Docx 20110903 Tong Hop Basel III Song Ngu en Vi Nguyen Thu P

8/2/2019 Docx 20110903 Tong Hop Basel III Song Ngu en Vi Nguyen Thu P...

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y ban gim st ngn hng Basel1 (y ban) c mt cam hon thin vic qun tr hot ngcc ngn hng. N ban hnh cc hng dn vo nm 1999, vi nhng nguyn tc csa i vo nm 20062. y ban h tr gim st ngn hng v cung cp cc im tham chiu ci tin hot ng qun tr ngn hng ti cc quc gia s ti. Cc nguyn tc cng ccc ngn hng tham chiu nh hng ca Chnh ph i vi hot ng chnh bn thn mingn hng.

3. The Committees 2006 guidance drew from principles of corporate governance that werepublished in 2004 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD).3 The OECDs widely accepted and long-established principles aim to assistgovernments in their efforts to evaluate and improve their frameworks for corporategovernance and to provide guidance for participants and regulators of financial markets.4

Cc nguyn tc c hiu lc vo nm 2006 c pht hnh nm 2004 bi cc ncOECD3. Cc nc ny chp nhn rng ri cng nh ban hnh cc quy nh nhm h tr

Chnh ph ca h trong vic nh gi v ci thin c cu t chc qun tr v cung cphng dn cho cc thnh vin nhng nguyn tc iu tit th trng ti chnh4.

4. The OECD principles define corporate governance as involving a set of relationshipsbetween a companys management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders.Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of thecompany are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoringperformance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide properincentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests ofthe company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. Thepresence of an effective corporate governance system, within an individual company or

group and across an economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence that isnecessary for the proper functioning of a market economy.

Cc nguyn tc qun tr m OECD a ra l mt tp hp cc quy nh lin quan n hing qun tr cng ty, ban iu hnh cp cao, c ng v cc bn lin quan khc. Qun trngn hng cung cp mt cu trc m qua cc mc tiu ca ngn hng c thit lp,cch thc (bin php, gii php) t ti mc tiu v s kim tra thc hin c xc nh.Qun tr tt s to ra nhng khch l cho ban iu hnh v hi ng qun tr nm bt v theost mc tiu v li ch cu cng ty v c ng v to thun li cho vic gim st c hiu qu.Mt h thng qun tr hiu qu trong ni b ngn hng hoc mt nhm hay nn kinh t nichung s gip to s tin tng vo tnh ng n ca nn kinh t th trng.

1 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisorymatters. It seeks to promote and strengthen supervisory and risk management practices globally. The Committeecomprises representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, HongKong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia,Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Itusually meets at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, where its permanentSecretariat is located.

1 Sau y gi tt l y ban, c thnh lp vi cc thnh vin t Argentina, c, B, Brazil, Canada,

Trung Quc, Php, c, Anh, , Nht, Hn Quc, Mexcico, Hng Kong, n ,2 Xem Basel thng 9/1999 v Basel sa i thng 2/20063 T chc cc nc pht trin (Anh, ..)4 Ti liu tham kho, OECD a ra mt lot cc danh mc Thut ng lin quan ti qun tr ngnhng vo nm 2003


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2 See Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,September 1999 and February 2006, available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.htm.

3 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, revised April 2004, originally issued June 1999, available atwww.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. The OECD principles constitute one of the twelve key standardsof the Financial Stability Board for sound financial systems.

4 For reference, the OECD has set forth a glossary of corporate governance-related terms in Experiences fromthe Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables, 2003, which can be accessed atwww.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/26/23742340.pdf. Precise uses of these terms may vary, however, acrossjurisdictions.

5. The Committees 2006 guidance targeted key issues of corporate governance. Amongthe primary points in the 2006 guidance were that:

the board should be appropriately involved in approving the banks strategy;

clear lines of responsibility should be set and enforced throughout the organisation;

compensation policies should be consistent with the banks long-term objectives; and

the risks generated by operations that lack transparency should be adequatelymanaged.

Mc tiu chnh ca bn Basel nm 2006 l qun tr ngn hng. Trong s cc im chnh caphin bn ny l:

- Ban iu hnh cp cao cn phi tm c chin lc thch hp cho ngn hng

- M t trch nhim r rng bng cch thit lp v bt buc thc thi trong ton b tchc

- Chnh sch tr cp (bi thng, khen thng, k lut, tr cp sau khi ngh vic) phinht qun vi mc tiu di hn ca ngn hng

- Cc nguy c ri ro c to ra bi cc hot ng thiu minh bch nn c qun lmt cch tha ng

6. Subsequent to the publication of the Committees 2006 guidance, there have been anumber of corporate governance failures and lapses, many of which came to light duringthe financial crisis that began in mid- 2007. 5 These included, for example, insufficientboard oversight of senior management, inadequate risk management and undulycomplex or opaque bank organisational structures and activities. Against this

background, the Committee decided to revisit its 2006 guidance. Having reviewed andrevised these principles, the Committee reaffirms their continued relevance and thecritical importance of their adoption by banks and supervisors to ensure effectiveimplementation of the principles. 6 The key areas where the Committee believes thegreatest focus is necessary are highlighted below:

Sau khi ph bin cc Hng dn theo phin bn nm 2006, xut hin mt s tht bi vsai st trong qun tr ngn hng, nhng bt cp l r trong cuc khng hong ti chnhbt u t gia nm 20075. Chng gm, v d, Hi ng qun tr b qua s gim st cc Ban

5 Nhng thiu st ny c nhn mnh Bo co Cc cng ty ti chnh a quc gia v gim stcp cao ca Nhm Quan st v thc tin qun l ri ro trong th trng,Thng 3/2008, c sn tiwww.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2008/ rp080306.html v bo co tip theo v qun l riro bi hc t cuc khng hong ngn hng ton cu nm 2008, thng 10 nm 2009, c trnwww.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2009/ma091021.html.


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iu hnh cp cao, qun tr ri ro khng tha ng v c cu ngn hng qu phc tp hoccu trc v hot ng khng r rng. Trong bi cnh , y ban quyt nh xem xt v sai phin bn Basel 2006. V vic xem xt v sa i cc nguyn tc, y ban tip tc xcnhn tm quan trng ca Basel II v tip tc thng qua vic ngn hng v c quan gim stm bo s thc thi y , hiu qu cc nguyn tc6. Cc mng chnh m y ban t s

ch vo l cc im ni bt di y:(1) Board practices

The board should actively carry out its overall responsibility for the bank, including itsbusiness and risk strategy, organisation, financial soundness and governance. Theboard should also provide effective oversight of senior management.

To fulfil this responsibility, the board should:

+ exercise sound objective judgment and have and maintain appropriate qualificationsand competence, individually and collectively;

+ follow good governance practices for its own work as a board; and+ be supported by competent, robust and independent risk and control functions, forwhich the board provides effective oversight.

(1) Hot ng ca Hi ng qun tr ngn hng

- Ch ng thc hin trch nhim ca ngn hng, bao gm hot ng kinh doanh vchin lc i ph vi ri ro, t chc, lnh mnh ti chnh v qun tr. Hi ng qun trnn gim st hiu qu Ban iu hnh( cc qun l cp cao).

- thc hin y cc trch nhim ny, Hi ng qun tr nn:

+ Xem xt vic thc thi cc mc tiu, duy tr chng nhn nng lc ca c nhn v tpth

+ Theo di vic thc hin l cng vic chnh ca Hi ng qun tr

+ c h tr bi b phn c nng lc tt, trung thc, lm vic c lp v kim sotcc chc nng gip cung cp nhng thng tin gim st cho Hi ng qun tr.

(2) Senior management

Under the direction of the board, senior management should ensure that the banksactivities are consistent with the business strategy, risk tolerance/appetite7 andpolicies approved by the board.

(2) Ban iu hnh cp cao

- Theo ch o ca Hi ng qun tr, Ban iu hnh phi m bo rng cc hot ngca ngn hng l ph hp vi chin lc kinh doanh, dung sai ri ro/mc ngng chpnhn ri ro7 v chnh sch c ph duyt bi Hi ng qun tr.

5 Many of these shortcomings at major global financial services firms were highlighted in the Senior Supervisors

6 OECD b sung cc nguyn tc c c t kinh nghim t cuc khng hong ti chnh. Xem Quntr doanh nghip v khng hong ti chnh: Kt lun v pht trin kinh nghim thc tin tt tngcng thc hin cc nguyn tc, nm 2010, c sn ti www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/62/44679170.pdf.7 Mt vi ngn hng v c quan gim st s dng thut ng dung sai ri ro m t mc ri ro mngn hng chp nhn. Mt s ngn hng v c quan gim st s dng thut ng chp nhn ri ro phn bit mc ri ro tuyt i m mt ngn hng c vi so vi mc gii hn thc t trong phm vichp nhn ca ngn hng (mc ngng chp nhn ri ro). Nguy c ri ro th mang ngha rng hnmc m ngn hng c th chp nhn c.


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Group report on Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence, March2008, available at www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2008/rp080306.html and its subsequentreport on Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008, October 2009, available atwww.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2009/ma091021.html.

6 The OECD has supplemented its principles to take account of the experience of the financial crisis.See Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Conclusions and emerging good practices to enhanceimplementation of the Principles, 2010, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/62/44679170.pdf.

7 Some banks and supervisors use the term risk tolerance to describe the amount of risk the bank is willing toaccept. Other banks and supervisors use the term risk appetite to create a distinction between the absoluterisks which a bank a priori is open to take (risk appetite) versus the actual limits within the risk appetite whichthe bank pursues (risk tolerance). Risk appetite can imply a more forward-looking or wider view of acceptablerisks, whereas risk tolerance suggests a more immediate definition of the specific risks that banks will take.Since there does not appear to be consensus among supervisors or banks in this regard, risktolerance/appetite is used in this document.

(3) Risk management and internal controls

A bank should have a risk management function (including a chief risk officer (CRO)or equivalent for large banks and internationally active banks), a compliancefunction and an internal audit function, each with sufficient authority, stature,independence, resources and access to the board;

Risks should be identified, assessed and monitored on an ongoing firm-wide andindividual entity basis;

An internal controls system which is effective in design and operation should be inplace;

The sophistication of a banks risk management, compliance and internal controlinfrastructures should keep pace with any changes to its risk profile (including itsgrowth) and to the external risk landscape; and

Effective risk management requires frank and timely internal communication withinthe bank about risk, both across the organisation and through reporting to the boardand senior management.

