Diversity Effects for Altruistic Behavior: Evidence

from the field and international data*

Timothy MacNeill�

David Wozniak�

March 21, 2019

*This research was funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Councilof Canada. Neither of the authors have potential conflicts of interest regarding this research. Datawas collected with proper Institutional Review Board approval.

�University of Ontario Institute of Technology2000 Simcoe St N, Oshawa, ON, CanadaEmail: timothy.macneill@uoit.ca

�Eastern Michigan UniversityCollege of Business300 W Michigan Ave, Ypsilanti, MIEmail: dwozniak@gmail.com

1

Abstract

To investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity and altruism, we

conduct a field experiment comparing ethnically diverse and homogeneous

communities. We observe that people are more altruistic in diverse commu-

nities, that ethnic discrimination is not present in more diverse communities,

and that discrimination and cultural differences in altruism disappear when

subjects receive a gift from others. The positive relationship between diver-

sity and altruism is verified using international data from 115 countries with

multiple diversity measures. The results suggest that policies encouraging di-

versity and interaction between ethnic groups within communities will increase

prosocial behavior and reduce discrimination.

Keywords: altruism, diversity, discrimination, ethnicity, field experiment, giving

2

1 Introduction

Ethnic diversity has been found to impact economic prosperity, governance, and so-

cial well being of communities and nations (Alesina and Ferrara 2005, Bove and Elia

2017, Baldwin and Huber 2010), but the relationship between diversity and altru-

ism has been investigated to a lesser extent (Stichnoth and Van der Straeten 2013).

Since prosocial behavior affects the provision of public goods and facilitates economic

interaction (Henrich et al. 2005, Bowles 2008), it is important to consider the rela-

tionship between the prosocial behavior of altruism and ethnic diversity. Diversity

differences exist across many scales, from institutions, neighborhoods, towns, cities,

and nations. Policymakers have some choice and control of diversity within these

different spheres, from affirmative action policies for institutions to immigration poli-

cies of governments. Therefore, a more thorough understanding of the relationship

between diversity and altruism would be useful to guide policy for many contexts.

We test the relationship between ethnic diversity and altruism using a field ex-

periment and then test the generalizability of the findings with international survey

data. The results of our field experiment show that residents of ethnically diverse

communities are more altruistic than those in homogeneous communities. We also

find that members of homogeneous communities discriminate based on ethnicity

while those in ethnically diverse communities do not. Furthermore, discrimination

and cultural differences in altruism disappear when subjects receive a gift from an-

other community member suggesting that diversity and ethnic effects differ between

pure and conditional altruism.

We consider the term pure altruism to describe giving that is devoid of any

extrinsic benefit to the giver. Warm-glow altruism is included in this categorization

since this describes giving for which there is an internal psychological payoff to the

altruist (Andreoni 1990). In contrast, reciprocal altruism implies that giving will

elicit economic or other extrinsic benefits to the giver in the future (Becker 1976).

Finally, conditional altruism is giving that only occurs when the subject has received

a gift themselves (Becker 1974).

The results concerning diversity and pure altruism in the field experiment are

novel, but as with any experiment, questions of external validity must be addressed.

To investigate this, we test our diversity finding using international survey data and

multiple established measures of ethnic and linguistic diversity (Alesina et al. 2003,

Fearon 2003). To measure altruism levels between nations we use a survey measure

for altruism, the World Giving Index, which goes beyond charitable donations as

3

it includes formal and informal giving, helping behavior, and volunteer work. The

results from these data replicate our findings from the field experiment. Diversity is

found to be positively associated with altruism and giving behavior.

Some research on the impact that ethnic diversity has on altruism in communities

exists, but it mainly relies on survey data, which does not allow for a distinction

between pure, reciprocal, or conditional altruism. In these studies, it is generally

found that ethnic diversity is correlated with lower public goods provision (Alesina

and Ferrara 2005). Similarly, recent work using national survey data finds evidence

that higher ethnic diversity in Canadian neighborhoods is linked with lower charitable

donations (Andreoni et al. 2016). However, a review of studies by Stichnoth (2013)

finds the overall evidence of the relationship between diversity and altruism to be

contradictory or weak. Other studies have also shown the negative impact of diversity

on prosocial behavior disappears or even reverses with larger samples, alternative

measures, or when considering income (Baldwin and Huber 2010, Steele 2016).

Studies that incorporate economic experiments can address some of the ambi-

guity around the relationship between altruism and diversity. Such methods have

been useful in exploring the related question of whether ethnic discrimination drives

differences in altruistic behavior. Using dictator and ultimatum games, Ferschtman

and Gneezy (2001) find evidence of discrimination in subjects in Israel. List (2004)

also finds discrimination in a field experiment in the United States, and Ferraro

and Cummings (2007) find similar evidence of discrimination among Hispanics and

Navajo in the United States. Using dictator and other economic games, Jensen et al.

(2015) observe that individuals are more likely to engage in reciprocal altruism with

members of their ethnic group, but find no discrimination regarding pure altruism.

Altogether, these studies suggest that altruism should decrease with diversity due to

a discrimination effect.

Although laboratory experiments are useful in studying individual discriminatory

attitudes, and can establish causal directions more clearly, they may be less effective

in assessing the relationships between community characteristics, such as diversity or

culture and linking them with individual expressions of altruism. Since community

members have a history of complex repeated interactions and expectations of more

in the future, some have argued that subjects that are removed from their complex

social environment and placed in artificial communities in a lab setting may not act

as they would outside of the lab (List 2011). Given this possible limitation, there is

considerable value in running experiments in the field.

Lab-in-the-field experiments have proven especially useful in scrutinizing related

4

interactions between culture, community, ethnicity, and altruism (Henrich et al. 2005,

Lamba and Mace 2011). These studies often use the simple one-shot dictator game,

which has advantages as it is easy to explain in the field and it precludes the possi-

bility of reciprocal altruism. Thus, the dictator game provides a measure of prosocial

behavior, which is not confounded with strategic self-interest. In the game, one per-

son (the dictator) is given a sum of money and is given a choice to keep the entire

amount or to give some or all to another player. Standard economic theory predicts

that devoid of any other incentives to donate, the dictator would rationally choose

to keep the entire amount.

For both lab and field experiments, Engel (2011) shows that outcomes of the

dictator game have been different from the standard theory prediction. Engel’s

analysis of 129 studies published between 1992 and 2010 finds that only 36.11 percent

of participants in dictator games gave nothing. The remaining 63.89 percent of

dictators chose some degree of altruistic giving, with 16.74 percent choosing an equal

split, 5.44 percent giving everything, and the mean amount given is 28.35 percent.

On issues related more closely to culture and ethnicity, Engel shows that giving rates

vary with race and country of origin. Indigenous societies give the most compared

with developing and Western countries, which give the least.

Henrich et al. (2001, 2005, 2010) have conducted lab-in-the-field experiments

evaluating cultural, ethnic, and community differences in altruism. Using dictator,

ultimatum, and public goods games in 15 distinct ethnic communities, they find

that altruism levels are higher where people regularly engage in market transactions,

or when daily economic life demands cooperation. They also find strong ethnic

differences in giving behavior, a finding that is also replicated by Chen and Tang

(2009). Lamba and Mace (2012) applied similar methods in Indian villages, finding

that altruism varies between communities of the same ethnicity. Gurven, Zanolini,

and Schniter (2008) come to a similar conclusion using dictator games in the Bolivian

Amazon. There remains debate as to whether community or cultural differences have

greater effects on altruism, but overall such studies have been successful in increasing

our understanding of altruistic behavior in community environments.

