Division of Occupational Safety & Health...Ms. Tari Enos, Administrative Regulations Analyst Division of Occupational Safety & Health Washing State Dept of Labor and Industries

May 14, 2018

Ms. Tari Enos, Administrative Regulations Analyst Division of Occupational Safety & Health Washing State Dept of Labor and Industries

Via email: [email protected]

Memo #2: Written Comments on Revisions to Chapter 296-XX WAC, Process Safety Requirements for Petroleum Refineries

Dear Ms. Enos,

On behalf of our organizations and members, we are pleased to offer the following three documents as comment on revisions to Chapter 296-XX WAC, Process Safety Requirements for Petroleum Refineries, version 1.19.18: (1) a line-edited version of the regulatory proposal; (2) a chart describing each of our recommended changes and the rationale for each change; and (3) a chart describing a number of strengths in the current proposal. These comments augment our previous comment, Memo #1, which focuses specifically on correcting changes that L&I made to existing California language. Memo #2 supersedes Memo #1 in cases where we have amended our recommendation.

In its current form, the PSM proposal is substantially weaker than the existing California regulation- however, with the changes we are recommending, W!’s PSM regulation could improve on several aspects of California’s regulation and provide a clear, enforceable and

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practical vehicle for improving process safety in the state’s refinery sector. We encourage you to take this path.

We will be glad to answer any questions and further elucidate our rationale for each of the changes we are recommending. Please contact Stephanie Celt of BlueGreen Alliance at [email protected] to arrange for this.

Thank you again for your leadership in working toward meaningful improvements in Washington’s PSM regulation. We support your efforts and stand ready to assist you and the Department in meeting this important objective.

Sincerely,

Charlotte Brody, VP for Health Initiatives BlueGreen Alliance

Stephanie Celt, Washington Policy Coordinator BlueGreen Alliance

Walter Cleve, Tesoro Anacortes Safety Rep United Steelworkers Local 12-591, AFL-CIO

Robin Everett, Organizing Manager Sierra Club Washington State Chapter

Steve Garey, Past President United Steelworkers Local 12-591, AFL-CIO

Neil Hartman, Legislative & Political Director WA Building & Construction Trades Council

Eleanor Hines, Lead Scientist Re Sources for Sustainable Communities

Mary Ruth Holder, Representative Evergreen Islands

Becky Kelley, President Washington Environmental Council

Kim Nibarger, Oil Division Chair United Steelworkers International, AFL-CIO

Mike Wilson, National Health Director BlueGreen Alliance

cc: Paulette !valos, Senior Policy !dvisor, Governor’s Policy Office !ndi Smith, Executive Director, External Relations, Governor’s Office Anne Soiza, Assistant Director, Department of Labor and Industries Maggie Leland, Policy Director, Government Affairs and Policy Division, Department of Labor and Industries

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USW-BlueGreen Alliance. Memo #2B. Rationale Chart for Changes to Washington PSM Proposal 1.9.18 (May 14, 2018)

Item Page Subsection IssueandCorrectiveAction Rationale

1 1 Purpose/Scope Issue: ThisisthetextoftheexistingWAPSMregulation. This languagedoesnotreflecttheupdated, prevention focusofthenewWAPSMtext, muchof whichisintendedtodrivedownthe likelihood side ofthe consequence xlikelihood riskequation.

CorrectiveAction: Consideradoptingthefollowinglanguage:“This sectioncontainsrequirementsforpetroleum refineriestopreventmajorincidentsand, tothe greatestextentfeasible, eliminate orminimize processsafetyhazardstowhichemployeesmaybe exposed.”

Thistextsetsaclearerexpectationthatmajor incidentsaretobeprevented.

The proposedWA Purpose doesnotreflectthe updated, prevention focusofthenewWAPSM text.“Preventingandminimizingthe consequences”ofreleasesislessprotectivethan preventingreleasesfromoccurringinthefirst place. Thetextoftheproposedregulationitself focusesonreducingthelikelihoodofarelease byrequiringrefinerstoimplementmeasuresto correctprocesssafetyhazards.Whilethe regulationincludesanEmergencyResponse subsectionandrequirementsforemergency operatingprocedures, itdoesnot, inthemain, focusonmeasurestoreduceharmoncea releasehasoccurred.

2 1 Definitionof “Affected Employee”

Issue: Item(d)indicates“Staffmembers”

CorrectiveAction: ConsiderrevisingItem(d)to“Supportstaff”

“Staffmembers”encompassesabroadgroupof rolesanddisciplines.Insomesites, “Staff”may includeallcompanyemployeesnotrepresented byaunion.“Supportstaff”ismorespecificand clearer.

3 2 Definition of “Explosive” removed

Issue:Thistermappearsinthedefinitionof “Process”butismissingfromthedefinitions element.

CorrectiveAction: Considerincludingadefinitionof“Explosive”that

Aconcisedefinitionofexplosivewillreduce ambiguityindeterminethescopeofthePSM regulation.

Memo#2USW-BlueGreenAlliance.WAPSMRationalChart—Tobeusedwithline-editedPSMdocumentversion1.9.18. 3 of28

http:Memo#2USW-BlueGreenAlliance.WAPSMRationalChart�Tobeusedwithline-editedPSMdocumentversion1.9.18

references WAC 296-901-14024,AppendixB.

4 2 Definitionof “Facility”

Issue:Thistermappearsintheproposalbutis missingfromthedefinitionssubsection.

CorrectiveAction: Considerincludingthefollowingdefinition: Facility.The plants, units, buildings, containersor equipmentthatcontain(s)orinclude(s)aprocess.”

“Facility”isusedinPHA, subsection(3)(e); OperatingProceduressubsection(4)(d); PrestartupSafetyReview, subsection(1); MechanicalIntegrity, subsection(6)(b)and IncidentInvestigation—RootCause Determination, subsection(7)currentlywithout definition.Thisdefinitionisnecessarytoclarify thattherulesaddresstheinfrastructureand othercomponentsthatsupport, contain, orin someotherwayinclude aprocess.

5 2 Definitionof “HighlyHazardous Chemical”

Issue: Definitioncurrentlyreads“Asubstancepossessing toxic…”

CorrectiveAction: Considerrevisingto“Asubstancepossessing acutely toxic…”

Adding“acutely”tothisdefinitioncreatesa referenceto“Acutetoxicity,”atermincludedin theDefinitionsection.

6 4 Definitionof “MajorChange”

Issue: Item(b)currentlyreads“Anyoperationalchange outsideof…”

Corrective Action: Considerrevisingto“Anychangethatinvolves operationoutside of…”

Thesuggestedrevisionhelpsclarifythat“Major Change”includesanychangethatwouldcausea processtooperateoutsidesafelimits.

7 4 Definitionof “MajorChange”

Issue: Item(c)currentlyreads“…orworsensanexisting processsafetyhazard”

Corrective Action:

Anychange, evenifitreducesanexisting processsafetyhazard, needstobefully consideredbeforeimplementation.An improvementinoneaspectmayresultina greaterhazardinanother.



