Strengthening the Political Grip on Government Coordination? Comparing Political

Advisers’ and Bureaucrats’ Roles in Denmark and Sweden

1.0 Introduction

Reflecting ‘the twin political and administrative nature of the executive’ (Goetz 2003, p. 79),

government coordination represents an example par excellence of the shadowland of politics and

administration. Research on government coordination has thus far primarily been interested in

political actors, mechanisms and structures and in bureaucratic actors operating just beneath the

‘political veneer’ (Goetz 2003, p. 74). This shadowland has, however, been filled with ministerial

advisers. In spite of a rather substantial amount of research on ministerial advisers (Shaw and

Eichbaum 2015a), investigations into their role in coordination remains limited (Eichbaum and

Shaw 2014, p. 520).

‘Coordination’ and ‘advisers’ have so far been treated by two strands of literature that developed

rather isolated from one another. On the one hand, research on coordination has been pre-occupied

with studying the mechanisms by which governments seek to coordinate through different general

modes of coordination such as hierarchy, markets or networks. On the other hand, research on

advisers has explored the advent of advisers, their recruitment and background and their

relationship with the permanent bureaucracy, within Westminster systems often arguing that they

serve as attempts to exert some degree of control over policy-making and the bureaucracy on behalf

of ministers or heads of government (e.g. Eichbaum and Shaw 2010). A few studies investigating

the role of ministerial advisers in New Zealand (Eichbaum and Shaw 2007, 2011), Ireland

(Connaughton 2010) and Australia (Maley 2011) touch on their coordinating role indicating that

advisers somehow contribute to enhance political control therein. In addition Dahlström et al. argue

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that ‘Governments today do not seem to be able to deliver a “tight coordination” without a cadre of

political appointees in government offices (…) (Dahlström et al. 2011, p. 15). However, whether

advisers actually increase political control in coordination as well as what determine whether a

stronger political grip on coordination is achieved remains an open empirical question.

The limited research on advisers role in government coordination is both surprising and

dissatisfying given that coordination is not only at the core of functionally specialized governments

to achieve ‘minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae’ (Peters 1998, p. 296) of policies; it is

also a core activity for any government to tame centrifugal forces, for which reason coordination is

a perennial concern in public administration and political science research and government practice.

Thus, investigating that a ‘third party’ has entered government coordination relates to issues of

government efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, it touches on the widespread claim that

politicized actors in general (Lewis 2009, Dahlström et al. 2011) and ministerial advisers in

particular imply a strengthening of the political grip of the bureaucracy (Shaw and Eichbaum

2015b, p. 67). Such a ‘thickening’ is said to provide for increasing political control by positioning

political loyal actors to the political principal in the government offices (Dahlström et al. 2011, p.

12). Hence, the role of political advisers in government coordination touches upon questions

regarding the democratic legitimacy of government, as it potentially challenges the established

politician–bureaucrat relationship by (potentially) strengthening the political grip of the former on

the latter.

By comparing the effects of political appointees on politico-bureaucratic relationships in Denmark

and Sweden, recent research by Christiansen et al. finds that it is the particular organization of

ministerial advice that affects the division of roles between civil servants and political advisors.

Through a comparative survey study the authors show that because there are only few and hardly

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formally organized political advisors in the Danish case, providing political-tactical advice has

evolved into a career asset for permanent civil servants; whereas in Sweden this advice has fully

been taken over by the comparatively large and well-organized group of political appointees

(Christiansen et al. 2016). Yet, the actual implications of the organization of ministerial advice on

the division of roles between civil servants and political advisors remains unexplored by the authors

investigating the organization of ministerial advice “…mainly by assessing the effect of the number

of political advisers.” (Christiansen et al. 2016, p.1245).

Research on government coordination suggests that changes in coordination typically affect the

room of manoeuvre and ultimately impact – at least – one of the involved actors. Recent research

argues that the bureaucracy as the traditional key player in government coordination looses its

position while others – such as party headquarters, centres of government or external advisors –

gain leverage (Goetz 2007, Dahlström, Peters, Pierre 2011). This reasoning assumes that there is a

fixed amount of activities to coordinate that can – however – be delivered by various actors: If one

gets ground, another one loose as his accomplishments in coordination have successfully been taken

over by another actor. Hence, in that perspective government coordination is considered a zero-sum

game.

Against this backdrop, this article investigates under which conditions political advisors provide for

a political grip on government coordination. This article investigates advisers’ role in horizontal

coordination, i.e. in inter departmental coordination by asking: Which organization of government

coordination enables advisers to establish a the political grip on the bureaucracy ? And does the

strength of the political grip on the permanent bureaucracy in horizontal coordination depend on the

number of advisers?

Departing from the argument put forward by Gulick (1937) that organizations represents a mean to

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achieve coordination, this article argues that the ability of political advisers to provide for such a

grip does not only depend shere number of advisers, but as importantly on the overall organization

of coordination and the position of advisors herein. If political advisors are equipped with powerful

resources this enables them to take a core role in government coordination.

The research question is studied through a most-similar case design comparing Danish and Swedish

governments. The two cases are similar in terms of their politico-administrative systems (e.g. being

parliamentary democracies in a Scandinavian context), but differ regarding the scope to which

political advisers have been introduced into the executive (see for a similar case design:

Christiansen et al. 2016) as well as the organizational of government coordination. The empirical

analysis is based on extensive interview material with top civil servants and advisers.

By so doing, the article contributes to research on ministerial advisers and government coordination

in several ways. First, it bridges two hitherto rather separate strands of research, research on

political advisers and government coordination. Secondly, the article deepens our empirical

knowledge concerning the roles of political advisers in government coordination. Third, the article

addresses the recent call for more systematic comparative research aimed at theorizing the roles and

functions of ministerial advisers (Shaw and Eichbaum 2015a, 2015b) outside Westminster territory.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows: The next section theorizes on the concept of

government coordination and the modes by which governments coordinate. After having presented

the research design, methods and data, the empirical analysis is conducted analyzing the roles of

advisors and civil servants in horizontal coordination. This is followed by a comparative assessment

of the degree to which advisers provides for more political control of government coordination. The

article concludes with a discussion of the potential to theorize on the role of ministerial advisers in

government coordination.

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2. Government coordination

Coordination is a recurring, classical concern in government attracting considerable scholarly

attention (Peters 2015) and a ‘philosopher’s stone’ (Lægreid et al. 2014, p. 4) for contemporary

governments. At the heart of the politico-administrative shadowland, however, government

coordination is usually addressed from either a political science or public administration perspective

(Goetz 2003, p. 78).

