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EASTERN JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES Volume 1, Issue 2, December 2010 139
Does FDI promote regional development?
Evidence from local and regional productivity
spillovers in Greece
Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS* and Jacob A. JORDAAN
Abstract
Studies on the productivity spillovers of FDI have concentrated on the national-
sectoral level. As a result, little is known about the impact of FDI on absolute
and relative regional economic performance. In this paper we examine this issue
by relying on a unique dataset of over 20,000 Greek firms for the period 2002-
2006 covering all sectors of economic activity. We examine the spatial
distribution of foreign-owned firms in the country and analyse the effect that
their presence – at the local, regional and national levels – has on the
productivity of domestic firms. We find strong evidence suggesting that foreign-
owned firms self-select into regions and sectors of high productivity. Net of this
selection effect, the impact of foreign presence on domestic productivity is
negative – although at the very local level some positive spillover effects are
identifiable. The bulk of the effects concentrate in non-manufacturing activities,
high-tech sectors, and medium-sized high-productivity firms. Importantly, this
effect is not constant across space however. Productivity spillovers tend to be
negative in the regions hosting the main urban areas in the country but positive
in smaller and more peripheral regions. In this way, despite the tendency of FDI
to concentrate in a limited number of areas within the country – those of the
highest level of development – the externalities that FDI activity generates to the
local economies appear to be of a rather equilibrating character.
Key words: regional development, FDI, productivity spillovers, Greece, spatial
heterogeneity
JEL classification: F23, R11, C23, O12
* Vassilis Monastiriotis is senior lecturer at European Institute, London School of Economics,
Houghton Street, WC2A 2AE London, UK; e-mail: [email protected]. Jacob A. Jordaan is assistant professor at Department of Economics, VU University Amsterdam,
1105 de Boelelaan, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; e-mail: [email protected].
140 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment can be an important source of economic
development for recipient economies. FDI inflows strengthen capital
accumulation and job creation domestically, while they improve the fiscal and
external position of the recipient countries, thus helping finance government
expenditures that can further stimulate economic development (Caves, 2007;
Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Besides these macroeconomic effects, foreign
investments may have more direct effects on industrial activity and performance,
through their impact on the technology and productivity of domestic firms.
Owing to their technological and other advantages, foreign-owned firms can
generate significant externalities for the domestic economy. These can operate
mainly through three channels: pecuniary/demand spillovers, technological/
learning spillovers, and competition effects1.
There is now a large literature examining the magnitude and direction of
these effects. Reflecting its industrial and business economics origins, the
literature has typically focused at the national-sectoral level, as these spillovers
are assumed to operate along sectoral lines. As a consequence, only limited
attention has been paid to the spatial distribution of FDI spillovers and the
identification of region-specific effects accruing from FDI. Of the few cases that
have studied regional-level FDI spillovers, most have either treated the
geographical information as an additional dimension in their sample (Aitken and
Harrison, 1999; Blalock and Gertler, 2008) or have limited their focus to the role
that industrial clusters and agglomeration play for the realisation of FDI
spillovers (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Jordaan, 2005; De Propris and Driffield,
2006) – both without explicitly examining the geography of such spillovers.
Only very few studies have instead examined the process of diffusion of FDI
spillovers across space (Halpern and Muraközy, 2007; Haskel et al, 2007;
Jordaan, 2008) and, to our knowledge, only one has examined specifically the
issue of differentiation in the direction and magnitude of FDI spillovers across
space (Mullen and Williams, 2007). By implication therefore, there is a notable
gap in our knowledge and understanding of the overall impact of foreign
investment on the host country‟s regional economic structure and performance.
This paper makes an important contribution in this regard, by providing an
analysis of the location and productivity spillovers of FDI at the regional and
sub-regional (local) level and examining both the process of spatial diffusion of
1 See Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) for an early literature on these
issues and Smeets (2008) for an excellent review of these theoretical channels. It should be noted
that spillovers can also be negative (and empirically they appear to be so more often than not),
especially in cases where market-capturing by the foreign affiliates creates a „demand-siphoning‟
effect for the domestic firms which raises average production costs and lowers productivity.
Moran et al (2005) offer an extensive discussion of positive and negative productivity effects that
arise from FDI.
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 141
FDI spillovers and the extent of differentiation of these spillovers across space.
We focus on the case of Greece, a country with a significantly skewed
geographical production structure (over-concentration of economic activity in a
few centres) and a low degree of FDI attraction. Owing to these features, Greece
appears as a particularly appealing empirical case – where the geographical
concentration of FDI is expected to be more intense and spatial differences in the
extent of spillovers more heightened. Our analysis sets to explore three main
questions. First, what has been the incidence and sectoral distribution of foreign
activity across the regional economies of Greece. Second, what is the effect of
foreign activity on the productivity of domestic firms in the country and how
localised is this effect. Third, whether and to what extent are FDI spillovers
regionally differentiated and conditioned upon specific firm-level, sectoral and
regional characteristics.
Our data refer to a firm-level panel of annual observations covering the
period 2002-2006, a period of relative stability and fast growth, starting after the
country‟s successful adoption of the EURO and ending before the first signs of
the global financial crisis. All data are derived from the Amadeus database
produced by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), which contains firm-level information on
turnover, fixed assets, employment, ownership and other variables of interest for
the majority of European countries, covering all sectors of economic activity.
For Greece, the Amadeus database contains some 27,000 firms per year, of
which just over 2,000 are foreign owned, representing an employment share of
7.78%.2 This dataset is unique in its detail and coverage and, to our knowledge,
it has not been used before for the case of Greece.
Our starting premise is that FDI spillovers are essentially and
fundamentally heterogeneous across space – not least because FDI itself tends to
be particularly concentrated, especially in locations of high productivity,
accessibility and industrial agglomeration. The scant existing empirical evidence
seems to support this claim, showing that industrial clustering (agglomeration) is
significant not only for attracting foreign firms (Guimaraes et al, 2000; Hilber
and Voicu, 2010) but also for determining the size of the realised productivity
spillovers (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Jordaan, 2005; De Propris and Driffield,
2006). There are also good theoretical reasons to expect FDI-induced
productivity spillovers to take a heterogeneous geographical manifestation –
although the effects can go either way. On the one hand, foreign investments
may be less able to generate positive spillovers in less developed regions
2 As is standard in the literature, we define a firm as foreign owned if at least 10% of its value is
owned by an ultimate owner who is resident or established outside the country. After excluding
thus defined foreign affiliates and observations with incomplete or erroneous information, our
estimating sample reduces to just over 20,000 firms (98,408 firms-specific observations in the
pooled sample) – bringing the average employment share of foreign-owned firms to just below
13%.