Considerrevisingto“…oraffectsanexisting processsafetyhazard”

8 4 Definitionof “Process”

Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissing:“Thisdefinition includesprocessesunderpartialorunplanned shutdowns.”

Corrective Action: ConsideradoptingtheCAtext.

Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissing: “Utilitiesand processequipmentshallbe consideredpartofthe processifinthe eventofafailure ormalfunction theycouldpotentiallycontribute toamajor incident.”

Corrective Action: ConsideradoptingtheCAtext.

Partialorunplannedshutdownscancontain highlyhazardousmaterialsandcanpresent seriousprocesssafetyhazards.Theyshouldfall underthescopeofthePSMregulation.

Utilitiesandprocessequipmentareintegraltoa processandcancauseorcontributetoamajor processincident.RetainingtheCAtextmakesit clearthatutilitiesandprocessequipmentare coveredbytherequirementsofthePSM regulation.

9 5 Definition of “ProcessSafety Performance Indicators.”

Issue: This termappears in theproposal but ismissing fromthedefinitions subsection.

Corrective Action: Consider adding thefollowing definition: “Process Safety Performance Indicators. Measurementsof the refinery’sactivities and eventsthatare usedto evaluate the performance of processsafety systems.“

This termisused in theProcess Safety ManagementProgramsection at (4) and Implementation at(1) without definition.

10 5 Definitionof “RAGAGEP”

Issue: WAhasaddedthefollowingphrase:“…unlessthey

Whileinternalemployerstandardscancertainly meetorexceedRAGAGEP, theydonot



are documentedasmeetingorexceedingexternal provisions.”

Corrective Action: Considerremovingthisphrase.

Issue: TheCenterforChemicalProcessSafety(CCPS)is missingfromthelistofexamples.Whilethelistis notinanywayexhaustive, itisimportanttoflag CCPS toavoid confusionduringenforcementand appealproceedings.

CorrectiveAction: AddCCPStothelistofexamplesofRAGAGEP.

Issue: RAGAGEPisnarrowlyappliedintheproposalto PSIandMechanicalIntegrity.

CorrectiveAction: Insertthefollowingphraseinallapplicable sections:“…consistentwithRAGAGEP.” In addition, addasentence tothedefinitionthat causesRAGAGEPtobeappliedtoeachsection evenifit’snotexplicitlystated assuch.

Issue: RAGAGEPsareoftendraftedasrecommendations, which can leadtoconfusionduringenforcement andappealproceedings.

CorrectiveAction: InsertasentencethatgivesDOSHthediscretionto

constituteRAGAGEP.Internalemployer standards, bydefinition, areneither “recognized”nor“generallyaccepted”within industry.Theadditionofthisphrasetothe definitionofRAGAGEPcouldalsointroduce ambiguityintheinterpretationRAGAGEPasitis appliedintheMechanicalIntegritysubsection.

RAGAGEPhastraditionallybeenappliedto ProcessSafetyInformationandMechanical Integrity;however, itisapplicabletonearly every sectionoftheWAproposal.Providinga meansforRAGAGEPtobeexpressedmore broadlyintheregulationensuresthatthe regulatorylanguagewillcontinuetodevelop alongsideimprovementsinindustrypractice, as reflectedinchangesinRAGAGEPovertime.



deemaRAGAGEPtobearegulatoryrequirement, evenifitisdraftedasarecommendedpractice.

11 6 Definitionof “Safeguard Protection Analysis(SPA)”

Issue: WAhasaddedthisdefinitionandintroduceda “risktolerance criteria”conceptintotheproposal andtheSPA.

Corrective Action: Consideringremovingthisdefinition, orredraftit usingRAGAGEPinplaceof“risktolerancecriteria.”

“Risktolerancecriteria“isaconceptthatis internallyderivedbytheemployerandcouldbe inconflictwithRAGAGEPforSPAs.Thisphrase alsointroducesaconceptthatisotherwise undefinedintheregulation, whichcould introduceambiguitybetweenthedefinitionand thewaySPAsareperformedinaccordancewith thePHAsubsection.

12 6 Definition of “Serious Physical Harm”

Issue: A definition of “Serious Physical Harm” is not included.

Corrective Action: Consider adding areference to WAC 296-900-14010, orotherWAC, thatprovides examplesorexplanation of “Serious Physical Harm.”

Providing examplesof theintended focus of theterm“Serious Physical Harm” allows consideration of potential consequences in the propercontext.

13 6 Definitionof “Toxic”

Issue: Currentdefinitionisambiguous.

CorrectiveAction: Considerreplacingthecurrentdefinitionwitha referenceto“AcuteToxicity”

Referencing“Acutetoxicity”, atermincludedin theDefinitionssection, addsclaritytotheuseof theterm“Toxic.”

14 8 Employee Collaboration

Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissingat5(d):“Written reportsofhazardsandthe employer’sresponse.”

CorrectiveAction: ConsideradoptingtheCAtext.

Aspartofaninvestigationorcomplaint, itis usefulfortheDivisiontobeabletoaccess writtenreportssubmittedby workersofprocess safetyhazards, alongwithdocumentationofthe employer’sresponses.Thisinformationcan supplementtheotherthreedocumentation



Issue: At(1)(a), “processsafetyinformation”appearson p. 10at(4)butismissingfromthislist.

CorrectiveAction: Consideradding“processsafetyinformation”to thelistat(1)(a).

Issue: At(5), arequirementtoretainthedocumentation inthissectionismissing.

CorrectiveAction: Considerinsertingthephrase, “…andretaina recordof…”and“…forthelifeoftheprocess.”

requirementslistedintheproposal. AdditionofPSIinthelistat(1)(a)ensuresclearer linkagebetweenthePSIandEmployee Collaborationsubsections.

AlloftheActionslistedin(5)(a-d), andthe documentsthataregeneratedaspartofthese Actions, areimportantindicatorsofaneffective processsafetymanagementprogram.These documentsshould beavailabletoemployees, employeesrepresentatives, andtoWADOSH. Thesedocumentscanalsoserveasimportant evidenceintheinvestigationofaprocess incident.Forthesereasons, werecommendthat thedocumentsberetainedforthelifeofeach process.

15 10 ProcessSafety Information(PSI)

Issue: Currenttextin3(b)includesthephrase, “…orwith more protective internalpracticesthatensure safe operation.”

CorrectiveAction: Considerremovingthephrase, “…orwithmore protective internalpracticesthatensure safe operation.”

Whetheraninternalpracticeismoreprotective canonlybedeterminedinretrospect, through experience.“Moreprotective”isamatterof opinionuntilthepractice, andtheequipment, fails.

TheequipmentmustcomplywithRAGAGEP, whereRAGAGEPexists.

16 10 ProcessSafety Information(PSI)

Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissingat3(c): “Ifthe employerinstallsnewprocessequipmentforwhich noRAGAGEPexists, the employershalldocument

Omittingthissentencecouldmakeitpermissible foranemployertoinstallnewequipmentthat mightbeinappropriateforitsintended purpose anddoesnotmeetRAGAGEP.



thatthisequipmentis designed, constructed, installed, maintained, inspected, testedand operatinginasafe manner.”