Given the success in using lab-in-the-field experiments to detect cultural and

community differences in altruism levels, we use similar methods to examine the re-

lationship between ethnic diversity and altruism. One reason for the lack of research

in this area is due to the difficulties in locating communities that are similar regard-

ing cultures and ethnicities, but that differ in diversity. Also, common locations for

experimental research, such as the USA, Canada, and Europe, tend to have very

5

heterogeneous communities with many ethnicities making it difficult to isolate the

effects of diversity versus the effects of interacting with a third or fourth ethnicity.

The ideal experiment would randomly assign diversity to communities or neighbor-

hoods with different proportions of similar ethnicities, but this is not possible in the

field. The most straightforward alternative design would involve existing towns of

only two ethnicities which are mixed to different degrees across communities. The

existence of frictions in travel between these communities would also help in that it

would limit interactions between communities while interactions within communities

remain high. Such communities are difficult to locate.

As part of a previous study which measured the impact of a specific foreign

direct investment project in Honduras, we did extensive ethnographic and qualitative

research, over five years, in the region (MacNeill and Wozniak 2018). Through this

process, we found four communities that are well suited for a field experiment on

altruism and diversity. We observed that these communities are similar in that

they are small, coastal villages that consist primarily of two distinct ethnic groups.

A very apparent difference, however, is in the levels of ethnic diversity. Two of

these communities are ethnically homogenous while the other two are ethnically

diverse. Since these diversity mixes occur primarily between only two ethnicities,

the diversity effects of having many ethnicities in more heterogeneous communities

does not confound the results. Thus, we can isolate a relation between diversity and

altruism that is not affected by interactions across many ethnicities.

2 Communities and population

Similar to Lamba and Mace (2012) and Gurven, Zanolini, and Schniter (2008), we

compare multiple communities containing the same ethnicities, but our study differs

in that the communities in our study are not ethnically homogeneous. The differences

in heterogeneity between communities allow us to explore the effects of diversity and

ethnic discrimination for altruistic behavior.

The experiments took place on the North Coast of Honduras; the general location

is shown in Figure 1. Similar to Gneezy et al. (2009), who studied gender differences

across different cultures, we make substantial attempts to understand the cultures

and communities where the field experiments took place. In our case, this involved

a review of the anthropological literature on the cultures in Honduras’ North coast

followed by extensive ethnographic and survey research done in Honduras over a five

6

Figure 1: General Location in Central America

year period. This approach involved in-depth interviews of community members,

conducting focus groups with community leaders and surveying many community

members (n=483) two years before our experiments took place. This background

research helped us to understand relevant similarities and differences between com-

munities and to be more sensitive to culturally specific factors. In comparison to

Gneezy et al. who studied one region and two towns in two different countries and

across two insulated ethnicities (n=155), our study involves four towns in the same

coastal region of Honduras with two interacting ethnicities (n=487).

The experiments were conducted in two remote Honduran island villages, Chachahu-

ate, and East End, and in two larger mainland coastal towns, Cristales and San

Martin. The island communities are largely isolated from one another and the main-

land. The Cristales river separates the mainland communities, and they also have

important administrative differences. Cristales is mostly a self-governed indigenous

community with communally held land, whereas the larger municipality of Trujillo

governs San Martin, which has private land tenure, while not having indigenous ter-

ritory status. Each mainland community also has its own community center, school,

market, and church, limiting the need for interaction between locales.

The two dominant ethnic groups are Garifuna and Mestizo. Two of the towns,

Chachahuate (island) and Cristales (mainland) are more homogeneous, predomi-

nantly with Garifuna; while the towns of East End (island) and San Martin (main-

land) are more ethnically diverse. Both the mainland towns of San Martin and

Cristales are diversified economies with residents being employed in various modern

7

industries such as construction and business, while residents of Chachahuate and

East End rely primarily on subsistence fishing and farming. This unique setting is

particularly well-suited for a field experiment such as ours since there are significant

frictions in interactions between the towns, and differences in ethnic compositions

between two main ethnic groups.

Mestizo is the dominant ethnic group in Honduras as they make up ninety percent

of the population. They also have a disproportionate representation in politics and

business and a history in which government and media favor them as the national

culture. Racially, they are the result of the mixing of European settlers with indige-

nous peoples. They speak Spanish and are present across all the various quintiles of

wealth and income distributions. They live predominantly in urban areas, and are

often firmly integrated into the modern market economy (Brondo 2010).1 Despite

their seeming dominance, many Mestizo are poor, having an average income that is

slightly lower than that of the otherwise marginalized Garifuna (Bailey et al. 2014).

The Garifuna represent only two percent of the Honduran population2, but their

settlements are concentrated in the North Coast area where the study was conducted.

The Garifuna have indigenous rights status under national law and the International

Labour Organization Convention 169 to which Honduras is a signatory. Due to their

distinct cultural mix of Carib indigenous and African culture, the United Nations

Education, Culture, and Science Organization (UNESCO) designated Garifuna as a

“Masterpiece of oral and intangible cultural heritage” in 2001. They were the first

ethnic group in the world to receive the designation. Compared with the dominant

Mestizo, the Garifuna are easily identified by their distinctive dark complexion due

to their African lineage. They also have their own religion, foods, dance, music, and

language. They are often noted for being a matrilineal society, with collective land

rights, and distinct subsistence farming and fishing practices (Brondo 2010).

The island villages of Chachahuate and East End, had their entire adult pop-

ulations participate in the study (61 and 28 respectively). The mainland subjects

consisted of 150 of an estimated 1500 residents in Cristales and 238 of an estimated

population of 1700 in San Martin. A systematic sampling method was used to get

a valid sample of the population.3 There are no official records of the exact demo-

graphic composition of these towns, but we believe our samples are representative

1Link: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ho.html2https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ho.html3Samples were selected by dividing each town into quadrants and assigning a quota for teams

of field researchers in each area.

8

due to our systematic sampling method.

Given that ethnic diversity is the dimension that we are splitting the sample by,

one may be curious as to how the low versus high diversity communities differ along

other dimensions. Appendix A provides summary statistics for sociodemographic

characteristics and survey responses by low and high diversity members. We find

few differences between low and high diversity community members. The differences

we do find suggest that low diversity community members would be more altruistic

and giving when compared to members of high diversity communities because they

are happier and see others in their community as more helpful, trustworthy, and

generous.4 Furthermore, our two island communites are smaller, more isolated, and

more dependent on subsistence practices than are the mainland communties. One of

the advantages of choosing these towns for the study is that one island community

is diverse, while the other is not. Similarly one of our larger mainland communties is

diverse while the other is not. We use a control variable for ”Island”, that captures

the unobservable differences between island and mainland effects, but ethnic diversity

remains the significant factor in contributing behavior even with this control.

3 Experiment

The first stage of the experiment consisted of a simple dictator game to observe pure

altruism. This was followed by a second stage where some individuals received an

altruistic gift before deciding how much to contribute to an anonymous community

member, creating a conditional altruism environment. The design was structured

to consider the following research questions: How is ethnic diversity related to con-

tributions in the dictator game? Is giving behavior related to cultural, ethnic, and

community differences? Given the ethnic differences in our communities, are there

ingroup/outgroup effects regarding contributions to others? After receiving a con-

tribution from a community member, do individuals exhibit consistent contribution

patterns as with the original endowment?

