Dryden2011 ABC of Rebt 1

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O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E

The ABCs of REBT I: A Preliminary Study of Errors

and Confusions in Counselling and PsychotherapyTextbooks

Windy Dryden

Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Abstract In this study, a random sample of twenty counselling and psychotherapy

textbooks were studied with respect to the errors and confusions made by the

authors of these textbooks with respect to the ABCs of REBT. A total of 240 of

such errors/confusions were found with most being made about beliefs at B,

particularly about irrational beliefs. A variety of errors and confusions were also

made about (i) the relationship between B and C (including whether or not

such a relationship is causal), (ii) the relationship between irrational beliefs anddisturbed responses at C, (iii) A and (iv) emotional Cs. Twenty errors were

even made about the name of the therapy! It was suggested that one way of

addressing this state of affairs would be for the Albert Ellis Institute to commission

a group of REBT experts to write a document especially for authors of counselling

and psychotherapy textbooks and for publishers of these works that specifies clearly

and accurately agreed wisdom about the ABCs of REBT. The weaknesses of the

current study were noted and suggestions for future research made.

Keywords REBT

Errors and confusions

ABCs of REBT

A key aspect of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) is how this therapy

conceptualises clients problems and healthy solutions to these problems. Whenever

REBT is written about by its adherents, taught in professional and academic settings

and employed with clients, there is a very good chance that what has become

known as the ABCs of REBT will be used to show how this therapy assesses

psychological problems and how it views healthy, but realistic alternatives to theseproblems.

W. Dryden (&)

Goldsmiths University of London, New Cross, London SE14 6NW, UK

e-mail: [email protected]

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J Rat-Emo Cognitive-Behav Ther

DOI 10.1007/s10942-011-0137-1


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and self-, other- and life-acceptance beliefs) are secondary in that they are said to be

derived from the non-dogmatic preferences.

Partial Versus Full Rational Beliefs

There is one important point that guides my thinking about rational beliefs. It is

Elliss idea that people easily transform rational beliefs into irrational beliefs,

particularly when their rational beliefs are strongly held. Thus, it is very important

that rational beliefs are carefully distinguished from irrational beliefs. To do this one

needs to discriminate between partial rational beliefs and full rational beliefs. Partial

rational beliefs are beliefs that assert the rational component of the belief, but do not

negate the irrational component. Thus, it is easy for partial rational beliefs to be

implicitly transformed into irrational beliefs, whereas this is not possible with full

rational beliefs since these latter beliefs are the antithesis of irrational beliefs. InTable 1, I outline and illustrate the differences between partial and full rational

beliefs.

C

C stands for the consequences of the beliefs held at B about the critical A.

This is often shown as A 9 B = C. There are three such consequences at

C: emotional, behavioural and cognitive.

Emotional Cs

REBT theory distinguishes between healthy negative emotions (HNEs) and

unhealthy negative emotions (UNEs). Healthy negative emotions are deemed to

stem from rational beliefs and unhealthy negative emotions from irrational beliefs.

As such the REBT theory of emotions is a qualitative one and not a quantitative one.

This means that HNEs and UNEs are placed on separate continua of intensity and

not on a single continuum of intensity.

There is some difference of opinion among REBT theorists concerning the length

of the separate continua. Ellis (1994) argues that they are of the same length and that

HNEs can be as intense at their zenith as UNEs, whereas my position is that the

HNE intensity continuum is shorter than the UNE continuum in that at their height

UNEs are more intense than HNEs at their height. For example, blind rage (100%)

will be more intense than healthy anger at the highest possible level of intensity.

Figure 1 presents these two positions.

Leaving aside the above differences, the point that distinguishes REBT from

other approaches to CBT is that UNEs and HNEs are qualitatively not quantitatively

different (Dryden 2009).

Health and Flavour of Negative Emotions I made the point above that beliefs

largely determine the health of negative emotions with rational beliefs underpinning

healthy negative emotions (HNEs) and irrational beliefs underpinning unhealthy

W. Dryden

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negative emotions (UNEs). However what gives emotions their flavour and whatdistinguishes among the different emotional flavours are the different inferences that

people make at A.

Let me provide an example. When a person is anxious (UNE) then, according to

REBT theory, they hold an irrational belief. The healthy alternative to anxiety in

Table 1 Distinguishing between partial and full rational beliefs

Partial rational belief Full rational belief

Partial preference Flexible belief (or non-dogmatic preference)

Preference asserted

Demand not negated

Preference asserted

Demand negated

This leaves open the possibility that the person will

transform his partial preference into a demand

(e.g. I want to do well..and therefore I have to

do so)

(e.g. I want to do well.but I dont have to do so)

Partial non-awfulising belief Full non-awfulising belief

Badness asserted,

Awfulising not negated

Badness asserted

Awfulising negated

This leaves open the possibility that the person willtransform his partial non-awfulising belief into an

awfulising belief

(e.g. It would be bad if I dont do well.and

therefore it would be awful)

(e.g. It would be bad if I dont do well.but it

wouldnt be awful )

Partial discomfort tolerance belief Full discomfort tolerance belief

Struggle asserted

Intolerability not negated

Struggle asserted

Intolerability negated

Tolerability asserted

Worth it component asserted

This leaves open the possibility that the person willtransform his partial discomfort tolerance belief

into a discomfort intolerance belief

(e.g. It would be hard for me to tolerate not doing

well.and therefore it would be intolerable)

(e.g. It would be hard for me to tolerate not doing

well. but it wouldnt be intolerable. I could

tolerate it and it would be worth it to me to do

so)

Partial acceptance belief Full acceptance belief

Negative evaluation of part asserted

Negative evaluation of whole negated,

Acceptance of whole not asserted

Negative evaluation of part asserted

Negative evaluation of whole negated.

Acceptance of whole assertedThis leaves the possibility that the person will

transform the partial acceptance belief into a

depreciation belief

(e.g. Not doing well would be bad, but it wouldnt

prove that I am a failure.but I would be

worthier if I did well than if I didnt)

(e.g. Not doing well would be bad, but it doesnt

prove that I am a failure.I am a fallible human

being whose worth is based on my aliveness not

on my performances)

Errors and Confusions in REBT

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REBT theory is concern (HNE). When a person is concerned but not anxious then

again according to REBT theory they hold a rational belief. However beliefs, on

their own, cannot explain why the person feels anxiety or concern rather than, say,depression or sadness. What determines what I call the flavour of an emotion is the

theme implicit in the inference that the person makes at A which in the case of

anxiety/concern is threat.

While inferential themes at A determine the flavour of an emotion, they cannot

on their own determine whether that resultant emotional flavour is healthy or

unhealthy. As we have seen, beliefs are the significant determining factor on this

point. Thus, we need to understand both the inferential theme at A and the belief

that the person holds at B if we are to understand the precise negative emotion

that the person experiences at C. These points are shown in the formulaepresented below.

A 9 B = C

Inferential theme 9 Belief= Emotion

A 9 iB = C

Inferential theme 9 Irrational Belief= UNE

A 9 rB = C

Inferential theme 9 Rational Belief= HNE

Table 2 presents the eight main unhealthy negative emotions for which clients

seek help, their healthy alternatives and the relevant inferential themes and beliefs

associated with each emotional pairing.

Ellis version

0______________________________________________________________________________100

Unhealthy Unhealthy

Anger Anger

0______________________________________________________________________________100

Healthy Healthy

Anger Anger

Dryden version

0______________________________________________________________________________100

Unhealthy Unhealthy

Anger Anger

0__________________________________________________________100

Healthy Healthy

Anger Anger

Fig. 1 Two versions of the two continuum model of unhealthy and unhealthy negative emotions with

reference to levels of intensity (as exemplified in anger)

W. Dryden

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Behavioural Cs

The second set of consequences of beliefs at B about A concerns behaviour.

Here, I distinguish between overt behaviour and action tendencies. The latterconcern an impulse to act in a certain way, but without that impulse being converted

into overt action. This distinction is important for we know that clients suppress

their action tendencies and can manage to act healthily despite holding irrational

beliefs. Thus, by their behaviour they appear to hold rational beliefs, but their

suppressed action tendencies reveal that, in fact, they are holding irrational beliefs.

For example, consider Ed, who is unhealthily angry towards his boss for criticising

his work. What Ed did was to thank his boss for the latters helpful feedback.