Issue: Thewords“constructed”and“installed”arenoted in3(c)butaremissingfrom3(d).

Corrective Action: Forconsistencyandeffectiveness, insertthewords “constructed”and“installed”intothelistnotedin 3(d).

17 10 ProcessHazard Analysis(PHA)

Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissingat(1): “Allinitial PHAsforprocessesnotpreviouslycoveredbythis chaptershallbe completedwithinthree yearsof the effective date of thischapter, inaccordance withthissubsection.”


TheAppendixAof“coveredchemicals”and “thresholdquantities”wasremovedfromtheCA PSMregulation.ThissentenceintheCAPHA subsectionthereby extendsthescopeofthe regulationtothoseprocessesthatwere previouslyexemptedbecausetheydidnot containachemicallistedunderAppendixA, or thechemicalwaspresentatlevelsbelowthe listedthresholdquantity.Sulfuricacid, for example, doesnotappearinAppendixAandwas previouslyexempted.Itisappropriatetorequire anewPHAforpreviouslyuncoveredprocesses. BecausetheWAproposalalsoremoves AppendixAandthresholdquantities, itshould requiretheemployertoconductPHAsfor previouslyuncoveredprocess.Thissentence meetsthisobjective.




Issue: WAhasaddedthefollowingtextat2(g): “An appropriate equivalentmethodology.”


ThissentenceappearsasfollowsintheCAtext: “OtherPHAmethodsrecognizedbyengineering organizationsorgovernmentalagencies.” The WAtextismorepermissive, anditcouldplace the“burdenofproof”withDOSHin demonstratingthattheemployer’smethodis not an“appropriate, equivalentmethodology.”


Issue: WAusestheterm“may”whereCAuses“shall”at (2), regardingPHAmethodologies.


Allowingforanunlimiteduniverseofpotential PHAmethodologiescouldplacetheburdenof proofwithDOSHinassessingtheefficacyofeach PHAmethodforitsintendeduseintheplant.


Issue: Thefollowingtextismissingat(11):“ The employer mustimplementallSPA recommendationsinaccordancewiththe ImplementationsectionXXX”

Corrective Action: Consider adding the missing text, asnotedabove.

Arequirementpertainingtoimplementation appearsintheHCAandDMRsubsectionsofthe WA proposal.Bydroppingthisrequirementfrom theSPAsubsection, WAhasintroducedan internal“difference”withintheproposed regulationregardingtheobligationofthe employertoimplementrecommendationsmade byaSPAteam.Thisdifferencecouldbe interpretedtomeanthatSPArecommendations arenotnecessarilyboundbythetimelinesand otherrequirementsoftheWA Implementation subsection.


Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissingat(15):“Exceptas requiredin (6), the employermustimplementall PHArecommendationsinaccordance withthe ImplementationsectionXXX.”

Arequirementpertainingtoimplementation appearsintheHCAandDMRsubsectionsofthe WA proposal.Bydroppingthisrequirementfrom thePHAsubsection, WAhasintroducedan internal“difference”withintheproposed regulationregardingtheobligationofthe



(1


employertoimplementrecommendationsmade byaPHAteam.Thisdifferencecouldbe interpretedtomeanthatPHArecommendations arenotnecessarilyboundbythetimelinesand otherrequirementsoftheWA Implementation subsection.


Issue: Currently, thePSMruledoesnotrequirePHA considerationofthe processunitasawholeatany timeaftertheinitialPHA.

CorrectiveAction: ) Consideraddinglanguagerequiringawholeunitor “full”PHAatleastonceevery10years: “Atleast once everytenyearsafterthe completionofthe initialprocesshazardanalysis, allhazardsofthe processmustbe evaluatedbyconductinga complete PHA.”

AcontinualcycleofrevalidationsofinitialPHAs couldleadtooversightsoromissionsinapartial PHAreview.Requiringa“full”PHAatten-year intervalswouldensure teamsareperiodically analyzingprocessesfromfeedthroughfinished product.

23 15 Operating Procedures

Issue: Informationonoperatingproceduresshouldbe accessibleinthesamemannertoemployeesand to“anyotherperson.”

CorrectiveAction: Consideradding“…neartheprocessareaor who…”asnotedat(2)

Parallelrequirementsareneededforemployees andfor“anyotherperson.”


Issue: Thefollowingtextismissingat(2): “Changesto OperatingProceduresmustbe managedin accordance withthe MOCandMOOC requirementsofthe MOCandMOOCsectionsXXX

Changestooperatingprocedurescanintroduce processsafetyhazardsandshouldthereforebe subjecttotheMOCandMOOCprocedures.



andYYY.”

CorrectiveAction: Consideradoptingthetextnotedabove.


Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissingat(4):“(5)The OperatingProceduresshallinclude emergency proceduresforeachprocess, includingany response tothe over-pressurizingoroverheatingof equipmentorpiping, andthe handlingofleaks, spills, releasesanddischargesofhighlyhazardous materials.These proceduresshallprovide thatonly qualifiedoperatorsmayinitiate these operations, andthatpriortoallowingemployeesinthe vicinity ofaleak, release ordischarge, the employershall, ataminimum, doone ofthe following…”

CorrectiveAction: AdopttheCAtextpertainingtoemergency proceduresintheOperatingProcedures, striking thefollowingsentenceat(4)(f)(i):“Define the conditionsforhandlingleads, spills, ordischarges thatprovide alevelofprotectionthatis functionallyto, orsaferthan, shuttingdownor isolatingthe process.”

Theproposalintroducesthefollowingthree elementspertainingtoemergencyresponse: (A) Define conditionsforhandlingleaks, spillsor dischargesthatprovide alevelofprotectionthat isfunctionallyequivalentto, orsaferthan, shuttingdownorisolatingthe process; (B) Isolate anyvessel, pipingandequipment wherealeak, spillordischarge isoccurring;or, (C) Shutdownanddepressurize allprocess operationswhere aleak, release ordischarge is occurring.

WAhasretainedthesethreeelementsbuthas conflatedthemwithsafeworkpracticesandhas constructedanambiguous, grammaticallynon-parallellistforthisprovision.


Issue: At(4)(f)(i), includedthefollowingtextisincluded: Define conditionsforhandlingleaks, spillsor dischargesthatprovide alevelofprotectionthatis functionallyequivalentto, orsaferthan, shutting downorisolatingthe process;

Whetherapracticeismoreprotectivethan isolatingequipmentorshuttingdownaunitcan onlybedeterminedinretrospect, through experience.“Saferthan”isamatterofopinion untilthepractice, andtheequipment, fails.

Isolatingtheequipment, ortakingtheunittoa



CorrectiveAction: Considerremovingtextat(4)(f)(i).Place(4)(f)(ii) and(iii)tounderanewparagraph(5)thatadopts thatCAtextpertainingtoemergencyprocedures.

MRH:At(3), useof“and…”impliesthatchangesto eachiteminthelistmustoccurtotriggerreview andupdating, ratherthananyindividualelement ofthelist, whichresultsbyreplacing“and”with “or.”

