Alexander Dugin and Russian Nationalists Vision of the USA in Late Yeltsin / Early Putin era

The USA as the Primordial Enemy of Russia / Eurasia

Russians fascination with the West, related mostly with the USA, declined sharply by the end of the 1990s. Its

ideological vacuum was filled with variety of nationalistic creeds. Neo-Eurasianism /Eurasianism was one of them.

The proponents regarded Russia as unique civilization based on “symbiosis” of Russians, historically Orthodox Slavs,

and Muslims, most of them Turkic by ethnic background. The proponents of the creed bemoaned the collapse of

the USSR and regarded the USA as the primordial enemy of Russia / Eurasia. They tried to explain the conflict /

tension between the USA and Russia – it reemerged soon after the collapse of the USSR – and the end of the regime

in the context of new paradigms, or actually it was reworking of the old one. Geopolitics reinforced by Samuel

Huntington’s theory of “clash of civilizations” and similar ideas taken from Russian intellectual tradition, such as

those elaborated by Nikolai la Danilevsky,1 emerged as the important ideological building blocks. They were

blended with “Eurasianism” created by Russian émigrés in the 1920s and the brand of Eurasianism / Neo-

Eurasianism had emerged as a result of these theoretical interactions. Alexander Dugin, the seminal Russian

1 N. la Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa, New York: Johnson Reprint, 1966.

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philosopher and political scientist and public intellectual, was among the most influential Eurasianists, especially in

the late 1920s / early 1930s.

Dugin’s Popularity in the 1990s

Dugin started publication of his works by the end of Gorbachev era. As vast majority of Russian intellectuals, he was

originally excited by the changes, as he noted. Lately because he believed that reforms would transform the USSR

along Eurasian direction.2 However, soon enough, Dugin’s view on Gorbachev and Yeltsin changed drastically for the

worse after the collapse of the USSR. The changes of views and cataclysmic events of the early 1990s had

corresponded with Dugin’s increasing intellectual activities. He published one book after the other. Already by that

time, he was noted by Russian nationalist intellectuals. For example, Vadim Kozhinov, well known nationalistic

writer, had praised Dugin Velikaia voina kontinentov (The great war of continents), one of his major works.3 Dugin

also became an active contributor of various “Red to Brown” – the term coined by the enemies of loose alliance

between nationalists and communists – publications including Den’ – lately renamed in Zavtra. The vehicle sees the

collapse of the USSR as the great catastrophe and appealed to assortment of variety of intellectuals to support its

2 Dugin, Evraziistvo: teoriia i praktika, Moscow:Artogeia tsentr, 2001, p.22.

3 Vadim Kozhinov, “Troika Markusa Vol’fa i geopolitika,” Den’, 3-9 May, 1992.

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agenda. It was not just communists and nationalists. The newspaper, for example, quoted the president of Tokyo

University who stated, even before the collapse, that the end of the USSR would not lead to democracy in Eurasia

but chaos.4 Dugin soon parted with Zavtra which he regarded as the narrowly nationalistic in its agenda. At the

same time, he continued to be a prolific writer and increasingly known public intellectual. He also became engaged

in publishing of the work of all major representatives of “classic,” pre-WWII Eurasianists.5 The Great War of

Continents (Velikaia voina kontinentov) was one of his major works at that time and here he elaborated on his

geopolitical doctrine clearly. Here he saw history as a great conflict between “Atlantism” / the USA and Eurasia with

Russia as its core. Dugin implied that his book was quite popular and even Andrei Kozyrev, the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, had read it. Still because of the domination of “Atlanticism,” the ideas of the book were rejected and those

who reject the book include, of course, Kozyrev6 who stated upon reading Dugin’s book that he, according to Dugin’s

classification, is “Atlantist” and he is a proud to be as such. Dugin that Kozyrev comments showed the level of

degeneration and certain perversions of Russian foreign policy. Indeed, Atlantism is the ideology of the Russia /

Eurasia primordial enemy and the very fact that Russian foreign minister endorse this ideology indicated that he was

4 “Tenevoi cabinet Bezopasnost’,” Den’, 15 Janaury, 1992.

5 Dugin, Evraziiskaia missiia Nursultana Nazarbaeva, Moscow:Evraziia, 2004, p. 204.

6 Ibid.

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serving the enemy. This indicated the level of perversion of Russian foreign policy. As a matter of fact, such a

statement would be impossible in the USA. Indeed, American foreign minister would never state openly that he was

the supporter of Eurasianism.7 Dugin’s views were hardly isolated and became increasingly popular as time

progressed. By the middle of the 1990s, the disappointment with post Soviet arrangement and the USA grew and

nostalgia and, in way, neo imperial feeling could be recorded even among basically pro-Western intellectuals. And

this provided increasing relevance of Eurasianism and increase Dugin’s popularity. For example, in 1995, Gleb

Pavlovsky, one of the leading Russian intellectuals and later Putin’s advisor during his first term, had created the

Foundation for Effective Politics (Fond effektivnoi politiki). The Foundation had published volume,”Under the title

‘Different’ (Inoe).” The authors of the included articles praised the Soviet era when the USSR / Russia was strong

enough to face the USA. The author of one article also stated that Russia shall follow its own “Eurasian” way. Later

the authors of these works had been incorporated into the government bodies. At the same time, they continued

their fascination with Eurasianism and befriended those of Russian intellectuals who prophesized Eurasianism.

Dugin had emerged here as the most influential Eurasianist philosopher and as a result, Dugin’s ideas became

increasingly influential.8 Dugin himself noted this shift in public mood by the middle of the 1990s. Dugin stated here

7 “Uchereditel’nyi s’ezd OPOD ‘Evraziia’,” Evraziia, 21 April, 2001.

