E S I E ACTIVIT D RFEORTS E R NTERNATIONAL C U C S G …russiancouncil.ru/papers/Russia-Japan-Paper33-en.pdf · Tel.: +7 (495) 225 6283 Fax: +7 (495) 225 6284 E–mail: [email protected]

InternatIonal actIvIty

Bu

sIn

ess

Civil SoCietyeduCation

an

al

yS

iS

an

d f

or

eC

aS

tin

g

dip

lo

ma

Cy

global politiCS

international organizationS


diS

Cu

SS

ion

Sdialogue

dialogueinternational relationS

netw

or

k

pr

oje

CtSexpert CommentarieS

Co

nfe

re

nC

eS

round tableS

Su

mm

er

SC

ho

ol

SreportSworking paperS

library

SCenarioS

SeC

ur

ity

mig

ra

tio

n

partnerShip

CompetitionS

an

th

olo

gie

S

anthologieS

referenCe bookS

referenCe bookS

webSite

gl

ob

al S

Cie

nC

e

Civil SoCiety

SCienCe

eduCation

foreign poliCy

analySiS and foreCaSting

diplomaCy

global politiCS


foreign poliCy talent poolin

ter

nS

hip

S

diSCuSSionS

dialogue

inter

na

tio

na

l r

ela

tio

nS

ne

tw

or

k p

ro

jeC

tS

expert CommentarieS

Co

nfe

ren

CeS

Co

nfe

re

nC

eS

ro

un

d t

ab

le

S

Su

mm

er

SC

ho

olS

re

po

rt

S

wo

rk

ing p

ap

er

S

gueSt leCtureS

library

Club meetingS

ro

ad

ma

pS

SCenarioS

SeCurity

bil

at

er

al r

el

at

ion

S

mig

ra

tio

np

ar

tn

er

Sh

ip

Co

mp

et

itio

nS

an

th

olo

gie

S

re

fer

en

Ce b

oo

kS

web

Sit

e

gl

ob

al S

Cie

nC

eCivil SoCiety

SC

ien

Ce

eduCation

foreign poliCy


diplomaCy

dip

lo

ma

Cy

global politiCS

int

er

na

tio

na

l o

rg

an

iza

tio

nS

for

eig

n p

oliC

y t

alen

t p

oo

l

foreign poliCy talent pool

int

er

nS

hip

S

diS

Cu

SS

ion

Sdialogue

international relationS

netw

or

k p

ro

jeC

tS

ex

per

t C

om

men

ta

rie

S

ConferenCeS

round tableS

Summer SChoolS

reportS

working paperS

gueSt leCtureS

library

Club meetingS

roadmapS

SC

en

ar

ioS S

eC

ur

ity

bil

at

er

al r

el

at

ion

S

mig

ra

tio

n

pa

rt

ne

rS

hip

Co

mp

et

itio

nS

anthologieS

referenCe bookS

web

Sit

e

global SCienCe

global SCienCe

expert CommentarieS

eduCation

Civ

il

So

Cie

ty

SC

ien

Ce

ed

uC

atio

n

for

eig

n p

ol

iCy


dip

lo

ma

Cy

gl

ob

al p

ol

itiC

S

int

er

na

tio

na

l o

rg

an

iza

tio

nS

for

eig

n p

ol

iCy t

al

en

t p

oo

l

internShipS

diSCuSSionS

dialogue

international relationS network projeCtS

ex

pe

rt C

om

me

nt

ar

ieS

ConferenCeS

round tableS

Summer SChoolS

reportS

working paperS

gu

eS

t l

eC

tu

re

S

lib

ra

ry

Cl

ub m

ee

tin

gS

ro

ad

ma

pS

SC

en

ar

ioS

SeC

ur

ity

bil

ater

al

rela

tio

nS

migration

partnerShip

CompetitionS

anthologieS

referenCe bookS

webSite

global SCienCe


referenCe bookS


Se

Cu

rit

y

mig

ra

tio

ninternational organizationS

diSCuSSionSinternShipS

eduCation

Civ

il S

oC

iet

ypartnerShip

Inte

rn

atI

on

al

ac

tIv

Ity

dialogue

expert CommentarieS

Summer SChoolS

lib

ra

ry

reportSgueSt leCtureS

roadmapS

WORKING PAPER

RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL (RIAC)1, B. Yakimanka street, 119180, Moscow, RussiaTel.: +7 (495) 225 6283Fax: +7 (495) 225 6284E–mail: [email protected]

RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL

32 / 2016

RUSSIA AND THE WEST: THE NEW NORMAL

Cover_WP-32.indd 1 12.12.2016 18:01:14


33 / 2017

THE IMAGE OF RUSSIA IN JAPAN AND THE IMAGE OF JAPAN IN RUSSIA


MOSCOW 2017

Russian International Affairs Council

Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief: I.S. Ivanov, RAS Corresponding Member, Dr. of History

Author: S.V. Chugrov, Dr. of Social Sciences

Copy editor: I.N. Timofeev, Ph.D. in Political Science; T.A. Makhmutov, Ph.D. in Political Science; L.V. Filippova; D.O. Kholopova; K.A. Kuzmina

Chugrov, S.V.

The Image of Russia in Japan and the Image of Japan in Russia: Working Paper 33/2017 / [S.V. Chu-grov]; [I.S. Ivanov, Editor-in-Chief]; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). – Moscow: NPMP RIAC, 2017. – 60 pages. Names of authors and editors are listed on reverse of title page.

ISBN 978-5-9500378-7-0

The Working Paper was prepared by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) as part of the project “Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region: Conceptual Basis for Security and Development Policy.” It deals with Russia’s and Japan’s mutual perceptions, analyses the dynamics of the evolution of these perceptions in the context of Tokyo’s territorial claims, and sets the goal of improving Russia’s positive image in Japan and reducing the influence of negative images on Russian national interests.

The author would like to thank A.N. Panov, Head of the Department of Diplomacy at MGIMO University of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Japan (1996–2003) for his advice, as well as the Japan Foundation employees, notably Mr. Masanori Takaguchi, for giving access to the materials used to prepare this working paper.

Russian International Affairs Council thanks Jessica Chin and James Rawlings for their help in preparing this publication.

The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of RIAC.

Any linguistic inadequacies in the publication are the sole responsibility of the translation editors.

The full text of the working paper is available on RIAC’s website. You can download it or leave a comment via this direct link – russiancouncil.ru/en/paper33

Cover photo credits: Flickr/Amir Jina (СС license 4.0).