In political science, government coordination is about resolving conflicting political preferences and

priorities (Goetz 2003, p. 80) and aligning or taming centrifugal forces in government based on

(party or personal) political interests, typically performed through formal cabinet meetings as well

as written coalition agreements, coalition committees and other types of inner cabinet groups (Goetz

2003, p. 80). In public administration, government coordination is typically considered as a

functional demand arising from organizational specialization generating ‘selective perceptions’,

departmentalism or ‘turf wars’ (Goetz 2003, p. 80). However, specialization does not reflect the

interdependence of ‘real-world’ policy problems, rendering coordination an indispensable

requirement to arrive at coherent government decisions (Peters 1998, p. 296). From this perspective,

coordination seems a predominantly bureaucratic endeavour, at the working level of the

bureaucracy while the top level and – in particular – the political leadership is only involved in rare

circumstances and for formal rubber-stamping (Mayntz and Scharpf 1975; Page and Wright 1999;

Peters 1998, p. 295).

Coordination remains a concept without firm scholarly agreement on its definition (Koop and

Lodge 2014, p. 1313; Peters 2015, p. 3). Based on the definition suggested by Koop and Lodge, this

article defines coordination as an organizing process and activity aimed at the ‘…adjustment of

actions and decisions among interdependent actors to achieve specified goals’ (2014, p. 1313). This

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definition emphasizes, firstly, the interdependence of actors in government coordination. Political

actors are interdependent because they share executive powers (Heffernan 2005, p. 609). At the

same time, they depend on the expertise of `their` ministries bureaucrats. Bureaucrats often find

themselves in interdependent relationships with other ministries in order to provide feasible

solutions (Wegrich and Stimac 2014, pp. 44–6).

Second, this definition allows for the fact that goals may be multiple and potentially conflicting

(Koop and Lodge 2014, p. 1313), which may be reflected both within as well as across the political

and bureaucratic parts of the process of coordinating governments.

The interdependence of the actors involved in coordination processes may be reflected in actors

adjusting their actions ‘…in voluntary or more directed ways’ (Koop and Lodge 2014, p. 113),

which differs depending on how the coordination is organized. Different organizational solutions

provide for different modes of coordination relevant for government coordination. Research on

government coordination distinguishes conceptually and empirically between a wide range of

modes of coordination (Peters 2015, p. 75). Two of the most prominent modes of coordination in

central government organizations include hierarchical coordination and horizontal self-coordination

(Scharpf 1994; Wegrich and Stimac 2014).

Hierarchical coordination at the executive level is always performed through power or authority

(Bevir 2009, p. 57). Hence, hierarchal coordination is not merely a question of establishing

appropriate rules and structures but it just as important to base the capacity for coordination in some

sort of authority enabling certain ministers, ministries or advisers to exercise power vis-à-vis other

government actors. Such powers can either be of a formal or informal nature. Interdependence in

hierarchical coordination arises between actors in a formal hierarchical relationship in which actors

in subordinate positions depend on the approval or acceptance of their actions from actors in

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superior positions. Conversely, the actors in superior positions depend on the knowledge possessed

by the subordinate actors (Wegrich and Stimac 2014, p. 49). However, hierarchical coordination

capacity is limited by problems relating to the channelling of all of the relevant information up

through the hierarchy (Scharpf 1994, pp. 33–4), which is why ‘…horizontal self-coordination is a

ubiquitous practice in executive government’ (Wegrich and Stimac 2014, p. 49).

Horizontal self-coordination can be performed in an either negative or positive manner. Positive

coordination refers to a coordination process in which all of the relevant actors are involved from

the initial stages contributing to drafting a policy ideally resulting in encompassing policies. In

contrast, negative coordination implies a process of coordination in which the main responsible

organizational unit prepares a draft that is sent out to the other affected units checking the proposal

for issues to which they must object from their respective points of view (Scharpf 1994).

Horizontal self-coordination is generally performed within the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf

1994, p. 37) in ways that make it more a supplement to rather than competing element in

coordination organized by the principle of hierarchy. In both positive and negative coordination,

political masters do ultimately ratify the final coordination output (Scharpf 1994, p. 40). Therefore,

although this coordination mode is not performed through any formal organization of power or

authority, the fact that such an authority ultimately approves, alters or dismisses any given decision

motivates the actors across political and ministerial boundaries to ‘self-organize’ and engage in

voluntary coordination before elevating them to the executive level. Moreover, horizontal self-

coordination can be carried out formally or informally. While formal horizontal self-coordination is

organized according to particular formal rules or structures governing daily routines in government,

informal self-coordination is more ad hoc in its organizational nature. In both instances, however,

typical patterns of bureaucratic behaviour, such as turf protection, protection of professional

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interests and selective perception, can be activated. Interdependence then develops, as those

formally equal in position must mutually adjust their actions through bargaining and negotiation.

Institutional arrangements – including the organization of government coordination - reflect

executive’s choices on how to balance the relative importance of politicized vis-à-vis bureaucratic

actors (Krause, Lewis and Douglas 2006:785). All governments organize their coordination, which

reflect both hierarchal and horizontal self-coordination, although the relative importance of the two

types may differ. However as the effectiveness of horizontal self-coordination depends upon the

‘shadow of the hierarchy’ we expect that in governments where advisers are formally embedded in

the hierarchy of government coordination provide for a stronger political grip compared to

countries where the advisers are excluded from the hierarchical organization of government

coordination and rather adds to government coordination through horizontal self-coordination.

The literature on the effect of the numbers of advisors is more ambiguous. As described in the

introduction, it has been suggested that more advisers would provide for a stronger political grip on

coordination. However, empirical evidence on political advice suggests that more advisers rather

provides for an insulation effect (Fawcett and Gay 2010, p. 25) on the bureaucracy, and hence

enables them to be ‘less political’ and ‘more professional’ in their advice. Hence on the one hand

one could expect that more political advisers would enable government to enhance political control

over government coordination. On the other hand on could also expect that political advisers would

simply ‘take over’ when issues related to establishing government coordination become more

politically than professionally based or based upon political disagreements rather than professional

disagreement or even ‘turf wars’.

In the subsequent section, we elaborate on the design and methods as well as provide for description

of how Denmark and Sweden differs with respect to not only the numbers of political advisers, but

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also the organizational positioning of advisers in government coordination.

