Dutch Analyst Dinner

Unlocking the global potential 1

Dutch Analyst DinnerJos Streppel, CFO AEGON N.V.

Amsterdam,13 January 2009


Fundamentally attractive industry

Attractive prospects for life insurance and pension companies:

o Fundamental demographic and economic changes

... generating new customers and new needs…

… driving demand for financial solutions

o Opportunities arising from

current market conditions


Need for capital buffer

Insurance industry faces challenges globally

o Demand for

guarantees

o Trust

Customers

Regulators

o Focus on capital

o Take a more

conservative

stance

Increased required capital

Financial markets

o Volatility

o Illiquidity

o Closed capital

markets

Increased cost of capital & less availability of capital

Increased required capital


Developments for the insurance industry

o Risk management improved following 2002 equity market decline

o Although actual losses are manageable, unrealized losses on

investments may put pressure on solvency margins

o Scarce capital will lead to more efficient use of capital and better

rewards for risk taking

o Risk awareness among insurers and customers increases

o New models strive to retain the best of a decentralized and

centralized business model


o Liability-driven

investment

management

o Local risk decisions

within integrated

global risk framework

o Local knowledge

Liability creation &

managementCapital & risk

management

Asset

management

People

Knowledgeable and entrepreneurial

Future model provides a solid foundation


Impact on AEGON - current priorities

Capital

Costs

Contingency

The three C’s


Capital: improve capital efficiency

o Implement more

o Capital releases from back books

o Reinsurance

o Insurance linked securities

Optimize

capital

structure

Reduce

capital

intensity

o Further reduce

o Equity risk

o Interest rate risk

o Credit risk

Maximize

diversification

benefits

o Manage portfolio of risks

o Reset retention limits

o Build global risk pooling infrastructure


Costs: reduce operating expenses

o Cost reduction measures:

o More than EUR 150 million in AEGON’s major operating units in 2009

o Key actions to achieve this include:

o US: no wage increase in 2009 and restructuring

o NL: restructuring, reduction in projects

o UK: restructuring, cost containment


Contingency: strong capital position provides sufficient buffer

EUR 312 million

S&P risk-based insurance

capital model excess

capital in operating units

above AA level

Pro-formapost draw down

EUR 312 million

September 30, 2008

EUR 5.0 billion

(160%)

Insurance Group Directive

(IGD) surplus capital

EUR 8.0 billion

(195%)

o Insurance Group Directive surplus capital includes unrealized losses on bond portfolio

o Excluding unrealized losses IGD ratio would be ~225% and ~260% pro-forma

Additional capital buffer of

EUR 3 billion is sufficient


Concluding remarks

o Insurance industry attractive despite current challenges

o Capital scarcity will lead to more rational pricing for risks taken

o Insurance industry will focus on its core business again

o AEGON in a good position with focus on capital preservation

AEGON has the right strategy in the current environment

Positioned to benefit from future opportunities


Q&A


593Q08 resultsVI

57Other countries investment portfolio detailV

13Management of US general accountI

SlideAppendix

76CapitalVII

54Netherlands investment portfolio detaillV

48UK investment portfolio detailIll

27US investment portfolio detailII


Appendix I

Management of US general account


Q3: an extraordinary quarter

o The Q3 environment

- Acceleration of Debt Crisis

- Failures of major financial institutions

- Deleveraging of the financial sector

- Darkening economic outlook

- Gapping credit spreads and declining non-government bond

prices

- Increasingly aggressive global policy response

o Impact on AEGON

- High Other-than-temporary impairments due to large financial

defaults

- Losses on fair value items

- Increase in revaluation reserve, consistent with the broad market

decline


44 4437

27

9

25

1 2 48

17

64

82

48

17

-6-2

2

54

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 YTD

2008

Credit losses in the Americas remain manageable

Credit losses in bps of assets (includes only bonds and mortgages)

o During Q3, impairments in the US totaled USD 540 million

o Products are priced for expected losses of 25 – 30 basis points

o Almost all fixed income instruments are held as Available For Sale securities and as such are only impaired through earnings if

1) we don't have the ability to hold, or

2) we intend to sell them, or

3) we expect to receive less than full principal and interest

average of 25 bps

since 1990


o Our credit derivatives are corporate credit exposures, not mortgage or

subprime credit

o Risk of permanent loss on our tranched credit protection is very low due to

seniority

US fair value items: credit derivatives

EUR (53) million

EUR (41) millionEUR 1 million

EUR (87) million

Q3 YTDfair value change

EUR 0.8 billionEUR (38) millionCLO Total Return Swap

EUR 1.1 billionEUR 0.0 billion

EUR (27) millionEUR 0 million

Credit Default SwapsSold ProtectionPurchased Protection

Tranched Credit Protection EUR 6.4 billionEUR (6) million

Notional valueQ3

fair value change


Unrealized losses

The revaluation account increased by EUR 2.5 billion in Q3, due to the

increase in unrealized losses in AFS bonds

o Why such a large change?

o Is it consistent with generic market changes or is it idiosyncratic?

o Does it portend large future impairments?