What he felt like doing, but suppressed, was to pin his boss to the wall and beat him

to a pulp. Here, the clients action tendencies revealed his true beliefs and his actualbehaviour revealed his ability to suppress his impulses and act counter to how he

was feeling.

Table 3 shows the most common behaviours / action tendencies associated with

the major UNEs and HNEs.

Table 2 The eight main unhealthy negative emotions for which clients seek help, their healthy alter-

natives and the relevant inferential themes and beliefs associated with each emotional pairing

Inferential theme Belief Emotion

Threat IrrationalRational

Anxiety (UNE)Concern (HNE)

Loss

Failure

Undeserved plight

Irrational

Rational

Depression (UNE)

Sadness (HNE)

Immoral act

Failing to act morally

Hurting others

Irrational

Rational

Guilt (UNE)

Remorse (HNE)

Falling short of ones ideal

Behaviour reflects badly on social groupOthers negative judgment of self

Irrational

Rational

Shame (UNE)

Disappointment (HNE)

Others bad treatment of self; self undeserving

Relationship devaluation

Irrational

Rational

Hurt (UNE)

Sorrow

Frustration

Goal obstruction

Other transgresses personal rule

Self transgresses personal rule

Threat to self-esteem

Irrational

Rational

Unhealthy anger (UNE)

Healthy anger (HNE)

Threat posed to relationship by a third personUncertainty about partner in the contest of the above threat

IrrationalRational

Unhealthy jealousy (UNE)Healthy jealousy (HNE)

Another person possesses and enjoys something

desirable that one does not have

Irrational

Rational

Unhealthy envy (UNE)

Healthy envy (HNE)


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Cognitive Cs

So far, I have discussed the emotional and behavioural consequences of irrational

beliefs. These are the most frequently discussed consequences in the REBT

literature. However, it is also recognised (e.g. Ellis and Dryden 1997) that

consequences of irrational beliefs can be cognitive in nature. Thus, Ellis and Dryden

(1997) argue that the cognitive distortions often discussed by cognitive therapists

(e.g. Beck et al. 1979; Burns 1980) are produced not just by a tendency for people to

think distortedly, but mainly as a result of their tendency to think irrationally. REBT

theory argues that irrational thinking is characterised by rigid and extreme thinking,

while distorted thinking is largely inferential in nature. Thus, the REBT position is

that when thinking is very skewed and distortedas they tend to be in the cognitive

distortions outlined by cognitive therapiststhey stem from rigid and extreme

thinking. Thus, if I believe that I must do well and I am faced with the prospect of

not doing well my subsequent thinking at C will be far more distorted than if I

were to hold a non-dogmatic preference about not doing well. Thus, holding an

irrational belief, I may well think that I will never do well if I fail to do well on this

occasion whereas I am far less likely to make such a distorted conclusion if I held

the alternative rational belief. In the late 1980s, I conducted a series of experiments

which demonstrated just this very point (e.g. Dryden et al. 1989).

My view is that in addition to the differential effect that rational and irrational

beliefs have on cognitive content at C they also have a differential effect on

Table 3 The most common behaviours/action tendencies associated with the major UNEs and HNEs

Negative emotion Dysfunctional behaviours and action tendencies

Anxiety (UNE) Withdrawing from threat; avoiding threat; seeking reassurance

even though not reassurable; seeking safety from threatConcern (HNE) Confronting threat; seeking reassurance when reassurable

Depression (UNE) Prolonged withdrawal from enjoyable activities

Sadness (HNE) Engaging with enjoyable activities after a period of

mourning or adjustment to the loss

Guilt (UNE) Begging for forgiveness

Remorse (HNE) Asking, not begging, for forgiveness

Shame (UNE) Withdrawing from others; avoiding eye contact with others

Disappointment (HNE) Keeping in contact with others, maintaining eye contact with others

Hurt (UNE) SulkingSorrow (HNE) Assertion and communicating with others

Unhealthy anger (UNE) Aggression (direct and indirect)

Healthy anger (HNE) Assertion

Unhealthy jealousy (UNE) Prolonged suspicious questioning of the other person;

checking on the other; restricting the other

Healthy jealousy (HNE) Brief, open-minded questioning of the other person; neither

checking on the other nor restricting them

Unhealthy envy (UNE) Spoiling the others enjoyment of the desired possession

Healthy envy (HNE) Striving to gain a similar possession for oneself if it is truly what you want

W. Dryden

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cognitive processes such as attentional focus and memory. Thus, if I were to hold an

irrational belief about failure, my attentional focus would be far more on those

aspects of my environment that I associate with failure than it would be if I held a

rational belief about failure. Similarly, if I held an irrational belief about failure, I

would access more failure-related memories than I would if I thought rationallyabout failure. These hypotheses about the differential effects of rational and

irrational beliefs on cognitive processes such as attentional focus and memory await

empirical enquiry.

Table 4 shows the most common cognitive consequences associated with the

major UNEs and HNEs.

Putting It All Together: Some Examples of the ABCsof REBT

Having discussed the major elements of my ABC framework, let me put all this

together by providing two examples. These examples will reflect specific examples

of two clients target problems (i.e. the problems that have been targeted for change

at that particular time).

Table 4 The most common cognitive consequences of irrational beliefs associated with the major UNEs

and HNEs

Negative emotion Cognitive consequences of irrational beliefs

Anxiety (UNE) Overestimating the negative consequences of the threat if it occursConcern (HNE) Realistically appraising the negative consequences of the threat if it occurs

Depression (UNE) Hopelessness; helplessness

Sadness (HNE) Viewing the future with hope; seeing self as able to cope with adversity

Guilt (UNE) Assigning too much responsibility to self and too little to others

Remorse (HNE) Assigning appropriate level of responsibility to self and to others

Shame (UNE) Overestimating the negativity of others reactions to self and the

extent of these reactions

Disappointment (HNE) Realistically appraising others reactions to self and the

extent of these reactions

Hurt (UNE) Thinking that the other has to put things right of their own accord

Sorrow (HNE) Not thinking that the other has to put things right of their own accord.

Thinking that one can initiate the healing process oneself

Unhealthy anger (UNE) Thinking that the other has malicious intent; thoughts of exacting revenge

Healthy anger (HNE) Only thinking that the other has malicious intent when there is clear evidence

of this; thoughts of assertion rather than of exacting revenge

Unhealthy jealousy

(UNE)

Tending to see threats to ones relationship in the absence of evidence

Healthy jealousy (HNE) Tending to see threats to ones relationship only when there

is clear evidence that such threats exist

Unhealthy envy (UNE) Tending to denigrate the value of the desired possession

Healthy envy (HNE) Honestly admitting to oneself that one wants the desired possession

for its own sake and not because the other person has it


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Sally: An ABC of Hurt

Sally reported that she felt hurt that her friends had gone to a party and had not

invited her. She thought that they did not care about her so she decided to withdraw

from them and resolved never to get close to a group of women again.Her ABC is as follows:

Situation = My friends went to a party and did not invite me to go with them

A = They dont care for me

iB = My friends must care for me and I cant stand it when they dont. Poor me!

C Emotional = Hurt

C Behavioural = Sulky withdrawal

C Cognitive = I will never get close to a group of women again

Here is Sallys ABC after I had worked with her on challenging and changing

her irrational belief to its rational alternative.

Situation = My friends went to a party and did not invite me to go with them

A = They dont care for me

rB = I want them to care for me, but sadly they dont have to do so. I can stand them not caring for me

although it is difficult to do so. I am not a poor person, but a non-person in a poor situation

C Emotional = Sorrow

C Behavioural = Talk to my friends about how I feel and ask then why they did not ask me to the

partyC Cognitive = I will get close to another group of women again. Just because this group of women

dont care for me, it doesnt mean that others wont

Sally talked to her friends about her feelings. Her friends were shocked that she

thought they did not care for her. They explained that they did not invite her because

they knew she was working on an essay and did not want to provide her with a

temptation which might interfere with her work.

Frank: An ABC of Health Anxiety

Frank had always had a brownish mark on his arm. One day he thought that it had

darkened and he panicked that he had a malignant melanoma and was going to die.

He kept checking the mark and looked on skin cancer websites for reassurance

which only served to further convince him that he had cancer. Being too scared to

consult his doctor, he sought reassurance from his friends instead, but was not

reassured when they assured him that it was not serious.

