thomist" school undergoes the doctrinal influence of Avicenna andthis Neo- Platonic tradition through St. Albert, Henry of Ghent, and possiblyMeister Eckhart.

On behalf of the second tradition, Suarez cites some texts of John Duns Scotus,Henry of Ghent and Dominicus Soto which purportedly support this modal distinction.In this tradition, esse existentiae , according to Suarez, is a mode which is a posi-tive existential entity in iis own right as in the first tradition. However, unlike thelatter, it cannot endure apart from the essence of which it is the mode. Thus, thesecond tradition differs from the first, not so much on the notion of essence whichis the same, but on the degree of reality each will attribute to esse existentiae.Of interest is the fact that no such position is found in the texts of Scotus and Henryof Ghent. The texts of Soto do contain a doctrine of esse existentiae as a mode ofessence but do not describe it as a positne existential reality.


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The third tradition is manifested in the texts of the sixteen men cited by Suarezas its exponents although there is a variety of formulation as to the type of distinc-tion of reason in question. However, this tradition is one in interpreting the realdistinctions of the first two traditions to be between duae res or a res and its mode.It is also one in rejecting these two traditions. Moreover, this third tradition isone in holding that the essence and existence in question is the actual existing es-sence and esse in actu exercito. It is between these that there is only a distinctionof reason. However, these men agree that the essence abstractly conceived or es-sence as possible is distinguished from actual existence or actual essence as non-being from being. The basic reason for their rejectionof a real distinction is thatsomething cannot be intrinsically constituted in the existential order by somethingreally distinct from it. For. each is a being in its own right as distinct from theother. More basic than this is the fact that there is no _esse existentiae in additionto the esse e ss entiae of a creature. Existence means nothing more than the actualexisting essence and in no way signifies an existential actus essendi nor any acci-dental accretion. The men of this third tradition are characterized for Suarez bythe fact that they are all opponents to sonie extent of any kind of a Platonic realismwithin being which is the most manifest feature of the first two traditions on thisquestion.

In explaining the principles behind this third tradition Suaruz first lakes stepsto remove any autonomous essential actuality apart from the divine intellect sincehe sees very clearly that the first two traditions follow from their doctrine of thedivine ideas. For them, the divine ideas are the essences of creatures endowedwith an esse essentiae in themselves as in Henry of Ghent. In Suarez' eyes thislooks too much like the divine ideas enjoying some eternal existential status apartfrom God or that they have been created from eternity. As his first principle, andthat of the third tradition, Suarez maintains that the essences of creatures, priorto their creation, are absolutely nothing in the sense of enjoying no real existentialstatus. Though a critic of this Avicennian tradition on the divine ideas, Suarezstill remains within that tradition since he endows the essences of creatures m thedivine intellect with an esse possibile, an esse objectivum or an_esse cognitum inmuch the same fashion as Duns Scotus in his critique of Henry of Ghent and asDurandus in his critique of the same doctrine. Thus, in his critique of any Platonicrealism of essence Suarez remains within the tradition of Duns Scotus and Henry ofGhent but much farther along that doctrinal curve which leads to the nominalism ofOckham. Suarez, in his second principle, carries his critique of any realism ofessence into the created order of existing things. For, this principle states thatens in potentia and ens in actu are immediately distinguished as non-being and being.In this Suarez counters those who maintained that ens in potentia or essence enjoyssome positive mode of being, though diminished, within the existent creature and hiscritique follows the pattern of the defense of his first principle.

_

Suarez' criticisms even carry within the tradition on the distinction of reason,rejecting all except the one which enables him to deny that existence is of the es-sence of the creature. He finds this feature in what he calls a distinction of thereasoned reason -- a distinction of reason with a foundation in reality. Because acreature has been created or is contingent it can cease to be and can found a con-cept of itself as non-existent. This concept of a creature prescinded from existenceoutside its causes but apt to exist, unlike a chimera, is signified by essentia forSuarez. The same concept of that creature as existing and outside its causes issignified by existentia. Existentia is denied of essentia creaturae because the con-cept of the possible essence does not explicitly include what is signified by existen-tia or is included in the concept of the actual essence. In a word, the possible es-sence and the actual essence are mentally distinguished and the concept of the actualessence as possible and the concept of the same essence as actual are likewise sodistinguished. Thus Suarez' distinction of reason is a result of a comparison be-tween two concepts or rather, different degrees of contraction or adequation of oneconcept with respect to the actual existing essence, the one more confused and ob-scure and less contracted than the other. It is just such a distinction which enables


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Suarez lo deny existcntia of essentia creaturae . Hence, this distinction betweenessence and existence is said to be in the existent thing and founded on it by extrin-sic denomination from the concepts of this one existent essence.

By way of this extrinsic denomination Suarez can maintain that the existent es-sence has some internal metaphysical structure of essence and existence. For, onthe basis of the two concepts of essence and existence and their degrees of adequa-tion 10 the existent essence, the concept of existence is said to contract and be con-tracted by the concept of essence. In this way existence is said to be added toessence. This conceptual structure of the contracted and the contracting is thenimposed on the actual essence by extrinsic denomination from these concepts.Thus the constant insistence of Suarez on the intrinsic constitution of the actualessence by existence does not imply any metaphysical structure within the actualexistent but is a conceptual structure imposed on this existent. Versus an orderof essence Aithin being Suarez offers an order of a radically contingent essencewhich is be ng itself, impervious to any existential co principle as it is to anydistinction within it. In this struggle against the Platonic realism of essence inthe first two traditions, being, in the hands of Suarez, has lost its metaphysicaldimension to the extent it has become an impenetrable, impervious, indistinct es-sence. Reality is only metaphysical by extrinsic denomination and the science ofmetaphysics itself becomt s nothing more than an analysis of concepts.

GRADUATE STUDIESMa.ior Subjeci:

Mediaeval Philosophy- - Professor E. Gilson,Professor C. B. Phelan,Professor A. C. Pegis

Minor Subjects:Systemaiic Philosophy- -The Staff in PhilosophyLatin Palaeography- -Professor J. R. O'Donncll


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THE DISTINCTION OP ESSENCE AND EXISTENCEIN THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS SUAREZ


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Acknowledgements

Those to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for myacademic career and its trappings are legion and xmfortunatelythey cannot be mentioned here. Their absence in no way signifiesmy Ingratitude.

I should like especially to thank ray director.Professor Etienne Ollson for obvious treasons.; Dr. Anton C.Pegls for some interesting conversations, the generous loanof a precious old printed edition of Durandus and equallyvaluable microfilms of Petrus Aureolus and Gregory of Rimini;the staff of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies andthe University of Toronto.The names of Dr. James H. Robb and Rev. Joseph C,Wey, C.S.B. must be alsc mentioned 3 the first for his generousoffer of assistance while a Pulbright scholar in Paris andthen for his procurement of the films of the many early printededitions used in this dissertation, all done with dispatch,thoroughness and exactlti'dei the second, for expediting theprocurement of these films by a letter of introduction for Dr.Robb to the photographic department of the Biblioth6queNational. I should also like to thanlc Rev, John F. Stapleton,C.S.B. , Librarian of the Pontifical Institute of MediaevalStudies for \intold assistance in the use of his library.Fir.ally, I should like to thank my wife, Lenore, whonot only typed every wore. In this dissertation, a moniomentaltask in Itself, but who also endured the conception of It andits stumoling beginnings, an achievement which surpasses anyacknowledgement I could attempt to render.