Why such a large change in unrealized losses?

o As a life insurer, AEGON invests in long-term, investment grade bonds to

match long-term liabilities

o Long-term bond prices are very sensitive to changes in discount rates, and

market yields have been rising sharply for all non-government bonds

o Spiking yields are the result of massive deleveraging in the financial sector

o Therefore, the price declines reflect a large “liquidity” discount, in addition to

increasing default risk

Example

o The spread duration of AEGON’s AFS portfolio is ~5 years

o Therefore, every 20 basis point change in market yields will cause a 1%

decline in market price

o On a USD 90 billion AFS portfolio, that is a USD 900 million pre-tax change

o The yield on US investment grade corporate bonds (Lehman Index) has risen

from 5.79% to 7.83%, or about 200 bps, year-to-date

o 153 bps of that change occurred in the third quarter


Bond prices declined in all sectors

Value in EUR billion66.4

Value in USD billion95.0

100%

7%

9%

38%

16%

1%

9%

9%

2%

9%

Percentage of portfolio

amortized cost

94%89%Total AFS Bond portfolio

103%101%Sovereign

98%94%Utility

98%93%Industrial

91%83%Financial

89%83%Collateralized Debt Obligations

92%88%Non-housing related asset-backed securities

79%72%Non-agency RMBS and subprime

100%97%Agency MBS

95%90%Commercial MBS

Q2 08Market value /

amortized cost

Q3 08 Market value /

amortized costUS AFS bond portfolio

* Includes manufactured housing ABS


Generic or idiosyncratic?

o Generic investment grade interest rates rose by 140 to 190 basis

points

– AEGON USA’s portfolio market yield rose from 7.01 to 8.51% during Q3,

or 150 basis points

o Generic investment grade bond prices fell by 5 to 8%

– AEGON USA’s AFS bond portfolio prices declined from 94.1% of cost to

88.8% of cost, or by 5.6%

o Generic investment grade credit spreads widened by 150 to 250 basis

points

– An internal attribution analysis estimates that AEGON USA’s AFS portfolio

experienced 138 basis points of credit spread widening in Q3


Future impairments?

o Since 1970, the relationship between investment grade credit spreads and subsequent impairments has been weak

BBB spreads sorted lowest to highest with corresponding 1, 3, 5 year default losses for the period 1970-2007 1,2

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

1997

1994

1996

1995

1992

1993

1998

1989

1978

1990

1991

1999

1988

1977

1973

1987

1979

1985

2000

1984

1986

2001

2002

1974

1970

1972

1983

1971

1980

1976

1981

1975

1982

1 Source of BBB data is the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15

2 The default losses are the annualized default losses for BBB bonds

using default rates from Moody’s Feb. 2008 publication “Corporate

Default and Recovery Rates, 1920 – 2007” assuming a 35%

recovery rate

BBB spread

5 year annualized default loss




o During the Depression, some correlation was seen, but milder than one might have guessed

BBB spreads sorted lowest to highest with corresponding 1 year BBB default losses for the corresponding period 1920-2007 1,2

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

1965

1955

1956

1982

1946

1950

1959

1988

1962

1944

1981

1994

1996

1958

2004

1943

1993

1998

1989

1990

1968

1999

1972

1977

1987

1985

1927

2000

1984

1986

1929

2002

1940

1970

1982

1983

1980

1976

1938

1975

1961

1932

BBB spread

1 year default loss1 Source of BBB data is the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15

2 The default losses are for BBB bonds using default rates from

Moody’s Feb. 2008 publication “Corporate Default and Recovery

Rates, 1920 – 2007” assuming a 35% recovery rate

Future impairments?


2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Q3 YTD

2008

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Q3 YTD

2008

Significant shift into higher rated assets

� AA � BIG� BBB� A

Subprime in US investment portfolio

EUR 2.7 billion as per September 30, 2008

CMBS securities in US investment portfolio


o As stated in previous

presentations, AEGON USA has

restructured its asset portfolio

defensively in numerous ways:

– Reducing and upgrading

corporate exposures

– Reducing financial credit

exposures

– Selling most public common

equity exposures

– Upgrading CMBS and

subprime portfolios

– Increasing treasury and

liquidity balances

70% 49%70%74%73%65%40%25%

86%82%79%76%61%53%45%

� AAA


Reduced exposure to financials

o Actively reduced financial

sector exposure, esp. in 2007

and 2008

o Risk mitigation actions in the

corporate bond portfolio

Financials as % of general account

assets in US investment portfolio


2005 2006 2007 Q3 YTD

2008

14.6% 12.3%15.7%16.4%

Corporate high yield as % of general account assets

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Q3

YTD

2008� B � BB� CCC or less


Sector-specific risk mitigants

o Subprime: The portion of the subprime portfolio from which most impairments

will come is the hybrid mezzanine sector, which is USD 731 million book value,

and has a remaining unrealized loss of USD 449 million. Other portions are

expected to avoid significant principal losses.

o Alt-A/Option ARM: Most of AEGON’s portfolio is supersenior and structured

to withstand high collateral loss rates. Even with stressed loss levels on the

underlying collateral, principal losses should remain modest.

o CMBS: Over 86% of this portfolio is in AAA senior or supersenior tranches that

can withstand very stressed loss levels without principal loss. Non-AAA bonds

are conservatively underwritten.

o Corporate Bonds: The upgrading of the portfolio in recent years provides a

much more conservative ratings profile than we had in the last recession. The

recapitalization of the financial sector is removing a key source of risk.