© S.V. Chugrov, 2017

© Drafting, translation and design. NPMP RIAC, 2017

Introduction 4

1. Perceptions of Japan in Russia: Key Components 7

The World through the Eyes of Russian People 7

Analysis of the Image of Japan in Russia 10

Historical Memory as a Catalyst of Distrust towards Japan 12

2. Perceptions of Russia in Japan: Key Components 19

The World through the Eyes of Japanese People 19

Analysis of the Image of Russia in Japan 22

Historical Memory as a Catalyst of Distrust towards Russia 25

3. “Soft Power” in Russia–Japan Cooperation in the Humanitarian Sphere 27

Cooperation in the Media 27

Cooperation in Education, Science, and Culture 29

Conclusions and Recommendations 34

Appendixes 37

About the Author 59

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4 Working Paper 33 / 2017

S.V. CHUGROV THE IMAGE OF RUSSIA IN JAPAN AND THE IMAGE OF JAPAN IN RUSSIA

Introduction

In 2018, Japan celebrates the 150th anniversary of Meiji Restoration, which in 1868 kicked off the epoch of modernization of the country. Both Japan and Russia belonged to the second echelon of countries that turned to fundamental reforms almost simultaneously. Russia chose this path seven years earlier than Japan, with the abolition of serfdom in 1861. Since then both countries were involved in military clashes in 1904-1905, 1938-1939, 1945.

On October 19, 2016, we celebrated a significant event, namely, the 60th anniver-sary of the signing of the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956.1 The most important thing about the document was that it officially put an end to the war between the two countries on the Pacific Front. For more than 60 years since, Russia and Japan went through a labyrinth of contacts and negotiations that were marked by an endless seesawing of hopes and disappointments. However, the positive influence that the Declaration has had on the nature of foreign policy decisions with regard to relations between the people of Russia and Japan, and their perception of one another and the surrounding reality, can be felt to this day. In order to reinforce this constructive trend, Russia and Japan have agreed to hold a year of cultural exchanges between the two countries in 2018.

Of course, there is no single structured view of the outside world in the national consciousness of a given country; there is, however, a dynamic interaction of images and associations, as well as clusters and layers of stereotypes and atti-tudes, which are all intricately combined in human consciousness.

At various periods of the bilateral relations between Russia and Japan, both coun-tries have been forced on numerous occasions to clarify the specific features of their own identities. And it has always happened when their traditional regu-latory systems have been under increased pressure from “foreign” value sys-tems, prompting both the Russian and Japanese peoples to differentiate between “Us” and “Them.” Yet, the basic precepts, which have deep sociocultural roots, collectively form an idealized persona, and have remained intact in the mass consciousness of both nations. Such a person, be it Russian or Japanese, has autonomy of thought, extraordinary adaptive capabilities with regard to cultural interventions and twists of fate, while at the same time preserving the predomi-nantly “non-economic” nature of social interaction. Studying the depths of the collective consciousness and the self-awareness of the members of both Russian and Japanese societies, the perceptions that they have of each other and their specific worldviews, which are based on long-standing and stable understand-ings of their own identities in relation to the outside world, helps to answer the questions: Where do we go from here? How can we build relations? The balance between the rational and the emotional in political decision-making, between the thirst for innovation and the desire to preserve the cultural and political poten-

1 Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. October 19, 1956 // Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1956. No. 24. Cit. ex. The History of Russia–Japan Relations / Ed. by S.V. Grishachev. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2015, p. 326 (in Russian).

5www.russiancouncil.ru

tial of the past that is characteristic of each country, manifests itself in the dif-ferent ways in which Russia and Japan position themselves in relation to sur-rounding countries, within their respective regions, in the world as a whole and, accordingly, in terms of the evolution of diplomatic practices. For example, in Japan’s case, the country’s growing self-identification as an Asian state has led to the appearance of the “Return to Asia, Turn Away from the West” strategy (帰亜離欧, kia rio), that is, we are witnessing a shift towards multilateral diplo-macy. The country is looking to reposition itself within Asia. The “Asian Boom” – interest in Asia and its sociocultural values in the broadest sense – is gathering steam. After a long period of zigzagging between western and eastern values, a new idea is starting to dominate Japanese foreign policy, namely, a kind of stri-ving towards a synthesis of cultures.

Russia and Japan have both experienced periods of full and partial isolation from the outside world, falling behind the Axial Age. The Land of the Rising Sun was in total isolation for around three centuries, up until the 1850s. Russia’s devel-opment was even more complicated. After the Mongol Invasion of Rus’ in the 13th century, it too was isolated from the rest of the world for around three cen-turies. The sense of religious and cultural closeness that the people of Russia felt towards Europe, coupled with the desire to find a path of development for the country that was its own, gave rise to the problem of self-identification. The Russian people resented the fact that the West had shut itself off from their coun-try and changed alliances with childish petulance; then, they tried to prove that Russia was, in fact, “more of a European power” than any of the countries on the Western part of the continent (by taking on the role of the “gendarme of Europe” and organizing the Holy Alliance in 1815, for example). The defeat in the Crimean War exposed the technological inferiority of Russia compared to the West. So, in 1861, Russia emancipated the serfs and set about modernizing the country. Similarly, the inability of Japan’s stagnating system to compete with the West led to the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the start of reforms.

The “second wave of modernization” in the USSR took place under totalitarian rule and was the result of an industrial breakthrough that allowed the Soviet Union not only to emerge victorious in the Second World War, but also to become a global superpower. Japan’s “second wave of modernization” took place during the U.S. occupation of the country and led to the country becoming a leading industrial power.

The “third wave of modernization” took place at different times in the two coun-tries. Russia started to throw off the shackles of totalitarianism and its painful consequences in the late 1980s. Meanwhile, Japan, faced with the challenges of globalization for which it was wholly unprepared, had sunk into economic crisis by the early 1990s. Today, both Russia and Japan are faced with the problem of which path of development to choose under renewed pressure from Western va lues and standards. Every encounter with the Western system of values turns into a test of the strength of the respective Russian and Japanese traditional systems.

INTRODUCTION



In addition to the historical and comparative cultural approaches used in this paper, we have also had recourse to certain sociological research methods, pri-marily the analysis of public opinion surveys carried out over the years by Rus-sian agencies – the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), the Public Opinion Foundation and other well-known research centres – as well as research conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Information Research Office, materials pro-vided by Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) and the author’s observations with regard to talks and negotiations between Russia and Japan. The interpreta-tion of the images that the people of Russia and Japan have of each other, as well as insight into how these images can be improved, arises at the intersection of sociology, history and political science.

This analysis focuses on the mutual images of Russia and Japan, within the broader international context of the perceptions of the US, China, and other important partners of both countries. Also, in order to assess the dynamics of the national worldviews, the data from the surveys compiled over the last two decades are given here with particular emphasis on recent assessments. Despite a large number of figures, we hope that we have succeeded in avoiding a one-dimensional picture and in showcasing its many nuances.