Situation = Thinking that the brown mark on my arm had darkened

A = Not knowing if the change was benign or malignant

iB = I must know right now that the change is benign and its terrible not knowing this

C Emotional = Anxiety

C Behavioural = Frequently checking the mark; looking at skin cancer websites for reassurance;

seeking reassurance from my friends that it wasnt serious; avoiding going to my doctor

C Cognitive = It must be a malignant melanoma and I am going to die

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Here is Franks ABC after I had worked with him on challenging and changing

her irrational belief to its rational alternative.

Situation = Thinking that the brown mark on my arm had darkened

A = Not knowing if the change was benign or malignant

rB = I would very much like to know right now that the change is benign, but I dont have to have

such an assurance. It is bad not knowing, but it is not terrible

C Emotional = Concern

C Behavioural = Refraining from checking the mark; not looking at skin cancer websites for

reassurance; not seeking reassurance from my friends that it wasnt serious; consulting my doctor

C Cognitive = It might be a malignant melanoma, but it is more likely to be a benign change. It is very

unlikely that I am going to die

On consulting his doctor, Frank was reassured that the change was minor and notindicative of anything sinister.

Having outlined the yardstick against which textbook portrayals presentations of

the ABCs of REBT can be judged, let me discuss how the present study was

conceptualised.

Method

Materials

In this study, I randomly selected twenty textbooks on counseling and psychother-

apy published in North America and Britain in a 10-year period between 1998 and

2008 that had a chapter or major section on REBT. There are two types of textbooks

in the field of counseling and psychotherapy: i) edited books containing chapters

written by experts on the presented therapy approaches and ii) authored books

where all such approaches are written by one or more authors. In my view, there are

advantages and disadvantages of both types of book. The main advantage of the

edited text is that each approach is written by an expert, while its main disadvantage

is lack of consistency of writing style. The main advantage of the authored text is

consistency of writing style and subject perspective, while its main disadvantage is

variability of subject knowledge and possible subject bias.

Perhaps the major purpose of a textbook in the counseling and therapy field,

irrespective of whether it is authored or edited, is to provide readers with accurate

information on the subject covered. While it may be assumed that experts on REBT

selected to contribute to edited texts would portray REBT accurately (an assumption

that needs, however, to be tested), I decided to select authored rather than edited

texts for investigation for two reasons. First, authored textbooks on counseling and

therapy are more common than edited texts and second, since authors of such texts

are not likely not to be REBT experts, the chances for errors and confusions aboutthe ABCs of REBT are increased.


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Procedure

I read each chapter and/or major section on REBT as well as every other reference

that was made to this therapy approach in the twenty textbooks and detailed major

errors and confusions in the following five categories: (1) The name of the therapy;(2) General issues related to the role of cognition in REBT; (3) The nature of A;

(4) The nature of B; (5) The nature of C.

While errors and confusions overlap in the sense that any error about REBT that

an author makes will result, ultimately, in the reader having an incorrect and

confused picture of that aspect of the approach, I differentiate an error and a

confusion in the following way. An error occurs when the author provides incorrect

information about REBT and does so clearly. On the other hand, a confusion occurs

when it is not clear what the author meant or there is sufficient ambiguity that the

reader will be unclear about some key aspect of the ABC framework. Put anotherway, an error occurs when an REBT expert says: This is wrong and a confusion

occurs when that same expert says: I am not sure what the authors is saying on this

point or the reader may be misled on this point.

Results

The Name of the Therapy

REBT has undergone three major name changes since its inception. Originallyknown as Rational Therapy (RT), Ellis changed its name to Rational-Emotive

Therapy (RET) in 1961 and to Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) in

1993. Since the textbooks I appraised in this study were published between 1998

and 2008, they could all be expected to get the name of the therapy correct, whether

present or past. Surprisingly, this was not the case.

I discovered twenty incorrect instances of the name of the therapy covering seven

incorrect names as shown below:

Rational-emotive behavior therapyError: inclusion of hyphen (n = 6)

Rational emotive therapyError: omission of behavior or old term usedwithout the hyphen (n = 4)

Rational emotive behavioral therapyError: use of behavioral not behav-

ior (n = 4)

Rational-emotive therapyError: old term used or if referring to the current

name, omission of behavior and inclusion of hyphen (n = 3)

Rational emotive behavioral therapiesErrors: use of behavioral not

behavior and use of therapies not therapy (n = 1)

Rational-emotive behavioral therapyErrors: inclusion of hyphen and use of

behavioral not behavior (n = 1) Rational behavioral emotive therapyErrors: use of behavioral not behav-

ior and behavioral placed before emotive (n = 1)

Thirteen of the twenty authors of the textbooks surveyed made name errors (see

Table 6). While eleven of these authors each made one such error and one author (i.e.

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Ivey et al. 2007: 227, 230) made two different errors, one other author (i.e. Mobley

2005) made six errors covering four different incorrect names of the therapy. Thus,

Mobley (2005) called the therapy Rational emotive therapy (p. ii), Rational

emotive behavioral therapies (p. 91), Rational behavioural emotive therapy

(p. 145) and on three different occasions called it Rational emotive behaviouraltherapy (pp. 11, 87, 163). Indeed, this author never called REBT by its correct name!

General Issues

Before I consider how each element of the ABCs are portrayed in the selected

textbooks, let me consider what these authors have to say about REBTs views on

the relationship between B and C.

The Relationship Between B and C

REBT has both a general model about the relationship between B and C and a

specific model about this relationship. The general model states that C is largely

determined by cognitive factors at B and this is synonymous with the general

viewpoint outlined by many approaches within the CBT tradition. The specific

model states that C is largely determined by beliefs at B and this is a

distinctive feature of REBT (Dryden 2009).

If textbook authors are to portray correctly REBTs views on this issue, they

need, at the very least to describe with accuracy the specific model. If they outlinethe general model, they need also to outline the specific model and make clear that

while the former shows REBTs allegiance to the CBT tradition, the latter is its

distinctive view.

Consequently, it would be an error for authors to state only the general model and

imply that this is REBTs position on the relationship between B and C. I

found ten such errors in the textbooks studied. Seven of these made the point that

thoughts largely determine responses at C. A typical example of this is as

follows: A primary focus of this approach is teaching clients to realise that feelings

are derived from thoughts not events (Gladding 2005: 148). In addition, there were

three errors that stated that these thoughts are interpretative in nature (e.g. A is the

objective event, B is the persons interpretation of the event and C is the persons

emotional or behavioural reaction found in Todd and Bohart 2006: 294).

Six of the twenty authors made this error with four authors each making one

error, one author making two errors (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 271-twice) and

one author making four such errors (Gladding 2005: 142-twice, 148-twice)

The Relationship Between B and Disturbed Responses at C

The REBT view of the relationship between B and psychological disturbance at

C is quite clear. It is that such disturbance is underpinned or largely determined

by irrational beliefs at C. Despite this being clear in the REBT literature, I found

the following eleven errors/confusions in the textbooks surveyed. Disturbance is

largely determined by:


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thoughts (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 271)

whatever you are telling yourself inside your head (Kottler 2002: 111)

views4 (Ford and Urban 1998: 387)

interpretations (e.g. the way they interpret an event that happens in a way that

involves them personallyMobley 2005: 149 and Corey 2005: 271-2)

These five instances may be read as any thoughts, views, personally relevant

interpretations and what you are telling yourself, can lead to psychological

disturbance. The following six instances, although problematic do, at least, indicate

the presence of some negative or irrational cognitive process:

self-defeating sentences (Corey 2005: 275)

self-talk or catastrophising5 (Hough 2002: 115)

irrational thinking (Hough 2002: 115) and irrational thoughts6 (Ivey et al.

2007: 253) negative thinking and inferences (Hough 2002: 126127)

irrational statements7 (Ivey et al. 2007: 234)

These eleven citations can be seen as both errors and confusions for the reader.

They are incorrect in that none explicitly mentions the term beliefs and they may

confuse the reader who may think of them as beliefs. As can be seen from the above,

seven of the twenty authors make such errors/confusions with five each making one,

two making two (i.e. Corey 2005 and Ivey et al. 2007) and one making three (i.e.

Hough 2002).