CorrectiveAction: Replace“and”with“or”inbothplaceswhere “and”appearsinthefirstsentence.

‘safeoff’ statewhentheequipmentcan’tbe isolated, providescleardirectionandremoves subjectivity.

TheexperienceattheRichmond, Chevronfireof August2012illustratedtheimportanceof languagepertainingtoemergencyresponse proceduresinthePSMOperatingProcedures element.Atthatincident, theprocesswasnot shutdownandaconfusedemergencyresponse totheleakingpipeendangeredthelivesof19 employees whenthepipecatastrophicallyfailed. Allowingtheemployertodefineunique conditionsforhandlingprocessincidents introducesthepossibilityofaninsufficientor unsaferesponsetoaprocessincident, as reportedbytheCSBintheChevron, Richmond investigation.

Itisappropriatetoreviewandupdateoperating proceduresafteranyoneofthesechanges occurs.

27 17 Training Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissingat(5): “Within twenty-fourmonthsofthe effective date ofthis chapter, the employermustdevelop…”

CorrectiveAction: ConsideradoptingtheCAtext

Includingatimelineforimplementationof requirementsensurestheprotectionsare establishedwithinareasonableamountoftime.

28 18 Contractors Issue: Requirementsforcontract employersin(3)(a) currentlyreads:“… ensure that each contract

Addingtheproposedlanguageclarifiesthe contractemployer’sresponsibilitytoensure trainingisreceived, understoodasintended, and



employee is trained in the work practices…”

CorrectiveAction: Consideradoptingthefollowingtext:“…ensure that each contract employee is effectively trained in, andfollows, the work practices …”

is applied in an effective manner.

29 19 Contractors Issue: At(3)(b), thetextcurrentlyreads: “The contract employermust document thateach…”

CorrectiveAction: Consideradoptingthefollowingtext: “The contractemployermust ensure thateach…”

Addingtheproposedlanguageclarifiesthe contractemployer’sresponsibilitytoensure trainingisreceivedandunderstoodasintended. “Document”mightonlycapturetheemployee’s attendanceatthetrainingsession.

30 19 Contractors Issue: At3(d), thefollowingtextfromtheCAregulation ismissing: “The contractormustensure thateach ofitsemployees understandsandfollowsthe safetyandhealthproceduresofthe refinery employerandthe contractor.”

CorrectiveAction: Addanewparagraph(3)(d)thatadoptsthe followingCAtext:“The contractormustensure thateachofitsemployeesunderstandsand follows the safetyandhealthproceduresofthe refinery employerandthe contractor.”

AddingtheCAlanguageclarifiesthecontract employer’sresponsibilitytoensurethe competencyofitsemployeeswithregardto safetyandhealthpracticesofboththe contractorandtherefineryemployer.This improvesprocesssafetyandthesafetyand healthofrefineryemployeesandcontractor employees.

31 19 Pre-StartupSafety Review(PSSR)

Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissingat(1): “…andfor partialorunplannedshutdowns.The employer shallalsoconductaPSSRforallturnaroundwork performedonaprocess.”

ConductingaPSSRafterapartialorunplanned shutdown, andafteraturnaround, isimportant topreventprocessfailuresfromoccurringthat mightberelatedto, orbetriggeredby, process orequipmentchangesorconditionsthatwere




introducedduringtheshutdownorturnaround.

32 19 Pre-StartupSafety Review(PSSR)

Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissingat2(b):“Process equipmenthasbeenmaintainedandisoperable in accordance withdesignspecifications.”


Thissentenceisneededtoensurethe mechanicalandoperationalintegrityofprocess equipmentpriortorestartingtheprocess, in additiontotheprocessitself.

33 21 Mechanical Integrity

Issue: At(5)(a), thefollowingCAtexthasbeenomitted: “Repairmethodologiesshallbe consistentwith RAGAGEPormore protective internalpractices”

CorrectiveAction: ConsideradoptingtheCAtext, butwithoutthe phrase, “ormoreprotectivepractices,”asfollows: “Repairmethodologiesshallbe consistentwith RAGAGEP.”

EnsuringrepairsareconsistentwithPSIand RAGAGEPensuresthatprocessequipmenthasa higherlikelihoodofoperatingsafelyuntila permanentfixcanbeapplied.

34 22 HotWorkPermit Issue: At(2)(b)theword“object”appearsandis undefinedinthetext.

CorrectiveAction: Considerreplacingtheword“object”with “equipmentofprocess.”

Processequipmentandprocessareeachdefined intheDefinitionssubsection;“object”isnot defined.

35 23 Managementof Change

Issue: At2(b), theword“impact”mustbemodifiedbya termthatappliestheconceptof“anticipation,”or

Withoutmodification, theterm“impact”is applicableonlyafteranincidenthasoccurred.



“expectation”ofimpact.

CorrectiveAction: Consideraddingtheword, “potential”tomodify “impact”at2(b).

At(5), arequirementhasbeenestablishedwithout atimeframe.

CorrectiveAction: At(5), consideringadoptingthefollowingphrase after“updated:”“…priortoimplementationofthe change.”

At(6), arequirementhasbeenestablishedwithout atimeframe.

CorrectiveAction: At(6), consideringadoptingthefollowingphrase after“updated:”“…priortoimplementationofthe change.”

Providingsomeguidanceastowhen documentationshouldbeupdatedincreasesthe likelihoodoftheupdatesoccurring.Requiring updatingofthePSIprior toimplementingthe changehelpsensurethattheupdateactually occursandisnotsimplydelayedindefinitely.

RequiringupdatingoftheOperatingProcedures priortoimplementingthechangehelpsensure thattheupdateactuallyoccursandisnotsimply delayedindefinitely.CurrentOperating Proceduresarenecessaryforsafeoperationof theprocess, beforeandafterthechange.

36 25 Incident Investigation— RootCause Determination

Issue: At(4), thewriteroftheinvestigationreportisnot specified

CorrectiveAction: Consideraddingthefollowingtext: “The investigationteammustprepare awrittenreport atthe conclusion…”

Specifyingtheinvestigationteamwillbe involvedinthedevelopmentofthefinalreport ensurestheteam’sfindingsand recommendationsarecapturedandemphasized appropriately.Theteam’sactiveinvolvementin creationofthereportisalsoconsistentwith othersectionsoftherule, i.e.PHA, DMR, HCA, etc.Thisisconsistentwithparagraph(8)ofthis subsection.

37 25 Incident Issue: Includingdocumentationofabroaderlistof



Investigation— At(4)(e), thetextcurrentlyreads:“Alistofany possibleanalysesincreasesthelikelihoodof RootCause DMR(s), PHA(s), SPA(s), …” thosesourcesbeingreviewedbytheteamand Determination

CorrectiveAction: Consideradoptingthefollowingtext: “ A list of anyrelevantanalyses, suchasDMR(s), PHA(s), SPA(s)….”

canattesttothethoroughnessofan investigation.