Identities of both dictators and receivers were kept anonymous. However, the

ethnicity of the anonymous receiver was randomized to be known only to a portion

of dictators allowing us to examine the role of discrimination and ingroup/outgroup

differences in giving behavior. Of all participants, 19 percent were informed of a

Garifuna receiver, and 19 percent were informed of a Mestizo receiver, and the rest

4The results are robust to the inclusion of these variables as controls.

9

received no information about the ethnicity of receivers. Participants were taken

to a private area and first answered a socio-demographic survey (See Appendix B

for protocol and questions).5 Participants were given 80 Honduran Lempira ($3.41

USD) and were told that they could keep it or choose to give part of that amount

to another community member. This endowment was slightly less than the median

reported daily income rate in our sample.6 After performing the sender function in

the dictator game and receiving their payments, those subjects who had been given

a positive sum from a previous (anonymous) dictator were informed of how much

they were to receive. As a final treatment, those who received a positive contribution

were asked if they would like to change the amount of their initial contribution. This

process was in the protocol to test whether receiving altruistic gifts from within the

community leads to different contribution behaviors.7

4 Subjects

There were 487 total participants. Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics

of the participants. The sample consists of an equal gender split with 18.3 percent

of the participants coming from our geographically isolated islands. The average

age is approximately 38 years and 74 percent of participants consider themselves

to be employed. The mean monthly income per subjects is approximately 3350

Lempiras, the median is 3000, making the 80 lempira endowment a significant amount

of money for subjects. Families are fairly large as the average number of children

per participant is almost three. The two main ethnicities in the region are Garifuna

and Mestizo, which is 31 percent and 68 percent of subjects respectively.

A distinct difference between sampled towns is in the degree of ethnic diversity.

We measure ethnic diversity in communities by using the ethnic fractionalization

index (Fearon 2003). This index (FI) is calculated as one minus the squared share

of each ethnicity: FI = 1 −∑

Share2ethnicity. Table 2 provides the ethnicity shares

5Field researchers who conducted the experiment were Honduran citizens who were recruitedfrom other parts of the country and did not personally know the residents of the four towns.

6The translation of the dictator game question is: ”I have a gift of 80 Lempira for you. It doesnot matter to me what you do with it, and your decision is completely private, but you have theoption to keep it all or to give part of it anonymously to a (Mestizo/Garifuna/anonymous) memberof the community.”

7The translation of this question is: “Similar to the decision you made, another member of yourcommunity contributed X Lempira to you. Here it is.” (Put money in hand.) “Does this changeyour decision about the amount you would like to donate?” If yes, “what is the new amount youwould like to donate?”

10

by each town from which participants were recruited, based on our sample. Based

on the FI (per community) we find similar pairings of ethnic diversity for one island

town and one mainland town. Based on these similarities we consider Chachahuate

and Cristales, with FI equal to 0.31 as being low diversity, while East End (FI: 0.54)

and San Martin (FI: 0.56) are two high diversity communities. Table 1 shows that

54.6 percent of participants came from more diverse communities.

Table 1: Summary statistics

Mean Std. Dev. Obs.Age 37.62 15.31 487Child 2.96 2.45 475Employed 0.74 0.44 487Female 0.5 0.5 487High Diversity 0.55 0.50 487Island 0.18 0.39 487Monthly Income 3355.6 3020.53 470Mestizo n=152Garifuna n=322

TreatmentIngroup 0.19 0.40 487Outgroup 0.19 0.39 487

To examine the effects of a dictator knowing the ethnicities of recepients, we

randomized information across three possible treatments. The ethnicity of the re-

ceiver was known for almost 40 percent of subjects, and 19.3 percent of participants

learned the receiver was of the same ethnicity as themselves (Ingroup) and 19.1

percent learned that the receiver was part of the outgroup. This randomization of

treatments allows us to compare the effects of ingroup and outgroup versus contri-

butions to unknown ethnicities among different communities.

Table 2: Diversity by Town and Geography

Town Diversity Measure (FI) Island Garifuna MestizoChachahuate 0.31 Island 0.82 0.05East End 0.54 Island 0.57 0.36Cristales 0.31 Mainland 0.82 0.12San Martin 0.56 Mainland 0.47 0.46

Systematic sampling was used in Cristales (n=160) and San Martin (=238).The entire populations participated in Chachahuate (N=61) and East End (N=28)

11

After individuals provided their dictator game contribution amounts, a final treat-

ment was implemented where individuals found out how much a previous dictator

sent to them (anonymously). This information was only presented if a previous dic-

tator was sending a non-zero amount. After learning the amount they were receiving,

subjects were asked if they would like to change the amount they were contributing

in the dictator game. For this treatment, 364 subjects (75% of participants) were

informed of a positive amount they were to receive.8

5 Results

We find differences in contributions based on diversity, ethnicity, and ingroup/outgroup.

Regarding ethnic differences, Garifuna contribute less than Mestizo, but we also see

that individuals from communities that are more ethnically diverse contribute more

in the dictator game. Figure 2 shows that both these results are consistent: Garifuna

in more diverse communities give more than Garifuna in less diverse communities

and Mestizo contribute greater amounts in more diverse communities than Mestizo

in less diverse communities.

Figure 2: Given by Diversity and Ethnicity

Overall, 69 percent of participants sent an amount greater than zero in the dic-

8Subjects who did not receive a positive amount were not told of having received zero nor werethey asked to alter their contributions. This process was used to ensure that participants wouldtrust the researchers because if they were informed that they received nothing from someone else,they could believe that researchers may have stolen the money.

12

tator game.9 The proportion of endowment given on average is 0.17 and the mean

amount given is 13.87 lempira. Table 3 summarizes these results along with a break-

down according to the proportion of endowment given by ingroup/outgroup and

unknown ethnicity, along with differences in the proportion of endowment given be-

tween the high and low diversity communities.

Table 3 shows that high diversity communities contribute more than low diversity

communities. However, we also see a difference in giving among the treatments

when individuals knew the ethnicity of the receiver and when they did not; when

individuals were uninformed of ethnicity, they contribute less than when ethnicity

was known regardless of being ingroup or outgroup giving. There is also a visible

difference in giving based on the ethnicity of the dictator, Table 3 shows that Garifuna

give less, 14% of their endowment, compared to Mestizo who give 25% of their

endowment on average.

Table 3: Dictator Game Results

Mean Std. Dev. Obs.Give Any 0.69 0.46 487Proportion Given 0.17 0.19 487Amount Given 13.87 15.02 487

Proportion Given by TreatmentIngroup 0.21 0.21 94OutGroup 0.19 0.20 93Unknown 0.16 0.18 288

Proportion Given by DiversityHigh Diversity 0.21 0.20 266Low Diversity 0.13 0.15 221Proportion Given by Ethnicity of Dictator

Garifuna 0.14 0.17 309Mestizo 0.25 0.21 146

Table 3 shows the mean level of contribution is lower when subjects did not

know the ethnicity of the receiver (Unknown) than if they were contributing to an

ingroup or outgroup member. Figure 3 also shows that contributions are much

lower for the outgroup in low diversity settings. This figure also shows that there

are few differences in giving by dictators in highly diverse communities. In low

diversity communities not only are contributions lower, but contributions are much

9To be fair to all participants randomized gifts were given to initial dictators on the first dayof fieldwork in each community according to approximate expected giving behavior. Thus, slightlymore people received gifts than contributed non-zero amounts

13

lower towards outgroup ethnicities. These differences are also statistically significant

when taking into account multiple hypothesis testing using both Holm (1979) and

methodology advanced by List et al. (2016).10 Therefore, diversity in communities

seems to be a major factor in contributing behavior and higher diversity is related

to more giving and less discriminatory behavior.