(3) Qun l ri ro v kim sot ni b

- Mt ngn hng phi c b phn qun l ri ro (bao gm mt Gim c ri ro (CRO)hoc mt chc danh tng ng cho cc ngn hng ln v cc ngn hng quc t),

mt b phn kim sot tun th v kim ton ni b, mi b phn phi c thmquyn, v tr, c lp, ngun lc v quyn trc tip tham vn ti Hi ng qun tr.

- Nhng ri ro cn c xc nh, nh gi v gim st trn c s thc t ang dinra trong ton b ngn hng v c nhn.

- Mt h thng kim sot ni b cn phi c thit k v hot ng phi c hiu lc

- S tinh vi ca hot ng qun l ri ro ngn hng, s phc tng v nn tng kimsot ni b phi lng trc c bt k thay i no ca ri ro (bao gm c s giatng kh nng ri ro) v nguy c ri ro bn ngoi; v

- Qun l ri ro hiu qu yu cu s thng thn v kp thi giao tip ni b trong ngnhng v nguy c ri ro vi t chc thng qua bo co Hi ng qun tr v Ban iuhnh.

(4) Compensation


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The bank should fully implement the Financial Stability Boards (FSB - formerly theFinancial Stability Forum) Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (FSBPrinciples) and accompanying Implementation Standards8 (FSB Standards) or theapplicable national provisions that are consistent with the FSB Principles andStandards.

Hot ng tr cp

Cc ngn hng cn thc hin y cc Nguyn tc tr cp ti chnh (nguyn tc FSB) caHi ng n nh ti chnh quc t (FSB tin thn l Din n n nh ti chnh) v kmtheo B tiu chun thc hin (tiu chun FSB)8 hoc quy nh quc gia c ni dung gn vicc nguyn tc v tiu chun FSB.

(5) Complex or opaque corporate structures

The board and senior management should know, understand and guide the bank'soverall corporate structure and its evolution, ensuring that the structure (and the

entities that form the structure) is justified and does not involve undue orinappropriate complexity; and

Senior management, and the board as appropriate, should understand the purpose ofany structures that impede transparency, be aware of the special risks that suchstructures may pose and seek to mitigate the risks identified.

Phc tp hoc cu trc ngn hng khng r rng

- Hi ng qun tr v Ban iu hnh cn bit, hiu v hng dn cu trc tng thca ngn hng v s pht trin ca n m bo rng cu trc (v cc b phn hnhthnh ln cu trc ) l hp l v khng qu phc tp hoc phi l qu mc; v

- Ban iu hnh v Hi ng qun tr cn hiu r mc ch ca bt k b phn notrong cu trc lm cn tr s minh bch; cu trc phi gip nhn dng v gim thiuc nhng ri ro c th.

(6) Disclosure and transparency

Transparency is one tool to help emphasise and implement the main principles forgood corporate governance.

Cng khai v minh bch

S minh bch l mt phng php tt gip nhn mnh v thc hin cc nguyn tcchnh cho qun tr ngn hng.

8 See FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, April 2009, available atwww.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf, and Implementation Standards, September 2009,available at www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf.

8

Xem Nguyn tc thc t tr cp ti chnh FSB, Thng 4/2009, available atwww.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf, and Implementation Standards, September 2009,available at www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf.
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdfhttp://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf


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7. This guidance is intended to assist banking organisations9 in enhancing their corporategovernance frameworks and to assist supervisors in assessing the quality of thoseframeworks. It is not, however, intended to establish a new regulatory framework layeredon top of existing national legislation, regulation or codes. The application of corporate

governance standards in any jurisdiction is naturally expected to be pursued in a mannerconsistent with applicable national laws, regulations and codes. Supervisors areencouraged to periodically check their frameworks and standards for consistency withrelevant Committee guidance.

Nhng hng dn ny c thit k h tr cc ngn hng9 trong vic tng cng khnng qun tr v h tr gim st trong vic nh gi cht lng ca b my. N khngphi l mt quy nh bt buc mang tnh php l thay cho cc quy nh hin ti ca quc gia,php lut. Vic p dng tiu chun qun tr trong phm vi thm quyn no l ph thuc vovic nht qun vi h thng php lut, quy nh v tiu chun ca mi quc gia. Vic gimst c khuyn khch la chn p dng cc tiu chun ph hp cho b my ca h da

trn cc hng dn ca y ban.8. The implementation of the principles set forth in this document should be proportionate

to the size, complexity, structure, economic significance and risk profile of the bank andthe group (if any) to which it belongs. The Committee recognises that some countrieshave found it appropriate to adopt legal frameworks and standards (eg for publicly tradedfirms), as well as accounting and auditing standards, which may be more extensive andprescriptive than the principles set forth in this document. Such frameworks andstandards tend to be particularly relevant for larger or publicly traded banks or financialinstitutions.

Vic thc hin cc nguyn tc c quy nh trong ti liu ny nn c thit lp v xc

nh da trn quy m, phc tp, cu trc, ngha kinh t v h thng cc ri ro cangn hng v nhm (nu c). y ban cng nhn rng mt vi quc gia thc hin thngqua cc h thng php lut v cc chun mc (v d v cc ngn hng thng mi ichng), cng nh ban hnh cc chun mc k ton, kim ton c th rng hn v quynh cht ch hn so vi cc nguyn tc trong ti liu ny. Vi h thng v chun mctrn hng ti quy nh lin quan c bit cho cc ngn hng ln hoc cc ngn hngthng mi i chng hay cc nh ch ti chnh.

9. Many of the corporate governance shortcomings identified during the financial crisis thatbegan in mid-2007 have been observed not only in the banking sector but also in theinsurance sector. As such, the Committee has coordinated its review with theInternational Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). The IAIS is currently reviewingthe full suite of Insurance Core Principles, including corporate governance principles, toaddress recent developments in the financial sector. The Committee and IAIS seek tocollaborate on monitoring the sound implementation of their respective principles.

Nhiu bt cp trong qun tr doanh nghip c xc nh nh cuc khng hong ti chnh

9Cc thut ng "Bank"v "Banking Organisation"c s dng trong ti liu ny dng ch chungcc ngn hng, tp on ngn hng hoc t chc ti chnh c qun l bi C quan gim st ngnhng theo php lut quc gia . Ti liu ny c p dng tng t(khng phn bit) cho cc ngn

hng hay nh ch ti chnh, tr khi lu mt cch r rng hoc khng c ch nh.

Bn dch Song ng Basel III - Nguyn Thu Phng Email: [email protected] Page 8


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bt u t gia nm 2007 c nhn thy khng ch trong lnh vc ngn hng m cntrong lnh vc bo him. Nh vy, y ban Basel phi hp vi Hip hi quc t gim stBo him (IAIS) xem xt li cc quy nh. IAIS hin ang xem li y s ph hp cacc, nguyn tc bo him ct li, bao gm cc nguyn tc qun tr doanh nghip, vhng ti pht trin thm trong lnh vc ti chnh. y ban Basel v AIS hp tc trong vic

thc hin cc nguyn tc gim st tng ng.

10. This document reinforces the key elements of the aforementioned OECD corporategovernance principles and is intended to guide the actions of board members, seniormanagers and supervisors of a diverse range of banks in a number of countries withvarying legal and regulatory systems, including both Committee-member countries andnon-member countries. While one fundamental corporate governance issue in respect ofpublicly listed companies is effective shareholder rights, such rights are not the primaryfocus of this guidance and are instead addressed in the OECD principles.

Ti liu ny cng c cc yu t chnh v qun tr doanh nghip ca OECD ni trn v

nhm hng dn hot ng ca Hi ng qun tr, Ban iu hnh v Ban kim sot trndin rng ca mt ngn hng ti mt s quc gia vi h thng cc quy nh php lut khcnhau, cc thnh vin tham gia xy dng ti liu ny bao gm c cc thnh vin y ban lquc gia v cc thnh vin phi quc gia. Trong khi mt nguyn tc qun tr c bn l viccng khai thng tin i vi cc cng ty nim yt l quyn li ca c ng, nhng ccquyn ny khng phi l trng tm ca Hip c ny v c th thay th cho cc nguyntc ca OECD trc y.

11. The principles set forth in this document are applicable regardless of whether or not acountry chooses to adopt the Basel II framework.10 The Committee neverthelessrecognised the importance of sound corporate governance when it published the Basel II

framework. In this regard, the board and senior management at each institution have anobligation to pursue good governance, in addition to understanding the risk profile oftheir institution.

Cc nguyn tc c quy nh trong ti liu ny c p dng bt k cc quc gia c lachn p dng Basel II10 hay khng. y ban vn cng nhn tm quan trng ca cc quy tcqun tr c bn trn khi n c ph bin trong Basel II. V vic ny, Hi ng qun tr vBan iu hnh ti mi nh ch ti chnh c trch nhim phi theo ui mc tiu qun tr ttv hiu r hn v cc ri ro ca chnh h.

12. This document refers to a governance structure composed of a board and seniormanagement. The Committee recognises that there are significant differencesin the legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries regarding thesefunctions. Some countries use a two-tier structure, where the supervisory function of theboard is performed by a separate entity known as a supervisory board, which has noexecutive functions. Other countries, by contrast, use a one-tier structure in which theboard has a broader role. Still other countries have moved or are moving to an approachthat discourages or prohibits executives from serving on the board or limits their number

10Trong thng 7/2009, trong mt n lc gii quyt cc im yu c bn trong qun tr ngn hng vthc tin qun l ri ro, y ban Basel II ci tin cc tiu chun v b sung thm tr ct 2 v qutrnh gim st hot ng ngn hng. Xem Ci tin ti Basel II, y ban Basel v Gim st Ngn hng,

thng 7/2009, c sn ti www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.htm.



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and/or requires the board and board committees to be chaired only by non -executiveboard members. Owing to these differences, this document does not advocate a specificboard structure. The terms board and senior management are only used as a way torefer to the oversight function and the management function in general and should beinterpreted throughout the document in accordance with the applicable law within each

jurisdiction. Recognising that different structural approaches to corporate governanceexist across countries, this document encourages practices that can strengthen checksand balances and sound corporate governance under diverse structures.

9 The terms bank and banking organisation as used in this document generally refer to banks,bank holding companies or other companies considered by banking supervisors to be the parent ofa banking group under applicable national law as determined to be appropriate by the entitysnational supervisor. This document makes no distinction in application to banks or bankingorganisations, unless explicitly noted or otherwise indicated by the context.

10 In July 2009, in an effort to address the fundamental weaknesses in banks governance and riskmanagement practices, the Committee enhanced the Basel II framework, including strengthened standards

of Pillar 2, the supervisory review process. See Enhancements to the Basel II Framework, Basel Committeeon Banking Supervision, July 2009, available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.htm.

