This is the published version Bangaroo,P and Weerakkody,N 2014, The propaganda strategies adopted by the Colonial British during the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 as applied in newspaper coverage: A case study, in Refereed Proceedings of the Australian and New Zealand Communication Association Conference: The digital and the social: Communication for inclusion and exchange. 2014, Australian and New Zealand Communication Association (ANZCA), Online http://www.anzca.net/conferences/past-conferences/, pp. 1-22. Available from Deakin Research Online http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30070616 Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner Copyright: 2014, ANZCA

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The Propaganda Strategies Adopted by the Colonial British During the Malayan

Emergency, 1948–1960 as Applied in Newspaper Coverage: A Case Study.

A paper submitted for publication in the proceedings of the Australian and New Zealand

Communication Association Annual Conference, Swinburne University, Victoria 9-11 July,

2014.

Prabavathy Bangaroo

School of Communication and Creative Arts

Deakin University

221 Burwood Highway, Burwood

VIC 3125

pbangaro@deakin.edu.au

and

Associate Professor Niranjala (Nina) Weerakkody

School of Communication and Creative Arts

Deakin University

Locked Bag 20000, Geelong

VIC 3220

nina.weerakkody@deakin.edu.au

2

Abstract

The ongoing discussions on the fluid boundaries between ‘propaganda’ and ‘persuasion’ have

emerged in numerous studies, the most prominent being Jowett and O’Donnell (2006). Sharing their

views, Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued on the repercussions of only using elite sources in media

reports due to their capacity to mobilise the masses for a single cause and shape elite opinions, due to

the absence of alternative or opposing viewpoints. This case study examined the nature of propaganda

strategies adopted by the colonial British during the Malayan Emergency that proved to be highly

effective. This study consisted of two separate elements. First, it extends the discussion on

propaganda by examining the significance of ‘race’ used as a crucial element within the discourses of

anti-communism, as a legitimate rationale to mobilise forces, primarily within a Malayan context.

Second, it investigated how propaganda strategies such as the forced resettlement of the ethnic

Chinese, strategies used in framing the insurgents, and psychological warfare operated as powerful

mechanisms to shape propaganda communication. A comparative content analysis of two mainstream

English newspapers – namely The Times (London) and Straits Times (Singapore) – was conducted to

identify trends in reporting used. Juxtaposing this method was the administration of in-depth

interviews with ex-service personnel who had actively served in Malaya during the Malayan

Emergency. The findings of this research reveal a significant correlation between ‘race’ and the

constructs of communism. The results also indicate that psychological strategies adopted by the

British in the form of deeds and news production proved to be highly effective.

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The Propaganda Strategies Adopted by the Colonial British During the Malayan

Emergency, 1948–1960 as Applied in Newspaper Coverage: A Case Study

Prabavathy Bangaroo and Niranjala (Nina) Weerakkody

Introduction

This paper reports on a study that comparatively content analysed the coverage of the

Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) by The Times (London) and the Straits Times (Singapore)

to examine how discourses about the insurgents were framed and correlated with the

propaganda strategies adopted by the Colonial British and may have served to set elite public

opinion in Britain and Malaya at the time. It was supplemented with the findings of in-depth

interviews conducted with ex-service personnel who had served in Malaya during the

Emergency, that support some of the findings of the newspaper content analysis.

While there has been abundant literature on the use of propaganda in times of unrest

and conflict, especially within US and British contexts, ranging from both World Wars to

Iraq and Afghanistan (Lasswell, 1977, 1971; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Wilcox, 2005;

Cottle, 2006; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2006), there is a lack of empirical findings or research

on propaganda dissemination in a domestic conflict, especially so within a colonial setting

perpetrated by colonial powers. Past research on British colonial propaganda during the

Malayan Emergency had been largely qualitative focusing primarily on historical narratives

(Deery, 2007, 2003; Clutterbuck, 1966; Hack, 2009, 1999; Ramakrishna, 2002). This paper

attempts to fill a methodological gap in providing empirical findings through the adoption of

a three-step triangulation method consisting of three separate modes of data collection – in-

depth interviews, newspaper content analysis and archival research on propaganda

dissemination in a domestic conflict, especially within a colonial setting. This study provides

findings that can lead to further studies on media agenda setting and their effects on

audiences.