Figure 3: Given Within/Between Group by Diversity

Figure 4 shows a breakdown of all three different categorical variables and con-

tributions as a proportion of endowment for each group. The figure shows that in

high diversity communities Garifuna contribute less than Mestizo and that there are

only small differences within these ethnic groupings for ingroup, outgroup and un-

known giving. In low diversity communities, Figure 4 shows that both Garifuna and

Mestizo give less than their equivalent counterparts from high diversity settings and

that Garifuna contribute less than Mestizo. However, contributions to the outgroup

are lower in low diversity settings for both Mestizo and Garifuna. Thus, the ingroup

versus outgroup effect occurs only in low diversity environments.

10P-values using Holm range from 0.001 to 0.020, and the List et al. method produces p-valuesfrom 0.0003 to 0.0203.

14

Figure 4: Given Between Ingroup and Outgroup by Diversity and Ethnicity

The figures show consistent results: one ethnic group tends to give more than

another, and the level of ethnic diversity plays a role in how altruistically individuals

behave. The figures also suggest that there is little difference between ingroup and

unknown ethnicity contributions and outgroup contributions are significantly lower

only in low diversity settings. However, other demographic characteristics may play

a role in differences in dictator game contributions. We take these characteristics into

account in estimating linear regressions on the proportion of endowment contributed

in dictator games in Table 4.

Column (1) in Table 4 provides an ordinary least squares regression estimates

using the full sample of participants only considering the level of diversity and the

ethnicity of the dictator in the experiment.11 This column shows that being from a

high diversity community leads to contributing 6% more and also that if the dictator

is Mestizo then the contribution is 9% higher. In column (2), control variables for

age, whether the individual has at least one child, gender and income are added and

the estimates for diversity and the Mestizo ethnicity remain highly significant.12

Column (3) in Table 4 provides estimates only using the individuals who self-

reported as Garifuna and Mestizo to allow for clean measures of the ingroup and

outgroup coefficients, the missing category and baseline being the unknown the eth-

nicity of the receiver. This regression shows that ethnicity and diversity effects are

still highly significant and meaningful, but the ingroup and outgroup estimates are

11With a control for the community being on an island.12The number of observations is lower due to non-responses to some of the control variable

questions.

15

Table 4: OLS: Proportion of Endowment Contributed

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Full Full Gari./Mest. High Div. Low Div.

High Diversity 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.08***(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)

Outgroup -0.04 -0.02 -0.07***(0.024) (0.032) (0.025)

Ingroup -0.01 -0.01 -0.02(0.024) (0.030) (0.029)

Garifuna 0.01 0.03(0.029) (0.030)

Mestizo 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06(0.034) (0.035) (0.023) (0.027) (0.047)

Constant 0.10*** 0.05 0.08** 0.09* 0.16***(0.030) (0.046) (0.040) (0.056) (0.047)

Baseline of Ingroup/Outgroup is unknown ethnicity of person receiving.Observations 487 470 440 244 196R-squared 0.086 0.130 0.138 0.116 0.092

Included ControlsAge No Yes Yes Yes YesChildren No Yes Yes Yes YesGender No Yes Yes Yes YesIncome No Yes Yes Yes YesIsland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

16

not significantly different from zero. Given the differences in ingroup and outgroup

giving found in Figure 4, we break out the sample according to high diversity (column

4) and low diversity (column 5) for only the Garifuna and Mestizo participants. Col-

umn (4) shows no significant differences in ingroup versus outgroup versus unknown

ethnicity giving, but a strong ethnicity difference remains as Mestizo contribute more

than Garifuna.

Column (5), which focuses only on low diversity communities, shows that out-

group giving is significantly lower than giving to unknown ethnicities in low diversity

communities. The coefficient difference between ingroup and outgroup giving is also

significant at the 10% level (p < 0.1). The ethnicity coefficient for Mestizo remains

almost the same although it no longer is significant in this specification, this change in

significance is mainly the result of lower power. Thus, regression results confirm the

results shown in the figures; high diversity communities give more than low diversity,

outgroup giving is significantly lower only in low diversity communities, and ethnic

differences in giving remain consistent between these different diverse communities.

5.1 Conditional Altruism: Does receiving change giving?

After individuals submitted their contributions in the dictator game, and physically

parted with their money, they were informed if they received a positive contribution

from a previous dictator. Subjects were not informed in advance that this treatment

would occur. Not all participants received positive contributions from others; thus,

this treatment lowered the available sample size for the conditional altruism part of

the study. The goal of this treatment was to test whether any systematic differences

based on ethnicity or community characteristics such as identity and ingroup or

outgroup effects remain if an individual received a positive gift from a community

member as opposed to being endowed with money. This conditional altruism setting

was used to compare behavior to the pure altruism setting of the standard dictator

game. We find that that ethnicity and ingroup/outgroup effects cease to exist, with

differences in giving being driven by the amount an individual receives and nothing

else.

Table 5 provides linear regression estimates with the dependent variable being

the change in (lempira) given by the dictator after learning how much was given to

them. All the regressions include controls for the initial proportion given from the

original endowment along with control variables for age, having at least one child,

gender, income and whether a community is on an island. Column (1) includes all

17

Garifuna and Mestizo who were given a positive amount. Column (2) consists of only

high diversity communities and column (3) contains only low diversity communities.

The results across all three regressions are similar. The only consistent variable of

interest that is meaningful and significant is the amount an individual receives. For

every unit of currency an individual receives from a community member, between 0.23

to 0.18 is contributed to the receiver in the dictator game. There are no differences

based on diversity, ethnicities or ingroup or outgroup giving.

Table 5: Change in Giving if Received Positive Amount from Community Member

(1) (2) (3)VARIABLES All High Div. Low Div.

Prop. Orig. Endow. -4.50 -1.15 -8.80(5.914) (7.488) (5.663)

Given 0.23*** 0.22** 0.18**(0.078) (0.089) (0.082)

High Diversity -0.73(1.299)

Outgroup -0.12 -1.24 2.93(1.647) (1.931) (2.898)

Ingroup 0.39 0.60 -0.32(1.254) (1.309) (3.397)

Mestizo -0.12 0.55 -1.66(1.459) (1.947) (1.894)

Constant -0.05 3.65 -3.76(2.801) (5.089) (4.123)

Baseline of Ingroup/Outgroup is unknown ethnicity of person receiving.Observations 331 198 133R-squared 0.172 0.226 0.146p 0.00568 0.0127 0.514

Included Controls: Age, Children, Gender, Income, IslandRobust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

This result could be interpreted in various ways. It may suggest that receiving

a gift from someone else provides information about norms which change behaviors.