3.0 Design, Methods and Data

The empirical analysis is ‘comparative by design’ (Derlien 1992), representing a comparative case

study of the role of ministerial advisers in government coordination in Denmark and Sweden. The

cases were selected according to a most-similar case design (Gerring 2007), as they are similar in

various respects: They represent parliamentary democracies in a Scandinavian administrative

tradition context and by the time of the data collection governed by coalition governments. They

differ, however, with respect to how many advisers have been allowed into the ministries as well as

the formal organization of coordination processes.

Albeit both countries are positioned in a Scandinavian administrative context, which, in general

compared to other traditions (e.g. the Napoleonic and some of the countries in the Anglo-Saxon

tradition (Australia and US) features the lowest number of formally politicized actors introduced to

the government organizations, they differ rather substantially in terms of the degree to which

governments have applied a ‘thickening’ strategy to increase political control over the bureaucracy

(Dahlström et al. 2011, p. 15)..

The comparative literature on ministerial advisers reveals considerable variation in the names, exact

formal positions and organizational structures in which advisers operate (Eichbaum and Shaw

2010). In Denmark, the political advisers are the so-called special advisers (særlige rådgivere)

formally established around 2000. In the period under investigation, there were around 30

ministerial advisers divided between 20 ministers, two of whom were positioned in the PMO. They

are formally positioned under the authority of the permanent secretary in the ministry (Ministry of

Finance 2004).

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In Sweden, ministerial advisers come as either political advisers (politisk sakkunniga) or press

secretaries (pressekreterare). While the latter were introduced in the 1960–70s, the former were

introduced a decade later (Dahlström and Pierre 2011, p. 204). However, when introduced into the

government organizations advisers were entering an already formally politicized habitat, as

politically appointed state secretaries were introduced into the Swedish government before advisers.

State secretaries are positioned at the very top of the ministerial bureaucracies and are hence the

administrative leader of the ministerial bureaucracies. The political advisers are under the formal

authority of the state secretaries (SWEPA2, SWEPRESS5). Since 2014, the press secretaries have

been formally employed in the PMO press unit under the formal responsibility of the head of press

(SWEPRESS4). In the period under investigation, there were around 200 politically recruited

actors, of which around 30 were state secretaries, 36 were press secretaries divided between 24

ministers in the 11 ministries (http://www.regeringen.se/regeringskansliet/regeringskansliets-

anstallda/ visited 13.02.2016 and 06.06.2016). All of the politically recruited actors come and go

with the government.

Regarding the organization of government coordination, the two countries also exhibit substantial

differences. As will be further elaborated in the empirical analysis government coordination in

Sweden comprises of much more elaborate and formally organized coordination system in which

some political advisers at the center enjoy a rather powerful position vis-à-vis the bureaucracy and

the state secretaries in the line ministries. In contrast, the organization of government coordination

in Denmark is less elaborate without any formal positions granted to the political advisers. Further,

while the politically appointed state secretaries are the main responsible in the line ministries for

government coordination and hence responsible for ensuring coordination within and across the

bureaucratic and political spheres of government (Niklasson and Christiansen 2012), the functional

equivalent holding this position is the permanent secretary in Denmark.

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The unit of analysis is the role of ministerial advisers vis-à-vis the role of the bureaucracy with

respect to the formers ability to perform a political grip on the latter in government coordination.

The data analysis is primarily based on 48 semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted by the

authors with high-ranking civil servants and political advisers in the two countries. The potential

interview partners were selected by their formal position, that is, the top of the bureaucratic

hierarchy (permanent secretaries and heads of communication) and the position of the countries’

respective political advisers. In the process of contacting potential interview partners, purposive and

snowball sampling techniques were applied, aiming and succeeding at including position-holders

across ministries representing the core-executive and the line ministries and achieving an equal

representation of the various positions according to their actual share in government. However, an

exact representation obviously could not be achieved, especially for the Swedish case (see below).

The interview guide included questions regarding the role and tasks of different types of actors in

coordination as well as coordination structures, mechanisms and modes. The interviews were

collected from October 2013 to November 2015, digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed.

They are quoted using anonymous codes as promised to the interviewees (see table 1). With two

exceptions, all of the respondents in the Danish case were in office during the minority coalition

government led by the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne) and headed by PM Helle

Thorning Schmidt. In this coalition government, the Social Democrats formed a coalition with the

Social Liberals (De Radikale) throughout the entire period of government, from 2011 to 2015,

which had initially been supplemented by the Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti),

which left the coalition in early 2014. For the Swedish case, all of the respondents were in office

serving the minority coalition government led by the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna) and

headed by PM Stefan Löfven. The coalition further included the Green Party (Miljöpartiet de

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gröna). Table 1 below gives an overview of the respondents.

Table 1: Overview over respondents

Type of actor SWE DK

Politicized positions 1 state seceretary (SWESTS)

5 press secretaries

(SWEPRESS)

5 political advisers (SWEPA)

9 special advisers (DKPA)

Permanent bureaucracy

1 civil servant in a leading

position (SWEHD)

5 heads of communications

(SWEHC)

12 permanent secretaries

(DKPS)

10 heads of communications

and/or press (DKHCP)

Total 17 31

As reflected in Table 1, the sample is somehow skewed, also in a relative sense with respect to the

total number of advisers. Given the rather similar account provided by the Swedish respondents

relative to the Danish respondents on the role of advisers, however, a ‘point of redundancy’

(Lincoln and Guba 1985, p. 202) was achieved with the relatively lower number of interviews. The

interviews are coded according to the dimensions guiding the empirical analysis including the

modes of coordination in which political advisers are involved.. In order to avoid the statements

from the interviewees serving as mere self-reporting and to cope with the issue that all interview

partners are embedded in a highly politicized arena, interview statements are cautiously related to

and against the background and position of the respective position-holders to account for the social

desirability bias in the accounts provided. In particular, the fact that the interview sample includes

actors from various political and top-bureaucratic positions allows the contrasting of statements

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against each other and to weigh and assess on what grounds particular position-holders arrive at

certain statements. By carefully contrasting the various accounts with one another, the authors were

able to produce reliable interview data beyond mere self-reporting and ‘face-value evidence’.

4.0 Empirical analysis

The empirical analysis is conducted in two steps. First, the cases are presented separately, beginning

with a presentation of the government system and the organization of the government coordination

describing the roles performed by advisers and the bureaucracy respectively. Second, the case

findings are compared, assessing the expectations regarding differences with respect to the degree

of political control performed by the advisers on the bureaucracy.