Ti liu ny cp ti mt c cu qun tr ca Hi ng qun tr v Ban iu hnh. y bannhn ra rng c mt s khc bit ng k trong vic lp php v hnh php gia cc ncv c cu ny. Mt s quc gia s dng cu trc hai tng, ngoi Hi ng qun tr cn cthm Ban kim sot nm ngoi nh mt ban c lp, nhm gim st cc hot ng vkhng c chc nng iu hnh. Cc quc gia khc, ngc li, s dng cu trc mt tng,trong Hi ng qun tr c vai tr rng ln hn. Tuy nhin, mt s nc khng khuynkhch hoc hn ch s lng thnh vin v/hoc yu cu trong Hi ng qun tr ch baogm cc thnh vin khng nm trong Ban iu hnh. Do nhng khc bit ny, Basel III

khng ng h mt c cu qun tr c th no. Cc iu khon v Hi ng qun tr v Baniu hnh ch c s dng tham kho v chc nng gim st v qun l ni chung vcn c tham chiu ti cc quy nh ca php lut ti mi quc gia. iu ny tha nhns khc nhau ca c cu qun tr doanh nghip tn ti cc quc gia, do ti liu ny cth c p dng linh hot, ph hp theo bt k c cu qun tr no.

Overview of bank corporate governance (Tng quan v qun tr ngn hng)

13. Effective corporate governance practices are essential to achieving and maintainingpublic trust and confidence in the banking system, which are critical to the properfunctioning of the banking sector and economy as a whole. Poor corporate governance

can contribute to bank failures, which can in turn pose significant public costs andconsequences due to their potential impact on any applicable deposit insurance systemand the possibility of broader macroeconomic implications, such as contagion risk andimpact on payment systems. This has been illustrated in the financial crisis that began inmid-2007. In addition, poor corporate governance can lead markets to lose confidence inthe ability of a bank to properly manage its assets and liabilities, including deposits,which could in turn trigger a bank run or liquidity crisis. Indeed, in addition to theirresponsibilities to shareholders, banks also have a responsibility to their depositors andto other recognised stakeholders. The legal and regulatory system in a countrydetermines the formal responsibilities a bank has to its shareholders, depositors and

other relevant stakeholders. This document will use the phrase shareholders, depositorsand other relevant stakeholders, while recognising that banks responsibilities in this



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regard vary across jurisdictions.11

Vic qun tr ngn hng hiu qu l rt cn thit t c v duy tr nim tin ca cngchng vo h thng ngn hng v nn kinh t ni chung. Ngn hng qun tr km c thgy ra s sp ca chnh n v cn tc ng xu ti h thng bo him tin gi v ti

ton b nn kinh t, chng hn nh hiu ng domino v ri ro thanh khon ton h thng.iu ny c minh ha trong cc cuc khng hong ti chnh bt u t gia nm2007. Ngoi ra, ngn hng qun tr km cn c th khin cng chng mt lng tin vo khnng thanh ton ca mt ngn hng khc d n qun l tt ti sn v n ca mnh; c bitl cc khon tin gi, t c th l ngi n cho cuc khng hong thanh khon. Thmna, ngoi trch nhim vi cc c ng, cc ngn hng cng phi c trch nhim vi cckhon tin gi ca khch hng v cc bn lin quan. H thng lut php v quy nh cami quc gia cn xc nh trch nhim c th ca ngn hng vi cc c ng, ngi gitin v cc bn lin quan. Ti liu ny s s dng cc thut ng c ng, ngi gi tin vcc bn lin quan khc v tha nhn rng trong pham vi quyn hn11 ca mnh, trchnhim ca ngn hng l khc nhau vi cc bn ni trn.

14. From a banking industry perspective, corporate governance involves the allocation ofauthority and responsibilities, ie the manner in which the business and affairs of a bankare governed by its board and senior management, including how they:

set the banks strategy and objectives;

determine the banks risk tolerance/appetite;

operate the banks business on a day-to-day basis;

protect the interests of depositors, meet shareholder obligations, and take intoaccount the interests of other recognised stakeholders; and align corporateactivities and behaviour with the expectation that the bank will operate in a safe andsound manner, with integrity and in compliance with applicable laws andregulations.

Theo vin cnh tng lai ca ngnh ngn hng th qun tr ngn hng lin quan n vicgiao quyn hn v trch nhim, ngha l hot ng kinh doanh v tnh hnh ti chnh camt ngn hng c qun l bi Hi ng qun tr v Ban iu hnh, bao gm cc cngvic chnh:

- Thit lp chin lc v mc tiu ca ngn hng

- Xc nh dung sai ri ro/ngng chp nhn ri ro

- Hot ng kinh doanh c bn ca ngn hng

- Bo v li ch cu ngi gi tin, p ng cc ngh v vi c ng v c tnh ti lich ca cc bn lin quan khc; v gn hot ng qun tr vi k vng ngn hng skinh doanh an ton, hp l; nht qun v tun th quy nh ca php lut.

15. Supervisors have a keen interest in sound corporate governance as it is an essentialelement in the safe and sound functioning of a bank and may adversely affect the banksrisk profile if not implemented effectively. Moreover, governance weaknesses at banks

11 Cc c quan gim st, cc chnh ph, ch s hu tri phiu v ngi gi tin l mt trong cc bnlin quan do vai tr c bit ca cc ngn hng i vi nn kinh t quc gia; h thng ti chnh, vnhng tim n hoc r rng lin quan n bo lnh tin gi.Bn dch Song ng Basel III - Nguyn Thu Phng Email: [email protected] Page 11


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that play a significant role in the financial system, including systemically importantclearing and settlement systems, can result in the transmission of problems across thebanking sector. Well-governed banks contribute to the maintenance of an efficient andcost-effective supervisory system. Sound corporate governance also contributes to theprotection of depositors and may permit the supervisor to place more reliance on the

banks internal processes. In this regard, supervisory experience underscores theimportance of having the appropriate levels of accountability and checks and balanceswithin each bank. Moreover, sound corporate governance practices can be helpful wherea bank is experiencing problems. In such cases, the supervisor may require substantiallymore involvement by the banks board or those responsible for the control functions inseeking solutions and overseeing the implementation of corrective actions.

Cc c quan gim st quan tm ti vic qun tr cng ty v n l mt yu t thit yu mbo kinh doanh an ton v lng trc nhng nh hng bt li do cc ri ro xy ra chongn hng nu khng thc hin c hiu qu vic qun tr chng. Hn na, vic qun tr yukm s nh hng ti h thng ti chnh, bao gm c hot ng thanh ton b tr v gy ra

hiu ng ri ro dy chuyn trong h thng cc ngn hng. Mt ngn hng qun tr tt s gpphn duy tr mt h thng gim st hiu qu. Quy nh v qun tr cng ty cng s to bov ngi gi tin v cho php cc gim st vin c th da trn cc quy trnh ni b cangn hng nh gi v n. V vn ny, kinh nghim gim st nhn mnh tm quantrng ca vic phn cp ph hp trong vic kim sot v cht s d trong mi ngn hng.Hn na, thc tin qun tr ngn hng c th hu ch cho mt ngn hng ang gp vn .Trong trng hp ny, ngi gim st c th yu cu s tham gia ng k ca Hi ngqun tr ngn hng hoc nhng ngi c trch nhim kim sot trong vic tm kim giiphp v gim st vic thc hin cc hnh ng khc phc.

16. There are unique corporate governance challenges posed where bank ownershipstructures are unduly complex, lack transparency, or impede appropriate checks andbalances. Challenges can also arise when insiders or controlling shareholders exerciseinappropriate influences on the banks activities. The Committee is not suggesting thatthe existence of controlling shareholders is in and of itself inappropriate; in many marketsand for many small banks this is a common ownership pattern. Indeed, controllingshareholders can be beneficial resources for a bank. It is nevertheless important thatsupervisors take steps to ensure that such ownership structures do not impede soundcorporate governance. In particular, supervisors should have the ability to assess thefitness and propriety of significant bank owners as well as board members and seniormanagers.12

C thch thc ng ch trong qun tr ngn hng l khi m c cu s hu l qu phctp, thiu minh bch hoc cn tr vic kim sot v cht s d. Nhng thch thc cng cth pht sinh khi cc c ng ni b hoc cc c ng ln c quyn kim sot lm dngquyn hn gy nh hng khng tt ti hot ng ca ngn hng. y ban khng tha nhnrng s tn ti ca cc c ng ln c quyn kim sot v cc hot ng ca n l khngph hp; nhiu th trng v i vi nhiu ngn hng nh th c ng kim sot c lptheo hnh thc ng s hu. Tht vy, cc c ng ln (c quyn kim sot) c th em lili ch ln cho ngn hng. V khng cn thit gim st cc bc thc hin m borng c cu s hu l cn tr vic qun tr ngn hng. c bit, gim st vin nn c khnng nh gi s ng n v tng ng ca c ng ln trong ngn hng cng nh thnh



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vin Hi ng qun tr v Ban iu hnh cp cao 12.

17. Good corporate governance requires appropriate and effective legal, regulatory andinstitutional foundations. A variety of factors, including the system of business laws,

stock exchange rules and accounting standards, can affect market integrity and systemicstability. Such factors, however, are often outside the scope of banking supervision. 13

Supervisors are nevertheless encouraged to be aware of legal and institutionalimpediments to sound corporate governance, and to take steps to foster effectivefoundations for corporate governance where it is within their legal authority to do so.Where it is not, supervisors may wish to consider supporting legislative or other reformsthat would allow them to have a more direct role in promoting or requiring good corporategovernance.

Qun tr doanh nghip tt yu cu s ph hp ca h thng php l hiu qu v th chhp l. Mt lot cc yu t, bao gm h thng lut php, cc quy tc ca th trng chng

khon v chun mc k ton c th nh hng n tnh an ton v n nh ca h thng.Tuy nhin, cc yu t thng nm ngoi phm vi gim st ca ngn hng 13, c quangim st c th xem xt h tr ci cch php l hoc cc ci tin khc m c th cho phph c mt vai tr trc tip hn trong vic thc y hoc yu cu nng cao cht lng quntr ngn hng.

18. Corporate governance arrangements, as well as legal and regulatory systems, varywidely between countries. Nevertheless, sound governance can be achieved regardlessof the form used by a banking organisation so long as several essential functions are inplace. The important forms of oversight that should be included in the organisationalstructure of any bank in order to ensure appropriate checks and balances include

oversight by the board; oversight by senior management; direct line supervision ofdifferent business areas; and independent risk management, compliance and auditfunctions.