142 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
because their technological distance to local firms does not allow for potential
spillovers to be absorbed (the „absorptive capacity‟ argument – see Kokko,
1994; Damijan et al, 2001; Girma, 2005; Jordaan, 2009). On the other hand,
foreign investments may produce larger spillovers in less developed regions, as
firms there are typically less exposed to international competition and have thus
more to „learn‟ from the foreign-owned firms (the „scope for spillovers‟
argument – see Kinoshita, 2000; Merlevede and Schoors, 2005; Gersl et al,
2007; Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011).3
In the remainder of this paper we set to explore the empirical validity of
these expectations by providing a holistic analysis of the incidence, geographical
scale and spatial differentiation of FDI-induced productivity spillovers across the
Greek regions. We examine the incidence and sectoral distribution of foreign
activity in section 2. Section 3 presents our econometric analysis, which explores
in detail the FDI productivity spillovers and the extent to which they diffuse
across space (how localised they are and how neighbouring FDI affects local
productivity). In section 4 we analyse the issue of spatial and functional
differentiation of these spillovers. We conclude with a short discussion of the
implications of our findings for both policy and the empirical literature on FDI
spillovers.
2. FDI in Greece and its regions
Historically, Greece has not been an important recipient of FDI. The
country embarked on a policy to encourage inward investments since the 1950s
and while FDI flows recorded an almost continuous growth (in absolute terms)
for decades (Louri et al, 2000), its total inward FDI stock was below 10% of
GDP in the 1990s and 2000s with annual FDI flows representing less than 10%
of total gross fixed capital formation in the country (UNCTAD, 2009). As a
result, Greece ranks persistently at the bottom of the international rankings of
FDI recipients and its FDI stock represents less than 1% of the total inward FDI
stock of the EU27. Moreover, it appears that the technology content of inward
FDI in Greece is also particularly low: according to data by the Bank of Greece,
in 2008 manufacturing accounted for some 33% of the total stock of inward FDI,
3 Ambiguity also exists with regard to the location of FDI across regions. Theory and empirical
evidence suggest that FDI tends to locate in national capitals and some highly accessible and
relatively developed regions, which “cream-off” the most productive foreign investors, thus
reinforcing existing spatial asymmetries in production structures and capabilities (Guimaraes et al,
2000; Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001; Resmini, 2008 – see Pantelidis and Nikolopoulos, 2008 for
the case of Greece). In theory, however, high-productivity foreign-owned firms may also choose to
locate in less developed regions, as part of a strategy to protect their technological advantages
from diffusing to their domestic competitors who are typically located in the more developed
regions of the host country.
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 143
almost two-thirds of which was in sectors producing consumer goods, with FDI
in the manufacture of capital goods representing a mere 0.8% of the total FDI
stock in the country.
This is consistent with findings of previous research, which has shown
that FDI is below the country‟s potential (Papazoglou, 2001; UNCTAD, 2004;
Kokkinou and Psycharis, 2004), predominantly of a market-seeking type
(Georganta et al, 1986; Georgopoulos and Preusse, 2006) and concentrating in
traditional sectors that are characterised by low technology and labour-intensive
production (Barrios et al, 2004). The low degree and quality of FDI in the
country has often been attributed to factors such as the extent of red-tape and
bureaucracy, high tax rates, poor infrastructure and a weak business and
macroeconomic environment (Apergis and Katrakylidis, 1998; Barbosa and
Louri, 2002; Filippaios and Kottaridi, 2004; Pantelidis and Nikolopoulos, 2008).
Previous research has also shown that FDI in Greece is highly
concentrated, along both sectoral and spatial lines (Dimelis et al, 2004; Bitzenis
et al, 2007). Indeed, together with manufacturing, three other sectors account
jointly for over 90% of the FDI stock in the country (financial services 30%,
transport and communications 15%, wholesale/retail trade 13%).4 Interestingly,
the Hotel and Restaurants sector, which includes the tourism industry, one of the
country‟s main comparative advantages, only accounts for 2% of total FDI
stock. FDI appears also particularly concentrated across space. Bank of Greece
data show that in the period 2000-2008 only 25 out of the 51 NUTS3 regions of
the country received any form of FDI, with 87% of FDI inflows going to the
prefecture of Attiki, where the national capital is situated, and the fifth highest
FDI recipient accounting for a mere 0.5% of total FDI inflows into the country
(€100m compared to a national figure of €18.8bn).
Thus, both along sectoral and geographical lines, the distribution of
foreign-owned activity in Greece is particularly skewed, with FDI being of an
important relative size in only a few sectors and regions. This is also revealed in
the data derived from the Amadeus database. Using this data, Figure 1 presents
the geography of FDI concentration (employment in foreign-owned firms as a
share of total employment in each region) at the NUTS3 level, averaged over the
2002-2006 period.
4 Data refer to the on the book value of investments derived from the Bank of Greece. In our data
we get a similar picture of concentration in these main sectors, although given that we use
employment than investment shares the ranking of the sectors is different, reflecting sectoral
differences in capital-labour ratios. The four main sectors account in our data for 85% of total
employment in foreign-owned firms (wholesale and retail trade: 37%; manufacturing: 26%;
transport and telecommunications: 14%; financial and business services: 8%).
144 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
Figure 1. Presence of foreign-owned activity in the Greek regions
(employment shares, period average, 2002-2006)
Source: Authors‟ calculations from the Amadeus database (BvD). Note: Regions have been classified into five groups using a „natural breaks‟ criterion
Figure 2 presents the same information this time split by sector
(manufacturing – non-manufacturing). As can be seen, high-concentrations of
foreign-owned activity are mainly in the regions of Attiki and Thessaloniki,
which host the two main urban centres in the country, and secondarily in the
island regions of Lesvos (for manufacturing) and the Dodecanese (for non-
manufacturing). Foreign-owned activity in the rest of the country is very sparse.
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 145
Overall, out of the 51 NUTS3 regions, in only two regions in the country does
employment in foreign-owned firms represent more than 6% of total regional
employment –while in only another 10 regions does it represent a share above
2%.
Figure 2. Foreign-owned activity by broad sector and region (employment
shares, period average, 2002-2006)
Manufacturing Non-manufacturing
Note: See note in Figure 1.