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TABLE OF CONTEOTS

PageINTRODUCTION 1PART I: REAL DISTINCTION

A. The Three Traditions 1B. First Thomistic Argument 5

1, John Capreolus 92, Patilus Barbus Sonoinas 203, Cajetan 23--'h, "Sylvester of Perrara 265. Chrysostoiuus Javellus 31

C. Second Thomistic Argument 3^1. Giles of Rome 362. John Capreolus 393. Paulas Barbus Soncinas 424. Cajetan 455. Sylvester of Perrara 466. Chrysostoraus Javellus 48

D. Third Thomiatic Argument 50E. Fourth Thomistic Argument 53F. Fifth Thomistic Argviraent 54G. Problem of the "Duae Res" 56H. Critical Summary 59

PART II: MODAL DISTINCTIONA. Introduction 63B. Basis for Modal Distinction 72C. Critical Summary 76

PART III: DISTINCTION OP REASONA. Introduction 79


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B. Proponents of Distinction of Reason


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PART VI: THE ROLE OP "ESSE"A. Introduction 200B. Confirmation of his Third Principle 205C. Critical Svunmary 214

PART VII: FURTHER CLARIFICATION OP THE ROLEOF " ESSE "A. Introduction 216B. Comparison of Existence and Subsistence 219C. Critical Sumniari'^ 249

PART VIII: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ESSE ESSENT'IAE"AND " ESSE EXISTSNTIAE" AS BWl'VllMi 'i'WO"RES"A. Introduction 252B. Rejection of the Real Distinction 253C. Critical SuBguary 269

PART IX: THE MODAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ESSESSSENTIAE" AND " ESSE EXISTENTlJg"A. Introduction 272B. Rejection of the Modal Distinction 273C. Critical Sunanary 283

PART X: THE DISTINCTION OF REASON BETWEEN "ESSEESSENTIAS" AND ''ESSE EXISTENTIAS"A . Introduction 284


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B. Critique of the Distinction of Reason 293C. Critical Summary 320

CONCLUSION 323

NOTES: Introduction 3^^PART I 3^6PART II 397PART III ^6PART IV ^16PART V ^^8PART VI ^5^PART VII ^57PART VIII ^65PART IX ^^PART X - ^71

BIBLIOGRAPHY: ^91


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INTRODUCTION

The name of Francis Suarez is a famous one In thehistory of Western thought as one of the eminent figures inthe tradition of Christian learning in the Spain of his day.Theologian, philosopher, legist, he takes his place alongsidethose great intellects of the Middle Ages who like so manyvirtuosos can turn their hand to anything in the intellectualmilieu of their day and establish themselves as men to bereckoned with.

Bom in Granada in 15^ on January 5th, Suarez wasdirected to an ecclesiastical career at an early age.^ ' Andfulfilling this parental direction, he enters the young Societyof Jesus in 1564. After an Initial difficulty in the studies

(2)in which he was later to excell, Suarez begins his eminentteaching career as professor of philosophy at Segovia. Thencehe goes to Valladolld and in 157^-1575 Is named professor oftheology at Segovia again, only to return to Valladolld inthe same capacity in 1576-1577. Next, in I581 he is at Romeand in I585 is professor of theology at Alcala where he re-mains until 1593* at which time he returns to his "Alraa Mater"Salamanca.' ' It is at Salpmanca that Suarez' "Disputationes

(4)Metaphysicae" see the light of day in 1597.In this famous work, which from 1605 to I610 went

through six editions,'-'' it is Suarez' purpose to do for thescience of metaphysics wtiat St. Thomas did for the science oftheology. For Just as St. Thomas freed theology from the text


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of Peter Lombard, Suarez Intends to free metaphysics from thetext of the Philosopher and treat it according to its ownintrinsic nature as an intellectual discipline in its ownright.

"And because I have always considered it a great ad-vantage for comprehending ind penetrating metaphysicalrealities if they are examined and considered accordingto a suitable method, something I could pursue withdifficulty or scarcely at all if, after the fashion ofthe commentators, I turned my hand to all the questionswhich arise by-the-by and almost willy-nilly from thetext of the Philosopher, for this reason I have thoughtit would be more useful, and in keeping vjlth the pro-cedure of such a discipline (servato doctrinae oixilne),to raise those questions for my reader's considerationwhich are usually Investigated and^sought in regard tothe whole object of this wisdom,"^ 'As he says elsewhere the subject matter of the

" Dlsputationes Metaphysicae " is not the text of Aristotle's"Metaphysics " but the very things with which metaphysicalknowledge is concerned.''' And Suarez himself tells us inhis " Ad Leetorem" how the fruit of his labors is contained intwo volximes and how the first disputation of the first volumediscusses the subject-matter of this science, its worth andutility. As well, this first tome contains discussions ofthis same object, its properties and causes. In the othervoliirae, what he calls " inferiors " of this same object aretreated, taking its beginning from that division of being," in creatum et creatorem" . ^ '

It is precisely in the context of the former divisionthat Suarez' famous thirty-first disputation finds its place.


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For, in this place Suai^z Intends to discuss finite andcreated being and to explain that by which finite and createdbeing is finite and created, that is, to establish the "ratio"of created being by noting what it is that makes finite beingto be finite. ^"^' In Suarez" eyes, the root of this wholequestion is found in the relation of the essence and the " esse"of the creature and in the manner in which they are distin-guished.

This is the famous battleground of Thomlsts andSuarezians in our day but to my knowledge no one hasapproached this text of Suarez through the men and works citedby him in his description of the three historical positions onthe question. Thus no one has sought the soiirces of the argu-ments cited by Suarez for the Thomistic position, let us say,in the very texts of the Thomlsts cited by Suarez at the out-set of the thirty-first disputation.^ '-' ^ Such will be thesubject matter of this thesis to seek out the Thomisticarguments reported by Suarez in his explication of their posi-tion, as well as the argxiraents for the second and third posi-tion, and to treat the position of Simrez himself in relationto these three historical positions.


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PART I

REAL DISTINCTION

A. The Three TraditionsBefore proceeding to an analysis of the first

historical position on the distinction between essence and" esse" as set down by Francis Sueirez in his famous 31stDisputation, let us note all the men he involves in thethree positions.

a. Proponents of the real distinction, Suarezlists the following men and the places where theirposition finds its expression.

1. St. Thomas: ^^'a. I S.Th. q.3 a.b. II CO. cap. 52c. De Ente et Essentia C.5d. IV Metaph. lect.2

2. Capreolus:Text Aa. In I Sent. d,8 a.l q.l

3. Cajetan:Text Ba. In S.Th. I q.3 a.b. In De Ente et Essentia cap.

4. Sylvester of Ferrarra:Text Ca. In II CO. cap. 32


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5. Soncinas:Text Da. In IV Metaph. q.l2

6. Chrysostoraus Javellus:Text Ea. Tractatus de Transcendentibus

7. Aegldius of RomeText Pa. In I Sent . d.2 aA a.l^^'b. De Ente et Essentia q.9 et sequentc. Quodllbet I q.7

8. St. Albert: '^^a. Super llbrum de Causls propos.8

9. Avicenna:a. V Metaph. cap. 1

b. Proponents of the modal distinction. Suarezlists the following men and places.

1 Scotus":Text Ga. In 3 Sent, d.6 q.l

2. Henry of Ghent:Text Ha. Quodllbet I qq: 9 & lO

3. Dominicus Soto:Text I' a. 2 Phys. q.2^^^

b. In 4 Sent. d.lO q.2


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c. Proponents of the distinction of reason. Thefollowing men and places are listed by Suarez.

1. Alexander of Alexandria:^ 'Text Ja. 7 Metaph. ad textxara 22

2. Aureolus:^ 'Text Ka. In I Sent, d.8 q.21 a. 1-4

3. Henry of Ghent:Text La. Quodlibet I q.9

4. Godfrey of Fontaine:Text M(9)

a. Quodlibet II qq: 2 & 3b. Quodlibet III qq: 1 & 2

5. Gerard of Cannel:Text Na. Quodlibet 5 q.9

$. Durand of St. Pourcain:Texta. In I Sent, d.8 q.2

7. Gabriel Biel:Text Pa. In 3 Sent, d.6 q.2

8, Hervaeus Natalis:Text Qa, Quodlibet 7 q.8

(10)

9. Greco rj"- of RiminiText R.(12)

a. In 2 Sent, d.l .6 ad argumentvun Aureoli


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10. Antonlus Andreae:Text Sa. 4 Metaph. q.3

11 LychetusText Ta. In 3 Sent, d.6

12. Alexander of AchlllinusText U.(13)

a. Liber I De eleraentis, dubixam 23Miciaae]Text V13. Miciaael de Palacios:

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a. In I Sent, d.8 disputatlo 214. Joannes Alensls:^ -''

a. In lexlco theologico, verbo Esse15. Augustinus Nlphus:Text W

a . 4 Metaph . dlsp .l6. John of Jemdun:Text X

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a. 4 Metaph, q.3PetrusText Y17. Petrus Fonseca:'

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a. 4 Metaph. c.2 q.4These are the positions, the men and their works, which willconstitute the subject matter for discussion and analysis inthe first part of this presentation.

