DocumentNo.6

Mr.TeltschiksMemorandumforChancellorKohl

Bonn,December6,1989

Re:TheSovietUnionandtheGermanQuestion

IamforwardingtheattachedofficialaswellasunofficialconsiderationsthroughtheconfidentialchannelthatYouandGeneralSecretaryGorbachevagreeduponbeforehand.1Thebearertoldmeexplicitlythattheofficialpositioncontainedtheconsiderationsofthehighestcircles(GeneralSecretaryGorbachev);theunofficialdeliberationsareideasthatwerediscussedintheInternationalDepartmentoftheCentralCommittee(PolitburomemberYakovlev).

Numbers1through7showthatsignificantconsiderationsinyour10PointPlanforDeutschlandpolitikgobacktoSovietleadership.

TheunofficialsecondpartdocumentsthattheSovietleadershipisseriouslydiscussingthevariouspossibilitiesofthereunificationissue.Your10PointPlanpreventstheworldpublicfromfacingtheGermanquestionwithSovietproposals,withoutbeingawareoftheFederalGovernmentsposition.

Vote:

ThepointscoveredinPartIIshouldbediscussedassoonaspossibleintheGermanyCircle[Deutschlandkreis]convenedbyMinisterSeiters.ThroughconfidentialchannelsGeneralSecretaryGorbachevshouldbeofferedtospeakwithyou.AtthistalkyoushouldbeinthepositiontodiscusstheaddressedtopicswiththeSovietside.

Teltschik

SovietUnionandtheGermanQuestion

I. OfficialPosition

1. TheSovietleadershiphasabasicallypositiveattitudetowardsthedevelopmentsintheGDR.

1Portugalov,ananalystintheCCCPSUInternationalDepartment,gavethedocumenttoMr.TeltschikonthemorningofNovember21,1989.DuringtheconversationTeltschikinitiatedameetingbetweenChancellorKohlandGeneralSecretaryGorbachev.ImmediatelyafterwardheinformedKohl.IfGorbachevandhisadvisersarealreadydiscussingthepossibilityofreunificationandtherelatedquestionsitishightimeforDeutschlandpolitiktogoontheoffensive.Kohlwasalreadyonthewaytothenextmeetingbutwantedtospeakaboutitindetailassoonaspossible.TheChancelloralsoconsidereditnecessarytomeetwithGorbachevinpersonsoon.(Teltschik,329Tage,4245).

2. NointerferenceintheGDRsaffairs,butdevelopmentswithouttheSovietUnion,letaloneagainstit,wouldhavebeeninconceivable.

Fromthebeginning,theSovietUnionknewwhatconsequencesitsownreformpoliticswouldhaveintheGDR.

3. IntheSovietUnion,structuraltransformationinallareas(political,economic,thenationalitiessphere)isstillinthebeginningstages.ItisevenmoresointheGDR.

However,contrarytotheUSSR,thedevelopment,qualityandspeedofthetransformationintheGDRcruciallydependsonthepoliciesoftheFederalGovernment.

4. Politicalslogansmaysoundsensible,forexampletheprecedenceofthecommonEuropeanorderforlastingpeaceoverthesolutionoftheGermanquestion,orthesolutionoftheGermanquestionexclusivelyunderaEuropeanroof.Buttheycouldalsoprovetobeemptyformulasor,whichwouldbeworse,theycouldcontradictrealisticpolicies.

TheSovietUnionisconcernedthatthedevelopmentofGermanGermanrelationscangoinanundesirableanddangerousdirectionduringthedecidingphaseoftheselandmarkmomentsonthesamegroundsasalways.

5. ThedevelopmentsintheGDRshouldremaininaccordwiththespiritandtheletterofthejointGermanSovietdeclarationfromJune12,1989.ThisconcernsaboveallthingstherecognitionoftheexistingEuropeanpostwarstructuresasthebasisfornewdevelopmentsfortheforeseeablefuture.

FortheSovietUnionthismeansthattheconstructionofacommonEuropeanorderforlastingpeacehastohavepriorityoverthesolutionoftheGermanquestion,i.e.beforefiguringouttheformoftheGermansfuturenationalandstateexistence.ThecommonEuropeanorderforpeacehastobeacceptedasanindispensableconditionforthesolutionoftheGermanquestion.

6. Thestrict,unlimitedandabsoluteadherencetotheMoscowandWarsawAgreements,includingtheBasicTreatywiththeGDR,mustbethematterofcourseuntilthenewEuropeanpeaceorderandstabilityaresecurelyinplace.

7. TodaythereisanewsituationintheGDR.AtthispointitwouldbesuitabletofindanewModusvivendionthebasisoftheBasicTreatywiththeGDR.

PrimeMinisterModrowsproposalofthewiderangingcooperationtreaty[Vertragsgemeinschaft]shouldmakeitpossibletohandletheFRGsexclusivemandate[Alleinvertretungsanspruch]restrictivelyandpragmatically.OtherwisetheGDRsExistencewouldobjectivelybethreatened.

II. UnofficialConsiderations

ThehourhascometofreetherelationshipbetweentheGDRandtheFRGfromrelicsofthepast.

1. TheGDRisdependentoneconomiccooperation.PreconditionsshouldnotleadtotherenunciationanddestabilizationoftheGDR.TheFederalGovernmentshouldbegenerousandhavepatience.