4.1 Denmark

Denmark has lengthy traditions with minority governments. The Danish constitution prescribes the

principle of ministerial government (ministerstyre), which is considered crucial to understanding

how central government works. The PM nominates (and dismisses) the ministers included in the

government. Together with the responsibility for distributing portfolios and hiring top officials, this

gives the PM a relatively strong formal position (Jensen 2011, p. 220). In practice, however,

portfolios are negotiated with government coalition partners, and the right to hire and fire top civil

servants does not extend to the privilege to recruit persons into the permanent bureaucracy on

political grounds.

The formal coordination structure in Danish government includes both hierarchical coordination

and primarily negative horizontal self-coordination. However, no formal position is granted to

special advisers in this organizational landscape. A weekly meeting between the PM and the

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ministers represents the final political coordination body within the government, which is prepared

by the more important permanent cabinet committees, in particular the ‘coordination committee’

chaired by the PM and the ‘economic committee’ chaired by the Finance Minister. The most

important ministers are members of the two committees. The ability for hierarchical coordination

across the government via these committees depends on the power distribution between the PM and

the Finance minister which varies from coalition to coalition (Jensen 2011, p. 221). For the

government in office when the data was collected, the PM was generally considered rather weak

and dependent on one of the other coalition parties, the leader of which was often referred to in the

public debate as the most powerful actor in the government. A parallel bureaucratic structure

comprising the permanent secretaries of the ministers in the committees prepares the meetings of

the committees. In practice, this group is a rather powerful forum for both bureaucratic coordination

and for solving conflicts and disagreements among the coalition partners before reaching the

political level. The formal inter-ministerial coordination is supplemented with informal mechanisms

at all levels of the Danish civil service (DKPS4, DKPS7, DKPA3). Whereas both the formal and

informal bureaucratic mechanisms are defined by negative horizontal self-coordination, the degree

to which permanent secretaries from the core executive may perform some hierarchical

coordination generally depends on the relative strengths of the political sphere of the core executive

(Jensen 2003, 2008, 2011).

Those two above-mentioned committees are considered strong coordination fora by the

interviewees (DKPS1, DKPA7, DKPS5, DKPA9, DKPS9, DKPS11, DKPS4). While policy

coordination with the two core committees has generally been strengthened since the 1990s

(DKPS1, similar: DKPA7), the coordination of communication attempts has been particularly

strengthened over the course of the last ten years (DKPS10). The way policy initiatives are

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communicated has become integrated in the ordinary government coordination procedures in the

two cabinet committees (DKPS8, DKPS5, DKPS1, DKPS6). When the documents for the

committee meetings are drafted, a particular section is devoted to ‘who says what and when and

who takes which role?’ (DKPS12, similar: DKPS5, DKPS7). However, while the particular

preparation of the committee meetings is carried out at the bureaucratic level, special advisers can

be involved in the communication issues, including ‘some coordination’ (DKPS5) on ‘how do we

explain this or that’ at the level of the special advisers and the press staff (DKPS5). However, the

special advisers take a more party-political perspective in their coordination activities (DKPS5,

DKPA2). The special advisers to the ‘top ministers’ (DKPA5), i.e. those who are members of the

two cabinet committees and those of the party heads of the coalition parties are particularly

involved in coordination (DKPA5). However, not all of the inter-ministerial policy issues are

discussed by one of the two committees. For the remaining issues, no formalized procedure exists

and coordination is carried out via horizontal self-coordination in an ad hoc manner, predominantly

by the involved civil servants, and also depends on personal networks (interviews DKPS4,

DKPA9). In those cases, there is not always a pre-cooked line of communication, which gives

special advisers considerable room for manoeuvre (DKPS7) to coordinate communication

initiatives. The communication dimension of the overall political issues is coordinated by the

special advisers, whereas more practical issues are coordinated at the level of the press staff

(DKHCP3, similar: DKPS7). Some interviewees therefore consider special advisers as being strong

in terms of coordinating communications on a day-to-day basis (DKPS10), while others generally

assess the coordination of communications as not very strong (DKPS4). While the effectiveness of

the two cabinet committees and their bureaucratic preparation structure is generally widely

acknowledged, as indicated above, the special advisers are not fully satisfied with the existing scope

and degree of inter-ministerial coordination. Rather, they request ‘more and stronger’ government

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coordination, particularly regarding how issues are communicated externally (DKPA9, similar:

DKPS4, DKPA4, DKPA6, DKPA8). Although the formal coordination structures do not include

special advisers, they are involved informally. This informality goes hand-in-hand with the fact that

the particular coordination pattern among special advisers differs between governments. All in all,

rather opposing assessments of coordination in the government under study here were expressed:

While some of the interview partners emphasized that coordination generally worked well (DKPS1,

DKPS11, DKPA7, DKPA9), others considered government coordination to be problematic

(DKHCP9, DKPA4, DKPA6, DKPA8).

The PM’s office (PMO) is not considered to play an active role in coordinating communications.

One interviewee described the PMO’s attitude as ‘we expect you (the departments) to coordinate

yourselves’ (DKHCP7). Hence, the formally strong position of the Danish PM is not translated into

an equivalently strong role played by her special advisers in government coordination, which may

be explained by the de facto relatively weak position of the PM in that government. Hence, the

coordination initiated and carried out by the PMO’s special advisers is not vital to Danish

government coordination.

There was only one coordination mechanism across the coalition parties at the special adviser level

that had been established on a regular basis: Special advisers to the PMO (Social Democrats), the

Ministry of Finance (Social Democrats), the Ministry of Economics (Social Liberals) and, if so,

other affected ministries had established teleconferences at 6.30 am to discuss daily media reporting

and potential needs for action (DKPA1, DKPA4). This daily teleconference is assessed as a

‘reactive’ (DKPA4, similar: DKPA1) endeavour rather than a tool for the strategic coordination and

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planning of the government’s communication and media-related activities. Besides, there were no

incentives for cross-party coordination at the special adviser level in any proactive way.

However, coordination mechanisms at the special adviser level were established alongside party-

political lines and differed considerably between Social Democrat special advisers and Social

Liberal advisers. While the special advisers to the Social Democrat ministers do not closely

coordinate, the advisers working for Social Liberal Party ministers do (DKHCP5, DKPA7,

DKPA9).

Informal, ad hoc, negative self-coordination prevails both across and alongside party-political lines.