8 Grigorii Nekhoroshev,”Biznes – Evraziia,” Delovaia Khronika, 5 June, 2000.

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that Kozyrev just followed the prevailing mood among elite and masses alike who saw in the USA Russia’s true friend

and model to follow. Still by the middle of the 1990s, there was a visible shift in the elite and masses attitude

toward the West and it became especially clear after the West had attacked Yugoslavia in 1999. The image of the

USA suffered more than any of the Western countries, Dugin rightfully admitted. By that time, Dugin noted, it

became obvious for everyone that the West was not Russia’s friend regardless of the political / ideological changes

in Russia and the conflict between the USA and Russia / the USSR was civilizational in nature and had nothing to do

with conflict between communism and capitalism. Reconciliation between Russia and the West, especially the USA

– in some of Dugin’s writings, Donald Rumsfeld’s “Old Europe,” notably France and Germany, was clearly

demarcated from the USA – would lead to nowhere. According to Dugin, the West regarded signs of friendship as

just the sign of weakness.9 This change in the ideology of the elite had influenced him, Dugin. And he stated that

since the late 1990s, he became the advisor of the speaker of State Duma.

Dugin’s influence and popularity became evident at the end of the 1990s and even those who hardly regarded

themselves as Dugin admirers acknowledged that “only a few years ago, Dugin was considered a ‘crackpot! He is a

very well-read and prolific crackpot with a lot of influence,’ according to Dmitry Trenin, defense analyst at the

9 Dugin, Evraziiskaia missia Nursultana Nazarbaeva, p. 206.

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Carnegie Moscow Centre, the mainstream think tank.” 10 The foreign observers also admitted that Dugin became

increasingly popular by the end of the 1990s when he was widely read in Russia and gained considerable attention

among students of Russia in the West who believed that Duginism and Eurasianism in general increasingly shaped

Russia foreign policy.11 Consequently, the interest to Dugin had corresponded to the interests of the other

proponents of Eurasianism.12 It indeed looked like that Dugin’s star was on the rise as was indicated, among many

other things, by the number of important personalities who embraced Dugin’s theories in this or that way.

There were quite a lot of influential people who were among those who followed Dugin.

Take for example, General-Lieutenant Nikolai Klokotov (ret.) who held the chair of strategy at

Russia’s Military Academy of the General Staff from 1988 to 1996. He is listed as a consultant for

the Basics of Geopolitics, and was among the influential people who took Duginian ideas close to

heart. The book was recommended as reading for the students of the Russian Academy of General

10 “Aleksandr Dugin: Mastermind of Global Empire,” http://www.eurasia.com/ru/eng/ft.html, 7 September, 2007.

11 Frederick Matern, “The Discourse of Civilization in the Works of the New Eurasianists: Lev Gumilev and Alexander Panarin,” YCASS Post-Communist Studies Programm Research Paper Series, Paper Number 002, February, 2007, p. 6; See also for example Alan Ingram “Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia,” Political Geography, Vol. 20, 2001 and G. Smith, “The Masks of Proteus: Russia geopolitical shift and the new Eurasianism,” Transactions of Institute of British Geographers, Vol. NS 24, 1999; “Personal’nyi magnit Aleksandra Dugina,” Moskovskie Novosti, 22 February-March, 1998.

12 Frederick Matern, “The Discourse of Civilization in the Works of the New Eurasianists: Lev Gumilev and Alexander Panarin,” YC!SS Post-Communist Studies Programme Research Paper Series, Paper Number 002, February, 2007, p. 6.

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Staff.13 Klokotov was not the only convert. Russia’s main military diplomat, General Leonid Ivashov,

the head of the international department at Russia’s Ministry of Defense, and the mastermind of

Russia’s takeover of Pristina Airport in Kosovo was also “one of the converts.”14 Dugin’s popularity

was not just due to his numerous publications. Dugin also disseminated his ideas as lecturer. From

1998 to 2001, Dugin delivered lectures in New University. Then he published the lecture under the

title “Filosofiia Traditsionalizma (Philosophy of Traditionalism).”

Regardless of Dugin’s influence, Eurasianism as well as other forms of imperial Russian nationalism

increasingly competed with pro-Western, mostly pro-American, “Atlanticism” by the end of Yeltsin tenure. Indeed

by the end of the 1990s, Eurasianism related similar terminology became quite popular, at least elements of

Eurasian could be found in the views of such diverse personalities as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the flambouyant L’enfant

Terrible of Russian politics and Genadii Ziuganov, Communist leader. Even liberal Anatolii Chubaiss, with his

conception of liberal empire, could be regarded as being influenced by Eurasianism. Indeed, even some basically

pro-Western liberals believed that Eurasianism preached by Dugin could be important ingredient for the creation of

13 Grigorii Nekhoroshev,”Biznes – Evraziia,” Delovaia Khronika, 5 June, 2002.

14 Ibid.

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“national idea”15 which shall fill the ideological vacuum emerging after the collapse of the USSR. While many people

in post-Soviet Russia either were influenced by Eurasianism or claimed to be Eurasianist, most of people in Kremlin

were still pro-American until the very end of Yeltsin tenure. While Eurasianism was hardly leading doctrine among

Yeltsin elite, the situation had changed during the first few years of Putin’s presidency, when Eurasianism did

become popular among ruling elite.16 Dugin was extremely excited by the changes and stated that at that point, as if

“touched by magic wand,” Eurasianism became blessed by the authorities. It became clear, he noted, that Putin

slowly moves Russia toward Eurasianist course.17 Soon after Putin’s taking office, Dugin created popular movement,