The Causation Error

REBT theorists are careful to avoid saying that B causes C. Rather, the

following terms are preferred: B largely determines C; B underpins C or

B is at the core of C. From the outset, Ellis (1958) made clear that A, B

and C are inter-related rather than separate processes and thus B cannot cause

C since this would imply that they were separate factors. This important point

needs to be reflected in the language employed by authors of counselling and

psychotherapy textbooks if the REBT position is to be accurately portrayed.Causation language, therefore, is an error and violates the inter-relatedness

principle.

I found eleven instances where authors of counselling and psychotherapy

textbooks stated that B causes C and in ten of these eleven instances B was

deemed to cause emotional problems. Two of these authors explicitly and

4 Epictetus, who is often cited by REBT theorists, claimed that people are disturbed not by things, but by

their views of things. The REBT version of this is: People are disturbed not by things; rather they disturb

themselves by the irrational beliefs that they hold about things.5 While catastrophising is the old-fashioned term for the irrational belief known as awfulising, its

pairing with self-talk here is confusing for the reader.6 It is the words thinking and thoughts that is the problem here, not the word irrational. The first

two words are too imprecise.7 It is the word statements here that is again the problem not the word irrational. It is too imprecise.

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incorrectly stated that this was Elliss position, albeit without citing any published

evidence (Corey 2005: 274; Todd and Bohart 2006: 294).

Nine of the twenty authors made the causation error in their textbooks with seven

authors each making one error and two authors making two respectively (i.e. Archer

and McCarthy 2007: 271-twice and Hough 2002: 121, 127-7).

A

In REBT, A stands for activating event. The term activating event is

problematic and confusing. It can mean the situation in which the person

experienced his disturbed feelings or it can be the precise part of the situation to

which the person responds with disturbance (sometimes called the critical A),

mediated of course by the persons irrational beliefs. In the framework that I

presented in the first part of this paper, A stands for the latter and this is itsmodern usage, but authors of textbooks can be forgiven for thinking that it is the

former. Perhaps the major difference between the objective A and the critical

A is that the latter is inferential in nature, while the former is not.

In describing A without direct reference to an example, seven out of the

twenty authors on one occasion each refer to A as an objective or factual event

devoid of inferential meaning. For example, Seligman (2006: 320) describes an

activating event as the external and objective source of discomfort and Ivey

et al. (2007: 237) say that A represents the objective facts, events, behaviors

that an individual encounters.When authors refer to A as an objective situation and provide an example, they

often reveal the critical A in the content of what they put under B in this example.

Here is an example of what I mean to be found in Sommers-Flanagan and

Sommers Flanagan (2004: 265):

Jems activating event: His wife is late for dinner

Jems belief: His wife doesnt love or respect him any more

She is probably having an affair

I found ten instances where the critical A was revealed under B as described

above. Four authors did so on one occasion each and three authors did so on two

occasions each (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 272-twice; Fall et al. 2004: 342, 351;

Hough 2002: 116, 119).

Making a clearer distinction between the situation in which an episode of

disturbance occurs (which I refer to as Situation in the framework that I

introduced earlier) and what the person is most disturbed about (which I refer to as

A in my framework) will help authors of textbooks have a clear understanding of

the two ways in which the term activating event is used in the REBT literature

and thus minimise errors about A.

B

Authors in the selected sample made most errors and confused readers most often

when dealing with beliefs at B and particularly when covering irrational beliefs.


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Irrational Beliefs

In REBT theory irrational beliefs are either rigid (e.g. demands) or extreme (i.e.

awfulising beliefs, discomfort intolerance beliefsalso known as low frustration

tolerance beliefsor depreciation beliefs).

Irrational Belief Errors The authors in the present sample made five types of error

when discussing irrational beliefs.

1. Irrational beliefs are really inferences at A. One of the most frequent errors

that new trainees make when they first learn REBT is to identify distorted inferences

when they think that they are identifying irrational beliefs. I found fifteen examples

of this type of error. Here are some examples of inferences that authors state are

irrational beliefs:

Charles thinking thatthe divorce was his fault (Archer and McCarthy 2007:

272)

Nick doesnt love me anymore (Day 2008: 376)

The employee who believes the boss is angry with him because she did not say

hello to him in the hall (Fall et al. 2004: 339)

The essay must be awful.8 She doesnt even feel its worth mentioning. She

probably thinks Im not up to much (Hough 2002: 116)

The reason I have nothing is that the rich have taken it all (Ivey et al. 2007:

234)

Life isnt fair (Kottler 2002: 109) My boss must9 be out to get me (Nystul 2006: 245)

His wife doesnt love or respect him anymore. She is probably having an

affair (Sommers-Flanagan and Sommers Flanagan 2004: 265)

Half of the sample of authors (n = 10) made this irrational belief as inference

error with seven making it once, one making it twice (Day 2008: 376-twice) and two

making it on three occasions (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 272, 276, 277) and

Kottler 109, 111, 113).

2. Irrational beliefs are really cognitive consequences at C. One of the more

recent developments in REBT theory has been to refer to highly distorted inferences

that are skewed to the negative and appear to stem from irrational beliefs as

cognitive consequences at C. An example of the difference between an inference

at A and an inferential cognitive consequence at C is shown on p. 10 of this

article where the person infers at A: My friends dont care for me and

concludes at C: I will never get close to a group of women again. Typical

examples of cognitive consequences are black and white thinking and making

always and never statements.

8 The inclusion of the words must and awful here do not indicate the presence of an irrational belief.

The meaning seems to be that the person thinks that the essay is very bad.9 Again the presence of the word must does not indicate the presence of an irrational belief. The

person appears to have a strong conviction that his inference that his boss is out to get him is correct.

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Ellis was not consistent in his placing of what I am calling cognitive

consequences in the ABC framework. Sometimes he stated clearly that they

stemmed from irrational beliefs and, by definition, are cognitive consequences at

C (e.g. Ellis and Dryden 1997), while at other times he saw them as irrational

beliefs at B (e.g. in Ellis and MacClaren 1998). Consequently, authors makingthe irrational belief as cognitive consequence may well be reflecting the

confusion that appears in the REBT literature on this point.

Having said that, I found sixteen instances where authors had described or listed

cognitive consequences as irrational beliefs of which three had made this error in

general terms and in thirteen other instances, authors demonstrated this error in an

example.

From a general perspective, Kottler (2002: 115) argued that overpersonalizing

(sic), disqualifying and perfectionism are examples of derivative irrational beliefs

from a basic must, when they are more appropriately viewed as cognitiveconsequences. James and Gilliland (2003: 239) listed a number of cognitive

distortions such as overgeneralizing and all-or-none thinking and called them hot

cognitions with which REBT is mainly concerned.10 Finally, Ivey et al. (2007:

234) stated that the word never is a useful indicator of irrational thinking when it

is a cognitive consequence of such thinking.

The following are a few of the thirteen examples where this error was

demonstrated:

I will never make my mother happy (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 276)

No one will ever love me again (Fall et al. 2004: 342) This means that I will never be a good therapist (Kottler 2002: 111)

Ill always do poorly in job interviews (Nelson-Jones 2006: 322)

No-one will ever respect me (Sharf 2008: 307)

Half of the sample (n = 10) committed the irrational belief as cognitive

consequence error with seven authors demonstrating this error on one occasion,

three authors demonstrating it twice (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 276, 277); James

and Gilliland 2003: 239, 246; Kottler, 2002: 111, 115) and one demonstrating it

three times (Fall et al. 2004: 341, 342, 351).

3. Failing to distinguish between role evaluation and self-evaluation. In REBT

theory, a distinction is made between role-depreciation and self-depreciation. The

latter is an irrational belief, the former is not. Thus, it is possible for someone to say

I am a poor father and for him to accept rather than to depreciate himself.

Consequently, it is an error to regard role depreciation to be an irrational belief. I

found five instances of this error with two authors responsible for the five errors.

Archer and McCarthy (2007) made four of these errors:

Charles thinking that he was an inadequate husband (p. 272)

I was never a good enough husband (p. 274) I am not a good enough daughter (p. 276)

Im not a real man unless I have a good body (p. 277)

10 Since REBT is mainly concerned with irrational beliefs, readers could easily infer that these hot

cognitions are, in fact, irrational beliefs.