In treating such a large nvunber of men, the mostworkable approach, lest our study get out of hand, seems to


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be a method of working backwards froa Susirez, For thesubject-matter of this dissertation is Suarez himself, andany approach, which seeks to elucidate in detail the individualdoctrine of each of these men he mentions, would frustrate thewhole purpose of the work at hand. Hence, our procedure in thisinitial part will be first to note and analyze the charac-teristics of each of the many argvunents which Suarez cites forthe Thomists, the Scotists and for the proponents of the thirdposition, each in their turn, and second to cite the Thomistor Scotist or proponents of the third position to whom thisargument belongs (and whence Suarez very likely takes it) andto remark how it manifests the characteristics of his resume.

B, First Thomistic ArgumentLet us now proceed to apply this method to the

Thomists in order to see if what Suarez quotes as the firstThomistic argument is to be found among the followers of St.Thomas, recalling that this first argument is to prove that,"existence is a certain thing altogether really distinct fromthe entity of the essence of a creature" , ' ' Suarez reca-pitulates the first argument of the Thomists as follows:

"The arguments for this position are many. The firstis because the essential predicates belong to acreature apart from the intervention of an efficientcause. Wherefore it has been true from all eternity


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to say man Is a rational animal. But existence doesnot belong to a creature except in virtue of anefficient cause. Axul for this reason a creature camnotbe said to be in act unless it has been created (nisifacta sit). Consequently the ' esse ' of the creatureIs a thing distinct (res distincta) from its essencebecause one and the SMJe thing cannot be and not be byan efficient cause." vl9;

To this, Suarez appends a possible objection, the answer towhich must be accepted 3 part and parcel of the sameThoraistlc argumentation as Suarez reports it. It j^eads likethis -

"But if you say, when the creature comes to be, notonly the ' esse * comes to be but also the essence of thecreature the reply comes back the essence does notcome to be but rather the essence comes under ' esse 'or that the esseiice becomes existing. Thus, it doesnot follow that the created essence is absolutelydistinguished from essence except by reason of existence,which It, created essence, adds to essence." v^O)A brief analysis will help to isolate and thereby

clarify the points made in this very succinct argument and inthe subsequent qualification of its conclusion in the face ofa possible objection.

a. The first feature worthy of note is theemphasis placed on essence apart from any relationto " esse " or an exlstentiaiL context i.e. efficientcausality. This is most important as will becomemore clear as we proceed.

b. Secondly, It must be remarked that thecontrast between essence and " esse" is made mani-fest by the absence of an efficient cause in the


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one case that of essence, and its presence Inthe other that of " esse" .

c. In the third place we must take note that thispresence and absence of an efficient cause is thebasis for the subsequent distinction between essenceand " esse" .

d. The fourth aspect is the recourse to anexample of " per se" predication in which theessential predicates of a creature i.e. the predi-cates which belong by nature to the very essenceor quiddity of a creature^^' are cited in orderto show that the essence does not have an efficientcause.

e. The fifth point, closely related to the fourth,is the affirmation of the eternal truth of such " perse" propositions as man is a rational animal, andthus the implicit affirmation of the eternity ofessence.

f Next, note the implicit emphasis placed onthe order of \increated truth in view of theeternity of essence and essential predication.For if an efficient cause is looked upon as thepurveyor of a created " esse" , which unlike theessence, is not eternal, but rather temporal, coming


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to be in time aa it does, the truth of such predi-cation as man is a rational, animal, can only bean uncreated truth, since it does not come to beby a creative efficient cause. This is a mostimportant implication or will become more manifestin time, when we come to Suarez' own refutation ofthis argument . ^ '

g. T5ie seventh detail is the very objection itself,stating tirnt the essence as well as " esse" is created,that is, that the essence as well as " esse" is theterminus of an efficient cause. Hence, in takingthis stand the counter argument is putting forwardthe claim of an order of created truth.

h. Lastly, we must be aiifare of the qualificationthat essence does not come to be i.e. does not havean efficient cause but rather that essence comeslander " esse " i.e. is posited outside its causes.In light of this Siiarez interprets the argument tomean that the distinction between created essenceand essence as such is not an absolute distinctionbased on something intrinsic to the nature of each.Rather they are distingiiished relatively in as muchas created essence is related to something extrinsicto the order of essence, namely existence.


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Now to search out and isolate what, if any, ofthese features may be found amongst the Thoraists.

1. Text A: Joiin CapreolusThe first Thomlst we shall confront is John Capreolus

whose date and place of birth are unknown to us but is thoughtto be Rodez in France around I38O. He entered the Dominicanorder and was reading the Sentences at Paris in 1409. Heteaches at many different Dominican convents, among which isToulouse. Rodez, 1444, are the place and date of his death.It is with his famous Commentary on the Sentences that we haveto deal, whose four books were completed in 1409, 1426, 1428and 1432 respectively. And their value, philosophical as v/ellas historical, has been noted by Grabmann and Quetif andEchard. Indeed, it has been said that with Capreolus we areat the meeting ground of the primitive Thoraists and the laterclassic ones. That is, Capreolus is inspired of such men asHervaeus Natalis, Peter of Palud, Bernard of Auvergne and Johnof Naples and in turn inspires such later Thoraists as Cajetan,Sylvester of Ferrara, Javellus and Soncinas.^ ^' A part ofthe influence on these later men will become evident as weproceed, so for now let us begin by noting the monumental, aswell as novel, task Capreolus sets for himself at the very-outset of his famous work:

"In this question (a. I) there will be two articles, in


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the first of which conclusions are osited andobjections are moved in the second.' 'But before I come to the conclusions, I premisethis one remark which I vrlsh to have understood (haberivolo pro supposito) throughout the whole reading (lectura)and it Is that I Intend to put forth nothing of ray own(et est quod nihil de proprio intend influere) but Iintend only to reproduce the opinions which have seemedto me to have been according to the mind of St. Thomas.Nor do I intend to adduce any proofs for the conclusionsbut his own word, with rare exceptions. But theobjections of Aureolus, Scotus, Durandus, Joannis deRlpa, Henricus, Cuido de Carmelo, Gan:*o, Adam and otheropponents of St. Thomas, I propose to set down in theirplaces and to solve by the words of St. Thomas." (25)

Thiat he has set himself this task there can be nodoubt and we shall have occasion to see if and how he achievesits fulfillment, at least in h s treatment of the problem ofthe distinction between essence and " esse"

.

Capreolus in the place cited by Suarez (cf . Text A)treats of the very question at issue, namely, the distinctionbetween essence and " esse" but phrased as follows: "Utrumcreatura subslstens sit suum esse ex3lstentiae".(2"^ Hisposition on this question includes his citation of numerousauthorities answering this question in the negative* ' andone argumentum " in opposittoa" ^ ^ preceding five conclusions,each followed by suitable arguments; all going to make up thefirst article. (^' The second article contains the ai'gumentsof the adversaries and Capreolus* answer to them. (30) it isthe first argument for the first conclusion (no subsistingcreature is its own

"esse" , which is the act by which it thesubsisting creature exists in reality) which interests us


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here.With both sides of the question attested to,

Capreolus stx*aightway proceeds to an explication of hisfirst conclusions-^ ' by citing a text from St. Thomas theburden of which is as follows:

"The substance of each thing belongs to it ' per se 'and not ' per aliud ' . Whence to be actuallyillumined (esse lucidum actu) is not the verysubstance of air, for it belongs to it ' per aliud *

.

