Int J Philos Relig (2007) 61:65–67DOI 10.1007/s11153-006-9105-6

O R I G I NA L PA P E R

Does panentheism reduce to pantheism? A response toCraig

William Rowe

Received: 12 July 2006 / Accepted: 11 October 2006 / Published online: 30 January 2007© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Pantheism is the view that God is wholly within the universe and the universe iswholly within God, so that God and the universe are coextensive, but not identical.A related, but distinct view known as Panentheism, agrees with pantheism that theuniverse is within God, but denies that God is limited to the universe. For accordingto panentheism, the universe is finite and within God, but God is truly infinite andso cannot be totally within or otherwise limited to the finite universe. Panentheism,like pantheism, has a long and venerable history. Within the world religions it is oftenthought to capture the views of certain religious mystics – Meister Eckhart, for exam-ple, has been claimed to be a panentheist. And panentheism also finds expression inprocess philosophy, particularly in the work of Charles Hartshorne. However, as clearas the distinction between pantheism and panentheism seems to be, it has recentlybeen challenged in an essay by Craig (2006). Craig discusses the views of two panen-theists, Wolfhart Pannenberg and Philip Clayton. I will focus here on Craig’s critiqueof Clayton’s views, particularly Craig’s argument for the conclusion that Clayton’spanentheism collapses into and is indistinguishable from pantheism.

Clayton’s principle idea, as I would describe it, is this:If the infinite does not include the finite within itself then there is “a border that

makes it this something rather than another.”1

Craig, however, chooses to express Clayton’s principle idea as follows: “if the infi-nite is distinct from the finite, then there is a border that makes it this something ratherthan another”(Craig, 2006; pp. 139–140).

The problem I have with Craig’s’s way of expressing what he takes to be Clayton’sview is that it not only suggests but actually implies that Clayton holds that the infiniteisn’t distinct from the finite, that the infinite is in fact itself no more than the finite.

1 Clayton’s discussion of this important topic is contained in Chapter three “On the Very Idea of anInfinite and Perfect God”, pp. 117–182, of his (2006).

W. Rowe (B)Department of Philosophy purdue University,West Lafayette, IN 47907, USAe-mail: wlrowe@purdue.edu

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One would expect, given that Clayton is clearly intent on defending the view that theinfinite (i.e., God) isn’t itself finite but, nevertheless includes the finite world withinitself, that Craig really does not mean to suggest that Clayton’s claim commits him toa view that Clayton explicitly denies. In short, one would expect that Craig would nottry to prove that Clayton’s panentheism is identical to pantheism. But we shall see.

After stating Clayton’s view of the infinite, Craig’s says: “It follows that a trulyinfinite being must have no borders to its existence.” Now this claim of Craig’s’s seemsexactly right. That is, adopting Clayton’s use of the term ‘infinite,’ it seems that anybeing that is truly infinite in Clayton’s sense must have no borders to its existence.And that clearly implies that if something finite exists, like, say, the planet earth, thenthe planet earth must somehow be included in the true infinite. For there is nowhereelse for the planet earth to exist. And thus we can see, I suppose, why Clayton is whathe is: a panentheist. God, being infinite includes the finite world within himself. Butunlike Clayton, Craig says something quite different. He takes the statement “a trulyinfinite being must have no borders to its existence” to logically imply the extraordi-nary claim that “nothing other than it can exist.” Now, if Craig is right about this, then,since each of us knows that quite a number of things exist, we must surely follow Craigand reject panentheism straightway. But since Clayton clearly states that the infinite,while including the finite world within itself, does not preclude the existence of finiteentities such as Clayton, you and me, the planet earth, and so on, we need a seriousargument from Craig to show that Clayton’s claim that the infinite has no bordersto its existence logically implies that finite creatures like Clayton, Craig, and the restof us, cannot exist. Realizing this, Craig proceeds to give us a deductive argument toprove that if God is infinite in Clayton’s sense, then nothing finite, like you and me,can exist. So, let’s have a look at that argument.

Craig’s’s Argument

1. God is infinite.2. If something is infinite, it is absolutely unlimited.3. If something is absolutely unlimited, it has no bounds.4. If something is distinct from another thing, then that other thing bounds it.5. If something is bounded by another thing, then it has bounds.6. God is distinct from the world. (premise for conditional proof).7. Therefore the world bounds God. (4, 6)8. Therefore God has bounds. (5, 7)9. Therefore God is not absolutely unlimited. (3, 8)

10. Therefore God is not infinite. (2, 9)11. Therefore, if God is distinct from the world, God is not infinite. (6–10, conditional

proof)12. Therefore God is not distinct from the world. (1–11)”(Craig, 2006, p. 140).

Premises (1) through (3) in Craig’s’s argument are clearly acceptable to Clayton,and those three premises logically imply that God has no bounds. But when we cometo premise (4) [If something is distinct from another thing, then that other thingbounds it], we have a claim that is not something that Clayton himself asserts. Indeed,by my lights Clayton will categorically deny (4). For Clayton thinks that God, beinginfinite, is unbounded and, therefore, not identical to the finite world, although thefinite world is included in God. Moreover, it is difficult to know how to understandwhat (4) asserts, owing to Craig’s’s use of the term ‘distinct’. For (4) tells us that ifCraig is distinct from another thing y, then Craig has bounds. So, if (4) is true and

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God is “distinct” from the world, then God isn’t really infinite, for God, no less thanyou and me, has bounds. What then does Craig mean when he says that God is dis-tinct from the world? That is a serious question. But it is clear, from what he sayson page 140 that provided the identity conditions for Craig are different from theidentity conditions for y, then Craig is distinct from y. So, the fact that being infiniteis an identity condition for God on Clayton’s view, whereas being finite is an identitycondition for the world, entails that God is distinct from the world. And, so far as Ican see, there is no problem for either Craig or Clayton in Craig’s’s using the word‘distinct’ in this sense. For all it amounts to is this: provided Craig has an essentialproperty that y lacks, or y has an essential property that Craig doesn’t have, Craig isdistinct from y. The problem comes when we consider whether from the fact that inthis sense of ‘distinct’ God is distinct from the world, it somehow follows, as Craig’spremise entails, that God is “bounded” by the world, and is therefore limited by theworld, with the result that God is not infinite.

The question we must ask Craig’s is this. Why should the fact that the defining fea-tures of God are different from the defining conditions for the world logically commitClayton to the view that God is bounded by the world and, therefore, cannot includethe world within himself?

Craig nowhere answers this question. Instead he simply assumes that he has estab-lished by this argument that Clayton’s God is not infinite. Later on in his paper Craigadvances a second argument against Clayton’s conception of God as both truly infiniteand including the finite world within himself. I am afraid if fares no better than hisfirst, more carefully developed argument. Both arguments simply assume to be truea proposition that Clayton denies. For Clayton holds that the finite world is includedin God, the true infinite, but, being finite the world is distinct from God in the sensethat a part is distinct from the whole of which it is a part. The fact that God is distinctfrom the world in that God is not identical to the world, does not in any way precludethe world from being included in God. I therefore conclude that Craig has failed tosupport his claim that panentheism is not a distinct view from pantheism.

References

1. Craig, W.L. (2006) Pantheists in spite of Themselves. In J.K. Beilby (Ed.), For faith and clarity (pp.135–156). Baker Academic, Grand Rapids, MI.

2. Clayton, P. (2006) The problem of god in modern thought. Eerdmans Publishing Company, GrandRapids, MI/Cambridge, UK.