Domicile Cases

8/13/2019 Domicile Cases

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G.R. No. L-30241 December 29, 1928GREGORIO NUVAL,petitioner-appellant,vs.

NORBERTO GURAY, ET AL.,respondents.NORBERTO GURAY,appelllee.Mabanag and Primicias, Gibbs and McDonough, and Mariano Alisangco for appellant.

Sison and Siguion and Franciscco Ortega for appellee.

VILLA-REAL,J.:

This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of La Union, upholding thedefense of res judicataand dismissing the quo warrantoproceedings instituted by the said Gregorio Nuval against Norbeto Guray

and others, with costs against the petitioner.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in holding that the judgment rendered upon Gregorio Nuval's petition for the cancellation of Norbeto

Guray's name on the election list of Luna is conclude and constitutes res judiatain the present case.

2. The trial court erred in not holding that Norbeto Guray at the time of his election, was ineligible for the office of the residence in

said municipality.

3. The lower court erred in not finding in its judgment that the petitioner is entitled to hold the office in question.

In regard to the first assignment of error, the evidence adduced during the trial of the case shows:

That on May 11, 1928, and within the period fixed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, Gregorio

Nuval filed, in civil case No. 1442 of the Court of First Instance of La Union, in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and

registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered candidate for the office of municipal president of

said municipality, a petition against Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said municipality,

not being a qualified voter of said municipality sine he had not resided therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said

Administrative Code.

Proceedings were had upon the petition in accordance with sections 437 and 438 of the same Code, as amended by Act No. 3387,

and Judge E. Araneta Diaz, rendered judgment dismissing it because, in his opinion, Norberto Guray was a bona fideresident of the

municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As that order was not appealable, Norberto Guray's name remained in the election list of

the municipality of Luna.

The general election having been held on June 5, 1928, Norbeto Guray was elected to the office of municipal president of Luna by a

plurality of votes, Gregorio Nuval obtaining second place. On June 7, 1928, the municipal council of Luna, acting as the municipal,

Norberto Guray, elected to the office of municipal president of the said municipality of Luna for the next triennium.

On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warrantoas provided in section 408 of the Administrative Code, as

amended by Act No. 3387, asking that Norberto Guray be declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos to the

election as required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to be eligible to an elective municipal office.The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in the case of the petition for

the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and prosecution

of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.

The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act. No. 3387 is of a summary character and

the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital or

the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent

jurisdiction.

The petition for execution was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as qualified voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a

duly registered candidate for the office of the president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the

election list of said municipality. The present proceedings of quo warrantowas intreposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a

registered candidate voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the

same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but

there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23

Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165.)

In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the conclusion of Norberto

Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the

litigation, or the litigious matter in his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist,

then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.

In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six months' legal residence in the

municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceedings of quo warranto, the case of this action is that

Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for the eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither

does there exist, therefore, identity of causes of action.

In order that res judicatamay exist the following are necessary: (a) Identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues

(Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 850). And as in the case of the petition for exclusion and in the present quo

warrantoproceeding, as there is no identity either of parties, or of things or l itigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there isno res judicata.1awphi1.net

For the above considerations, the trial court erred in holding that the judgment rendered in the case on the petition of Gregorio

Nuval asking for the cancellation of Norberto Guray's name in the election list of Luna is conclusive and constitutes res judicatain

the present case.

With respect to the second assignment of error, the evidence establishes the following facts:

Up to June 27, 1922, Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his birthplace, where he had married and had hel d the

office of municipal treasurer. On that date he was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, Province of La Union. The rules of the

provincial treasurer of La Union, to which Norberto Guray was subject as such municipal treasurer, require that municipality

treasurers live continuously in the municipality where they perform they official duties, in order to be able to give an account of

their acts as such treasurers at any time. In order to qualify and be in a position to vote as an elector in Balaoan in the general


