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Drawing the Line:

The Effects of the People’s Republic of

China’s National Focus on its Strategy in

Territorial Disputes

Master Thesis – China’s International Political Economy

Supervisor: Dr. Jue Wang

Asian Studies PSE, Leiden University

2019 - 2020

Final Version

15 July 2020

Word count: 15000

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Contents:

1. Introduction 4

1.1 Literature Review 5

2. Analytical Framework 9

2.1 The Concept of a Territorial Dispute 9

2.2 Strategies of Dispute Resolution 12

3. Data Analysis 17

3.1 Methodology 17

3.2 Overview of the PRC’s Territorial Disputes 19

3.3 The PRC’s National Focus 25

3.4 Case Study – Sino-Indian Dispute 34

3.4.1 Context 34

3.4.2 Analysis 38

4. Conclusion 42

5. Bibliography 44

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List of Tables and Figures:

Figures:

Figure 1: Subdivision of Territorial Dispute 11

Figure 2: Dispute Strategy Flowchart 13

Figure 3: Qing Dynasty and Current PRC Borders 22

Figure 4: Dispute Strategy Timelines 26

Figure 5: Strategy Usage in Numbers 28

Figure 6: PRC’s General Strategy Timeline 29

Figure 7: Sino-Indian Dispute Claims Layout 35

Figure 8: Sino-Indian Dispute Strategy Timeline 38

Tables:

Table 1: Overview of the PRC’s Territorial Disputes

20/21

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1. Introduction:

On June 15, 2020 a large-scale brawl broke out between the Indian army and the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) in the Galwan Valley. The Galwan Valley is located along the Line

of Actual Control (LAC) established in the Sino-Indian border’s Western sector. It is part of

the disputed territory claimed by both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India, whose

dispute encompasses almost the entire border. Although the situation is still developing, this

clash is significant as it marks the first time in 45 years that soldiers died fighting over the

Sino-Indian border.1 This escalation merits concern as, historically, territorial disputes are the

leading cause of war.2 Even if a territorial dispute does not lead to war, it may still carry long-

reaching consequences. Millions could be impacted by the location of a border, determining

everything from the language their children are taught in school to the army they may be

drafted into.3 It is therefore paramount that territorial disputes are properly studied and

understood.

Aside from raising concerns, this clash also raises some interesting questions. After all, this

clash seems to be a far cry from how the dispute has been handled in the past, as several

agreements regarding the peaceful management of border incidents have been made since

1988 (some even as recent as 2013).4 It shows that strategies regarding territorial disputes can

change, begging the questions of what strategies the PRC uses in territorial disputes and what

that choice of strategy is based on. These questions are especially relevant today considering

the heightened tensions on the Sino-Indian border. That is why, in this thesis, I will be

answering the following research question: “How does the PRC’s National Focus influence its

strategy in territorial disputes?”. With National Focus I mean the priorities of Chinese

leadership(s) in regard to national identity and domestic development. During this research I

have paid particular attention to the temporal factor; how the PRC’s strategy changes over

time as priorities change. Using this lens, I have been able to divide the PRC’s history into 3

distinct periods where the PRC prefers a specific strategy. Moreover, these periods almost

perfectly coincide with drastic changes in the PRC’s priorities as well as its outlook on itself.

These are, what I call, the Ideological Period, the Pragmatic Period and the Competitive

Period. The Ideological Period covers the Mao Zedong (毛泽东) era and is characterized by a

1 Safi, “20 soldiers killed”, The Guardian. 2 Fravel, Strong Borders, 3. 3 Cukwurah, Settlement of Boundary Disputes, 228-229. 4 Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 108-109; Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 149.

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radical adherence to communist ideology, with the PRC believing itself to be the bastion of

Communism. The Pragmatic Period covers the Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) and Jiang Zemin (江

泽民) eras. Though still important, ideology took a backseat as the PRC prioritized economic

development and saw itself as a developing nation, applying lessons learned from successful

Western states (albeit adjusted to Chinese circumstances). The Competitive Period covers the

Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Xi Jinping (习近平) eras and is defined by a growing sense of

confidence. The PRC’s development was so successful that it considers itself and its methods

to be a competitor to the West, prioritizing its spread and influence over the rest of the world.

In this thesis, I will argue that a purely realistic approach, 1 of the main theories of

International Relations (IR), is inadequate to explain the PRC’s behavior in territorial

disputes. Instead, more consideration should be given to domestic factors like national

identity and domestic development. This thesis will show that there is a link between these

domestic factors and the PRC’s preferred strategy in territorial disputes. I propose that drastic

shifts in the PRC’s National Focus can best explain the PRC’s changing behavior, as

illustrated by these 3 periods. I will do that by first explaining why I chose this particular

angle for my research in the literature review following this introduction. I will then introduce

my analytical framework while I go over the basics of territorial dispute theory in chapter 2,

breaking down the term and discussing possible strategies. In chapter 3, I will explain my

methodology before providing an overview of the PRC’s territorial disputes. In this overview,

I will prove that a purely realistic approach is lacking by comparing the PRC’s disputes and

analyzing relevant patterns. Next, I will examine the PRC’s strategy during its disputes to

determine the PRC’s preferred strategy throughout time, explaining the 3 periods and how

they tie into the PRC’s National Focus. Then, I will prove this concept holds up by taking the

Sino-Indian dispute as case study. Finally, I will finish with some concluding remarks.

1.1 Literature Review:

While reading up on the available literature on the PRC’s territorial disputes, I noticed that

these are often framed within the context of a much larger debate. Although they do not say it

outright, all these studies seem to indirectly engage in the overarching debate on whether the

PRC’s rise poses a threat to the current international system or not. On one side you have

people like Jung and Mearsheimer who subscribe to the China threat theory. This theory

claims that the PRC aims to challenge the United States (US) and take its place as the

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hegemon.5 According to them, the PRC’s rise of the last decades has granted it more wealth,

power and influence facilitating this challenge and allowing it to take more initiative in

territorial disputes. Arguments supporting this side include that the PRC has become

increasingly assertive, especially since President Xi took over (Tweed, Zhang)6; and the

PRC’s ballooning military expenses and developments (Jung, Mearsheimer).7

The other side of the debate consist of people like Bhakal and Brzezinski who subscribe to the

theory of China’s peaceful rise. This theory claims that the PRC would need a peaceful

international environment to maintain its rise. To that end, it would not destabilize the

international system nor oppress its neighbors while rising to superpower status. Instead, the

PRC would aim to play an active part in the development, stability and prosperity of all other

Asian countries.8 Subscribers to this theory claim that the PRC’s rise was only possible by

assimilating in and adhering to the current international system. Thus, the PRC has no

incentive to destabilize the region. Common arguments supporting this side include that the

PRC has relinquished a lot of its claims onto former territory, offering considerable

concessions during negotiations (Fravel, Voronin)9; and that the PRC prioritizes economic

development over issues of sovereignty (Bhakal, Brzezinski).10

It is important to also address the possibility of bias regarding the PRC’s territorial disputes.

Although a minor part of the debate, both sides have addressed this issue. This resulted in a

spectrum of viewpoints ranging from the PRC manipulating the facts surrounding a territorial

dispute, via censorship and propaganda, to discredit any form of criticism; to the PRC being a

target of a defamation campaign orchestrated by the US as part of its containment strategy.11

Unfortunately, it is very hard to find, research, or prove intent. Therefore, it is impossible to

know for sure whether certain analyses and reports are based on biased interpretations of

events. Nevertheless, the extent of this debate and the sensitivity of this subject demonstrates

that one needs to be cautious when tackling this subject.

5 Jung, “Realists Are Not Wrong”, 103-106; Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans”, Foreign Policy. 6 Tweed, “China’s Territorial Disputes”, Bloomberg; Zhang, “Is China an Exception”, 1. 7 Jung, “Realists Are Not Wrong”, 90-93; Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans”, Foreign Policy. 8 Suettinger, “Rise and Decent”, 2-5. 9 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 81-83; Voronin “A Comparative Analysis”, 51-52. 10 Bhakal, “Five Reasons”, India’s China Blog; Brzezinski, “Clash of the Titans”, Foreign Policy. 11 Allen-Ebrahimain, “How China Won”, Foreign Policy; Bhakal, “Five Reasons”, India’s China Blog.

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Concerning methodology, many scholars have studied these territorial disputes through 1 of

the theoretical lenses of IR. There is, however, a noticeable disparity among the different IR

theories as there seems to be an overabundance of focus on realist arguments. Zero-sum

arguments like power politics, strategic value and natural resources are brought up often to

explain the PRC’s behavior in territorial disputes.12 Realists view the world as a rational place

where states act in self-interest, aiming to become as strong as possible in order to survive.

They argue that the basis of all power lies in territory, as generally the bigger countries are

also more powerful. Control over a territory gives a state access to its resources, strengthening

its (war) economy and denying other states the same. Strategically speaking, it also allows a

state to establish a military base, extending their military reach and thereby allowing them to

better control, contest and/or defend the region. Because of these reasons, irredentist claims

are seen as attempts of a growing state to gain more power at the expense of weaker ones.