But the 'esse' of any creature belongs to it ' peraliud ' , otherwise it would not be created. Hence inno created substance is its ' esse ' the same as itsessence." ^32jTo say the least this is a rather enigmatic text, especiallywhen quoted out of context. Indeed, such a text would seemto give some Justification to those who identify the notionsof composition and creation. ^33) Howver, without any attemptat explanatory comment Capreolus complements this text witha long citation from St. Albert, since, for him, ot. Albertargues in a manner similar to St, Thomas (consimiliter arguit

(34)Albertus).^ ' Still Capreolus does not pause for an obviouscommentary as much as one might expect, and almost hope tofind, after his long citation of St. Albert. Instead, heposits a possible objection to the position set down in thetwo prior citations. Yet while there still is no directcomment on Capreo'us' part the objecticn and his reply to itfurnish us with an evident indication to hie own interpretationof these two authoritative passages. Indeed this objection


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is the key to Capreolus' interpretation of these two textsand also the key to the pattern of Capreolus' subsequentresponse. It reads as follows:

"It will be said, perhaps, that this argumentation isnot conclusive because its major premise is false,namely, the essence of a thing belongs to it ' per se 'i.e. without any efficient cause. But this is denied(says the object-r) because Just as man owes the factof his existence co an efficient cause (homo habet acausa efficiente quod existat vel quod sit in actu),so does he owe the fact that he is man to a cause,and the essence is not something ' per se * and withoutany cause. Whence, Just as man was not existing beforethe creation of the world, so neither was there man(i.e. any essence 7%^) ^^*^ that proposition wasfalse man is man."^-^-''Let us note at once that this in subst2uice is the

very objection reported by Suarez in that both affirm thatnot only the

"esse " is created but also the essence of the

creature. This adversary has confronted the notion behindthe use of " per se " in the text of St. Thomas and " a seipso "by St. Albert, for as he sees it, the meaning is withoutan efficient cause, {...et non per se, hoc est, sine aliacausa). This, the adversary refuses to accept, so m' oh sothat any essential predication wherein the essence is predicatedof itself, e.g. man is man, is false if no man exists priorto its formulation. ^^' Hence it is interesting to see justhow this possible refutation sets the pattern of Capreolus'answer and is for him so to speak, the point of no return.For if he himself holds that there is no efficient cause ofthe essence, on the basis of his interpretation of the texts


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of St, Thomas and St. Albert, he can only oppose thisrefutation as best he can, whence there is no return shortof an upheaval of his metaphysical principles. And Capreolusdoes Just that i.e. oppose this refutation, for hecounter-attacks with citations from Aristotle and Grosseteste^^'whose texts make clear to him that every proposition in thefirst and second mode of predicating " per se" is necessaryand is perpetually true.^-^ '

We have here isolated two features of the argumentrecapitulated by Suarez, namely, that it has been true from alleternity to say man is a rational animal. For this is anexample of "per se " predication in the first mode and Capreolushas said that such a mode of predication is necessary andperpetually true,

"Prom these quotations it is manifest that everyproposition of the first and second mode of predicating' per se ' is necessary and is perpetually true.Consequently, since the quiddity of a rose belongs tothe rose in the first mode of predicating ' per se * , itfollows that it necessarily belongs to it. And alsoQrosseteste shows that the quiddity of a rose does notbelong to a rose by some extrinsic efficient (agentem)cause, so that some. efficient cause is the cause that arose is a rose." '39;

Thus we have isolated another feature of Suarez'summary argument, namely, that the essence does not come to beby an efficient cause. The example of the rose is a ratherfamous one^'^^' and vrill bloom again in the same context as inCapreolus.^ ' But now that we have undoubtedly found one of


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the men Suarez had in mind, let us see if Capieolu5 can addanything to the Intelligibility of the argument as set downby Svarez.

A contribution in this regard is made by Capreolus'qualifying remarks on the eternity of such "per se" propo-sitions. For he tells us:

"And for this reason, I reiterate that man always isman and this is immutably true man is a rationalanimal, and its tnath Is eternally in the divineintellect, as St. Thomas holds in I S.Th. q.lO, a. 3*ad 3 pd in De Veritate q.l, a. 5, adj.''^^^^

And he bolsters this contention first with a very long textfrom St. Albert' ^' bearing on eternal truth and eternalpropositions in the context of the Divine Ideas' ' andsecondly with the famous text of Augustine on the niimber six(45)along with St. Thomas' commentary on the same.^ ^' HenceCapreolus concludes:

"Just as the first -attempt at refutation was worthless,so the second attack^^' is of no consequence. Andthis is obvious. For if Grosseteste intends that insuch propositions in the first mode of predicating' per se * of this type man is a rational mortalanimal, the predicate is the precise (praecisa) formalcause of the subject, yet it is not the precise(praecisa) cause that it inheres in the subject, butdemands an extrinsic cause in order that the predicatebelong to the subject, it follows that that cause causessomething after it already is, nay that such a thing isits effect and is not its effect. For even when thatcause is causing nothing, the predicate still belongs tothe subject, since, whether the subject is or is not, itis no less that which it is, as a rose is a rose.Hence no cause is the cause that the quiddity of a rosebelongs to a rtsse for it was shown above that suchpropositions (i.e. 'per se' in the first mode) arebternally necessary because their truth arises once the


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divlne ideas have been posited. For when the divineidea of man Is posited In God, at once the definition(ratio) of man is identical with the definition (ratio)of man, and so immutably man Is man. Likewise whenthat idea of man is set down, at once the definition|ratio) of animal is included within the definition(ratio) of man, and so man is an animal; so of therest. To be sure, if any cause effects that man is ananimal, that cause will be the cause why the idea ofman includes the definition (ratio) of animal, whichcan be done neither by God himself nor by a creature.Consequently, it is clear that man is an animal, is' per se * in this sense, that man is an animal by noextrinsic efficient cause. For its truth, it issufficient that the predicate be of the definition ofthe subject. But this is immutably true andineffectibly so, unless we imagine that the. divine ideasare effectible by some efficient cause." (^7)

All of this helps us to clarify matters a great dealand also manifests all the features found in Suarez' summary.For in seeking the basis of the distinction between essenceand " esse" , we have ended in the divine intellect and becomeinvolved in the problem of the divine ideas. Yet how couldCapreolus conclude otherwise if he has denied any such thingas a created and thereby""a contingent essential order or acroated order of essence within being? And who would daresay that the divine ideas are created, if that is what onesays when one states that essence has an efficient cause.' 'We shall have occasion to go into this more in detail later,so for now let us be content to notice the whole trend andbroad characteristics of this argumentation; its emphasis onthe perseity of essence, with relatively little attentionpaid to " esse" other than to point out that it is " per aliud" ;


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the need of no efficient cause of the essence; the eternaltruth of "per se" predication; the reference to the divineintellect and its ideas, and the fact that the answers to theobjections are on the level of vmcreated truth as found inthe divine intellect. All of these or most of them willappear again in all but one of the Thomists cited by Suarez.For I have been unable to unearth iny such presentation inGiles of Rome in the texts cited by Suarez (cf. Text F).'^^'And the reappearance of these highlights is so striking thatone would not be too far wrong in saying that Capreolus, orsomeone before him has set the pattern for this particularapproach to the problem of essence and " esse" . In addition,this manner of attack is important, for it will help explainvhy Suarez begins his own formulation and solution where hedoes begin it i.e. why Suarez establishes as his firstprinciple that the essence of a creature has, in itself, notrue " esse" before it is created by God, rather it isabsolutely nothing. ^^0) indeed, Capreolus' approach wouldseem to be behind the position, previously mentioned, whichreduces the problem of the real distinction to that ofcreation.