Investments summary

o The large market price change in the AEGON AFS portfolio was

consistent with generic interest rate increases in Q3

o The macroeconomic environment is highly stressed. Credit spreads

presage a period of elevated impairments but AEGON expects them

to remain at manageable levels due to risk mitigation steps taken in

the past


Appendix II

US investment portfolio detailSeptember 30, 2008


Policyholder

account

22%

Off balance

sheet

37%

General

account

41%

US general account well diversified

Total investments

EUR 206 billion

General account

EUR 85.2 billion

Bonds

72%

Loans

16%

Shares

1%

Real estate

<1%

Other

11%

Note: data as per September 30, 2008


Asset allocation is typical for the US life industry

Industry data source: Lehman Brothers 2007 annual survey of top 20 Insurance Companies

11,4%

45,1%

2,0%

14,9%

6,7%

13,6%

0,9%

5,4%5,6%

46,0%

1,9%

18,3%

7,1%

13,3%

1,7%

6,1%

Cash & Govt Corp. Bonds EM Bonds MBS/ABS CMBS Mortgage

Loans

Equities /

Converts

Other

Asset allocation of USD 119.2 billion – September 30, 2008

* excludes policy loans

Total invested assets of EUR 83.3 billion*

� AEGON� Industry


A & above

62.6%

BBB

31.3%

Below B

0.4%

B

2.0%BB

3.7%

94% of US bond portfolio is investment grade

EUR 61 billion (USD 87 billion)* – September 30, 2008

AEGON US bond portfolio quality profile

* Based on market value of bonds – IFRS basis; Ratings based on hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal, NAIC


Credit quality is typical for the US industry

2,4%3,7%

31,3%

62.6%

2,9%3,9%

26,0%

67,2%

A & above BBB BB B & below

Industry data source: Lehman Brothers 2007 annual survey of top 20 Insurance Companies. AEGON Rating

hierarchy used is: S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal, NAIC

* Based on market values – IFRS basis


AEGON US bond portfolio quality profile

� AEGON� Industry


Corporate bonds breakdown AEGON USA

Reit's

12%

Other - finance

12%

Insurance

20%

Brokerage

8%

Banking

48%

Industrial 60.4%

Financial 24.8%

Sovereign 0.5%

Utility14.3%

Transportation

6%Technology

6%

Other industry

1%

Energy

11%

Consumer non

cyclical

24% Consumer

cyclical

13%

Communications

16%

Capital goods

13%

Basic industry

10%

Utility other

3%

Natural gas

32%

Electric

65%

Total corporate bonds USD 54 billion (per September 30, 2008)


AAA

1,8%AA

10,0%

A

36,8%

BIG

7,5%

BBB

43,9%

Industrial

60,4%

Financial

24,8%

Utility

14,3%

Sovereign

0.5%

Ratings are based on a hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal, NAIC

* Based on market values – IFRS Basis

US corporate bonds by quality and sector


AEGON US corporate bond portfolio


US corporate bonds by quality and sector

22,7082,23711,3437,6061,279241Industrial

5,3854503,3451,5263331Utility

9,3401531,8124,5762,406393Financial

37,6122,83916,50013,8283,771675Total

180

Total

0

<BBB

119

A

0529Sovereign

BBBAAAAA(in EUR million)

Ratings are based on a hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal, NAIC.

60.4%5.9%30.2%20.2%3.4%0.7%Industrial

14.3%1.2%8.9%4.0%0.1%0.1%Utility

24.8%0.4%4.8%12.2%6.4%1.0%Financial

100.0%7.5%43.9%36.8%10.0%1.8%Total

0.5%

Total

0%

<BBB

0.4%

A

0%0.1%0.0%Sovereign

BBBAAAAA


AA

11.7%

A

4.7%

BBB

7.5%

BB & Lower

2.4%

AAA

73.7%

CMBS

27,6%

Residential

MBS 26,3%

Non-

Housing-

related ABS

27,9%

Housing-

related ABS

13,3%

CDO 4,9%

Structured assets of US

High quality Diversified

AEGON US structured assets portfolio quality profile

EUR 21.5 billion (USD 30.7 billion)* – September 30, 2008

Ratings are based on a hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal, NAIC

* Based on amortized costs – IFRS Basis


US structured assets detail

Mortgage-backed and Asset-backed Securities

Amortized costs as of September 30, 2008

(EUR million)

(1,146)

(60)

(61)

(1)

1

(59)

(294)

(85)

(20)

(188)

(446)

(5)

(182)

(132)

(92)

(36)

(286)

Unrealized

change from

June 30, 2008

(3,519)21,495 5,646 15,850 Total MBS & ABS

(191)1,054 300 756 Total CDOs

(801)2,867 1,496 1,371 Total housing ABS

(10)170 110 60 Mfg housing

(426)1,056 755 301 Subprime floating

(364)1,641 631 1,010 Subprime fixed

(285)2,125 731 1,393 Other ABS

(73)371 0 371 Rev.Mtg. Floaters

(745)6,001 2,901 3,099 Total non-housing ABS

(94)