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election of 1925, Norberto Guray asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna, where he had voted in the

general elections of 1922, alleging as a ground therefore the following: "On the ground of transfer of any residence which took place

on the 28th day of June, 1922. My correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;" and in order to be registered in the

subscribed affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of election inspectors of precinct No. 1 of Balaoan, by virtue of which he was

registered as an elector of the said precinct, having made use of the right of suffrage in said municipality in the general elections of

1925. In his cedula certificates issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from the year 1923 to 1928, included, he made it

appear that his residence was the residential district of Balaoan. In the year 1926, his wife and children who, up to that time, had

lived in the municipality of Balaoan, went back to live in the town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents, due to the high cost of

living in that municipality. Norberto Guray used to go home to Luna in the afternoons after office hours, and there he passed the

nights with his family. His children studied in the public school of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a houseof strong materials in Luna, which has not yet been completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. On February 1, 1928,

Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the 16th of the same month he filed his

resignation by telegraph, which was accepted on the same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided

with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him resident of said town, he obtained

another cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was dated January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that

he resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of Luna, Province of La Union. On February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for

and obtained the cancellation of his name in the election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, he applied for

registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that he had been residing in said municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he made of

the cedula certificate antedated.

In view of the facts just related, the question arises whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal residence of one year immediately

prior to the general elections of June 5, 1928, in order to be eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna, Province of La

Union.

There is no question but that when Norberto Guray accepted and assumed the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union, he

transferred his residence from the municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.

The only question to determine refers to the date when he once more established his residence in the municipality of Luna.

It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in another state, he cannot again

vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The

term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also

personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)

Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote

and be a candidate in the municipality of Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time

prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so, but his personal presence in said

municipality.

By reason of his office as municipal treasurer of Balaoan and on account of the rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under

whose jurisdiction was such municipality, Norberto Guray had to reside and in fact resided in said municipality until the 6th ofFebruary, 1928 when he filed his resignation from his office, which was accepted on the same date. The fact that his family moved to

the municipality of Luna in the year 1926 in order to live there in view of the high cost of living in balaoan; the fact that his children

studied in the public shool of said town; the fact that on afternoons after hours he went home to the municipality of Luna and there

passed the night with his family, are not in themselves alone sufficient to show that from said year he had transfered his residence

to said municipality, since his wife and children lived with his father-in-law, in the latter's house that only in the month of January,

1927, did he begin the construction of a house of strong materials, which is not yet completed, nor occupied by himself or his family,

His aftrenoon tips to Luna, according to his own explanation given to the provincial treasurer, were made for purpose of visiting his

sick father. His own act in recording in his cedula certificates for the years 1927 and 1928 issued by himself in his favor as municipal

treasurer of Balaoan, that his place of residene was that municipality, and in taking out a new cedula in the municipality of Luna of

February 20, 1928, and having the date of its issuance surreptitiuosly put back to January 15 1928, show that until the date of his

resignation he did not consider himself as a resident of the municipality of Luna. The fact that his wife and children lived in Luna not

in his own house but in that of his wife's father since the year 1926, cannot be looked upon as a change of residence, since a change

of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the former (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71) and one cannot have two legal

residences at the same time.

The present case is different from that of Doctor Apacible cited by the appellee in his brief. Doctor Apacible never had abandoned

his legal residence in the Province of Batangas, nothwithstanding that he had been living with his family in the City of Manila, taking

out his cedula certificates here, but he never exercised the right of suffrage here. Norberto Guray abandoned his legal residencce in

the municipality of Luna, transferring it to the municipality of Balaoan by reason and an account of the requirements of the rules of

the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction is said municipality, exercising his right of suffrage in the

latter.1awphi1.net

For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and in law Norberto Guray only abandoned his legal

residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and began to acquire another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he

filed his resignation from the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding, and which resignation was

accepted; and on being elected municipal president of Luna in the general elections of June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal

residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of municipal president of Luna is hereby held to

be unlawful and quashed and, in consequence, he has no right to take possession of said office, petitioner Gregorio Nuval being the

one legally elected to said office with a right to take possession thereof, having secured second place in the election. With costs

against the respondent. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., dissents.