It could also indicate that an individual becomes more generous due to a sense of

gratitude after having received a gift. It could merely be a reflection of greater

diminishing utility returns from self-wealth than the utility from giving, leading

an individual to give more towards someone else. We cannot test which of these

explanations is valid, but we can conclude that diversity, ethnicity, and discrimination

18

have no effect on giving in the conditional altruism setting.

6 International Data

Given the findings regarding diversity and altruism in the field experiment in Hon-

duras, we now consider whether this relationship exists in a broader context, using

other measures of altruism and diversity. Specifically, we focus on giving behaviors

that differ by nation using a measure of diversity within nations from Gordon Jr

(2005). This measure is simple to interpret since it indexes the number of languages

spoken by at least 1,000 individuals within a country, and has been used effectively

to study the origins of ethnolinguistic diversity (Michalopoulos 2012). More complex

diversity measures that expand the linguistic measure will also be considered later.

The measure of altruism that we use comes from the annual report of the Char-

ities Aid Foundation for the World Giving Index.13 The report and index average

three types of giving behavior measures. These are donating money to a charity,

volunteering time to an organization, and helping a stranger who needed help. The

World Giving Index report incorporates measures from fieldwork performed in 2013

from 135 countries by Gallup. The survey method used yielded about 1,000 com-

pleted questionnaires from a representative sample of most countries. The use of

this index allows us to expand analysis beyond the pure altruism measured by the

dictator game. Since some altruistic behavior may be informal, the World Giving

Index also provides a more comprehensive measure than relying on income tax data

for charitable giving. Such income tax data may miss informal altruism and may

also confound giving that is motivated by tax exemptions with charity motivated by

altruism.

We merge the World Giving Index data with World Bank data for Gross Domestic

Product per capita (GDP) and population data from 2013. This data allows us to

use the language data from Gordon (2005) to estimate linear regressions of language

diversity on the world giving index while controlling for GDP and population size.

We find that the estimate from language diversity is very significant and essential

in explaining the variation of giving across nations. This result gives support and

external validity to the diversity results we found in our study in Honduras.

Diversity and GDP explain much of the variation that is found across nations

in the World Giving Index. Table 6 shows across all regressions that the number of

13The World Giving Index 2014

19

Table 6: OLS: World Giving Index as a Function of Country Characteristics

World Give Index (1) (2) (3) (4)GDP per capita (100s) 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***

(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)No. of Languages 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05***

(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)Log of Size (km2) -1.24* -1.59 -1.65**

(0.693) (1.094) (0.773)Population (millions) -0.01* -0.01*** -0.01* -0.01*

(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)Constant 27.27*** 31.82*** 23.68 32.77***

(1.326) (2.547) (49.425) (2.510)Observations 120 120 117 119R-squared 0.263 0.399 0.418 0.418p 9.30e-08 0 3.53e-10 0

ControlsContinents No Yes Yes YesPhysical No No Yes NoIndependence Yr No No Yes NoPop. Density 1500 No No Yes Yes

Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

20

languages spoken in a country (No. Languages) is highly significant and has an effect

size that is large when compared to the most significant factor in giving, income

measured as GDP. The effect size of one language is equivalent to a one-hundred

dollar increase in GDP per capita.

Figure 5: Giving Index by Diversity and GDP

To compare the effect size of diversity, we compare the marginal effects by cre-

ating a standardized measure of the World Giving Index, GDP, and the number of

languages spoken. The standardized measure is the simple z-score for these vari-

ables, and the marginal effects for this are shown in Figure 5. As the figure shows,

a difference of one standard deviation in the number of languages in a country leads

to approximately a 0.31 standard deviation change in the world giving index. This

effect is approximately half of that observed in GDP per capita where a one standard

deviation change in GDP per capita leads to 0.65 standard deviation change in the

Giving Index.

The variables used to measure and distinguish country-specific characteristics are

based on Michalopoulos (2012). They include the number of languages spoken as a

first language within a country (which is our measure of diversity), the log of the

physical area of the country, dummy variables indicating the continent a country

is a part of (Africa, Europe or the Americas), the average elevation across regions,

the standard deviation of elevation, the absolute latitude, the average temperature,

the year the country obtained independence, the log of the population density in

1500 AD, and the percent of people that can trace their ancestry in 1500 AD. These

data allow us to control for geographical, climatic, and long-term migration impacts.

21

Table 7 provides summary statistics for these variables along with population size

in 2013 and GDP per capita from 2013 and the World Giving Index measure which

was collected in 2013.

Table 7: Summary statistics by nation

Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. NWorld Give Score 32.93 11.46 14 64 121GDP per capita 12974 16699 333 67990 120Number of Languages with n > 999 speakers 38.16 73.96 1 462 121Log Area of Country i 0.77 1.43 -2.83 4.73 121Africa 0.26 0.44 0 1 121Europe 0.28 0.45 0 1 121Americas 0.17 0.37 0 1 121% of people can trace ancestry (1500 AD) 0.78 0.28 0 1 120Average elevation 0.59 0.49 0.03 2.52 121Absolute Latitude of Country i 28.88 17.78 0.64 65.01 121St. dev. of elevation 0.39 0.4 0.01 1.95 121Average temperature 1961-90 (Celsius) 16.93 8.26 -4.79 28.74 121Year Country Obtained Independence 1922.17 58.65 1816 1993 119Distance from Coast of Country 0.35 0.37 0.01 1.71 121Log population density in 1500 AD 1.02 1.52 -3.82 3.84 120Population in millions 56.61 172.08 0.32 1357.38 121

6.1 Other Measures of Diversity?

The number of languages by itself is a simple and intuitive measure of diversity, but

it is not the only one. Here, we consider if alternative measures of diversity that

have been used in other economic studies will yield different results from our field

study and language-based international comparisons (Fearon 2003, Alesina et al.

2003). Each of these alternative measures of fragmentation or fractionalization is

calculated in a slightly different manner, but they all attempt to capture ethnic or

linguistic diversity. In the analysis, we include the same control variables used in

our original regressions with languages, as well as control variables that have been

used in the other papers examining the impact of ethnicity and fractionalization

on economic growth. These other variables include the average luminosity a nation

receives and the average annual precipitation. These characteristics may impact

altruistic and giving behavior because the weather can affect the moods of individuals

which is primarily a result of geographic location and has no connection to ethnicity

or language.

22

Table 8 provides the summary statistics for the diversity measures, luminosity,

and precipitation. Although the table shows that there is a large number of countries

with measures of cultural, ethnic and linguistic fragmentation, the data available

once merged with the world giving index is much smaller than when using the more

straightforward linguistic measure.