(366)

(1,255)

(635)

(331)

(180)

(36)

(528)

Unrealized

gains /

(losses)

931 559 371 Autos

2,946 1,611 1,335 Credit cards

5,639 120 5,520 Total MBS

1,679 19 1,660 Neg.Am. Floaters

1,291 76 1,215 Alt-A fixed

1,365 0 1,365 Agency MBS

Jumbos

Total CMBS

Ratings hierarchy of S&P,

Moody’s, Fitch, Internal, NAIC

933 24 909

5,934 831 5,103

Total<AAAAAA


US commercial mortgage backed securities

(113)78 191 -17 27 42 105 CMBS and CRE CDOs

(528)

Pre-taxrevaluations

5,406

Market value

5,934

Amortized costs

15

<BBB

169

A

104 542 5,103 CMBS Securities

BBBAAAAAExternal ratings hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch(all figures in EUR million)

o The CMBS portfolio has been structured defensively, with over 80% AAA-rated

securities

o Below-AAA exposures have been positioned conservatively, particularly for 2006

and 2007 vintage deals, when standards were most aggressive

o CMBS and Commercial Real Estate CDOs are collateralized by real estate loans,

CMBS bonds and REIT debt. A majority are AAA-rated, and the below-AAA

holdings were almost all originated prior to 2005

o Our stress-tests show limited impairments, even under environments of substantial

decline in commercial real estate values


AEGON USA CMBS portfolio

Amortized Cost data based on ratings hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal, NAIC as of 9/30/2008

Capital Structure Classification

CMBS -- Total Exposure 2008 2007 2006 2005 Pre-2005

Amortized

Cost Fair Value

Unrealized

Gain/(Loss)

AAA $390 $1,959 $1,877 $847 $2,377 $7,449 $6,872 ($577)

AA - 114 220 121 380 835 681 (154)

A 43 67 40 12 119 280 231 (49)

BBB - 61 59 13 42 174 137 (37)

BIG - 16 6 - - 22 20 (2)

Total 433 2,216 2,202 993 2,917 8,760 7,941 (819)

($ in millions by Amortized Cost)

Vintage Year


US prime and near-prime residential MBS

o Almost all of AEGON’s Prime and Near-prime Residential MBS are rated AAA

o The Near-prime portfolio is composed of primarily Fixed-rate Alt-A and Negative

Amortization Floating-rate mortgage securitizations

o A majority of the “near prime” portfolio is supersenior, meaning that it has many

times the required credit enhancement needed to obtain a AAA rating

o Even in the current stressed environment, the risk of impairment on these securities

is low, and our margin of safety remains high

1,044 1,679 ---19 98 8 30 1,524 Neg. am. floaters

1,329 1,365 ------1,365 -GSE Guaranteed

753 933 -3 8 13 11 7 598 293 Prime Jumbo

960 1,291 --62 15 --419 796 Alt-A

109

-

AAA SSUP

2,613

-

AAA SSNR

2,783

371

AAA SNR

4,384

299

Market value

5,639

371

Cost price

0

-

<BBB

69

-

A

3 47 15 Residential mortgage-backed securities

---Rev. mortgage floaters

BBBAAAAA

MEZZ

Ratings hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal (EUR million)

SSNR = Super Senior; SNR = Senior; MEZZ = Mezzanine; SSUP = Senior Support


(426)

(364)

Pre-taxrevaluations

630

1,277

Market value

1,056

1,641

Cost price

314

32

<BBB

37

13

A

102 302 301 Subprime and second lien securitizations– floating rate

155 431 1,010 Subprime and second lien securitizations –fixed rate

BBBAAAAARatings hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal(all figures in EUR million)

o Negligible subprime CDOs: EUR 17 million held at fair value

o Senior subprime tranches hold up well under stress tests, and are unlikely to be

permanently impaired

o EUR 511 million are mezzanine tranches of securitizations collateralized by

subprime hybrid-ARM loans, and these represent AEGON’s riskier subprime

holdings

o The remaining margin of safety on these mezzanine tranches has declined

o The unrealized loss on the EUR 511 million of these mezzanine tranches was

EUR 314 million at September 30. If we take subprime impairments in the future, this

is where they are likely to arise

o Nevertheless, this represents a manageable exposure for AEGON

US subprime summary


US subprime unrealized losses

Amortized costs / (unrealized loss) September 30, 2008(EUR million)

(790)

(219)

(382)

(189)

Unrealized

loss

(1)

(1)

-

-

Unrealized

loss

(355)

(2)

(314)

(39)

Unrealized

loss

(158)

(13)

(46)

(99)

Unrealized

loss

Amortized

costs

Amortized

costs

Amortized

costs

Amortized

costs

Unrealized

loss

Amortized

costs

(276)

(203)

(22)

(51)