Figures 1 and 2 suggest a rather high degree of geographical concentration
of FDI around two main clusters (centred in the main cities of Athens – Attiki,
Voiotia, Evoia – and Thessaloniki – Thessaloniki, Kilkis, Pieria), with a few
„hotspots‟ of FDI activity in the remaining periphery. To examine to what extent
this visual pattern is supported by statistical evidence of spatial association
across or within regions, we performed an exploratory spatial data analysis (see
Anselin, 1995) using various definitions of neighbourliness based on distance
thresholds or on a pre-defined maximum number of neighbours.5 Figure 3
reports the results obtained from the analysis based on the 4-nearest neighbours
criterion. The maps depict the membership of regions into different types of
spatial association. The high-high cluster (black shade) includes regions that
have high shares of FDI employment and are also surrounded by regions of high
FDI shares. The high-low cluster (dark grey) includes high-FDI regions which
5 We used a range of alternative distance cut-off points as well as the k-nearest neighbour criterion
for values of k in the range {2, 8}. Using contiguity-based neighbourliness is not appropriate in the
case of Greece due to its peculiar physical geography (many island regions). In no case was the
level of global spatial association greater than 0.03 and in no case was it statistically significant
(the expected value of the Moran‟s I is around 0.16).
146 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
are surrounded by regions with low FDI shares. Similarly, the low-low and low-
high clusters include regions that have low FDI employment shares and are
surrounded by regions that also have low FDI shares (plain grey shade) or by
regions with high FDI shares (light grey stripes). Regions for which no statistical
association exists between local and neighbouring values are coloured white.
As can be seen, there is very little evidence of clustering across space. The
Moran‟s I, which measures the extent to which local outcomes correlate with
outcomes in neighbouring regions, is effectively zero; while although a few
„hotspots‟ can be identified, these are not necessarily in the places one would
expect them to appear. Specifically, for total FDI there are two main hotspots,
both located in the west (Ioannina and Etoloakarnania). These two regions are
effectively „spatial outliers‟, having relatively high shares of FDI but being
surrounded by regions with low FDI shares. Three other regions constitute
negative outliers, in the sense that they have neighbouring regions with high
values but they themselves have low shares of employment in foreign-owned
firms. Finally, two main clusters are also observable: Kozani in the north is the
centre of a low-low cluster, while Evoia in Central Greece signifies the high-
high cluster which extends southwards to Attiki and northwards to Magnisia (see
Figure 1 for the location of specific regions). Interestingly, this picture is not
replicated in either of the maps that depict the geography of spatial association
of FDI employment in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. The
Etoloakarnania outlier survives in the case of manufacturing and some new
outliers emerge in the case of non-manufacturing, but overall there is very little
consistency between the different maps, suggesting that even in cases where
local spatial association is statistically significant, the extent of clustering across
regions is rather weak.
Figure 3. Local clusters of FDI (LISA maps)
FDI:
Moran‟s I:
Total
0.0016
Manufacturing
0.0283
Non-manufacturing
-0.0200
Note: See text and footnote 7.
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 147
The high degree of geographical concentration of FDI within Greece and
its low technological content makes it plausible that, despite being a relatively
small proportion of the domestic economy, it can generate significant spillovers.
This is because spillovers often occur inside agglomerations and in a rather
localised manner (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Jordaan, 2009)6 and because the
low technological content means that problems of absorptive capacity for the
domestic firms are less likely to arise. Indeed, this is not refuted in the scant
literature that exists on the topic in Greece. The study by Dimelis and Louri
(2002) for a sample of manufacturing firms found some evidence of positive
productivity spillovers to domestic firms – but only from firms with a minority
foreign ownership. A similar effect was found by Barrios et al (2004), although
in that study the effect vanished when controls were introduced for sectoral
heterogeneity. Finally, Fotopoulos and Louri (2004) also provide indirect
evidence of positive spillovers in their analysis of foreign presence and domestic
firm growth, finding that foreign participation accelerates firm growth especially
for medium-sized firms. To our knowledge, no other study has examined the
extent and nature of FDI spillovers in Greece and no study has done so with any
attention to the geography of these spillovers. Our analysis in the remainder of
this paper seeks to fill this gap by providing unique evidence on the direction
and intensity of FDI spillovers across the Greek regions.
3. FDI spillovers across the Greek regions
As mentioned earlier, our dataset consists of firm-level data on turnover,
fixed assets and employment, organised across sectors (NACE2 and NACE4),
regions (NUTS2 and NUTS3) and years (2002-2006). Additionally, we have
aggregated the foreign ownership information at the sectoral (NACE2) and
regional (NUTS3) level to construct a variable measuring the intra-sector share
of foreign ownership in each of the 51 prefectures of Greece. As is standard in
the literature, we follow a production-function approach, where firm-level output
is made a function of each firm‟s value of fixed assets and level of employment,
adding the FDI variable as an additional regressor. Our approach implies that
investment and manning decisions are not influenced by a firms‟ own
productivity and that FDI affects a firm‟s total factor productivity but not its
level of investment or employment. Although the literature has occasionally
questioned the full validity of such assumptions (see Olley and Pakes, 1996;
Jarvocik, 2004), others have shown that the bias introduced by these
assumptions is minimal, especially in empirical studies with limited time-
horizons (Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011).
6 See however Haskel et al (2007) for evidence against this.
148 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
Empirically, our estimating model takes the following form:
yirst = a + b1kirst + b2lirst + eirst (1)
which we later amend with the inclusion of the FDI variable and occasionally by
adding various fixed effects. Thus, our full estimating model is
yirst = a + b1kirst + b2lirst + cHrst + Rrd1 + Ssd2 + Ttd3 + Fid4 + eirst (2)
where small letters stand for logarithms, y is turnover; k is capital
(measured by fixed assets); l is employment; H is the employment share of
foreign-owned firms; R, S, T, and F are vectors containing binary dummies for
regions, sectors, time and firms, respectively; a, b1, b2, c, d1, d2, d3 and d4 are
coefficients to be estimated; i, r, s, and t index firms, regions, sectors and time,
respectively; and e is an error term. We do not restrict the coefficients b1 and b2
to add up to one, thus allowing for increasing or decreasing returns to scale. We
experiment with different definitions of the H variable (at the NUTS2 level, the
NUTS3 level, or both) and we introduce the various sets of dummy variables
selectively in alternative specifications.
Given the fact that our sample contains many dimensions (sectors,
regions, years), we start our analysis by examining the performance of our
production-function model across alternative fixed-effects specifications,
introducing gradually additional regressors to control for these dimensions.
Table 1 presents the results from this analysis. As can be seen, our base model
performs very well and the obtained factor elasticities are very robust to the
inclusion of controls for the different dimensions of our dataset.