Table 8: Summary statistics of other measures

Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. NTotal luminosity 1118273 3850669 843.91 44315816 173Avg. annual precip. (mm) 1139.27 812.75 14.41 3777.36 173Linguistic fragmentation (Alesina et al. 2003) 0.4 0.28 0 0.92 165Ethnic fragmentation (Alesina et al. 2003) 0.44 0.26 0 0.93 173Cultural fragmentation (Fearon 2003) 0.31 0.21 0 0.73 149Alt. ethnic fragmentation (Fearon 2003) 0.43 0.29 0 0.93 124

Although these measures of diversity differ from each other, fragmentation/fractionalization

are all measured similarly as stated by Alesina et al.:

FRACj = 1 −N∑i=1

s2ij (6.1)

where for country j, sij represents the share of group i. The Ethnic fragmentation

(Alesina et al. 2003) measure uses data compiled from the Soviet Union using eth-

nicity data from the 1960s. The Alt. ethnic fragmentation (Fearon 2003) was more

recently constructed using 822 ethnic groups that comprised more than one-percent

of the population of a nation. Linguistic fragmentation (Alesina et al. 2003) was con-

structed using the Encyclopedia Britannica (2001) and the CIA Factbook. Cultural

fragmentation (Fearon 2003) still uses some of the linguistic data, but augments

it with other measures to correct for possible misrepresentations of diversity that

language data alone may produce.14

Table 9, uses standardized measures (z-scores) using the number of standard

deviations away from the mean for each measure to clearly make the comparisons

across measures from the simple measure of diversity in the number of languages

spoken in a nation in column (1) compared to the other measures of diversity. We

find that overall the results are very consistent for all these measures of diversity

where the relationship with giving in a nation is positive. Column (2) uses the

linguistic fractionalization index from Alesina et al. (2003) and column (3) uses the

14For a thorough explanation see Fearon (2003).

23

ethnic fragmentation index developed in the same study. For both these measures,

we observe a positive and statistically significant relationship between giving and

diversity. In using two indices for diversity from Fearon (2003) for culture (column

(4)), ethnicity (column (5)), we find that all measures are positively related and

statistically significant in explaining variation in the world giving index.

Table 9: Standardized OLS: World Giving Index and Diversity Measures

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Diversity Vars. Lang. Ling. Ethn. Cult. Alt. Ethn.

S.GDP 0.60*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.62*** 0.54***(0.090) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.107)

S. No. Lang. 0.24***(0.063)

S. Ling. Frag. (A2003) 0.36***(0.071)

S. Ethnic Frag. (A2003) 0.24***(0.084)

S. Cultural Frag. (F2003) 0.27***(0.076)

S. Alt. Frag. (F2003) 0.47***(0.097)

Constant 0.39** 0.39** 0.45*** 0.39** 0.57***(0.166) (0.154) (0.162) (0.158) (0.150)

Observations 116 114 116 114 93R-squared 0.488 0.541 0.481 0.493 0.580p 0 0 0 0 0

ControlsContinents, luminosity, ancestry, precipitation, population, area

Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The ethnic fragmentation (ethnic diversity) from Alesina et al. (2003) in column

(3) shows that a one standard deviation increase in the measure of ethnic diver-

sity leads to a 0.24 standard deviation increase in the world giving index. The

number of languages (column (1)) and the measure of linguistic fragmentation from

Alesina et. al (2003) (column (2) both show that a one standard deviation increase

in the number of languages or in linguistic fragmentation exhibit an increase in the

world giving index of 0.24 and 0.36 standard deviation respectively. The cultural

fragmentation index from Fearon (2003) in column (4) also shows that cultural frag-

mentation/diversity corresponds to more altruistic behavior. Column (5) provides a

24

different fractionalization measure created by Fearon (2003) than the one in column

(5) which is based on the Soviet Atlas. This other measure of ethnic fractionaliza-

tion, Alt. Frag., has fewer country measures and although the coefficient is larger

and column (5) explains more of the variation in the World Giving Index, the sample

size is limited compared with other measures.

The key takeaway is that results of the regressions from Table 9 are consistent

with our findings with the dictator game in the field experiment in Honduras. Similar

to the field study, international data on diversity from numerous sources combined

with the World Giving Index data shows that higher levels of diversity are positively

related with altruism. These consistent behaviors at both the international and

community level suggest that interacting with different types of individuals may

indeed breed compassion towards others.

7 Discussion

In this study, we use both a field experiment and international data to investigate

the relationship between altruism and ethnic diversity. These methods provide us

with three main findings: First, we find that altruism is greater in ethnically diverse

communities than in homogeneous ones. This relationship is strong in both the inter-

national data or and the experiment data from the field. Second, we find that ethnic

discrimination in giving exists in homogeneous communities, but not in diverse ones.

Third, we find that receiving a contribution from a community member eliminates

ethnic and discrimination and cultural differences in future giving behavior.

Existing theory and research suggest a mechanism through which the positive re-

lationship between diversity and altruism may emerge. As research in evolutionary

behavioral science suggests, since humans rely on other humans to survive, we have

evolved mechanisms for cooperation and coordination (Bowles and Gintis 2011). One

way that humans achieve coordination is using similar ethnic markers to facilitate

reciprocal altruism (Jensen et al. 2015). This approach may be due to an expectation

of reciprocity, or a primordial assumption that helping our group will also help our-

selves. We also know that humans engage in selfless acts because they empathize and

are moved by the sorrow and happiness of others. Studies have shown that empathy

is a significant motivator for altruism in economic interactions and it is induced by

social environments (Klimecki et al. 2016).

This research regarding empathy, diversity, cooperation, and coordination helps

25

us to interpret the results presented here. In environments where most people look

like ourselves, our primordial brains may engage in seemingly selfless or charitable

behavior because we instinctively feel our actions are benefiting our ingroup, and by

extension ourselves. We cannot make this assumption where people around us look

different, but we still need to cooperate and interact with other humans to survive.

This necessity may encourage the development of our capacity for empathy during

our day-to-day interactions, generating a stronger impulse toward pure altruism.

Neuropsychological studies have repeatedly found that interaction with other humans

requires us to develop a Theory of Mind (ToM): an interpretation of the motives of

those with which we must interact. The development of a ToM, however, requires

an increased capacity for empathy (Vollm et al. 2006). Since empathy and altruism

have also been shown to be interrelated, we can expect to see increased altruism in

situations where a developed ToM is necessary for daily interactions (Batson and

Moran 1999).

This view helps us understand why discrimination occurs in ethnically homoge-

neous but not heterogeneous settings, and why people in diverse settings give more

in general. In ethnically diverse communities and nations, individuals must regularly

interact across groups to achieve their economic and social goals. This interaction

increases the empathetic capacity of community members regarding members of in-

groups as well as outgroups. Since altruism is closely related to empathy, this en-

vironment eliminates discrimination in purely altruistic giving as shown in the field

experiment. However, this increase in empathy also increases the general level of

altruism in the community or also within a nation.

Interestingly, although the diversity results reported here are strong, the second

component of the field experiment suggests that kindness between individuals may

eliminate differences in giving based on ethnicity. Once participants receive a gift

from an anonymous community member, discrimination and ethnic differences in

giving behavior disappear. The cause of such disappearance in such a relationship

is uncertain. It could be that a gift provides information about social norms to the

participant, or that a gift induces a generosity effect which overpowers ethnic and

discrimination effects, or the diminishing returns to wealth may diminish faster than

the benefit of altruism. If an anonymous gift from a community member can be

considered a meaningful interaction, it may also mean that this signal is sufficient in

evoking a generalized empathy that is powerful enough to erase discrimination and

cultural differences. This type of manipulation is not possible to examine in the in-

ternational data, but the results suggest that kindness may eliminate discriminatory

26

tendencies in individuals.

The findings of this study are relevant for many environments, from communities

to firms and to nations and their immigration and cultural policies. The results sug-

gest that different types of immigration policies may mediate the impact of diversity

differently. A policy climate that encourages the isolation of ethnic groups from one

another may preclude the development of intergroup empathy and therefore altruism,

while policies that encourage communication, exchange, and interaction between in-

dividuals of different ethnic groups may instead amplify altruism. Such results are

crucial in shaping policies as some nations’ political parties move towards campaigns

pursuing lower ethnic diversity while some are choosing to promote diversity. Amid

these contrasting movements, policy makers and voters should take into account the

effects that diversity may have on prosocial behaviors.