Background

The Malayan Emergency spanned over 12 years – June 1948 to July 1960 – and was

often referred to as the ‘Long, Long War’ (Clutterbuck, 1966). The root of this conflict

stemmed from hostilities caused by a group that emanated from a sizeable local army

approximating 6,000–10,000 (Clutterbuck, 1966; Jackson, 1991; Coates, 1992). This

Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was established by the British colonial

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administration to help fight the Japanese during World War II. With the end of the War, a

majority of the MPAJA members joined the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to fight the

British in order to end their colonial rule (Jackson, 1991). As priorities shifted, the MCP, by

then operating under the banner of the Malayan Races’ Liberation Army (MRLA), vied to

fight for a Communist ‘People’s Government’, while the British struggled to regain its

authority over the colony once the Japanese occupation of Malaya had ended. The MCP

members were largely ethnic Chinese Malayans – a fundamental detail the British, especially

the Colonial Office in Great Britain, were keenly aware of, widely publicised and exploited.

The Malayan Emergency began with many minor incidents – mainly attacks on the locals.

However, the British authorities started to respond to them only after the murder of three

European managers by the MCP, in a rubber plantation on 16 June 1948. This brought about

the declaration of a Federation-wide State of Emergency in Malaya, by the British on 18 June

1948 (Ramakrishna, 2002).

According to Kumar Ramakrishna (2002) and Karl Hack (2009), the Malayan

Emergency can be classified into four chronological chapters, viz.:

1. June 1948 – May 1950 – The period of turmoil and increased violence from MCP

members to overthrow British control.

2. May 1950 – February 1952 – A period where MCP members tried to seize power in

Malaya due to the weaknesses of the British civil and military sectors, especially after

WWII.

3. February 1952 – May 1954 – This third stage marked a turning point for the British

with strengthened military and civil resources. Propaganda communication, through

words and deeds, proved to be beneficial to the British during this period.

4. June 1954 – December 1958 – This final stage saw a decline in terrorist activities and

strength, resulting in an end to the crisis that finally saw Malaya gaining its

independence in August 1957.

News Management and Propaganda

The British Information Research Department of the Foreign Office (IRD) worked

closely with the British Secret Service, supporting British propaganda communication and

techniques with the intention to ‘influence public opinion in its favour both at home and

overseas’ (Fletcher, 1982: 106). A remote station, the Regional Information Office (RIO), as

another arm of the IRD, was set up in Singapore to produce counter-communist propaganda

communication.

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A Memorandum issued by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Cabinet

underlined proposed improvements to information services for the purposes of: (a) general

propaganda work, (b) direct ‘psychological warfare’ against the ‘bandits’ and (c) to develop

an anti-communist propaganda campaign for Malaya’i. Using news management as a key

priority for propaganda purposes was widespread to ‘ensure that, as far as possible, the

‘terrorists’ received only as much publicity (and of the right sort) as the government saw fit’

(Carruthers, 1995: 90). In addition to defeating communism, there was an urgent need for the

British to manage their news so as to project a positive image of Great Britain’s economic

and colonial status to its overseas allies and enemies.

The local newspapers dominating at the time were the Straits Times, which was

owned by the company Straits Times Press Ltd, wholly owned by its British board of

directors and based in Singapore, which was part of Malaya before the former’s

independence in 1965. The Straits Times was read mostly by the local English-speaking elites

and British nationals based in Malaya and Singapore, while the New Path News (Sin Lu Pao),

a British-sponsored Chinese language newspaper, targeted the local rural Chinese population.

Another local paper, the Kin Kwok Daily News, an anti-communist newspaper, was another

source employed by the British in opposition to communist propaganda.

Other media forms managed by the Psychological Warfare Division were propaganda

leaflets distributed/dropped by the Royal Air Force that ranged between 53 million in 1950

and 77 million in 1953 (Jackson, 1991). Radio Malaya was used for local radio broadcasts,

and voice aircrafts referred to as the ‘Stop Press of the Jungle’ (Simpson, 1999) were used to

broadcast anti-communist messages and to drop propaganda leaflets. Mobile cinema shows

and plays were prominent as effective media forms. Ex-MCP members who were also known

as Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) were used by the British to put up local plays and

speeches to encourage other MCP members to surrender.