Eurasia (OPOD Evraziia) and according to Peter Suslov, at that time Dugin’s right hand, the OPOD Evraziia had

branches in various parts of Russia with thousands of activists.18 Soon the movement was transformed into the

Party which emerged with the great pomp with 126 delegates at the constituent congress of the party.19 Predictably,

Dugin had the most important role in the congress and promulgated that it was he and the groups of his followers

15 Aleksei Malashenko, “Gosudarstvo v poiskakh ravnovesiia,” NG-Stsenarii, 7 June, 197.

16 Andrei Konovalenko and Arkadii Arzamastsev, “Prikliuchenia evraziistva v Rossii,” Delovye liudi, vol.166,-167, 2005.

17 Dugin,Evraziskaia missiia Nursultana Nazarbaeva, p. 207-208.

18 “SMI o ‘Evrazii,’ http://www.smi.ru, 14 Apreal, 2001.

19 “Pervyi Uchereditel’nyi S’ed Politicheskoi Partii ‘Evraziia’,” 30 May, 2002; “V Peterburge poiavilas’ iacheika Evraziiskogo soiuza molodezhi,” Moskovskii Komsomolets v Pitere, No. 16, 20 Apreal, 2005.

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who had resurrected Eurasianism in the 1980s20 and promised both to the ideology and party bright future. Dugin

energy and beliefs attracted the dedicated supporters. Pavel Zarifullin is 22 years old in 2005 was a good example.

He was a graduate student at the Department of History of Kazan University. Still, he actually abandoned his work

on dissertation because of his involvement in Eurasian movement which apparently takes most of his time.21 The

Party seems to have had a good start and was registrated in 52 regions of Russia.22 Later, however, Dugin became

disenchanted with Party which collapsed quickly. Dugin, however, did not stop his political activities. He tried to join

some leftist parties / groups and proclaimed that, in Dugin’s view, Russia needed a new Left Party.23 He also

engaged in other political / quasi-political activities such as, for example, creation of Union of Eurasian Youth which

proliferated throughout Eurasian space. In August 2005, for example, the Union of Eurasian Youth of Ukraine had

emerged.24 Despite of his increasing disenchantment with Putin, already by Putin’s first term, he continued to be

influential person and in the view of some of Western pundits, Dugin exercised influence over Putin himself.25

20 “Vystuplenie A.G. Dugina na ucheriditel’nom sezde politicheskoi partii ‘Evraziia’,” Evraziia, 20 May, 2002.

21 Aleksei Nikolaev, “Oranzhevaia paranoia ili Aziopiia naoborot,” Narodnaia Gazeta, 7 Apreal, 2005.

22 “Rasshirennoe zasedanie Politsoveta partii ‘Evraziia’,” Evraziia, 2 March, 2003.

23 Dugin, “Levyi proekt,” Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 26 March, 2003.

24 “Bitva za Evraziiskuiu imperiiu nachalas’ v Kieve,” Evraziia, 8 August, 2005.

25 “Markus Fernback (ed.) Eurasien über alles, Regin-Verlag, 2004.

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Dugin continued to be widely published and attracted the interest of Western observers. For example, Dugin’s

book, Eurasia, Conservative Revolution and Russia, was published in Italian and several influential intellectuals were

present at the presentation of the book on Rome.26 Dugin’s popularity, at least in the beginning of Putin’s tenure,

was mostly due to the fact that he addressed the needs of both masses and elite to explain the reason for

continuous conflict between Russia and the West, mostly the USA, at the time when Russia professed the same

ideological / political principles as its Cold War rivals. And here geopolitics emerged as the most handy explanation

model. And it was geopolitics which was the basic framework of Duginian explanatory model. In his view, it

explained both the reason for the USSR collapse as well as continuous confrontation with the USA.

Dugin Geopolitics

In 2001 in one of his interviews, Dugin pointed out that geopolitics is the science which could explain the

relationship between the powers. Dugin stated that it was he had actually brought geopolitics in the Russian

intellectual life. He detected some of the geopolitical thinking among the founders of Eurasianism such as Peter

Savitsky and lately Lev Gumilev. Still geopolitics has played actually a minor role in their overall philosophy and

could hardly influence the broad segment of Russian elite at least this was the case during Soviet era. There were

26 Ernest Pliev, “Evraziiskaia revoliutsiia dostigla Rima,” Evraziia, 10 July, 2004.

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several reasons for this. First, geopolitics was proclaimed as pseudo science created by bourgeoisie West and thus

unacceptable for the Soviet people. Secondly, those who had some elements of geopolitics in their overall

intellectual construction were émigrés and had extremely limited, if any, influence on Soviet science plainly because

the work of émigrés could hardly reach Soviet audience. At the same time, Dugin noted that while, geopolitics was

not classical Eurasianism central element, it was present and reworked Eurasianism became a great intellectual

setting for geopolitical paradigm. And it was one of the major reasons why he, Dugin, became fascinated with

Eurasianism and introduced Eurasianism in the Russian intellectual life. He stated that he became interested in

Eurasianism already in his youth together with the classics of geopolitics. He noted that he was able to read the

works of the founders of geopolitical thought in their original languages. And here, Dugin stated he read the books

in English, German, French, Italian and Spanish. He then was able to integrate geopolitics into Eurasian discourse.