It will not be amiss to remark that in the courseof this whole argumentation only four texts of St. Thomashave been cited and three do not treat of the composition ofessence and "esse" in any direct way. Indeed, St. Albert or


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rather Avlcenna seem to bulk larger than St. Thomas. However,(51)in another context, that of creation, ^"^ ' Capi^eolus has left

us a remarkable witness to a doctrinal inspiration other thanSt. Thomas. It is this:

"Hence it is clear at first glance (prima facie) thatalthoiigh no created essence has been a being(ens) frometernity, speaking of being (ens) as it designates the' actus essendi ' or actual existence, still any essencehas been always what it is now essentially and ' per se 'for example, man always is man, always is animal, alwaysis a body, always substsmce, always essence or being (ens)which signifies essence. And this is in accord with themind of Albert and many others. Also of this opinion isSt. Thomas."

And then Capreolus brings himself up short, indicating somehesitation at claiming this doctrine for St. Thomas. He isobviously embarrassed as he writes

"Yet if this position does not please, what St. Thomasholds in De Potent!a Dei q.3 a. 5 is held, whex'ein St.Thomas argues as follows: 'All things created by Godare said to be the creatures of God. But creation isterminated to " esse" : for the first of created thingsis " esse" as the Liber de Causis has it. Hence, sincethe quiddity of the thing is other than its " esse",it is clear (vldetur) that the quiddity of a thing isnot from God." (52)

Capreolus remarks that this is the argvunent and then cites St.Thomas' reply (Ecce argumentum. Sequitur responsio):

"From the very fact, he (St. Thomas) says, that ' esse *is attributed to the quiddity, not only ' esse' but thevery quiddity is said to be created, because before ithas ' esse ', the quiddity Is nothing, except perchancein the intellect of the creator where it is not acreature but the creative (creatrix) essence."And having quoted these texts, Capreolus goes on to make this


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candid comment:"And I think that this second way (St. Thomas' answer)Is safer (securlor). Still the other way (the"argumentiim" ) is not erroneous nor even close to error,except to the degree (pro quanto) it is seen to upholdthat essence has some ' esse ' and not from God. But weshould not feel disturbed over this (sed hoc non debetmovere). For, just as Henry sa^s, and says well in myestimation (et bene raeo Judicioj, essence has a twofoldesse' viz. ' esse essentlae ' and ' esse ex.. '.stGntiae *,and it has each of them from God. But the Tirst ^esseessentiae), it has from God as he is an exemplar cause,granting to each essence by his act of knowing (per suimintelligere ) , an intelligible and quidditative ' esse '(esse intelligibile et quidditativum) ; he gives thesecond ' esse ' (esse exsistentiae) as he is an efficientcause. Thus, it does not follow that a creature hassome ' esse * which is not from God, but it follows onlythat the creature is not said to be created in regardto the first (es'-e essentiae) but only in regard to thesecond (esse exsistentiae). On another score (item),there is no need for argument, for as v


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belongs to a creature and yet is uncreated? (...et sic nonsequitur quod creatura habeat allquod esse quod non sit aDeo, sed solum quod non dicitur crearl quantum ad priraum, sedquantum ad secundum esse). What, also, is the nature of this" esse" which is caused yet not created? Ir; then a creatureessentially such? And has not Capreolus made of the realdistinction a distinction between essence as possible andessence as actual, between essence as it exists within thedivine intellect and essence as it exists outside that intellect,in reality? This would help explain Suarez' remark to theeffect that created essence is not distinguished from un-determined essence in any absolute way but only in so far ascreated essence has the addition of existence i.e. is positedoutside its causes, which essence as such does not possess.For, though it is Capreolus' explicit intention to talk ofthe subsisting creature. Vet, in virtue of his principlethat essence is uncreated (though not uncaused nor unproduced)and his subsequent emphasis of this thesis, he cannot helpbut ascend, almost at once, to the uncreated order proper tothe divine intellect and their ideas therein. The "esseessentiae " v/ould seem to be his chief concern.

Given the fact that Capreolus has influenced theniomists who succeeded him, we must then watch for the presenceof Henry of Ghent, and for that reason, the omnipresent Avicenna.


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That is, from our analysis of Capreolus it vfould seem thatthe essence and "esse" between which he affirms a realdistinction is an Avicennian essence and an Avicennian'esse--".^^ ' What then can be Capreolus' comprehension of thetexts of his master if he cites them in defense of a compositionof " esse essentiae" and " esse existentiae"?

2. Text D: Paulus Barbus SoncinasOur second Thomlst is also a Dominican, Paulus

Barbus Soncinas., whose last name, and the one he is bestknown by, is explained by the fact that he was bom of anoble family at Soncino in Lombardy. He enters the Dominicanorder and in succession teaches philosophy and theology atMilan, Perrara and Bologna . He dies on August 4, 1494 atCremona, the same year in which he was named lecturer intheology and preacher at "the convent there. He numbered theThomists, Dominic of Plandria and Peter Nigri among hiscontemporaries and among his friends are the nominalist Markof Benevento and the fgunous hvunamist Pico della Mlrandola.He writes a commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,published at Milan in 1488; compiles a complete edition ofthe ' Opuscula" of St. Thomas, containing many apocrypha, andlast but not least, writes a resume of the work of Capreolusjust studied, entitled "Epitonia quaestioniim in guatuor llbris


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calllng some of the marks pr-evlously noted. Then, too, re-course is had to the example of

"per se " predication by the

same example cited by Suarez man is a rational animal.However, in order to do justice to the man, let us note aqualification of this argijment under the press of an objectionreminiscent of that found in Suarez, an objection to the effectthat:

"Essence belongs to things ' per se ' in the order offormal cause (formallter) but ' per allud ' in the orderof efficient cause (effective). f*or there is anefficient cause that man is an animal." v5o)It is also worthy of note that this objection is a compositeof the two found in Capreolus. Thus, vmder fire of such arefutation Soncinas reacts as follows and qualifies somewhatthe stand he took initially:

"But against this objection it is countered (arguitur)in three ways . And it is shown not, to be sure (nonauidem), that essence does not have an efficient(effectivam) cause,- because it is certain that humanityand lapideity and whatever else is in things, is pro-duced by the prime cause. Rather, it is shown that thereis no efficient cause of the simplified connection of thisproposition (connexionis significati hujus propositionis) man is a rational animal, whereais (sicut) there is anefficient cause of the signified connection of thisproposition (connexionis significati hujus propositionis) man is. .For God, in producing man, conjoins ' esse 'to him." 159)The question may well be asked if Soncinas is not

destroying his former position based on the absence of anefficient cause of the essence and the presence of one in thecase of "esse" . For if, under the press of opposition.


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SoncinaB qualifies his previous stand to say finally thatessence as well as

"esse " has an efficient cause, has he not

qualified his original position out of existence? Vfhat thenbecomes of the original position cited by Suarez? Let us keepthese queries in mind for now, since we shall return to theseproblems again when we treat Suarez' refutation of the firstThomistic argument. But before leaving Soncinas let us noteanother very likely indebtedness to Capreolus. It is found inhis third proof of the above qualification. He argues:

"Thirdly; if man is an animal, has an efficient cause,it vfould follow that something would come to be after Italready is. But this is false, otherwise it would twicereceive ' esse * . Hence etc. The consequence (consequentia)is proved: when God* 3 efficient causality has ceased, thisis still true man is an animal. Consequently If manis an animal, is from an efficient agent, it follows thatit comes to be after it already is. The consequence(consequentia) is cleai'. The antecedent is made manifest.That which results when the divine ideas are posited mustbe, though all causality has ceased. But when the ideaof man and the idea of animal is posited, their connection(connexio) results iDecause the idea of man necessarilyrealizes (repraesentat) aniraallty. Hence etc."(^^0)

Again, in expounding a man's teaching on the distinction ofessence and " esse" we have ascended to the divine intellect andto the ideas therein. In brief, we have once more found our-selves in the order of imcreated truth.