Sp xp v qun tr ngn hng cng ging nh l vic h thng ha cc vn bn php lutv cc quy nh; iu ny l khc nhau gia cc quc gia. Tuy nhin, qun tr ngn hng cth t c khi thit lp mt s b phn chc nng. Vic gim st nn c m bo lc kim tra v cht s liu bao gm gim st ca Hi ng qun tr, gim st ca Baniu hnh v gim st trc tip ti cc mng kinh doanh khc nhau; v bao gm c vicqun tr ri ro, kim sot tun th v kim ton phi c lp.

19. The general principles of sound corporate governance should also be applied to state-owned or state-supported banks, including when such support is temporary (eg duringthe financial crisis that began in mid-2007, national governments and/or central banks in

12 bit thm thng tin kim tra v "s ph hp v hp l , xem Cc nguyn tc ct li gim sthot ng ngn hng hiu qu v bi vit lin quanCc phng php lun ch yu ca y ban Baselv Gim st Ngn hng, thng 10/2006, c trn www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.htm v www.bis.org/publ/bcbs130.htm.

13 Cc c s ca qun tr cng ty hiu qu c so snh vi cc iu kin tin quyt gim st ngnhng c hiu qu c trch dn trong Nguyn tc ct li gim st ngn hng hiu qu. Ging nhnhng nn tng cho qun tr doanh nghip hiu qu, cc iu kin tin quyt gim st ngn hnghiu qu l cc k quan trng nhng thng bn ngoi phm vi thm quyn v php lut ca cquan gim st ngn hng.Bn dch Song ng Basel III - Nguyn Thu Phng Email: [email protected] Page 13


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some cases provided capital support to banks). In these cases, government financing orownership (even if temporary) may raise new governance challenges. Althoughgovernment financing or ownership of a bank has the potential to alter the strategies andobjectives of the bank, such a bank may face many of the same risks associated withweak corporate governance as are faced by banks that are not state-owned or

supported. 14 Exit policies from government ownership or support may present additionalchallenges that require attention in order to ensure good governance. Likewise, theseprinciples apply to banks with other types of ownership structures, for example those thatare family-owned or part of a wider non-financial group, and to those that are non-listed(including, for example, cooperative banking organisations).

Cc nguyn tc chung v qun tr nn c p dng cho cc ngn hng Nh nc hocngn hng c Nh nc bo tr; k c l cc h tr tm thi (v d nh trong cuckhng hong ti chnh bt u t gia nm 2007, chnh ph/ngn hng Trung ng trongmt s trng hp cung cp vn h tr cc ngn hng). Trong trng hp ny, chnhph l nh ti tr hoc ch s hu (thm ch ch l tm thi) nhng vn c th yu cu

nhng yu cu qun tr mi cao hn. Mc d chnh ph l nh ti tr hay ch s hu ngnhng c kh nng thay i chin lc mc tiu ca ngn hng nhng ngn hng vn cth i mt vi nhng ri ro lin quan do kh nng qun tr yu km nh cc ngn hngkhc khng phi l ca Nh nc hoc c Nh nc h tr14. Cc chnh sch do Chnhph thc hin khi h tr, s hu ngn hng c th gip m bo vic qun tr tt hn.Tng t nh vy, nhng nguyn tc ny cng s c tc dng tt cho cc ngn hng vicc loi c cu s hu, v d ngn hng s hu bi gia nh hoc nhm cc c nhn(v dvic ng s hu).

Sound corporate governance principles (Cc nguyn tc qun tr ngn hng)

20. As discussed above, supervisors have a keen interest in ensuring that banks adopt andimplement sound corporate governance practices. The following guidance draws onsupervisory experience with those banks having corporate governance problems as wellas with those exhibiting good governance practices. As such the guidance is designedboth to reinforce basic principles that can help minimise problems and to identifypractices that can be used to implement the principles. Together these representimportant elements of an effective corporate governance process.

III.Cc nguyn tc qun tr ngn hng

Nh ni trn, c quan gim st phi m bo rng cc ngn hng ban hnh v thc

hin cc nguyn tc qun tr cng ty. Cc hng dn sau y da trn kinh nghim gimst i vi nhng ngn hng hay gp vn v qun tr cng nh trnh by cc nguyn tcqun tr tt. nh vy, hng dn ny c s dng cng c cc nguyn tc c bnnhm gip gim thiu vn gp phi v xc nh c th hnh ng c th c s dng khc phc. Cc nguyn tc ny i din cho cc yu t quan trng ca mt qu trnhqun tr ngn hng hiu qu.

A. Board practices Boards overall responsibilities

Principle 1

14 Ngoi ra, cc hng dn cho Nh nc trong vic thc hin vai tr s hu ca n c th c tmthy trong Hng dn ca OECD v qun tr doanh nghip ca Doanh nghip Nh nc, thng 10nm 2005, c trn www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/34803211.pdf.Bn dch Song ng Basel III - Nguyn Thu Phng Email: [email protected] Page 14


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The board has overall responsibility for the bank, including approving and overseeingthe implementation of the banks strategic objectives, risk strategy, corporategovernance and corporate values. The board is also responsible for providingoversight of senior management.

Responsibilities of the boardTng quan v nhim v ca Hi ng qun tr

Nguyn tc 1:

Hi ng qun tr c trch nhim v ton b hot ng ca ngn hng, bao gm cph duyt v gim st thc hin cc mc tiu chin lc ca ngn hng, chin lcqun tr ri ro, tng cng qun tr cng ty v nng cao gi tr cng ty. Hi ng quntr c trch nhim gim st hot ng ca Ban iu hnh.

Trch nhim c th ca Hi ng qun tr

21. The board has ultimate responsibility for the banks business, risk strategy and financialsoundness, as well as for how the bank organises and governs itself.

Hi ng qun tr chu trch nhim cui cng i vi hot ng kinh doanh ca ngn hng,chin lc i ph vi ri ro v tnh hnh ti chnh, cng nh vic t chc v iu chnh hotng ca ngn hng.

22. Accordingly, the board should:

approve and monitor the overall business strategy of the bank, taking into accountthe banks long-term financial interests, its exposure to risk, and its ability tomanage risk effectively;15 and

approve and oversee the implementation of the banks:

+ overall risk strategy, including its risk tolerance/appetite; policies for risk, risk management and compliance;

+ internal controls system;

+ corporate governance framework, principles and corporate values, including acode of conduct or comparable document; and

+ compensation system.

15 Strategic planning is an on-going and dynamic process that takes into account such changes as those inmarkets, activities, business environment and technology.

Theo , Hi ng qun tr nn:

- Ph duyt v gim st ton b chin lc kinh doanh ca ngn hng c tnh ti lich ti chnh di hn, kh nng chp nhn ri ro v kh nng qun l ri ro hiu qu15.

- Ph duyt v gim st vic thc hin ca ngn hng nh:

+ Chin lc v ri ro tng th; bao gm dung sai ri ro/ngng chp nhn ri ro;chnh sch i ph vi ri ro; qun tr ri ro v tun th.

+ H thng kim sot ni b15 Chin lc kinh doanh l mt qu trnh lin tc v nng ng nhm m bo p ng c vinhng thay i t th trng, hnh ng ca i th , mi trng kinh doanh v cng ngh.Bn dch Song ng Basel III - Nguyn Thu Phng Email: [email protected] Page 15


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+ B my qun tr v cc nguyn tc bao gm mt s quy chun o c ngh nghiphoc cc ti liu tng ng

+ H thng khen thng, tr cp

23. In discharging these responsibilities, the board should take into account the legitimate

interests of shareholders, depositors and other relevant stakeholders. It should alsoensure that the bank maintains an effective relationship with its supervisors.

Trong khi thc hin trch nhim ny, Hi ng qun tr nn xem xt ti li ch hp php cac ng, ngi gi tin v cc bn lin quan khc. N cn m bo rng ngn hng vnduy tr hiu qu cc hot ng gim st.

24. The members of the board should exercise their duty of care and duty of loyalty16 tothe bank under applicable national laws and supervisory standards. This includesengaging actively in the major matters of the bank and keeping up with material changesin the banks business and the external environment, as well as acting to protect theinterests of the bank.

Thnh vin Hi ng qun tr phi c ngha v chm sc v ngha v trung thnh 16 vingn hng theo nhng quy nh ca php lut v cc tiu chun gim st. iu ny baogm vic tch cc tham gia vo gii quyt cc vn ln ca ngn hng v bt kp vinhng thay i trong ni b hot ng kinh doanh ca ngn hng v mi trng bn ngoicng nh hnh dng kp thi bo v li ch ca ngn hng.

25. The board should ensure that transactions with related parties (including internal grouptransactions) are reviewed to assess risk and are subject to appropriate restrictions (egby requiring that such transactions be conducted at arms-length terms) and thatcorporate or business resources of the bank are not misappropriated or misapplied.

Hi ng qun tr phi m bo rng cc giao dch vi cc bn lin quan (bao gm c ccgiao dch ni b) l c xem xt nh gi ri ro v c th gim thiu c (v d bngcch ban hnh cc tiu chun thc hin i vi cc giao dch ny) v qun tr m bocc ngun lc ca ngn hng khng b chim dng hoc lm dng.

Corporate values and code of conduct

26. A demonstrated corporate culture that supports and provides appropriate norms andincentives for professional and responsible behaviour is an essential foundation of goodgovernance. In this regard, the board should take the lead in establishing the tone at thetop and in setting professional standards and corporate values that promote integrity foritself, senior management and other employees.

Gi tr doanh nghip v b quy tc ng x

Vn ha doanh nghip c th h tr v khuyn khch cc hot ng chuyn nghip cng16 OECD nh ngha "ngha v chm sc" l vic thnh vin hi ng qun tr phi hnh ng trn cs thng tin y v thn trng trong cc quyt nh i vi cng ty. Tc l yu cu cc thnh vinhi ng qun tr xem xt mt cch cn trng cc quyt nh ca mnh lin quan ti hot ng cangn hng. OECD cng quy nh" ngha v trung thnh" l vic cc thnh vin hi ng qun tr hnhng v li ch ca cng ty v c ng. iu ny tc l cc thnh vin hi ng qun tr phi hot ngv li ch ca cng ty ch khng c v li ch ring ca h, hay li ch ca mt c nhn hoc

nhm.Xem ch thch 4 tham kho.Bn dch Song ng Basel III - Nguyn Thu Phng Email: [email protected] Page 16


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nh cc hnh vi ph hp l n l mt nn tng c bn ca vic qun tr tt. V vn ny,Hi ng qun tr nn cn phi gng mu trong vic thit lp cc k nng truyn t mnhlnh v tiu chun ha chng nhm khuyn khch s t gic ca Ban iu hnh v ccnhn vin khc.