So by the beginning of Gorbachev reform and easing of state control over intellectual life, he was well equipped to

bring geopolitics into Russian intellectual discourse and put forward geopolitics major premise: There is

irreconcilable conflict between civilizations of the land and civilizations of the sea.27

The Geopolitics as a “Clash of Civilizations”

27 Dugin, Evraziiskaia missiia Nursultana Nazarbaeva, 2004, p. 121.

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Dugin was not always consistent in his negative view of the USA / “Atlanticism” and believed that in certain

circumstances, America could be Russia’s partner.28 Still in most of the cases and especially in the 1990s, Dugin’s

view on the USA was extremely negative and he saw conflict between the USA and Russia as inevitable, and it had

nothing to do with control over natural resources and other pragmatic considerations. The conflict is not lodged in

raison d’etat in the spirit of Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer. The conflict between “Eurasianism” and

“Atlantic” civilization was due to the specifics of “Atlanticism” and inability of “Atlanticism” to co-exist with values of

Eurasia. Here Dugin saw several negative traits of “Atlanticism.” These negative images of “Atlanticism” are not

necessarily related to each other, or to be more precise, evolved as time progressed. In the 1990s, Dugin saw

“Atlanticism” / Americanism as the force which despiritualized traditional cultures and spread absolute cynicism. It

was also seen as the force which tried to homogenize the traditional cultures, make them similar to that of America.

The other negative vision – and Dugin seems to have developed it later – related the negative traits of “Atlanticism”

with belief that humanity could play God, so to speak, and change the nature or even man himself.

“Atlanticism as Despiritualization and Homogenization

28 Dugin, “Osnovnye printsipy evraziiskoi politiki,” Evraziia, 13 June, 2001.

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The notion that “Atlanticism” / Americanism is related to despiritualization, cynicism and desire to make

everyone similar to the USA had emerged in Dugin’s mind by the 1990s when he watched the devastating effect

of economic / political Westernism on Russian society. It was this what convinced him that “Atlanticism” and

“Eurasianism” are not just two different geographical entities but actually two mortal enemies locked in conflict.

While elaborating on the USA dealing with “Eurasian” civilization, Dugin was not always consistent. He, for

example, on occasion implied that USA plainly did not understand well the horrific implications of its attempt to

change the cultural matrix of the civilization of Eurasia. According to Dugin, the West, especially the USA, is

advanced in the realms of economic and technology. Still in the realms of culture and spirituality, the West is

“underdeveloped civilization.”29 And it was this intellectual immaturity, so to speak, which prevented Americans

to understand the evil which they brought to the others. Still in most of the cases, or at least in the 1990s, Dugin

was convinced that the nature of evil was fully cognized and destruction of “Eurasia” / Russia was well defined

plan of “Atlantists.” In Dugin’s view, the differences in geographical locations translated into different cultural

makeup. The people of “Atlantic” civilization of the USA, the people of modernity, represented the absolute

metaphysical evil of total profanity and cynicism. The language of modernity thus is devil, anti-Christ as stated

29 Dugin, Evraziiskaia missiia Nursultana Nazarbaeva, p. 134.

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by Old Believers, this is intellectual Wolf.30 At the same time, the people of Eurasia / Russia and in way some

parts of Europe represent the sacredness of eternal moral and cultural paradigm. They are people of

“traditions” and collaboration on tradition is one of the major roles of geopolitics. Indeed, geopolitics, in Dugin’s

view, is the science of “tradition.” For this very reason, those modern philosophers who discard the notion of

tradition usually discard geopolitics.31 At the present, the intellectuals like him, those whose defend the

traditional and sacred, could not convey message to society. Between those and the people stand “ ‘last man’ of

Fukuyama,” the average American as symbol of “end of history,” who engage in perversion of the sacred /

traditional messages. The devils of modernity / post-modernity, protein cynics of Americanism, tried to destroy

sacred tradition of Eurasia and he, Dugin, tried to show to the masses the sheer danger of “Atlanticism.” Still the

enemy is too cunning. And for this reason, crowd could hardly understand this position and was pretty much

helpless.32 Hoi polloi could not understand that “Atlanticism” would never stop until it would destroy “Eurasia,”

which include Russia, most of Donald Rumsfeld’s “Old Europe” and most of Asia. Those who believed that

30 Ibid.

31 Dugin, “Reno Genon: traditsionalizm kak iazyk,” Lektsiia Pervaia. Filosofiia Traditsionalizma, Moscow: 2002 http:www.areto.

ru/article/113 p.342.

32 Ibid, p. 10.

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Eurasia and Atlanticism could live in peace shall be acquainted with what “Atlantist” American elite think. There

are two books which need to be read by those who wish to understand the meaning of the present day

American foreign policy. These are Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and Zbignew Brzezinski’s The

Grand Chessboard. These books will show them clearly that “Atlanticism” / Americanism could not live in peace

and Americans would never rest until Eurasia is destroyed. “Atlantists” used all possible means to destroy

Eurasian powers ranging from war to plots. While the image of “Atlanticism” / Americanism as the

despirtualizing cynical force had emerged in Dugin’s mind early on, it was later supplemented by the other

image. Here the problem with “Atlanticism” / Americanism was related with the people of these civilizations to

play God, so to speak, change the nature and the man himself.

“Atlanticism” as Devilish Temptation to Play God

Dugin had developed a peculiar ecologism and fear of technological progress early on. And here he followed the

view of many other similar minded people who expressed their concern with the notion that people could

neglect environment. One of the contributors to Pravda noted, already in 1994, that the most important for all

humans is the natural resources. The Earth and each country had the limited amount of them. And already

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Genghis Khan understood this very well. His laws punished severely those who had polluted environment.33 The

technological progress is seen here as actually a dangerous trend which could lead humanity to self-destruction.