Russian people view Japan with a certain degree of ambiguity; the image that Russian people have of the Land of the Rising Sun is based on a wide range of perceptions. On the one hand, we have the image of an attractive and exotic country. On the other hand, we quite often hear alarmist comments about the mysterious and incomprehensible “Japanese soul” (“For Russian people, Japan is a strange, alien, and even slightly eerie country.”).2 In reality, both impressions are true: what we are talking about are “myths” about Japan. And their extremes have long since started to converge. For many Russians, Japan has lost a part of what makes it exotic: just about everyone knows what Geishas are; almost every school has karate and judo clubs; and Japanese restaurants and sushi bars have become part of everyday life in Russian cities. The Land of the Rising Sun has become just another one of those more or less “understandable” countries. So how do people in Russia today perceive Japan and Japanese people? And what forms these attitudes?

The World through the Eyes of Russian PeopleIn order to understand the dramatic nature of the changes that have taken place in Russian public opinion, it is necessary to look at a notional map that characte-rizes the dynamics of the attitudes of Russian people towards Japan against the background of their attitudes towards the United States and China, as well as to other global powers. From a sociological standpoint, these transformations – even over the course of the last 10 to 15 years – are quite remarkable and suggest that a new model of social consciousness has appeared. For example, many Rus-sian people say that the United States and Japan were instigators of the Second World War (in addition to Germany, which 80 percent of respondents routinely hold accountable for starting the War). However, while the frequency with which Russian people ascribe blame to the United States has grown (from 2 percent in 2003 to 4 percent in 2014), the opposite has happened with Japan, drop-ping from 12 percent in 2003 to 2 percent in 2014 (see Fig. 1). The comparative method would lead us to the conclusion that, as far as Russian public opinion is concerned, the role of Japan in the Second World War has changed.

During the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, against the background of general disillusionment with perestroika and growing support for market reforms and a transition to democracy, Russian public consciousness showed an unconditional preference towards the United States as a foreign policy priority and as the best development model. Pro-American sentiments were at an all-time high in 1990–1993, with 70 to 80 percent of the Russian population

2 What Does Russia Think about Japan? // Japan Today, February 28, 2013. URL: http://www.japantoday.ru/rossiya-i-yaponiya/yaponiya.-chto-o-ney-dumaet-rossiyass.html (in Russian).

1. Perceptions of Japan in Russia: Key Components

1. PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN IN RUSSIA: KEY COMPONENTS



viewing the United States favourably, whereas only 10 percent viewed the country negatively (see Fig. 12). In 1990, the Russian people thought that Germany was more likely to carry out an attack on Russia (23 percent) than the United States was (19 percent) (see Fig. 10).

However, just a few years later, the public mind-set had altered drastically. This was the result of wholly unfulfilled expectations with regard to radical socioeco-nomic transformations taking place in the country and the rather aggressive for-eign policy of the United States. The opinion of the Russian people towards the United States started to grow noticeably more negative in response to Washing-ton’s decision to start bombing Yugoslavia in 1999 (after which positive opinion dropped to almost 30 percent, while negative opinion shot to above 50 percent). This impassioned response against the military operation led by the United States and its allies against Serbia, a country that is culturally very close to Russia, was partly due to the fact that the Russian people could very well imagine a similar scenario happening in their own country. After the operation, the United States directed harsh criticism at Russia for starting the Second Chechen War in 1999, and the tensions increased between the two countries with regard to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the expansion of NATO (the fourth time the organiza-tion had expanded its borders, but the first time since the collapse of the USSR). There was a similar reaction to U.S. policy in 2003 following the invasion of Iraq (when 66 percent of respondents reported negative opinions with regard to the United States, against 30 percent who responded positively), and again in 2008, when the United States was severely critical of Russia’s actions in the conflict in South Ossetia.3

In 2013–2015, the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by several countries, includ-ing Japan, placed a lot of pressure on the social consciousness of the Russian people. To be fair, it must be stressed that the Japanese sanctions were more symbolic in nature, with more “peaceful” measures in comparison to those taken by the United States and the European Union. The cooling of political relations – Euromaidan, the drama surrounding Crimea and the Civil War in Southeast Ukraine that led to the escalation of a hybrid conflict with the United States and NATO – all this had a significant effect on the mind-set of the Russian people. In 2008, the United States and Ukraine topped the list of countries with which Russia has the most strained and hostile relations (25 percent of respondents named the United States, while 21 percent said Ukraine). By 2014, the United States had taken an overwhelming lead at 73 percent, followed by Ukraine (32 percent) and the European Union and Germany (10 percent each) (see Fig. 4). The level of resentment towards the United States peaked in early 2015 (at 81 per-cent) before dropping slightly in September 2016 (to 65 percent) (see Fig. 12). U.S.–Russia relations are consistently referred to as “hostile,” “strained,” and “chilly” (see Fig. 13). In 2015, 71 percent of respondents believed that the United

3 For more detail, see: Twenty Years of Reform through the Eyes of the Russian People (looking at several years of surveys). Analytical Report / Ed. by M.K. Gorshkov, R. Krumm and V.V. Petukhov. Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: Ves Mir, 2011 (in Russian); Volkov D. The History of Russian Anti-Americanism: Why Russians Started to See the United States as the Enemy // The Carnegie Moscow Center. June 8, 2015. URL: http://www.carnegie.ru/2015/05/27/ru-60220/i9kf (in Russian).


States played a predominantly negative role in the modern world (see Fig. 14). According to surveys conducted by the Levada Center in late 2014, only 10 per-cent of respondents approved of a foreign policy oriented towards the United States (see Fig. 9).

The number of people in Russia who believe that the threat of military attack is likely to come from the United States grew from 19 percent in 1990 to 53 percent in 2015 (see Fig. 10).

Conversely, China has come to be seen very favourably in recent years. It has been steadily climbing the rating of perceived friendly countries since the middle of the 2000s. According to the Levada Center, in 2005, 12 percent of respondents saw China as a close friend and ally of Russia, and at the start of the following year the country has consistently been in the top five closest friends, with results of between 16 percent and 40 percent (see Fig. 6). For comparison: in 2014, only a tenth of the number of Russians who viewed China as a close friend of Russia named Japan as one of Russia’s closest friends. Furthermore, against the background of worsening relations between Russia and the West, and the strengthening of the strategic partnership between Mos-cow and Beijing, the percentage of the population that viewed China as a close ally of Russia in 2014 rose sharply (from 20 percent to 40 percent). Between 2014 and 2016, the number of people who described relations with China as good never dropped below 67 percent, with a maximum of 14 percent of people describing relations as bad (see Fig. 15).

The results of opinion polls conducted by VCIOM in 2016 demonstrated that China ranked first with 25 percent among countries that Russians trust, while Japan had gained the trust of 9.9 percent of respondents (see Fig. 5). In response to the open question “Which countries does Russia currently have the most stable and friendly relations with?” China was named more frequently by respondents than any other nation starting in 2008 (23 percent). This figure had more than doubled by 2014, to 51 percent. “Friendly,” “positive,” “good-neighbourly,” “healthy,” and “untroubled” – these are all words used by 87 percent of Russians who took part in a 2015 survey to describe relations with Beijing (see Fig. 16), although there is certain scepticism about whether China’s policy with regard to Russia has a positive or negative effect on the country (see Fig. 17).