27. A banks code of conduct, or comparable policy, should articulate acceptable andunacceptable behaviours. It is especially important that such a policy clearly disallowsbehaviour that could result in the bank engaging in any improper or illegal activity, suchas financial misreporting, money laundering, fraud, bribery or corruption. It should alsodiscourage the taking of excessive risks as defined by internal corporate policy.

B quy tc ng x ca ngn hng, hoc cc chnh sch tng t, nn th hin r hnh vic chp nhn v cc hnh vi khng th chp nhn. iu c ngha l mt chnh schr rng khng cho php hnh vi c th dn n vic khuyn khch ngn hng tham giavo bt k hot ng hoc hnh vi bt hp php no; chng hn nh: lm sai lch bo coti chnh, ra tin, gian ln, hi l hay tham nhng. N cng s gip gim thiu cc ri ro

theo quy nh ca ni b ngn hng.28. The banks corporate values should recognise the critical importance of timely and frank

discussion and elevation of problems to higher levels within the organisation. In thisregard, employees should be encouraged and able to communicate, with protection fromreprisal, legitimate concerns about illegal, unethical or questionable practices. Becausesuch practices can have a detrimental impact on a banks reputation, it is highlybeneficial for banks to establish a policy setting forth adequate procedures, consistentwith national law, for employees to confidentially communicate material and bona fideconcerns or observations of any violations. Communication should be allowed to bechannelled to the board - directly or indirectly (eg through an independent audit or

compliance process or through an ombudsman) - independent of the internal chain ofcommand. The board should determine how and by whom legitimate concerns shall beinvestigated and addressed, for example by an internal control function, an objectiveexternal party, senior management and/or the board itself.

Ngn hng nn nhn ra tm quan trng ca cc cuc tho lun thng thn, kp thi vi ccvn nng bng trong ni b. V th nhn vin cn c khch l v bo v c th giaotip, thng thn v chnh ng v cc hnh vi bt hp php, phi o c. Bi v cc hotng bt hp php c th tc ng xu vi uy tn ca ngn hng; ngn hng nn ban hnhcc chnh sch mt cch y , ph hp vi lut php v gip nhn vin t tin giao tip vtrung thc hoc theo di bt k s vi phm no. Cc cuc tho lun ny nn c php

chuyn ti Hi ng qun tr trc tip hoc gin tip (v d thng qua B phn kim ton clp hoc trong mt cuc thanh tra). Hi ng qun tr nn xc nh bng cch no v ngic trch nhim s iu tra v gii quyt, v d nh b phn kim sot ni b vi hai mctiu i ngoi vi cc i tc bn ngoi v thc hin chc nng kim sot gip cho Ban iuhnh hoc Hi ng qun tr.

29. The board should ensure that appropriate steps are taken to communicate throughoutthe bank the corporate values, professional standards or codes of conduct it sets,together with supporting policies and procedures, such as the means to confidentiallyreport concerns or violations to an appropriate body.

Hi ng qun tr phi m bo cc bc thch hp thc hin vic truyn thng trongngn hng c gi tr thit thc, chuyn nghip hoc theo b quy tc ng x, cng vi l



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chnh sch h tr v cc th tc, chng hn nh l phng tin bo mt cc bo coc lp hoc thng tin v cc vi phm ti b phn c trch nhim x l.

Oversight of senior management

30. Except where required otherwise by applicable law or regulations, the board shouldselect and, when necessary, replace senior management and have in place anappropriate plan for succession.

Gim st i vi Ban iu hnh

Tr khi c yu cu khc ca php lut hoc cc quy nh, Hi ng qun tr nn la chn vnu cn th thay th Ban iu hnh v s dng mt k hoch tt m bo thnh cng.

31. The board should provide oversight of senior management as part of the banks checksand balances. In doing so the board should:

monitor that senior managements actions are consistent with the strategy andpolicies approved by the board, including the risk tolerance/appetite;

meet regularly with senior management;

question and review critically explanations and information provided by seniormanagement;

set formal performance standards for senior management consistent with the long-term objectives, strategy and financial soundness of the bank, and monitor senior

managements performance against these standards; and ensure that senior managements knowledge and expertise remain appropriate given

the nature of the business and the banks risk profile.

Hi ng qun tr nn gim st Ban iu hnh nh l mt phn ca hot ng kim sotngn hng. Khi lm nh vy, Hi ng qun tr nn:

- Gim st hot ng ca Ban iu hnh xem c ph hp vi chin lc v chnhsch c Hi ng qun tr ban hnh, bao gm c dung sai ri ro v ngng gii hnchp nhn ri ro.

- Gp g thng xuyn Ban iu hnh

- Hi v xem xt nghim tc cc gii thch v thng tin c cung cp bi Ban iuhnh

- Thit lp cc tiu chun thc hin i vi Ban iu hnh sao cho st vi mc tiudi hn, chin lc v tim lc ti chnh ca ngn hng v gim st hot ng theocc tiu chun trn.

- m bo rng Ban iu hnh c y kin thc, chuyn mn ph hp vi tnhhnh hot ng kinh doanh v nm bt c cc ri ro hin ti ca ngn hng.

32. The board should also ensure that the banks organisational structure facilitates effective

decision making and good governance. This should include ensuring that lines ofresponsibility and accountability-- which define clearly the key responsibilities and



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authorities of the board itself, as well as of senior management and those responsible forthe control functions-- are set and enforced throughout the organisation.

Hi ng qun tr cng phi m bo rng c cu t chc ca ngn hng to iu kin ttcho vic ra quyt nh v qun tr hiu qu. iu ny bao gm vic m bo rng vic thc

hin v gii trnh c xc nh r rng trch nhim chnh v y quyn ca Hi ng quntr, cng nh l Ban iu hnh v nhng ngi chu trch nhim ti cc b phn kim sotc thit lp v thc thi trong ngn hng.

33. The board should regularly review policies and controls with senior management andinternal control functions (including internal audit, risk management and compliance) inorder to determine areas needing improvement, as well as to identify and addresssignificant risks and issues. The board should ensure that the control functions areproperly positioned, staffed and resourced and are carrying out their responsibilitiesindependently and effectively.

Hi ng qun tr nn thng xuyn xem xt li cc chnh sch v kim sot i vi Ban

iu hnh v b phn kim sot ni b (bao gm kim ton ni b, qun l ri ro v tunth) xc nh cc khu vc cn ci tin, cng nh xc nh v gii quyt nhng ri ronghim trng v cc vn . Hi ng qun tr phi m bo rng cc b phn kim sotc thit lp ng, nhn vin v cc ngun lc thc hin nhim v ca h c lp v hiuqu.

BoardQualificationsPrinciple 2

Board members should be and remain qualified, including through training, for their

positions. They should have a clear understanding of their role in corporategovernance and be able to exercise sound and objective judgment about the affairs ofthe bank.

Trnh chuyn mn i vi Hi ng qun tr

Nguyn tc 2

Thnh vin Hi ng qun tr nn v cn thit phi yu cu cc tiu chun, bao gmvic c o to cho v tr ca mnh. H cn phi c mt s hiu bit thu o vaitr qun tr ca h trong ngn hng v c th nh gi c cc mc tiu v tnhhnh ti chnh ca ngn hng.

34. This principle applies to a board member in his or her capacity as a member of the fullboard and as a member of any board committee.

Nguyn tc ny p dng ging nhau i vi thnh vin Hi ng qun tr; Hi ng thnhvin v vi thnh vin ca bt k y ban no ca ngn hng

Qualifications

35. The board should possess, both as individual board members and collectively,appropriate experience, competencies and personal qualities, including professionalismand personal integrity.17



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17 See Principle 3 of the Core Principles Methodology, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, October2006. When a bank is authorised, the licensing authority is expected to evaluate proposed board members andsenior managers for fitness and propriety.

18 Definitions of what constitutes independence for board members vary across different legal systems,and are often reflected in exchange listing requirements and supervisory standards. The key characteristic ofindependence is the ability to exercise objective, independent judgment after fair consideration of all relevantinformation and views without undue influence from executives or from inappropriate external parties or interests.

Trnh chuyn mnHi ng qun tr nn bao gm c thnh vin Hi ng qun tr c lp v tp th, c kinhnghim ph hp, nng lc v phm hcaats c nhn bao gm c nhng phm cht chnh trv s lim chnh17.

36. The board collectively should have adequate knowledge and experience relevant to eachof the material financial activities the bank intends to pursue in order to enable effectivegovernance and oversight. Examples of areas where the board should seek to have, orhave access to, appropriate experience or expertise include finance, accounting, lending,

bank operations and payment systems, strategic planning, communications, governance,risk management, internal controls, bank regulation, auditing and compliance. The boardcollectively should also have a reasonable understanding of local, regional and, ifappropriate, global economic and market forces and of the legal and regulatoryenvironment.

Hi ng qun tr phi c y kin thc v kinh nghim lin quan n hot ng tichnh ca ngn hng cho php vic qun tr v gim st hiu qu. V d cc lnh vcm Hi ng qun tr cn tm kim hoc tip cn, kinh nghim ph hp hoc chuynmn bao gm ti chnh, k ton, tn dng, hot ng ngn hng v h thng thanh ton,chin lc, k hoch, truyn thng, qun tr doanh nghip, qun l ri ro, kim sot ni

b v cc quy nh v ti chnh k ton v tun th. Hi ng qun tr cng cn phi cs hiu bit v a phng, khu vc v kinh t ton cu, cc th trng v mi trngphp l.

Training

37. In order to help board members acquire, maintain and deepen their knowledge and skillsand to fulfil their responsibilities, the board should ensure that board members haveaccess to programmes of tailored initial (eg induction) and ongoing education on relevantissues. The board should dedicate sufficient time, budget and other resources for thispurpose.

o to

gip cc thnh vin c c, duy tr v nng cao kin thc cng nh cc k nng hon thnh nhim v, Hi ng qun tr nn m bo rng cc thnh vin c quyn thamgia cc chng trnh gio dc c thit k ph hp t ban u (v d nh s b nhim) vc o to trc tip bng thc t v cc vn lin quan. Hi ng qun tr nn dnh thi gian, ngn sch v cc ngun lc khc cho mc ch ny.