In most of his writings, Dugin followed the suit and noted the danger of technological progress. He noted in

some of his narratives, that humanity could make discovery which could be useful. Still the same technological

progress could destroy earth and put to the end of humanity very existence.34 Still the most dangerous trend –

and here, “Atlanticism” / Americanism played the leading role – is the attempt to change the human being.

According to Dugin, the modern civilization was moving to direction to change the human being as a species35

and the USA ideologist envisioned the future humanity as the society which consists of the artificially created

“clones.”36 Consequently in most of his writings, Dugin attacked the technological progress which is worshipped

in the West.37 In this interpretation, “Atlantist” worshipping of technology is the way of destroying of traditional

civilizations of Eurasia and actually leads humanity to self destruction. It was clear that “Atlantist” and

“Eurasian” / civilizations of “Eurasia” could not live in peace but shall engage in mortal struggle. And, as a

33 Aleksei Krivel’,” Gusei kriklivykh karavan,” Pravda, 4 February, 1994.

34 Dugin, “Evraziiskii Put’ kak Natsional’naia Ideia,” Evraziia Part 2, 2002 (no month or date given).

35 Dugin, “Rozhdenie postcheloveka uzhe nachalos’,” Vechernii Novosibirsk, 15 December, 2005.

36 Dugin, “Ultramodern: epokha imperii zakat gosudarstv,” Biznes i Investitsii, 5 June, 2003.

37 Aleksandr Nikonov, “Aleksandr Dugin filosof ot sokhi, ili zakat nad Zambezi,” Ogonek, 22 May, 2003.

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matter of fact, Dugin insisted the recent history of Russia / the USSR relationship demonstrated this clearly. In

the drive to destroy “Eurasianist” civilization of the USSR, “Atlantists” used all methods but mostly relied on

conniving plots. And it was their plots which destroyed the mighty USSR, the great Eurasian empire.

The Conflict Between the USSR / Russia and the USA / Atlantists as the Manifestation of Primordial Struggle of

Continents

Dugin noted that “Atlanticism” started to influence Soviet elite even before WWII. Vladimir Vernadsky, famous

Russian scholar, who provided, in Dugin’s view, the feedback to Theilhard de Chardin was “dedicated Mondalist

and theoretician of noosfera.” The same could be said about Pytor Kapitsa, one of the founders of Russia atomic

bomb. They were just among the numerous agents of “Atlaticism” who succeeded in pushing the USSR against

its ideological / geopolitical brother – National-Socialist Germany. Indeed, Nazi elite also had people who

thought in Eurasian terms38 and they were foreign to narrow and debilitating racism, and, in any case, Nazi

Germany was much closer to the USSR than to “Atlantist” West. While Stalin, in Dugin’s view, was solidly

Eurasian leader, this was not the case with his Secret Police. The most dangerous of all Soviet organizations. It

38 Ibid, p. 5.

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was due not so much to the mass repression in which it was involved but because it was a hidden agent of

“Atlantism.” It represented “Atlantic Order, Order of the Dancing Death.” The order was based on the following

ideas foreign to Russia / Eurasia. First, it was “bloody Phoenician cult of Moloch.” Secondly, it was attempt of

“imposing to the Eurasian people an economy centered model unnatural for them which compelled the former

to use a repressive apparatus.”39 One might add here that Dugin was not alone in seeing in the Secret Police the

force which represented the enemies of Eurasia. Indeed, the view of Aleksandr Potapov of the Secret Police had

“pro-Atlantic” inclinations.40 Thus, in Dugin’s view, the variety of “Atlantist” forces who influenced both the

USSR and Nazi Germany led brotherly Eurasian power to fraternicized struggle. According to Dugin, “Hitler’s

aggression against the USSR was the great Eurasian catastrophe. After the terrible fratricidal war between the

two geopolitically, spiritually and metaphysically close, related peoples, between two anti-Atlantist oriented

regimes, Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany, the USSR victory was actually equivalent to a strategic defeat”41

Stalin, as Dugin implied, understood this. He also understood the nature of “Atlantist” forces inside of the

country. Still he tried to use them during WWII. This was the reason why he had a conversation with Vernadsky.

39 Dugin, “The Great War of Continent, Part I,” 1992, p. 1, (Quote from internet site, Evraziia).

40 Aleksandr Potapov, “Spetssluzhby i Evraziia,” Vol. 9, Elementy, 2000, p. 2.

41 Dugin, “The Great War of Continent,” p.1.

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Stalin also understood that a new generation of Russian intellectuals was on his side and this emboldened him,

and in 1948, “Stalin returned to orthodox Eurasianist geopolitics…”42 Later GRU became the center of an

Eurasian drive in Soviet foreign policy. And the leading role in the agency was played by General – Colonel

Sergey Matveevich Shtemenko (1907 – 1976). Still, “Atlantists” were not vanquished and Stalin’s death

emboldened them. Khrushchev was the representative of Atlantist lobby.43 Still Eurasian forces

counterattacked soon. Khrushchev’s “dismissal was undoubtedly made by hand of the Order of Eurasia” which

could be proven by the fact “that eight days after he left the place of General Secretary, the airplane on which

were two key agents of the “Atlantic” lobby – Marshall Biryuzov and General Mironov – suffered a crash.”44

While not praising Brezhnev regime openly – the memory of it was still fresh in Dugin’s mind – he implicitly saw

it as a benign Eurasian force, mostly, as one could assume, because of its confrontation with the USA. In the

1960s and 1970s, the “Mondalist” influence in the USSR had increased.45 The Secret Police continued to play

here the most nefarious role. Indeed, the disastrous war in Afghanistan was provoked by KGB – the stronghold