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The other error was made by Seligman (2006: 317):

I am a terrible mother Clients often imply self-depreciation when they

engage in role-depreciation, but in textbooks, authors need to make this point

clear to readers and clarify this distinction as, interestingly enough, Archer andMcCarthy (2007: 272) did themselves:

.she is not a perfect daughter (woman) because she doesnt have a family/

children that she is not a worthwhile person because of this (sic)

4. Conditional musts as irrational beliefs. Just because the word must appears

in a sentence does not necessarily indicate the presence of an irrational belief. Thus,

some musts are conditional whereas the musts that underpin disturbance are

unconditional. I found only one instance of this error:

I must have a wife to be happy (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 274)

5. Catastrophising as irrational belief. REBT theory makes clear distinctions

between concepts that appear, at first sight to be synonymous or similar, but are not.

Thus, awfulising is different from catastrophising in that in REBT, the former is seen

as an irrational belief and the latter as a cognitive consequence from an irrational

belief. Thus, a person can believe: It is awful that this catastrophe occurred or It

is very bad that this catastrophe occurred, but not awful. The latter belief is deemed

to help the person to process the catastrophe, grieve and move on while the latter

belief interferes with this process. I do concede that this is an understandable error for

authors to make since it is not prominent in the REBT literature, but it is an errornonetheless and it occurred on two separate occasions in the textbooks surveyed. For

example, Hough (2002: 121) says: The urge to catastrophise about the inevitable is

a fundamental cause of unhappiness in clients

James and Gilliland (2003: 238) compound this error by making it clear in the

following example of awfulising that catastrophic is worse than awful whereas,

the reverse is the case in REBT theory: I have no job. Im 45 years old. I cant get

another job. My family will starve. This is not just awful. It is catastrophic.

6. Failing to distinguish between cant tolerate and will not tolerate. In

REBT, there is an important difference between cant tolerate (which is an irrational

belief and will not tolerate (which appears to be a determination not to put up with

something passively). In the latter, the person often believes that he can tolerate the

adversity, but he is determined not to do so. I found one instance of this error. James

and Gilliland (2003: 238) say: I-cant-stand-it-itis: I will not tolerate them firing me.

I am totally destroyed by this and I will get even if its the last thing I do.

Irrational Belief Confusions In this section, I will present eight ways (n = 18) in

which authors confused readers about irrational beliefs together with four other

instances where the authors meaning was not clear and therefore these instances of

confusion were difficult to categorise.

1. Confusion about the nature of an irrational belief. I found six instances where

readers would be confused about the nature of an irrational belief after reading the

author on this point. I will discuss these in turn:

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I must have a date for New Years by tomorrow or I will be the laughing stock

of the community (Seligman, 2006: 317). Here it is not clear if the demand is

an irrational belief with the statement I will be the laughing stock of the

community representing the cognitive consequence of this demand or whether

it is a conditional must as in in order for me to prevent myself from becomingthe laughing stock of the community, I must have a date for New Years by

tomorrow.

Gladding (2005: 142) says: Another goal of REBT is to help people change

self-defeating habits of thought or behavior. He then presents the ABC

model where B stands for thoughts (1. Positive, 2. Negative, 3. Neutral and 4.

Mixed). Since Gladding is referring to self-defeating thought, the reader will end

up thoroughly confused concerning what constitutes such thought, leaving aside

the more obvious point that Gladding does not mention beliefs, let alone

irrational beliefs. McLeod (2003: 132) mentions the following belief which he says is irrational

because it is exaggerated and overstated: I must have love or approval from all

the significant people in my life. McLeod confuses the reader who will not

know whether this belief is irrational because of the must or because of the

all or both. If McLeod had provided the standard criteria for a demand being

irrational (i.e. it is rigid, false, illogical and helpful) rather than being

exaggerated and overstated the reader would be clearer, particularly if the

rigid criterion was emphasized.

I would never want to bring a child into this insane and awful world. Thisstatement by Nystul (2006: 244) confuses the reader because it appears that the

inclusion of the word awful here makes the belief an irrational awfulising

belief. This may not the case. The meaning of the word awful here is

ambiguous. It could mean very bad. A clear example of an awfulising belief

would be as follows: I would never to bring a child into this insane world. It

would be awful if I did so.

Perhaps the most confusing example of an author presenting an irrational belief

was that found in Day (2008: 376). She begins by incorrectly stating that belief

at B is: The often spontaneous, often irrational, thought within the clients

mind in response to A. She goes on to give the following example of this: Sera

thinks: Nick knows that I want to watch our favourite television series together

in fifteen minutes, and that cigar will take all night to finish! He hates to smoke

just half, and he will never come in on time to watch our show. He is so

inconsiderate. I just cant stand it. He always does things like this to ruin our

time together.

The only statement here that is an irrational belief is: I just cant stand it. The

other statements seem to be descriptive and inferential in nature. But how is the

reader to know which is the irrational belief? Day provides no help here.

Day (2008: 376) goes on to provide disputing interventions designed to help

Seras therapist to ask questions about the B that came between A and C.

Perhaps these will help the reader identify Seras irrational belief. Sadly, these

questions only deepen the readers confusion.


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Does Nick know what time it is?

Does he want to smoke that particular whole cigar?

Does he do considerate things, ever?

Could there be another reason for his choice of cigar. Other than to ruin her

evening? How bad could it really be if they missed watching part of their show

together?

Isnt it true that she can stand an incident like this, even if he is ignoring

her?

Only the last question is targeted at an irrational belief. The other questions are

primarily targeted at inferences at A. Strikingly, the one thing that Day does not

teach her readers is the centrality of the demand in disturbance, an issue I will

discuss in greater detail later.

Five authors confused their readers about the nature of irrational beliefs with four

doing so on one occasion each and with one doing so on two occasions (Day, 2008:

376-twice).

2. Confusion between an irrational belief and an inference. I found two instances

where an author indicated that an inference might be an irrational belief, but this

was not clear.

Fall et al. (2004: 339) state that teaching people how to identify irrational

thinking and how to produce rational thinking is the primary thrust of REBT.

However, they provide three examples of inferences determining emotional andbehavioural responses (e.g. the adolescent girl who believes He hates me

when her boyfriend does not call her one evening). Readers are thus given two

different views of the determinants of emotional and behavioural responses and

will end up being confused.

Todd and Bohart (2006: 295) claim that the following is an irrational need: I

deserve to be well liked. This is confusing since while deservingness is often

taken as an irrational belief, this statement is best regarded as an inference. The

irrational belief would be: Since I deserve to be well liked, I must get what I

deserve.

3. Confusion between an irrational belief and a cognitive consequence. I found

four instances where an author indicated that a cognitive consequence might be an

irrational belief or vice versa, but this was also not clear.

McLeod (2002: 133) says that the irrational belief leads to catastrophizing.

Since it is not clear whether McLeod regards catastrophizing as a derivative

irrational belief or a cognitive consequence, the reader will be confused.

Sharf (2008: 307) lists the following irrational belief: I must get an A on my

exam, or I will be a worthless person, and no-one will ever respect me. This is

confusing because the reader will think that the statement and no-one will

ever respect me is part of the irrational belief, not a cognitive consequence of it.

Parrott (2003: 313) says: Once clients begin to identify their irrational beliefs,

the counselor can help group them into themes and goes on to list the fol-

lowing: all-or-nothing thinking, mind reading, over-generalization, discounting,

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magnification, emotional reasoning and self-blame. Apart from the latter, all the

above are examples of cognitive consequences of irrational beliefs (Ellis and

Dryden 1997). However, by recommending that counsellors group clients

irrational beliefs into themes, it is not clear what the author is saying. Thus

readers could easily conclude that Parrot is saying that they are irrational beliefs. Colledge (2002: 231) states that Individuals usually make over-generalised and

unrealistic inferences in response to their absolutistic demands. For example,

awfulising, terribleising, horribleising; I cant stand it-itis; a feeling of

worthlessness and self-hatred and a prediction of continuous failure. While it

is correct that distorted inferences stem from absolutistic demands and are thus

best regarded as cognitive consequences of these demands, Colledge implies that

the three major derivatives are over-generalised and unrealistic inferences and

not derivative irrational beliefs which will be confusing for the reader.

4. Confusion between an irrational belief and a rational belief. I found two

instances where an author confused an irrational belief with a rational belief.

Colledge (2002: 233) notes that Bs and Cs interact as follows. Preferential

Beliefs (Bs) lead to consequences (Cs) that reciprocally influence Bs. So if

people are rejected and consequently feel depressed they avoid anyone who may

reject them because they have constructed the belief that he is an idiot and isnt

worth bothering with. Leaving aside the point that it is not clear who holds the

belief outlined (i.e. he is an idiot and isnt worth bothering with), the author

gives an example that shows the impact of an irrational belief not a rationalbelief that his opening point about preferential beliefs suggests. Thus, the reader

is likely to be confused on both points.