Issue: At(4)(g), theteam’srecommendationsshould includeinterimmeasuresthatwillpreventa recurrenceorsimilarincidentuntilfinalcorrective Actionscanbeimplemented.ThisistheCAtextat (o)(6).ThissentencewasincorrectlyplacebyWA into (5), whichhastodowiththeemployer’s resolutionofreportrecommendations.

CorrectiveAction: Considermovingthetextfrom(5)to(4)(g), as follows: “Anyrecommendationsresultingfrom investigation, includinginterimmeasuresthatwill preventa recurrence orsimilarincidentuntilfinal corrective Actionscanbe implemented.”

Theinvestigationteamdevelops recommendationsandtheemployeractsonthe recommendations.WAmixedtheserolesupat (4) and(5).


Issue: At(7), investigationreportsare“…uponrequest, reviewedwithemployeeswhosejobtasksare affectedbytheincident”

CorrectiveAction: Considerremoving“uponrequest”andrevisingto read“…reviewedwithemployeeswhosejobtasks areaffectedbytheincidentinatimelymanner.”

Aclearrequirementtoreviewthefinal investigationreportwithallemployeesdirectly affectedbyanincidentincreasesthelikelihood ofthelearningsfromaninvestigationbeing understood andeffectivelyapplied.Withoutan expressedrequirementfortheemployer, employeesarelesslikelytobeinvolvedina discussionoftheincident’scausesorcorrective Actions.




Issue: The followingtextismissingat(10):“The employer mustimplementallrecommendationsthatresult formthe investigationandHCAinaccordance with the ImplementationsectionXXX”


Arequirementpertainingtoimplementation appearsintheHCAandDMRsubsectionsofthe WAproposal.Bydroppingthisrequirementfrom theIncidentInvestigationsubsection, WAhas introducedaninternal“difference”withinthe proposedregulationregardingtheobligationof theemployertoimplementrecommendations madebyanIncidentInvestigationteam.This differencecouldbeinterpretedtomeanthatthe team’srecommendationsarenotnecessarily boundbythetimelinesandotherrequirements oftheWA Implementation subsection.

41 26 Emergency Planningand Response

Issue: Thesentenceat(2)isnotproperlyconstructed;it isalsonotclearwhat“documentthenatureand agreement”means.

CorrectiveAction: Considerusingthefollowingtextat(2):“… must develop, implementand maintainawritten agreementbetweenitselfandeachexternal emergencyresponseorganizationregardingthe assistancethattheexternalorganizationis expectedtoprovide.”

TheWest, Texasexplosionthatresultedinthe deathsof13firstrespondersillustratesthe importanceofemergencyresponse requirementsinthePSMregulation, particularly withregardtopre-planning.Requiringawritten agreement, alongwithdocumentationof activities, willhelpmeetthisobjective.

42 27 ComplianceAudits Issue: ThefollowingCAtextismissingat(5):“The employermustimplementallrecommendationsin accordance withthe Implementationsection.”


Arequirementpertainingtoimplementation appearsinthe HCAandDMRsubsectionsofthe WAproposal.Bydroppingthisrequirementfrom theComplianceAuditssubsection, WAhas introducedaninternal“difference”withinthe proposedregulationregardingtheobligationof theemployertoimplementrecommendations madeaspartofaComplianceAudit.This



differencecouldbeinterpretedtomeanthat ComplianceAuditrecommendationsarenot necessarilyboundbythetimelinesandother requirementsoftheWA Implementation subsection.

43 27 TradeSecrets Issue: At (1), thetextrequirestheemployertoprovide onlyalimitedsetofinformationtoemployeesand employeerepresentatives.Itleavesoutkey informationfromallotherPSMsectionsthatis necessaryformeaningfulparticipationinthePSM programbyemployeesandemployee representatives.

CorrectiveAction: At(1), considerreplacingthetextwiththe following: “Employersmustmake allinformation necessaryforcomplyingwiththischapteravailable toemployeesandemployee representatives responsible for, orparticipatingin, the development, implementationormaintenance of eachPSMelementsetforthinthischapter.”:

At(2), correctthereferencetoWAC296-901-14018andconsiderreplacingthetextwiththe following: “ The employermayrequire an individualtoenterintoaconfidentialityagreement forinformationthatmeetsthe definitionofatrade secretassetforthinWAC296-901-14018,Trade Secrets.”

At(3), considerreplacingthetextwiththe following: “Subjecttothe rulesandproceduresset

SomerefineryemployersinCAarerequiring employeesandemployeerepresentativestosign confidentialityagreementsforPSMpoliciesand proceduresdevelopedunderthenewPSM regulation.Thisispreventingrefineryworkers andtheirrepresentativesfromsharingand developingbestprocesssafetypractices.We alsobelieveitrepresentsaninappropriate applicationofthetradesecretprovisionsofCCR Tile8, Section5194(i)(CAHazardous CommunicationStandard), whichareintended to(1)protecttheidentityofuniquechemical ingredients, and(2)provideamechanismfor healthcareprofessionalstoaccessthisunique chemicalinformationonanas-neededbasis.It’s possiblethattheextensiveTradeSecret subsectionproposedinWAcouldbeusedby employerstobaremployeesfromaccessing importantPSMinformationandfromsharing bestpracticesinthedevelopment, implementationandmaintenanceofPSM policiesandprocedures.



forthinWAC296-67-117, the employermust provide employeesandtheirdesignated representativesaccesstotrade secret information.”

44 30 Damage Mechanism Review

Issue: At(11)(f), thefollowingtexthasbeenadded: “Operatingmetrics, instrumentationandalarm, andotherrelatedequipmentthatcouldcause, worsen,or mitigatedamagemechanism.” Theintentofincludingtheterm“metrics”hereis notclear.

CorrectiveAction: Considerusinganotherwordinplaceof“metrics”; perhaps“data”, “conditions”, “variables”or “parameters”wouldaddclarity.

“Metrics”typicallyappliestoinformationthatis gatheredandmeasuredagainstastandardvalue orestablishedgoal.Operatingconditionstobe avoidedwouldbeamorelikelyproductofa DMR.


Issue: At(7), investigationreportsare“…uponrequest, reviewedwithemployeeswhosework assignmentsarewithintheunitdescribedinthe DMR”

CorrectiveAction: Considerremoving“uponrequest”andrevisingto read“…reviewedwithemployeeswhosework assignmentsarewithintheunitdescribed inthe DMR”

AclearrequirementtoreviewthefinalDMR reportwithallemployeesdirectlyaffected increasesthelikelihoodofthelearningsfroma DMRbeingunderstoodandeffectivelyapplied. Withoutanexpressedrequirementforthe employer, employees arelesslikelytobe involvedinadiscussionoftheprocessunit’s integrityandsafety.

46 33 Hierarchyof HazardControls Analysis(HCA)

Issue: Theimplementationrequirementhasbeen amendedfrom:“The employershallimplementall

Toavoidambiguity, theimplementationtextin theHCAsubsectionshouldreflecttheexact wordingoftheimplementationtextintheDMR



recommendationsin accordance withsubsection (x),” toread:“The employermustimplementall recommendations.”

