doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 1

IEEE 802.11i is SecureDate: 2011-05-11

Name Affiliations Address Phone email IEEE 802.11 WG Numerous 445 Hoes lane,

Piscataway, NJ

Authors:

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

• Unsubstantiated allegations regarding security vulnerabilities in IEEE 802.11 were made during the WAPI NP process and were used to justify the need for this project.

• IEEE 802 attempted, multiple times, to rebut these allegations.

• ISO/IEC/SC6/WG1 did not properly process IEEE 802’s comments.

• Where do we go from here?

Synopsis

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 2

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 3

IEEE 802 provided input into the WAPI NP proposal voting and resolution process

D

O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J

Oct 09: N14123

WAPI NP proposal

Feb 10: N14228

WAPI NPvoting results

Oct 10: N14436

Initial WAPI NP disposition

Mar 11: N14620

Revised WAPI NP disposition

Dec 09: N14142

IEEE 802 comments on WAPI NP proposal

Jan 11: N14551

IEEE 802 comments on WAPI NP disposition

2009 2010 J 2011

Timeline of IEEE 802

participation

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

Unfortunately, that input was ignored and is now being rejected

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 4

D

O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J

Oct 09: N14123Justification of WAPI NP based on assertion that 802.11i is insecure

Feb 10: N14228Apparently IEEE 802 input was not considered in WAPI NP vote

Oct 10: N14436

IEEE 802 input is ignored, incorrect claims about 802.11i are repeated

Mar 11: N14620

IEEE 802 input is dismissed on the basis that it is too late!

Dec 09: N14142

IEEE 802 rebuts all assertions regarding the claim of 802.11i insecurity

Jan 11: N14551

IEEE 802 again rebuts all assertions regarding the claim of 802.11i insecurity

2009 2010 J 2011

Timeline of IEEE 802

participation

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

802.11, 802.11i, and 8802-11

• Initial 802.11 standard, IEEE 802.11-1999 did have a recognized flaw– Security protocol, WEP, was broken soon after publication

• IEEE 802.11 initiated work in 2001 to provide robust security which resulted in the 802.11i amendment in 2004– Provides scalable and flexible authentication using 802.1x/EAP

– Provides key confirmation and secure derivation of session keys

– Provides provably secure authenticated encryption of data

• 802.11i was reviewed by cryptographers and security professionals

• 802.11i amended the IEEE 802.11 standard and is part of 8802-11

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 5

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 6

N14123: WAPI NP justification entirely based on assertion that 802.11 is insecure

• Single assertion to justify WAPI NP:– “It is a well known fact that current WLAN international standards

contain serious security loopholes which need to be dealt with by enhanced security mechanisms.”

• Evidence to support this assertion:– “Can your neighbors router make yours sick?”– Hu, et al, 2008

– “A Wi-Fi virus outbreak? Researchers say it’s possible”– article in Network World, 2008

– “Practical Attacks Against WEP and WPA”– Beck and Tews, 2008

– “A Practical Message Falsification Attack on WPA”– Ohigashi and Morii, 2009

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

N14142: IEEE 802 rebuts all claims of 802.11i insecurity

• “Can your neighbor’s router make yours sick?”– Assumes either no security, or WEP, on an AP. WEP has been deprecated

in favor of 802.11i! Says nothing about 802.11i.

• “A Wi-Fi Virus Outbreak? Researchers say it’s possible”– Refers to paper by Hu et al– i.e. no security or WEP, not 802.11i

• “Practical Attacks against WEP and WPA”– WPA attack is against TKIP and its MIC, Michael, which is not a one-

way function, and whose security is not assumed strong. TKIP was designed in 2003 with a 5 year expectation of validity. Paper says nothing about mandatory aspects of 802.11i (i.e. it addresses WPA not WPA2).

• “A Practical Message Falsification Attack Against WPA”– An improvement on paper above-- it’s WPA, no mention of WPA2

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 7

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

N14228: Significant Lack of Consideration of IEEE 802 rebuttal during WAPI NP

vote• US NB

– Two comments made challenging the statement that 802.11i is insecure (apparent consideration of IEEE 802 rebuttal).

– Seven other substantive comments submitted.

• UK NB– Comments alluding to technical concerns.

– Mostly focused on “standalone security issue”.

• No other NB submitted comments– Silence implies the rebuttal was not considered.

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 8

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

N14436: Repeats, and extends, invalid claims regarding 802.11i security

• IEEE 802 rebuttal of previous claims are completely ignored.

• Asserts that “Security loopholes in the current IS (ISO/IEC 8802-11) have been reported in the security literature” but provides no evidence to support that claim.

• Additional, new, unsubstantiated claims– WAPI can protect against fake STA/AP attacks and 802.11i cannot.

– In N14123, N14399, N14402 and N14410 all “comprehensively address weaknesses in existing network security”.

– Specific security problems were asserted during 802.11i fast track ballot in 2006.

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 9

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

N14551: IEEE 802 Rebuts New Claims of 802.11i insecurity

• Repetition of N14123– Already addressed by N14142! Unfortunately N14142 was ignored.

• N14410 refers to IEEE 802.16 Security Issues: A Survey– This notes that security was not designed into IEEE 802.11-2003, says

nothing about IEEE 802.11-2004 (or ISO/IEC 8802-11)

• N14399, N14402 and N14410 make claims on lack of mutual authentication between STA, AP and AS– RFC4017-compliant EAP methods perform mutual authentication, the AP/AS

distinction is logical and in many deployments does not apply, the 4-way Handshake confirms AS has disclosed PMK to AP and provides implicit authentication.

• Claims made during Fast Track Balloting of 802.11i– Same sort of non-mutual authentication assertions.

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 10

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

N14620: IEEE 802 Objections and Rebuttal of invalid claims of insecurity

dismissed• After failing to address comments per the Directives,

they are dismissed on the basis that the comment disposition is no longer concerned with the WAPI NP proposal– “This comment is focusing on the Justification of ISO/IEC 20011,

but it should be noted that the NP ballot has passed; the main comment and contribution in this state should be focused and changed to the editing and commenting of WD text.”

• This does not meet our expectations of a mutually beneficial relationship with SC6

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 11

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

IEEE 802’s Current View of the Process is Best Summarized in Conclusion of N14551

• IEEE 802 respectfully requests consideration:– … the fundamental justification for a WAPI NP in SC6 is based on the assertion

that there are security loopholes or flaws in mandatory security components included in 802.11 (and its amendments). However, no valid or credible evidence has been provided to support this assertion.

• The reality is that mandatory security components included 802.11 have no known “security loopholes”. This statement is practically supported by the use of 802.11 in millions of systems worldwide, in high security applications, by governments, financial institutions, telecommunications providers, enterprises and consumers.

• IEEE 802 requests SC6 do not consider any assertions that mandatory security components included in 802.11 (and its amendments) are insecure when deciding whether to authorize the WAPI NP proposal. Alternatively, IEEE 802 invites any SC6 NB to provide valid and credible evidence to the 820.11 WG of “serious security loopholes”.

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 12

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

IEEE 802 Requests SC6 to Undertake Further Action

• Ensure that in all official SC6 documents there are no unsubstantiated allegations regarding security– For example, the WAPI NP proposal and all associated comment

dispositions.

– Provide credible evidence of security issues with IEEE 802 technologies

• Work with IEEE 802 to improve the security of IEEE 802 technologies– Comments received on IEEE 802.11s Draft 10.0 were very helpful

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 13

doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/0792r1

Submission

May 2011

IEEE 802.11 WGSlide 14

References