This competition expresses itself in the form of territorial disputes.13 Although I do think that

realism has its merits, it does not seem able to explain why states shift strategy within the

same territorial dispute. It lacks nuance, and yet their arguments permeate the literature.

Because of this, I feel that the field is suffering from tunnel-vision. There is a need for

alternative approaches to the PRC’s territorial disputes, in order to correct the overreliance on

realism.

Fortunately, I am not alone in recognizing this disparity as some scholars have provided

alternative approaches. For example, Wei approaches the PRC’s territorial disputes from a

legal perspective, arguing that there is a relationship between legal choices and policy

considerations.14 Forsberg proposes a normative approach to explain territorial disputes,

linking the concept of (in)justice to a state’s behavior.15 Huth modified a realist approach with

constructivist elements and argues, among other things, the impact of democratic institutions

and norms on behavior in territorial disputes.16 Still, these alternative approaches seem to

have remained limited in number, constituting a gap, or at least a weakness, in the literature.

12 Forsberg, “Explaining Territorial Disputes”, 433-435. 13 Ibid., 433-435. 14 Wei, “China and its neighbors”, 107. 15 Forsberg, “Explaining Territorial Disputes”, 433-434. 16 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 33, 187.

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Another pattern that I found while reading the available literature is segmentation. Generally

speaking, whenever scholars research territorial disputes they focus their research on either

the characteristics of the state or of the disputed territory, and rarely combine them.17 The

problem with this is that territorial disputes do not exist in a vacuum. As leaders have to

balance the resolution of a territorial dispute with other interests, external factors are bound to

have an impact. There is a precedent for this line of thought in the literature. Fravel claims

that the PRC’s willingness to compromise is heavily tied to regime security.18 Wang

hypothesizes that, aside from economic and military value, a territory’s symbolic value can

also dictate the PRC’s behavior.19 Zhang researches the relationship between the PRC’s

economic engagement and the militarization of its territorial disputes.20

Considering this, I believe it merits further investigation to see if and how domestic factors

affect the PRC’s behavior in territorial disputes. After all, this concept also has a precedent.

Ananda Bikash claims that because ethnic identity issues can evoke intense commitments

from individuals and groups alike, it can force state leaders to be uncompromising. He

concludes that states tend to take a more hardline approach to disputes about territories that

are tied to the state’s ethnic identity.21 Putnam’s theory, on the other hand, claims that the

assumption of a unitary-actor is often false. Instead, foreign and domestic policy are entangled

as leaders try to accommodate foreign and domestic needs simultaneously. The preference

and ideology at home are therefore instrumental in determining the state’s behavior in

disputes.22 Hence, this angle may provide an explanation to the PRC’s behavior in territorial

disputes that conventional theories have been unable to.

To summarize, my main issues with the state of the field is that it seems to be suffering from

tunnel-vision in its argumentation and it tends to study territorial disputes in a vacuum. The

purpose of this thesis is to help fill this gap by adding to the limited library of alternative

approaches while taking a critical yet objective look at characteristics of the state as well as of

the disputed territories. This thesis aims to contribute to the literature by highlighting the

impact of domestic factors, specifically the National Focus, on the PRC’s strategy choice in

territorial disputes.

17 Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 12. 18 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 46-51. 19 Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 10-11. 20 Zhang, “Is China an Exception”, 192. 21 Ananda Bikash, “Interstate Dyadic Interaction Patterns”, ii, 298-301. 22 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics”, 433, 459-460.

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2. Analytical Framework:

In this chapter I will introduce my analytical framework and discuss the basics of territorial

dispute theory; what exactly defines a territorial dispute, what constitutes as a resolution and

what strategies are there to resolve them. I will, however, not go into the theory of strategy

itself, as the complexity surrounding the term is not relevant to my research. For the context

of this thesis it is enough to know that a strategy is all about improving one’s situation. It is a

plan to turn a situation in one’s favor, whilst making sure that others, with opposing interests

and concerns, cannot thwart that plan.23

2.1. The Concept of a Territorial Dispute:

In order to research how the PRC’s strategy in territorial disputes may have been influenced,

one first needs to have a proper understanding of what a territorial dispute exactly is.

Although many definitions are slight variations, there is not 1 commonly agreed upon

definition.24 Moreover, these definitions tend to be quite simplistic, overlooking some

important details.25 Thus, I first want to thoroughly break the term down.

The term ‘territorial dispute’ consists of 2 parts; ‘territorial’ and ‘dispute’. ‘Territorial’ refers

to ‘territory’ which, according to Merriam-Webster, is defined as: the geographical area

belonging to, or under the jurisdiction of a state.26 In this context, it means everything where

the state exercises effective control and therefore has sovereignty over. This not only includes

the land within their borders but also any islands and territorial waters. The term ‘dispute’ is

often left undefined or simplistically put away as just a ‘disagreement’.27 This overlooks an

important part of what constitutes a dispute according to international law. In order to be

considered a dispute there needs to be an official challenge or claim which is then denied by

the targeted party.28 Putting these parts together I have devised my own definition: a

disagreement where 2 or more states have official conflicting claims over the ownership of a

23 Freedman, Strategy: A History, xi-xii. 24 Fravel, Strong Borders, 10, 45; Guo, Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management, 1-2; Huth, Standing Your Ground, 19. 25 Brownlie, African Boundaries, 12. 26 “Territory”, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary. 27 Brownlie, African Boundaries, 12-13; Guo, Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management, 1-2; Huth, Standing Your Ground, 19. 28 Brownlie, African Boundaries, 12-13.

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certain territory. ‘Official’ being the key word. Because even though a state might feel that

they should have sovereignty over a territory, it is not considered a dispute until an official

claim has been made, and subsequently rejected.

Using my definition, Huth’s 5 situations still apply. In his book, Huth explains 5 situations

that constitute a territorial dispute. The first situation is where at least 1 state disputes where

the current border is fixed, while the other side considers it the legal border as defined by a

previously signed treaty or document. The second situation is when there is an imprecise

treaty and/or demarcation or when there is no commonly agreed upon treaty to work off of. In

this situation both sides have opposing views on where the border should lie.29 In both of

these situations the existence of a border between the 2 states is not put into question. The

dispute is merely about its location. Note that these situations are an issue of border

delimitation and not demarcation, as there is an important distinction between the 2 terms.

Delimitation is the process of determining the limits of a border in an official treaty.

Demarcation is the process of physically marking where the border lies via markers,

structures or by appointing natural features like a river.30 Just because a border is not

demarcated does not necessarily mean that the location of the border is in dispute.

The third of Huth’s situations is when a state has an unwelcome military presence in the

territory of another state and, despite demands to withdrawal, refuses to leave. This includes

foreign occupations as well as established military bases within other state’s borders. In this

case both parties are challenging the status quo, 1 by its demands for the other to leave and the

other by its refusal to do so. In its essence this situation is about sovereignty and the ability to

exercise effective control over one’s territory. This theme is echoed in the fourth situation

where a state does not recognize the sovereignty of another state over part of its own territory.

Finally, the fifth situation is where a state does not recognize the independence and

sovereignty of the opposing state at all.31 In these last 3 situations, the discussion on border

delimitation has not even started yet as the challenging party puts the target’s sovereignty into

question.

Huth points out that these 5 situations show a progression of complexity and severity in the

dispute. The first 2 situations are relatively straightforward, as there is no question about the

existence of the border nor about who owns the territory along it. The third and fourth

29 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 19-21. 30 Brownlie, African Boundaries, 4; Huth, Standing Your Ground, 20. 31 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 21-22.

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situations are already a bit more complex as 1 party puts the sovereignty of the other party

into question. These situations are not necessarily about a border but more-so about the ability

and right to exercise effective control over the territory. The fifth situation is even more

complex. It too is a dispute about sovereignty, however the challenging party goes so far as to

refuse the very existence of the other party.32

Seeing the broad range of Huth’s situations, I have made a subdivision of his concept to avoid

confusion. Thus, from here on out, I will be using the term ‘border dispute’ to refer to the 2

situations focused on border delimitation and ‘territorial dispute’ when I refer to the 3

situations centered around challenges of sovereignty. In case of any confusion, I have made a

model further showcasing my breakdown of the term (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Subdivision of Territorial Dispute

Finally, there are maritime disputes. As the name implies, maritime disputes are disputes

about the ownership of (parts of) bodies of water. Borders at sea are physically impossible to

demarcate, making it hard to clearly differentiate the territorial waters of 2 states. This also

adds an additional security concern as warships can maneuver and attack but do not defend

any water, unlike troops and fortifications dug-in near a land border. Moreover, the

delimitation of maritime borders and zones follow an entirely different set of laws and

32 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 23.

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conventions, principally the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).33

Considering these differences, ‘maritime disputes’ constitute their own separate type of

territorial dispute. Accordingly, in my subdivision, the term ‘maritime dispute’ will refer to

disputes concerning maritime borders and zones. Islands, on the other hand, are a bit more

tricky to categorize. Disputes concerning islands are about the sovereignty over the island and

are therefore by my definition ‘territorial disputes’. However, the disputed islands are often

not that valuable by themselves. Rather it is the role they play in the delimitation of maritime

borders and zones that make these islands so coveted.34 Thus, disputes concerning islands at

sea will be categorized by a combination of a ‘territorial dispute’ and a ‘maritime dispute’. A

similar conundrum exists in border disputes concerning rivers and their islands, which I will

categorize by a combination of a ‘border dispute’ and a ‘maritime dispute’.

