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THE EDITORS, STEPHANIE T. KLEINE-AHLBRANDT, SUSAN SHIRK, WANG YIZHOU 05.02.13

Does Promoting “Core Interests” Do ChinaMore Harm Than Good?PART TWO of a ChinaFile Conversation

A paramilitary policeman stands guard at Tiananmen Square last year.

On April 30, as tensions around China’s claims to territories in the South- and EastChina Seas continued to simmer, we began what proved to be a popular ChinaFileConversation, asking the question, What's Really at the Core of China’s ‘CoreInterests’? The participants included Shai Oster of Bloomberg News, Andrew Nathanof Columbia University, Orville Schell of the Center on U.S.-China Relations, SusanShirk, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Tai Ming Cheung of theUniversity of California, and John Delury of Yonsei University in Seoul. Today, wecontinue that discussion, beginning with a Letter to the Editor from Alastair IainJohnston, Laine Professor of China in World Affairs in the Government Department atHarvard University:

The source of story that the Chinese have officially declared the Senkakus a coreinterest is a Kyodo report. The Kyodo report accurately reported that the PRC ForeignMinistry spokesperson stated on April 26, “Of course, the Diaoyudao are part of China’score interests.” Video clips of the press conference confirm this.

But Kyodo did not report that the official transcripts of the spokesperson’s remarks

Feng Li/Getty Images

The Editors

ChinaFile is a new not-for-profit, English-language,online magazine published bythe Center on U.S.-ChinaRelations at the Asia Society.We hope to help facilitate a...More

Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt

Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt is the NortheastAsia Project Director andChina Adviser at theInternational Crisis Group(ICG) in Beijing. Beforejoining ICG, she was an...More

Susan Shirk

Susan L. Shirk is the chair ofthe 21st Century ChinaProgram and Ho Miu LamProfessor of China andPacific Relations at theSchool of InternationalRelations and Pacific Studies(...More

Wang Yizhou

Wang Yizhou is Deputy Deanof the School of InternationalStudies at Peking University.More

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removed this sentence.

If one looks at the official transcripts, these state only that “….China resolutely upholdsthe nation’s core interests, including national sovereignty, national security, territorialintegrity etc. The Diaoyudao issue touches on China’s territorial sovereignty”. So, forsome reason the Foreign Ministry decided to cut what would have been the most directofficial statement about the islands being a core interest.

It is possible that the P.R.C. spokesperson strayed a bit from the official position andthat the official record reflects official policy, or it is possible that that retrospectivelythe government decided not to state the issue as baldly as it the spokesperson originallydid. In any event, this particular formulation—“touches on territorial sovereignty” (涉及中国�土主权)—Chinese is not as declarative as it could have been. This editing,therefore, may reflect a dilemma the P.R.C. government faces. It cannot say theDiaoyudao/Senkaku are not a core interest. This would create domestic problems forthe regime. But it cannot say as explicitly as it could that the islands are a core interest,because this could constrain any future space for negotiation. So, a critical piece ofevidence will be whether or not the P.R.C. drops the demand for negotiations withJapan over the islands. If it does, then this would be consistent with an officialdeclaration that the islands are a core interest. If it continues to demand negotiations,this would be consistent with the official position of not (yet) directly stating the islandsare a core interest.

I would be interested in what the commentators [from Tuesday's dicussion] believe thesignificance (if any) is of the edited official transcript that drops the most directstatement about core interests.—Alastair Iain Johnston

ResponsesShai's take [ChinaFile's first, back on Tuesday] is both right andwrong. Yes, China is expanding its core interests. But it's notdoing so by making a list. It’s doing so by redefining the concept,as was done initially by Dai Bingguo in 2009, and then enshrinedin the White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development inSeptember 2011. Initially confined to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang,the definition of core interests was: 1) China’s political systemunder the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 2)sovereignty, security and territorial integrity 3) economicadvancement. But these are not so much interests as goals orambitions, and they were easily expanded beyond the specifics ofTaiwan or Xinjiang.

With such a definition, any sovereignty claims—including theSouth China Sea and Senkaku/Diaoyu—are core interests underthe second category. Given the emphasis on China becoming a“maritime power,” it was perhaps only a matter of time before theEast and South China Seas would be explicitly mentioned as coreinterests.