It should be noted that sociologists expected a more clear-cut breakthrough in terms of positive feelings on the part of Russian people towards China. How-ever, research conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Aca demy of Sciences has demonstrated that “the Russian population still regards the Asian giant with a certain apprehension.”4 At the same time, despite the cau-tious attitude towards China, a large and densely populated neighbour, the number of respondents identifying the country as unfriendly or hostile has not been significant for the entire period that such surveys have been carried out (since 2005) (see Fig. 7).

4 Twenty Years of Reforms through the Eyes of the Russian People (looking at several years of surveys). Analytical Report, 2011. P. 205 (in Russian).




Japan’s place as a neighbour and partner of Russia is very different (Fig. 18). What are the reasons for such a contrast?

Analysis of the Image of Japan in RussiaJapan holds a special place in the Russian mass consciousness as a “significant Other”; when the conversation turns to the great powers, Japan is seen as even more important than Germany, a long-standing partner of the USSR and Russia, and other European countries (see Fig. 2).

At the same time, it should be stressed that when it comes to the terms “friend” and “enemy,” a very small percentage of the Russian people view relations with Japan as strong and friendly (3 percent in 2008 and 1 percent in 2014); however, roughly the same number of people see these relations as negative, strained and hostile (3 percent and 2 percent, respectively) (see Figs. 3 and 4). The number of people in Russia who believe that Tokyo poses a military threat to Russia shrank from 6 percent in 1990 to zero in 2015 (see Fig. 10).

It would seem that the Russian people are entirely indifferent towards Japan in terms of political projections. And this can be observed against the background of a dramatic decline in the attitudes of Russian people towards the United States over the same period. However, a survey conducted by a working group at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the autumn of 2014 placed Japan seventh (with 6 percent of respondents), right behind Georgia, in the list of countries that Russian people see as being hostile towards Russia (see Fig. 8).

As regards the attitude of Russians to Japan as a whole, a poll conducted in March 2016 paints a very different picture: 9 percent and 55 percent of Rus-sians view Japan “very positively” and “mostly positively” respectively, while only 12 percent and 3 percent view it “mostly negatively” and “very negatively.”5 Among the traditional factors that determine the attitude of Russian people towards Japan, the latter’s participation in the Second World War on the side of the “Axis powers” is always at the forefront (with built-in attributes such as the attack on Pearl Harbor, the kamikaze suicide attacks and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The 2016 poll shows that Russians view Japan mostly as synony-mous with smart technologies (86 percent) and as having a wealth of traditions (84 percent). The most frequent answers include beautiful nature (69 percent), pop culture achievements such as anime and fashion (67 percent), high quali ty of life (66 percent). Respondents mention negative associations (“a conserva-tive country” – 40 percent, “difficult to understand” – 41 percent) with much less frequency, and Russians’ positive ideas are linked to Japan’s sophisticated cuisine (79 percent), architecture (78 percent), and also to the way of life of our Far Eastern neighbour (77 percent) (Figs. 19 and 20).

A survey conducted in two cities in the Irkutsk Region to analyse the local po pulations’ perceptions of the Japanese people also highlighted these tradi-

5 International Relations // Levada Center. Press Release. April 7, 2016. URL http://www.levada.ru/2016/04/07/mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya-2 (in Russian).


tional factors perfectly (see Fig. 21). The age group (16–20 years old) was chosen because the younger generation grew up after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which means that its representatives are less susceptible to the influence of pre-judices and stereotypes. A total of 407 people took part in the survey; 207 from Ust-Ilimsk, a young (even by Siberian standards) industrial city that is isolated from major centres and which does not have close cultural or economic ties with Japan; and 200 from Irkutsk, the capital of Irkutsk Region and twin city of Kanazawa, Japan, which has a rich history of relations with Japan. Respondents were asked to write three (or more) words that they associate first with Japan, and secondly with Japanese people.

The answers were almost identical for how the people of Irkutsk viewed Japan and the Japanese people (especially with regard to “culture” – the words sake, geisha, cherry blossoms, kimono, and samurai prevailed in both cases). Only 4 percent of respondents mentioned the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands. Strangely enough, the image that the people of Irkutsk and Ust-Ilimsk have of Japan is more or less exactly the same. The survey also revealed that the younger generation is confident that it has sufficient knowledge of Japan and does not see the need to read novels by Japanese authors or watch Japanese films (perhaps this is due to a reluctance to destroy the familiar image they have of a medieval Japan). As a rule, the younger generation finds Japanese films to be unusually long and “loaded” with material. The only exceptions seem to be joint projects or films shot according to Western (read: Hollywood) standards (The Fast and the Furious: Tokyo Drift, The Ring, Memoirs of a Geisha, The Last Samurai). The sur-vey also showed that respondents believe the Russian media, especially state-run TV channels, do not pay enough attention to Japan. The frequent references to the Kuril Islands and to Japanese whale poachers undoubtedly influence the for-mation of a predominantly negative image of Japan and Japanese people among Russians.6

At the same time, over the past decade, information flows have brought new factors to the forefront. These include the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster on March 11, 2011, Japan joining the anti-Russian sanctions, the rivalry between China and Japan, and Russia–Japan relations in the context of Russia’s strategic partnership with China. These news topics reflect the main issues that are dealt with in the Russian and Japanese media and which both shape public opinion and act as an indicator thereof. The psychological state of Japanese society after Fukushima has forced the media to pay attention to a new cluster of issues that concern the country’s scientific and technological achievements and the limits to which the human mind can control technology.7 One quarter of Russian people see the Fukushima Daiichi disaster as “likely the result of human intervention in nature, climate change and the terrain.” Almost 70 percent of respondents believe that “the Japanese authorities have not told the whole truth about what

6 Goloshchapova, N. Japan through the Eyes of the Youth in Irkutsk Region // Window to Japan. Email Bulletin of the Russia–Japan Society No. 12, 2007. URL: http://www.ru-jp.org/goloshapova_01.htm (in Russian).

7 Eguchi, M. Scientific and Technical Progress in the Search within Japanese Society for New Areas of Development following the 2011 Disaster in East Japan // Philosophy and Science in Eastern and Western Culture. Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, 2013, pp. 256–263.




happened at Fukushima,” and that they continue to “downplay the real scale of the disaster.” What is more, 66 percent of those who took part in the survey see the consequences of the disaster as a threat to the environment in Russia.8 It is clear that the perception of Japan has changed in the eyes of the Russian people, and it has become a “close neighbour” of Russia.