Now that I have established the different types of territorial disputes, I will discuss what

constitutes a resolution to these disputes and the various strategies of dispute resolution

available.

2.2 Strategies of Dispute Resolution:

As my definition states, a situation only constitutes a dispute when there are official

conflicting claims. Consequently, in order to resolve a dispute the 2 disputing states need to

officially come to a consensus in regard to these claims. This happens in 1 of 3 ways. Either

the targeted party formally recognizes the challenging claims, the challenging party formally

renounces its claims, or both parties sign a treaty containing a compromise satisfactory to both

parties. States can employ several strategies to get to 1 of these end resolutions which,

according to Fravel, can be grouped into 3 general types: delaying, cooperation and escalation

strategies. In a delaying strategy, the state decides to do nothing but maintain its claims

through public declarations. A cooperation strategy involves offering to find a compromise by

dividing control of the disputed territory or dropping its claims entirely and an escalating

strategy involves the use of force or threat thereof as a way to force the issue.35 To illustrate

how these strategies work, I have made a flowchart which I included below (Figure 2).

33 Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 9, 217, 255. 34 Storey, South China Sea Dispute, 2-3; UNCLOS – Article 121. 35 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52-53; Fravel, Strong Borders, 5.

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Figure 2: Dispute Strategy Flowchart

The existence of these 3 general types already demonstrates the limits of a purely realistic

approach. Many realist arguments are based on characteristics of the territory, like strategic

value or the presence of natural resources. Though these characteristics can change over time

as technology advances (for instance trivializing defensive terrain or making previously

impossible to reach deposits accessible) the arguments based on them are usually very rigid.

The territory has it and therefore a state wants it, and the more of it there is, the more

important the territory is. However, this is a very crude way of looking at these disputes. It

may sometimes explain the claim but it does not account for the strategy used to resolve them.

In fact, it completely neglects the nuances involved in choosing a strategy. According to

Fravel, each of these strategies has its own advantages and disadvantages, making some better

suited to certain situations than others.36 That means that, regardless of the territory, choosing

a strategy is a careful consideration of the circumstances surrounding the dispute.

Furthermore, external factors can play an important role in shaping these circumstances, as

can be seen from the advantages and disadvantages of the different strategies.

36 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52-53; Fravel, Strong Borders, 16.

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Of the 3 strategies, states will most often use the delaying strategy as it usually carries the

fewest risks. The state only maintains its claims but does not act on them in any way.

Delaying can be a valid strategy as it buys the state time to improve its (bargaining) position

by strengthening its military or gaining more support abroad and/or at home. Additionally, a

state that occupies the disputed territory can use a delaying strategy to consolidate the

situation and become the de facto owner. Delaying strategies do still negatively impact the

relationship between the 2 countries though, as it generates grievances which can make

cooperation in other areas, like the economy, less likely. This negative impact is also not

limited to the relationship between the disputing parties but could even tarnish the overall

reputation of the challenging party.37

The cooperation strategy is the most successful strategy of the 3. About half of the world’s

existing territorial disputes have been settled via this strategy.38 Also, having to negotiate and

find a satisfying resolution together often yields additional benefits. The relationship

improves which could in turn, increase trade or stimulate other mutually beneficial projects.

Nevertheless, a cooperation strategy usually involves concessions by 1 or both parties.39

Therefore, most likely neither state will have sole ownership of the entire disputed territory.

This can be risky as, aside from losing some of the benefits of the territory, any concessions

could lead to backlash domestically, causing unrest and weakening a leader’s position.

Escalation, on the other hand, is not only resource-intensive but also has a lot of uncertainty

associated with it. Military conflicts are unpredictable and any defeats can have great political

consequences at home.40 Moreover escalation is generally frowned upon by the international

community, as all members of the United Nations (UN) are bound by its charter to try to find

peaceful solutions to international disputes.41 Still, an escalation strategy would allow a

stronger state to use its military capabilities and force a resolution in their favor. Oftentimes a

state will shift its strategy once the costs/risks of their current strategy outweigh the potential

benefits it may procure. Given that states often keep sovereignty and territory in high regard,

only drastic shifts are likely to change a state’s strategy. For example, the Soviet Union

(USSR) dropped its claims on territory in Turkey in 1953 and Iran in 1954. In the new

37 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52-53; Fravel, Strong Borders, 16; Guo, Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management, 3. 38 Guo, Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management, 3. 39 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52. 40 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52-53; Fravel, Strong Borders, 5. 41 Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 255-256; UN Charter – Article 2.3.

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international landscape of the Cold War, the USSR found that it could no longer afford to

alienate these potential allies. The territory was simply not worth the deteriorating

relationship.42

All 3 strategies manifest themselves is their own ways. The delaying strategy is characterized

by a lack of initiative. Though the state maintains its claims on the territory, it does not take

any actions aimed at finding a resolution to the dispute. It is relatively content with the status

quo and does not want to change that. The escalation strategy mainly manifests itself through

the military, which can be utilized in 3 ways. It can be used by threatening its use, showing a

display of force or actually using it. Usually it is the goal of these actions to coerce the other

party into accepting their claims without going to war. But, occasionally, these escalation

strategies can and have led to war.43 Both of these strategies are relatively straightforward in

their execution, the cooperation strategy is, however, a bit more complicated as there are

several possible avenues to be taken. The preferred method of the cooperation strategy is by

direct negotiations as they allow both parties to keep full control over the resolution process.

Negotiations also serve as the foundation on which other peaceful resolutions are built.44 But

it is not an infallible strategy, negotiations do fail sometimes when a settlement satisfactory to

both parties cannot be reached. In which case, other avenues can be explored.

As I said before, territorial disputes do not exist in a vacuum. The involvement of third parties

is therefore not out of the question. Third parties can help in the pursuit of a resolution by

good offices and mediation. Good offices are calls to action aimed at the disputing parties, to

start negotiations or keep them going. They can also mediate between the disputing parties by

joining the negotiations directly or forming a bridge through which the disputing parties can

continue negotiating. This type of involvement is aimed at urging the disputing parties to

move to, or continue with a cooperation strategy. Alternatively, the disputing parties can call

upon third parties for conciliation or enquiry. Conciliation is a more formal variation of

mediation. In this case, the disputing parties establish a commission of neutral third parties

that is tasked to make recommendations regarding terms of settlement. An enquiry, on the

other hand, is a fact-finding investigation conducted by a third party to establish the facts of

42 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52-53; Fravel, Strong Borders, 16, 19. 43 Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 256-257. 44 Ibid., 256-257.

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the dispute.45 These are all non-binding procedures to help the disputing parties find a

compromise, though the disputing parties are free to disregard them entirely.

The dispute can also be submitted for adjudication by an international tribunal, like the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) or an ad hoc arbitration body. Although adjudication does

provide some form of settlement to the dispute, is has proven to be less successful than direct

negotiations. In order to find a satisfactory settlement, concessions by both parties (territorial

or otherwise) are simply unavoidable. These concessions are a lot harder to swallow if a party

is forced to give them rather than if it agrees to them. Moreover, these tribunals’ rulings may

be legally binding but can only be enforced by international pressure. Oftentimes the

disputing parties use the tribunal’s ruling as a basis and modify it on grounds of mutual

convenience and common interest. In fact, disputing parties have, on several occasions,

agreed to disregard all of the tribunal’s ruling.46

Nevertheless, third party involvement can also have a negative impact on a dispute,

particularly when it favors 1 side of the dispute over the other. States opting for delaying or

escalation strategies can be subjected to sanctions (economic or otherwise), or receive

assistance through funds and material or by direct intervention. This type of involvement can

not only cause the dispute to last longer, it can also increase the dispute’s intensity and cause

it to spill over into other areas.47

Finally, in recent years 2 alternative methods have been developed: confidence building

measures and joint development arrangements. These alternatives are meant to help foster a

better environment in which a settlement can be struck, while bypassing the dispute for the

time being. Confidence building measures try to stimulate cooperation between disputing

states by creating consensus on issues besides jurisdiction, like the environment. Joint

development arrangements, on the other hand, allows both parties to move forward with their

development plans while maintaining their claims. It also fairly divides the resources in the

area (including undiscovered resources) among the parties. Both alternatives seem particularly

popular in maritime disputes.48 Although these alternatives seem promising, I believe their

success should not be seen as a replacement for an actual solution as the dispute still exists.

45 Cukwurah, Settlement of Boundary Disputes, 151-152; Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 257-258. 46 Cukwurah, Settlement of Boundary Disputes, 200, 230-231; Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 258-264. 47 Fravel, Strong Borders, 8. 48 Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, 262-264.

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3. Data Analysis:

In this chapter I will present the findings of my research and further analyze them. My

research is divided into 3 parts: a comparative study of all the PRC’s territorial disputes, an

analysis of the PRC’s strategy during those disputes through time, and a case study on the

Sino-Indian dispute. Before discussing the results of these 3 parts, I will first explain my

methodology.