CorrectiveAction: Considerusingthefollowingwordingforthis sentencehere(andforeachsubsectionwherea PSMteamgeneratesrecommendationsthatlinkto the Implementation subsection;i.e., PHA, SPA, DMR, HCA, IncidentInvestigationandCompliance Audits): The employershallimplementall recommendationsinaccordance withthe Implementationsection(XXX)

subsection.

47 33 ProcessSafety Culture Assessment (PSCA)

Issue: TheCAtexthasbeenalteredat(3), effectively shiftingthesafetycultureconsultationfunction fromthePSCAteamtotheemployer.

CorrectiveAction: ConsideradoptingthefollowingCAlanguage: “The employershallprovide foremployee participation, pursuanttosubsection(q).The team mustconsultwithatleastone employee or anotherindividualwithexpertise inassessing processsafetyculture inthe petroleumrefining industry.”

ThePSCAconsultationfunctionisaresponsibility ofthePSCAteam, nottheemployer.This distinctionisreflectedintheCAtextat(3).

48 34 ProcessSafety Culture Assessment (PSCA)

Issue: Adesigneeoftherefinerymanagerisgiventhe authoritytosign-offonPSCAreports, collective plansandInterimAssessments.

CorrectiveAction:

Processsafetymustbeacorevalueatall companylevels.Processsafetycultureis considereda“criticaldriverofprocesssafety performance.”4 Comprehensive PSC Assessmentsareessentialinordertoevaluate whethertherefineryprioritizesitsprocesssafety



Strike“ordesignee”at(8) managementperformancealongsideother demandssuchascostcontrol, production demandsandcompetitiveness.ThePSCA signatoryrequirementwillensurethatarefinery manager, asthetopcompanyrepresentativeat therefinery, isknowledgeableaboutand accountablefortherefinery’sprocesssafety cultureandunderstandscorrectiveActions needed.Thisrequirementhelpsensurethe manager’seffectiveprocesssafetyleadership.

Therequirementisalsoimportantbecause changesinrefineryownership, corporate leadership, technologies, managementsystems, andtheeconomycanresultinturnoverin refinerymanagers.Therequirementwillhelp ensureanewmanager’sfamiliaritywiththe refinery’sexistingsafetycultureandworkforce aswellasherorhisaccountability.Elimination oftheword“designee”willavoidambiguity becausethemanagementpositionand backgroundofthedesigneeisnotidentifiedand delegationofthisresponsibilitywouldnot ensurethatimportantcultureinformationwould reachtherefinerymanageroraccountabilityof themanager.

49 36 Managementof Organizational Change(MOOC)

Issue: Thereisacommamissinginlinetwoat(2), at “…classificationof employees, changing shift duration…”

CorrectiveAction: Considerinsertingacommabetween“employees”

ThisisagrammaticalerrorintheCAtextthat hasbeentransmittedtotheWAtext.



and“changing.”

50 36 Managementof Organizational Change(MOOC)

Issue: At(5), therefinerymanagerordesigneeare responsibleforcertifyingtheMOOCisaccurate and complieswiththesiteMOOCprocedures, but thereisnoexpressedrequirementtoaddressthe team’srecommendationsorimplementAction itemsbeforethechangeismade.

Inaddition, authorityisdelegatedinappropriately toa“designee.”

CorrectiveAction: Consideraddingat(5), orelsewhere, as appropriate, textdetailingtherefinerymanager’s responsibilitytoassurecompletionofActionitems priortoanorganizationalchange:“… thatall recommendationshavebeenaddressed, thatall Actionitemsarecomplete…”

Strike“ordesignee”at(5).

Inordertoeffectivelymanageorganizational change, theMOOCsectionshouldcontainall basicprinciplesoftheMOCsection.Actionitem managementisdirectlyaddressedinMOC, and similarly, shouldbeinMOOC.

Therefinerymanagercertificationrequirement willensureaccountabilityfortheMOOC assessmentandcompliancewithsection’s requirements.Eliminationoftheword “designee”willavoidambiguitybecausethe managementpositionandbackgroundof the designeeisnotidentifiedanddelegationofthis responsibilitywouldnotadequatelyensure accountability.Referenceto“section”rather than“subsection”iscorrect – referstoWAC-XX-XXX, insteadofonlysubsection(5).

51 37 ProcessSafety Management Program

Issue: At(4), leadingandlaggingindicatorsare“process safetyindicators.”Thissubsectionismissingalist ofindicators.

Aspecificsetofprocesssafetyindicatorsshould betracked, documented, assessedagainstindustry bestpractices, andreportedtothepublic.Thisis requiredintheCaliforniaAccidentalRelease Program(Cal/ARP)updatesforProgram4, PetroleumRefineries, adoptedOct2017.

TheCSBrecommendedrulesthatwouldthe “reportingofinformationtothepublictothe greatestextentfeasiblesuchasasummaryof thecomprehensiveprocesshazardanalysis whichincludesalistofsafeguardsimplemented andstandardsutilizedtoreducerisk, and processsafetyindicatorsthatdemonstratethe effectivenessofthesafeguardsand managementsystems.”TheCSBfurther recommendedestablishingaprogramthat “collects, tracksandanalyzesprocesssafety



to

CorrectiveActions: At(4), consideraddingthefollowingtext: “The employermustdevelop, implementandmaintain aneffective programtotrack, document, and assessthe followingprocesssafetyperformance indicatorsagainstindustrybestpractices: Pastdue inspectionsforpipingandpressure vessels; (a) Pastdue PHAcorrective actions, including

corrective actionsresultingfromSPAsandHCAs; (b) Pastdue IncidentInvestigationcorrective

actions; (c) The numberofmajorincidentsandincidents

that couldreasonablyhave ledtomajorincident; (d) The numberoftemporarypipingandequipment

repairsthatare installedonhydrocarbonand high energyutilitysystemsthatare pasttheir date of replacementwithapermanentrepair; and

(e) Thetotalnumberoftemporarypipingand equipmentrepairsinstalledonhydrocarbonand highenergyutilitysystems, includingthe date the temporarypipingrepairwasinstalledand the date the permanentrepairistobe completed.”

At(5), consideraddingthefollowingtext: “Forpurposesofthissection, pastdueisdefined by RAGAGEP.”

At(6), consideraddingthefollowingtext: “Withinthe firstthree monthsofeachcalendar year, the employermustposttheprocesssafety

leadingandlaggingindicatorsfromoperators andcontractorstopromotecontinuousprocess safetyimprovements,”includingpublicly reporting“requiredindicatorsannuallyatfacility andcorporatelevels."

performance indicatorsdescribedinsubsection Memo#2USW-BlueGreenAlliance.WAPSMRationalChart—Tobeusedwithline-editedPSMdocumentversion1.9.18. 24 of28 (4)

a-fandtheirassessmentagainstRAGAGEPtoa website thatisreadilyaccessible withoutcharge

the public.”

Issue: ThereisaneedtoensurecontinuityofPSM informationwhenarefineryissoldtoanew owner.