2,697

586

826

1,286

Total

3

3

-

-

Sub/residual

706 1,068 920 Total

18 77 488 Closed end

2nd lien

177 740 368 Fixed rate

1st lienHybrid /

ARM 1st lien

Collateral

511 251 64

SubordinatedSeniorInsured


US sub-prime and second lien exposure

* Second lien mortgages composed primarily of loans and alt-a borrowers

Amortized costs as of September 30, 2008(EUR million)

0%

1

-

1

-

BBB-

11%

308

14

272

22

<BBB

1%

24

24

-

-

BBB wrapped

0%

6

6

-

-

AA-wrapped

1%

38

38

-

-

<BBB wrapped

1%

25

-

25

-

BBB+ wrapped

1%

34

9

24

-

A wrapped

0%

1

-

1

-

A+

100%4%4%1%14%7%6%12%37%

2,698

587

982

1,129

Total

103

103

-

-

BBB-wrapped

103

3

76

25

BBB

16

4

11

1

A

375

287

13

76

AA wrapped

201

6

141

54

AA

151 314 997 Total

-22 71 2nd lien mortgages*

20 266 665 Subprime 1st lien mortgages –fixed rateSubprime 1st lien mortgages –

floating rate

Ratings hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal, NAIC

131 27 261

AA+AAA

wrappedAAA

Market value as of September 30, 2008

(EUR million)

0%

1

-

1

-

BBB-

5%

96

13

72

12

<BBB

1%

14

14

-

-

BBB wrapped

0%

4

4

-

-

AA-wrapped

1%

22

22

-

-

<BBB wrapped

1%

13

-

13

-

BBB+ wrapped

1%

24

7

17

-

A wrapped

0%

1

-

1

-

A+

100%3%2%0%12%7%6%14%45%

1,907

367

578

961

Total

61

61

-

-

BBB-wrapped

39

2

20

17

BBB

8

3

5

1

A

231

160

10

61

AA wrapped

143

5

99

39

AA

109 273 867 Total

-16 60 2nd lien mortgages*

14 231 587 Subprime 1st lien mortgages –fixed rate

Subprime 1st lien mortgages –floating rate

Ratings hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, Internal, NAIC

95 25 220

AA+AAA

wrappedAAA


US sub-prime by vintage

Amortized costs - fixed as of September 30, 2008(EUR million)

239 -25 --15 -114 85 2007

145 22 --17 -1 -105 2006

160 ----6 5 -150 2005

100%2%2%0%7%5%2%24%59%1,128

-

584

Total

22

-

-

Below

BBB

25

-

-

BBB

1

-

1

A

76

-

59

AA

wrapped

54

-

33

AA

20 266 665 Total

---2008

14 152 326 2004 & prior

Ratings hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s,

Fitch, Internal, NAICAA+

AAA

wrappedAAA

Amortized costs - floating as of September 30, 2008(EUR million)

0%

1

-

-

-

-

1

BBB-

3%

25

-

2

10

-

13

BBB+

wrapped

2%

24

-

17

-

-

8

A

wrapped

0%

1

-

-

-

-

1

A+

324 137 23 6 -3 27 -110 2007

328 57 52 3 -91 60 -54 2006

227 78 --1 32 38 -78 2005

100%28%8%1%1%14%13%3%27%

984

27

76

Total

272

-

-

Below

BBB

76

-

-

BBB

11

-

2

A

13

-

12

AA

wrapped

141

-

15

AA

131 27 261 Total

-27 -2008

6 1 20 2004 & prior


Moody’s, Fitch, Internal,

NAIC

AA+AAA

wrappedAAA


US second lien by vintage

* Second lien mortgages composed primarily of fixed rate loans to prime and alt-a borrowers

Amortized costs as of September 30, 2008(EUR million)

18%

103

-

-

59

30

14

BB-

wrapped

1%

6

-

-

-

-

6

AA-

wrapped

100%

587

-

234

143

66

144

Total

7%

38

-

-

10

28

-

<BBB

wrapped

2%

13

-

3

10

-

-

Below

BBB

4%

24

-

-

15

-

9

BBB

wrapped

---220 -11 -2007

-9 -36 -3 -2006

0%2%1%49%1%4%12%

3

-

-

3

BBB

9

-

-

-

A

wrapped

4

-

-

4

A

287

-

3

28

AA

wrapped

6

-

-

6

AA

22 71 Total*--2008

8 66 2004 & prior

2005


Moody’s, Fitch, Internal,

NAIC

-5

AAA

wrappedAAA


US CDO summary

o No purchases of ABS CDOs since 2001

o Therefore, negligible subprime exposure

o Primarily corporate credit collateral

145 Corporate bonds

1,054Total

14 Asset backed securities

704 Leveraged bank loans

Commercial real estate and CMBS

Collateral by type

192

EUR million

37 A

226 AA

1,054Total

17 <BBB

756 AAA

BBB

Tranches by rating

17

EUR million


No synthetic subprime CDO’s

o No synthetic subprime or mortgage-related CDOs

o Sold protection primarily on very senior tranches of the CDX (index of 125

investment grade corporate bonds)

o Accounting for all credit derivatives is mark to market through earnings

o Market volatility is currently high, but risk of permanent loss is very low

AAA192 (6)10% - 15%

4,663 (67)Total

14 (6)Equity

AA/AAA

AAA

AAA

Implied rating

752 (17)15% - 30%

3,671 (34)30% - 100%

Notional (EUR million)

