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2 l 8 KING S BENCH DIVISION. [19 36]c. A. In the result I agree w ith Slesser L .J. in the orde r which he1935 has proposed, including his order as to costs.

B A R T L A Mv. Appeal allowed. (1)EVANS. Solicitor for appellant: Leslie Marrison.

Solicitors for respondent: M aude Tunn icliffe, for Stirk

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1 K . B . KING'S BENCH DIVISION . 219 SE D IT IO N . 1935

Meeting at the Test Centre to-day (now) 1 P.M. DUNCANSpeakers : R. Kidd (Council for Civil Liberties), iA. Bing (Barrister-at-Law),

E. Hanley (Amalgamated Engineers' Union),K. Duncan (National Unemployed

Workers' Movement),Defend the right of free speech and public meeting.

A box was placed in the roadway opposite the entranceto the training centre, on which the appellant was about tomount, when the chief constable of the district, with whomwas the respondent, William Jones, an inspector of theMetropolitan Police, told the appellant that a meeting couldnot be held in Nynehead Street, but that it could be heldin D esmond Street, some 175 yard s distan t. The appellantthen said : I'm going to hold it, stepped on to the box,and started to address the people who were present, whenthe respondent immediately took her into custody, to whichshe submitted without resistance.

An information was preferred on August 6, 1934, at TowerBridge Police Court by the respondent against the appellantunder the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871, s. 12, as amendedby the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885, s. 2,alleging that on July 30, 1934, the appellant did unlawfullyand wilfully obstruct the respondent when in the executionof his du ty. The m agistrate convicted the appellant andfined her 40s. The appe llant appealed to London Qua rterSessions.

At the hearing of the appeal it was not alleged on behalfof the respondent that there was any obstruction of thehighway or of the access to the training centre, save in thesense of the obstruction necessarily caused by the box whichwas placed in the roadway and by the presence of the peoplesurrounding it. N either was it alleged th a t the appellantnor any of the persons present at the meeting had eithercommitted, incited or provoked any breach of the peace.

S 2 2

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220 KING 'S BENCH DIVISION . [1936]X 9 It was proved or admitted that on May 25, 1933, a

DUNCAN mee ting had been held opposite the entrance to the trainingTONES c e ntre, and the appellant had addressed that meeting.Following that meeting and on the same day a disturbance

took place inside the trainin g centre. The su perintend entof the training centre, who attributed the disturbance to themeeting, sent for the police to prevent a breach of the peace.Subsequently, and in spite of the disturbance and of warningsby the police, the appellant, for some reason unexplained byher, made one or more attempts to hold a meeting at thesame spot, which were frustra ted by the police. BeforeJuly 30, 1934, the superintendent of the training centre, whofeared a repetition of the previous disturbance, communicatedwith the police, and by reason of such communication andof reports by the police in the course of their duty, the chiefconstable of the district and the respondent apprehendedthat a breach of the peace would result if the meeting nowin question were held.

The depu ty-chairm an of q ua rter sessions was of opinion :(1.) that in fact (if it be material) the appellant must haveknown of the probable consequences of her holding themeetingnamely, a disturbance and possibly a breach ofthe peaceand was not unwilling that such consequencesshould en su e; (2.) th a t in fact the respond ent reason ablyapprehen ded a breach of the peace ; (3.) tha t in law it there -upon became his duty to prevent the holding of the meeting;and (4.) that in fact, by attempting to hold the meeting, theappellant obstructed the respondent when in the executionof his du ty . Th e app eal was, therefore, dismissed.

On the application of the appellant, quarter sessions statedthis case for the opinion of the Court whether there wasevidence on which the deputy-chairman could so decide inpoint of law.

Pritt K.C. and Dingle Foot for the app ellan t. It is notunlawful to hold a public m eeting on the highwa y. Thepolice have no right to prevent a person doing a lawful actmerely because they think that a breach of the peace may

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KING S BENCH DIVISION. [1936]9 5

DUNCANv.JONES.

Lord Hew ar tC.J.

tha t the Court had to do with a grave case involving whatis calledthe right of public meeting. I say called, becauseEnglish law does not recognize any special right of publicmeetingforpoliticalorother purposes. Therightof assembly,as Professor Dicey puts it (1), is nothing more than a viewtaken by the Court of the individual liberty of the subject.If I thought that the present case raised a question whichhas been held in suspense by more than one writer on con-stitutional lawnamely, whether an assembly can properlybe held to be unlawful merely because the holding of it isexpectedtogive riseto a breach of the peace on the par t ofpersons opposed to those who are holding the meetingIshould wish to hear much more argument before I expressedan opinion. Th is case, however, does not even touch thatimportant question.