Table 1. Production function analysis
Model:
ln(output) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(capital) 0.133*** 0.131*** 0.192*** 0.200*** 0.158*** 0.160*** 0.206*** 0.112***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0026)
ln(employ-ment) 0.606*** 0.608*** 0.638*** 0.628*** 0.574*** 0.573*** 0.612*** 0.397*** (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.016)
Constant 5.002*** 4.901*** 4.525*** 4.440*** 4.686*** 4.715*** 4.129*** 5.564*** (0.011) (0.013) (0.038) (0.099) (0.025) (0.044) (0.10) (0.041)
Fixed effects No Time Nace2 Nace4 NUTS2 NUTS3 All Firms
& Time
Obs 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407
R-sq 0.35 0.35 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.37 0.54 0.05
Notes: Model (8) is estimated using the Fixed Effects Within estimator. All other regressions are
estimated with OLS. NACE2 (NACE4) contains 54 (429) sectoral dummies while NUTS2
(NUTS3) contains 13 (51) regional dummies. The model of column 7 includes dummies for
NACE4, NUTS3 and time.
The coefficient on capital is rather low, but within acceptable limits, and it
increases somewhat when we add sectoral controls, which appear to control
partly for differences in capacity utilisation. The coefficient on labour is much
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 149
more stable suggesting little variation across sectors or regions in the extent of
labour hoarding. Together, the two coefficients are consistently below 1,
suggesting the presence of decreasing returns to scale in the Greek economy – a
finding consistent with the widely acknowledged inefficiency of its production
system (Bryant et al, 2001; Pagoulatos, 2003).
Importantly, adding temporal fixed effects does not affect the regression
estimates, consistent with the observation that the 2002-2006 period was a
period of relative stability for Greece. As mentioned above, sectoral controls
(either at the 2- or 4-digit of the NACE classification) raise the estimated
productivity of capital (columns 3 and 4). The influence of the regional fixed
effects (columns 5 and 6) is smaller and is again very similar for fixed effects of
different spatial scales (NUTS2 or NUTS3), suggesting that regional differences
in production technologies are minimal and smaller than differences across
sectors. Finally, introducing firm-specific fixed effects (which subsume the
regional and sectoral controls) leads to a drop in the estimated coefficients for
capital and labour, as these effects capture unobserved firm-specific
characteristics which contribute to firm output (managerial capacities,
distribution/client networks, etc).
To this basic but well performing specification we add next our FDI
variable. We experiment with different specifications of this variable for reasons
that will become clear in the discussion that follows. Table 2 presents a set of
key findings. We start by introducing a sector-specific FDI measure calculated at
the NUTS2 level (columns 1-5). When not controlling for fixed effects, of any
type, the impact of foreign firms on domestic productivity appears positive and
very significant. An increase in the employment share of foreign-owned firms by
one percentage point (e.g., from the sample average of 13% to 14%) raises
domestic productivity by 1.7%, with the effect being significant well beyond the
1% level.
Controlling for firm heterogeneity (column 2) maintains this significance
but reduces the magnitude of the estimated spillover by more than 10 times. This
clearly suggests that foreign investments concentrate in regions and sectors with
high concentrations of firms that possess productivity-enhancing unobservable
characteristics, such as good managerial practices and inter-firm networks. This
is consistent with findings elsewhere in the literature (Head et al, 1995; Hilber
and Voicu, 2010). The observed productivity spillovers increase somewhat when
we replace the firm-specific fixed effects with sector-specific ones (column 3),
but remain many times lower than those obtained through a simple OLS
estimation (column 1). Moreover, when we additionally cluster the standard
errors within sectors (column 4) the estimated spillover effect becomes
150 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
statistically not different from zero.7,8
This suggests that a large part of the self-
selection of foreign investments takes place across sectoral lines: high
productivity sectors typically attract above-average amounts of FDI.
The influence of self-selection, however, appears even stronger in its
spatial dimension. When NUTS3 fixed effects are added (col.5), the estimated
spillover effect becomes significantly negative and rather large (a rise in foreign
presence by 1 percentage point reduces domestic productivity by 0.55%). In
other words, when we control for geographical differences in productivity, the
effect of FDI turns out negative. This result, which is very consistent across
different specifications as we shall see later, has a very important implication for
the study of the spatial effects of FDI: productivity spillovers appear
misleadingly positive, largely due to the fact that foreign investments
concentrate –in the case of Greece very heavily– in regions of above-average
productivity. Net of this self-selection effect, the impact of FDI is to reduce
domestic productivity, reflecting a negative competition effect, which
presumably operates via one of the following channels: by lowering pre-existing
monopolistic rents, by creaming off skilled labour in the sector/region, or by
lowering the market share of domestic firms. All these channels are consistent
with features that are known to characterise the Greek economy, such as low
labour mobility, low effective competition within sectors and attraction of
foreign investments which are predominantly of a market-seeking type.
These results are fully replicated when using an FDI measure defined at a
much narrower geographical scale, namely the NUTS3 level (see col.6-10). The
results there are qualitatively identical to those obtained from the NUTS2-level
analysis, although in general the estimated elasticities are somewhat higher,
implying that the positive impact of foreign presence on domestic productivity is
stronger at a more localised level.
The negative spillover effect that we identify when controlling for
regional fixed effects –and thus for self-selection of foreign affiliates into high-
productivity regions– casts doubt on the conventional wisdom about the
beneficial effects of FDI but is not at odds with empirical estimates in the
international literature (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999;
Blomström and Sjoholm, 1999; Damijan et al, 2001; Kugler, 2006;
Gorodnichenko et al, 2007). A possible factor that could account for this
negative effect, if one maintains that the overall impact of FDI should be
7 This is necessary to account for the fact that our FDI variable is measured at the sectoral level.
Clustered standard errors relax the assumption of within-cluster independence, thus allowing for
firm-specific productivities within sectors to be correlated and, by implication, for the errors to be
heteroskedastic. 8 The same result is obtained when we cluster the standard errors within regions, as well as when
we cluster within region-sector clusters (results available upon request).