Fair value (EUR million)

By attachment point

35 (5)<10%

US investment portfolio detail


99.9

85.9

94.1

64.1

77.8

89.85

Sep 30

Price (% of Par)Yield to MaturityCredit Spreads

5.54

6.58

5.25

13.25

10.89

6.35

Jun 30

8

198

246

176

313

176

∆

135

514

474

1155

1020

441

Sep 30

127

316

227

979

708

265

Jun 30

0.5%99.4(.07)5.47U.S. Agency MBS

(7.8%)93.11.618.19CMBSInvestment Grade

(5.2%)99.31.887.13U.S ABS [Non-Housing]

(5.1%)67.61.4214.67U.S ABS [Housing]

(11.5%)87.83.0213.91U.S. CorporateHigh Yield

(7.8%)97.51.487.83U.S. Corp. Investment Grade

∆Jun 30∆Sep 30Lehman Index

o During Q3, non-government investment grade bonds’

- Yields rose by 140 to 190 basis points

- Prices fell by 5% to 8%

- Credit spreads widened by 170 to 250 basis points

Market movement Q3

US investment portfolio detail


Appendix Ill

UK investment portfolio detailSeptember 30, 2008


Policyholder

account

85%

Off balance

sheet

5%

General

account

10%

UK general account mainly bonds

Total investments

EUR 60 billion

General account

EUR 6 billion

Bonds

99%

Loans

<1%Shares

1%



UK general account portfolio

89%Total100%

Value in EUR billion5.6

Value in GBP billion4.4

7%

2%

7%

11%

48%

3%

2%

7%

7%

1%

5%

Percentage of

book value

94%Utilities

91%Mortgage securities

91%Industrial

98%Government

84%Financial

95%Energy

92%Consumer, non-cyclical

92%Consumer, cyclical

88%Communications

90%Basic industries

89%Asset backed securities

Market value /

amortized costUK general account*



Rating split of UK general account

0%0%0%83%B

1%1%0%58%BB

-5%16%21%85%BBB

6%48%42%87%A

-19%18%37%91%AA

17%17%0.0%97%AAA

Difference

%

Fund

%

Index

%

Market value /

amortized costRatings split*

o The rating split of the UK general account demonstrates the

conservative positioning of our portfolio

o A downgrade below investment grade is a trigger for considering a sale

o Other main trigger being concerns about the credit



UK investments conservatively positioned

The UK general account is conservatively positioned

versus the iBoxx corporate bond index for all investment grade

corporates rated AA to BBB

-11%45%56%Financial

10%13%3%Sub-sovereigns

-2%8%10%Asset/mortgage-backed

4%35%31%Non-financials

Difference

%

Fund

%

Index

%Sector split*



Comfortable with our exposure to UK financials

-11%45%56%84%Total

0%8%9%87%Other financial

2%12%10%85%Insurance

-13%25%37%83%Banks

Difference

%

Fund

%

Index

%

Market value /

amortized costFinancials break down*

o We have been cautious on banks and are therefore underweight in

our portfolio



Appendix lV

Netherlands investment portfolio detail September 30, 2008


Policyholder

account

31%

Off balance

sheet

19%

General

account

50%

Dutch general account well diversified

Total investments

EUR 63 billion

General account

EUR 31 billion

Bonds

55%

Loans

32%

Shares

5%

Real estate

7%

Other

<1%



All collateralized assets investment grade

* Buy to let

** Non-conforming

106%-117000017CMBS94%-351046339SME86%-402860622910887CDO

96%0800017RMBS NC**

97%-134000034RMBS BTL*

99%-1298700314970RMBS92%-13173001511147ABS

94%88%

Market value / book

value (%)

-124-53

Unrealized loss

1,997440

Total exposure

00

<BBB

13178

A

1521951,556Total5058254CLO

BBBAAAAAExternal ratings hierarchy of S&P, Moody’s, Fitch(all figures in EUR million)

AA

10%

A

6%

AAA

77%

BBB

7%


Netherlands investment portfolio detail


Appendix V

Other countries investment portfolio detail September 30, 2008


Policyholder

account

18%

Off balance

sheet

44%

General

account

38%

Other countries general account mainly bonds

Total investments

EUR 14 billion

General account

EUR 5 billion

Bonds

82%

Loans

13%

Shares

3%

Other

2%


18%


Appendix VI

3Q08 results


5007(13)(32)(33)

(120)691

Q3 07 Americas The

Netherlands

United

Kingdom

Other countries Holding and

other

Q3 08

o Underlying earnings before tax in Q3 impacted by

– lower fees in US and UK

– reserve strengthening, mainly related to VA’s sold pre-2004 in US

– higher mortality charges in US life reinsurance

– provisioning in NL for unit linked policies and charge on a group of

pension contracts

Underlying earnings impacted by world financial markets turmoil

Underlying earnings before tax (EUR million)

(22)%7%

Underlying earnings development at constant currency

(18)%(39)%(31)%(17)%


Financial markets and impairments had a negative impact

(407)(47)