3. Text B: CajetanThe next Thomist to be ti'eated, and one who scarcely

needs any introduction, is the famous Thomas De Vio Cajetanus,


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so named by reason of his place of birth, Gaeta in Italy. Bomin 1469 he enters the Dominican order at the age of 16. Laterhe teaches philosophy and theology at Pavia, Brescia, Padua andRome. In 1508 he is general of the order and in 151? is madea cardinal. Of his prolific works the most famous, of course,is his commentary on the " Summa Theologiae " of St. Thomas.Indeed, his literary output is truly remarkable when one realizesthat much of it was accomplished while he was the covinselor ofseveral Popes, even to fulfilling many missions for them, aswell as general of his order.' ' For our needs it is hiscommentary on the "De Ente et Essentia" of St. Thomas whichcontains something of interest. It is noteworthy that he hasrecourse to St. Thomas' arguments as found in II Contra Gentilescap. 52 for a fuller clarification of the already demonstrateddistinction between essence and " esse ". For he tells us:

"In regard to the s'fecond step in our procedure: theposition (opinio) of St. Thomas, talcen by him in IIContra Gentiles (cap LII), is that in every creature,its quiddity and its actual existence (esse actualisexistentiae) are really distinguished. And though thisconclusion has already been made clear in the text (i.e.of the De Ente et Essentia) still (attamen), for afuller exposition I shall excerpt (adducam) three proofsfrom St, Thoijias in that olace (i.e. the ContraGentiles)." (027The remarkable thing is that in the two men already

featured, Capreolus and Soncinas, and now Cajetan, a referenceto the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles chapter 52,explicit or implied, has always attended the facsimile of the


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first Thomlstlc argument resumed by Suarez. For within thatvery context we find Cajetan saying:

"The third argument Is this; Wliat belongs to a specificnature apart from any efficient (effectiva) cause isreally distinguished from what belongs to that specificnature only by some efficient (effectivam) cause. Butthe quiddltative predicates belong to a thing withoutany efficient (effectiva) cause. Yet existence does notbelong to a thing except by some efficient agent. Hencethe quiddltative predicates and the existence of a thingare really distinguished. The major is ' per ae nota '

.

The minor also, in regard to the second part is mostclear, but in regard to the second part, it is madeclearer (declaratur) as follows: When all efficient(effectiva) causality is removed in respect to the rose,I ask whether this is true a rose is a corporealsubstance. If so, I have my point (intentum). If not,then rose, taken absolutely, is not in a predicament &ndthe predicates of the first mode can be understood notto be of the thing and the definition would be separatedfrom the defined, all of which are unimaginable etc.Also, this opinion is clearly (videtur) derived from theancients, namely Plato, Alpharabi, Avlcenna, Algazeli,Boethius, Hilarlus, Albert and their followers, althoughAristotle has left us nothing clear on this."(o3)

The similarity of this text to that written by Suarezis so striking, with the same turns of phrase and choice ofwords, that we may well have the prototype of Suarez* re-capitulation. Cajetan is likely one of the men Suarez had inmind when he quoted this argument. The large portion givenover to essence apart from its relation to "esae." is patent;the contrast of these two principles according to the presenceand absence of an efficient cause to found the distinction ofessence and " esse " is employed; recourse is had to an exampleof " per se" predication pointing out that the essential


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predicates, and hence the essence, have no efficient cause.However, explicit reference to the eternal truth of suchas a rose is a corporeal substance, is missing, though im-plied, when he says that the truth of such a proposition hasno efficient cause. Also, no explicit statement in regard tothe order of uncreated truth is to be found, though that toomust be implied in the absence of any efficient cause of thetruth of the above predication. That Cajetan is in the sametradition as Capreolus^^^' before him is made clear by hisreference to Avlcenna, Alpharabi, Algazel, Albert, Boethiusand St. Hilary, though Aristotle, says Cajetan, has leftnothing on this point. The addition of Plato by Cajetan tothis tradition is very interesting.'*^^'

4. Text C: Sylvester of FerraraPranciscus de Sllvestris Pen^ariensis is the fourth

Thomist we are to treat. As in the case of his contemporary,Cajetan, we are concerned with one of the classic commentatorsof St. Thomas and, like Cajetan, he too is a general of theDominican order, having entered it at the age of 14. Bom inPerrara in 1474 he enters the Dominican convent there. Theyear 1498 finds him teaching philosophy at Mantua; in 1503 heteaches at Milan and in 1507 he is at Bologna. Indeed, whatCajetan is to the Suirnna Theologlae of St. Thomas, Sylvester is


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to the S-umma Contra Gentiles , This famous commentary datesfrom 1508 to 1517i the year in which it was finished, and itis said that when Cajeteui, now master general, passed by theconvent at Bologna in 1313 and was presented this commentaryof Sylvester, he ordered them to be published, realizing theirgreat worth. He dies in 1528 at Rennes while visiting theconvents in France.^ '

With Perrara we are again faced with that onuiipresentchapter* in the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles and,more particulai'ly, at grips with the very argument which seemsto have inspired all the Thomists we have met thus far. As ishis custom, before commenting, Sylvester interprets the fifthargument of St. Thomas thusly:

"Fifthly. Substance belongs to each thing per se *that is, not by a productive cause. But ' esse ' belongsto substance (sibij ' per aliud ' . Hence etc. Theemtecedent is made clear by an argument from opposition(ex opposite): for to be actually illumined is not ofthe substance of air because it belongs to it ' perallud'.n^JThe same interpretation of "per se" to mean with-

out an efficient cause, encountered previously in Capreolus,Soncinas and Cajetsai, is here facing us again. And just aswe saw in Suarez, the presence and absence of this efficientcause is the basis for the distinction essence and " esse"

.

But just like Soncinas before him, Sylvester qualifies thisposition as follows:

"It must be noted that it is one thing to say that the


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essence of something has a productive cause and it Isanother thing to say that the essence belonss to a thinghy an efficient (effectivam) cause. For the first istrue and the second is false. Since every productionis teiminated to actual existence (ad esse act\aalisexistentiae), everything which has ' esse ' from anotheris said to have a productive cause. And thus, sinceevery created essence has ' esse ' from another, it isnecessary to say that every created essence has aproductive cause. But when it is said man is ananimal, no actual existence (esse actualis existentiae)is expressed, but merely the composition of predicateand subject and the relation (ordo) of one to the other.For it is an order or relation which belongs to a thingwhether it really exists or not, as Avicenna, Algazel,Alpharabi, and Albert hold whether man is or is not,this is always true man is an animal. Hence manis an animal, has no productive cause, but this manis, does have such a cause. Nor is it any obstacle thatsometime the Doctors say that God made man rational be-cause it is not said for this reason as if God maderational belong to man, but because He produced theintellective,soul of man vrtience man formally (foiroaliter)is animal." (^o)

The same tradition of Avicenna, Alpharabi, Algazel,and Albert is attested to once more. And since the presenceof Soncinas seems obvious here, the same problems noted inhis regard confront us again. For we must also ask ifSylvester is not destroying the very position found in hisinitial interpretation of the fifth argument of St. Thomas?Such seems to be the case if, as he admits in this text, it isnecessary to say that every created essence has a productivecause (cum omnls essentia creata ab alio habeat esse, necesseest dicere omnem essentiam ci*eatara habere causam productivam),for the point of his original interpretation was that thecreated essence had no productive cause. What then becomes of


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the relation of this to Suarez' rendering? We shall haveoccasion later to return to these queries, so we shall leavetheir resolution till then. But it is to be remarked that,in qualifying his stand, Sylvester has departed from the orderof created essence or created trxith and climbed to the levelof uncreated (because not caused by an efficient agent) essenceand xmcreated truth. For, it is always true to say man isan animal. Thus, in Spite of the different tack taken bySylvester, we have isolated two features of Suarez* originalpresentation. A third and important one is instanced in hisquotation of and reply to the same objection which plaguedCapreolus and Sonclnas and was cited by Suarez. The objectionis this:

"But someone may be able to say to the argument of St,Thomas that substance in truth (quldem) belongs to athing 'perse* in the order of formal causality(formallter) but not so in the order of efficientcausality (non aute effective). And for this reason,it (substantia) belongs to a thing in viii^ue of anotherjust as ' esse * does."T69)Here follows the rather lengthy reply of Sylvester containingsomething we have already met in each of the three precedingThomists

