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Summary
58 Registered Attendees
21%
20%
11%12%
14%
11%
3%4% 2% 2%
DOE
JLAB
ORNL
SLAC
LANL
BNL
ANL
FERMI
LBL
Ret
8/14/2008 22008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Available Examples of Hazard Analysis
ERL at BNL
JLab (in process)
SNS
8/14/2008 32008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Network Share Experience, Concerns, Clarifications Outcomes
Better understanding of safety issues facing accelerator facilities in 2008-2009
Recommendations for action▪ Who?▪ What?▪ When?▪ How?
▪ Reports▪ Guidance▪ Standard▪ White Paper▪ Technical Report▪ Let Sleeping dogs….
8/14/2008 42008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Very contemporary Lessons Learned
SLAC PVC Pipe Explosion
Contactor Failure after modification
Incorrect Software Loaded
8/14/2008 52008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Implementation of 10CFR851 Pressure Systems Requirements
10CFR851 has broad requirements that make it difficult to apply to accelerators. Many regulators with different expectations.
Many of cited codes difficult to apply to accelerator components.
Working group to work with EFCOG to address issues with 851 owners?
8/14/2008 62008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
851 Flow down of requirements to Subcontractors
Scope of 851 subcontractor Occupational Medicine program requirements
Enforcement actions – and subcontractor requirements
Makes it difficult to apply guiding principles, e.g. tailored solutions
8/14/2008 72008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Continued application of nuclear orders, regulations, standards, guidance… to non-nuclear facilities. Cost of compliance Controls not tailored to the work
Staffing reduction in the light of funding cuts Balanced priorities?
Concept of standardization across complex Prescriptive requirements make it difficult to tailor
safety programs to each lab’s unique makeup Post examples of sad/ase ?
8/14/2008 82008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Pressure Systems
Agreement on Vacuum Systems Standard!▪ We recommend issuance as appendix to Accelerator Safety Order
Guidance
▪ DOE HQ representative will explore path forward within Office of Science and will coordinate with OS senior management
▪ Final document will be posted on BNL web site and forwarded to DOE Office of Science for further action
8/14/2008 92008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Nano Materials Health hazards: Communication of hazards to community is important. At least one laboratory has
an annual community meeting where the work with engineered nano materials and the controls used are discussed.
Medical Surveillance: Care must be taken to avoid establishing what could be perceived as an engineered nano material worker “registry”
Air Sampling: ▪ Air sampling techniques are “area monitoring” methods. Use of two downloadable direct read
particle counters is required when using the NSRC Industrial Hygiene Protocol. The output of these meters must be manipulated using a spreadsheet to standardize the units of concentration and the graphics: one counter uses x y plot of counts vs. time and the other displays a histogram of counts across particle size ranges.
▪ Care must be taken to hold static all other activity in the area when using these instruments, as they will have a significant effect on the background.
▪ Significance of the read outs of these instruments is the delta between background measurements and measurements during engineered nano material work. A mechanism to decrease background counts would significantly improve usefulness of area monitoring.
8/14/2008 102008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Nano Materials
Engineering controls: ▪ low flow hoods are preferred due to the unwanted dispersion of engineered nanomaterials
associated with use in conventional chemical fume hoods. ▪ HEPA filters for exhaust systems:
▪ recent studies indicate that as particle size decreases, impaction increases. ▪ Retrofitted HEPA filter systems must be DOP tested in situ.
8/14/2008 112008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Accelerator Produced Radiation 10 CFR 835 and Neutrons
▪ Should DOE have (or still should) issue dose/fluence factors? ▪ Spectra do not vary much in bulk shields; labyrinths, skyshine, etc. are a different matter.▪ Discussed prevalence of actual neutron exposures to people.▪ May be a problem with shipping to or from a non-DOE entity. (e.g, shipment of an AmBe source.)▪ WNR has an unmoderated neutron beam that mimics a cosmic spectrum. Suggested WNR be used as
place to do neutron calibrations as a better match to accelerator neutron spectrum accurately known. This was thought to be a good idea. Personnel changes may make this a renewed possibility.
▪ Air crews receive the highest neutron exposures.
Passive Versus Active Shielding▪ Good discussion▪ Question of where to place remote instruments. ▪ The question was raised as to how to make failsafe. What is “failsafe”? Passive shielding is not failsafe.
There have been reported failures of administrative controls. Perhaps we have relied too much on passive shielding. Where did the “ 1 hour “ criterion of DOE 5480.25 come from?
▪ LANL wants feedback on their proposal. Perhaps the SAD/ASE process is the vehicle for resolving this. The LANSCE proposed approach perhaps is more conservative at high beam powers than at low beam powers. Is 30 MJ per beam loss a good starting point? It was rather amazing as to how close the “independent” criteria were coming. A lively discussion of active/passive ensued.
▪ There are two kinds of passive shielding, bulk permanent shielding versus movable shielding that can readily be moved. But, there are still administrative controls that have to be correctly implemented to maintain the desired level of safety.
▪ Combined discussion of Active+Passive controls? – effectiveness, QA?
8/14/2008 122008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Accelerator Produced Radiation DOE Order 5400.5 is under review?