42 Ibid.

43 Dugin, “The Great War of Continents Part II, After 1992,” Eurasia, 1997, p. 3.

44 Ibid, p. 9.

45 Vadim Kozhinov, “Troika’ Markusa Vol’fa i geopolitika,” Den’, 3-9 May, 1992.

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of Atlantists – to discredit the army. August 1991 event was also masterminded by Atlantists who had achieved

their major goal – the destruction of the USSR and weakening of Europe, “Old Europe” – benign and Eurasian

Germany and France. While the destruction of the USSR was the great blow against Eurasia, “Atlantists” /

“Mondalists” would not rest until they would destroy Eurasian civilization completely and NATO, actually

American, war against Serbia shall be placed in this context. Elaborating on this, Dugin noted that it would be

naïve to assume that war against Serbia was done on the spur of the moment as sort of knee jerk response to

Albanians suffering. “The war in Kosovo has been prepared since a long time“ and ”maybe even before the

Dayton Accords.”46 The USA just looked for the pretext. “The war against Serbia had global implications. This is

a war against Europe. Against the whole Europe. More specifically, against the perspective that the Eurasian

geopolitical entity could finally develop into supranational union and economic integration, against any potential

cooperation between Asia and Europe. Just imagine what a different world landscape would materialize if

Europe (western and eastern) were able to benefit from the extraordinary economic potential of Asia, to

promote an economic integration of such different and complimentary realities – in the perspective of building a

pacified and reciprocally advantageous equilibrium with the Islamic world and Far East (India, China, Japan).” 47

46 Evraziia, 15 June, 1999.

47 Ibid.

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While NATO’s attack against Serbia could be explained as a result of geopolitical calculations – fear of the rise of

mighty Eurasian coalition – it is not the only explanation. As a matter of fact, Dugin believed that cultural and, in

way, irrational motivations are much more important than pragmatic ones. Elaborating on this notion, Dugin

stated that NATO attack against Serbia is the beginning of “planetarian nightmare” and it showed clearly the real

faces of the West. The attack against Serbia could not be explained by ideological or economic reasons. The

conflict was purely geopolitical and the West, with the USA as spearhead, clearly showed Eurasia the way how

it’s going to be treated in the future. Israel, interestingly enough, took pro-Serbian position and clearly saw the

analogies between Serbian suffering and those of Jews.48 No compromise is possible and for this reason Dugin

stated that “pro Western directions” of Russia’s foreign policy after September 11 th was a great mistake. Thus,

instead of entertaining illusions about cooperation with the USA, Russia and, implicitly, other Eurasian countries,

shall be ready for final stand and choose appropriate strategy. Elaborating on this, Dugin stated that at the

present, Russia lives in a brutal world. Russia could not avoid reality. There are only two alternatives for Russia:

either it would strive for multi-polar world and survive, or it would accept unpopular world with the USA as the

sole global master. In this (latter) case, Russia would plainly disappear.49 According to Dugin, there are several

48 Dugin, “Mirovoe soobshchestvo upravliaemo kovrovymi bombardirovkami,” Evraziiskoe Vtorzhenie, Vol. 22, 1999.

49 Dugin, “Ultramodern: epokha imperii zakat gosudarstv,” Biznes i Investitsii, 5 June, 2003.

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geopolitical models in the present day world. The first model is American. It implied the absolute American

global domination. The second model is that of European Union, but this model is just limited to Europe. Third

is Islamic model. It provides the universal appeal but had no viable social / economic program. Fourth is

Chinese project. Still this project is found in China only and implied that everyone shall be Chinese. Russia

cannot be a part of any of these projects for the variety of reasons. Still, Russia could build “axis of friendship.”

These “axes of friendship” are structured as follows – Russia/Europe, Russia/Islamic world, and Russia/China.

Not joining any particular project, but balancing between these poles, Russia has an interest in supporting each

of them in common system of opposing the uni-polar aspirations of the United States. In this case, Russia’s

national identity is defined as the “basis of two factors: resistance to globalization and a self-sufficient,

independent position with regard to all the major poles.”50 As time progressed, Dugin and his supporters started

to believe that the USA had reached the limits of its capabilities and one of the contributors to Dugin’s Eurasia

(Evraziia) noted that the process of the spread of globalism and the rise of the influence of the USA is now

reversed and new anti-American empires would spread all over the world.51

50 Aleksander Dugin, “Does Russia Have any friends?,” Vremya Novostei, 23 August, 2006 (from Johnson List).

51 Ermek Bulatov, “Lozung ‘zhit’ dlia sebia’ – legkii put’ v chernuiu gibel’,” Evraziia, 24 October, 2003.

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One, of course, could dismiss Dugin’s vision of the political reality and Russia’s relationship with the USA as

marginal. Still it was not the case and it was supported by broad segments of Russian elite from conservative

Nationalists who joined communists in so called “Red to Brown” coalition to liberals. Communists definitely

second Dugin and Ziuganov accepted Huntington doctrine which emphasized the conflict of civilizations as the

dominant conflict of the 21st century.52 At the same time, the liberals , so recently pro-Western and implicitly

pro-American, sound in unison with their supposedly ideological enemies after shocking attack against Serbia.

Liberals were concerned with NATO /American move even before attack on Serbia, on the eve of the war. In

1998, the contributor to Izvestiia noted that the West creates military alliances from the previous Russian allies

in East Europe and former Soviet republics. All of these alliances are actually directed against Russia and Russia

was therefore excluded from these arrangements.53 Nikolai Ryzhkov, a person with rather liberal pro- Western

view, Duma Deputy, pointed out that the West ignores the non-Western world and actually hate it, especially

those who resist Western encroachment and assimilation. This was the case with Orthodox civilization. This

explains NATO expansion to the East and the attack on Yugoslavia. Still, West was not able to destroy Russia and

it would rise in the future. And in any case, non-Western civilization would catch up with the West in the near

52 S. B. Lavrov and I. la Froianov, “Litsom k narodnym voliam,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 11 January, 1992.