27

References

Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg, R.: 2003,Fractionalization, Journal of Economic Growth 8(2), 155–194.

Alesina, A. and Ferrara, E. L.: 2005, Ethnic diversity and economic performance,Journal of Economic Literature 43(3), 762–800.

Andreoni, J.: 1990, Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory ofwarm-glow giving, The Economic Journal 100(401), 464–477.

Andreoni, J., Payne, A. A., Smith, J. and Karp, D.: 2016, Diversity and dona-tions: The effect of religious and ethnic diversity on charitable giving, Journal ofEconomic Behavior & Organization 128, 47–58.

Bailey, S. R., Saperstein, A. and Penner, A. M.: 2014, Race, color, and incomeinequality across the Americas, Demographic Research 31, 735–756.

Baldwin, K. and Huber, J. D.: 2010, Economic versus cultural differences: Formsof ethnic diversity and public goods provision, American Political Science Review104(04), 644–662.

Batson, C. D. and Moran, T.: 1999, Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner’sdilemma, European Journal of Social Psychology 29(7), 909–924.

Becker, G. S.: 1974, A theory of social interactions, Journal of Political Economy82(6), 1063–1093.

Becker, G. S.: 1976, Altruism, egoism, and genetic fitness: Economics and sociobi-ology, Journal of Economic Literature 14(3), 817–826.

Bove, V. and Elia, L.: 2017, Migration, diversity, and economic growth, WorldDevelopment 89, 227–239.

Bowles, S.: 2008, Policies designed for self-interested citizens may under-mine” the moral sentiments”: Evidence from economic experiments, Science320(5883), 1605–1609.

Bowles, S. and Gintis, H.: 2011, A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and itsevolution, Princeton University Press.

Brondo, K. V.: 2010, When Mestizo Becomes (Like) Indio. . . or is it Garıfuna?:Multicultural Rights and “Making Place” on Honduras’ North Coast, The Journalof Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology 15(1), 170–194.

Chen, K. and Tang, F.-F.: 2009, Cultural differences between Tibetans and ethnicHan Chinese in ultimatum bargaining experiments, European Journal of PoliticalEconomy 25(1), 78–84.

28

Engel, C.: 2011, Dictator games: a meta study, Experimental Economics14(4), 583–610.

Fearon, J. D.: 2003, Ethnic and cultural diversity by country, Journal of EconomicGrowth 8(2), 195–222.

Ferraro, P. J. and Cummings, R. G.: 2007, Cultural diversity, discrimination, andeconomic outcomes: an experimental analysis, Economic Inquiry 45(2), 217–232.

Fershtman, C. and Gneezy, U.: 2001, Discrimination in a segmented society: Anexperimental approach, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 351–377.

Gneezy, U., Leonard, K. L. and List, J.: 2009, Gender Differences in Compe-tition: Evidence From a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society, Econometrica77(5), 1637–1664.

Gordon Jr, R. G.: 2005, Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Fifteenth edition,Online version: http://www. ethnologue.com/15/ .

Gurven, M., Zanolini, A. and Schniter, E.: 2008, Culture sometimes matters: Intra-cultural variation in pro-social behavior among Tsimane Amerindians, Journal ofEconomic Behavior & Organization 67(3), 587–607.

Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H. and McElreath,R.: 2001, In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scalesocieties, The American Economic Review 91(2), 73–78.

Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath,R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J. et al.: 2005, “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies, Behavioraland Brain Sciences 28(06), 795–815.

Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A.,Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N. et al.: 2010, Markets, re-ligion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment, Science327(5972), 1480–1484.

Holm, S.: 1979, A simple sequentially rejective multiple test procedure, ScandinavianJournal of Statistics pp. 65–70.

Jensen, N. H., Petersen, M. B., Høgh-Olesen, H. and Ejstrup, M.: 2015, TestingTheories about Ethnic Markers, Human Nature 26(2), 210–234.

Klimecki, O. M., Mayer, S. V., Jusyte, A., Scheeff, J. and Schonenberg, M.: 2016,Empathy promotes altruistic behavior in economic interactions, Scientific reports6, 31961.

29

Lamba, S. and Mace, R.: 2011, Demography and ecology drive variation in cooper-ation across human populations, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences108(35), 14426–14430.

List, J. A.: 2004, The nature and extent of discrimination in the marketplace: Evi-dence from the field, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1), 49–89.

List, J. A.: 2011, Why economists should conduct field experiments and 14 tips forpulling one off, Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(3), 3–16.

List, J. A., Shaikh, A. M. and Xu, Y.: 2016, Multiple hypothesis testing in experi-mental economics, Experimental Economics p. 1–21.

MacNeill, T. and Wozniak, D.: 2018, The economic, social, and environmental im-pacts of cruise tourism, Tourism Management 66, 387–404.

Michalopoulos, S.: 2012, The origins of ethnolinguistic diversity, American EconomicReview 102(4), 1508–39.

Steele, L. G.: 2016, Ethnic diversity and support for redistributive social policies,Social Forces 94(4), 1439–1481.

Stichnoth, H. and Van der Straeten, K.: 2013, Ethnic diversity, public spending,and individual support for the welfare state: A review of the empirical literature,Journal of Economic Surveys 27(2), 364–389.

Vollm, B. A., Taylor, A. N., Richardson, P., Corcoran, R., Stirling, J., McKie, S.,Deakin, J. F. and Elliott, R.: 2006, Neuronal correlates of theory of mind andempathy: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study in a nonverbal task,Neuroimage 29(1), 90–98.

30

Appendices

Appendix A Differences By Diversity

The possibility exists that other factors beyond diversity may be leading to differ-

ences in contributions in the dictator game. In comparing low to high diversity

community members, we provide summary statistics in Table 10 for variables that

come from individual self-reported surveys. The descriptions of these measures are

below. The differences are for the most part small, but there are some variables

which have statistically significant differences. Low diversity community members

tend to be older, happier (and less sad). Low diversity individuals view their com-

munity members as being more helpful and sharing and they are more trusting of

community members. Based on the direction of these differences one would expect

that low diversity community members would be more giving, but we find that in-

dividuals from high diversity communities contribute more. We find this diversity

result holds even when including these self-reported survey measures of community

perceptions as control variables.