Hough (2002: 102) says the following in considering the need for approval:

Besides people who want to be loved and approved of at all times set

impossibly high standards for themselves, since such an ambition requires

continual hard work and expenditure of energy. Insecurity is also generated by

this constant need for approval, and ingratiating behaviour is likely to follow.

Hough confuses the reader by seeming to equate wants with needs and also by

implying that desires lead to disturbed consequences.

5. Confusion between irrational beliefs. I found one instance where the author

confuses the reader by making a point about one irrational belief (a rigid belief) and

then by exemplifying this point with reference to a different irrational belief (an

awfulising belief). Thus, Corey (2005: 280) says: Clients learn that musts,

oughts, and shoulds can be replaced by preferences. Instead of saying It would

be absolutely awful if, they learn to say It would be inconvenient if

6. Confusion about what is meant by a distorted evaluation. Archer and

McCarthy (2007: 271) say the following: we have this basic idea that human

evaluation of events is often distorted and that this distortion causes many of ourproblems and difficulties. Readers will be confused in that they will not know what

is meant by distorted evaluation. Also, the word distorted is more frequently

used to describe inferences rather than evaluations (which when extreme are a

cornerstone of derivative irrational beliefs). This will also add to readers confusion.


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23/40

McLeod (2003; 136) lists a number of irrational beliefs and then says: The

belief statements used in RET [sic] reflect the operation of a number of distorted

cognitive processes. For example, over-generalisation is present if the client

believes that he or she needs to be loved at all times. This is confusing for two

reasons. First, McLeod considers the need to be loved to reflect the distortedcognitive process of over-generalisation. In REBT theory this need reflects the

cognitive operation of rigidity and leads to the distorted cognitive consequence of

over-generalisation. Second, it is not clear what McLeod regards as distorted (his

term) in the belief, he needs to be loved at all times. Is it the need to be loved

component or the at all times component? In REBT, it is the need component

since a person can believe I want to be loved at all times and this would not be

irrational as long as the person also believes but I dont have to be.

Conversely, if the person believes that he needs to be loved by one person, then in

REBT theory this would be regarded as an irrational belief. McLeod fails to helpreaders understand these subtle but important distinctions made in REBT theory.

The final instance of how an author can baffle readers concerning the nature of

irrational beliefs demonstrates just how confused an author can be in their own

minds about this topic. Thus, Ivey et al. (2007: 234) say the following: In

counseling and psychotherapy, clients will frequently use such irrational

statements as12

1. If I dont pass the course, it is the end of the world

2. Because my parents have been cruel to me as a child, there is nothing I can

do now to help myself3. Since the economy is lacking jobs, I cant have a good life

4. If I cant get a scholarship, all is ended

5. The reason I have nothing is that the rich have taken it all

All of these statements at one level are true, but all of them represent helpless

thinking, a common end result of irrational thought.

Iveys statement is very confusing for the following reasons:

(a) It is not clear if the authors intend these statements to be examples of irrational

beliefs as the meaning of the term irrational statements here is not defined(b) Only statement 1 above is an example of an irrational (awfulising) belief.

Statements 2 and 3 seem to be cognitive consequences of irrational beliefs,

statement 4 is confusing (it may be an awfulising belief or it may be a

cognitive consequence of an irrational belief) and statement 5 is an inference.

Irrational Beliefs: Theory not Emphasised I found two major areas where REBT

theory was not emphasised in the discussion of irrational beliefs.

i. Rigid beliefs. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of REBT theory is the central

role given to rigid beliefs i.e. demands, musts, absolute should, etc. in

accounting for psychological disturbance (Dryden 2009). Thus, it is important

12 I have inserted numbers in this quote to aid comprehension.


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for authors of textbooks to make clear the core place of rigid beliefs in such

disturbance. It is not sufficient, therefore, for authors to make reference to

derivative irrational beliefs without, at the very least, also mentioning rigid

beliefs.

Six authors mentioned derivative irrational beliefs without mentioning rigid

beliefs on twelve occasions in total.

1. Archer and McCarthy (2007: 270) state that discomfort disturbances basically

involve beliefs that lead to an inability to deal with frustration when things in life

dont go as one wants or expects. Things become terrible and awful when one is

treated unfairly or blocked in some avenue of life. Here, the authors mention

awfulising, but omit any mention of rigid beliefs which according to Ellis (1994) are

the breeding ground for the three other derivative irrational beliefs including

awfulising. Archer and McCarthy (2007: 272-twice) give two examples where no

mention is made of a rigid belief, but where reference is made to other derivative

irrational beliefs.

Charles thinking that he was an inadequate husband, the divorce was his fault

and that his has ruined his life forever.

In the following example, there are two different irrational beliefs provided and

the demand is present in only the second: Sharons irrational beliefs that she is

not a perfect daughter (woman) because she doesnt have a family/children that

she is not a worthwhile person because of this,13 and that her mother must

approve of the lifestyle choices she (Sharon) makes.

14

2. Hough (2002: 115) say that According to the [ABC] model, it is not what

happens at point A which causes an individual to experience disturbance or

discomfort; on the contrary, it is the individuals own self-talk or catastrophising

which inflicts the damage, and this place at point B. Once again the author

mentions catastrophising,15 but omits any reference to rigid beliefs. Hough

(2002: 117, 119) goes on to give two examples where no mention is made of a rigid

belief, but where reference is made to other derivative irrational beliefs.

Paul believes Its awful that I failed the test and Im useless for having failed

(Hough 2002: 117).

There will be a lot of students there. Many have studied the Romantic poets

before. They are likely to know a lot about the subject. They may not appreciate

what I have planned to say to them. Some might even leave the lecture hall in

boredom. My God, it would be awful. I would just dieit would be terrible

(Hough 2002: 119).

3. James and Gilliland (2003: 263) say: Rational-emotive therapy theory

suggests that emotional disturbance may be explained by ABC theory. This theory

states that when an unpleasant event (activating event) occurs at point A, an

13 This is the first irrational belief.14 This is the second irrational belief.15 See footnote 5 for the difference between awfulising and catastrophising.

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individual may react in two ways. One is to conclude that this event is unfortunate

and disadvantageous (a rational belief).orthat circumstances are terrible or

even catastrophic and therefore should not exist (irrational belief). James and

Gilliland (2003: 235) provide one example where no mention is made of a rigid

belief, but where reference is made to other derivative irrational beliefs, in this case,awfulising again and other-depreciation.

In reality, however, Dr. James tells himself, Here is another example of

stupidity and incompetency insinuated on me, and it is a major catastrophe that

this jerk is now making me late for my therapy session.

4. Day (2008) give two examples where no mention is made of a rigid belief, but

where reference is made to other derivative irrational beliefs, self-depreciation in

the first example and discomfort intolerance in the second.

See I am a loser. No one will ever want a long-term relationship with me (Day

2008: 372).

Nick knows that I want to watch our favorite television series together in

15 min, and that cigar will take all night to finish! He hates to smoke just half,

and he will never come in on time to watch our show. He is so inconsiderate, I

just cant stand it.16 He always does things like this to ruin our time together.

(Day 2008: 376).

5. Fall et al. (2004: 342) give one example where no mention is made of a rigid

belief, but where mention is made of all three derivative irrational beliefs. That is horrible! I must be a complete loser. No one will ever love me again! I

am all alone, unloveable, and I cant live without her.

6. Kottler (2002: 111) give one example where no mention is made of a rigid

belief, but where mention is made self-depreciation.

I cant believe I blew this assignment completely. Im such an idiot!

ii. Unqualified shoulds. As discussed above, REBT emphasises the rigid nature ofirrational beliefs. In this context, the word should is sometimes referred to by

the authors of counselling and psychotherapy textbooks, but without a qualifier

(such as absolutely should) and as such REBT theory is not brought to the

fore. As I have showed elsewhere, REBT theory acknowledged that the word

should has several different meanings and that only the absolute should is

deemed to be irrational in REBT (Dryden 2010).