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 151
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.01
6)
(0.0
15
) (0
.00
19
) (0
.00
26
) (0
.00
19
) (0
.01
6)
(0.0
15
) (0
.01
5)
(0.0
15
) (0
.01
6)
(0.0
15
)
Em
plo
ym
ent
0.5
89
**
*
0.3
96
**
*
0.6
36
**
*
0.6
36
**
*
0.6
24
**
*
0.5
88
**
*
0.3
96
**
*
0.6
35
**
*
0.6
35
**
*
0.6
24
**
*
0.6
15
**
*
0.6
06
**
*
0.6
35
**
*
0.6
24
**
*
(0
.00
38
) (0
.01
6)
(0.0
03
6)
(0.0
32
) (0
.02
8)
(0.0
03
8)
(0.0
16
) (0
.00
36
) (0
.03
2)
(0.0
28
) (0
.02
8)
(0.0
29
) (0
.03
1)
(0.0
28
)
FD
I (n
uts
2)
1.7
01
**
*
0.1
48
**
*
0.2
37
**
*
0.2
37
-0.5
49
**
*
-0
.40
7
-0.8
27
**
(0
.02
8)
(0.0
41
) (0
.03
) (0
.15
) (0
.19
)
(0.3
2)
(0.3
3)
FD
I (n
uts
3)
1
.73
0*
**
0.1
38
**
*
0.2
84
**
*
0.2
84
*
-0.4
28
**
0.6
67
**
0.3
10
(0.0
27
) (0
.04
) (0
.02
9)
(0.1
7)
(0.1
9)
(0.3
3)
(0.2
8)
FD
I(t-
1)
nu
ts3
-0.4
55
**
(0
.19
)
FD
I(t-
2)
nu
ts3
-0
.50
0*
*
(0.2
1)
Fix
ed e
ffec
ts
No
F
irm
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
NU
TS
3
Yea
r
No
F
irm
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
NU
TS
3
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
NU
TS
3
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
NU
TS
3
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
Yea
r
NA
CE
2
NU
TS
3
Yea
r
Est
imat
ion
met
ho
d
OL
S
Wit
hin
O
LS
O
LS
+
cl(n
ace2
)
OL
S +
cl(n
ace2
) O
LS
W
ith
in
OL
S
OL
S +
cl(n
ace2
)
OL
S +
cl(n
ace2
)
OL
S +
cl(n
ace2
)
OL
S +
cl(n
ace2
)
OL
S +
cl(n
ace2
)
OL
S +
cl(n
ace2
)
Co
nst
ant
4.7
03
**
*
5.5
46
**
*
4.4
30
**
*
4.4
30
**
*
4.2
40
**
*
4.7
02
**
*
5.5
48
**
*
4.4
28
**
*
4.4
28
**
*
4.2
45
**
*
4.3
06
**
*
4.4
44
**
*
4.4
30
**
*
4.2
39
**
*
-0
.01
2
-0.0
42
-0.0
39
-0.0
75
-0.1
2
-0.0
12
-0.0
42
-0.0
39
-0.0
74
-0.1
2
-0.1
1
-0.1
1
-0.0
75
-0.1
2
Ob
serv
atio
ns
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
98
40
7
79
80
1
60
04
5
98
40
7
98
40
7
R-s
qu
ared
0
.37
0.0
5
0.4
9
0.4
9
0.5
0
.37
0.0
5
0.4
9
0.4
9
0.5
0
0.4
9
0.4
9
0.4
9
0.5
0
Note
s: E
stim
ated
sta
nd
ard
err
ors
in
par
enth
eses
. **
*.
**
and
* i
ndic
ate
sign
ific
ance
at
the
1,
5 a
nd
10
% l
evel
s. E
stim
atio
ns
wher
e st
and
ard e
rro
rs a
re
clust
ered
wit
hin
NA
CE
2 s
ecto
rs a
re i
ndic
ated
wit
h „
cl(n
ace2
)‟;
„Wit
hin
‟ is
the
fixed
eff
ects
pan
el d
ata
esti
mat
or.
152 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
positive, is the possibility that the beneficial effects of FDI take time to
materialise, i.e. occur with some hysterisis (Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011).
If this hypothesis is valid, then we should observe a contemporaneous negative
association between foreign presence and domestic productivity but a more
positive relation between current domestic productivity and past values of FDI.
Although year-to-year variation in the share of foreign presence in the Greek
economy is limited, which somewhat problematises the identification of this
mechanism in our data, our estimations that test the hysterisis hypothesis
(columns 11 and 12) do not seem to support this assumption: the estimated
spillovers remain negative when we replace the contemporaneous FDI variable
with its one- and two-year lags. In fact, the magnitude of the negative FDI effect
is actually increasing, suggesting if anything a deterioration of domestic
productivity as a response to foreign presence over time. It thus appears that
domestic firms do not adapt (at least not in a two-year horizon) to the negative
shock of foreign presence and continue to suffer from the increased competition
generated by the foreign affiliates. Again, this is consistent with the view of
Greece as an economy that lacks dynamism and where competition is largely a
zero-sum game which does not lead to market expansion.
Returning to the point that we raised earlier about the geographical scale
at which the positive and negative spillovers of FDI occur, in the last two
columns of Table 2 we include simultaneously two FDI variables, measured at
two different geographical scales (NUTS2 and NUTS3), alternatively excluding
and then including our controls for regional fixed effects. In both cases, an
interesting pattern emerges: FDI spillovers appear negative at the wider
geographical scale but are consistently positive at the more localised level.9 This
suggests that locally concentrated FDI helps the performance of domestic firms,
especially in comparison to the performance of similar firms in other NUTS3
regions (since the estimated NUTS3 spillover is stronger and larger when not
including regional fixed effects). At the same time, concentration of FDI in
neighbouring areas, within a local economy‟s administrative region, has an
absolute negative effect on the performance of domestic firms. This offers an
important insight into the workings of FDI spillovers in Greece. Positive FDI
spillovers, presumably due to both pecuniary (demand) and technology effects
(demonstration, imitation), do exist, but they are very localised. Indeed, these
benefits do not diffuse to wider geographical scales and thus at the regional (and
national) level the competition and market capture effect of FDI dominates.
Therefore, despite the localised benefits, the overall effect of FDI on domestic
9 The NUTS2 and NUTS3 spillover coefficients reported in columns 13 and 14 are not
simultaneously significant statistically. They are however jointly significant in each of the
regressions and also significantly different from each other. When replicating these regressions
without clustering the standard errors all coefficients are highly significant even at the 0.1% level.
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 153
productivity, when taking into account the tendency of foreign investments to
self-select into high-productivity regions and sectors, is negative.
4. Spatial and functional heterogeneity of FDI spillovers
The literature on FDI productivity spillovers has often found that
spillovers do not accrue homogeneously across different types of firms and
sectors but are rather dependent on specific firm characteristics such as size,
technology content and sector of economic activity. A similar argument can be
made about the heterogeneity of FDI effects across space, especially under the
light of our preceding discussion and findings. In this section we explore these
two issues, starting with the functional dimension. Table 3 reports the results
from a set of regressions where we split the sample across sectoral
characteristics (manufacturing versus non-manufacturing, high-tech sectors
versus low-tech sectors), firm sizes (large, medium, small), and firm-specific
technological content (high/low technology gap10
). We perform this analysis for
two alternative specifications, first excluding (top panel) and then including
regional fixed effects (bottom panel).