Which country would Russian people like to see Russia emulate? Opinion polls conducted in 2014 suggest that 55 percent of respondents believe that Russia should strive to be itself; 12 percent believe that Russia should follow the exam-ple of Germany; 4 percent believe it should try to emulate the United States and Switzerland; and only 2 percent think that Russia should try to be like Japan (see Fig. 11). Interest in the Japanese language is growing slowly: 2 percent of Rus-sians believe that knowledge of Japanese could be useful for their children and grandchildren. That is not exactly a significant amount; however, only 1 percent of respondents consider knowledge of Italian, or even Russian, useful.9

Historical Memory as a Catalyst of Distrust towards JapanThe Russian perception of Japan is largely based on historical memory, which is formed by information sources in the process of socialization. Key to how the Russian people see Japan is the problem of the “northern territories,” which they view in emotional terms, as they know very little about them.

The survey conducted in May 2016 confirmed that most Russians do not wish to cede the disputed territories to Japan. In 1992, 71 percent of respondents were against ceding the islands to Japan, and in 2016, the number of those against it grew to 78 percent (Fig. 23). There is another scenario of the so-called “delayed sovereignty” Japan insists on. It entails recognizing the islands as part of Japan, but preserving Russian governance there for a long time. Yet the May 2016 sur-vey showed that 69 percent of respondents were strictly against such a solution to the territorial problem (in 1998, their stance was harsher, 73 percent agreed on such a “compromise”) (Fig. 24).

It is interesting to note whether Russians’ level of trust in their President will rise or fall if he decides to cede the “disputed islands.” It turns out that 32 percent of respondents will trust the President much less, 23 percent will trust somewhat less, and for 23 percent, the level of trust will remain unchanged (Fig. 25). This suggests that public opinion essentially ties the hands of Russia’s leader, even though he does have the option of making an unpopular decision if, in his opin-ion, it is in the best interests of the nation.

The proposal that Russia and Japan’s joint sovereignty over the four islands be recognized looks attractive for only 8 percent of the respondents (as opposed to 18 percent in 1991), while Russians’ determination to not cede even a single island, on the contrary, grew over twenty five years from 37 percent to 56 percent

8 Press Release No. 1722: The Fukushima Disaster: Is there a Threat to Russia? // VCIOM. March 31, 2011. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=111489 (in Russian).

9 Press Release No. 2714: Why Study a Foreign Language // VCIOM. November 14, 2014. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115051 (in Russian).


(Fig. 27). Curiously, the public opinion is somewhat dichotomous: 48 percent of respondents believe it to be “very important” or “quite important” for Russia to conclude a peace treaty, and only 38 percent believe that it is not particularly important or that it does not have major significance (Fig. 26). A scenario, which entails “signing the peace treaty and receiving loans and technologies” that could help transform the Russian Far East, would appear to be very attractive. Yet only 21 percent of respondents support this idea, and 56 percent want Russia to keep the islands at any cost (Fig. 28). This logic can be understood as: “a treaty is necessary, but without any concessions.” Unfortunately, Japan does not support this stance and insists on its tenet of “irredentas.”

Where does the South Kuril problem stem from and how is it linked to historical memory?

The Kuril Islands were discovered by the Dutch explorer Martin de Vries in 1643 (interestingly, the Netherlands has never laid claim to the territory). The first Rus-sian mention of the territory was in 1646 in connection with the “fairy tales” about the explorer Ivan Moskvitin. Martyn Spangberg led expeditions to the region in 1738–1739 and 1742, resulting in the members of his team mapping the Lesser Kuril Ridge (the Shikotan and Habomai Islands), where they erected signs in the form of crosses and copper plaques with the inscription: “This land belongs to Russia.” The Russians taught the local Ainu people various crafts. Importantly, the Ainu were not Japanese in their origin: “When I went to ask the hairy folk that lived there (i.e. Ainu people with beards – Author) about who they were and how they differed from Japanese people, they said that they would not declare them-selves the subjects of any state, and therefore those hairy people from the Kuril Islands as other peoples that might be found there should be influenced through kindness and goodwill…”10

Japanese documents confirm this. For example, in his work An Illustrated Description of Three Countries (三国通覧図説, “Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu”), the Japanese thinker Shihei Hayashi (1738–1793) warned about the advancement of the Russians on the Kuril Islands: “I heard that when they asked, ‘What coun-try are you from?’ the Ainu people said, ‘We’re from Orossia” (incidentally, the ‘Orossia’ is a variation of the word ‘Rus’, and Rus is the name of the fortress in Muscovy – something like Edo in Japan…).” The name “Kuril” most likely comes from the Ainu language, in which “kuru” means “man” or “person,” hence their second name – “Kuril.”

Russia first attempted to establish relations with Japan in the late 18th century. In 1792–1793, Adam Laxman led an expedition to Japan, returning several Japa-nese sailors who had been shipwrecked off the coast of Kamchatka under the captaincy of the merchant Daikokuya Kōdayū. Despite its isolationist policy, the

10 Russian Expeditions to Explore the Northern Part of the Pacific Ocean in the Second Half of the XVIII Century in: collection of documents / Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Central Archives of the Fleet and the Navy Department of the USSR [compiled by T.S. Fedorova (chief compiler), L.V. Glazunova and G.N. Fedorova]. Moscow: Nauka; Chief Editorial Board of Eastern Literature, 1989. (Russian Studies of the Pacific Ocean in the XVIII and First Half of the XIX Centuries in: collection of documents: [in 6 volumes] / Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Central Archives of the Fleet and the Navy Department of the USSR, Editor-in-Chief – A.L. Narochnitskiy. Vol. 2) (in Russian).




Tokugawa Shogunate graciously welcomed the Russian embassy in Hakodate on the island of Matmai (now Hokkaido), which did not even belong to Japan at the time. However, the next attempt by Russia to foster diplomatic relations with Japan in 1803–1804, when Nikolai Rezanov was sent to the country by Alexan-der I, proved to be unsuccessful. The Shogunate did not receive the ambassador and refused to establish any kind of relationship with Russia. �

The Russian people still feel a vague threat (which has evidently been transmitted from generation to generation) as a result of Tokyo’s efforts in the late 19th century to strengthen its positions in Manchuria on the Russian border. Other historical events remain in the national memory: the humiliating defeat of 1905, the missing “Russian gold,” the Japanese intervention in the Russian Far East during the Civil War, the Battle of Lake Khasan (1938) and the Nomonhan (Khalkhin Gol) Incident (1939). Stalinist propaganda successfully spun the Soviet Union’s entrance into the war against Japan in 1945 as a reaction against Japanese provocation. Russia spent decades planting and cultivating negative stereotypes about Japan, which also played a fatal role. However, noticeable changes have been taking place of late: for example, the word “samurai,” which until recently carried a negative connotation, is now often used in more positive contexts as a symbol of tenacity and fidelity to one’s duty.

Historical memory matters. What is important, however, is that it is not critical in determining public consciousness, provided that it is not encouraged. The most compelling proof of this is Germany, which has managed to successfully over-come the effects of historical conflicts with its neighbours to become the driving force of the European Union.