(384)500

(329)

14(5)

Underlying

earnings Q3 08

Fair value items

performance

Gain/(losses) on

investments

Impairment

charges

Other

income/(charges)

Income tax Net income Q3 08

o Net income mainly impacted by underperformance of fair value items and

impairment charges

– Impairment charges in Q3 mainly related to Lehman Brothers, Washington

Mutual (EUR 336 million) and US housing related asset-backed securities

(EUR 46 million)Underlying earnings to net income development (EUR million)


Fair value items performance

(54)

(41)

123

(384)(224)

(61)

(60)

(67)

Americas Netherlands Holding Total

Total underperformance of fair value items (EUR million)

Canadian segregated funds

Alternative investments**

Total return annuities*

VA GMWB*

Credit derivatives

* Represents closed books of business

** Alternative investments include hedge funds, private equity, real estate, and other

Private equity Debt held at FV


30Life reinsurance

(11)%9,6018,567IGP

(13)%3,2502,834Pensions & AM

19%638758Retail mutual funds

(38)%8955Life reinsurance

Gross deposit overview267%4931,811Fixed annuities

(2)%934912Variable annuities

New life sales overview

(98)%401BOLI/COLI

Retail life insurance

(in USD million)

(16)%191160

∆Q3 07Q3 08

Underlying earnings before tax(USD million)

o Fundamentals of business remain

intact but results impacted by financial

markets turmoil

o Economic downturn impacted sales of

high net worth and middle market

products

o Very strong FA deposits as result of

additional distribution, steeper yield

curve and increased demand

o VA deposits relatively flat

o Net deposits of USD 3 billion

o VNB up 9% driven by strong fixed

annuity production

o IRR at 12.3%

Americas – net deposits of USD 3 billion

699

578

Q3 07 Q3 08


(46)%7239Total (APE)

Gross deposit overview

(15)%647547Savings deposits

(78)%8118Pensions & AM


(69)%5116Pensions (APE)

Life insurance (APE)

(in EUR million)

10%2123

∆Q3 07Q3 08

o Underlying earnings declined to

EUR 74 million, mainly due to costs of

modifying unit-linked insurance

products and charges related to a

group of pension products

o Life sales down 46%, due to

slowdown in group pension market

o Individual life sales up 10%

o VNB of EUR 8 million

o IRR at 11.5%

The Netherlands – individual life sales up 10%

Underlying earnings before tax(EUR million)

107

74

Q3 07 Q3 08



(53)%18386Pensions & AM


(1)%235232Pensions (APE)

Total (APE)

Life insurance (APE)

(in GBP million)

0%302303

6%6771

∆Q3 07Q3 08

o Sales growth across most lines of

businesses

o Underlying earnings decline due to

lower financial markets and

investments for growth

o VNB up 13% on higher margins and

volumes

o IRR improves to 13.6%

United Kingdom – continued strong sales

Underlying earnings before tax(GBP million)

46

28

Q3 07 Q3 08


Other countries – strong growth of deposits


134Variable annuities

50218Retail mutual funds

45%153222Pensions & AM


(38)%6943Recurring premium

Total (APE)

Single premium

(in EUR million)

(47)%9952

(72)%29383

∆Q3 07Q3 08

o Strong increase in deposits driven by

retail mutual funds and variable

annuity sales in Asia

o Weakness in financial markets

resulted in decline in life sales

o Underlying earnings in Central &

Eastern Europe remained robust

o VNB decreased to EUR 32 million

mainly as a result of lower sales

o IRRs remain at high level

Underlying earnings before tax(EUR million)

55

42

Q3 07 Q3 08


842 (662)

59

729 (315)

(313)

(29) 312

Q2 08 Excess

Capital

Estimated

Statutory

Earnings

Investments in

country units

Capital

preservation

actions*

Dividend paid

to holding

Change in

target capital

Other

(including

currency

effects)

Q3 08 Excess

Capital

Excess capital roll-forward

Excess capital in operating units development Q3 2008 (EUR million)

* Capital preservation actions includes UK ViF securitization and hedging


9,412(9)(142)(258)(49)1,077

(2,499) (329) 11.621

June 30, 08 Net income Change in

revaluation

reserves

Movements

in foreign

currency

translation

reserves

Coupons on

perpetuals

(net of tax)

Dividend

common

shares

Repurchased

and sold own

shares

Other

changes

Sept 30, 08

Shareholders’ equity (EUR million)

Shareholders’ equity development

o Shareholders’ equity excluding revaluation reserve is 71.5% of total capital

base – above target

o Decline in revaluation reserves driven by wider credit spreads

o Revaluation reserve stands at negative EUR 5.5 billion


Calculation of financial flexibility

756Financial flexibility

312Excess capital in operating units

444Additional leverage capacity

20,800Actual capital base

21,244Maximum capital base allowed

14,870

1,568

19,232

5,458

9,412

(EUR million)

Shareholders’ equity excl. revaluation reserve

Target is minimum 70% of total capital base in

shareholders’ equity

20,800Total capital base

14,870Shareholders’ equity

excl. revaluation reserve

Group equity

Capital leverage

Revaluation reserve

Shareholders’ equity

Financial flexibility (EUR billion)