The results are particularly revealing. Although in virtually all cases the
pattern of positive localised spillovers and negative overall spillovers is
maintained (with the exception of the results obtained for large firms, as
discussed below), there are important variations in the effects observed for
different firm types. The impact of FDI is much more heightened outside the
manufacturing sector: the positive localised (NUTS3) effect is stronger, while
the negative diffused (NUTS2) effect is also more pronounced. In contrast, the
impact of FDI in the manufacturing sector is statistically weak (although the
introduction of only one FDI variable at a time makes the results consistent with
our earlier analysis). This is true both for including or excluding regional fixed
effects. In the latter case, the negative diffused effect becomes larger, while the
positive localised effect is smaller. This suggests that in non-manufacturing
sectors foreign firms self-select into high-productivity localities but,
interestingly, away from localities that are neighbouring to high productivity
ones.11
In a somewhat similar fashion, localised FDI spillovers appear stronger
(more positive) in high-tech sectors, especially when we do not control for self-
selection, and the diffused spillover effect appears more negative, especially
10 This is measured as the distance of each domestic firm from the productivity frontier of its
sector, proxied by the level of productivity achieved by the most productive foreign-owned firm in
the sector nationally. 11 For the manufacturing sector the opposite pattern is observed, with foreign firms self-selecting
into broader regions of high productivity but not necessarily into the localities with the highest
productivity within these broad regions. The results here, however, lack statistical significance and
thus this interpretation is tentative.
154 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
when we do control for self-selection. Although the results for the low-tech
sectors are of a similar nature, they are more modest and at the margin of
statistical significance. Our findings, however, differ markedly when we split
our sample by firm size. For large firms, the presence of foreign-owned affiliates
within the same locality appears to produce negative, not positive, productivity
effects, especially when we control for self-selection. In contrast, it is the
diffused spillovers that turn out positive. This suggests an interesting property
for large firms in Greece: co-location with foreign affiliates seems to hamper
their performance, presumably as large firms have less to gain from
demonstration effects and pecuniary spillovers accruing from their foreign-
owned competitors; but the agglomeration of foreign firms in the wider region
outside the domestic large firms‟ own locality has a positive effect on their
performance. The absence of localised benefits in the presence of wider-scale
ones seems to suggest that foreign-firm concentration tends to generate a
market-creation effect for large firms, which is not operational in the case of
medium and small firms within the same sector. For the latter, and especially for
medium-sized firms, the main (and only) benefit is from the presence of foreign
affiliates within the local economy, while the wider-scale effect is consistently
and very strongly negative. An obvious interpretation of this finding is that
smaller firms do not have the reach to capture the benefits from the market-
creation effect at wider geographical scales. Medium-sized firms appear able to
internalise successfully some of the positive spillovers of foreign participation in
the local economy, while very small firms lack the absorptive capacity to do so,
which would explain why the estimated localised spillover effect fails to reach
acceptable levels of statistical significance for these firms.
The level of productivity (technology gap) of domestic firms does not
seem to be a crucial factor for the realisation of FDI spillovers. Firms with a
lower technological gap appear to benefit more from the presence of foreign
firms in the local economy and to suffer less from the agglomeration of foreign
affiliates at the wider geographical scale outside the local economy – although
self-selection appears to be more important here than in the case of firms with a
lower technology content (higher technology gap).12
When controlling for
selection, the latter appear to be better placed to reap the benefits of co-location
(technology transfers and pecuniary effects), although they remain more
susceptible to suffering from competition with foreign-owned firms at a wider
geographical scale (market capture effect).
What do these patterns imply for the geography of productivity spillovers
accruing from the geographical concentration of foreign-owned firms across the
Greek economy?
12 This implies that foreign firms tend to locate in areas with higher concentrations of high
technology firms within any given sector – a finding which is consistent with widespread evidence
in the literature concerning the location of FDI.
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 155
Tab
le 3
. Fu
nct
ion
al h
eter
ogen
eity
of
FD
I sp
illo
vers
M
anu-
fact
urin
g N
on-m
anuf
. H
igh-
tech
Lo
w-t
ech
Larg
e SM
Es
Med
ium
Sm
all
Low
tech
n. g
ap
Hig
h te
chn.
gap
W
ITH
OU
T RE
GIO
NAL
DU
MM
IES
Capi
tal
0.22
4***
0.
186*
**
0.19
2***
0.
193*
**
0.25
2***
0.
175*
**
0.18
6***
0.
148*
**
0.13
3***
0.
134*
**
(0
.021
) (0
.019
) (0
.025
) (0
.019
) (0
.025
) (0
.015
) (0
.017
) (0
.019
) (0
.016
) (0
.019
) Em
ploy
men
t 0.
633*
**
0.63
2***
0.
644*
**
0.63
3***
0.
690*
**
0.53
2***
0.
729*
**
0.30
7***
0.
716*
**
0.79
2***
(0.0
27)
(0.0
40)
(0.0
52)
(0.0
38)
(0.0
38)
(0.0
28)
(0.0
42)
(0.0
26)
(0.0
29)
(0.0
41)
FDI (
nuts
2)
-0.0
323
-0.9
15*
-0.5
14
-0.3
50
0.56
2***
-0
.705
**
-0.6
18*
-0.8
13*
0.05
27
-0.5
05
(0
.27)
(0
.46)
(0
.60)
(0
.37)
(0
.18)
(0
.32)
(0
.33)
(0
.43)
(0
.16)
(0
.36)
FD
I (nu
ts3)
0.
398
1.13
**
1.35
**
0.49
1 -0
.111
0.
853*
* 0.
810*
* 0.
810*
0.
549*
**
0.50
7
(0.2
8)
(0.5
0)
(0.5
8)
(0.3
8)
(0.1
5)
(0.3
4)
(0.3
3)
(0.4
7)
(0.1
6)
(0.3
5)
Cons
tant
5.
106*
**
4.48
7***
3.
075*
**
4.45
2***
3.
934*
**
4.64
3***
4.
028*
**
5.08
4***
4.