▪ 10 CFR 835 Appendix D values may be revised to match the revised DOE 5400.5. This may be out soon, perhaps before the end of CY08. Be on the lookout to make comments.
▪ The question was asked if this is an opportunity to get relief from the metals recycling moratorium.
▪ May network before next ASW to address this
Nuclear Packaging Manual – Impact?▪ Probably not?
Sealed Source Reporting Notice▪ People do not seem to be seeing a lot of impact.▪ ORNL/SNS tried to design the response to avoid disrupting normal processes. ORNL does
generate some sources. What constitutes the birth of a source?▪ Are there issues on reporting timeframes?
Occurrence Reporting▪ Is this system overly aggressive? Believe to be in review. There may be some missing
criteria, for example, no criterion on beryllium.
8/14/2008 132008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Safety PLCs and Software Consensus standard for active credited engineering controls Software testing (PLC application software for interlock
systems)▪ Should a consistent approach across the complex be desired then the
following issues should be addressed: · ▪ Who should develop the validation procedure (interlock group, separate expert,
etc.) · ▪ Who should review and approve the resulting procedures▪ Who executes the procedure during periodic testing▪ Who accepts the results of the validation procedure
Use of SIL 3 rated PLCs▪ Would it be acceptable to use a single SIL 3 rated safety PLC in lieu of
the common 1oo2 PLC architecture used at several of the labs that are programmed by different programmers?▪ Several persons maintained that this approach could be used but they suggested
that the two programmer model be retained
8/14/2008 142008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Management of Low Quantity Radioactive Material Use of Tags on Non-Radioactive Items
▪ It was felt not to be a good idea to label non-radioactive items released from activation areas as “clean.”
Unrestricted Release of Non-Metal Materials from Accelerators▪ Proximity to beam can be used to pre-determine if activation of
non-metal materials is possible. Additionally, participants indicated unrestricted release can occur if:▪ Process knowledge indicates the material could not have been made
radioactive; process knowledge is imparted through work planning and training
▪ Other controls are used such as routine surveys in uncontrolled areas, gate detectors, training, posting, and work planning
▪ Materials are surveyed and are not measured to be above background before they are released
8/14/2008 152008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Management of Low Quantity Radioactive Material Unrestricted Release of Metals from Accelerators
▪ It was felt that the DOE metals moratorium on unrestricted release will remain in effect since there are industrial applications that may not permit any radioactive material in the supply stream (e.g., silver when used in film).
▪ Because of DOE Order 5400.5, unrestricted release of property for public use is moving towards model-derived dose based analysis. Not only is the Authorized Release process quantitative but it requires stakeholder involvement
▪ It was felt that the DOE metals moratorium may have outlived its usefulness when applied to metals released from a radiological area at an operating accelerator. The DOE should consider limiting the applicability of the moratorium to decommissioning activities, and defer to the Authorized Release process for all other situations involving unrestricted release determinations.
▪ HSS needs to publish authorized release limit determinations on web to give examples to the rest of us.
Other issues discussed (See Report)▪ Practices to Prevent Inadvertent Release of Radioactive Materials at Accelerators▪ Public Relations▪ Shipping Radioactive Materials ▪ De-posting Issues
8/14/2008 162008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Safety Software QA QA Order 414.1C is broad enough to incorporate QA requirements for
accelerator software without undue hardship▪ However, 414.1C Attachment 2 “Contractor QA Program Requirements”, part 5 specifically
addresses its requirements to safety software for nuclear facilities. For example, in a nuclear facility, the software used to model source terms is considered
Category 1, Level A: the highest. In an accelerator, analogous software is used for shielding calculations and is not comparable to that used for modeling a nuclear accident.
One major advantage – shielding software is verificable. Nuclear Loss of Containment spill is not.
Discussed safety system software QA at several labs. ▪ Validation step is performed everywhere
▪ Execution of verification step varies across the complex; ▪ None▪ In Situ▪ Off-line switch board ▪ Off-line PLC simulation
▪ None are using the manufacturer’s simulation software at this time but it was agreed that this may be of value.
8/14/2008 172008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
SAD/ASE/USI ASE scope:
▪ Guidance implies too much detail required.▪ Correct level varies greatly for different facilities, but
categories allow comprehensive assessment.▪ ASE limits vs operations envelope limits – operator
awareness and actions if violated▪ Staffing, beam power ▪ Should all credited controls be included in ASE?▪ Must be easily verifiable.▪ Include fire safety with respect to equipment damage (vs
safety)▪ Common repository for SAD/ASE documentation?
8/14/2008 182008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
SAD/ASE/USI
Accelerator Safety Working Group – has value(nuclear has safety working group which works well EFCOG)
▪ Home for Repository?
USI prescreen, then review against hazard analysis
Check list that triggers use of USI process (e.g. PSS, other equipment, safety manual ,…)
8/14/2008 192008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
Topics for consideration next year: Experiment review process
User issues
NEPA Process
IH Monitoring Assessments per 851
Cyber security of Interlock systems
2009 NFPA 70E
Update on5400.5 and release criteria?
RF safety C95.1 standard?
ACGIH magnetic field
8/14/2008 202008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
BNL Will host – stay tuned!
8/14/2008 212008 DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop: Summary