17 Xem Nguyn tc 3 Cc nguyn tc ct li ca y ban Basel v Gim st Ngn hng, thng10/2006. Khi ngn hng c y quyn, c quan cp giy php s nh gi cc thnh vin hi ng

qun tr v thnh vin Ban iu hnh c xut xc nh s ng n v ph hp.



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Composition

38. The bank should have an adequate number and appropriate composition of boardmembers. Unless required otherwise by law, the board should identify and nominatecandidates and ensure appropriate succession planning. Board perspective and ability to

exercise objective judgment independent 18 of both the views of executives and ofinappropriate political or personal interests can be enhanced by recruiting members froma sufficiently broad population of candidates, to the extent possible and practicable giventhe banks size, complexity and geographic scope. Independence can be enhanced byincluding a large enough number of qualified non-executive members on the board whoare capable of exercising sound objective judgment. Where a supervisory board or boardof auditors is formally separate from a management board, objectivity and independencestill needs to be assured by appropriate selection of board members.19

19 If a former executive of the company is being considered to serve on the board of the company, theboard should carefully review any potential conflicts of interest that might arise from this, particularly if this personis to carry out the role of chair of the board or of a committee of the board. If the board deems it to be in theinterest of the company to have this person serve on the board, appropriate processes to mitigate the potentialconflicts of interest should be put in place, such as a waiting period and/or a description of matters on which theperson should recuse himself or herself to avoid a conflict of interest.

Ngn hng cn c Hi ng qun tr vi s lng v thnh phn ph hp. Tr khi cyu cu bi php lut, Hi ng nn xc nh v c cc ng c vin v m bo khoch k nhim thch hp. m bo Hi ng qun tr thc hin nhim v mt cch clp18, trnh cc quan im chnh tr v c nhn c th tng cng bng cch tuyn dngthm cc thnh vin ph hp t cc ng vin a phng ty theo quy m, s phc tp vphm vi hot ng ca ngn hng. S c lp c th c tng cng bng cch thm vos lng ln cc thnh vin Hi ng qun tr c nng lc thc s nhng khng tham

gia iu hnh. V thng thng Ban kim sot hoc Ban kim ton chnh thc c lachn t thnh vin Hi ng qun tr v do s c lp l cn thit m bo s lachn l ph hp19.

39. In identifying potential board members, the board should ensure that the candidates arequalified to serve as board members and are able to commit the necessary time andeffort to fulfil their responsibilities. Serving as a board member or senior manager of acompany that competes or does business with the bank can compromise boardindependent judgment and potentially create conflicts of interest, as can cross-membership of boards.

Trong vic xc nh cc thnh vin tim nng ca Hi ng qun tr, Hi ng nn m borng cc ng vin l phm cht lm thnh vin v c th cam kt thi gian cn thitv n lc hon thnh nhim v ca h. Nu thnh vin Hi ng qun tr hoc Ban iu

18 nh nghathnh vin hi ng qun tr c lp c th thay i trong h thng php lut khc nhau, nhngthng c quy nh r rng c th nh cc tiu chun gim st. S c lp ny th hin vic thc hinmc tiu, phn bin c lp sau khi xem xt cng bng tt c cc thng tin lin quan v cc quan im mkhng chu nh hng t gim c iu hnh hoc t cc bn khng thch hp bn ngoi.

19 Nu mt gim c iu hnh c ca cng ty ang c xem xt tr thnh thnh vin Hi ng qun tr, Hing nn xem xt cn thn bt k xung t li ch no c th pht sinh, c bit khi ngi ny vi vai tr caCh tch Hi ng qun tr hoc y ban. Nu Hi ng qun tr xt thy li ch ca cng ty tng ln nh c ngi

ny th vn nn xc nh mt quy trnh thch hp gim thiu nhng xung t li ch, chng hn nh thi gianch i/hoc m t c th nhng vn m khi tuyn dng ngi ny nn xem xt trnh cc xung t lich.



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hnh c cng ty ring hoc tham gia cc hot ng kinh doanh mang tnh cht cnh tranhvi ngn hng th thnh vin Hi ng qun t c lp c th li to ra cc xung t li chtim n gia cc thnh vin Hi ng qun tr.

Board's own practices and structure

Principle 3The board should define appropriate governance practices for its own work and havein place the means to ensure that such practices are followed and periodicallyreviewed for ongoing improvement.

Hot ng v c cu ca Hi ng qun tr

Nguyn tc 3

Hi ng qun tr cn xc nh thng l qun tr thch hp cho cng vic ca Hing v c phng tin m bo rng vic thc hin l c theo di v nh k

xem xt ci tin lin tc.40. The board should exemplify through its own practices sound governance principles.

These practices help the board carry out its duties more effectively. At the same time,they send important signals internally and externally about the kind of enterprise thebank aims to be.

Hi ng qun tr nn minh ha c cu ca Hi ng thng qua vic thc hnh cc nguyntc qun tr. Vic ny gip Hi ng qun tr thc hin nhim v hiu qu hn. ng thi, hgi ti cc tn hiu quan trng t trong ni b v bn ngoi v m hnh t chc m ngnhng ang hng ti.

Organisation and functioning of the board

41. The board should maintain, and periodically update, organisational rules, by-laws, orother similar documents setting out its organisation, rights, responsibilities and keyactivities.

T chc v hot ng ca Hi ng qun tr

Hi ng nn duy tr v cp nht nh k, cc quy nh ca t chc, quy nh ca php luthoc cc ti liu tng t thit lp li c cu t chc, cc quyn, trch nhim v cchot ng chnh ca ngn hng.

42. The board should structure itself in a way, including in terms of size, frequency ofmeetings and the use of committees, so as to promote efficiency, sufficiently deepreview of matters, and robust, critical challenge and discussion of issues.

Hi ng nn cu trc li chnh n, bao gm c quy m, tn xut cc cuc hp v vic sdng cc y ban pht huy hiu qu v xem xt su cc vn , cc nn tng v ccthch thc quan trng v cc tho lun v cc s v ln.

43. To support board performance, it is a good practice for the board to carry out regularassessments of both the board as a whole and of individual board members. Assistancefrom external facilitators in carrying out board assessments can contribute to theobjectivity of the process. Where the board has serious reservations about the

performance or integrity of a board member, the board should take appropriate actions.Either separately or as part of these assessments, the board should periodically review



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the effectiveness of its own governance practices and procedures, determine whereimprovements may be needed, and make any necessary changes.

h tr vic thc hin qun tr, Hi ng qun tr t thc hin nh gi ton b v mithnh vin c nhn. Vic thc hin nh gi bi cc c vn bn ngoi s gip to s khch

quan cho qu trnh nh gi. Trng hp, Hi ng qun tr dnh u tin v vic thc hinnh gi hiu sut cho mt thnh vin Hi ng qun tr th Hi ng qun tr nn thngxuyn v nh k xem hiu qu ca hot ng ny. Hi ng qun tr phi nh k xem xtli tnh hiu qu ca hot ng qun tr v tun th, xc nh nhng ci tin cn c v thchin bt k thay i cn thit no.

Role of the chair

44. The chair of the board plays a crucial role in the proper functioning of the board. He orshe provides leadership to the board and is responsible for the boards effective overallfunctioning, including maintaining a relationship of trust with board members. The chairshould possess the requisite experience, competencies and personal qualities in order tofulfil these responsibilities.

Vai tr ca Ch tch Hi ng qun tr

Ch tch HQT ng vai tr quan trng trong cc hot ng ca Hi ng. Ch tch a ratm nhn vi cc thnh vin v chu trch nhim cho cc hot ng ca Hi ng hiu qu,bao gm c vic duy tr mi quan h tin cy vi cc thnh vin Hi ng qun tr. Ch tchnn c nhng kinh nghim cn thit, nng lc v phm cht c nhn thc hin nhim vny.

45. The chair should ensure that board decisions are taken on a sound and well-informedbasis. He or she should encourage and promote critical discussion and ensure thatdissenting views can be expressed and discussed within the decision-making process.

Ch tch cn bo m rng cc quyt nh ca Hi ng qun tr c da trn mt nntng c s thng tin y . Ch tch khuyn khch v thc y cc cuc tho lun v mbo rng cc quan im bt ng c th c a ra v tho lun trong qu trnh ra quytnh.

46. To achieve appropriate checks and balances, an increasing number of banks require thechair of the board to be a non-executive, except where otherwise required by law. Wherea bank does not have this separation and particularly where the roles of the chair of theboard and chief executive officer (CEO) are vested in the same person, it is important for

the bank to have measures in place to minimise the impact on the banks checks andbalances of such a situation (such as, for example, by having a lead board member,senior independent board member or a similar position).

t mc tiu kim sot, mt s lng ngy cng tng yu cu i vi Ch tch ca Hing qun tr ngn hng phi khng tham gia iu hnh, tr trng hp php lut yu cu.trng hp ngn hng khng yu cu tch bit v c bit c ni Ch tch Hi ng qun trng thi l Gim c iu hnh (CEO), iu ny l quan trng i vi ngn hng cbin php gim thiu tc ng n vic kim sot ngn hng ca nhng ngi ny (chnghn nh, bng vic c thm thnh vin lnh o, thnh vin Hi ng qun tr c lp hocmt v tr tng t trong ngn hng).

Board committees



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47. To increase efficiency and allow deeper focus in specific areas, boards in manyjurisdictions establish certain specialised board committees. The number and nature ofcommittees depends on many factors, including the size of the bank and its board, thenature of the business areas of the bank, and its risk profile.

y ban chuyn mn trong Hi ng qun tr tng hiu qu v cho php tp trung trng im vo cc lnh vc c th, Hi ng quntr thnh lp cc y ban chuyn mn. S lng v tnh cht ca cc y ban ph thuc vonhiu yu t, bao gm quy m ca ngn hng v Hi ng qun tr, tnh cht ca lnh vchot ng v cc ri ro ca ngn hng.

48. Each committee should have a charter or other instrument that sets out its mandate,scope and working procedures. In the interest of greater transparency andaccountability, a board should disclose the committees it has established, theirmandates, and their composition (including members who are considered to beindependent). To avoid undue concentration of power and to promote fresh perspectives,

it may be useful to consider occasional rotation of membership and chairmanship of suchcommittees provided that doing so does not impair the collective skills, experience, andeffectiveness of these committees.

Mi y ban cn phi c mt bn iu l hoc vn bn quy nh nhim v, phm vi v quytrnh lm vic. Vi s minh bch v trch nhim gii trnh, Hi ng nn thnh lp, quy nhnhim v v thnh phn ca cc y ban (bao gm c cc thnh vin c coi l c lp). trnh vic tp trung qu mc quyn lc v thc y nhng ci tin mi, s l hu chnu cc y ban ny c xem xt thng xuyn bi cc thnh vin v ch tch ca Hing qun tr nhng phi m bo rng cc quy nh nh vy khng lm gim cc k nng,kinh nghim v hiu qu ca cc y ban.