797*
**
1.69
6***
(0.0
49)
(0.0
88)
(0.1
9)
(0.0
82)
(0.1
4)
(0.0
70)
(0.1
1)
(0.0
73)
(0.0
80)
(0.0
61)
Obs
erva
tions
26
224
7218
3 18
563
7984
4 20
520
7788
7 53
742
2414
5 48
366
5004
1 R-
squa
red
0.55
0.
47
0.47
0.
49
0.52
0.
34
0.34
0.
22
0.73
0.
58
IN
CLU
DIN
G R
EGIO
NAL
DU
MM
IES
Capi
tal
0.23
6***
0.
191*
**
0.19
5***
0.
199*
**
0.26
0***
0.
181*
**
0.19
5***
0.
151*
**
0.14
1***
0.
135*
**
(0
.019
) (0
.017
) (0
.023
) (0
.018
) (0
.023
) (0
.014
) (0
.015
) (0
.018
) (0
.017
) (0
.018
) Em
ploy
men
t 0.
620*
**
0.62
0***
0.
634*
**
0.62
1***
0.
676*
**
0.52
3***
0.
712*
**
0.30
7***
0.
701*
**
0.79
3***
(0.0
25)
(0.0
35)
(0.0
48)
(0.0
34)
(0.0
35)
(0.0
25)
(0.0
41)
(0.0
27)
(0.0
26)
(0.0
40)
FDI (
nuts
2)
-0.1
91
-1.5
2***
-0
.819
***
-0.7
65*
0.29
5 -1
.16*
**
-1.1
6***
-1
.04*
**
-0.2
07
-0.6
42*
(0
.27)
(0
.33)
(0
.25)
(0
.39)
(0
.21)
(0
.31)
(0
.33)
(0
.38)
(0
.16)
(0
.38)
FD
I (nu
ts3)
0.
0598
0.
661*
* 0.
536*
* 0.
254
-0.4
80**
0.
499*
0.
506*
0.
446
0.27
5*
0.59
8*
(0
.29)
(0
.30)
(0
.23)
(0
.33)
(0
.19)
(0
.26)
(0
.29)
(0
.36)
(0
.15)
(0
.34)
Co
nsta
nt
4.58
9***
4.
461*
**
2.36
6***
4.
265*
**
4.05
2***
4.
419*
**
3.67
3***
5.
064*
**
4.67
1***
1.
566*
**
(0
.093
) (0
.12)
(0
.34)
(0
.13)
(0
.18)
(0
.11)
(0
.12)
(0
.16)
(0
.10)
(0
.12)
Obs
erva
tions
26
224
7218
3 18
563
7984
4 20
520
7788
7 53
742
2414
5 48
366
5004
1
R-sq
uare
d 0.
56
0.48
0.
49
0.49
0.
52
0.35
0.
34
0.23
0.
73
0.58
Not
es:
Est
imat
ed s
tand
ard
erro
rs i
n pa
rent
hese
s. *
**.
** a
nd *
ind
icat
e si
gnif
ican
ce l
evel
s at
the
1,
5 an
d 10
%.
All
reg
ress
ions
inc
lude
tim
e an
d se
ctor
dum
mie
s, w
ith
stan
dard
err
ors
clus
tere
d at
the
NA
CE
2 le
vel.
156 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
We examine this by replicating the regressions presented in columns 5
and 10 of Table 2, this time interacting the FDI variable with a set of regional
(alternatively, NUTS2 and NUTS3) dummies.13
This provides us with a full set
of region-specific estimates of the productivity effects of FDI on domestic firms.
It is of course difficult to report the full set of obtained coefficients in tabular
form (in the NUTS3 analysis, this set contains 51 region-specific spillover
coefficients). Instead, in Figure 4 we offer a visualisation of the magnitude and
geography of these effects.
Figure 4. Region-specific estimates of local FDI spillovers
Without local/regional fixed-effects Including local/regional fixed effects
Notes: Estimated coefficients derived from an extension of models 5 and 10 of Table 2, which
includes interaction terms between the FDI variable and the regional dummies. See the text for
more details.
13 We can not replicate this analysis for the models presented in columns 13 and 14 of Table 2, as
the NUTS2-level effects are absorbed completely by the NUTS3-level effects when both are
included in the same model.
Reg
ion
-sp
ecif
ic s
pil
lov
ers
(NU
TS
2)
Lo
cal-
spec
ific
sp
illo
ver
s (N
UT
S3
)
Lo
cal-
spec
ific
sp
illo
ver
s (N
UT
S3
)
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 157
The top panel depicts the results obtained from the NUTS3-level analysis
(corresponding to the regression of column 10 in Table 2), while the bottom
panel presents the results of the NUTS2-level analysis. The right-hand side maps
correspond to regressions that include locational fixed effects (regional or local),
which take into account the self-selection of foreign firms into high-productivity
regions.
As can be seen, there is significant variation both in the size and, more
importantly, in the direction of the estimated effects. At the NUTS2 level, when
not controlling for self-selection (bottom-left map), this variation is less
heightened and the overall picture appears to be one of a core-periphery pattern.
Peripheral regions in the north-east, west and south appear unable to internalise
positive productivity spillovers, thus ending up with a net loss in their
performance. In contrast, more central regions, especially in central and western
mainland Greece, experience net gains from the presence of foreign-owned
firms.
Controlling for self-selection, however, completely overturns this picture:
in this case, the direct productivity effect of FDI is negative in all regions
(consistent with the findings reported in column 5 of Table 2), but with one
important exception. The region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace (EMT:
located in north-east mainland Greece) appears now to benefit from positive
spillovers, suggesting that self-selection in this region operates in the opposite
direction. The structure of incentives operating in this region through the
country‟s Incentives Laws (Filippaios and Kottaridi, 2004) may have a big role
to play here, as foreign firms may locate there not because the region offers a
high concentration of more productive firms but rather because the structure of
incentives provided by the government attracts high-productivity foreign
affiliates to this low-productivity region. In any case, the issue of regional
incentives aside, our results suggest that had average productivity in this region
been the same as the average productivity nationally, the effect of foreign
presence in the region would have been to raise the overall productivity of the
domestic firms located there.