Table 10: Summary Statistics by Diversity Level

Low DiversityMean SD

Age 39.97 16.01Child> 0 0.91 0.29Food Security 3.90 1.18Friends 4.22 1.10Education 7.63 3.04Happy 4.20 0.99Helpful 3.28 1.41Income 3,205 2,806Neccesities 3.27 1.29Sad 2.02 0.75Satisfied 3.96 1.11Sharing 2.36 1.40Trust 3.00 1.40Worry 2.53 1.02

High DiversityMean SD

Age 35.67 14.44Child> 0 0.88 0.33Food Security 3.71 1.20Friends 4.11 1.18Education 7.58 3.20Happy 3.91 1.03Helpful 2.77 1.34Income 3,481 3,189Neccesities 3.21 1.23Sad 2.21 1.09Satisfied 3.79 1.17Sharing 1.94 1.15Trust 2.62 1.36Worry 2.69 1.22

31

Variable DescriptionAge: Age in yearsChild> 0: Dummy variable showing whether an individual has at least one child.Food Security: Frequency of having enough food (1=never; 5=always)Friends: Amount of quality friendships (1=none; 5=very many)Education: Years of educationHappy: How happy are you generally? (1=not at all; 5=completely)Helpful: How helpful are community members? (1=not at all; 5=completely)Income: Monthly income in LempiraNecessities: Frequency of being able to provide for necessities (1=never; 5=always)Sad: Frequency of being sad (1=never; 5=always)Satisfied: How satisfied are you with your life? (1=not at all; 5=completely)Sharing: How sharing are your neighbors? (1=not at all; 5=completely)Trust: How much do you trust your neighbors? (1=not at all; 5=completely)Worry: How often do you find yourself being worried? (1=never; 5=always)

Appendix B Field Protocol and Survey

Appendix B.1 Dictator Game Protocol for Field Researchers

1. Locate household according to assigned to you in morning meetings.

2. Greet: “hello, we are doing a survey about tourism investment in the area.

Would you like to participate?”

3. Take participant to private room inside or private area outside the home. Be

sure that identities of all recipients are private.

4. Administer survey

5. Say following statement exactly. Each time you have a new participant, switch

identity of anonymous recipient from “another” to “Garifuna,” and then “Mestizo.”:

“I have a gift of 80 lempira to give you (put it in their hand). I do not care what you

do with this and your decision is completely private, but you have the option to keep

everything, or give part of this anonymously to [another/ a Garifuna/ a Mesitizo]

person that we will interview later. How much do you want to keep and how much

do you want to give? Amount Given: ”

*Note: Not all field researchers used identity indicators each day. Thus there are

more “another” identities than Garifuna/Mestizo as recipients in the sample.

6. Only if there was a donation given previously: “Similar to the decision you made,

32

another member of your community donated X Lempira to you. Here it is.” (Put

money in hand.) “Does this change your decision about the amount you would like

to donate?” If yes, “what is the new amount you would like to donate from the 80

lempira I gave you?” New Amount Given:

Appendix B.2 English Translation of Survey

1. Do you identify as a man, woman, other?

2. Age?

3. How many children do you have?

4. Do you identify as: 1-Garifuna 2-Caracol 3-Mulato 4-Mestizo 5-Latino 6-

Indigenas (a-misquito b-Pech c-Tawahkas d-Tolupanes e-Mayas Chortis f-Lencas g-

Nahuas) 5-Foreigner

5. What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 1-Primaria (grado:

) 2-Secondaria (grado: ), universitario, universidad completa, Maestrıa, Doctorado,

certificado

6. Do you consider yourself the head of the household?

7. In which town do you live?

8. Regarding your home: a) you are the owner; b) a family member owns it; c)

you or a family member rent; d) it belongs to the community

9. How many bedrooms are there in your house?

10. How many people live in your house?

11. Do you have running water in your house?

12. Is the water safe to drink?

33

13. How often is your water service interrupted? 1) Rarely 2) weekly 3) Every

two days 4) Nearly every day 5) Always

14. What type of toilet do you have? a-flushing b-letrine c-none

15. Is your toilet inside or outside of your house?

16. Is your toilet comunal or private?

17. How often do you suffer intestinal illness a- Never b-Rarely c-Sometimes d-

Frequently e-Almost Always

18. Do you have electricity in your home?

19. How often is your service inturrupted? a-Never b-Sometimes c-Frequently

d-Very Frequently e-Almost always

20. What type of floor do you have in your house? a. Dirt b. Sand c. Wood d.

Cement e. Ceramic tile

21. Transport owned: car? Motorcycle? Bicycle? Cayuco? Motor boat?

22. How many televisions are in your home?

23. Do you have internet in your house (not including data on phone)?

24. Do you have a cell phone?

25. How long have you lived in this town? If moved within 5 years, from where?

Why?

26. Do you travel to another city or country for work? Where? How often?

27. At this moment, do you have another family member who is in another city

or country for work?

34

28. Do you have a friend or family member who sends you money from another

city or country? From where? How often?

How much does this help to provide for your necessities? a) very much; b) some; c)

little

29. Do you work for pay to maintain yourself?

30. What work?

31. Do you own a business?

32. Do you farm or fish for your own family’s consumption?

33. If you do not work, why?

34. Do you have a partner who is not at home now because they are at work?

35. Since the cruise ships have begun to arrive has your life improved, worsened,

or stayed the same in these spheres: economically? socially? culturally? security?

36. Could you list your three most important cultural practices?

37. How often do you practice them? a) never; b) rarely; c) sometimes; d) often;

e) always

38. In the past three years have you recieved training to help you in the tourism

industry? a-none b-very little c-some d-much e-very much

39. In 2015, what was your approximate average monthly income?

40. Was this more, less, or equal to your monthly income in 2014?

41. Have you worked in the tourism industry this year? -if “yes” were you hired

or self-employed?

-Were you paid directly by tourists? Were you paid a fee or only by tips? Was in

35

full or part-time work? Were you paid justly in your opinion?

-What percentage of your anual income was earned in this way? 1) less than 10%

2)aprox. 25% 3)aprox. 50% 4)aprox. 75% 5) aprox. 100%

42. List the three foods you most commonly eat?

43. Using a scale of 1 to 5, how often do you have enough to eat? (1-never 2-

sometimes 3- often 4- almost always 5-always)

44. What type of stove do you cook on in your home? a) electric/gas stove b)

Wood stove c) none

45. Over the last two years, your access to medical services has a) worsened b)

not changed c) improved

46. Using a scale of 1-5 how often can you provide for your necessities? (1-never

2- sometimes 3- often 4- almost always 5-always)

47. Can you rely on your neighbours to be honest? (1-never 2- sometimes 3-

often 4- almost alsways 5-always)

48. Can you count on your neighbours when you need help? (1-never 2- some-

times 3- often 4- almost always 5-always)

49. When a neighbour receives money or food, they share with their neighbours?

(1-never 2- sometimes 3- often 4- almost always 5-always)

50. What is the level of crime in the community? (1) none; 2) little; 3) some; 4)

much; 5) very much)

51. How much corruption is there amongst local political and business leaders?

(1- none 2- little 3- some 4- much 5- very much)

52. Is there a problem with drugs in the community? 1)little, 2)some, 3)very

much

36

53. Is there a problem with prostitution in the community? 1)little, 2)some,

3)very much

54. Is there a problem with alcoholism in the community? 1)little, 2)some, 3)very

much

55. Do you currently have a health problem? Serious? Has it improved, stayed

the same, or worsened in the past year?

56. Do you think your life will be better, the same, or worse in five years?

57. How satisfied are you with your life in general? (1-not at all 2- little 3-

somewhat 4- very 5- completely)

58. How happy do you feel in general? (1-not at all 2- little 3- somewhat 4- very

5- completely)

59. How often are you worried? (1-never, 2- not often 3- sometimes 4- much 5-

almost always)

60. How often are you sad? (1-never, 2- not often 3- sometimes 4- much 5- almost

always)

61. How often do you have difficulty sleeping? (1-never, 2- not often 3- sometimes

4- much 5- almost always)

62. Using a scale of 1 to 5, how religious are you? (1 not at all; 5 extremely)

63. Which religion/s)?

64. How important to you is it to interact with community members outside your

family? (1 Not; 5 Extremely)

37