The Japanese side likes to point to the first official document concerning the status of the Kuril Islands – the Treaty of Shimoda, which was signed on February 7 (January 26), 1855 (nationalists celebrate “Northern Territories Day” on Febru-ary 7 every year). Article 2 of the Treaty states that: “Henceforth the boundary between the two nations shall lie between the islands of Iturup and Urup. The whole of Iturup shall belong to Japan; and the Kuril Islands, lying to the north of and including Urup, shall belong to Russia. As for the island of Karafuto [Sakha-lin], it remains as heretofore undivided between Japan and Russia.”11

As part of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg signed on May 7 (April 25), 1875, Japan ceded the rights to the southern part of Sakhalin in exchange for all 18 Kuril islands.12 This was followed by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, which resulted in Russian statesman and signatory to the treaty S. Witte being named Count Half-Sakhalin. However, according to the principle of international law that was actively used up until the first half of the 20th century and which states that all agreements and treaties between countries are rendered null and void when

11 Hayashi S. Ezo shi (A Description of Ezo) // Written Monuments of the East, 2011, No. 1 (14), pp. 5–17 (translated into Russian from the Japanese by V.V. Shchepkin). Cit. ex: The History of Russia–Japan Relations / Ed. by: S.V. Grishachev. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2015, p. 281 (in Russian).

12 Karelova L.B., Chugrov S.V. Japan and the Outside World: Contacts from Ancient Ages to the “Opening” of the Country in 1853 // Japan’s Foreign Policy / Ed. by E.V. Molodyakova. Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, 2008, p. 17 (in Russian).


those countries are at war with each other,13 Japan lost all rights to invoke those “treaties.” What is more, these rights were lost not in 1945, following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, but rather in 1904, when it so treacherously attacked Port Arthur.

Looking ahead, we should note that to engage in a historical (or, for that matter, legal or ethnographical) dispute with Japanese partners is not particularly pro-ductive: first, because each side has its own arguments and, secondly, the sides do not always understand each other. However, Russia’s main argument in the dispute is political: the islands became part of the Soviet Union after the Second World War, as the USSR was on the winning side, while Japan was not. This is an indisputable fact, and all other arguments fade into the background.

The status of the Kuril Islands is defined by the following documents: The Crimean Agreement of the Three Great Powers on the Far East of February 11, 1945 (part of the Yalta Conference); Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945; Article 107 of the UN Charter; and the Treaty of San Francisco of September 8, 1951. Chapter 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco officially states that Japan renounces all rights and claims to the Kuril Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adja-cent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.14 However, Moscow was unable back then (in 1951) to ensure that the document clearly stated to whom the Kuril Islands would be transferred. This fact would later be used by Tokyo as a loophole in an effort to justify its territorial claims. At the same time, the suggestion that the rights to the Kuril Islands could be given to a country other than the Soviet Union, which had administrative control over the territory – say, to Greece or Luxem-bourg, which were also party to the Treaty – is patently absurd.15

An attempt was made to find a way out of the impasse in the main document codifying relations between the two countries at the time, namely, the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of October 19, 1956, which was ratified by the parlia-ments of Russia and Japan. Article 9 of the Declaration states that the USSR, “desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-lics and Japan.”16 Two months after the signing of the Declaration, and with the

13 Grimm, E.D. Digest of Agreements and Other Documents on the History of International Relations in the Far East (1842–1925). Moscow, 1927. Cit. ex: The History of Russia–Japan Relations… p. 292 (in Russian).

14 Klyuchnikov Y., Sabanin A. Recent International Politics in Treaties, Notes and Declarations. Part 1. From the French Revolution to the Imperial War. Moscow: Litizdat NKID, 1925. Cit. ex: The History of Russia–Japan Relations… p. 298 (in Russian).

15 The Modern Law of International Treaties. Vol. 2. The Validity if International Agreements: in 2 Volumes / I.I. Lukashuk; The Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: Volters Kluver, 2006, pp. 352–353 (in Russian).

16 Chugrov S.V. USSR–Japan Relations after the Second World War (Late 1940s – 1950s) // Russia–Japan Relations as Parallel Histories. Collective Monograph / Editors-in-Chief – A.V. Torkunov and M. Iokibe. Moscow: MGIMO University, 2015, p. 630. Japanese version: Chugrov, S.V. Kova-kara soniti kokko kaifuku. Dai 20 syu (From a Peace Agreement to the Restoration of USSR–Japan Relations, Chapter 20) // Nichirokankeishi. Parareru hisutōri no chōsen (The History of Russia–Japan Relations. The Experience of a Parallel History) / Ed. by M. Iokibe, N. Simotomai, A.V. Torkunov, D.V. Streltsov. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppan-kai (University of Tokyo Press), 2015, p. 442 (in Russian).




support of Moscow, Japan became a member of the United Nations. It would later become a non-permanent member of the Security Council. The exhausting dip-lomatic marathon that concluded with the signing of the Declaration claimed two key Japanese politicians: that December, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama retired from political life; and soon after, the chief negotiator for the Japanese side and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mamoru Shigemitsu, passed away.

Furthermore, in December 1960, Japan signed a new agreement on cooperation and security with the United States that strengthened the U.S. presence on the Japanese islands. Nikita Khrushchev was outraged by the news and Moscow radically changed its attitude towards Tokyo in response, refusing to honour its obligations under Article 9 of the Declaration. A long and painful period of entropy followed, during which Moscow stubbornly repeated that the “matter had been settled,” and that there were insufficient points of contact for a compromise to be reached by the two sides.

The visit of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka to Moscow in October 1973 could have been a turning point in bilateral relations, but it failed to live up to expectations: Leonid Brezhnev was not impressed by the insistence of the Japanese side that it be given “all four islands.” The territorial issue became even more painful for Tokyo after 1977, when the global community reached agreements on the delin-eation of 200-mile economic zones, and a sea area of roughly 200 thousand square kilometres that was teeming with an immeasurable amount of marine resources was developed around the islands.

The sentiments of the political elite changed radically with the advent of perestroika, and it seemed that the “moment of glory” had arrived for Japan. How-ever, President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev did not visit Japan until April 1991, when the Soviet Union was already on its last legs. Boris Yeltsin will be remembered in the history of Russia–Japan relations primarily for his deci-sion to cancel his trip to Tokyo in September 1992, just four days before he was scheduled to leave Moscow. Nevertheless, the Tokyo Declaration signed during the President’s visit to Japan in October 1993, which lasted just 36 hours, did take relations between the two countries to a new level, as all four islands were mentioned in it.17 The informal “No Tie” meeting with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto that took place in Krasnoyarsk in November 1997 was marked by the announcement by Boris Yeltsin of his decision to sign a peace agreement by 2000. However, the negotiations that took place in 1997 in the city of Kawana on the idyllic Izu Peninsula did not bring about any official announcements.18

Since the beginning of the 21st century, Russia’s attempts to reach a mutual understanding with Japan on the territorial dispute have taken on a systemic character. Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in Irkutsk

17 Swearingen R. The Soviet Union and the Postwar Japan. Stanford, Calif., 1978, pp. 223-225.18 Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialists. October 19, 1956 // Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1956.