If issues were coming up, special advisers from the involved ministries contacted each other to

discuss how to handle them (DKPA5, DKPA6, DKPA8). If necessary, they would also involve an

adviser from the other party’s ministry – but would first and foremost contact each other alongside

party-political lines as exemplified by the following quote: ‘I also coordinate with the other special

advisers, including those from the Social Democrats – if there are specific issues to be handled. But

I definitely think the overall coordination and the sense of community between the Social Democrat

and Social Liberal special advisers could be developed a lot’ (DKPA5). The PMO’s advisers only

involved themselves in particular issues, but not on a daily basis (DKPA5). Shortly after the

government had come to power, coordination at the special adviser level was described as being

particularly conflictual: ‘They coordinate somehow with each other, but they are also at war with

each other’ (DKHCP10, similar: DKPA7, DKPA8, DKPA9, DKPS12) because they continue

fighting the battles of ‘their’ ministers (DKHCP10, similar: DKPS12). While formally equal,

however, interview partners attribute considerable power differentials to the special advisers –

depending on the political strength of the respective minister: ‘A special adviser is never stronger

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than his minister. That’s how it is. It doesn’t matter how many stars you have on your shoulder – if

the minister is a loser, then it just helps. If so, a special adviser has no power’ (DKHCP10). Hence,

a special adviser’s capacity to accomplish their minister’s interests depends on the minister’s

political power.

Internally, i.e. in the single ministries, special advisors do hold a formally weak structural position,

also with respect to the part of government coordination performed by the permanent bureaucracy.

From the perspective of the permanent secretaries, the main role of the special advisors in

horizontal coordination is to maintain close contacts to fellows from the minister`s party and

constantly connect the minister`s and ministrie`s policy plans to intra-party discussions (DKPS

2,4,5,11).

All in all, Danish special advisers exert political control on government coordination to a limited

extent. If involved this depends individual political skills and –maybe – borrowed political

authority, but overall remains idiosyncratic, erratic and adhoc. They rather serve as `party political

ears` in coordination constantly relating the minister`s positions to those inside the party. Further

they dominate a particular coordination object; that is, the coordination of government

communications. However, in that respect they do hold a party-political grip on government

coordination.

4.2 Sweden

Until the mid-1970s, Sweden was dominated by Social Democrat, single-party governments,

Particularly since the 1990s, however, Sweden has been governed by various multi-party

constellations in formal coalition governments or based on stable cooperation agreements. This

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development toward multi-party governing brought questions of government coordination to the

government’s attention (Dahlström and Pierre 2011, pp. 198–9).

The Swedish constitution prescribes the principle of collective government. This severely restricts

the opportunities available to individual ministers to make decisions on their own (Larsson 1995).

The government is organized in ‘government offices’ (Regerinskansliet), described as a single

public authority comprising of the line ministries, the PMO (Statsrådsberedningen) and an Office

for Administrative Affairs (Förvaltningsavdelingen) (http://www.government.se/the-government-

offices/, visited 12 February 2016).

Government coordination is performed through a variety of mechanisms in which formal structures

and organizational units as well as rules and norms play a central role in both hierarchical and

horizontal self-coordination modes. The political coordination mechanisms comprise of weekly

cabinet meetings with parallel meetings of politically appointed state secretaries (Ministry of

Finance 2004, pp. 111–17). Before issues and decisions reach this ultimate forum of hierarchical

coordination, however, extensive coordination has been carried out in which ministerial advisers

and politically appointed secretaries of state play a crucial role.

Various political coordination units staffed with political appointees have been established

(Dahlström and Pierre 2011, p. 200). There are also formal rules for the political coordination and

preparation of policies and strategies involving different ministries (gemensam beredning) as well

as rules for preparing policies involving the entire government (allmän beredning) (Ministry of

Finance 2004, p. 112). Whereas the former is steered by a central coordination unit placed under the

PMO (samordningskansliet), the latter is coordinated at cabinet meetings (SWEPA5); the last resort

19

for coordination (Ullström 2011, pp. 231–2). The rules reflect a combination of hierarchical and

negative horizontal self-coordination modes by prescribing that all policy issues should be

coordinated horizontally by the relevant ministries, to begin with primarily involving the permanent

bureaucracy (Ullström 2011, p. 59). However, they further prescribe very clearly how this should be

lifted up through the hierarchy should any given level of coordination fail through the ‘gemensam

beredning’ process, to the state secretaries, and ultimately to be finally coordinated and approved by

the central coordination unit.

The central coordination unit is led by two state secretaries from the different parties in government

and a number of political advisers (Niklasson and Christiansen 2012, p. 28). The unit is vital for

coordinating policy and coalition issues: ‘The coordination office makes sure that the two parties

stand by every decision made by the government. (…) This is also a minority government. So

sometimes, even though we think this is the right policy, we can see that this is impossible to get

through the parliament. So sometimes we have to stop things (…). Sometimes we want a conflict

with the parliament but not too often. If it happens too often, we’re a weak government’

(SWEPA5). The unit is responsible for ensuring that there is a formal government decision on all

new policies and their communication (SWEPA5, SWEPA3) and/or in case of disagreement on

lower levels (SWEPA2). The policy coordination is carried out between the political advisers in the

central coordination unit and the state secretaries and does not involve the permanent civil servants

the line ministries (SWEPA2, SWEPA5, SWEPA2, SWEHD1). The role of the political advisers in

this unit is generally described as rather powerful for coordinating the political aspects of policy

(SWEHD1, SWEPA5, SWEPA4), as they have the political authority to ensure tight coordination in

the case of disagreement due to ‘turf wars’ or party-political differences within the coalition – even

blocking policy initiatives proposed by ministers and state secretaries if they do not fit with the

political goals set by the coalition. Hence, the unit is the ultimate arbiter in the policy advisory part

20

of the political sphere of horizontal coordination for ensuring the coordination of policies from the

perspective of the government as a whole and are indeed casting a significant hierarchical shadow

over the otherwise horizontal self-coordination activities.

According to some respondents, the remaining bulk of policies are coordinated at the level of

political advisers in the line ministries (SWEPA2) before reaching the state secretary level

(SWEPA3), whereas others point out the importance of the permanent bureaucracy at this stage of

policy coordination (SWEHD1). Hence the accounts somehow differs with respect to whether

advisers are involved in the horizontal self-coordination between line ministries which is otherwise

primarily bureaucratic territory, before policies reach the political sphere in which firstly the state

secretaries, secondly the central coordination unit and ultimately the cabinet are the central

coordination actors. The divergent accounts of advisers role at this stage do not reflect an absence

of a political grip on the bureaucracy but rather, that at this stage of the coordination the state

secretaries, as formally intended, is described as playing a crucial role, as ‘the heart’ of the

coordination performed by and across the line ministries (SWEPRESS2), and hence the person

responsible for ensuring that the bureaucracy coordinate policies along the political lines decided by

government. This also reflects that some ministers prefer that the advisers in the line ministries

should rather work for them exclusively than serving the government per se (SWEPA3).