Six of the selected sample of twenty authors did this, five on one occasion each

(Archer and McCarthy 2007: 270; Fall et al. 2004: 341; James and Gilliland, 2003:

263); Kottler 2002: 111; and Seligman (2006: 317) and one Hough (2002) on three

occasions. Thus Hough refers to demands as unqualified shoulds in the following

examples:

16 I just cant stand it is the discomfort intolerance belief in this example.


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People should always like me (Hough 2002: 127)

People should always believe me (Hough 2002: 127)

Things should always be the way I want them to be (Hough 2002: 137).

Rational Beliefs

In REBT theory rational beliefs are either flexible (e.g. non-dogmatic preferences)

or non-extreme (i.e. non-awfulising beliefs, discomfort tolerance beliefsalso

known as high frustration tolerance beliefsor depreciation beliefs).

Rational Belief Errors The authors in the present sample made five types of error

when discussing rational beliefs.

1. Rational beliefs are really inferences at A. I mentioned earlier that one of

the most frequent errors that new trainees make when they first learn REBT is to

identify distorted inferences when they think that they are identifying irrational

beliefs. This is also the case when they come to formulate rational belief

alternatives. I found fifteen instances of this error where rational beliefs are really

inferences: one as a general point and fourteen in examples. In general, Fall et al.

(2004: 343) state that: When faced with situations they find difficult, rational

people interpret the events as hurtful or disappointing but not catastrophic.

Here are some of the fourteen examples of inferences that authors state are

rational beliefs:

I will be a good daughter and do what I can for my mother, but I am not

responsible for her happiness (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 277)

I havent found the right way to choose relationships yet (Day 2008: 372)

My boss seems to have concerns about my report (Nystul 2006: 245)

My wifes behaviour is independent of my own success and accomplishments

(Parrott 2003: 315)

I believe that my supervisor is not really familiar with my work and so is not

giving me the praise I would like (Seligman 2006: 318).

Nine of the sample of authors made this rational belief as inference error withfive making it once, three making it on two occasions (Archer and McCarthy 2007:

277-twice; Mobley 2005: 150-1-twice and Seligman, 2006: 318-twice), and one

making it on four occasions (Day 2008: 372, 376-three times).

2. Rational beliefs are really cognitive consequences at C. I mentioned earlier

in this paper that a recent development of REBT is the emphasis placed on the

cognitive consequences of beliefs. When these beliefs are irrational, their cognitive

consequences tend to be highly distorted and skewed to the negative and when they

are rational, their cognitive consequences are realistic and balanced. I found just one

instance when an author put forward a rational belief that was really a cognitiveconsequence. Thus, Todd and Bohart (2006: 297) put forward the rational belief: I

would prefer not to act that way. I will try to do better next time. The latter

statement forms part of the rational belief, but is really a cognitive consequence of

that belief.

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3. Rational beliefs are really role evaluations. In the section on irrational belief

errors, I mentioned that it was an error to state that a role evaluation was an

irrational belief. I found one instance where an author stated that a role evaluation

was a rational belief: I will be a good daughter and do what I can for my

mother (Archer and McCarthy (2007: 277).4. Rational beliefs are really feeling statements. On three occasions, McLeod

(2002) gives examples of rational beliefs which seem to be feeling statements rather

than beliefs. Thus:

I enjoy being loved by others. (McLeod 2003: 133)

I feel most secure when the majority of the people in my life care about me.

(McLeod 2003: 133)

I enjoy the feeling of being loved and accepted by another person, and if this is

not available to me I can sometimes feel unhappy. (McLeod 2002: 136)

5. Rational beliefs lessen disturbance. REBT theory states that rational beliefs

are qualitatively, rather than quantitatively different from irrational beliefs. As a

result, rational beliefs do not lessen disturbance; rather they help people to have a

healthily negative, but undisturbed set of responses to lifes adversities (Dryden

2009; Ellis 1994). Hough (2002) makes this error on three separate occasions. Thus:

.and to substitute rational and less disturbing beliefs in their place (Hough

2002: 139).

Homework assignments.are designed to correct the clients irrational beliefs

and to help him replace them with more realistic and less disturbing language orself-talk (Hough 2002: 128).

Eleanor was also asked by the counsellor to practise changing her internal

language so that her thinking would become less rigid and self-sabotaging

(Hough 2002: 137).

Rational Belief Confusions In this section, there were four instances where, in my

view, readers would have been confused about the nature of a rational belief after

reading what three of the samples authors had to say on this topic. In giving a rational belief alternative to the following belief: I must be

approved or accepted by people I find important, James and Gilliland ( 2003:

254) provide the following: While it would be grand if everyone thought I was

great, thats not going to happen, particularly if Im me. And if I am me and

people like me, Ill know they really like me for what I really am and not for

what I pretend to be. Furthermore, Im only anxious about this. It isnt

dangerous. Its a bit uncomfortable right now, but risk in any new situation is

distressing.

The above statement contains a number of different components. Parts of it

provide partial components of rational beliefs which are not negated (see below),

while others are inferential. One is even a feeling statement. Consequently readers

will be confused about why this statement is rational.


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Kottler (2002: 111) provides the following: Oh well, so what if the grade

isnt what I wanted. Ill do better next time. While Kottler does not state that

this is a rational belief, it is put forward as a contrast to an irrational belief in

a section under the heading The Irrational Belief. This is confusing in

itself. In addition, the statement oh well, so what if can be taken as anindifference belief rather than a rational belief. Finally, the statement Ill do

better next time seems more like a cognitive consequence of a rational belief

than an integral part of such a belief. In short, the reader will be left very

confused by Kottler on the nature of a rational belief after reading his

example.

Another statement put forward by Kottler (2002: 113) as a rational belief is

even more confusing for the reader. This statement is as follows: Well it is a

little disappointing that I didnt do well as I had hoped. And I do think that

the assignment was rather unclear and inconsistently graded. But that is theway things sometimes go in this imperfect world. Just because I didnt

perform perfectly doesnt mean I wont do better on the next assignment.

Even if I dont improve, these tasks in class dont reflect how well I will do

in the field. But they do provide useful feedback that I can use to improve my

knowledge and skills. So this is hardly a terrible disaster, merely a very minor

setback.

Only the last sentence is an accurate example of a (non-awfulising) rational belief

where the badness component is acknowledged (albeit in a diluted form i.e. very

minor) and the awfulising component is negated. The other parts of the statementare partial rational beliefs or inferences.

Seligman (2006: 322) begins by presenting the following irrational belief: My

supervisor should praise me more and is a jerk for not seeing how hard I work. It

is awful that I work so hard and am not valued as I ought to be. Then Seligman

puts forward the following rational belief alternative to Martins irrational

belief: Although I am disappointed that my evaluation was average, it is not the

end of the world. I will take steps to familiarize my supervisor with my work and

hopefully obtain a more positive evaluation next time.

This rational belief is not a point-by-point alternative to the irrational belief,

which it needs to be if readers are to be clear about the nature of the rational belief

provided. Also, Seligman fails to provide a flexible, non-dogmatic preference

alternative to the (unqualified) should in the rational belief. Compare my own

proposed rational belief alternative to that provided by Seligman: I wish my

supervisor would praise me more, but sadly he does not have to do so. He is not a

jerk for not seeing how hard I work. Rather, he is a fallible human being who is

doing what I consider to be the wrong thing. It is bad, but not awful that I work so

hard and not valued as I would to be, but dont have to be.

Rational Beliefs: Theory Not Emphasised I found five areas where REBT theory

was not emphasised in the discussion of rational beliefs.

W. Dryden

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i. No flexible beliefs mentioned. REBT theory states that at the core of a healthy

response to adversity is a flexible belief where the person asserts her preference and

negates her demand. I found six instances where neither a full nor a partial flexible

belief was put forward in the authors discussion of a rational belief. In the one

general case of this de-emphasis that I found, James and Gilliland (2003: 263) statethe following: Rational-emotive therapy theory suggests that emotional distur-

bance may be explained by ABC theory. This theory states that when an unpleasant

event (activating event) occurs at point A, an individual may react in two ways. One

is to conclude that this event is unfortunate and disadvantageous (a rational

belief).or.that circumstances are terrible or even catastrophic and therefore

should not exist (irrational belief). In this statement, by only mentioning a non-

awfulising belief (albeit in a partial form) and omitting the flexible belief, James and

Gilliland (2003) are clearly de-emphasising the REBT theoretical position on the

central role of flexibility in rational beliefs.I found five examples of this de-emphasis. Here are a couple of examples:

Too bad I failed the test. Its disappointing. Ill have to take more lessons.