CorrectiveAction: At(7), consideraddingthefollowingtext: “PhysicalcustodyofallDMRreportsmustremain atthe refineryoverthe life ofprocessunits.The refineryownerwhoeithertransfersownershipof the refineryorselectsnewmanagementshallbe responsible forassuringthatallDMRreportsare formallytransferredtosuccessorsininterest and/ornewmanagement.The new owner and newmanagementshallbe responsible for retainingallDMRreportstransferredtothem.”

ThisclarificationwasrecommendedbyCSB BoardMemberRickEnglerduringarulemaking stakeholdermeetingbasedonhisexperience withrefineryincidentinvestigations.The absenceofsuchaprovisioncouldleaveanew owner/managerwithoutadequateinformation aboutconditionsofprocessunitsorequipment andcouldhamperfutureincidentinvestigation efforts.

52 38 Implementation Issue: TheWAtextreplacestheterm “recommendations”in(1)asusedintheCAtext, withthephrase, “processsafetyperformance indicators.”

CorrectiveAction: ConsideradoptingtheCAtext:use “recommendations”ratherthan”processsafety performanceindicators.”

Theuseofthephrase“processsafety performanceindicators”ratherthan “recommendations”representsafundamental flawinthelogicandeffectivenessofthePSM proposal.InsixsubsectionsoftheWAproposal andtheCAregulation(PHA, SPA, DMR, HCA, IncidentInvestigationandComplianceAudits) PSMteamsarechargedwithdeveloping recommendations, towhichtheemployermust respondaccordingtotherequirementsofthe Implementation subsection. PSMteamsdonot develop“processsafetyperformance indicators.”

Byintroducingthisphraseat(1)in the Implementation subsection, theWAproposal



(1

createsadisconnectbetweenthe recommendationsofthePSMteamsandthe obligationoftheemployertotakecorrective actioninresponsetothoserecommendations, asrequiredbytheprovisionsofthe implementationsubsection.Thiscouldallowthe employertoeffectivelydisregardthe recommendationsofthePSMteams. Thisrepresentsacriticalfailureinthelogicand structureofthePSMproposal.

53 38-40 Implementation Issue: At(3)theemployerisgiventheopportunityto rejecttherecommendationsofPSMteams, which aremade-upofbothmanagementandlabor representatives.

CorrectiveAction: At(3), striketheproposedtext, including sentencesat(a), (b)and(c).

At(4), thetextreads ”The employer may change a team recommendation for a safeguard if an alternative safeguard provides an equally or more effective level ofprotection”.

CorrectiveAction: At(4), considerusingthefollowingtext:

) “The employermayimplementanalternative corrective actionforarecommendationifthe employercandemonstrate inwritingthatthe alternative measure willprovide anequivalentor higherorderofinherentsafety.The employermay implementanalternative corrective actionfora

Providingavehicleforrejecting(ratherthan simplychanging)therecommendationsmadeby PSMteamsopensthepossibilitythatanyteam recommendation, despiteitsnecessity, couldbe rejectedbytheemployer.

The employermightelecttoimplementan alternativecorrectiveaction, butthisdoesnot changethePSMteam’srecommendations.The recommendationstillstand;theemployer’s actiondoesnotaffectthecontentofthe recommendations.Theproposedtextconfuses theroleofthePSMteamsinmaking



(a

(b

(c

( “)

recommendedsafeguardifthe employercan demonstrate inwritingthatthe alternative safeguardwillprovide anequallyormore effective levelofprotection.”

At(5), amechanismisneededbywhichPSM teamsaremadeawareofcorrectiveactionsbythe employerthatdifferfromtherecommendations madebytheteam.ItisimportantthatPSMteam membersareaffordedtheopportunityto commentontheemployer’schoiceofcorrective action(s).

CorrectiveAction: At(5), considerusingthefollowingtext:

Priortoimplementingacorrective action,the1employermust:

) Communicate the anticipatedcorrective actionto allteammembersforcomment

) Documentallwrittencommentsreceivedfrom teammembers;and,

) Documentafinaldecisionforeach recommendationandcommunicate itto allteam members”

At(10), asuperfluousphrasehasbeenaddedto endofthesentence.

CorrectiveAction: Considerstrikingthefollowingphrase:“…thatisin infeasible todoso.”

At(13), arequirementtocommunicatetothePSM

recommendationsandtheroleofemployerin implementingcorrectiveactions.

CommunicatingbacktoPSMteammembers completestherecommendationandcorrective action“decision-loop”andrequiresimproved accountabilitybytheemployertothePSM teams.Thisinformationisessentialforthe teamstoimprovetheireffectivenessand, if necessary, forDOSHtoapplyininvestigatinga processincident, particularlyincaseswherethe employerelectedtochangeaPSMteam recommendation, andwhentheteamprovided additionalcommentregardingtheemployer’s choiceofcorrectiveaction(s).

Theimplicationsofdelayingacorrectiveaction thathasbeenrecommendedbyaPSMteamcan besignificant.Deferredmaintenance, for example, canresultifaprocessfailure.Itis necessaryforPSMteammemberstoknowthat outcomeoftheirrecommendations.This informationisalsoimportantforDOSHin


(1

teammembersforcommentismissing.

CorrectiveAction: Consideraddingthefollowingphrase:“…be providedtoallteammembersforcommentsand must…”

At(15)thereisaneedforlanguagerequiringthe employertoretaindocumentationofPSMteam recommendationsandthecorresponding correctiveactionsandtheirimplementationtaken bytheemployer.

) At(15), consideraddingthesentence, “All recommendations, correctiveactions, timelines, MOCsandotherdocumentationgenerated pursuanttothissectionmustberetainedfor the lifeoftheprocess.”

investigatingaprocessincident.

TheImplementationsectioniswhere allofthe workofPSMistranslatedfrompaperintoactual processsafetyimprovements.Documentingthe finalimplementationstepisessentialforthe employer, employees, andDOSHtounderstand thesafetyofaprocessanditschangingstatus overtime. Documentationisthefoundationof transparencyandaccountability, whichis essentialtoaneffectiveregulation, andto continuousimprovementinprocesssafety management.Implementationdocumentsfora processanditsrelatedequipmentarealso essentialtoanyinvestigationbyDOSHintoa processsafetyincident.

* ******



USW-BlueGreen Alliance. Memo #2B. Supportive Comments, WashingtonPSMProposal1.9.18 (May 14, 2018)

Item Page Subsection Comment 1 1 Purpose/Scope In Scope, WA has appropriately focused the proposed

changes on the petroleum refining industry. Refineries contain millions of barrels of highly hazardous materials, and due to the size, complexity, number of workers and community members potentially affected, and amount of change with the facility on a daily basis, refineries should be the subject of increased focus.


Replacement of “Employee Participation” with “Employee Collaboration” is a significant and meaningful change. Collaboration speaks directly to the original intent of the Employee Participation element. Workers have not been provided an adequate say in PSM program development, and this clarification will give workers greater influence over safety in their workplaces. Also, Employee Collaboration is rightly emphasized in each applicable section throughout the rule.