2. InthesphereofdisarmamentadditionalgreatpossibilitiesareopeningupforbothStatesoftheGermanNation.ItisnowcompletelyuptotheFederalGovernmenthowquicklyandcomprehensivelyprogresscanbeachievedonthedisarmamentissuesintheinterestsofbothGermanstates.

3. ItistheSovietUnionsdesireandrequestthatthelongtermsolutiontotheGermanQuestionnotbetiedupindailypoliticsortheelectioncampaign.

4. Apurelytheoreticalquestion:iftheFederalGovernmentintendstointroducethequestionofthereunificationand/ornewunificationtopracticalpolicythenitwouldbereasonabletoopenlyconsiderthefutureallianceaffiliationofbothGermanstatesandthewithdrawalclauseoftheParisTreaties2andtheRomeTreatiesinthecaseofreunification.3

5. Theoretically,iftheGDRweretobequicklyintegratedintotheEuropeanCommunity,shouldtheSovietUnionthensitatthesidetableandcarryouttheirbusinesswiththeGDRthroughBrussels,payingEuropeantaxesandrenouncingtheircurrentmost

2ThroughtheProtocolforamendingandaddingtotheTreatyofBrussels,signedonOctober23,1954,inParis(withadditionsandcorrespondencein:UNTS.Vol.211,342349,350387;BGBI.1955II,258261,262282),theFederalRepublicandItalyenteredintotheTreaty(Treatyoncooperationineconomic,socialandculturalaffairsandforcollectiveselfdefense,signedonMarch17,1948inBrussels,in:UNTS.Vol.19,5163),thatwouldberedefinedintheWestEuropeanUnion;accordingtoArticleXIIoftheTreatyofBrusselsanexitispossibleaftertheexpirationoffifteenyears.AtthesametimetheforeignministerofNATOStatesdecidedinParistoinvitetheFRGtojoinNATO(ProtocolfromOctober23,1954,ibidemVol.243,308313).Accordingtoarticle12oftheNorthAtlanticTreatyfromApril4,1949(asamendedintheprotocolfromOctober17,1951:ibidemVol.34,243255andVol.126,352;BGBI.1955II,289294)eachpartycanlettheTreatybephasedoutafteraperiodof20years.

3Accordingtoarticle240,theAgreementtofoundtheEuropeanEconomicCommunity,signedonMarch25,1957inRome(withadditionsin:BGBI.1957II,766963,here900)wasvalidforunlimitedtime.TheGermandelegationattheintergovernmentalconferenceforthejointmarketandtheEuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunity[Euratom]statedonFebruary28,1957toacommitteeofdelegationleaderstheacknowledgementthattheleadershipoftheGDRstemsfromthepremisethatthefoundingagreementoftheEuropeanEconomicCommunityandtheEuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunitywouldberevisedincaseofGermanreunification(draftofaprotocolfromameetingonFebruary28andMarch1,2and3,1957inBrussels,Ch.Del.406,MAE777d/57,Mach9,1957;BArchB102/10870.Also:compilationofthedisplayedstatementsfortheEuropeanEconomicCommunityandtheEuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunityAgreement,MAE874d/57andMAE890d/57,March26,1957,ibidem.).

favorednationstatuswiththeGDR?ThisisalsosomethingtheFederalGovernmentshouldthinkabout.

6. TogetherwiththeGermanquestion,theSovietUnionisthinkingaboutallthepossiblealternatives,even,inamannerofspeaking,theunthinkable.TheyknewfromthebeginninghowtobeinvolvedincaseofareformationoftheGDR.Inthiscontext,theUSSRwouldbeinterestedtoknowtheFederalRepublicsattitudetowardsapossiblepeacetreaty.TheFRGcannotrelyonitsalliesinthis,whowouldnotwanttodoawaywiththeOccupationStatute.

7. TheUSSRfollowswithlaughterandtearssomeofthecleverheadsinBonnwhoseeasolutioninafutureGermanConfederationintegratedintotheEuropeanCommunity,therebyembellishingtheallEuropeanintegration.ThisdirectiondoesnotsuittheUSSR.TheFederalGovernmentshouldconsiderthattheSovietUnioncanbaittheWesternAlliesinPariswiththeideaoftwopeacetreaties,onewiththeFRGandonewiththeGDR.InthiscaseyoucanbesurethattheWesternallieswouldcallformorepowerintheFRGthantheUSSRcallsforintheGDR.

8. ThereforeitcanbeassumedthatonthepathofthetwoGermanstatesgrowingclosertogetherthequestionofapeacetreatywillariseverysoon.Itwouldbethereforereasonabletoconfidentiallythinkaboutittogether,possiblyalsotogetherwiththeGDR.

9. Itisconceivablethatintheforeseeablefuture,inthemediumterm,theUSSRcouldgivethegreenlighttoaGermanconfederationoftheusualnature.ThiswouldrequirethattherewouldbenomoreforeignnuclearpresenceonGermansoil.ThiswouldperhapsbetheonlyConditiosinequanonthattheSovietUnioncouldhavetoupholdfuturegoodconductintermsofGermanregulations.

[Source:DokumentezurDeutschlandpolitik:DeutscheEinheit.SondereditionausdenAktendesBundeskanzleramtes1989/90.TranslatedbyAnnaMelyakova.]