Our at tention has been directed to the somewhat unsatis-factory case of Beatty v. Gillbanks. (2) The circumstancesof that case and the charge must be remembered, as alsomust the im porta nt passage in the judgment of Field J., inwhich Cave J. concu rred. Field J. said (3) : I entirelyconcede that every one must be taken to intend the naturalconsequences of his own acts, and it is clear to me tha t ifthis disturbance of the peacewas the natural consequenceofacts of the appellants they would be liable, and the justiceswould have been rightinbinding them over. But theevidenceset forth in the case does not support this contention ; onthe contrary, it shows that the disturbances were caused byother people antagonistic to the appellants, and tha t no actsof violence were committed by them. Our attention hasalso been directedto other authorities wherethejudgmentsinBeatty v. Gillbanks (2) have been referred to, but they donot carry the mat ter any further, although they more thanonce express a doubt about the exact meaning of thedecision. In my view, Beatty v. Gillbanks(2) is apart fromthe present case. No such question as that which arosethere is even mooted here.

(1) Dicey's Law of the Consti-tution,8th ed., p. 499. (2) 9 Q. B. D. 308.(3) Ibid. 314.

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1 K . B . K I N G ' S B E N C H D I V I S I O N . 223The prese nt case rem inds one ra the r of th e obse rvations of 1935

Bramwell B. in Reg. v. Prebble (1), where, in holding th a t a DUNCANconstable, in clearing certain licensed premises of the persons JON 'E Sthereon, was not acting in the execution of his duty, he said :

J Lord Hewart It would hav e been otherwise ha d the re been a nuisance C-J-or disturbance of the public peace, or any danger of a breachof the peace.

The case stated which we have before us indicates clearlya causal connection between the meeting of May, 1933, andthe disturbance which occurred after itthat the disturbancewas not only post the meeting but was also propter themeeting. In my view, the deputy-chairman was entitled tocome to the conclusion to which he came on the facts whichhe found and to hold that the conviction of the appellantfor wilfully obstructing the respondent when in the executionof his du ty was right. This appe al should, therefore, bedismissed.

H U M P H R E Y S J. I agree. I rega rd this as a plain case.It ha s nothing to do with the law of unlawful assembly. N ocharge of that sort was even suggested against the appellant.The sole question raised by the case is whether the respondent,who was admittedly obstructed, was so obstructed when inthe execution of his duty.

It does not require authority to emphasize the statementthat it is the duty of a police officer to prevent apprehendedbreaches of the peace. Here it is found as a fact th at therespondent reasonably apprehended a breach of the peace.It then, as is rightly expressed in the case, became his dutyto prevent anything which in his view would cause thatbreac h of the peace. W hile he was taking steps so to dohe was wilfully obstructed by the appe llant. I can conceiveno clearer case within the statutes than that.

SINGLETON J. On the facts state d in the case I am satisfiedthat the respondent at the material time was doing thatwhich it was his du ty to do, and th at , therefore, the obstruction

(1) 1 F. & F. 325, 326.

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224 KING S BENCH DIVISION. [19 36 ]'935 of him by th e appellant con stituted obstruction of him when

DUNCAN in the execution of his du ty. Au thorities in other branche sJONES. f the law do not carry th e m atte r any further. I agreesi~kt nj ^ a * ^ e a P P e a l should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

Solicitor for appellant: R. W. G. Mackay.Solicitors for respondent: Wontner Sons.

G. F. L. B.

'935 D E KE YS E R v. BR ITISH RAILWAY TR AFFIC ANDOct-*7' l 8' ELEC TRIC COMPANY, L IMITE D.

Revenue Customs Forfeiture of vehicle used for co nveyance of goodsliable to forfeiture-Order for condem nation by justices A bsence ofdiscretion Cttstoms Consolidation Act, 1876 (39 40 Viet. c. 36),ss . 202, 207, 226.

A motor tank wagon was seized by officers of the Customsand Excise on the ground that it was being used in the convey-ance of goods liable to forfeiture under the Customs Acts. Theowners claimed the vehicle under s. 207 of the Customs Con-solidation Act, 1876, and an information was exhibited beforejustices on behalf of the Commissioners of Customs and Excisefor the forfeiture and condemnation of the vehicle under s. 226of the Act:Held that, it having been admitted that the vehicle had beenvised in th e conveyance of goods liable to forfeiture (in whichcase s. 202 of the Act provides that the vehicle itself shall beforfeited), the justices were bound to condemn the vehicle, s. 226giving them no discretion to refuse to do so on the ground, forexample, of hardship on an innocent owner.

CASE stated by justices.At a court of sum m ary jurisdiction sitting at Stratford,

Essex, an information was preferred by the appellant, Israelde Keyser, an officer of Customs and Excise, on behalf ofthe Commissioners of Customs and Excise, against therespon dents, B ritish Railway Traffic a nd E lectric Com pany, Ld.,alleging that on July 25, 1934, one motor tank wagon andthe contents thereof were seized at Barking, in the county