49. Committees should maintain appropriate records (eg meeting minutes or summary ofmatters reviewed and decisions taken) of their deliberations and decisions. Such recordsshould document the committees fulfilment of their responsibilities and help in theassessment by those responsible for the control functions or the supervisor of theeffectiveness of these committees.

y ban nn duy tr cc h s thch hp (v d nh bin bn hp hoc tm tt cc vn xem xt v quyt nh a ra) ca cc cuc tho lun v quyt nh. H s ti liu nh vyphi c thc hin bi cc y ban v y ban cn c nh gi bi nhng ngi chutrch nhim kim sot hoc gim st hot ng ca cc y ban ny.

Audit committee

50. For large banks and internationally active banks, an audit committee or equivalentshould be required. The audit committee typically is responsible for the financialreporting process; providing oversight of the banks internal and external auditors;approving, or recommending to the board or shareholders for their approval, theappointment, 20 compensation and dismissal of external auditors; reviewing andapproving the audit scope and frequency; receiving key audit reports; 21 and ensuringthat senior management is taking necessary corrective actions in a timely manner to

address control weaknesses, non-compliance with policies, laws and regulations andother problems identified by auditors. In addition, the audit committee should oversee the



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establishment of accounting policies and practices by the bank.

y ban kim ton

i vi cc ngn hng ln hay cc ngn hng mang tnh ton cu, mt y ban kim tonhoc tng ng nn c thnh lp. Cc y ban kim ton thng chu trch nhim v

cc bo co ti chnh, gim st bi kim ton ni b v kim ton bn ngoi; a kinhoc bo co ca mnh ti Hi ng qun tr hoc cc c ng v s chp thun ca h, sb nhim20, trch nhim bi thng v sa thi cc kim ton bn ngoi; xem xt v phduyt phm vi cng nh tn xut kim ton; tip nhn cc bo co kim ton trng im21;

V m bo rng Ban iu hnh c cc hnh ng khc phc cn thit, kp thi kimsot cc yu km, s khng tun th chnh sch, php lut v cc quy nh hoc cc vn c xc nh bi kim ton vin. Ngoi ra, y ban kim ton cn gim st vic thc hincc chnh sch k ton v hot ng ca ngn hng.

20. In some jurisdictions, external auditors are appointed directly by shareholders, with the board onlymaking a recommendation

21 As well as risk management and compliance reports, unless the bank has separate boardcommittees for these areas.

51. It is advisable that the audit committee consists of a sufficient number of independentnon-executive board members. In jurisdictions where external auditors are selected bythe audit committee, it is beneficial for the appointment or dismissal of external auditorsto be made only by a decision of the independent, non-executive audit committeemembers. At a minimum, the audit committee as a whole should have recent andrelevant experience and should possess a collective balance of skills and expertknowledge - commensurate with the complexity of the banking organisation and the

duties to be performed - in financial reporting, accounting and auditing.y ban kim ton nn bao gm cc thnh vin c lp khng tham gia iu hnh. Trongnhng lnh vc c la chn thc hin bi cc y ban kim ton; vic b nhim, minnhim ca kim ton bn ngoi ch c thc hin theo quyt nh ca nhng thnh vin yban kim ton c lp khng tham gia iu hnh. Ti thiu, cc y ban kim ton cn ckinh nghim lin quan v nn c cc k nng v kin thc chuyn mn tng xng vi sphc tp ca t chc ngn hng v cc nhim v c giao trong lnh vc ti chnh, kton v kim ton.

Risk committee

52. It is also appropriate for many banks, especially large banks and internationally activebanks, to have a board-level risk committee or equivalent, responsible for advising theboard on the banks overall current and future risk tolerance/appetite and strategy, andfor overseeing senior managements implementation of that strategy. This should includestrategies for capital and liquidity management, as well as for credit, market, operational,compliance, reputational and other risks of the bank. To enhance the effectiveness of therisk committee, it should receive formal and informal communication from the banks risk

20 Ti mt s nc theo quy nh ca php lut, kim ton c lp bn ngoi c b nhim trc tipbi cc c ng, cn Hi ng qun tr ch c quyn xut.

21 Cng p dng ging nh vic qun l ri ro v cc bo co ph hp, tr khi ngn hng c cc yban ring bit cho tng lnh vc thc hin cc bo co ny.Bn dch Song ng Basel III - Nguyn Thu Phng Email: [email protected] Page 25


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management function and CRO (see Principle 6), and should, where appropriate, haveaccess to external expert advice, particularly in relation to proposed strategictransactions, such as mergers and acquisitions.

y ban kim sot ri ro

y ban ny ph hp vi nhiu ngn hng, c bit l cc ngn hng ln v c tnh chtquc t cn phi c mt y ban kim sot ri ro hoc tng ng, chu trch nhim t vncho Hi ng qun tr ca ngn hng v dung sai ri ro/ngng chp nhn ri ro hin ti vtng lai cng nh chin lc v nh hng cho Ban iu hnh v chin lc . iuny s bao gm cc chin lc v vn, qun l thanh khon cng nh hot ng tn dng,ri ro th trng, ri ro hot ng, ri ro tun th, ri ro danh ting v ri ro khc ca ngnhng. nng cao hiu qu ca y ban kim sot ri ro, y ban ny cn nhn c ccthng tin chnh thc v phi chnh thc t b phn kim sot ri ro ca ngn hng v CRO(xem Nguyn tc 6), v c quyn tham kho cc t vn ca cc chuyn gia bn ngoi, cbit lin quan ti giao dch mang tnh cht chin lc, chng hn hot ng mua bn v sp

nhp (M&A).Other committees

53. Among other specialised committees that have become increasingly common amongbanks are the following:

Compensation committee - oversees the compensation systems design andoperation,and ensures that compensation is appropriate and consistent with the banksculture, long-term business and risk strategy, performance and control environment(see Principles 10 and 11), as well as with any legal or regulatory requirements.

Nominations/human resources/governance committee - provides recommendationsto the board for new board members and members of senior management; may beinvolved in assessment of board and senior management effectiveness; may beinvolved in overseeing the banks personnel or human resource policies.

Ethics/compliance committee - focuses on ensuring that the bank has theappropriatemeans for promoting proper decision making and compliance with laws, regulationsand internal rules; provides oversight of the compliance function.

y ban khc

Trong s cc y ban chuyn mn khc hin nay tr nn ngy cng ph bin ti cc ngn

hng bao gm:- y ban tr cp/khen thng: gim st h thng v hot ng tr cp m borng vic tr cp l thch hp v ph hp vi vn ha ca ngn hng, hot ng kinhdoanh di hn v chin lc v ri ro, nng sut v mi trng lm vic (xem Nguyntc 10 v 11), cng nh vi bt k quy nh no ca php lut.

- y ban c/y ban nhn s/y ban qun tr: cung cp thng tin v cc khuynngh cho Hi ng qun tr v cc ng c vin mi cho Hi ng qun tr v Ban iuhnh; c th tham gia vo hot ng nh gi hiu qu ca Hi ng qun tr v Baniu hnh; c th c tham gia gim st nhn vin ca ngn hng hoc iu chnhcc chnh sch v ngun nhn lc.

- y ban o c/y ban tun th: tp trung vo vic m bo rng ngn hng c cc



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bin php thch hp thc y vic ra quyt nh ng n v ph hp vi quy nhphp lut, quy nh ni b cng ty; chc nng gim st vic tun th.

54. The board should appoint members to specialised committees with the goal of achievingan optimal mix of skills and experience that, in combination, allow the committees to fully

understand, objectively evaluate and bring fresh thinking to the relevant issues. In orderto achieve the needed objectivity, membership should be composed of non-executivesand to the extent possible, a majority of independent members. In cases where a pool ofindependent candidates is not available, committee membership should strive to mixskills and experience in order to maximise objectivity. Notwithstanding the composition ofthe specialised committees, it may be beneficial for independent members to meetseparately, both among themselves and with the relevant control areas, on a regularbasis to ensure frank and timely dialogue. In addition, board consideration of risk-relatedissues may be enhanced by members serving on more than one committee (subject toconstraints on members time). For example, a member who serves on thecompensation committee while also serving on either the risk or audit committee may

have a greater appreciation of risk considerations in these areas.

Hi ng qun tr phi ch nh cc thnh vin vo y ban chuyn mn vi mc tiu tc s kt hp ti u gia k nng v kinh nghim, nhm gip cc y ban hiu mt cchy , khch quan v mang ti nhng t tng mi m cho cc vn lin quan. tc s khch quan cn thit, thnh vin phi khng tham gia iu hnh, c quy nh phmvi cng vic c th v cn c s c lp tng i. trong trng hp mt nhm cc ngvin c lp khng c, vic lp cc y ban nn c gng kt hp m bo ti a skhch quan. Mc d thnh phn ca cc y ban chuyn ngnh c lp l c li nhng phida trn c s thng xuyn i thoi thng thn v kp thi. Ngoi ra, Hi ng qun trnn xem xt cc nguy c ri ro bi vic thnh vin c th tham gia ph trch nhiu y ban,(do thi gian tham gia ca cc thnh vin l hn ch). V d, mt thnh vin cng tc trongy ban tr cp trong khi cng lm vic trong y ban kim sot ri ro hoc y ban kim tonc th khin ri ro hn so vi nhng thnh vin c lp trong cc y ban.

Conflicts of interest

55. Conflicts of interest may arise as a result of the various activities and roles of the bank(eg where the bank extends loans to a firm while its proprietary trading function buys andsells securities issued by that firm), or between the interests of the bank or its customersand those of the banks board members or senior managers (eg where the bank entersinto a business relationship with an entity in which one of the banks board members hasa financial interest). Conflicts of interest may also arise when a bank is part of a broadergroup. For example, where the bank is part of a group, reporting lines and informationflows between the bank, its parent company and/or other subsidiaries can lead to theemergence of similar conflicts of interest (eg sharing of potential proprietary, confidentialor otherwise sensitive information from different entities). The board should ensure thatpolicies to identify potential conflicts of interest are developed and implemented and, ifthese conflicts cannot be prevented, are appropriately managed (based on thepermissibility of relationships or transactions under sound corporate policies consistentwith national law and supervisory standards).