53 Irina Kobrinskaia, “V Pol’she poiavilis’ svoi interesy na prostorakh SNG,” Izvestiia, 9 January, 1998.

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future.54 They, as Ryzhkov implied, would upgrade their economic and military machine and would payback to

NATO in general, and the USA in particular, for its aggressive behavior. For the other liberals, attack against

Serbia was a disaster not just because it showed how cynical was the West, especially the USA, but provided the

chance to such people as Dugin to rise. The contributor to liberal Novaia Gazeta, for example, noted that the

USA attacked Serbia because of its hatred of Russia. It implicitly wants to dismember Russia. This not only

demonstrated the cynicism of Western, especially American, politics but lay bare the unworkability of Western

paradigms in general and naiveté of Western supporters in Russia. The Russian Westernized Liberals proposed

the complete transformation of Russia into the Western country. Really impossible task. This disappointment

had already led to deep disappointment of majority of Russians and the present day attack against Serbia made

the situation much worse. All of these insane policies would actually lead to rise of the influence of such a

people as Dugin who sees Russia as being absolutely hostile to the West.55 The end of Serbian / NATO war was

not the end of Western pressure and this pushed the increasing liberal mainstream to sound Duginian. For

example, the contributor to Izvestiia noted the former Soviet republic in Baltic would soon be a part of NATO

54 Nikolai Ryzhkov, “Konfrontatsiia ili dialog?,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 28 September, 1999.

55 Aleksei Pimenov, “Iavlenie Fashizma snimaet kamufliazh. Durnaia bolezn’ stanovitsia prestizhnoi,” Novaia Gazeta – Ponedel’nik, 28 June, 1999.

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which officially tried to convince Russia that it shall not be concerned.56 This shall be seen as nothing but

hypocrisy for this clearly anti-Russian move. The anti-American feeling affect even part of Russian Muslims. This

was the case with Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin who worked together with Dugin in Eurasian Party. Tadzhuddin

proclaimed jihad against the USA. This led to protests by some other members of Russian clergy. According to

Council of Mufti of Russia had proclaimed that Tadzhuddin had no right to proclaim jihad against the USA. It was

also stated that Tadzhuddin could not lead any of Muslim organizations in Russia and Ravil’ Gainutdin, the

Chairman of Council of Muftis of Russia explain the reasons. According to Gainutdin, Tadzhuddin had serious

mental problems long time ago. Tadzhuddin, however, stated that he paid absolutely no attention to all of these

proclamations57 and believed that he made right decision. The foreign observers also believed that

“Eurasianists” and similar minded individuals are influential and could well become the leading group in Russia

in the case of the USA continuous imperial aggrandizement. This was the case with Igor’ Torbakov, Western

observer of Russian origin, who wrote the article on eve of the USA invasion of Iraq. The article was published

later.

56 Ilia Zhegulev and Vladimir Vrangel’, “Chleny NATO Postavili diagnoz,” Gazeta.Ru, 21 November, 2002.

57 Indira Kviatkovskaia and Anton Kliuev, “Tadzhuddin pokazal kukish Gainutdinu,” Izvestiia.Ru, 15 Apreal, 2003.

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Elaborating on Russia’s political landscape, he noted that it was complicated. At the present, the pragmatists

dominated. They understood that West, including the USA, was not the major threat. Igor’Ivanov, in his

capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, proclaimed that the major danger for Russia would come not from the

West but from Asia and the Caucuses. The other members of Russian elite also supported these notions. For

example, alarmed by Chinese migration, they conclude that Russia shall abandon its attempts to create “soft

empire” in post-Soviet state and just become the USA junior partner. They believe that it the geopolitical chaos

which was Russia’s major threat and therefore Russia’s major goal was to maintain stability in Central Eurasia.

These people are not against Russian integration into the West. Still they believed that Russia shall engage in

active flirting with East in order to be taken by the West with more respect. “The pragmatic nationalists” were

the most influential people in the present day Russian elite. Neo – Eurasianists had a different view. They are

influential among military and intelligence and people of similar occupations. They could not reconcile

themselves with the fact that Russia was not the USSR and lost Cold War. They believed that the USA is the

major, if not the only, threat for Russia and Russia shall do everything to weaken the USA. While the

pragmatist-dominated Russian political landscape, the situation could change in the future if the USA would

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attack Iraq. If this would indeed happen, Neo-Eurasianists would emerge as the leading groups among Russian

elite.58

Thus, by the end of the late 1990s / early 2000s, the majority of Russian intellectuals, even those who

hardly regarded themselves as Dugin intellectual allies, shared his view that the USA is mortal threat. This

geopolitical revelation, so to speak, had led them to reevaluate the nature of the Soviet regime and related

notions of strong state.