Stephanie T.Kleine-Ahlbrandt

The ChinaFile Conversation is a twice-weekly, real-time discussion on Chinanews, from a group of the world’sleading China experts. It is publishedin partnership with The Atlantic ChinaChannel.

“China Is Seen Nearing U.S.’s MilitaryPower in Region,” The New YorkTimes, May 2, 2013

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson HuaChunying’s Regular Press Conferenceon April 26, 2013

“Dangerous Waters: China-JapanRelations on the Rocks,” TheInternational Crisis Group, April 8,2013

Position of Japan on the SenkakuIslands, Embassy of Japan in theNetherlands, October 1, 2012

“Chinese Vice President Urges U.S. toRespect ‘Core Interests,’” The NewYork Times, February 15, 2012

Stirring Up the South China Sea I, TheInterenational Crisis Group, April 23,2012

Stirring Up the South China Sea II,The Interenational Crisis Group, July24, 2012

Related Reading

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As Shai said, the phrase has not necessarily gotten China anyfurther in its aim of strengthening its sovereignty claims in theEast and South China Seas – mostly due to continued resistancefrom Asian countries which are also increasingly reaching out tothe US to counter what they see as China’s more assertive stance.But at the same time, Beijing has succeeded in inserting thephrase into US-China relations and is trying to set it as a bottomline in that and other bilateral relationships.

It is not by accident that China has informed U.S. officials thatthe South and East China Sea are part of its core interests. "Coreinterests" has become a key concept that it has consistentlypushed in its relations with Washington. Beijing was emboldenedin this effort when the U.S. agreed to the term’s inclusion in theNovember 2009 US-China Joint Statement ("the two sidesagreed that respecting each other’s core interests is extremelyimportant to ensure steady progress in China-U.S. relations").Since then, the Chinese have regularly invoked the term, morerecently along with its corollary, the “new type of great powerrelations” (see below). Beijing was only too happy to see theprevious U.S. guiding principle for the relationship, “responsiblestakeholder,” replaced by its own phrase. Despite Beijing’s initialmistrust for the concept—as it sees such external calls tocontribute to the global public good as an attempt to slow its rise– it ended up accepting it. It was the U.S. that jettisoned it withthe change of administration.

The next joint statement, issued following President Hu Jintao'sJanuary 2011 state visit, tried to shift the emphasis away from “core interests” to focus more on the concept of "partnershipbased on mutual interests." This was the result of seriousnegotiation, with a deliberate effort by the U.S. to exclude anydirect reference to “core interests” in the text this time. While thiswas achieved, the two presidents also “further reaffirmed theircommitment to the November 2009 U.S.-China joint statement,”which essentially preserves the continuity of the Chinese focus on“core interests.”[1]

There are at least three reasons that China insists on using thisframework of discussion with the U.S. Beijing perceives some ofWashington's actions, such as arms sales to Taiwan andinvolvement in the Tibet and Xinjiang issues, as a challenge to itscore interests. It feels it needs to use every opportunity to remindWashington of its sensitivity to these issues in the hopes ofpreventing its positions on them from being undermined, lestChinese elites and the public see its diplomacy with the U.S. as afailure.[2] China's emphasis on its core interests also reflects itsgrowing confidence in interactions with the U.S. There is a beliefthat as China’s national strength grows, it has a more

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advantageous position and more resources to deal withWashington; therefore, Washington should be more cautious inhandling China’s core interests.

The use of the concept has also been integral to China’sconsistent efforts at explicit issue linkage. While one will not heara US official use the term “core interests”, Beijing has defined US“core interests” for Washington. Beijing considers the preventionof nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea as “U.S. coreinterests”. There is a prevalent belief that if China helps out onthese issues, then the U.S. should do the same with regard tointerests China holds dear. This is rooted in the belief that whenChina assists the US on certain issues, it does Washington afavor. Pressure on China to reprimand North Korea for its recentround of threats is one example. I was posed the question inBeijing last week: If China were to “help out” the US on NorthKorea, what could the US do to “sweeten the deal”? Specifically,would the US be more willing to be “flexible on the East ChinaSea and South China Sea issues”? Could it ease up on jointmilitary drills and support to Japan, so that “China will feel moreencouraged”?