Xung t li ch

Xung t li ch c th pht sinh nh l kt qu ca cc hot ng v vai tr khc nhau



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trong ngn hng(v d khi ngn hng m rng cho vay mt cng ty trong khi n bo lnhchng khon cng ty pht hnh), hoc li ch gia ngn hng v khch hng ca n haycc thnh vin Hi ng qun tr hoc Ban iu hnh (v d ngn hng tin hnh mt miquan h hp tc kinh doanh khi m thnh vin ca Hi ng qun tr c mi li ch trong). Xung t li ch c th pht sinh khi mt ngn hng l mt cng ty thnh vin trong mt

Tp on ln. V d, ngn hng l mt thnh vin ca mt Tp on, cc dng bo co vlung thng tin gia ngn hng, cng ty m ca n hoc cc cng ty con khc c th dnn s xut hin cc xung t li ch (v d, s chia s cc quyn li tim nng, vic bomt hoc cc thng tin nhy cm khc). Hi ng qun tr cn m bo xy dng v phttrin cc chnh sch nhm xc nh v x l cc xung t li ch. Nu cc xung t li chkhng th c ngn chn, cch thch hp l qun l chng (da trn s tha nhn ccmi quan h hoc cc giao dch c th gy xung t li ch theo cc chnh sch c banhnh ca cng ty ph hp vi quy nh ca php lut v cc tiu chun gim st).

56. The board should have a formal written conflicts of interest policy and an objectivecompliance process for implementing the policy. The policy should include:

a members duty to avoid to the extent possible activities that could create conflicts ofinterest or the appearance of conflicts of interest;

a review or approval process for members to follow before they engage in certainactivities (such as serving on another board) so as to ensure that such activity willnot create a conflict of interest;

a members duty to disclose any matter that may result, or has already resulted, in aconflict of interest;

a members responsibility to abstain from voting on any matter where the member

may have a conflict of interest or where the members objectivity or ability toproperly fulfil duties to the bank may be otherwise compromised;

adequate procedures for transactions with related parties to be made on an arms-length basis; and

the way in which the board will deal with any non-compliance with the policy.

Hi ng qun tr cn phi c mt vn bn chnh thc v chnh sch Xung t li ch v mtQuy trnh v quy nh tun th thc hin chnh sch. Cc chnh sch nn bao gm:

- Chnh sch v trch nhim ca mt thnh vin trnh cc hot ng c th to ra

xung t li ch hay trng hp c s xut hin ca xung t li ch;- Quy trnh xem xt hoc ph duyt cho cc thnh vin theo di trc khi h thamgia vo cc hot ng nht nh (nh lm vic trong mt b phn khc) m borng hot ng nh vy s khng to ra mt xung t li ch;

- Chnh sch v trch nhim ca thnh vin vch trn bt c vn no v bomt cc kt qu nhm trnh xung t li ch;

- Chnh sch v trch nhim ca mt thnh vin khng c nh gi v bt kvn no m thnh vin ny thc hin v s c th to ra xung t li ch hoctrng hp cc hot ng ca nhn vin hon thnh ngha v vi ngn hng c th

b xm phm do iu kin khch quan.- Chnh sch v giao dch kinh doanh vi cc bn lin quan phi c thc hin trn



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quy nh thng thng;

- Chnh sch v cch thc m Hi ng qun tr s dng x l vi bt k s khngtun th chnh sch.

57. It is a leading practice to include in any conflicts of interest policy examples of where

conflicts can arise when serving as a board member.y l mt yu t quan trng hng u phi tnh n trong chnh sch v x l xung t lich khi m xung t c th pht sinh i vi thnh vin Hi ng quan tr.

58. The board should ensure that appropriate public disclosure is made, and/or informationis provided to supervisors, relating to the banks policies on conflicts of interest andpotential conflicts of interest. This should include information on the banks approach tomanaging material conflicts of interest that are not consistent with such policies; andconflicts that could arise as a result of the banks affiliation or transactions with otherentities within the group.

Hi ng qun tr phi m bo rng vic cng b thng tin c thc hin cng kha v ccthng tin cng b phi c gim st, lin quan ti chnh sch v x l xung t li ch vxung t li ch tim n ca ngn hng. iu ny s bao gm thng tin v cch tip cn cangn hng qun l cc xung t v quyn li vt cht m khng ph hp vi chnh sch;v xung t c th xy ra nh l kt qu ca quan h chi nhnh ca ngn hng hoc cccng ty khc trong Tp on m ngn hng l thnh vin.

59. There is a potential conflict of interest where a bank is both owned by and subject tobanking supervision by the state. If such conflicts of interests do exist, there should befull administrative separation of the ownership and banking supervision functions in orderto try to minimise political interference in the supervision of the bank.

C xung t li ch khi ngn hng va b qun l bi cc ch s hu ngn hng v ngthi cng phi chu s gim st ca c quan qun l Nh nc. S xung t li ch l khtrnh khi, do vy cn c s tch bit gia quyn s hu v chc nng gim st ngn hng lm gim s can thip ca Nh nc vo vic gim st ngn hng.

Controlling shareholders

60. Where there are controlling shareholders with power to appoint board members, theboard should exercise corresponding caution. In such cases, it is useful to bear in mindthat the board members have responsibilities to the bank itself, regardless of whoappoints them. In cases where there are board members appointed by a controllingshareholder, the board may wish to set out specific procedures or conduct periodicreviews to ensure the appropriate discharge of responsibilities by all board members.

C ng ln

Trng hp c cc c ng ln(c ng c quyn kim sot) vi quyn b nhim cc thnhvin Hi ng qun tr, Hi ng qun tr s c s quan tm tng ng ti cc c ng ny.iu ny c li ch cc thnh vin Hi ng qun tr c trch nhim cho chnh ngn hngca h, li ch cho bt k ai ch nh h. Khi thnh vin Hi ng qun tr c ch nh bimt c ng ln, Hi ng qun tr c th mun thit lp cc quy trnh c th hoc tin hnhnh gi nh k m bo s ng mc v trch nhim ca tt c cc thnh vin Hi

ng.



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Group tructuresPrinciple 4

In a group structure, the board of the parent company has the overall responsibilityfor adequate corporate governance across the group and ensuring that there are

governance policies and mechanisms appropriate to the structure, business andrisks of the group and its entities.

Board of parent company

Cu trc ca Tp on

Nguyn tc 4

Trong mt Tp on, Hi ng qun tr ca cng ty m c trch nhim tng th vvn qun tr doanh nghip ca c Tp on v m bo rng c nhng chnh schqun tr v c ch thch hp m bo v cu trc, hot ng kinh doanh v kim

sot ri ro ca c Tp on v cc thnh vin ca n.Hi ng qun tr ca cng ty m

61. In the discharge of its corporate governance responsibilities, the board of the parentcompany should be aware of the material risks and issues that might affect both thebank as a whole and its subsidiaries. It should therefore exercise adequate oversightover subsidiaries, while respecting the independent legal and governance responsibilitiesthat might apply to regulated subsidiary boards.

Khi thc hin trch nhim qun tr, Hi ng qun tr ca cng ty m cn nhn thc cton b ri ro (thit hi v mt vt cht) v cc vn c th nh hng n c ngn hng

v ton b tp on cng nh cng ty con ca n. V vy, nn c hot ng gim st y cng ty con trn c s vn phi tn trng cc quy nh ca php lut v trch nhim qun trc lp ca cc cng ty ny.

62. In order to fulfil its corporate governance responsibilities, the board of the parentcompany should:

establish a governance structure which contributes to the effective oversight of subsidiaries and which takes into account the nature, scale and complexity of thedifferent risks to which the group and its subsidiaries are exposed;

assess the governance structure periodically to ensure that it remains appropriate in

light of growth, increased complexity, geographic expansion, etc; approve a corporate governance policy at the group level for its subsidiaries, which

includes the commitment to meet all applicable governance requirements;

ensure that enough resources are available for each subsidiary to meet both groupstandards and local governance standards;

understand the roles and relationships of subsidiaries to one another and to theparent company; and

have appropriate means to monitor that each subsidiary complies with all applicablegovernance requirements.

hon thnh trch nhim qun tr doanh nghip ca mnh, Hi ng qun tr cng ty m



31/68

nn:

- Thit lp mt c cu qun tr gp phn vo vic gim st hiu qu ca cc cng tycon v trong c tnh n tnh cht, quy m, s phc tp ca cc ri ro khc nhauca Tp on v cc cng ty con ca n;

- nh gi c cu qun tr nh k m bo rng n thch hp cho vic tngtrng, gia tng mc phc tp, m rng chi nhnh,

- Chp thun mt chnh sch qun tr doanh nghip cp Tp on i vi cccng ty con, bao gm cc cam kt p ng tt c cc yu cu qun tr;

- m bo ngun lc va ngun lc c sn mi cng ty con p ng tiuchun qun tr ca Tp on v tiu chun qun tr ca a phng/quc gia/vng lnhth.

- Hiu c vai tr v mi quan h ca cc cng ty con vi nhau v vi cng ty m;v

- C phng tin thch hp gim st s tun th ca mi cng ty con p ng y cc yu cu qun tr.

Board of regulated subsidiary

63. In general, the board of a regulated banking subsidiary should adhere to the corporatevalues and governance principles espoused by its parent company. In doing so theboard should take into account the nature of the business of the subsidiary and the legalrequirements that are applicable.

Quy nh i vi Hi ng qun tr ca cng ty con

Nhn chung, Hi ng qun tr ca cng ty con mt ngn hng phi tun th vn ha doanhnghip v cc nguyn tc qun tr ca cng ty m. Nh vy, Hi ng qun tr nn tnh tibn cht ca vic kinh doanh ca cng ty con v cc yu cu php l c p dng.

64. The board of a regulated banking subsidiary should retain and set its own corporategovernance responsibilities, and should evaluate any group-level decisions or practicesto ensure that they do not put the regulated subsidiary in breach of applicable legal orregulatory provisions or prudential rules. 22 The board of the regulated bankingsubsidiary should also ensure that such decisions or practices are not detrimental to:

the sound and prudent management of the subsidiary;

the financial health of the subsidiary; or the legal interests of the subsidiarys stakeholders.

22 In some jurisdictions, in order to exercise its corporate governance responsibilities independently, the boardof the subsidiary is expected to have an adequate number of qualified, independent non-executive boardmembers, who devote sufficient time to the matters of the subsidiary.

Hi ng qun tr ca cng ty con ngn hng nn quy nh gi li v thit lp trch nhimqun tr ca ring n v nn nh gi bt k quyt nh cp Tp on hoc hot ng m bo rng cc cng ty con khng vi phm quy nh ca php l

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