The Briggs Plan, Race and Resettlement

The element of ‘race’ became a vital tool during this conflict, especially when

mobilising other races – predominantly the Malays and Indians – to support the British. The

primary aim of British propaganda was to destroy insurgent morale and create division

between the Chinese and other races in Malaya promoting a ‘divide and rule’ strategy within

Malaya’s plural society of Chinese, Malays and Indians (Ramakrishna, 2002). This was made

clear with the introduction of the ‘new villages’ that arose with the resettlement program

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proposed in the Briggs Plan of 1950 – an initiation of Sir Harold Briggs, the Director of

Emergency Operations at that time. It saw 86% of the Chinese Malayan population forced or

‘resettled’ into these segregated ‘new villages’. This containment initiative housed a large

number of Chinese squatters/villagers suspected of aiding MCP members, willingly or under

duress, allegedly providing the insurgents with food, money, medical supplies, clothing and

information on British troop positions. These resettlement villages, surrounded by barbed

wire and entrenchments, were deemed to be highly effective British counter-insurgency

propaganda of deeds similar to the rewards policy (Clutterbuck, 1966), that resulted in the

‘severing [of] the umbilical cord’ between the MCP members and local reinforcements

(Deery, 2007: 53).

Theoretical Framework

This study adopts a functionalist paradigm, with attempts made to explain how and

why some of these strategies worked and how media effects such as agenda setting and

framing did not operate consistently in ways they were originally intended to, especially

within a Malayan context as the conflict ended with Malaya gaining independence from

Britain. The theoretical frameworks adopted were that of media agenda setting (McCombs,

2004), gatekeeping (White, 1950; Shoemaker and Vos, 2009) and framing of discourses (van

Dijk, 1985; Entman, 1989, 2007, 2010) that refer to the selecting, emphasising and distorting

of information for psychological impact on targeted audiences.

Literature Review

Media Power, Propaganda and Public Opinion

The nature of propaganda and ongoing discussions on the fluid boundaries between

‘propaganda’ and ‘persuasion’ emerges in the studies of Jowett and O’Donnell (2006). As

propaganda scholars, Jowett and O’Donnell claim that propaganda is almost always in some

‘form of activated ideology’ and at times agitating and arousing an audience to act, lending

credence to the hypodermic needle theory (Sparks, 2013: 58; Schramm, 1971). This will be

especially valid within contexts and times in history where other more dominant and easily

accessible modes of information and alternative viewpoints were unavailable to the targeted

audiences.

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In defining the levels of propaganda, Jowett and O’Donnell (2006: 16) categorise or

label them according to source and information accuracy as either ‘white’ (where the source

is clearly identified with the information likely to be accurate to maintain credibility but not

necessarily verifiable); ‘black’ (as the other extreme with sources concealed and false

information communicated to deceive); and finally, ‘grey’ propaganda (where sources may

sometimes be identified or concealed with the accuracy of information disseminated being

uncertain).

Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) study on propaganda developed a similar view and

adopted the position that highly emotive messages propagated by elite sources have a

staggering capacity to mobilise the masses for a single cause. Another concept closely

related to news media effects and public opinion is McCombs’ (2004) study stemming from

the initial work of Lippmann’s (1965) titled Public Opinion. In terms of racial stereotyping,

McCombs refers to the ‘cause-and-effect relationship between media agenda and public

agenda’ (McCombs, 2004: 16) that draws on the impact of stereotypes on public opinion. His

study found that the news media, in creating a fixed set of qualities or stereotypes for a

particular race, no matter how subtle, has the effect of governing the way the public would

perceive that race. This is especially so when audience members have no direct experiences

with the relevant issues or particular groups of people involved and are therefore completely

dependent on media depictions for creating their social reality (Adoni and Mane, 1984;

Berger and Luckman, 1966).