3.1 Methodology:

This thesis has adopted a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches in its

research to determine the influence of the PRC’s National Focus on its strategy in territorial

disputes. For this thesis, I conducted a comparative study of all the PRC’s territorial disputes.

Next, I analyzed the PRC’s strategy in those disputes through time and linked them to the

PRC’s national identity and domestic developments. Finally, I put this concept to the test by

taking the Sino-Indian dispute as a case study.

I have limited the comparative study to a set of variables that I deemed relevant in discerning

the PRC’s strategy. These are: the type of dispute, the duration of the dispute, the concessions

made (represented by the PRC’s take of the disputed territory), and the use of force. My

parameters for determining these values are that I determined the type using the subdivision

provided in chapter 2. I measured the duration from the first official claim to official

delimitation of the border, either by treaty or by official transfer of territory. The PRC’s take

is based on the final agreement or, if there is none, on the latest known offering. In which case

it will be indicated within brackets. Finally, I have only counted coordinated military action

that was directly related to the dispute, or threats thereof, as use of force. The only exceptions

being minor border violations. Since both parties disagree on the location of the border, one

state’s regular patrol can easily be regarded as an intrusion by the other. This makes it hard to

determine whether these patrols are meant as an escalation or not. Moreover, I have also

included variables that showcase important characteristics of the disputed territory like the

approximate size, the presence of a permanent population and natural resources, whether it is

considered a strategic location and whether the PRC has an identity based connection with the

territory (sharing a common ethnicity, language, religion etc. with Han-Chinese).

~ 18 ~

Of course, this limited choice of variables does not provide the entire picture of the disputes in

question, but that is not the intent of this overview. Instead, this overview aims to reveal

noticeable patterns in timing and behavior. Most of the data used in this comparative study

was drawn from Fravel’s studies in “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation:

Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes.” and Strong Borders, Secure

Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes, Huth’s study in Standing

Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict, Zhang’s study in “Is China an

Exception to the Commercial Peace?” (all similar comparative studies), and the datasets Issue

Correlates of War (ICOW) v1.20 and Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) v4.3.49 Any

leftover gaps were filled with additional issue specific literature, like proclamations and the

15th edition of The Times comprehensive atlas of the world.50 The data found was cross-

referenced between the aforementioned sources to check for accuracy.

I then analyzed the PRC’s behavior during their disputes, the results of which I used to create

timelines for all disputes. For simplicities sake, I have divided the timelines into 5 year

intervals. Furthermore, as the National Focus is about the priorities of Chinese leadership(s) in

regard to national identity and domestic development, I also added the PRC’s leadership eras

to the timelines, dividing it into 5 sections. The data used in this comparison is coming from

the same sources as the comparative study described above and the results were determined as

follows: the PRC was employing a cooperation strategy any time the PRC entered and

maintained negotiations (blue). It utilized an escalation strategy any time the PRC conducted

a coordinated military action or threatened to do so (red). Finally, if the PRC maintained its

claim but did not employ either of the other 2 strategies it was using a delaying strategy

(yellow). In cases where negotiations and coordinated military action overlap, the escalation

strategy overrode the cooperation strategy, because a cooperation strategy requires the

absence of the use of force.51 Unfortunately, at the time of writing this thesis, the data

regarding the PRC’s other peaceful settlement attempts is unreleased, and could therefore not

be used in this research.52 Considering the situation, I still feel this is a viable method of

determining the PRC’s strategy.

49 Hensel, “Issue Correlates of War”; Palmer, “Militarized Interstate Dispute Data”. 50 Collins Bartholomew, Times Comprehensive Atlas; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROK), “Sending Data”; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), “Declaration”. 51 Fravel, “Regime Insecurity”, 52. 52 Hensel, “Project Description”, Paulhensel.org.

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In regard to the case study, I narrowed it down to only 1, as it would be impossible to tackle

them all in this thesis. The absence of a comparative study is made up for by the depth of this

analysis as I will explain the context and background of why the PRC chose the strategies it

did. I specifically chose the Sino-Indian dispute as my case study because it is a long running

and complex dispute that has spanned all 5 leadership eras. This allows me to research the

PRC’s behavior over a long stretch of time, providing more opportunities to study the impact

of its National Focus. Moreover, the PRC has utilized all 3 types of strategies over the course

of this dispute, giving me the chance to properly compare their usage.

3.2 Overview of the PRC’s Territorial Disputes:

Currently, the PRC is the 4th biggest country in the world by area. It covers about

9,600,000 km² and shares its borders with 14 countries on land and an additional 7 at sea.53

This thesis found that the PRC has been involved in 23 territorial disputes. I have compiled all

23 disputes in the table below (Table 1), showcasing them alongside several interesting

variables. The patterns established from this table (which will all be discussed later in this

section) will show that a purely realistic approach is lacking as it is unable to explain many of

them. But first, a keen eye will notice that some of these disputes started even before the PRC

was founded in 1949.54 That is because these disputes were started by the Republic of China

(ROC) or sometimes even the Qing Dynasty but could not be resolved before their downfall.

As their successor state, the PRC has inherited and pursued the same claims starting from

their founding. In these cases, I have only included the engagement of the PRC (its actions

and the parties that they were in dispute with) but still displayed the original start of the

dispute. For instance, the Chinese already claimed Arunachal Pradesh when India was still a

colony of the United Kingdom (UK) in the late 19th century. However, since India gained its

independence in 1947, the only party that the PRC had to engage in this dispute was India,

thus the UK was left out of the overview.

53 Collins Bartholomew, Times comprehensive atlas, 35, Plate 15. 54 Ter Haar, Hemels Mandaat, 538.

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Table 1: Overview of the PRC’s Territorial Disputes

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From this table, several observations can be made. For one, the PRC seems to have had a

dispute with all its neighbors, though that is not surprising. Qing-China lost a lot of territory

due to what the Chinese deem ‘unequal treaties’, treaties forced onto them after a war or by

threat thereof. These treaties were seen as humiliating as they greatly diminished Chinese

sovereignty.55 Therefore, it stands to reason that the PRC would attempt to undo these treaties.

In fact, both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (KMT) ran on a

platform of abolishing the unequal treaties during the Chinese Civil War.56 Considering this,

the extent of the PRC’s claims is probably more surprising. The PRC has claimed about

236,187 km² in total. In absolute numbers that is a vast amount of land, constituting a bigger

area than the country of Laos.57 However, compared to the 3,400,000 km² lost to unequal

treaties since the Qing dynasty (Figure 3) it is rather insignificant, constituting only 6.9%.58

55 Wang, “China’s Unequal Treaties”, 10; Wang, Unequal Treaties and China, 2-14. 56 Wang, “China’s Unequal Treaties”, 88-92. 57 Collins Bartholomew, Times Comprehensive Atlas, 37. 58 Fravel, Strong Borders, 1-2.

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Figure 3: Qing Dynasty and Current PRC Borders

Furthermore, this thesis found that 15 of the 23 disputes have been resolved, with the PRC

oftentimes offering considerable concessions and relinquishing their claims on their former

territories. On average, the final agreements leave only about 37.5% to the PRC. Using the

information provided in this table, I calculated that the PRC received about 15,877 km² in

their resolved territorial disputes and relinquished their claims on about 59,899 km². That

means that the PRC has relinquished over 3.77 times more territory than it had gained in these

disputes. These numbers show that despite the PRC’s disdain of the unequal treaties it has for

the most part accepted their territorial consequences. Even now as the PRC has grown

stronger it has seemingly chosen to only pursue a small part of its former territory. A behavior

that realism has trouble to explain.

Looking at the territories’ characteristics, this thesis argues that the PRC seems to hold the

territories with natural resources or with a connection to their identity in higher regard than

those without these features. This is evident from the fact that these territories are often

subject to more extensive claims of the PRC, both in area and severity. As can be seen from

the table, none of the border disputes have any of these features, but many territorial disputes

do. Furthermore, these territorial disputes include some of the biggest disputed territories in

size. That being said, there does not seem to be a pattern that the presence of natural resources

~ 23 ~

nor its strategic location inhibit the PRC’s willingness to compromise. Despite these factors,

the PRC has consistently offered substantial concessions in these disputes. Thus, even though

realism may explain the increased importance of these territories/claims, it misses the mark

when it comes to the PRC’s behavior in these disputes. In fact, the only disputes where the

PRC does not seem willing to compromise at all are those concerning Hong Kong, Macao,

and Taiwan. Coincidentally, these are also the only territories that seem to have an identity

based connection with the PRC. Interestingly, this noticeable more hardline approach for

these heartland territories does not necessarily lead to a more violent approach. Although

Taiwan is the textbook example of military aggression and the escalation strategy, both Hong

Kong and Macao were returned to the PRC without violence or compromise. This proves that

the choice of strategy is not entirely depended on the territories’ characteristics, something

that realism does not account for.