For the political advisers in the line ministries, the central coordination mechanism is a weekly

meeting parallel to the weekly cabinet meeting (SWEPA3, SWEPA2, SWEPA3) supplemented by

informal contacts (SWEPA3) and a ‘chat function’ (SWEPA2). The advisers see themselves as

facilitators: ‘In my opinion, my work is trying to solve conflicts more than anything else. My job is

to try to solve conflicts. The minister often has a proposition that I know will be difficult for the

21

coalition. And then it’s my job to try communicating it in a way that facilitates the process to the

other advisers’ (SWEPA2). As another adviser describes the weekly meetings, ‘It’s important for

me to meet the political advisers from [the other party in government]. Also more informally and to

become friends with them as well’ (SWEPA3). Rather than adding to the interdependence among

the actors in a formal and hierarchical sense, the meetings are described as creating an environment

for finding compromises on potentially conflicting goals through a mode that resembles hierarchical

self-coordination.

The fact that policy is described and perceived as ‘tightly’ coordinated facilitates ‘tight’

communication (SWEPRESS4) by creating a ‘mentality’ (SWEPRESS3) that horizontal

coordination is vital for both policy and communication. However, this ‘mentality’ is related to

formal hierarchical modes of coordination by press secretaries positioned at the centre of the

government. Strategically linked to the policy coordination by the central coordination unit is the

press unit in the PMO (although not as part of the PM’s staff) (SWEPA4) to coordinate government

communication. The press unit is strategically linked to powerful central actors through weekly

meetings with the state secretaries in the PMO and with the central coordination unit supplemented

by on-going informal contacts (SWEPRESS5).

Led by a head of press and a vice head of press, both recruited from each of the coalition parties, the

unit approves all of the communications from ministers and the PM (SWEPRESS5). They have the

power to decide on the political aspects of communication, including the authority to decide on

whether ministers are allowed to publish any given item of communication (SWEPRESS5). Hence,

they have the authority to perform hierarchal coordination related to the communication of

strategies and policy and authority to ‘control’ the government agenda. Not surprisingly, the unit is

22

described as a ‘strong centre’ (SWEPA3, similar SWEPA5, SWEPRESS4), which sometimes

prohibits communication from the line ministries (SWEPA2). Although the press secretaries in the

line ministries experience some latitude (SWEPRESS1, SWEPRESS2) to ensure that policy issues

are in line with the entire coalition government before they are communicated, press secretaries

must seek approval from both the central coordination unit and the PM’s press office

(SWEPRESS4).

The fact that press secretaries are formally employed in the PMO’s press unit under the formal

responsibility of the head of press points to the importance given to thinking as a government

collegium rather than as individual ministries or parties within the corps of press secretaries. As one

of the press secretaries explains, this implies that ‘…you should be able to be a bit “free standing”

from your minister…we are not satellites; rather, we coordinate our policy’ (SWEPRESS1).

A short daily morning meeting of all of the press secretaries led by the head of the press unit at the

PMO which is described as the core coordination mechanism for reactive communication often to

the media (SWEPA3, SWEPA4, SWEPRESS1). Further common talking points for communication

to guide minister’s communications, especially with the media, are prepared by the centre

(SWEPRESS5). Moreover, the head of press plans communications in a weekly document,

including all planned communication activities based on requests made by the press secretaries

(SWEPRESS1), which resembles the former UK government news grid. Hence, the grid is difficult

to ‘go up against’ and disagree with (SWEPRESS5), reflecting a hierarchical mechanism. All of

these mechanisms add to the interdependence among the press secretaries as well as providing the

heads of press at the centre with the authority to change communication behaviour.

23

Due to the hierarchical coordination by the press unit, press secretaries do not perceive themselves

as ‘free standing’ (SWEPRESS1), although they first and foremost pledge their loyalty to ‘their’

respective ministers (SWEPRESS2, SWEPRESS3, SWEHC4). This causes conflicts: ‘It is a

balancing act how to defend your own portfolio externally while at the same time keeping a unified

government. It’s not good in the eye of the public if you see a divided government’ (SWEPRESS3).

Demands for tight coordination are substantial, however, as a coherent and unified government is

considered a crucial norm in Swedish government; as described by one adviser, the interests of the

minister and the government are ‘in principle the same’ (SWEPA3), which is further described as a

‘….necessity when you have collective decision making…the fact that we make collective

decisions renders it even more important to have a strong centre’ (SWEPA3).

Although most respondents implicitly or explicitly testify to the perception that tight coordination is

preferred and indeed in many cases accomplished, some report instances in which this is not

accomplished. For example, one press secretary reports that documents have been leaked to the

media, revealing disagreement among the coalition partners. However, the secretary stresses the

importance of trying to ‘…keep a united government. A divided government in the public eye is not

good, either’ (SWEPRESS3).

Most of the respondents reflect on the importance and effectiveness of coordination, although not

without exception and with some conflicts along the way. Quite in contrast to the Danish case, the

Swedish respondents generally recognize the need for strong, tight coordination to ensure that the

government represents a collegium (SWEPA3, SWEPA5, SWEPRESS3, SWEPRESS1). In the

eyes of the Swedish public, acting as a collegium and striving for consensus is crucial for any

Swedish government. As one respondent puts it, the word ‘governability’, (regeringsduglighet) is

24

vital for all Swedish governments (SWEPRESS3). Thus, a general ‘striving for unity’ (SWEPA4) is

one of the most important norms of governing in Sweden.

This governmental perspective is also reflected in the bureaucratic actors employed to work with

communication. Within the ministries, the permanent civil servants heading the communication

units positioned in the permanent bureaucracy describes their role rather as ‘watch dogs’ in terms of

ensuring that the advisers positioned as press secretaries are indeed acting loyal to the coordinated

government line of communication rather than pushing for communication promoting single

ministers or party interests, view pointes etc. (SWEHC2). This is partly accomplished through

coordination of government communication in the permanent part of the government organizations

by a central coordinating unit positioned at the Office for Administrative Affairs, formally

subordinated the Prime Minister as head of the Government offices. The head of this unit, a

permanent civil servant, is responsible for coordinating government communication among the

permanent head of communication, among others through a monthly meeting with all heads of

communication from the line ministries (SWEHS3). However, this is also party accomplished

through the very self-perception of their role as being part of government, working to promote that

government, but from a non-politicized position, rather than merely serving a single minister and/or

his or hers party (SWEHC1; SWEHC2; SWEHC3; SWEHC4; SWENONPOLPRESS1).