"But against this refutation (responsionem) it isai^gued by the Thon^ists on these grounds. First, be-cause when all causality has ceased, it is true tliat man is man and man is an animal. Otherwise,predicates in the first mode can be understood not tobe present to the thing and the definition is separatedfrom the defined. All of iirhJ.ch are contrary to everyphilosophy, (cf. Cajetan).Second, because something would come to be after it


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Is. Because when all efficiency is removed, it wouldstill be true that man is man, since the predicate be-longs formally to the subject of itself and for thisreason is of eternal truth. And thus if some causemakes man to be man, it follows that it causes some-thing after it is. (cf. Capreolus and Soncinas).Third, because these are equally necessary manis man and God is one, since their opposites areequally impossible, viz, from the iii?)lication ofcontradiction. But that God is one, is establishedto have no efficient (effectivam) cause, (cf. Soncinas'note #39). Nor is it valid if it is said that pix>-positions of this sort are necessary when the existenceof the subject is supposed. Because then this twoand three are five is no more necessary tlian this es.rthis. Heaven is and the like, which are established to beconditionally (ex suppositione) necessary. But this isboth contrary to philosophy and contrary to Augustinede Libero-^bitrio (Lib. II cap VIII)." (cf. Capreolusnote yTHl)K(^)

And he bolsters this position with a long text showing justhow "per se" propositions (in the first way) are eternallytrue;

"But for evidence of this how the already-mentionedpropositions in which the predicate is of the definitionof the subject are eternally trnie, and hov; (quoniara)they do not have an efficient (effectivam) cause of theinherence of predicate in subject, it must be ponderedthat, since a nature is subject to a threefold consider-ation viz. absolutely, abstracting from every ' esse *both in an intellect and outside an intellect, as ithas 'esse' in an intellect and as it has ' esse * outsidean intellect in things themselves, the quidditativepredicates belong to a nature not from the ' esse ' ithas in an intellect, nor from the ' esse ' which thenature has in things but in itself (secundum se) asit abstracts from every ' esse ' . For when no intellectis considering or even when there is no man really(in rerum natiira) existing, man is a rational animal.Indeed, I say that predicates belong to a nature, notin respect to actual predication, because that does notcome about except by the operation (opus) of an intellect,but fundamentally and in reality (quantum ad rem). Butalthough such predicates do not belong fundamentally andin reality (secxindura rem) to the natuj^e by reason of (ex)


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the ' esse * which they have in an intellect, as, namely,if the intellect were not, man would not be a rationalanimal, neverthless such an inherence of predicates ina subject is able to be known by an intellect, divineas well as created. And for this reason propositionsof this type are eternally true in two ways. First, be-cause for eternity (aeternaliter) the thing is what itis (talis) essentially and it is its true nature to beunderstood with the attribution of such a predicate.Secondly, because they are known eternally by the divineintellect to be true, not only on the part of the act ofunderstanding (ex parte intelligentis) but also on thepart of the thing understood (ex parte rei intellectae)

.

For, since the ideas of all natures are in the divinemind eternally, when these ideas are posited, theconnection of a substauitial predicate v;ith a subjectresults. For this reason (ideo) such propositions areknown to be true from all eternity by the divine intellect,And, as a consequence, no efficient (effectiva) causeis required to make predicate belong to subject." (71)Again we have come to the divine intellect and its

ideas, all in the context of the discussion of the distinctionof essence and " esse " which, after all, we must expect, sincein each man studied so far a retreat to the order of uncreatedtruth has been the order of the day. Let us see if our lastThomist will fail to follow suit.

5. Text E: Chrysostomus JavellusOur last Thomist to be discussed is Chrysostomus

Javellus, another Dominican friar, who is bom in Piedmontaround 1470, auid because of the place in Piedmont where hewas bom is known in religion as Chrysostomus Casalensis.After teaching several years, he is appointed master of studentsat Bologna by the general chapter of 1507. In 1513 he is a


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bachelor at the same convent and two years later, along withhis famous colleague at Bologna, Sylvester of Ferrara, receivesthe title of master. Indeed, his vrtiole university career wasspent at Bologna, at the time when Cajetan was directing theintellectual life of the order. Further, he plays an activepart in the controversy aroused by the publication of PeterPomponazzi's " De Immortalitate Animae " . He has left us an"Ethica Christiana", an Invaluable work entitled, "TotiusRationalis, Naturalis, Divlnae ac Moralis PhilosophiaeCompendium" , a commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, a" Logicae Compendium Peripateticae " and a rare commentary onthe first part of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas. Thelatter may be found in the 158I Lyon edition of the " Summa" .He dies in 1538.^''^'

Like his predecessors in defending the doctrine ofSt. Thomas, he too harks back to the words of his master inII Contra Gentiles cap. 52, for he tells us:

"The third opinion, and the one we intend to maintain,is that of St. Thomas in 2 Contra Gentiles, cap. 52.To make it clear (ad cujus evidentiam) we shall do threethings. First, we shall discuss what essence is andwhat ' esse ' is. Second, in what genus they are. Third,I shall posit two conclusions in keepins_with what hasbeen proposed (responsivas proposito) ."TT3)

As his first conclusion he states that in any being below theprime cause, " esse" and essence are really distinguished, asthese two are taken " in concrete" , namely as " esse hominis"and " id quod est homo" . It is his second proof of this


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conclusion which interests us in regard to the first argumentcited by Suarez. For there Javellus argues:

"The first conclusion is proved a second time asfollows. ' Esse * tias a productive cause, because it isthe effect of an agent which gives ' esse * to its product.But essence does not have a productive cause. Hence,they ai'e not the same in reality (realiter). The con-sequence ( consequentia) is clear. The second part ofthe antecedent is proved in many ways, for if theessence has a productive cause, then (ergo) thequldditative and essential predicates have a productivecause. But these predicates belong to a thing withoutany (omni) productive cause. For when all productivecausality in relation to the rose is removed, I askwhether this is true a rose is a corporeal substsuice.If so I have ray point; if not, then one can have noscience of the rose absolutely taken, but only of therose as it exists. Yet this is fsdse, for, as it ishad in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, scienceis of incorruptibles and necessary things. But the roseas it exists is corruptible and contingent. Hence, inorder that there be science of the ixDse, this must beperpetually true the rose is a corporeal substance, /k'even though all productive causality is absent (remota)."^' '

The influence of Capreolus and of Cajetan, I think,is obvious. But more important we have londoubtedly foundanother owner of the first Thomistlc argument reported bySuarez. The absence of an efficient cause of the essence isclearly brought out in the text of Javellus revealing thatthis presence and absence is the basis for the real distinctionof essence and " esse" . The position that essence has noefficient cause is elucidated and demonstrated by recourse toessential predication in the first mode, all of whichingredients appeared in the recoxinting of the argument bySuarez. And though any explicit reference to eternal and un-


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created truth is lacking it seems implied as was the case withCajetan.^^^^

C. Second Thomistic ArgumentNow that v/e have completed our research into the

background of the first Thomistic argument cited by Suarezand now that our method of procedure has proved workable andalso fruitful, let us go on to the second argument reportedby Suarez following the same method of approach by beginningwith Suarez and working back.

The second argument is presented in the first person(argumentor), indicating that Suarez is summing up these argu-ments as if they were his own which as we shall ultimately see,they are not.^' ' The argument goes as follows:

"The ' esse * of a creature is an ' esse * received in some-thing. Hence in the essence, for no other can be con-ceived into which it is received. Therefore it is athing distinct from essence for the seune thing cannotbe received into itself." (77)But not content merely to state the argument in skeleton form,Suax^z proceeds to put some flesh on the bones by giving aproof of this argument. Thus he sets about to prove the ante-cedent viz. that the " esse" of a creature is an " esse " receivedIn something.