The Propaganda Model and News Production

The ‘propaganda model’ of news production, as introduced by Herman and Chomsky

(1988), will help inform some theoretical underpinnings of this study. Although this model

has met with some scholarly criticisms for its failure to take into account journalistic

objectivity and professionalism (Hallin, 1994), and disregarding audiences’ oppositional

readings (Hall, 1980) to dominant frames (LaFeber, 1988; Schlesinger, 1989; Hallin, 1994),

this study will rely on this model, within limits, particularly to reflect on media’s behaviour

in conforming to elite agenda setting dominating during the Malayan Emergency. The

prevailing argument contradicting the ‘propaganda model’ (Herman and Chomsky, 1988)

predictions centres on the fact that media have a commitment to state the ‘truth’ and

objectivity of journalists. However, it can be argued that in the case of mid-twentieth-century

Great Britain, especially with respect to events that occurred in Malaya, media performance

8

inclined more towards elite sentiments and explains the way the newspaper medium operated.

After all, ‘It was an axiom of British propaganda always to tell the truth – but the truth was

presented to give the British point of view’ (Fletcher, 1982: 102). This situation is analogous

to the Fox News coverage in the 2000s strongly supporting the George W Bush government

and its conservative agenda in the US and worldwide. The New York Times and Washington

Post and other prestige press followed the US government line after the September 11, 2001

attacks on New York and the early stages of the war on Iraq. However, this changed when

these two newspapers later exposed and discussed the secret surveillance of US citizens in

2005 and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal in 2004, respectively.

In terms of news production, five key factors or filters set the foundation to the

propaganda model, as they merge to sieve out undesirable news and leave the residue as

pertinent information which is as defined by the elites. These five filters are: ownership,

funding through advertisements, sourcing, flak and anti-communist fear and ideology

(Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Profoundly salient and significant to this study will be the

filter of ‘reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and

experts’ known as ‘elite sources and/or opinion’ (Cohen, 1963; Gandy, 1982) and the filter

constraint of ‘anti-communism’ as a national religion and control mechanism or ideology

(Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 2). Both these filter constraints appear to be valuable in

researching the communication of propaganda by the British during the Malayan Emergency.

This study attempts to augment the fifth filter of the ‘propaganda model’ (Herman and

Chomsky, 1988) of ‘anti-communism’ to encompass ‘race’ as a component that rendered

British propaganda effective. By adopting this trajectory and their continued focus on the

actual racial differences existing within the Malayan population, the mainstream print media

at the time had provided a pertinent mechanism for future researchers to examine the

dominant British ideology of anti-communism that prevailed at the time and reproduced by

the media that helped mobilise local support against their ‘common enemies’ during this

conflict. This style of reporting and strategy suggests the use of dichotomies of ‘us’ versus

‘them’ with an explicit intention to mobilise forces against an enemy or ‘them’, which is a

recurring strategy that has found its way from the twentieth-century through to the present

with the global ‘war on terror’ narrative.

Discourses and Framing

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Framing in news discourses examined in the past reveals how the salience of a

particular story is promoted, minimised or excluded to influence audience perceptions of the

issues covered by the media (Entman, 1989, 2007, 2010). Framing of a news discourse is

shaped by the angle used in reporting a story and choosing a ‘lead’ for it which controls how

the rest of the story is told and what headlines may be used (Dicken-Garcia, 1998). The use

of specific adjectives, metaphors, analogies euphemisms and disphemisms when reporting a

story within a selected frame leads to specific connotations (Planalp, 1998: 69). Entman

(1989; 2007; 2010) equally categorises both agenda-setting and framing theoretical

frameworks under the conceptual umbrella of bias. Kuypers’ (2010) ‘rhetorical framing

analysis’ framework is helpful when analysing the content in the press during this conflict,

where news stories were framed using specific features of prominent storylines,

terminologies and stereotypes to influence its readers’ thinking and interpretations. Van Dijk

(2008; 1988) and Steuter and Wills (2008) equally assist in interrogating discourses of power,

ideology and racism, which was evident in the style of communication strategies and political

rhetoric often used by the dominant British colonial powers.

Steuter and Wills (2008) found that enlisting discourses to study the framing of news

with the media’s engagement of metaphors as political rhetoric would help reveal the way

propaganda constructs reality; ‘othering’ the enemy, and upholding dominant views.

Emerging from the ‘othering’ and stereotyping perspectives, British colonial rule was

promoted and justified through racial (Chinese) and ideological (anti-communist) division.