(Hough 2002: 117)

How unfortunate it is that I have been fired because it will be inconvenient to

look for a job. (James and Gilliland, 2003: 238).

The six instances (five examples and one general point) of the de-emphasis of

flexibility in rational beliefs were found in the work of three authors with two

examples found in Hough (2002: 117, 119) and three in James and Gilliland (2003:235, 238, 263).

ii. Partial rational beliefs presented: Partial flexible beliefs (or partial

preferential beliefs). In the first part of this paper, I presented my version of the

ABC framework and was very clear in distinguishing rational from irrational

beliefs. Thus, the essence of a flexible belief is where the person states his

preference and notes explicitly that this preference does not have to be met (e.g. I

want to do well, but I dont have to do so). If he just articulates his preference, this

is known as a partial flexible or preferential belief and the person can implicitly

transform this into a rigid belief (e.g. I want to do well.and therefore I have to do

well).

I found eight instances of this de-emphasis; one was a general point and the other

seven were examples of this point. In the one general point that I found, Nelson-

Jones (2006: 308) states: B Belief system involving preferential thinking: I prefer

to have my important Goals unblocked and fulfilled. It would have been more

accurate for Nelson-Jones to have stated: I prefer to have my important Goals

unblocked and fulfilled, but I dont have to do so.

Of the seven examples, each was made by one author. Here is a selection of these

examples with the full version of this flexible belief also provided:

I would like to make my mother happy (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 276).

The full version would be: I would like to make my mother happy, but it does

not follow that I have to do so.


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I dont like this failure, and I wish it had not occurred (Ford and Urban 1998:

390). The full version would be: I dont like this failure, and I wish it had not

occurred, but that does not mean that my wish must be fulfilled.

I dont like to fail a test (Sharf 2008: 305). The full version would be: I

dont like to fail a test, but there is no reason why I must not do so.

iii. Partial rational beliefs presented: Partial non-awfulising beliefs. A full

awfulising belief occurs where the person asserts the badness of the adversity, but

explicitly negates that it is awful (e.g. It would be is bad if I dont do well, but it

would not be awful). If the person just asserts the badness of the adversity, this is

known as a partial non-awfulising belief and the person can implicitly transform this

into an awfulising belief (e.g. It would be bad if I dont do well.and therefore it

would be awful).

I found five instances of this de-emphasis: two made in general points and three

in examples. Dealing with the general points first, Corey (2005: 280) says: Clients

learn that musts, oughts, and shoulds can be replaced by preferences. Instead of

saying It would be absolutely awful if., they learn to say It would be

inconvenient if. What would be more consistent with REBT theory would be

the statement: It would be inconvenient, but not awful if James and Gilliland

(2003: 263) say that concluding that an event is unfortunate and disadvantageous

is a rational belief. Once again they do not make it clear that a full non-awfulising

belief would involve negating the idea that it would be awful.

The three examples of a partial non-awfulising belief were as follows:

Too bad I failed the test. Its disappointing Hough (2002: 117)

How unfortunate it is that I have been fired because it will be inconvenient to

look for a job. (James and Gilliland 2003: 238)

This is too bad; I dont like to fail a test. (Sharf, 2008: 305)

Four authors de-emphasized the importance of stating a full non-awfulising

belief, three doing so on one occasion and one doing so on two occasions (James

and Gilliland, 2003: 238, 263).

iv. Partial rational beliefs presented: Partial acceptance beliefs17A full

acceptance belief occurs where the person does three things: (a) acknowledgesthe negativity of an aspect of himself or what has happened to him, (b) negates that

this aspect or experience means that he is worthless and (c) asserts his fallibility,

unrateability and that he is in flux (e.g. I have been demoted, but this does not

mean that I am worthless. I am fallible, unrateable and capable of change and this is

true whether I was demoted or not). If the person only takes the first two steps, this

is known as a partial self-acceptance belief and the person can implicitly transform

this into a self-depreciation belief (e.g. I have been demoted, but this does not

mean that I am worthless. However, I would be worthier if I hadnt been

demoted.) I found two instances where the author did not present a full self-acceptance belief.

17 In this section I will discuss this issue with respect to partial and full self-acceptance beliefs. The same

points are relevant to partial and full other-acceptance and life-acceptance beliefs.

W. Dryden

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Even if I do behave foolishly at times, this does not make me a foolish person

(Corey 2005: 279)

Just because I dont understand everything about these theories doesnt make me

stupid (Parrott 2003: 317).

As can be seen from these two examples, in partial self-acceptance beliefs, the

person makes clear who he is not, but does not make clear who he is.

v. The pantomime horse. In what I call the pantomime horse rational belief,

the person asserts the first part of one rational belief and negates the irrationality of a

different rational belief. A common pantomime horse belief pairs the front half of a

flexible belief with the back half of a non-awfulising belief. This pairing appears in

the two instances of the pantomime horse rational belief that I found in our sample.

Its nice to be liked, but not everybody will like me, and that isnt the end of the

world (Corey 2005: 279) It would be nice to live in a warm country abroad, but it isnt awful that I dont

(Hough 2002: 137).

To make REBT theory transparent here, both parts of the two rational beliefs

need to be expressed in their full form (e.g. It would be nice to live in a warm

country abroad, but I dont have to do so. It would be bad if I dont, but not awful.

C

In the first part of the paper, I noted that C can be emotional, behavioural andcognitive. The present sample of authors largely discussed emotional Cs.

Emotional Cs

Emotional C Errors I found ten errors when authors discussed emotional Cs

1. More than one C in an ABC

In the first part of this paper, I distinguished between what might be called the

situational A and the critical A. The former represents the situation in which

the person disturbed himself and latter is that aspect of the situation about which theperson was most disturbed. The latter tends to be used as A in modern REBT.

This distinction is important when considering C. When A is situational, many

Cs can be experienced, but it is not clear what these emotions are about.

However, when A is critical, only one C can be experienced and there is a

theme in the A that is representation of that emotion (Dryden 2009). It follows

therefore that a number of critical As can be found within one situational A.

I found ten instances where the author provided more than one C when

outlining an ABC example with two authors doing this twice (Archer and

McCarthy 2007: 272-twice and Colledge 2002: 232-twice).In nine of the ten instances, the ABC described a psychologically disturbed

response to a negative situational A. In five of these, the author provided three

unhealthy negative emotions (UNEs), in two the author provided two UNEs

(Colledge 2002: 232-twice), in one instance the author (Sommers-Flanagan and


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Sommers Flanagan 2004: 265) provided four UNEs and one HNE (healthy negative

emotion) and in one the author provided three UNEs and one HNE (Archer and

McCarthy 2007: 272). Here are a few examples:

A=

Sharons mother showing her the picture of her sisters baby and remarkingthat her grandchildren are the only things that really make her life worthwhile.

C = anxious, angry and hurt (Archer and McCarthy 2007: 272)

A = My supervisor gave me an average rating on my evaluation. C = anger,

shame, and anxiety (Seligman 2006: 321).

In the one instance where the ABC described a psychologically healthy

response to a negative situational A, the author provided three HNEs (Hough

2002: 117) as follows:

A = Paul fails his driving test; C = regret, disappointment, irritation

2. Emotional Cs are too vague. REBTs emotional theory requires specificityand clarity in detailing emotional Cs when explaining the ABC model and

exemplifying this model (see Dryden 2009). I found four instances when such

specificity and clarity in authors writings on this issue were lacking with three

authors doing this once and one author doing so twice (Hough 2002: x, 126127). In

three of these four instances, authors talked about the vague term emotional upset

instead of the term preferred in REBT theory i.e. emotional disturbance. The

other vague term employed was serious emotional reaction (Nystul 2006: 244).

I found two instances where authors were also too vague in exemplifying the

ABC of emotional disturbance. Hough (2002: 117) mentioned the termunhappy while Mobley (2005: 89) referred to tired of acting shy.

3. Emotional Cs are really inferences at A. I found four instances where

authors (n = 3) used inferences to refer to emotional Cs. Thus, the following

refer to the following inferences as UNEs:

victimised and ignored (Day (2008: 376)

betrayal Fall et al. (2004: 351)

frustration (Parrott 2003: 317)

Fall et al. (2004: 351) also refer to frustration as a feeling, but this time as a

HNE. However, as Trexler (1976) noted, frustra

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