A similar thing happened when Hu Jintao attended the nuclearsecurity summit in Washington in April 2010, at a time when theUS was requesting Chinese cooperation on sanctions againstIran. Hu Jintao eventually gave in, stating: “China and the UnitedStates should respect each other’s core interests and majorconcerns. This is key to the healthy and stable development ofbilateral ties.” Subsequent to the visit, policy circles in Beijingwere abuzz with what China would get in return for havingrespected a “US core interest.”

The core interest concept also lies at the heart of the Chinesenotion of a “new type of great power relations” with the US (新型大国关系). While many Western analysts continue to argue thatthe concept is unclear, the following defining elements haverepeatedly come up in editorials, articles and speeches by Chineseanalysts and policymakers:

The new type of great power relations should be different fromthe old type of relations—which are characterized as zero-sumand by the inevitability of conflicts -- between an incumbent anda rising power.

1. The U.S. should respect Chinese "core interests": Taiwan, Tibet,Xinjiang and other sovereignty-related issues.

2. The U.S. should accept and respect the Chinese political system and notinterfere in Chinese domestic affairs.

3. Cooperation on international affairs should be based on commoninterests and undertaken on an equal footing.

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In his meeting with President Obama on the sidelines of theseventh G20 Summit, then-President Hu Jintao more clearly laidout what this “new type of great power relations” would look like:The United States and China “should properly manage theirdifferences and ward off interferences” and the U.S. should“adopt a positive and pragmatic China policy” that does not allowdomestic politics to disturb China-U.S. ties” and supports “thepeaceful development of the relations across the Taiwan Straitwith concrete action…”

In July of 2012, Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai and PangHanzhao released an essay that clarified China’s goal in seekingimproved U.S.-China relations.[3] They identify a number ofareas in which the United States needs to change its policy inorder to achieve closer bilateral relations, including with regardto arms sales to Taiwan; intervention in China’s territorialdisputes with its neighbors; public criticism on “issues related toTibet, Xinjiang, democracy;” failure to view China as an equal;and trade disputes as areas in which the United States is notacting as a “positive partner.” Regarding recognition and respectof core interests, Cui and Pang conclude: “China has never doneanything to undermine the US core interests and major concerns,yet what the United States has done in matters concerningChina’s core and important interests and major concerns isunsatisfactory.”

Beijing clearly sees the new type of great power relations as anopportunity for increased benefit without greater costs. The “newtype of great power relations” concept seems squarely aimed atachieving concessions from the U.S. on so-far unspecified issues.China seems to be saying that a rising power and an establishedpower are not destined for conflict only if the U.S. embracesChina’s core interests. (Or as Andy put it on Tuesday, “If onlyWashington would recognize this logic and yield its remote,peripheral, non-core interests in Asia in favor of China’s trulyessential, ‘legitimate’ interests, then the two sides can enjoypeace.”)

Surprisingly, the United States has been willing to engage Chinain both public and private on the concept. Instead the conceptshould be rejected as a non-starter. Accepting and discussing itwill only lead to Chinese expectations of recognition andacceptance of "core interests" and of a trade-off on other issues.While there is a natural give-and-take in international diplomacy,to bring things down to a brute horse trade where each side mustrespect each other’s allegedly distinct core interests is aprofoundly unhelpful paradigm for building cooperation andreducing mistrust in the U.S.-China relationship, let aloneeffectively managing global challenges. At the very least, it sets up

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Thursday, May 2, 2013 - 8:13am

unrealistic expectations that there might be major shifts in USpolicies in return for China taking certain actions.

Rather than trying to work out an abstract conceptual frameworkfor the relationship, that effort should be spent on findingconcrete areas in which cooperation is achievable. And instead offocusing on issues on which both sides are unlikely to agree in theforeseeable future, attention should be given to challenges thataffect mutual interests but do not directly impact the coreinterests of either side. Nothing builds bilateral trust andcooperation better than the two countries working together oncommon problems, as they have on the Six-Party Talks, piracy inthe Gulf of Aden or conflict in the Sudan. The world continues todeliver a myriad of challenges including: climate change,nonproliferation, counterterrorism, disease control, counter-piracy and armed conflict. Instead of each side re-emphasizingbottom lines and focusing on the most intractable issues, astronger foundation for the overall U.S.-China relationship wouldresult from a string of successful cooperation on challenges thataffect our mutual interests. That is also the most viable route to anew type of great power relationship.