The British in Malaya, like the French in Cambodia (Edwards, 1996) embraced political

agendas of constructing an idea and expressing a worldview of themselves as protectors and

custodians, representing the best interests of the Bumiputeras (Princes of the Land) or the

Malays against the communist Chinese, hence justifying its colonial presence. An equally

prominent framing strategy used was that of ‘code words’ (Graber, 1981), disphemisms (the

opposite of euphemisms) which make a phenomenon sound worse than it really is to evoke

strong emotions to shape the thinking of a group of people to behave in a particular manner

as required by the communicator (Planalp, 1998)

Agenda-setting and Gatekeeping

Empirical studies, conducted in the past (Cohen, 1963; McCombs and Shaw, 1972;

McLeod, Becker and Byrnes, 1974) revealed agenda-setting as a pervasive and potent media

effect contributing to information on events or issues being legitimated to alter or shape

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public opinion. The level and depth of facts and news sources the media used in giving

extensive coverage, while prioritising and defining specific events or issues, defined the

media as well as elite agenda and contributed to the way public opinion was generally

formed. In other words, media in defining the saliency of issues make media agenda become

the agenda of the public (McCombs, 2004). In finding an indisputable correlation between

media agenda and public opinion, McCombs (2004) establishes, through his countless studies

conducted over four decades, a causal relationship between media agenda and public agenda.

However, this also unequivocally acknowledged other compelling influences that could also

‘shape individual attitudes and public opinion’. For example, ‘personal experience, general

culture and exposure to mass media’ (McCombs, 2004: 19) help shed some light on audience

reactions within the context of Malaya. Likewise, studies by Shoemaker and Vos (2009)

would assist in further understanding the link between agenda-setting and gatekeeping in the

ways certain issues that are detrimental to or challenge the dominant status quo are kept out

and not covered by mass media. They draw attention to political media gatekeeping practices

as involving the ‘process of culling and crafting countless bits of information’, through the

selection, manipulation and exclusion of information (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009: 1). A large

number of empirical research on the agenda-setting function are based on similar assumptions

of ‘influencing public agenda through media gatekeeping in formulating meaning – selecting,

screening, interpreting, emphasizing, and distorting information’ (Jowett and O’Donnell,

2006: 188).

Research Methodology

This case study used both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods; viz., an

examination of archival documents, content analysis of newspaper coverage and in-depth

interviews.

The archival data examined cabinet papers, and some private and confidential

correspondence in the form of memoranda and letters exchanged between the British

government and its military officials. These documents were downloaded from the ‘digital

image system’ of the National Archives, UK, and were used to examine across the period

analysed the relevant issues raised by the British government during the Malayan Emergency.

The quantitative and qualitative content analysis examined purposive samples of the

articles published on the Malayan Emergency by two mainstream English language

newspapers – namely The Times (London) and Straits Times (Singapore) – based on their

11

geographic location and readership for comparison. The Times was accessed electronically

from its website while the Straits Times was manually accessed as hardcopy prints from the

State Library, Victoria, for the period studied.

The Times (London) was considered a prestigious newspaper that dominated the

market with a circulation of around 50,000 at that time (Williams, 2009). Despite its small

circulation figures, The Times was reported to be targeted at mostly the educated elite and

was considered a ‘politically important and influential’ newspaper that leaned more towards

‘conservative’ parties in the UK (Negrine, 1994).

The Straits Times (Singapore) was promoted as ‘Malaya’s National Newspaper’

(Turnbull, 1995: 183), with circulation figures exceeding 50,500 in the early fifties. By 1953,

the Straits Times newspaper’s circulation had skyrocketed over all other competitive local

newspapers (Turnbull, 1995: 183).

Using the criteria and guidelines suggested by the political and historical analyst Dr

Kumar Ramakrishna (2002) and adhering to the chronology of events as stipulated in the

Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the period February 1952 to January

1953 was identified as the most critical and pivotal stage of the Malayan Emergency and was

chosen as the time period for the content analysis of the news coverage. The analysis used a

custom designed coding instrument consisting of 26 items that allowed for the examination of

several aspects of the coverage. However, this paper reports only the findings obtained using

14 items of the coding instrument (see Appendix 1) that were relevant to the two aspects

examined and reported on, viz:

1. The frequency of the race of insurgents mentioned in the coverage, and;

2. The terminologies used to describe the insurgents.

The population or the universe (Weerakkody, 2009: 148) of the news content for the

study consisted of all Malayan Emergency related coverage in the two newspapers selected

for analysis during the period under study. This non-probability purposive sample included

all news stories and commentaries on the Malayan Emergency. The content analysis coded

and quantitatively analysed the space allocated to Malayan Emergency stories, and the

number of times the race of the insurgents were mentioned in the coverages, and qualitatively

examined the different terminologies used when describing them. These were identified by

qualitatively examining the statements made or views expressed by the different news

sources relating to the emergency; violence or riots that erupted due to the conflict; any deeds

or policies implemented that resulted in the surrender or arrests of insurgents; adjectival

12

descriptors used when describing insurgents and racial profiling; and any other events or

narratives that appeared in the two newspapers related to the conflict (see Appendix 1).

In addition, the coding of MCP links to communist countries/organisation/groups and

space allocation to stories were examined quantitatively (measured in words). Each of these

variables was categorised, labelled and coded accordingly using the coding instrument and

coding sheets specifically designed for the study. The construct of the British agenda-setting

objectives and practices were the dependent variables that are examined in this paper. The

independent nominal variables examined include: the terminologies adopted by the British to

describe the insurgents; violence committed by insurgents; links to communist countries; and

racial profiling of the insurgents by the British. These were used to examine the correlation

between them and answer the research questions posed in this inductive study.

The Sample of Newspaper Articles

In selecting the relevant articles to be examined from the newspapers published

during the period under study, purposive sampling was used via selecting a composite week

for each month with randomly selected days, for example, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,

Thursday and Friday chosen in each month for the selected newspapers. All news items

concerning Malaya and the Malayan Emergency published in the selected papers between

1 February 1952 and 31 January 1953, excluding issues that were published on the weekend,

were selected. Through this procedure, 65 news stories from The Times and 207 from the

Straits Times were identified, totalling 272 news stories which served as the units of analysis

that were content analysed using the coding manual (the abridged version relevant to this

paper is provided as Appendix 1).

The Depth Interviews

Depth interviews were conducted with ex-servicemen with the relevant British

military forces who served during the Malayan Emergency. The 17 interviewees participating

were all males, consisting of 12 Army and 5 Air Force personnel. These interviews were

conducted face to face, over the telephone and through email.

All volunteer participants were selected using purposive sampling based on their

service in Malaya during the Malayan Emergency. Participants were recruited through

advertisements in the Vetaffairs newspaper, RSL clubs in Melbourne and The National

13

Malaya and Borneo Veterans Association of Australia (Vic). To allow for a reasonable level

of diversity and a representative sample, attempts were made to select from the Army, Air

Force and Navy. Unfortunately, the ex-Navy respondents (2) had to withdraw from this

study, despite their initial consent to participate, for health/personal reasons. To overcome

this gap, a book written by former Navy personnel Ian Pfennigwerth entitled Tiger Territory:

The Untold Story of the Royal Australian Navy in Southeast Asia from 1948–1971 (2008) that

detailed his naval experiences at that time was used as background information.

In each semi-structured interview, respondents were presented with three general

grand tour questions:

- Duration of service

- Individual role in respective divisions/battalions

- Primary role of individual division, battalion, platoon during military activity

Given that the Malayan Emergency was a conflict fought essentially on land, Army

ex-service personnel were presented the highest number of 16 semi-structured questions,

followed by 11 questions for the Air Force personnel. During data analysis, all respondents

were assigned numbers as identifiers so as to maintain confidentiality in terms of their

identity throughout this study.

On focusing primarily on negative propaganda against a race and population control

that operated as powerful mechanisms to shape and assist in the propaganda communication,

respondents were asked about racial stereotyping and the adjectives used to describe the

insurgents; as well as propaganda actions such as forced settlement (euphemistically called

‘population control’ at the time) and the reward system – that is, monetary rewards paid to

insurgents to surrender, which varied between $28,000 for someone with a Chairman’s rank

to $800 for an ordinary insurgent (Carruthers, 1995).

Findings

Race as a Crucial Element

The findings indicated that giving intensive attention to and promoting the salience of

a particular race when reporting on insurgents was consistent with attribute of agenda-setting

and framing used in McCombs (2004). Results from the content analysis showed that the race

of insurgents specified as ‘Chinese’ figured at 23.1% in The Times newspaper with the Straits

Times reflecting a higher frequency of mentions, standing at 31%. The Straits Times equally

14

published the names of Chinese insurgents including the offered rewards for their capture.