4.3 Comparative Analysis

The analysis shows that the advisers in both cases are involved in coordination but in rather

different ways resulting in rather different abilities to perform political control on government

coordination vis-à-vis the bureaucray. In addition, the analysis has revealed that the very notion of

political control may be to crude a conceptualization of the different aspects of political control

25

performed. Whereas the Swedish case demonstrates that political control may be exercised from

advisers concerns for the government as such the prevalent perspective in the Danish case is that

advisers involvement in coordination is primarily based on concerns for the minister and and his or

hers party.

In the Danish case, negative horizontal self-coordination in an informal, ad hoc manner prevails

among special advisers. While they enjoy considerable leeway in terms of how to organize their

coordination, representing the interests of their respective ministers is part of their role. Thus, while

there is no formal ‘hierarchy’ to cast any shadow, coordination serves as a means to ‘pre-cook’

political conflicts. In other words, they coordinate by means of negative horizontal self-coordination

to perform a clearinghouse function that ‘their’ ministers would otherwise carry out. In so doing,

they add some degree of party politicization to coordination. However, in the absence of formal

coordination mechanisms through which special advisers contribute to coordination, they

coordinate in an ad hoc, conflict-solving manner. Hierarchical coordination is less important for the

contribution of Danish special advisers to government coordination, as the adviser for the PMO is

not pro-actively engaged in government coordination.

By being predominantly involved in the coordination to the party and of a distinct object

(communication), special advisers contribute to the functional differentiation of government

coordination alongside objects of coordination. In so doing, they affect the degree of

interdependence of the involved actors: As there is a political and functional demand to include

communication considerations in government policy coordination, special advisers increase the

interdependence of actors by overtaking that function, as civil servants would otherwise need to do

so. Hence, special advisers and civil servants perform distinct functions that are interrelated in the

overall coordination. In particular, outside of the formal cabinet committee coordination, special

26

advisers are potentially able to affect the goals of coordination – but again, predominantly with

regard to issues of communication – rather than regarding policy goals apart from aligning those

with the minister’s party. It is because of this specialized coordinating function, that the potential of

Danish special advisers to contribute to the adjustment of actors in coordination is limited. Further

they predominantly coordinate with their counterparts from other ministries – rather than with civil

servants.

In the Swedish case, the various formal hierarchical modes through which political strategies,

policies and communications are coordinated generate and increase the interdependence among the

advisers and state secretaries and their bureaucracies and the central coordination unit at the centre

as well as between the press secretaries in the line ministries through the central press unit and

between the heads of communication and the central communication unit in the Office for

Administrative Affairs in the permanent bureaucracy. In that sense advisers at the centre adds a

governmental rather than ministerial political grip on government coordination vis-à-vis the

ministries to an already existing political grip on the bureaucracy performed primarily by politically

appointed state secretaries. In some cases assisted by the advisers positioned in the line ministries. It

also generates and adds to the interdependence among policy and government communications,

generating governmental political control in the horizontal government coordination exercised by

advisers at the centre. Both advisers at the central policy and at the press-coordinating units at the

centre have the formal authority to resolve and give priority to conflicting goals, to block policy and

communications which are not in line with the agreed upon political goals set by the coalition, and

by so doing enforce changing behaviour onto the bureaucrats including the politically appointed

State Secretary. Adding further to this control is the normative foundation for coordination

underlining the existing formal modes of coordination in the Swedish government, which is also

27

reflected in the accounts provided by the permanent civil servants formally posited as heads of

communication in the line bureaucracies serving as non-politicised watch dogs regarding the

formally coordinated government communication lines. Finally, the establishment of central

coordinating units for both policy and communications at the centre strategically linking the

coalition partners impedes coordination along party-political lines as is the case in Denmark, where

advisers are ‘left to their own devices’ through modes of voluntary coordination.

In a comparative perspective, negative self-coordination prevails in both cases. In the Danish case it

is characterized by considerable informality and for the advisers hardly affecting the established

hierarchy for coordination inhabited by the permanent secretaries. In the Swedish case, in contrast,

horizontal self-coordination is featured by a very strong awareness of the existence of the hierarchy

and further supplemented by hierarchical modes from the advisers at the centre based on authority

towards the line ministries in which the state secretaries already performs a political grip on the

bureaucracy.

Whereas the role of Danish advisers is contingent on their respective minister’s preferences and in

particular their political power, the Swedish case reflects formal patterns of hierarchy among

advisers and differentiation with respect to the government agenda, strategy, policy and

communication, i.e. advisers differ in the subjects they coordinate. While the role of Danish

advisers in horizontal coordination is informal and ad hoc, focussing on the party-political and

coalition implications of coordination as well as the communication of issues, the sheer variety of

formal coordinating mechanisms grants Swedish advisers a role in the coordination of policies,

communications and political strategies, albeit their involvement differs according to their formal

position. It is particularly the informality of the roles of advisers in horizontal coordination in

Denmark that allows for the contingency of the (coalition) government of the day.

28

In Denmark, the central horizontal coordinating fora are still ministerial or bureaucratic territory. In

contrast, horizontal government coordination in Sweden is the homeland of political actors in which

ministers and politically appointed state secretaries reside as well as being a territory into which

some political ministerial advisers and press secretaries have been invited and even equipped with

hierarchical authority vis-à-vis the state secretaries and the bureaucracy in the line ministries. They

act through distinct mechanisms that are linked to cabinet meetings and to each other, adding to the

authority through which hierarchal coordination can be performed and to the interdependence

between government actors. Central actors (the central coordination unit in the PMO and the central

press office in the government) are mutually and strategically linked by a close, daily working

relationship creating an environment in which tight coordination appears appropriate and as the

standard operating procedure. The differences between the two cases are particularly

straightforward when comparing advisers across the centre and periphery of government. Whereas

the political advisers in the Swedish central coordination unit and those in the central press unit

have substantial power and the political authority to block policy initiatives or change

communication, this centre–periphery difference lacks in the Danish case.