The NUTS3-level analysis (top panel) suggests that this is essentially due
to two more localised effects: a negative effect in Xanthi (located in the middle
of the EMT region), which after controlling for selection turns mildly positive,
and a mildly positive effect in Evros (the eastern-most prefecture of the EMT
region), which after controlling for selection becomes even stronger. Besides
this, self-selection seems to operate more strongly (and to result to a negative
overall effect of FDI) in the prefectures of Attiki, Thessaloniki and Larissa –the
regions hosting three of the five largest cities in Greece– and less strongly in the
case of Etoloakarnania (the western-most region of central Greece). FDI
spillovers are invariably negative (irrespective of controls for region-specific
fixed effects) in Pella (in the north), Kerkyra (the western-most island) and
158 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
Chania and Irakleio (both in the southern-most island of Crete); while inverse
self-selection (into low productivity regions) appears, besides Xanthi and Evros,
in the cases of Argolida (south-west of Athens), Lasithi (in eastern Crete),
Trikala (located north of central Greece), Ipeiros (west of Trikala) and the
Dodecanese (the south-eastern island complex). Interestingly, the estimated
spillovers of FDI are persistently negligible in the prefectures of Lesvos (north-
east islands), Rethymno (in Crete), Voiotia (north of Athens), Magnisia (in
central-east mainland Greece) and Achaia and Korinthos (both in northern
Peloponese)14
, while the most positive FDI effect at the NUTS3 level, which
appears also independent of self-selection, is observed in the case of Preveza –
whose predominantly agricultural economy (representing some 30% of total
employment) has attracted in the past some modest, but highly concentrated,
foreign investment in the manufacture of wood and wood products.
5. Discussion
This paper has sought to contribute to filling an important gap in the
literature of FDI-induced spillovers, by providing a detailed and novel analysis
of the spatial heterogeneity of the productivity effects of foreign-owned firms at
the local and regional level. Our results confirm that FDI tends to concentrate in
a limited number of locations, self-selecting into regions and sectors of high
productivity. It thus acts to heighten existing spatial imbalances, as the
productive capacity of the most developed regions is strengthened and the
relative performance of regions located in the economic periphery deteriorates.
Nevertheless, although this effect on the spatial structure is important, our
analysis has found that FDI does not raise the productivity of domestic firms,
neither contemporaneously nor in a longer time-horizon. In this sense, the
concentration of FDI in the most developed regions in the country is not a
hindrance to regional growth and convergence for the less well-off regions. This
is consistent with the scant evidence in the literature about the localised effects
of FDI.
Besides this, our analysis has shown further that the productivity
spillovers of FDI exhibit substantial heterogeneity across space, even after
controlling for regional differences in the volume and sectoral composition of
FDI. To our knowledge, this is a unique finding in the literature. Moreover, it
has very important policy implications, pointing to a strong need for FDI-
attracting policies to incorporate a clear regional dimension. This is because if,
as it seems, FDI is not equally beneficial (or harmful) across the national
economic space, maximising the benefits of FDI at the aggregate/national level
necessitates paying specific attention to the set of endogenous (e.g., average firm
sizes) and exogenous (e.g., proximity to main agglomerations) locational
14 This is despite the fact that the latter four are rather highly industrialised regions.
DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT? 159
characteristics that influence local abilities to benefit from FDI spillovers. In
other words, it requires policies that are spatially targeted and selective.
Our analysis has identified a number of factors that condition the
externalities generated by the presence of foreign-owned activity. Some of these,
concerning firm- and sector-specific characteristics, have already been identified
in the literature and the evidence presented here has lent further support to them.
Two other factors identified in our analysis, however, are novel in character and
perhaps also more important for understanding the spatial processes that underlie
FDI spillovers. The first has to do with the extent of urbanisation and the size of
the recipient economy. Our results indicate that FDI spillovers are negative
mainly in regions that host the largest urban areas (Athens, Thessaloniki,
Irakleio, Larissa). In contrast, they are positive, even after controlling for
selection, in smaller and more peripheral regions. Whether this signifies an
adverse agglomeration effect or something qualitatively different15
, its policy
implications are clear. At least in the case of Greece, the spatial selectivity of
policies seeking to maximise the productivity effects of FDI should be such so as
to direct foreign investments towards less dynamic, less urbanised and less
competitive regions in the country. This is particularly relevant for Greece today,
as the country is ready to embark on a new phase of FDI promotion to deal with
the acute investment problems that it faces following the fiscal crisis and the
austerity measures that were implemented to address it.
The second factor concerns geographical proximity and the scale of the
spillovers. Domestic firms tend to enjoy positive FDI spillovers at the very
localised level (with the exception of large domestic firms, which operate at a
different scale), even after controlling for self-selection of FDI firms into high-
productivity areas. The overall effect remains negative, but this is due to a very
strong negative effect on local productivity coming from the location of foreign
investments in neighbouring regions. The implication of this finding is of
paramount importance and has foregone the attention in most of the FDI
literature so far: not only is the effect of FDI spatially heterogeneous or
conditioned on specific firm, sectoral, and regional characteristics, it is moreover
dependent on geographical proximity.
To us, this seems to suggest that different mechanisms are in operation at
different geographical scales – at least in the case of Greece. Although we
cannot provide conclusive evidence to support this interpretation, it appears that
processes of technology diffusion and learning are very localised, taking place at
the prefectural level within NUTS3 areas. In contrast, at wider geographical
scales the effect that dominates is a negative competition effect of market
capture and demand siphoning, where foreign-owned firms limit the market size
15 For example, it is consistent with the observation that FDI spillovers tend to be weaker in areas
exposed to high domestic and international competition, because firms in such areas have already
acquired the technological features that foreign-owned firms are believed to incorporate.
160 Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN
of the domestic firms and thus push upwards their average production costs and
reduce their productivity – as domestic firms find it difficult to adjust either
positively (for example, through product differentiation and expansion to new
markets) or negatively (through disinvestment and downsizing) to the foreign
presence. This may be a feature unique to Greece, as the country is known to
have rather inflexible industrial relations and inefficient managerial practices,
but our sense is that it may be true, perhaps to different extents, also in other
countries, at least in cases where significant spatial differences exist in the
competitiveness and extroversion of local firms.
The extent to which this is true, and the particular mechanics under which
this process takes effect (e.g., the role of agglomeration, openness, industrial
diversity, etc), is something that we could not address in this paper and that
future research needs to address. For what concerns the present analysis, the
main conclusions that we can draw are the following. Foreign investments have
inequitable location patterns that can intensify existing spatial and sectoral
asymmetries. In economies such as that of Greece, however, such investments
do not generate positive productivity spillovers, especially in more developed
regions. Therefore, their overall impact on relative regional performance and
cross-regional convergence is not detrimental. Positive spillovers, when they
exist, are very localised and dominated by wider-area negative market-capture
effects. It follows that a successful FDI promotion and regional development
policy is not a policy that maximises the FDI flows accruing to the country but
one that addresses effectively two key issues: the location of FDI within the
national economic space and the conversion of negative competition into
economic extroversion and market expansion.
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