Figures mentioning other races were also higher in the Straits Times as opposed to The Times

(See Table 1).

Table: 1 Race of insurgents mentioned in the newspaper articles analysed

Discussion

Although a large percentage – The Times (72.3%) and Straits Times (62.8%) – of the

news stories analysed did not mention race, drawing attention to a particular race and making

comparisons with other races suggest an agenda-setting effect. As found by McCombs

(2004), some attributes are ‘more likely than others to be noticed and remembered by the

audience quite apart from their frequency of appearance’ (2004: 92). In other words,

psychologically implanting the information of a large number of communist insurgents

belonging to a particular race would be more pertinent in the public’s mind and will more

likely be noticed and remembered by an audience.

Race The Times

(London)

Straits Times

(Singapore)

TOTAL

% % %

Chinese 23.1 31.0 29.0

Malay 1.5 4.3 3.7

Indian 1.5 1.9 1.8

Other 1.5 0 0.4

Not

Applicable

72.3 62.8 65.1

Total 23.9 76.1 100

n=65 articles n=207 articles N=272

articles

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Labelling of Insurgents

Table: 2 Disphemisms and terminologies used in the news stories analysed

Terminologies

The Times

(London)

Straits Times

(Singapore)

TOTAL

% % %

Communist-

Terrorists

30.4 13.4 18.3

Terrorists 58.7 35.4 42.2

Bandits 7.7 39.5 30.2

Gangs 1.8 3.9 3.3

Insurgents 0 0.6 0.4

Comrade 0 0.6 0.4

Reds 0 5.7 4.1

Other:

Guerrillas

Enemy

1.2

0

0.1

0.2

0.4

0.2

Not

Applicable

0.3 0.6 0.5

Total 29.2 70.8 100

n=65 articles n=207 articles N=272

articles

Discussion

On examining the framing and rhetorical strategies adopted by the British to label the

insurgents, ‘terrorists’ and ‘communist terrorists’ were the preferred terminologies that were

16

reflected in The Times newspaper, totalled 58.7% and 30.4% respectively for the sample

analysed. The Straits Times preferred the less threatening term ‘bandits’ – that recorded

39.5% – used mostly between the period February 1952 to June 1952. Interestingly, this

practice changed from June 1952 onward to the preferred term ‘Terrorists’, totalling 35.4%.

Other labels such as ‘insurgents, gangs, reds and guerrillas’ were also used by the Straits

Times. A large number of respondents (76%) who were interviewed with regard to this

question cited ‘bandits’ and ‘terrorists’ as the dominant labels used to refer to insurgents at

the time, which appeared to be consistent with the results from the content analysis data.

Planalp (1998) claims the media play a powerful role in shaping emotions. In the case

of The Times newspaper, the British had succeeded in mobilising global perceptions to fight

communism by presenting it as a common global threat (Edwards, 1996) and referring to

them as ‘terrorists’ at a later stage rather than ‘bandits’, which carries different connotations.

However, the findings indicated that things differed slightly in Malaya as factors such

as counter-propaganda by communist parties – especially through acts of threats and violence

towards the local population – found the locals helping the communist terrorists out of fear.

This supports findings by van Dijk (2008; 1988) and Entman (2007), who state that framing

the same news narratives, including the use of lexical terminologies, within different cultures

and environments would produce contrasting audience reactions.

Propaganda Strategy of Deeds

Questions posed to the 17 depth interview respondents who were serving military

personnel with the British or Australian forces during the insurgency also asked about how

psychological deeds as supplementary mechanisms, especially population control through

(forced) resettlement programs and the reward system, assisted in propaganda

communication. Eighty-eight percent (88%) of respondents revealed that isolation of mostly

the Chinese race into these ‘new villages’ enabled close and constant surveillance by the

British and these resettlement programs were considered to be the most productive acts that

paralleled propaganda messages. Similarly, about 77% of respondents cited the reward

system as an effective state propaganda measure. One participant in particular summed it up

by stating that ‘this form of propaganda produced more insurgent surrenders and useful

information such as insurgent tactics, camp positions and local information on identities of

communist terrorists’.