Strong Authoritarian / Totalitarian State As the Only Appropriate for Russia / Eurasia

Elaborating on Russia social / economic and political system, Dugin stated that since each country has a

different culture, each of them shall have a different form of government. “The idea of universal applicability of

Western democracy is nothing but Nazi idea.”59 (One might note here that, in this case, Dugin moved away from his

usually positive views of Nazis.) Russia / Eurasia was historically the country with the strong government. Consequently,

Dugin support the increasing power of the state in the social / economic life of the society.60 Russia needs the strong

58 Igor’ Torbakov, “Formirovanie vneshnei politiki Rossii i bor’ba ideologii,” Euraisanet.org, 27 December, 2004.

59 Dugin, “Interviu,” Navigator (http://www.navigator.kz), 1 April, 2002.

60 Nikolai Rabotiazhev, “Ne tushite pozhar benzinom,” Trud, No. 235, 10 December, 2004.

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army and defense industry.61 In Russian tradition, the state is sacred and those who damage Russian state shall be

severely punished and Dugin asserted that until Gorbachev and Yeltsin do not punished one could not discuss seriously

future for Russia. Dugin’s assumption that strong totalitarian state was needed for defense of the country against

“Atlanticism” and that this state is viable from all prospective, became quite popular among Russian elite. One of the

Russian economists who had worked with Lavrentii Beriia, the chief of Stalin’s Secret Police, noted that the system which

was implemented by Soviet regime and such of its representatives as Beriia, was something of a cross between slave

owners society and that of feudal system. This system was quite brutal. At the same time, it was quite efficient. 62 It was

this centralized totalitarian state what make possible for the USSR emerge as a global superpower and defend itself from

the USA. At the same time, as General Leonid Ivashov, Dugin intellectual ally in the 1990s stated, the situation was

absolutely different now and capabilities of Russian Army were declining.63 While Dugin’s view on the USA and Russia /

Eurasia was quite popular in the late 1990s / early 2000s, it does not mean that they dominate the intellectual discourse

61 Dugin, “Armiia i oboronno – promyshlennyi kompleks iavliaiutsia osnovoi sovremennoi identichnosti Rossii,” Pravaia.Ru, 7 July, 2006.

62 Sergei Leskov, “Lavrentii Beriia sumel by dobit’sia ekonomicheskogo protsvetaniia strany, schitaet vysokopostavlennyi sotrudnik NKVD khorosho znavshii svoego shefa,” Izvestiia, 29 January, 1993.

63 Leonid Ivashov, “Nazemnogo vtorzheiia v Iran ne budet,” Izvestiia.Ru, 9 February, 2005.

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totally. And the critics of Duginism increased by the end of Putin’s first term when the popularity of Eurasianism and

related creeds started to wane.

The Early Critics of Duginism

There were a variety of prospective from which Duginism and his methodology, including reliance on geopolitics,

was criticized. Aron Tsypin, apparently liberal intellectual, noted with air of irony that geopolitics was indeed

quite popular among Russian elite and the proponents of geopolitics made the following statements. First, they

believed that geopolitics guide the USA elite and geopolitics was a key to unlock the secrets of Washington

mind. Second, they believed that Putin was listening to them, Dugin included, carefully and was ready for

mortal confrontation with the USA. All of these statements are wrong.

The proponents of geopolitics in Russia believed that the USA elite also follow the geopolitical line of

thought. They, for example, believed that Zbigniew Brzezinski represent the mainstream of American political

elite and his books were indeed the guiding light for Washington. These assumptions were wrong. To start

with, Brzezinski was comparatively marginal figure in Washington. In fact, he lost his influence already during

Reagan administration. And this “fall from grace” could be well understood if one would remember that not

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only was Brzezinski advice extremely risky but also because his books demonstrate absolute ignorance. And, of

course it would be absolutely ridiculous to assume that Washington elite was guided in its actions by the classic

geopolitical thinkers of the past. Secondly, one shall no overestimate the influence of Dugin and his crew on

Kremlin. The point here is that Putin entourage was not homogenous and includes the variety of the people.

Most of them, as it was implied here, wanted the good life and had no desire for the confrontation with the

West. Still there was a danger that Russia would indeed follow Dugin and similar people and this would be the

catastrophe for the country.64 Thus for Tsypin, Russia and the USA indeed have different interests. Still neither

side is ready for confrontation. The other critics believed that they actually have common interests. This was

the case with Vitalii Tret’iakov, the editor of centrist Nezavisimaia Gazeta, who stated that Russia, EU and the

USA belong to the same civilization and shall be together.65

Conclusion

What is the importance of Duginism and similar ideological constructions quite popular in Russia in the 1990s

and early 2000s beside the obvious conclusion that they reflect the traumatic collapse of the state and the

64 Aron Tsypin, “Idoly geopolitiki,” www.kavkaz-forum.ru, 15 Janaury, 2005.

65 Vitali Tretiakov, “Mir i my, Novyi Evropeiskii zavet,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, 24 December, 2003.

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social, political and economic systems? The point here that methodology / paradigms with which the

intellectuals tried to understand the new reality is often rooted in the past regardless of seems to be external

novelty. Indeed, the geopolitical / cultural explanation of the conflict between Russia and the USA looks quite

similar to that of old Soviet cliché about the inevitable conflict between communism and capitalism. The USA,

already in the process of its economic decline due to the speedy process of deindustrialization, was still seen as

global power which would dominate globally almost indefinitely and this notion was also carbon copy of Soviet

ideological shibboleth. Indeed, while Soviet ideologists thought that the USA, as the leader of the capitalist

world, had entered the period of decay, they still asserted that the USA was a formidable force and would be a

major problem for the USSR for the foreseeable future. Finally Duginism with its conspiracy theory

demonstrated the peculiar inclination of social thought to find a deep-seated explanation in what was not

related neither to Americans conniving nor to supposedly the deep-seated problems of Soviet society – collapse

of the USSR. Neither Dugin nor score of post-Sovietologists and, of course, the new generations of Russians

were able to understand that the end of the mighty empire was due just to Gorbachev blunders, whereas

China’s rise could be well attributed to Deng Xiaoping who not just reform but also brutally stop any attempt to

challenge authority of the state.

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