No. 24. Cit. ex. A Systematic History of International Relations in Four Volumes. Events and Documents. 1918–2003 / MGIMO University of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; ed. by A.D. Bogaturov. Vol. 4. Documents. 1845–2003 / Compiled by E.G. Kapustin, A.V. Malgin and A.A. Sokolov. Moscow: Scientific and Educational Forum on International Relations, 2004 (in Russian).


in 2001 resulted in the Japanese people warming significantly to Russia (see Fig. 31). Following the talks, the parties agreed to continue cooperation concerning the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai, with the aim of creating a favourable environment for the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty. The parties reaffirmed the importance of implementing the Memorandum on the New Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan Yohei Kono on January 16, 2001, and of activities to increase public awareness about the significance of signing a peace treaty.19 A sizeable portion of the Irkutsk Agreements was implemented, the negotiations continued, and the compendium of documents was published. However, it became clear that the sides were still far from reaching a genuine mutual understanding.

The feelings of the Japanese people towards Russia spiked following the visit of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Moscow in January 2003, with 20 percent of respondents viewing the country positively (see Fig. 31): the parties signed the Japan–Russia Action Plan in six key areas, which mentions the importance of concluding a peace treaty.20 In 2009, Japan’s government Advisor on inter-national issues Shotaro Yachi proposed to divide the four disputed South Kuril Islands between Russia and Japan “equally” (3.5+0.5).21 The proposal was met with a storm of criticism from members of the Japanese parliament and within the Japanese political elite, who were one in their demand that Japan should be given “all four islands, and nothing less.” The attitude of the Japanese people towards Russia hardened once again, with just over 17 percent of respondents saying that they had positive feelings towards their neighbour (see Fig. 31).

In 2010, a “war” broke out between Japan and Russia that had a similar effect on the mind-set of the Russian people as the U.S. bombing of Serbia, when any affection they may have felt towards the United States was destroyed. The sit-uation aggravated after the House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Diet of Japan, unanimously approved amendments to the Law “On Spe-cial Measures Forcing the Solution of the Problem of the Northern Territories,” which included a clause stating that the four islands belong to Japan.

It just so happened that then President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev visited Kunashir Island on November 1, 2010. The visit was the first trip by a head of state of Russia or the former Soviet Union to the South Kuril Islands and it had been planned long before the amendments to the Law were approved in Japan.22 The trip

19 New Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2001, pp. 6–9.

20 Irkutsk Statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of Japan on the Continuation of Future Negotiations on the Issue of a Peace Treaty. March 25, 2001. Cit. ex.: The History of Russia–Japan Relations… p. 333 (in Russian).

21 Japan–Russia Action Plan // Official Site of the President of the Russian Federation. January 10, 2003. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/4684. Cit. ex.: The History of Russia–Japan Relations… p. 257 (in Russian).

22 The government of Japan announced the visit of Secretary of the Security Council in Moscow // World News, Breaking News. November 16, 2017. URL: http://sevendaynews.com/2016/11/08/the-government-of-japan-announced-the-visit-of-secretary-of-the-security-council-in-moscow/




angered the Japanese authorities, and the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Japan was sent a formal protest. The sharp reaction of Japanese leaders, in turn, caused bewilderment and unabashed resentment in Russia.

Russian politicians are looking for ways to establish a wider platform for coop-eration, one that does not sacrifice the national interests of the parties or turn the territory into a “bargaining chip.” In November 2016, Chairwoman of the Council of the Federation Valentina Matviyenko visited Japan and called for the Japanese side to be realistic in its assessment of the situation, saying that there could no longer be any doubt that the Kuril Islands belong to Russia.23 However, this position does not contradict the fact that the Russian side is actively looking for, and is sincerely committed to, finding mutually beneficial compromises. Of course, one or two visits are not nearly enough to resolve all the issues. It is a deep-seated problem, a tangled knot that cannot be untied. However, we must try, patiently, methodically and persistently, to untangle the mess and gradually move closer to a constructive compromise.

These challenges have become particularly relevant since Donald Trump was elected President of the United States. Observers were curious to what extent Trump was ready to remain true to the claims and promises he had made during the election campaign and immediately afterwards. Let us point to three in particular: 1) the promise to take a more hard-line approach to relations with China; 2) the desire for Japan to pay for its “umbrella,” that is, to cover a larger share of the costs for maintaining US military bases on its territory; 3) the intention to conduct a constructive dialogue with the President of the Russian Federation. As for China, his contradictory line reminds more of a zigzag. During his talks with Shinzo Abe in November 2017, Trump urged Japan to to purchase a large-scale arsenal of US anti-ballistic missiles to shoot down Pyongyang’s rockets.24 As for contacts with Russia, at the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Danang, Vietnam, on November 10, 2017, Trump showed his shortage of ideas for a constructive dialogue.25 One still cannot rule out the possibility that the President of the United States could come up with new, more pragmatic (as well as difficult to predict) scenarios for transforming the current world order.

This could lead to new and more balanced geopolitical configurations appearing in the northwest part of the Pacific Ocean, configurations in which Russia–Japan relations could receive an unexpected boost to their development. How effective will these new schemes be? To what extent will the interpretation of the territorial problems change? This will depend to a great degree on a multi-factor system of variables, including the images that Russia and Japan have of each other.

23 U.S. says backs Japan in dispute with Russia over Kuril Islands // Katakami. November 3, 2010. URL: https://katakaml.wordpress.com/tag/russia/page/4/

24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: Tokyo Distorts History in the dialogue on a Peace Treaty // RIA Novosti. February 20, 2016. URL: http://www.ria.ru/world/20160220/1377951658.html#ixzz45OdHpPDQ (in Russian).