The table further emphasizes this argument. If one looks at the PRC’s use of force it becomes

apparent that PRC has used force in several disputes concerning natural resources but did not

do so for all of them. Yet, it did use force in 2 border disputes that did not have natural

resources. The use of force also does not seem to have a pattern related to the PRC’s relative

power to the other party, as the PRC has used force against both big and strong countries as

well as small and weaker ones. However, it is interesting that the PRC did not use coordinated

military action against the former Soviet states on its Western border. In 1969 the PRC and

the USSR were engaged in a border conflict. Though not the focus of the conflict, fighting

also broke out over the Western section of the border, near the Tielieketi area (Yumin county,

Xinjiang). This is around the same area that would become part of the dispute with

Kazakhstan after the fall of the USSR in 1991.59 So, despite being the same territory, the PRC

utilized military actions in the dispute with the USSR, a very powerful opponent, and yet did

not do so in the dispute with Kazakhstan, which was much weaker. This implies that timing in

general plays a factor into the PRC’s decision to use force, rather than it being based on the

territory or the opposing party.

Looking more specifically at the temporal distribution of these disputes, this thesis finds that

there are some noticeable patterns. 6 of the 23 disputes were inherited by the PRC as they

were already in motion before its founding in October of 1949. Disputes with Taiwan, the

Koreas and Russia (USSR back then) all started within 5 years of the PRC’s founding. All

59 Kuisong, “Sino-Soviet Border Clash”, 34.

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other disputes started in the next few decades, with the disputes with the Republic of Vietnam,

Nepal, Vietnam and Indonesia starting in the mid to late-50s. Those with Bhutan, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Pakistan and Tajikistan starting in the early to mid-60s (Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan disputes started when they were still a part of the USSR). And

those with Portugal, UK and Japan in the early-70s. Thus all 23 disputes were already active a

little over 20 years after the PRC’s founding.

Although the beginnings of the disputes can be traced back to 1 big block of time (1949-

1972), the resolutions to the resolved disputes could fit into 2 distinct periods with 1 outlier.

Of the 15 resolved disputes, 1 was resolved in the late-50s (Republic of Vietnam), 6 were

solved in the early-60s (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, North Korea and Mongolia)

and 8 were solved in the late-90s to early-2000s (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Vietnam,

Portugal, UK, Tajikistan and Russia). This temporal distribution suggests that something

happened before or in the early-60s and the late-90s that caused the PRC to make an effort to

resolve its territorial disputes. I believe it is very likely that this change has happened on the

Chinese side of the disputes, considering that such a large amount of disputes were resolved

in that short amount of time, at 2 different times no less. I think that if the change had

happened on the non-PRC side, these resolutions would have been more spread out over a

longer period.

These patterns show that a purely realistic approach cannot adequately explain everything

about the PRC’s territorial disputes (though it can explain some, like the interest in territories

with natural resources). They reinforce the idea that alternative approaches are needed to

properly study territorial disputes. The patterns also heavily suggest that there is a temporal

factor at play. Especially considering that there are only a few consistent patterns established

through characteristics of the territory itself. Now that I have found these patterns, I will take

a deeper look at the PRC’s National Focus during these disputes to see whether they can

provide an explanation for the patterns described above.

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3.3 The PRC’s National Focus:

The PRC is a one-party, socialist republic and has been under the rule of the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) since its founding in 1949. The CCP has managed to maintain

control by continuously adapting to the ever-changing circumstances of its domestic situation.

In particular, its ideology has played an important role in this evolution. During the Chinese

Civil War, the CCP fought to overthrow the capitalist exploiters, with the goal of turning

China into a socialist, and later, communist state. Though this goal has remained consistent all

throughout its existence, the method of getting there has changed a lot.60 Over the years,

several different leadership groups have ruled the CCP, each with their own distinct party

ideology. In fact, the PRC’s political history can be divided into 5 eras all named after the

‘core leader’ of their leadership group; the Mao era, the Deng era, the Jiang era, the Hu era

and the Xi era.61 As will be explained in this section, among the key differences between the 5

ideologies are its National Focus, the priorities of these leadership groups in regard to national

identity and domestic development. Using these eras to frame the disputes discussed in the

overview, I created individual timelines that showcase the PRC’s strategy at various times in

the disputes (Figure 4).

The patterns established from these timelines will show that the PRC has a preferred strategy

in territorial disputes. Moreover, it will show that this preference has changed over time,

creating 3 periods. This thesis argues that there is a connection between these changes in the

PRC’s preferred strategy and changes in the PRC’s National Focus. Because, as this section

will show, not only does the timing of these changes line up almost perfectly, the changes

seem to be motivated by the same mindset. There is a logic to why there is a preference to a

certain strategy as it best fits the National Focus of the time.

60 Lawrence, “Understanding China”, 1, 11. 61 Lams, “Examining Strategic Narratives”, 388.

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Figure 4: Dispute Strategy Timelines

~ 27 ~

Taking a closer look at the strategies themselves, this thesis finds that there are some patterns

concerning their usage. For instance, the period from 1965 to 1980 is a relatively calm period

in regard to territorial disputes. Not in the sense that there were no disputes, but that the PRC

consistently utilized delaying strategies for many of them. During this period the PRC only

used the ‘active strategies’ in 2 to 3 disputes and used the delaying strategy in all others. This

implies that the territorial disputes were not a priority during this period as there was even a

lull in the escalation of the Taiwan dispute. Then, starting from 1980, the PRC seems to

slowly phase out the delaying strategy in favor of the other 2, especially cooperation

strategies. Note that the PRC started a great number of negotiations in quick succession,

culminating in the late-90s when the PRC was maintaining negotiations in all its border and

territorial disputes except for Taiwan. Conversely, barely any cooperation strategies are used

in offshore disputes (only 1 in island disputes and 0 in maritime disputes), suggesting that the

PRC has a different approach to land and sea based disputes.

For a slightly different perspective I plotted a graph using the frequency of the strategies’

usage (Figure 5). This graph supports many of the patterns described above. It reaffirms the

pattern that the territorial disputes have gained importance starting with 1980, as the PRC

started taking more active strategies in the disputes. It also re-establishes that the cooperation

strategy primarily happened in the 2 aforementioned periods. Interestingly though, the graph

shows that the instances of an escalation strategy has remained relatively consistent, despite

the changing numbers of total disputes. Currently, the PRC is at its lowest amount of active

disputes ever, but escalation has been the most employed strategy for basically the last 20

years, which had also never happened before. This larger share of escalation strategies could

be an explanation why the PRC is considered more assertive in recent years.

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Figure 5: Strategy Usage in Numbers

From all these patterns this thesis concludes that the PRC has generally favored delaying

strategies from its establishment up until 1980, with the only exception being the early-60s. It

favored cooperation strategies during the early-60s and the 1990s, and favored escalation

strategies from 2000 onwards. For the 1980s it is a more difficult to call what the preferred

strategy was. Although the most employed strategy during these years was the delaying

strategy, they show the first signs of a surge in cooperation strategy usage, setting the stage

for the trends of the 1990s. Because of this, I consider them favoring the cooperation strategy

rather than the delaying strategy. Putting them all together, they form the following general

strategy timeline (Figure 6).

~ 29 ~

Figure 6: PRC’s General Strategy Timeline

As can be seen from this timeline, the PRC’s favored choice of strategy has remained quite

consistent for long stretches of time, with the only deviation being the early-60s. It also

closely follows the different eras, showing a preference for delaying strategies under Mao,

cooperation strategies under Deng and Jiang, and escalation strategies under Hu and Xi. The

only deviations from this pattern are the early-60s, the late-70s and the early-2000s. This

consistency supports the idea that states do not change their strategy randomly, rather a drastic

shift is needed for that. Which begs the question: are there any drastic shifts in the PRC’s

National Focus around the time of these changes? This thesis argues there are. These changes

not only sync-up almost perfectly to changes in the PRC’s National Focus but also seem to

follow the same line of thinking. I propose that viewing these changes from this perspective

and dividing the timeline into the Ideological Period (1949-1980), the Pragmatic Period

(1980-2000) and the Competitive Period (2000-Present) provides the best explanation for the

PRC’s changes in strategy.

After the Chinese Civil War, the CCP emerged victorious and founded the PRC in 1949 with

the ultimate goal of turning China into a socialist, and later communist, state.62 Under Mao

this became the defining characteristic of the PRC. For him, making the transition into

socialism was the top priority. The Mao era would last from the establishment of the PRC to

Mao’s death in 1976. Its party ideology was focused on Marxism-Leninism and the Mao

Zedong Thought (Maoism). Mao firmly believed that continuous revolution would allow

China to make the transition into socialism and that the PRC would lead the rest of the world

in doing the same. Accordingly, this period was characterized by a constant state of

revolution, enacting radical social and economic movements like the Great Leap Forward and

the Cultural Revolution.63 Mao’s vision for the PRC was a proper socialist state, self-reliant

and free of foreign influences. But his obsession with this ideal made him ignore warning

signs and those who spoke out against him were branded contra-revolutionaries and enemies

62 Fenby, History of Modern China, 351-353; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 32; Ter Haar, Hemels Mandaat, 538. 63 Fenby, History of Modern China, 351-352; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 30, 34; Westcott, “Poliheuristic Analysis”, 165.