June 30, 08 Sept 30, 08

� Additional leverage capital� Excess capital in operating units:

available capital -/- required capital for AA-rating

0.8

1.8


40%20%

Assumed equity market decline of40%20%

Assumed equity market decline of

Contingency: equity market sensitivity

o Lower fees

o Reserve strengthening for VA guarantees (old book before 2004; new VA is delta hedged)

o DAC unlocking*

-700

-1,600

-900

-1,900

* Acceleration of amortization of deferred acquisition costs

o Direct exposure

o Reserve strengthening for guarantees

o Impact of first 20% decline can be absorbed by capital preservation actions

Estimated impact on earnings (12 month period, EUR million)

Estimated impact on capital (EUR million)

Based on equity markets as of September 30, 2008

� Direct

� Fees

� DAC� Guarantees

� Direct

� Fees

� Guarantees


o Approximately 63% of living benefit guarantees currently hedged or reinsured

o GMIB requires policyholder to exercise into life annuity after waiting period

o The NAR is the net amount at risk, which is the sum by individual policy, the

difference between fund value and the guarantee value**

US variable annuity guarantees

0.20.639%0.82.1Reinsurance

0.43.5-0.017.3GMDB

0.64.14%0.819.4Total death benefits

14.9

8.2

5.5

1.2*

Hedgedfund value

63%

94%

100%

13%

% of fund value

hedged

0.9

0.3

0.1

0.5

Statutoryreserve

3.6

0.7

0.8

2.1

Net amountat risk

23.5Total living benefits

8.7Reinsurance

5.5Direct - GMWB

9.3Direct - GMIB

(USD billion)

Totalfund value

Per September 30, 2008

* Reinsurance capped at USD 200 million benefit

** Before reinsurance and hedging


2%1%

Assumed*

interest rate decline of2%1%

Assumed*

interest rate decline of

Interest rate sensitivity

o Lower funding costs

o Higher capital gains

175

270

-250

-450

* Assumes a parallel shift in the yield curve

o Reserve strengthening for guarantees

Impact on earnings (12 month period, EUR million)

Impact on capital (EUR million)

Based on interest rates as of September 30, 2008


Limited DAC at risk, only 11% of DAC related to US annuities

100%4%29%6%61%Total

7%7%Life reinsurance

2%2%Institutional products

27%27%1%Pensions & asset man.

11%11%Ind. savings

& retirement

53%4%2%5%41%Life &

protection

TotalOther

countriesUKNetherlandsAmericas

DAC per line of business

Data as of December 31, 2007


Impact of potential credit impairments manageable

Impact on IFRS net income Impact on available capital

Example:o 100 bps of losses on USD 120 billion of assets*

o 20% DAC offset(possible range 0% – 60%, depending on business line)

o 35% tax offset(depending on geography)

-624

-1.200

-445

240

336

Losses DAC offset Taxes

IFRS net

income

IFRS net

income

-780

-1.200

-550

420

Losses DAC offset Taxes

Impact on

available

capital

Impact on

available

capital

No DAC

offset

(USD million) (EUR million) (USD million) (EUR million)

* includes bonds and mortgages of US fixed income portfolio


Assumptions:

o Extreme possibility of ‘frozen’ markets for years anticipated

o Impaired capital markets liquidity test assumes an extended period and normal liquidity only resuming in 2 years

Results:

o Our liquidity position remains very strong even ignoring contingent liquidity sources

o Under a conservative best estimate basis, AEGON has positive net inflows into 2010

Liquidity management

(EUR billion)

� Available liquidity under stress scenario� Required liquidity under stress scenario

Stress scenario

Even under a prolonged stress environment

AEGON unlikely to be a “forced seller” of securities into distressed markets

0

20

40

60

80

100

7day 1mo 3mo 6mo 1yr 18mo 2yr

Strong liquidity position

Stress scenario assumptions

o Extreme possibility of ‘frozen’ markets has been anticipated for years

– Impaired capital markets liquidity test assumes an extended period and normal liquidity only resuming in 2 years

o Immediate and permanent increase in interest rates

o Liabilities are assumed to withdraw at their earliest conceivable date


Appendix VII

Capital


~89% of

common

shares

~11% of

common

shares

100% of

preferred

shares

AEGON secured additional core capital of EUR 3 billion

AEGON N.V.

Public Market Dutch StateVereniging AEGON

Capital facility

EUR 3 billion

Non-voting securities

EUR 3 billion

EUR

EU

R


Capital position

AEGON to reinforce capital buffer significantly above AA level requirements

Substantial buffer to protect against further market deterioration

EUR 8.5 billion

(205%)

Insurance Group Directive

(IGD) surplus capital

EUR 842 million

S&P risk-based insurance

capital model excess

capital in operating units

above AA level

September 30, 2008

EUR 5.0 billion

(160%)

EUR 312 million

June 30, 2008

74%Capital Base Ratio

(debt / equity ratio)71.5%

+ Underlying

earnings

- Market

movements

+ De-risking

+ Capital

releases

Expectedchanges in Q4

+ EUR 3 billion

Documents

Dutch Analyst Dinner