At (4)(a)(iv), the employer is required to develop “measures to ensure that employees who exercise stop work authority as described in this part are protected from intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination.” This provision will encourage employees to take proactive Stop Work procedures without fearing that doing so could jeopardize their job.This “lowers the barrier” for employees to take action, which will help ensure that Stop Work procedures are actually used in practice. This will improve process safety and the implementation of the new regulation.


At (4), the employer is required to consult with the employees in developing effective Stop Work procedures. Effective Stop Work procedures, including thorough documentation of instances where Stop Work is exercised, will encourage workers to voice their concerns and have their issues addressed, rather than remain silent, accept a known hazard, and potentially be injured in the workplace or allow a potential process safety hazard to go uncorrected.

5 12 Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

At (5), the concept of a Safeguard Protection Analysis (SPA) is rightly incorporated into the PSM rule.Some refineries already use an SPA work process; since SPA represents a best practice, it should be a required part of a PHA.

6 15 Operating At (1)(c)(vi) the rule requires the employer to include in

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Procedures the Operating Procedures a provision pertaining to the “minimum number of personnel required to safely execute the procedure.” This provision willimprove process safety by establishing minimum staffing levels for procedures and helping to prevent personnel, including management, from taking “short cuts” with insufficient numbers of personnel.

7 16 Training In the Training subsection, as well as other subsections, WA has recognized the significance of an effective training program for both operations and maintenance employees. Requiring documentation of the trainer and means used to verify understanding creates an auditable program, useful in any continuous improvement effort.

8 17 Contractors At (2)(e), WA recognizes the importance of refinery employers retaining a log of injuries and illnesses experiences by employees of contractors. Knowledge of this record will indirectly improve safety and health practices among contractor employers and will help improve oversight of contractor safety and health by refinery employers.

9 17 Contractors In the Contractors subsection, WA has recognized the significance of an effective training program for contract company employees. Requiring documentation of the means used to verify understanding creates an auditable program, useful in any continuous improvement effort.

10 18 Prestartup Safety Review

At (1), WA has made an important addition in specifying all prestartup safety review items have been resolved and all systems and components are in place and working properly. Starting a unit with incomplete systems process systems compromises the design of the facility and the safety of the workers.


At (1), WA has made a significant improvement in the application of PSM by clarifying that all process equipment is to be included in a refinery’s mechanicalintegrity program.


At (6)(b), WA has made significant improvement by requiring evaluation of substantially similar equipment when a deficiency is found in one piece of equipment.


At(6)(c), WA has rightly specified all affected equipment will be inspected after a detrimental processing event.

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14 22 Hot Work Permit At (4), adding a requirement to retain hot work permits for one year increases auditability of the permitting program.

15 22 Management of Change

At (1), WA has clarified requirements by expressly including temporary repairs as part of the management of change (MOC) work process.


At (7), WA has significantly improved the effectiveness of the MOC work process by requiring sign-off by the employer that the “MOC evaluation is safe, complete, and all action items are completed prior to executing the change.” This is clearer that MOC considerations being “documented and addressed,” as required at (2), and will improve the safety and accountability of the MOC process.


At (8), WA has significantly improved the effectiveness of the MOC work process by requiring a damage mechanism review (DMR) and hierarchy of hazard controls analysis (HCA) for each major change.

18 24 Incident Investigation

At (8), WA has appropriately established a timeline for completion of the investigation team’s written report. Establishing a timeline ensures the report is issued and corrective actions established in a timely manner.


At (9), WA has required an HCA for each recommendation resulting from an incident investigation. This significantly improves the effectiveness of corrective actions from an investigation, in that a rigorous system is used to identify higher-order safeguards that may be applied.


At (9), WA has required an HCA for each recommendation resulting from an incident investigation. This significantly improves the effectiveness of corrective actions from an investigation, in that a rigorous system is used to identify higher-order safeguards that may be applied.


At (10), WA has required retention of investigation reports for the life of the process. Keeping investigation reports allows reference and auditing and is a critical if a continual improvement program is to be effective.

22 25 Emergency Planning and Response

At (1), WA has required appropriate planning and procedures for handling small releases. This is important because small releases represent the majority of incidents and can sometimes escalate into larger releases if not

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properly controlled.

23 25 Emergency Planning and Response

At (2), while we have recommended test changes to clarify this paragraph, WA’s proposed requirements will help improve the effectiveness and safety of an emergency response to a refinery by external response organizations.

24 25 Compliance Audits

At (2), WA has required the employer to consult with operators in each audited process and document the findings and recommendations from these consultations. This is important in evaluating the effectiveness of the audit, in that the audit findings can be compared with workers’ input.

25 26 Compliance Audits

At (4), WA has required the employer to make the audit report available to employees and their representatives and respond in writing to any written comments submitted by same. These are all important when trying to ensure the validity and effectiveness of the auditing process. Without a feedback process, the objectivity and thoroughness of the report could be uncertain.


Adoption of the concept of a rigorous damage mechanism review is an important step in improving process safety for refineries. This is another example of an industry best practice integrated into PSM requirements.

27 29 Hierarchy of Hazard Controls Analysis

Adoption of HCA concepts requires the employer to methodically evaluate the refinery, in an effort to identify opportunities to improve the effectiveness of safeguards and incorporate inherently safer technologies.

28 32 Process Safety Culture Assessment

Process safety culture is not a new concept.Integrating safety culture assessment into PSM the rules in order to improve a site’s current culture and develop actions to drive a safer “Way things are done around here” is an absolutely necessary element of an effective safety program. Where honest effort, adequate resources and employee involvement have been invested in culture assessment efforts, positive results have been realized.

29 33 Human Factors Adoption of requirements for the employer to evaluate and understand the interaction between the worker and the work environment is essential to improving process safety.

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30 35 Management of Organizational Change

Adopting management of organizational change requirements is critical to avoiding negative impacts to process safety programs. Understanding how a proposed organizational change might affect a single position or a group of employees allows identification of problems before they are implemented. MOOC is an essential part of any effective MOC work process.

31 36 PSM Program Adopting the requirements in the PSM Program section make it clear that the refinery’s PSM program needs to be integralto every piece of the facility’s operation, a concept that needs to be supported from the highest level of site management.

32 36 Implementation Adopting PSM language that includes clear timelines for completion of reports and implementation of corrective actions is an essential part of ensuring that opportunities for process safety improvements are addressed in a timely manner. In the absence of clear time requirements, an action plan following an incident investigation, for instance, might not be assigned and implemented for months, if not years, after the incident. The timeframes proposed in the draft Implementation section are reasonable and appropriate.

* * * * * * *

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2018 Coalition Comments to WA PSM Cover Ltr Memo #2 5.14.18 FINAL recordedUSW-BGA Memo 2B Rationale Chart - May 14, 2018 FINALUSW-BGA Memo 2C Supportive Comments - May 14, 2018 FINAL recorded

Documents

Division of Occupational Safety & Health...Ms. Tari Enos, Administrative Regulations Analyst Division of Occupational Safety & Health Washing State Dept of Labor and Industries