~ 30 ~

of the state. Under the motto: “better red than expert”, any sound scientific method that did

not support this ideal was not just wrong but an attempt to sabotage his revolution. Realism

(the word not the theory) had no place in Mao’s China, ideology took prominence over

everything.64

As the general strategy timeline shows, the preferred strategy during the Mao era was the

delaying strategy. This makes sense from a National Focus perspective as Mao prioritized the

PRC’s transition into socialism above all else. His attention was solely focused on this

process, and he saw other matters like these disputes as nothing more than distractions.

Accordingly, he made few attempts to resolve the territorial disputes. In fact, he used them in

his discourse, and even escalated them on occasion, to motivate the masses, ignite their

national spirit and strengthen their resolve.65 Furthermore, in Mao’s view there was no reason

to try and resolve them. As discussed before, territorial disputes hurt the relationship between

the disputing parties. But Mao was primarily looking inwards, trying to create an independent

and self-reliant China. Thus, leaving these disputes linger would not hurt Mao’s goal in any

way. This is supported by the fact that Mao’s focus on the PRC itself and his obsession with

protecting communism resulted in it gradually closing itself off from the rest of the world.66

He was just not concerned about the relationships with other countries. For its radical

adherence to communist ideology that drove this strategy choice, I named this period the

Ideological Period.

In the following era under Deng, the CCP would change its direction. Seeing the destruction

that Mao’s radicalism had brought, Deng chose to take a step back. Whereas Mao had

proclaimed that the PRC had successfully made the transition into socialism, Deng stated that

the PRC was still only in the first stage of its transition. In his view, the PRC first had to learn

from the outside world and become economically viable before it could make the transition.

Therefore, he reversed a lot of Mao’s policies and allowed a mixed economy to exist. The

Deng era would last from 1976 to 1992 when Deng retreated from politics. The new party

ideology became the Deng Xiaoping Theory, which focused primarily on fostering economic

development through pragmatism while ideology took a backseat. Deng prioritized the

economy, believing that political liberalization before economic reforms would only result in

chaos.67 Deng’s liberalization and re-integration policies proved successful. His immediate

64 Fenby, History of Modern China, 351-353, 392-400; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 32, 35. 65 Fenby, History of Modern China, 403; Kuisong, “Sino-Soviet Border Clash”, 30. 66 Fenby, History of Modern China, 365, 422-423. 67 Fenby, History of Modern China, 539, 553-559; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 30-36.

~ 31 ~

successor Jiang continued where Deng left off. He incorporated the same rational rhetoric in

his Three Represents thesis, officially recognizing and legitimizing the role that business men

were playing in the development of the PRC. In doing so, Jiang doubled-down on Deng’s

vision, making economic growth the absolute priority.68

The general strategy timeline shows that the cooperation strategy was the preferred strategy

during both these eras. Like with Mao, this choice of strategy makes sense from a National

Focus perspective. Because in order to facilitate liberalization and economic development the

PRC would need to interact with the outside world. Seeing that territorial disputes hurt these

relationships, it makes finding a resolution to these disputes that much more important.

Accordingly, more than half of the resolved disputes were solved in this period. Furthermore,

many of those disputes were resolved by offering considerable concessions (Table 1). This

willingness to compromise is echoed in the pragmatic way that the PRC has handled its

domestic development following the Mao era. Despite ideology taking a backseat, it remained

integral to the CCP’s rule. Deng reaffirmed the importance of Marxism-Leninism and

enshrined it and Maoism in the CCP’s history and constitution. He also personally stressed

the importance of basic Marxist tenets. He just did not believe in blind faith. Instead, his

approach was based on rational reasoning and a sense of responsibility.69 This can be seen

from his economic reforms. Among other things, the PRC liberalized its economy and

introduced a (limited) market system. These capitalist mechanics diametrically oppose

Marxism-Leninism. Under Deng (and Jiang), the PRC was willing to compromise on their

ideology in order to pursue economic development. For its pragmatic approach to its ideology

that drove this strategy choice, I named this period the Pragmatic Period.

Although the economic reforms were already quite successful during the Deng and Jiang eras,

their successors would continue to maintain, and add to this approach leading to the PRC’s

economy developing at an unprecedented pace. Under Hu and Xi, the PRC has become the

worlds’ largest exporter and its 2nd largest importer, while its Gross Domestic Product

averaged a yearly growth of about 9.5%.70 This enormous success has made the PRC

increasingly self-confident, to the point that it started taking a more active role in global

governance and started promoting their own Chinese solutions as an alternative to the West. It

advocated for the internationalization of the renminbi. It started new initiatives like the Belt

68 Fenby, History of Modern China, 667; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 33, 37-39. 69 Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 31-35. 70 Fenby, History of Modern China, 530; “GDP growth”, Worldbank; Kennedy, Global Governance, 50.

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and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Even Confucianism

returned and was used as an ideological tool to promote the greatness of China.71 This

confidence was further expounded by the fact that the PRC managed to navigate the 2008

global financial crisis much smoother than developed Western countries. As the competition

between these countries intensified, these Chinese alternatives became integral for the PRC in

order to maintain its economic growth.72 Consequently, the spread and influence of these

alternatives became the PRC’s new priority.

Finally, the general strategy timeline shows that both these eras preferred the escalation

strategy. Again, from a National Focus perspective this makes sense. Now that the PRC

considered itself to be a competitor to the West, both Hu and Xi started using anti-western

rhetoric. This created a volatile situation where any criticism leveled at the PRC and/or CCP

was seen as an attack.73 As mentioned prior, national pride can greatly inhibit a states’

willingness to compromise. The PRC’s competitive stance had created a situation that would

no longer allow the PRC to compromise in territorial disputes. Still, a solution to these

disputes was needed, leaving escalation strategies as the only option available. For its

competitive stance to the Western world that drove this strategy choice, I named this period

the Competitive Period.

If this theory is true then what can explain the inconsistencies of the early-60s, late-70s and

early-2000s within the general timeline? Well, in the late-50s Mao enacted the Great Leap

Forward, which was his plan to collectivize the agricultural sector. The plan was meant to

multiply yields but failed miserably and was therefore quickly scrapped. This failure caused

Mao to lose a lot of influence and he relinquished day-to-day leadership to Liu Shaoqi (刘少

奇) in 1959. Though Mao would regain his power and consolidate his position a few years

later (through the Socialist Education Movement and Cultural Revolution), he was effectively

temporarily replaced. Liu attempted to reverse the PRC back to the pre-leap situation and

among the policies that were implemented during this time were smaller forms of

liberalization, foreshadowing Deng’s future reforms.74 Regarding the late-70s, even though it

is officially considered part of the Deng era, Deng did not take power until 1978. At first,

Mao was succeeded by Hua Guofeng (华国锋), but he was cast aside because he intended to

71 Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 40-41; Kennedy, Global Governance, 3, 61; Lams, “Examining Strategic Narratives”, 395. 72 Kennedy, Global Governance, 56. 73 Lams, “Examining Strategic Narratives”, 391, 400-402. 74 Fenby, History of Modern China, 408, 418-419; Hsiung, “Revolutionary Regime”, 30.

~ 33 ~

continue Mao’s Cultural Revolution.75 Therefore, I argue that the late-70s (at least partially)

still carried the ideology of the Mao era. Finally, many of the PRC’s Chinese alternatives are

an extension from its new approach to global governance. Although the PRC had already

joined various international (economic) institutions like the World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund during the Deng and Jiang eras, it had remained a passive member. The PRC

did not start taking a more active, and even leading, role until its accession to the World Trade

Organization in 2001.76 Its accession also marks the point that the PRC’s competition with the

West intensified and its economic development soared to new heights.77 So you see, the not-

so-perfect alignment with the eras actually strengthens this theory instead of weakening it.

Thus, the PRC’s National Focus changed in 3 significant ways. First, the PRC was

reintegrated into the world at large after the Mao era, making the search for resolutions to the

territorial disputes that much more important. This signified the transition from using delaying

strategies to more ‘active strategies’. Second, the pragmatism associated with the

liberalization initiated by Liu and Deng showed that the PRC was not ruled solely by its

ideology. It was open to compromise. This same ethos was carried over to their handling of

territorial disputes, as shown by their preference for cooperation strategies. Third, the PRC’s

unprecedented economic success translated into an increasingly confident PRC, viewing itself

as in competition with the West. This competition translated to an increase in escalation

strategies as compromise was no longer an option. Now that I have found a possible

explanation, I will put these findings to the test by conducting a case study on the Sino-Indian

dispute.

75 Fenby, History of Modern China, 533-540. 76 Kennedy, Global Governance, 4. 77 Ibid., 52-53, 67-69.

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3.4 Case study – Sino-Indian Dispute:

In this section, I will put the patterns found in the comparative study and the analysis to the

test, by conducting a case study on the Sino-Indian dispute. In this case study, I will take an

in-depth look at the context and the events of the dispute as well as any changes in the PRC’s

behavior and domestic situation.