"The first antecedent is proved because an imreceived' esse ' is an ' esse * subsisting by itself, in virtue ofits own actuality, for it is wholly abstracted from a


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subject or potency in which it may be received. Suchan ' esse ' is therefore most perfect and the most supreme(suiiinuin)'^ and thus pure act and something Infinite inthe order of being (infinitum quid in ratione essendi).Hence it is repugnant that the ' esse ' of a creature bealtogether unreceived. Such a proof is confirmed becausesuch an ' esse ' i.e. ' esse Irreceptum ' does not have anyprinciple of limitation. For it is not limited by apotency in which it may be received, if it does not haveany potency (si illam non habet). Nor is such an ' esse 'limited by an act or a difference which is related ymode of act vjith respect to existence (existent lae).The reason is that since existence is the ultimateactuality, it is not constituted by an act by which itis limited. Therefore, in order that the 'esse' of acreature be finite and limited, it is necessary that it1> the act of the essence ;ji,n which it is i*eceived, andby which it is limited." ( '^)

Let us now isolate the highlights of this secondargument as resumed by Suarez. It emphasizes the followingpoints

a. Created " esse" is a received " esse" .b. The relation of " esse " and essence in a creature

is that of received to receiver with essence acting asreceiver.

c. The distinction of receiver and received is areal distinction otherwise, if they were not so distinct,but rather identical, it would amount to saying that thesame thing receives itself, which is absurd,

d. An unreceived " esse" is self-subsistent, lacksno perfections, is pure act and thus infinite in theorder of being, all of which characteristics are re-pugnant to a creature.


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e. That an unreceived " esse" should have theseis due to its lack of any limitation by a potency in\riiich it might be received.

f To say that this unreceived " esse " is limited byanother act or difference is to forget that such an " esse "is the ultimate actviality which is not in potency to anyfurther act by which it might be limited.

Following our previous procedure let us look to theThomists to see if their texts Justify the attribution of suchan argument.

1. Text P: Giles of RomeThough strangely absent from our research into the

sources of the first Thomistic argument according to Suarez,nevertheless a number of texts in one of the works of Gilesof Rome cited by Suarez ^cf . Text P) lend themselves aspossible sources for Suarez' second summation. With Giles, weare dealing with one of the famous students of St, Thomas whostudied under him at Paris between 1269-1272, and yet one whoseallegiance to the master's doctrine is such that hischaracterization as a faithful disciple is Justly suspect.He teaches at Paris from 1285 to 1291 during which time hedisputes the problem of the distinction between essence and" esse " with one of the "magni" ^ ^^^ ^*y Henry of Ghent.


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In 1292 he becomes general of the Order of the Hermits of St,Augustine of which he is a member. Further, in 1295, he be-comes bishop of Bourges and dies in 1316 at Avignon. '^9'

However, let it be noted at once that some texts ofGiles may be the sources for the second Thomistic argument,though they do not seem to be part of one whole argument, suchas Suarez has it. Giles, in citing the arguments which the"magni", who oppose the real distinction, cite against them-selves refers to the following:

"Versus themselves they offer three argtunents. The firstis this. If a creature were its ' esse ', then (c\jm) acreature would be something subsisting (quid subsistens).Hence the ' esse * of the creature would be a subsistent' esse ' . But such an ' esse' is pure ' esse ' which belongsto God alone. Thus etcT "The second 2u?gument amounts tothis. Since an ' esse * of this sort is not somethinglimited if the creature were its ' esse ' , the creaturewould not be something limited. And thus it would notbe something finite, which is unfitting. . ."(80)

This in substance is the argument as cited by Suarez.For Just as in Suarez, the emphasis is laid on the fact that acreature's " esse" is a limited "esse" (cf. d). And that it isessence which limits, is made clear farther on in the sametext:

"Further, in the same book (De Hebdomadibus) it is said'id quod est accepta essendi forma est atque subsistit*.But what is received is really other (aliud re) than whatreceives. Hence the essence v^lch receives ' esse ' isreally different from ' esse ' ." (ol)

That Suarez has made this same point I do not think can bedoubted (cf. a and b). And Giles affirms the same point in


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other texts'"^' the most striking of which, as far as itspartial similarity to Suarez' account is concerned, is perhapsthe following:

"So also in the case of what is proposed (in proposito) the ' esse ' of the creature is a diminished ' esse '(esse diminutura) because it is a received ' esse ' re-ceived in the creature. It has a diminished ' esse ' be-cause it possesses something other than ' esse ' . But ifthe creature's ' esse ' were not a received ' esse ' itwould not be diminished. For act is not said to bediminished nor said to be something participated, ex-cept by reason of the potency in which it is received,vnience it would not be an act which would be receivedin a potency nor would it by nature (natus) be apt tobe received. It would be but act and hence an infiniteact in the manner we mentioned above in the eighth bookof the De Trinitate c.3 where St. Augustine argues thatGod is infinite good because he is nothing but good.Thus iinless we grant that ' esse ' is something receivedin essence we say in effect that it is not son^thingparticipated, neither in itself nor with respect toanother. For limitation accrues to act only by reasonof the potency receptive of it. Nor can it be saidthat that is not a real difference, for if, on thisbasis (i.e. no real difference), we posit that acreature's ' esse ' is a certain diminished act becauseit is not received in a potency according to its full-ness, it is necessary that the receiver be reallydifferent from the received. For otherwise it wouldnot receive it in a diminished degree, for we shall notsay that the ^ same thing receives itself in a diminishedfashion." (S3)

This, as well as other texts, ' ' contain the highlights ofSuarez' recounting (cf. a-b-c-e) but I think it is unlikelythat Giles of Rome is a direct source for Suarez in thisInstance. Let us now look to Capreolus to see if we findsomething more compact in the way of argxunentation and con-taining the highlights reported in Suarez.


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2. Text A: John CapreolusIn the second argument on behalf of his first

conclusion, Capreolus leads off with a text of St. Thomasfrom II Contra Gentiles 3 cap. 32 which reads as follows:

"It is impossible that ' esse ' be wholly Infinite in twoinstances (duplex). For an ' esse ' which is absolutely(omnino) infinite comprehends every perfection of being(essendi). Thus, if infinity were present to two such' esse's ' , that would not be found whereby the one woulddiffer from the other. But subsistent

' esse ' must beinfinite because it is not limited (tenainatur) by anyrecipient. Hence it is impossible to grant a subsistent' esse ' besides the first." v85)

Capreolus, in lieu of an outright coiranentary, citesa possible objection taking issue with St. Thomas' assertionthat " a subsistent 'esse* must be infinite" ^ , and recordsthe following reply:

"To this it is said that there is no groiinds forarguiment ( instantia nulla est) because if it isestablished that an 'esse' subsists in the first way(accepting " esse subsistens " for an " esse " not receivedin something distinct from it), it is necessary that itsubsist in the second way (accepting " esse subsistens "for an " esse" in no vjay contracted to a special gradeof beingJI This is made clear as follows. No act,which, in as much as it is act (talis), does not haveformal differences by which it may be divided, can bedivided except by its receiver (susceptlvum ejus) whichin itself has a certain divisibility. It is made clear(patet) in the third book of the Metaphysics c.ll vriiereAristotle lays it dovm that everything divisible isdivided either by form or quantity'. But ' esse ' as itis of this sort cannot have any formal difference. Henceit cannot be divided except by receivers (susceptiva).And if these receivers were of one order or genus (ratio),' esse ' would be multiplied only by number. If they wereof one and another order or genus (ratio), ' esse ' wouldbe divided into many ' esse ' of another order. 6ut ifsome 'esse' were to subsist (subsisteret) so that it


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would not be received, it would have no distinctiveformal or material principle. Thus it could in no waybe divided. Consequently, it could in no way be con-tracted, for every contraction of something common findsthat what is common (ipsugi) is in some way divided intomany. Contraction cannot even be understood withoutdivision. Yet if it were in no way contracted it v/ouldbe subsistent in the second way and absolutely Infinite.But that ' esse ' cannot have any formal differences isclear because ' ens ' cannot have them as is manifest in3 Metaphysics c.lO . Hence by much less can 'esse' havethem since the concrete is more divisible than the abstractjust as man is more divisible than

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Distinction of Essence and Existence in Francis Suarez