17

Conclusion

Evidence, especially in studying the media content in The Times (London) and Straits

Times (Singapore), shows an integration of gatekeeping, agenda-setting and framing forces

operating at diverse levels and targeted at different audiences. Responses from interviewees

were consistent with some of the content analysis findings in that the identification of the

Chinese race assisted the British to strategise and adopt a propaganda measure of segregation

or resettlement to allow for increased surveillance and control of large numbers of mainly

Chinese through strategies of population control. It also justified the segregation and

surveillance of the Chinese population. Although findings were largely consistent with the

theoretical paradigms applied, there appears to be a slight disjuncture between media framing

and public behaviour, especially within the Malayan context – suggesting limited or no

effects. This could be due to the two newspapers under study being read by mainly English-

educated elites, or the public facing threats from the insurgents, or the servicemen of the

British and Australian military, rather than the Malayan and British populations in general.

This study also suggests a strong correlation between race and the constructs of

communism. This finding contributes to an extension of Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) fifth

filter constraint in news production of the ideology of ‘anti-communism’ in the ‘propaganda

model’ to include race as a crucial construct.

Limitations of the Study

It is important to specify the limitations of this study because in extending the

discussion on propaganda, especially with regards to ‘race’ and ‘othering’ in addition to the

‘anti-communism’ or ideological filter of the propaganda model (Herman and Chomsky,

1988), there was no local Malayan population’s perspective (officials, civilians who

experienced the crisis first hand and local journalists) sought or included in this study. This

could have been rectified by interviewing a relevant and purposive sample of Malayan

counterparts. Examining comparable archival materials from the Malayan side and examining

Malayan newspaper content published in Malay, Chinese or Tamil languages for the same

period as a comparison will contribute a more holistic perspective to the study’s findings.

This is a suggestion for further study for the overall topic area and project. Another limitation

that restricts generalising the findings is the issue of selecting only a limited period of the

18

crisis rather than the entire period of the conflict, which would have allowed for comparison

within and between the newspapers at various times of the conflict.

In order to extend the boundaries to discussions on propaganda, further comparative

analyses of conflicts in colonial settings in Southeast Asia are warranted. Further research is

also required to examine audience effects and news bias in media framing, especially through

content analysis, consistent with political issues and ideologies.

Endnotes

i CAB/129/40 Memorandum number C.P. (50) 125, ‘Preliminary Report on visit to Malaya and Singapore, 13 June 1950.

19

Appendix 1

Project Title: The Propaganda Strategies Adopted by the Colonial British During the Malayan

Emergency, 1948–1960 as Applied in Newspaper Coverage: A Case Study

Coding manual for newspaper coverage of the Malayan Emergency conflict study

The following is a 14-item coding manual used in the content analysis of The Times (London)

and Straits Times (Singapore) newspapers on propaganda messages that appeared during the

Malayan Emergency.

Coding Date: ____________________________________

Title/Headline of article: _____________________________________

1. ID Number of article

0001 to 1000

2. Newspaper analysed

(1) Times (London)

(2) Straits Times (Singapore)

3. Date of Newspaper: day/month/year

4. Page number

5. Space allocated to Malayan stories (measured in words)

Prominent categories/themes covered in the press as per items (6–12)

(To be coded as Yes/No)

6. Riots 1. Yes 2. No

7. Killings by insurgents 1. Yes 2. No

8. Armed robberies 1. Yes 2. No

9. Abduction of civilians by insurgents 1. Yes 2. No

10. Ambushes by insurgents 1. Yes 2. No

11. Insurgents killing to steal weapons 1. Yes 2. No

12. Links to communist countries/organisations/groups

1. Soviet Russia

2. China

3. Other e.g. Vietnam, Australian Communist Party-Party Secretary Mr. Sharkey;

Anti-imperialists-India

9. N/A

13. Adjectival descriptors used when reporting on members of the Communist Party

1. Communist-Terrorists

20

2. Terrorists

3. Bandits

4. Gangs

5. Insurgents

6. Comrade

7. Reds

8. Other (Guerrillas, Enemy)

9. Not applicable

14. Racial profiling used on members of the Communist Party

1. Chinese

2. Malay

3. Indian

4. Other

9. Not applicable

Note: This is an abridged version of the original coding instrument used. This coding

document includes only the variables relevant to this paper.

21

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