3.4.1 Context:

The PRC and India share a border of about 3,488 km, connecting the PRC’s Western and

Southwestern autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet directly to several of India’s

Northern states. The border largely follows the Himalayas and is interrupted twice, once by

Nepal and Bhutan each. To this date most of the border is still in dispute, but the Sino-Indian

dispute is mainly centered around 2 specific territories: Arunachal Pradesh in the East and

Aksai Chin in the West (Figure 7). Currently, Arunachal Pradesh is governed by India

whereas Aksai Chin is controlled by China.78 Arunachal Pradesh is a mountainous region,

home to a culture heavily influenced by Tibet as well as many ethnic Tibetans. Furthermore,

the region is considered to have great economic and energy potential due to its fertility and

many natural resources. Aksai Chin, on the other hand, is a high elevation salt desert, largely

uninhabited and possessing little to no natural resources. It does, however, house the only

road connecting Xinjiang to Tibet, making it of strategic importance to the PRC.79

78 Purohit, “Can India and China”, South China Morning Post; Zhang, “Is China an Exception”, 94-95. 79 Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 122-129.

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Figure 7: Sino-Indian Dispute Claims Layout

The Sino-Indian dispute originated from the time of the British Raj and the Qing Dynasty.

The Qing established authority over Tibet in 1728 and Xinjiang in 1757, preventing the

British from expanding their sphere of influence into these regions, which Britain wanted to

turn into a buffer for its competition with Russia in Central Asia (the Great Game). 80 This

was the crux of the dispute for a long time, but as the Qing weakened so did its hold over

these territories. The British took advantage of that, gaining more and more influence in the

region.

After the downfall of the empire in 1911, Tibet declared its independence whereas Xinjiang

came to be ruled by 1 of the many warlords. The newly established Republic of China (ROC)

quickly moved to reassert Chinese control, sending its forces into Tibet and legitimizing the

warlord as a governor. Although these actions were quite successful, the ROC was still too

weak to resist British pressure, who was intent on not letting the ROC establish firm control

over Tibet. Therefore, the ROC withdrew from Tibet and started negotiations over its future,

resulting in the highly controversial Simla conference (more on that later). The issue was,

however, put on the backburner as World War I took all the attention. After the war,

negotiations stalled and were eventually abandoned due to opposition from the Chinese side.81

80 Ter Haar, Hemels Mandaat, 381-386; Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 118-119. 81 Lu, Sino-Indian Border Dispute, 17-18, 21-36, 41.

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In the next decades, both parties would undergo great changes. India gained its independence

in 1947 and continued British policy in regard to its borders. Meanwhile, the PRC replaced

the ROC and liberated the Western territories, establishing communist control.82 Setting aside

the discussion on the legitimacy of Chinese rule over these autonomous regions, the situation

had basically returned to that of the beginning. Except that now there was even more

confusion on where the border should be. At this point neither of the disputing parties was the

original claimant. Moreover, in all these years the de facto borders were never properly

delimited. Over time the British had proposed up to 11 different borders, none of which were

accepted by any Chinese government. These proposals varied wildly with some favoring the

British and others favoring the Chinese, creating even more uncertainty surrounding the

location of the border.83

3 of these proposed borders have become the center of the current dispute: the Johnson-

Ardagh Line (1897), the Macartney-MacDonald Line (1899) and the McMahon Line (1913).84

Unfortunately, all 3 lines are not without their controversy. After the British incorporated

Jammu and Kashmir into the Raj in 1846 they wanted to discuss the border with the Qing,

who refused, claiming that it was already sufficiently delimited. Nevertheless, the British tried

to delimit it still. Internally, the British first came up with the Johnson-Ardagh Line, which

made Aksai Chin part of India, but they decided against using this line as the border. Instead,

the Macartney-MacDonald Line was approved by the British, leaving Aksai Chin to China.

They presented this line to the Qing who gave no reply, which was seen by the British as a

tacit agreement. Since then, the British claim shifted back and forth between the 2 lines

depending on the international landscape, ending on the Johnson-Ardagh Line during World

War II. This stance was copied by India after their independence. However, after the PRC

liberated Tibet they started constructing a road through Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang to

Tibet. Once discovered India protested, but the PRC’s position was that the Macartney-

MacDonald Line was the only approved border by agreement, reigniting the dispute.85

In the Eastern sector, the McMahon Line became the center of the dispute which was first

introduced at the Simla conference. During this tripartite conference the new status of Tibet

was discussed. An accord was made where Tibet would be divided into 2 parts; Inner and

Outer Tibet. Inner Tibet would remain under full ROC control whereas Outer Tibet would

82 Maxwell, China’s “Aggression”, 8-9. 83 Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 118-119. 84 Ibid., 118-119. 85 Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 104-106.

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become autonomous under Chinese suzerainty. This accord would eventually be signed by the

British and Tibetan representatives, but not by the Chinese representative. Afterwards it

turned out that McMahon, the British representative, had negotiated a new border between the

British Raj and Outer Tibet in secret (the McMahon Line) moving the border further north.

Upon revelation, all sides protested. The Tibetans repudiated their representative for agreeing,

the Chinese claimed the agreement illegitimate as it was without their knowledge and the

British reprimanded McMahon for overstepping his authority. Furthermore, the convention

was later denounced for going against a previously signed British-Russian treaty. But despite

all that, from the 1940s onwards the British started to push the McMahon-line as the official

Northern border of the British Raj. A policy India inherited after their independence.86

The uncertainty surrounding these 3 lines makes for an incredibly complex dispute. The

argumentation of both the PRC and India for their claims are largely based in history (earlier

rule) and, arguably, treaty law (the various agreements between the PRC and India and those

of their predecessors). The problem with these argumentations is that they, legally speaking,

do not amount to a very strong case for either side. Sumners’ study on the ICJ’s rulings of

territorial disputes show that historical arguments do not hold much water in international

law. Instead, the only valid arguments are, in order, treaty law, uti possidetis (sovereignty

over colonial territory devolves to the local authority), and effective control.87 But, as

discussed before, the circumstances surrounding these agreements are convoluted at best. It is

unsure whether the Qing even tacitly agreed to the Macartney-MacDonald Line and the

British had denounced the Simla Accords.

On top off all that, there are another 3 territories of interest; Kashmir, Western Bhutan and

Sikkim. Although not officially part of the Sino-Indian dispute, they all further complicate the

Sino-Indian relationship and therefore do warrant a mention. The Kashmir region is the focus

of a three-way dispute between India, Pakistan and the PRC. From the PRC’s point of view,

this is the territory involved in the Sino-Pakistani dispute. As was established in the overview,

the PRC and Pakistan have already resolved this dispute, transferring territories and

demarcating the border. However, India does not recognize this resolution and continues to

maintain its claim on the area.88 Likewise, the disputed territory in Western Bhutan is part of

another 1 of the PRC’s disputes. The Sino-Bhutanese dispute also closely involves India.

86 Maxwell, China’s “Aggression”, 7-9; Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 102-104. 87 Sumner, “Territorial Disputes”, 1790, 1804-1808. 88 Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 105.

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During the 2017 Doklam standoff, the Indian army reacted to People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) activity rather than the Bhutanese army. That is because Bhutan has been a longtime

protectorate of India. Even though Bhutan has since regained some autonomy over its foreign

affairs, India continues to keep an eye on the situation.89 Finally, there is Sikkim. Sikkim is

located in-between Nepal and Bhutan and constitutes the entire Sino-Indian border there. It

used to be an independent kingdom but was forcibly turned into a protectorate by the British

in 1861. It later officially transitioned into an Indian state in 1975, in accordance with a

referendum. Although the PRC does not claim Sikkim as part of its territory, it does consider

it an independent state. Until recently, they considered India’s annexation of Sikkim as an

invasion.90 With all that context out of the way, I will now delve into the PRC’s behavior over

the course of this dispute.

3.4.2 Analysis:

The Sino-Indian dispute is mostly known for being the cause of the 1962 Sino-Indian border

war. It is, however, far from the only interaction that the PRC and India have had over this

territory. Below I have isolated the strategy timeline of the Sino-Indian dispute (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Sino-Indian Dispute Strategy Timeline

The first thing that immediately jumps out is the similarity to the PRC’s general strategy

timeline. Furthermore, it mostly follows the same trends that were established before; the

delaying strategy is only utilized during the Mao era and phased out starting from 1980, the

Deng and Jiang eras mostly employ cooperation strategies and escalation strategy usage

ramps up during the Hu and Xi eras. Nevertheless, there are 3 deviations from the general

strategy timeline: the PRC escalated the dispute during the late-50s and 1960s instead of using

a delaying strategy, they also escalated it during the late-80s instead of using a cooperation

strategy and during the late-2000s it used a cooperation strategy over an escalation strategy.

89 Panda, “Standoff at Doklam”, The Diplomat. 90 Lu, Sino-Indian Border Dispute, 22; Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 120.

~ 39 ~

In the early years of the PRC, Mao largely ignored the border issues. As discussed before,

Mao was a radical revolutionary focused on the PRC itself. Therefore, he opted not to take

any pro-active strategies in territorial disputes as he did not want them to distract him from his

domestic agenda. After Stalin’s death and denouncement by his successor Khrushchev (1953

and 1956 respectively), Mao grew even more anxious over the future of his revolution,

ramping up efforts to ensure that his revolution survived after his death. 91 With this in mind,

his sidelining after the failure of the Great Leap Forward greatly upset Mao. Around the same

time Tibet started to revolt and Mao was convinced that India (with US support) was the

cause. After all, they granted the Dalai Lama asylum who had fled after the failed revolt.