[1] Testimony of John Park before the U.S.-China Economic andSecurity Review Commission, April 2011.

[2] Wu Xinbo, “China and the United States: Core Interests,Common Interests, and Partnership,” USIP Special Report, June2011.

[3] Cui Tiankai and Pang Hanzhao, “China-U.S. Relations inChina’s Overall Diplomacy Diplomacy in the New Era.” Ministryof Foreign Affairs, July 2012.

Thanks to Iain’s careful reading of the P.R.C. Foreign Ministrywebsite we now know that the spokesperson’s statement that theDiaoyu Islands are a “core interest” was changed in the writtentranscript to something much less definitive. As good Chinawatchers, we wish we knew the backstory of why thespokesperson’s words were changed.

Is there internal disagreement within the Foreign Ministry orbetween the Foreign Ministry and the P.L.A. (which reportedlytold U.S. General Dempsey that the islands were “core interests”)or even with other government agencies? Might it indicate thatthe coordination problems that plagued Chinese foreign policyduring the Hu Jintao era have not yet been remedied by XiJinping’s efforts to lead with greater decisiveness?

By editing the spokesperson’s words, the Chinese government

Susan Shirk

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Thursday, May 2, 2013 - 3:37pm

indicates that for the time being it isn’t prepared to extend theloaded term “core interest” to off-shore sovereignty claimsbeyond Taiwan. We should welcome the Chinese government’scaution. Let’s not play “gotcha” over Beijing’s confusing messagesor get in the way of its climb-down.

Meanwhile it will be interesting to follow the Chinese media andInternet to see how the attentive public reacts and what thepropaganda censors allow. Will nationalist Netizens criticize thegovernment for backing down?

The discussion about China’s national “core interests” has goneon for many years among China’s academics and diplomats.People’s passions for this kind of discussion were rare in the past,but now reflect Chinese people’s self-confidence andexpectations, both rising with China’s national power and itsgrowth.

On the official side, the newest expression is China’s top leader XiJinping’s “Chinese Dream.” Though Xi doesn’t give out criteriafor the Chinese Dream, his meaning is that the Chinese people’sgreatest dream in the modern era is the rejuvenation of theirnation’s great position, the realization of its national wealth andpower, and the improvement of its peoples’ lives. Following Xi’slogic we can say that anything—any pursuits, any interests, andany borders, as long as they are helpful to China’s rejuvenation—can be included in this conception of the national interest,including the core interests. Therefore, it is not hard tounderstand why, with the growth of power, the Chinesegovernment is gradually extending the perimeter of its “coreinterests” from the issue of Taiwan, first to Tibet and Xinjiang,and now to the Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea, and so on.

On the academic side, there is no consensus, but a few popularinclinations have arisen:

First, China should prioritize its different interests and try torealize them in more active ways. Previously, the categorization ofnational interests was too simple in China’s academic anddiplomatic literatures. Now we need to refine it and add moredetailed explanations, such as the difference between coreinterests and non-core interests, or the similarities anddifferences of the interests in development, security andinternational community.

Second, given the context of China’s rise, China should exercisemore flexibility in defining its “core interests.” For example,traditionally, China has paid more attention to diverse interestson land. But now, with the aid of affluence and technology , and

Wang Yizhou

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Friday, May 3, 2013 - 3:23pm

the promotion of the United Nations Convention of the Law ofthe Sea, China pays more attention to the "High Frontier," i.e. the seas, the poles and space.

Third, China should insist on following Deng Xiaoping’sassessment of “Peace and Development,” and vigilantly avoidbeing hijacked by extreme or narrow ideas or demands. Now, it isDeng Xiaoping's philosophy, rather than Mao Zedong thought,that is dominant in China's policy. This point is the key tounderstanding Chinese decision makers' definition of nationalinterests, including core interests.

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