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RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

February 1, 1929

VILLA-REAL,J.:This is a motion praying for the reasons given that the judgment rendered in this case on December 29, 1928 be reconsidered, and

another rendered affirming the judgment appealed from.

In regard to the grounds of the motion with reference to the defence of res judicata, as the movant does not adduce any new

argument in support thereof, and inasmuch as this court has already discussed question at length, we find no sufficient reason to

grant the motion on said grounds.

As to the other grounds touching this court's holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who has been legally elected to the office ofmunicipal president of Luna, La Union, and entitled to take possession thereof, having received second place, we consider them

meritorious, for the reason that 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy in case a person not eligible should be elected to a

provincial or municipal office, does not authorize that it be declared who has been legally elected, thus differing from section 479 of

the law, which contains such an authorization, and for the reason, furthermore, that section 477 of the said law provides that only

those who have obtained a plurality of votes, and have presented their certificates of candidacy may be certified as elected to

municipal offices. Elective offices are by nature different from the appointive offices. The occupation of the first depends on the will

of the elector, while that of the second depends on the will of the authority providing for it. Inquo warrantoproceedings referring to

offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo warrantoproceedings

referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person

elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were

eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has

presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second case, the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought

to declare who is entitled to occupy the office.

In view of the foregoing, we are of opinion that the judgment rendered in this case on December 29, 1928, should be, and is hereby,

amended, eliminating from the dispositive part thereof, the holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who has been legally elected, so

as to read as follows:

By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of Municipal president of Luna, is hereby

declared unlawful and quashed and, consequently, that he has no right to take possession of said office, with costs against said

respondent.

So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Malcolm, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.


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G.R. No. L-43314 December 19, 1935A.L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, plaintiff -appellant,vs.

JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue,defendant-appellee.Ohnick and Opisso for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

BUTTE, J.:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instant of manila in an action to recover from the defendant-appellee as

Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P77,018.39 as inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed against theestate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.

The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of facts as follows:

I. That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.

II. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, certified copy of which marked Exhibit AA is hereto attached

and made a part hereof, by virtue of which will, he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and

still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, United States of America.

III. That on February 24,1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon

Moody was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same being designated as case No. 39113 of

said court. Copy of said petition marked Exhibit BB is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

IV. That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition will of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody, and the same was, after hearing,

duly probated by the court in a decree dated May 5, 1931. Copies of the petition and of the decree marked Exhibits CC and DD,

respectively, are hereto attached and made parts hereof.

V. That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by

virtue of an order issued by the court in said case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit EE is hereto attached and made a part

hereof; and that during the hearing for the declaration of heirs, Ida M. Palmer presented as evidence a letter dated February 28,

1925, and addressed to her by Arthur Graydon Moody, copy of which marked Exhibit FF hereto attached and made part hereof.

VI. That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations

organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are more fully shown in the

inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special administrator with the court in said case No. 39113, certified copy of which inventory

marked Exhibit GG is hereto attached and made a part hereof. This stipulation does not, however, cover the respective values of said

properties for the purpose of the inheritance tax.

VII. That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance

tax return, certified copy of which marked Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a part, hereof.

VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period from January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, certified copy

of which marked Exhibit 11 is hereto attached and made a part hereof, was also prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for theestate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.1awphil.net

IX. That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed with the court its report, certified copy of which marked

Exhibit KK is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

X. That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a

letter, copy of which marked Exhibit LL is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

XI. That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the letter of the Collector of Internal Revenue referred to in

the preceding paragraph. Said answer marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

XII. That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue

addressed to the attorney for Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto attached and made a part

hereof.

XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied in a letter, marked Exhibit OO, hereto attached and

made a part hereof.

XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of

P40,019.75 on January 19, 1932, making assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the assessment for

income tax against said estate.

XV. That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.

XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing of the present case.

Manila, August 15, 1933.