Seeing his position endangered and realizing the threat posed from India, Mao was convinced

something had to be done about the Sino-Indian border. At first, Mao attempted to negotiate

to get a quick resolution and get back to re-establishing his leadership and leading his

revolution. However, his criticism of his more moderate successors and President Nehru’s

unreceptiveness led to Mao quickly abandoning this strategy. Confronted with India’s

increasingly provocative Forward Policy and left with no other options, Mao ordered the PLA

to conduct a preemptive offensive in 1962. Within a month, the PLA completely overran the

Indian army and took all disputed territories. Noticeably, the PLA’s advance stopped at the

Chinese claim lines after which the PRC unilaterally declared a ceasefire and withdrew its

forces 20 km behind the Johnson-Ardagh and McMahon Lines. Nevertheless they maintained

control over Aksai Chin and established the Line of Actual Control (LAC) approximately

along the Macartney-MacDonald and McMahon Lines.92

There is some debate over why the PRC withdrew with some thinking that, if it was not for

the international community rallying behind India, the PLA would likely have continued its

advance.93 However, looking at it from a National Focus perspective, it makes sense. Mao had

already achieved his goals. Although the war did not resolve the dispute, it did neutralize the

threat that India posed, making a resolution less of a priority. Furthermore, his bold and

successful strategy had strengthened his position, allowing him to put his revolution back on

track. This view is supported by the fact that Mao was seemingly content with the status quo

and, aside from reacting to some smaller incidents, returned to a delaying strategy.94

91 Westcott, “Poliheuristic Analysis”, 165. 92 Maxwell, China’s “Aggression”, 21-24; Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 106-107; Westcott, “Poliheuristic Analysis”, 165-167. 93 Lu, Sino-Indian Border Dispute, 4-6. 94 Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 107; Westcott, “Poliheuristic Analysis”, 167.

~ 40 ~

After the war, there were some failed attempts to resolve the dispute. A group of 6 non-

aligned nations attempted to mediate in 1962 but their proposals were shot down. In 1964,

Nehru was prepared to open negotiations if the PRC removed its outposts from Aksai Chin

but the PRC rejected this offer, accusing India of making negotiating impossible by

demanding these stipulations. Offers for international arbitration were also rejected by the

PRC.95 Although India shifted policy and allowed diplomatic relations to resume in 1975, it

would take until 1981 for negotiations to reopen. However, tensions were still felt at the

border which came to a head in 1987. The Indians started a military build-up at the border and

Deng reacted in kind, leading to a situation similar to just before the outbreak of the 1962 war.

But the PRC never actually retaliated. Not long after, the standoff anti-climatically fizzled

out.96 This thesis argues that Deng’s reaction is proof of the PRC’s more pragmatic stance.

While Deng still meets the Indian military build-up and warns them about the consequences

of their actions (therefore utilizing an escalation strategy) he, unlike Mao, did not let it

escalate into war. Presumably because he understood the impact that a new war would have

on his economic reforms.

In the following years, both parties have been actively trying to prevent further escalation. A

joint working group was established in 1988 to better clarify both parties’ position on the

LAC which was followed-up with an expert group in 1993. In 1996 both parties agreed to

confidence building measures, promising to; limit their military presence on the LAC, refrain

from discharging firearms, warn each other about military drills and set up a hotline for better

communication, all the while negotiations continued.97 Interestingly, these efforts continued

into the reigns of Hu and Xi. In 2003, the PRC recognized Sikkim as an Indian State while

India acknowledged PRC rule over Tibet, removing another obstacle from negotiations. This

was followed up with a treaty in 2005, detailing guiding principles of managing border

incidents and reaffirming their commitment to find a peaceful solution to the dispute. Finally,

in 2013, both parties signed an agreement to ensure that patrols would not be fired upon by

border guards.98

95 Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 106-107. 96 Maxwell, China’s “Aggression”, 24-29; Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 107-108. 97 Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 108. 98 Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 108-109; Wang, “Rethinking Chinese Territorial Disputes”, 149.

~ 41 ~

Despite these efforts, still no resolution has been found as the PRC continues to fiercely

defend their claims. Any criticism on this issue is met with strong reactions from the PRC. In

2003, the PRC seized and detained Indian border guards, claiming they were on their side of

the LAC. In 2013, another standoff happened when the PLA moved into territory claimed by

India. While the PRC disputed that it was Indian territory, the PLA only withdrew after India

met its demands and removed several bunkers from the Chumar region. In 2014, a similar

incident happened in the Western sector and, finally, there were physical altercations in 2020

on the border.99 These incidents show that, despite ongoing negotiations, the PRC was not

afraid to back their claims up with an escalation strategy.

Thus, the Sino-Indian dispute generally supports the theoretical framework provided in this

thesis. The dispute largely follows the patterns established prior. National Focus

considerations can even explain the 1962 war and the 1987 built-up. Although the last

deviation is less obviously linked to these trends, a resemblance can still be found in their

handling of the dispute. That being said, seeing as all 3 deviations are reactions to a perceived

threat or lack thereof, it could also be argued that self-preservation/self-defense is a key factor

in the PRC’s strategy choice. Therefore, I conclude that the National Focus has a big

influence on the PRC’s strategy in territorial disputes, but is not the main influence nor the

only 1.

99 Palmer, “Militarized Interstate Dispute Data”; Ranjan, “India-China Boundary Disputes”, 108-109.

~ 42 ~

4. Conclusion:

The research question that I aimed to answer was: “How does the PRC’s National Focus

influence its strategy in territorial disputes?”. From this research, I conclude that National

Focus does indeed influence the PRC’s strategy in territorial disputes, albeit not exclusively.

As this thesis shows, the PRC’s favored choice of strategy closely follows changes in

priorities of Chinese leadership(s) in regard to national identity and domestic development.

The research of this thesis consisted of three parts, a comparative study of all the PRC’s

territorial disputes, an analysis of the PRC’s strategy during those disputes as well as domestic

developments, and a case study on the Sino-Indian dispute. The comparative study showed

that a purely realistic approach could not adequately explain all the patterns in PRC’s

handling of the disputes. Furthermore, it heavily suggested that a temporal factor was at play

as there were only a few consistent patterns related to the territories’ characteristics.

Next, the analysis produced 3 patterns that National Focus needed to explain. The dominance

of delaying strategies until the 1980s, the PRC’s favor of cooperation strategies observed in

the early-60s and 1990s and the increased usage of escalating strategies starting from the

early-2000s onwards. I proposed that changes in the PRC’s National Focus could best explain

these patterns, as their timing and logic lines up almost perfectly. In the Ideological Period

(1949-1980), the PRC focused on delaying strategies. This corresponds to the time of Mao’s

radical adherence to communist ideology, with the PRC believing itself to be the bastion of

Communism. The 2 periods in which the PRC favors cooperation strategies coincide with the

introduction of Liu and Deng’s liberalization policies and the adoption of a more pragmatic

approach. Though Liu’s redirection was short-lived, Deng’s became the foundation of a new

course, constituting the Pragmatic Period (1980-2000). Lastly, in the Competitive Period

(2000-Present), the PRC focused on escalation strategies. This is tied to the PRC’s growing

sense of confidence that resulted from its incredibly successful economic development which

caused it to see itself in competition to the West.

Finally, the case study on the Sino-Indian dispute showed a remarkable similarity between its

strategy timeline and the PRC’s general strategy timeline, with only 3 deviations; the war of

1962 and its lead-up to it, the PRC counter escalation strategy during the 1987 standoff and

the lack of escalation strategies during the late-2000s. During these deviations, the National

Focus trends can still be recognized but other factors like self-preservation/self-defense seem

to trump them when choosing a strategy is concerned.

~ 43 ~

In short, the comparative study justified my usage of an alternative approach. The analysis

demonstrated that changes in National Focus work as a possible explanation for the PRC’s

strategy choice. Finally, the case study confirmed that this theory holds up most of the time.

That last part is important. I argued that a purely realistic approach cannot explain everything

but neither can a purely National Focus approach. As the case study shows, there are some

deviations that this approach cannot account for. That just goes to show that there are a

number of different factors that influence the PRC’s strategy choice, underscoring the

importance of these alternative approaches. This thesis has not only proven that there is more

than 1 factor that influences the PRC’s strategy but also that National Focus must definitely

be considered among them.

That being said, this thesis mainly looked at the larger trends exhibited by the PRC. Possible

avenues for future research are to go more in-depth into other factors like domestic policy or

to take a more detailed look at the individual disputes themselves. Once the ICOW releases its

dataset on the peaceful settlement attempts it would be possible to make an even more

accurate timeline of the disputes. For now, this thesis serves as a reminder that just because

we do not understand a state’s actions it does not mean that there is no logic behind them. A

lesson that I hope will help us prevent needless conflicts over territorial disputes in the future.

~ 44 ~

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