Hence, as expected, we find that the Swedish case reflects more political control on government

coordination than in Denmark. However, the comparison reveals that political control of

government coordination in Sweden is not enabled by the relatively higher number of ministerial

advisers. Although the political advisers in the Swedish ministries outnumber the Danish, none of

them, as in Denmark, is generally considered central to the coordination in the inter-departmental

arena, although informal mechanisms exist to begin facilitating political agreements. Instead, what

generates the difference between the two cases is related to the positioning of political advisers and

leading press secretaries in central coordinating units at the very core of the Swedish government

that also possess the authority for hierarchical coordination. It is this authority in particular that

29

enables the political advisers at the core in the Swedish case to exert political control from the

perspective of the government on coordination across the government. This indicates that it is the

modes generated through adviser’s position in the hierarchal organization of coordination at the

centre rather than the ‘mere’ number of advisers that mediates the capacity of advisers to provide a

political grip on government coordination.

5.0 Conclusion

This article shows that it is not just the advent of advisers or their sheer numbers that affects if and

how (some) political advisers are able to perform a political grip vis-à-vis the bureaucracy in

government coordination. By providing fine-grained insight into the internal dynamics of

government coordination, the article finds that it rather depends on advisers position in the

hierarchical organization of government coordination at the center. Further the article does not point

in a direction where advisers in line ministers exerts a political control of the coordination

performed by the bureaucracy. In the Danish case this is due to the functional differentiation where

the bureaucracy has preserved the permanent secretaries privileged position in the organization

around government coordination, although they somehow insulate the bureaucracy from entering

coordination within the party circles. In the Swedish case advisers in the line ministers are primarily

preserved a role as adviser to the minister, leaving the political grip already established and

performed by the politically appointed state secretaries.

However, the comparative perspective reveals how a formalized ‘machinery’ of coordination

mechanisms with distinct mechanisms for advisers, strategically linked to each other and to existing

coordination mechanisms – as in Sweden – counters the centrifugal forces in government inherent

30

to individual minister’s or party preferences and provides for governmental political grip on the line

ministries vis-à-vis not the permanent bureaucracy per se, but rather on the state secretaries in the

line ministries. Such machinery further creates an awareness of the interdependence among

government actors, even across parties in a coalition government and within the permanent

bureaucracy at least in terms of communication, and directs their attention toward horizontality and

‘tightens up’ government coordination.

The article demonstrates that a bridging of research addressing political advisers and coordination

provides a fruitful perspective on the study of both. To research on political advisers, the article

adds that their coordinating role may be fruitfully investigated from the perspective of established

government coordination theory. More generally, for research on ministerial advisers and the call

for a ‘second wave’ of research on advisers seeking to theorize on their functions and roles in

government (Shaw and Eichbaum 2015a), this indicates the relevance of departing from also

established theories rather than developing specific theories for explaining advisers, their behaviour

and their relation with their minister (for a similar point of view, see Shaw and Eichbaum 2015b;

2016).

With regard to research on government coordination, the article shows how an encompassing

perspective including all of the actors on the table – and not just politicians and/or permanent

bureaucrats – provides a more realistic picture of the power dynamics of government coordination,

as the ‘third party’ can add a dose of party politicization next to established political and

bureaucratic lines as in Denmark or can exercise considerable power and authority actually

affecting coordination and – hence, ultimately – both policy and communication output as in

Sweden. With regard to a political science perspective on coordination, the article demonstrates that

political advisers actually contribute to aligning conflicting political preferences and priorities

31

(Goetz 2003, p. 80) and, hence, especially if positioned at the core executive as in Sweden,

contribute to taming the centrifugal forces and ‘silo mentality’ inherent in any government.

Advisers are therefore another ‘mean’ together with coalition agreements and formal committees

through which politicians are able to establish a governmental political grip on coordination. This

raises further demands to consider the (power) political role of the political advisers in government

coordination as an extension of single ministers or as a strengthening of a ‘whole of government’

perspective.

With regard to a public administration perspective on coordination, the analysis reveals that

political advisers can indeed enter – and possibly even incur – what was once (rather uncontested)

‘bureaucratic homeland’. Hence, there is a need to re-assess the finding that bureaucrats perform the

main bulk of horizontal coordination, as this analysis shows how political advisers contribute their

share, although to rather varying degrees. By so doing, this third party is indeed suited to alter

established the politico–administrative patterns or the relationship between politics and

bureaucracy. However, whereas this in the Swedish case reflects getting a tighter grip on the

bureaucracy indirectly through a tighter ‘coalition grip’ on already formally politicized actors, in the

Danish case this reflects a more direct way in the sense of advisers being prime responsible for

coordination, however only related to communication issues or within party political circles. Hence,

if political advisers are well equipped in terms of position and power (Sweden) or coordinates

issues which were not bureaucratic territory to begin with (Denmark), the political control vis-à-vis

the ministerial bureaucracy is potentially strengthened. From a democratic perspective, this is good

news and bad news. The good news is that a strong political grip constrains the bureaucracy and the

tendency to become self-controlling. At the same time, however, there is the risk of an excessively

32

tight grip downplaying bureaucratic expertise in coordination and policy-making. Further there is a

risk of downplaying purposes related to government communication, and the democratic concerns

characterizing this perspective (Sanders and Canel 2013) relative to purposes of a political

communication nature.

To test our hypothesis in other cases, the findings of this study point to avenues for further research

in at least three respects. Firstly, the external validity of the importance of the organization of

coordination rather than the mere numbers of advisers’ contribution to tightening government needs

to be tested in other cases, including comparing cases with similar shares of advisers, equipped with

different modes of coordination. Related to this, as the modes of coordination seem intimately

related to the institutional systems, particularly regarding the constitutionally prescribed

government systems, future studies may explore the relative importance of different types of

government systems for explaining advisers (coordination) behavior vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, e.g.

in cabinet systems featuring even more extensive formal politicization in government organizations

than the cases included in this article .

Secondly, it suggests a need to link the study of political advisers more systematically to core

executive studies, because formal and informal power differential and their implications for doing

the business of government have been acknowledged by this strand of research and actually

represent its starting point (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990). This kind of a closer link between the

study of advisers and core executive studies is particularly promising, as the study in hand also

demonstrates how there is indeed a hierarchy in the horizontal coordination arena between more and

less powerful actors – at least in the case of Sweden.

Thirdly, it suggest that the idea of advisers performing political control may further be theorized by

33

reassessing for whom this political control is performed. The analysis suggests that the political grip

may indeed be performed not only on behalf of the minister, but also on the government per se, and

hence more by the center of government, suggesting that advisers may serve not merely as an

extension of individual ministers, but as importantly of (the centers) of governments as such as

recently suggested by Shaw and Eichbaum 2016).

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