In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral and documentary evidence from which it

appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in bus iness

in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. He had no business elsewhere and at the time of

his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine

Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at

P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property at the

time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property of anykind located anywhere else. In his will, Exhibit AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities of the

Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. Palmer, he stated:

I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the

following as my last Will and Testament . . ..

The substance of the plaintiff's cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his complaint as follows:

That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax

may be levied, assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person not

domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of inheritance tax computed upon the value of said

stocks, bonds, credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property

without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of the Philippine Islands.


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Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as follows:

SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. Every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or

advance in anticipation of inheritance. devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands and real rights in such

property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands, of any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any

corporation or sociedad anonima organized or constituted in the Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or

rights in any partnership, business or any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the following tax:

x x x x x x x x x

It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a "non-resident of the Philippine Islands". The

answer, besides the general denial, sets up as a special defense "Arthur G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date of his

death, a resident in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was engaged actively in business." Issue was thus joined on thequestion: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?

The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any evidence that Moody's domicile was elsewhere than

in Manila at the time of his death based on the proposition that as no such objection was made before the Collector of Internal

Revenue as one of the grounds of the protest against the payment of the tax, this objection cannot be considered in a suit against

the Collector to recover the taxes paid under protest. He relies upon the decision in the case of W.C. Tucker vs. A.C. Alexander,

Collector (15 Fed. [21, 356). We call attention, however, to the fact that this decision was reversed in 275 U.S., 232; 72 Law. ed., 256,

and the case remanded for trial on the merits on the ground that the requirement that the action shall be based upon the same

grounds, and only such, as were presented in the protest had been waived by the collector. In the case before us no copy of the

taxpayer's protest is included in the record and we have no means of knowing its contents. We think, therefore, the preliminary

objection made on behalf of the appellee does not lie.

We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to whether Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in

the Philippine Islands on the day of his death. Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal domicile in the

Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands

He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to the date he left Manila the latter part of February,

1928, under the following circumstances: He was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and been informed by Dr. Wade that he

would be reported to the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law. Distressed at the

thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his promise to Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he

surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax

clearance certificate. The record does not show where Moody was during the remainder of the year 1928. He lived with a friend in

Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929 where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur

Institute. The record does not show where Moody was in the interval between April, 1929, and November 26, 1930, on which latter

date he wrote a letter, Exhibit B, to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him mis interest in the Camera Supply Company, a

Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In this letter, among other things, he states: "Certainly I'll

never return there to live or enter business again." In this same letter he says:

I wish to know as soon as now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently decided either to sell or put in a line of school or officesupplies ... before I go to the necessary investments placing any side lines, I concluded to get your definite reply to this ... I have

given our New York buying agent a conditional order not to be executed until March and this will give you plenty of time ... anything

that kills a business is to have it peddled around as being for sale and this is what I wish to avoid. He wrote letters dated December

12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the same line to Wendt. As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these letters

were written, there can be no doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he returned to

the Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance

with the law of the Philippine Islands.

There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila.

Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not claim that

Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell his business in

Manila and that he had no intention to live there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he established a legal

domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where

in Paris he had any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he acquired any property in

Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the

establishment of a legal domicile there. The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does

not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that

he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The evidence in the record indicates

clearly that Moody's continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the

same motive that caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Cullion Leper Colony for he doubtless

knew that on his return he would be immediately confined, because his affliction became graver to us while he was absent than it

was on the day of his precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well known, as he

might do in foreign parts.

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual residence". The record before us leaves no

doubt in our minds that the "usual residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was

in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during hiswanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and

provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it

should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody

ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.

