DISTRIBUTED DATABASE SECURITY

Prepared by :-1) Mohammed Siddig Ahmed.2) Omer Salih Dawood.3) Mohammed zein.

“STATE-OF-THE-ART”

introduction

– The developments in computer networking technology and database systems technology resulted in the development of distributed databases in the late 1970s.

– There are various architectural for a distributed database systems :-

1. the control is centralized while the data is distributed.2. the data as well as control are distributed.3. Multidatabase architectures .4. non-multidatabase approach(no local database

management systems (DBMSs))

Multilevel Security

• Much of the work in secure distributed database systems has focused on multilevel security.

• the early work in the field began with the US. Air Force Summer Study .

• approaches based on distributed data and centralized control architectures were proposed.

• Prototypes based on these approaches were also developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s

Multilevel Security Con.

• Two approaches were proposed at the Summer Study:-– the Partitioned approach .• trusted front-end database system is connected to non-

trusted back-end.

– second approach was examined where data is replicated.• In this approach, the unclassified data is replicated at

the Secret and Top-Secret databases, and the Secret data is replicated at the Top-Secret database

Inference Problem

• This problem has been discussed a great deal over the past three decades.

• An extensive investigation of the inference problem for distributed database systems began around 1992.

• There is still work on this problem especially with emerging technologies such as data warehousing, data mining and the web.

Hippocratic databases

• During the late of 1990s and early and mid of 2000s .

• These databases are designed such that data collection and disclosure are only performed with the consent of the user who’s data is in question.

trusted mediator

• At the same time the trusted mediator databases has received a great deal of attention

• the TIHI (Trusted Interoperation of Healthcare Information) project uses a trusted mediator to determine which queries should or should not be allowed .– several commercial systems.

• Google Health.• Microsoft HealthVault,

Blind comparer

• During the mid and late of 2000s .• share privacy-sensitive data across distinct

organizations.• allowing organizations to keep their legacy

databases and maintain ownership of the data that they currently store

Blind comparer

Improve Blind comparer

• On the late of 2000s.• to make the blind comparer more secure it

was better to use fake queries and declassification techniques

FEDERATED DATABASE SECURITY

“STATE OF THE ART”

• Introduction.• A federated database system .• Characteristics of Federated Database

Systems :Distribution.Heterogeneity .Autonomy .

Multidatabase systems can be classified into two types based on the autonomy

• Five-level Schema Architecture for Federated Databases: Local schema . Component schema. Export schema . Federated schema .

External schema . • Federated Database Security:

Federated Database Security State of The Art :

Federated Database Security in 80th:

Federated Database Security in 90th focused on: access control . identity management . Authorization.

Federated Database Security in millennium : access control . identity management . Authorization. Concurrency control .

INTEGRATED DISTRIBUTED DATABASE SECURITY“STATE OF THE ART”

Integrated Distributed Database

• A common problem within most large corporations is the diversity of database systems.

• multi-vendor database servers.• components of security (availability, integrity,

confidentiality).

Research Directions (1998)

• Security is an important issue in health care environments where large amounts of highly sensitive personal data are processed.

• appeared in the late nineties methodology based on the combination of DAC and MAC security models and uses hierarchies of user roles and data sets

User Role Hierarchies

Fragmentation and allocation

Fragmentation and allocation

Beginning of the millennium

Research Directions (2002)

New architecture that uses mediators and a primitive ticket-based authorization model to manage disparate policies in information enclaves.

Heterogeneous information system

Mediation Infrastructure

• A middleware architecture for security policy mediation in information enclaves. It begins by assessing existing technology for software interoperability.

Mediator & primitive authorization

• Mediators can be used in conjunction with other integration technologies to achieve a standard architecture for security policy coordination .

• The primitive authorization model architecture provides a common foundation for policy facilitates and coordination

Ticket-based Authorization Model Architecture

At the end of 2006

Research Directions (2006)

• Some researchers develop “Mediator” to map different policies. The deficiency is its lower efficiency. They proposed the concept of “authority propagation” to realize the integration AC policies.

Authority Propagating Tree (APT) Model

Use “tree” to express the ministration of authorities for Graph Theory offer convenient means describing attribution flows.

The Advantages of APT1. It can represent RBAC, MAC and DAC policies.2. It can track the whole authority granting history.

Because of the above advantages the APT can generate a new access control model .

Integrated Database Access ControlModel (DBIAC)

• Model ElementsAccess Attribute Security Level Request element Access Request Access Decision Time

Integrated Database Access ControlModel (DBIAC)

• Model ComponentsAccess Set Object hierarchyRole hierarchy APTFunctions

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