The contention under the appellant's third assignment of error that the defendant collector illegally assessed an income tax of

P13,001.41 against the Moody estate is, in our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by the Collector of

Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount of P59,986.69 was received by the estate of

Moody as dividends declared out of surplus by the Camera Supply Company is clearly established by the evidence. The appellant

contends that this assessment in taxation: First, because the corporation paid income tax on the same amount during the years it

was accumulated as surplus; second, that an inheritance tax on the same amount was assessed against the estate, and third, the


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same amount is assessed as income of the estate. As to the first, it appears from the collector's assessment, Exhibit 11, to the

collector allowed the estate a deduction of the normal income tax on said amount because it had already been paid at the source by

the Camera Supply Company. The only income tax assessed against the estate was the additional tax or surtax that had not been

paid by the Camera Supply Company for which the estate, having actually received the income, is clearly liable. As to the second

alleged double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the additional income tax in question are entirely distinct. They are

assessed under different statutes and we are not convinced by the appellant's argument that the estate which received these

dividends should not be held liable for the payment of the income tax thereon because the operation was simply the conversion of

the surplus of the corporation into the property of the individual stockholders. (Cf. U.S.vs.Phellis, 257 U.S., 171, and Taft vs. Bowers,

278 U.S., 460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is relied on by the appellant, plainly provides that the income from

exempt property shall be included as income subject to tax.Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, first, because the

property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and,

second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine Islands. Costs against the appellant.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.


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May 19, 1966

G.R. No. L-22041

MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, petitioner and appellant,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.

Tagayuna, Arce and Tabaino for petitioner and appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor F. C.

Zaballero and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for oppositor and appellee.

, J.:

Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has

one son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. He left the Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where after a residence

of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. He returned to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to

which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay. He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal,

Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. He receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from the Social Security Administration of the

United States of America. He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.

After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the residence

required by law six months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.

The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: "One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine

citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization' [Section

3(1),Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This 'residence' requirement in cases of naturalization, has already been interpreted to mean the

actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the

Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after

a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien

who has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though

actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary

in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the present case, petitioner, who is presently a citizenof the United States of America, was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the

filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to the present. Such being the case,

he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before filing his present petition."

We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it to be a correct interpretation [Section 3 (1)

ofCommonwealth Act No. 63]which requires that before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall have resided in

the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization." The word "residence" used therein imports not only an

intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic, L-

18885, January 31,1964; Nuval vs. Guray,52 Phil. 645). Indeed, that term cannot refer to the presence in this country of a person

who has been admitted only on the strength of a permit for temporary residence. In other words, the term residence used in said

Act should have the same connotation as that used inCommonwealth Act No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, even if in

approving the law permitting the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship our Congress has liberalized its requirement by foregoing the

qualifications and special disqualifications prescribed therein. The only way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine

citizenship is by securing a quota for permanent residence so that he may come within the purview of the residence requirement

ofCommonwealth Act No. 63.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
http://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ca63.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ca63.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr30241-nuval-v-guray.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ca473-revised-naturalization-law.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ca63.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ca63.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ca473-revised-naturalization-law.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr30241-nuval-v-guray.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ca63.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ca63.html


8/17

G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990MATEO CAASI, petitioner,vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.

Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus

Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was

elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the

United States of America, not of Bolinao.

G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorariof the decision dated January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing

the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-

604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition for quo warrantofiled by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of

municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.

In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he

denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he

may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a

permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for

the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.

After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed

the petitions on the ground that:

The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the

Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside

in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements

of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code,

there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).

In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a

green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status

as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No.

84508.)

In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel, respondents," the petitioner prays for a review

of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio

R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition

for quo warrantofiled by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding

in the quo warrantocase. The Court of Appeals held:

... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the

Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and residence for

candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that

decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo,

G.R. No. 88831.)

These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the

United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior

to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee

who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by

law.

In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:

SEC. 68. Disqualifications... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to

run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign

country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the present administration of President

Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in

the Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.

In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application forImmigrantVisa and Alien Registration"

(Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in

Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of

intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,"Permanently."

On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and

Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the

card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:


9/17

Alien Registration Receipt Card.

Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanentlyand work in the United States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R.

No. 84508.)

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and

residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the

limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or

tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or a uthority to reside

there permanently.

Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of

residing in it.Animmigrantis a person who removes into a country for the purpose ofpermanent residence.As shown infra 84, however, statutes

sometimes give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)

As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527).

This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein.

Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general entitled to the protection of the laws with

regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.

In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution

with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled

to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of

life liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the law, and the protection of this

amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the

protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his

citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to

Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States beforehe was elected to public office, not "during his

tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.

The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office

under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance

with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.'

Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the

January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder musthave "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of

candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or

immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done

prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective

office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).

Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the

United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such beforehe ran for election as

municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.

The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for

elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for

elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification

because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one

year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the

Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens

who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country

"without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are

incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they

must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as

permanent residents thereof.

Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United States, he never really intended

to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other

words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only

had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to

be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such

status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of

such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of

that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local

elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was

null and void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP

No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao,

Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said respondent.

SO ORDERED.


10/17

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.


11/17

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN,J.:A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.

1The

1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in

which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."2The

mischief which this provision

reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution

seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "strangeror newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office

to serve that community."3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte

with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years

and sevenMonths.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a

candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5

with the Commission on Elections alleging

that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.

Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of

declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726

and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order

be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since

childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8

On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed

petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the

deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy

should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros,

Manila on

March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same

day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the r esult of an

"honest misinterpretation"10

which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected

Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.11

Impugning respondent's

motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress

in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a

resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of

her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First

District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as

petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen,

seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.

However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same

objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First

District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1,13

came up with a Resolution

1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended

Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14Dealing with two primary issues,

namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of

candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest

misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that

she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First

Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile

is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never

abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has

been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of

Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before

coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registeringin Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the

Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim

and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only

asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be

Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what

was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates

about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be

elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.


12/17

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case ofAlialy v.COMELEC (2 SCRA 957).

The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot

affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of e lections."

The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot

be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place

where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those

intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the

amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the

integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "sincechildhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months

residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record

accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the

said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro

Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she

can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the

respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such

limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The

Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year

residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the

intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to

return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she

returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus

revertendiis pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her

a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by

the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City,

she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila

where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, sheserved as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of

Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when

she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.

As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for

the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot,

Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed

her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that

prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different

places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is

considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez

vs.RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily

presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must

basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled

with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is

deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's

statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that

intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one

year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa,

she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year,

petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa,

Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of sixmonths. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her

failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing

proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only.15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration16

of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of

Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte.17

The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having

been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification.18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that

she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the


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COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event

that she obtains the highest number of votes.19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the

congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of

Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the

36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the

public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general

areas:I.The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of

the May 9, 1995 elections.

II.The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the

Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's

qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I.Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of

"Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the

purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the

concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for

election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the

qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil r ights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural

persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic20

this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's

"permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts

and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."21

Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact

of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of

a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence

involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place forpurposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as

soon as his purpose is established it is residence.22

It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in

various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile

in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic,23

we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or

temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may

have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the

intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have

numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since

no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts

have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used

synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs.Guray,24

the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to

reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."25

Larena

vs. Teves26

reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal

President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.Faypon vs. Quirino,27

held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a

profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence.28

So settled

is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere

absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of

domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the

principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require

residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is theCommittee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or

constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section

merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the

day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident"

has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.


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Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere

intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on

Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by

domicile and not physical residence.30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,31

this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution

obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as

domicile.32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated

by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacystating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and

individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there

is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It

would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would

lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided

for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the

subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period

of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply

detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein

petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private

respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then

registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in

her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence

(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed

domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries

in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances

surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could

be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such factwere established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the

COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for

some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as

indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she l ived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte.

First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then,

in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In

1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served

these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences

in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence

from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature

does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City

since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face

of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law

purposes. In Larena vs.Teves,33

supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality

without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another

municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other

municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a

resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs.Quirino,34

We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course

includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business.

Documents

Domicile Cases