25 US-Japan arms deals will help counter North Korea threat, says Trump // The Guardian. November 6, 2017. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/06/trump-defends-strong-rhetoric-in-calling-north-korea-a-threat-to-civilised-world


2. Perceptions of Russia in Japan: Key Components

Russian and Japanese people share a number of common traits – both experience intense internal emotions; both have a tendency to conceal their real feelings and engage in self-reflection; both try to deal with the twists and turns of life through psychological filters; and both experience “soft passions,” no matter how strange this oxymoron might seem. So why is distrust of Russian people a dominant aspect of the Japanese national consciousness? After all, neither the Soviet Union nor Russia had any involvement in any of the terrible crimes committed against humanity. Why, after being the target of the United States’ atomic bombs at the end of the Second World War, have the Japanese people forgiven the Americans? Not only have they forgiven them, but they are even on friendly terms with them. Why is this? Today, more than 70 years after the surrender of Japan, we are still looking for an answer to the question: What is the difference for the Japanese people between the winners of the war, between Washington and Moscow? “Even towards the United States, which was responsible for the deaths of 500,000 civilians in indiscriminate bombing of cities, including the two atomic bombs which annihilated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people in general, did not harbour such a strong sense of injustice and wounded feelings as was the case with the Soviet Union,” notes Professor Kazuhiko Togo.26

The World through the Eyes of Japanese PeopleWhen discussing the “pivot to Asia,” Russian politicians should pay greater attention to the contours of the political and psychological problem – the grow-ing awareness on the part of the Japanese people of their identity as an Asian people, and the psychological scars that come as a result of self-isolation and which are part of the Japanese socio-genetic code. The Japanese have never felt the need to classify their country as part of Asia; for centuries, they were convinced that they could “ignore Asia.” As far as we can see, towards the end of the 20th century Japan started to feel that it was breaking away from Asia. Now, however, it is fighting to be recognized as part of the continent. The slo-gan “From Asia to Europe” (脱亜入欧, datsua nyuo) remains, but its content has changed: it now includes the desire to occupy dominant positions in Asia through economic influence, a very important component. What is even more important, a new slogan was proposed: “Return to Asia, Turn Away from the West” (帰亜離欧, kia rio), that is, finding Asia anew, and positioning Japan within that continent.27 The interest in Asia and its peoples is growing by the

26 Togo K. Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945–2009. The Quest for a Proactive Policy. 3rd ed. Leiden, N.L. & Boston: Brill, 2010, pp. 230–231.

27 Abe K. Sonaeru Nasyonarizumu. Orientarizumu. Japan. Gurobarizeshon (Nationalism that Lost its Way. Orientalism. Japan. Globalization.) Tokyo: Sekai shisosha, 2001, pp. 77–85.

2. PERCEPTIONS OF RUSSIA IN JAPAN: KEY COMPONENTS



minute. The Japanese people had at one time been semi-isolated from Asia. Later on, they largely followed their neighbour across the ocean; yet now, they have become acutely conscious of the significance of Asia for their country. Japan has been experiencing an “Asian boom”: a renewed interest in an East-ern worldview, in India as the cradle of civilization, and its esoteric teachings and ancient culture; a fascination with the spiritual and material culture of South Korea; and the high popularity of applied folk arts from Vietnam and Bali (Indonesia).

The United States, China, and South Korea are always parts of Japan’s vital inter-ests and they represent key priorities for the Japanese political elite and public opinion (See Figs. 32, 33 and 34). At the same time, when political relations with, for instance, Beijing and Seoul experience a turn for the worse, it has almost no influence on the cultural affinities of the Japanese. The image of Asia that is emerging in the “Asian boom” is radically different from the xenophobic hostil-ity whipped up by propaganda during past aggressive imperial campaigns. The ghosts of the past are gradually being replaced by a more intimate, allied and pure image of Asia, which is somewhat reminiscent of the nostalgic image of patriarchal Japan.

Mutual perceptions of the Japanese, on the one hand, and of the Chinese, Kore-ans and peoples of Southeast Asia on the other, have been clouded by the fact that they cannot accept the Japanese interpretation of those episodes of military history, which, in the opinions of the politicians, experts and the populations of the latter countries, are proof of Japan’s aggressive politics. In the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, Japan twice initiated military operations against China and Korea, which both suffered extensive financial, physical, and moral damage. Flare-ups in relations with Japan occur on a regular basis: every time the Prime Minister of Japan visits Yasukuni shrine, a memorial that China and Korea view as militarist, or every time a new history textbook comes out. The out-bursts of protest from their neighbours, which sometimes assume radical forms, cause Japanese people psychological discomfort that is exacerbated by territo-rial disputes with Beijing concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and with Seoul concerning the Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Tokto Islands) (See Figs. 33 and 34). Besides, the Japanese are very sensitive to any mention of North Korea’s nuclear programme, which is of particular danger for Japan.

Given the situation, the United States remains Japan’s strategic partner since the occupation by the Allies. Despite the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Naga-saki in 1945, pro-American leanings in Japan are fairly strong (See Fig. 32), due to the following reasons:

• the Japanese people came to terms with the 1945–1951 occupation, as it was prudent to submit to the superior force, and got used to the idea of the United States assuming the role of guardian;

• due to the dominance of paternalism in their collective unconscious, the majority of Japanese people began to view the United States as a “father-figure” or a “big brother”;


• top-to-bottom reform of the system exerted a powerful influence on the Japanese mind-set, since the Americans instilled the idea of U.S. superiority in the Japanese society;

• the United States assumed Japan’s defence expenses by opening its nuclear “umbrella” over Japan;

• Washington invested heavily into its ally’s modernization, and Japan made use of that money to start mass-producing equipment, including home appliances, which had a positive effect on the Japanese economy.

Yet the key is probably the fact that the United States introduced an effective system, which was drastically different from the authoritarianism of the past. The United States also wrote Japan’s new constitution, which came into force on May 3, 1947. What is more, the Japanese were exhausted by the “barracks mentality” and huge casualties, and the United States gave Japan a hope for the future. Moreover, this “bright future” made itself known as the Japanese eco-nomic miracle of the 1960s–1970s, when Japan joined the ranks of the world’s richest and most industrially developed countries.

The United States compensated Japan for the atrocities of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with large-scale reforms, and, most importantly, with a hope for success. The USSR and then Russia offered no such compensation for the blows delivered to Japan’s national pride. Japan admits the attack on Pearl Harbor and honours the memory of the victims of the nuclear bombings, but the country must have resigned itself to the thought that these victims were the toll Japan had to pay for her treacherous attack on the United States in December 1941. However, the Japanese know with absolute certainty that their country did not attack Russia (the USSR) at the time, and they refuse to accept references to Joseph Stalin’s political calculations as explanatory arguments. Tokyo does not accept that the Soviet military operation against the Kwantung Army was a form of payment for the opening of the Second Front. Hence, the Japanese mind formed the drastically different images of the victors: the United States as a bene-factor and a caretaker, and Russia as a kind of treacherous nation.28

Russia cannot accept Japan’s logic, but it should try to understand it. Hushing up the facts will only exacerbate the misunderstandings. Yet instead of unbiased facts, the Russian media often comes up with fictitious statements, errors and hostile opinions. For instance, one TV show claimed that Japanese teachers tell their students that “the Russians are responsible” for the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.29

We should not claim that all Japanese people are fond of the United States. They view Americans in various ways, but mostly, their take is entirely pragmatic. The older generation who lived through the occupation remembers the instances of violence perpetrated by the United States and they disapprove of the Americans’

28 Chugrov S. An Interrupted Dream // Ogonyok. 2015. No. 34 (5387). August 31. URL: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2795331 (in Russian).

29 REN TV. The Military Secret. Broadcast on April 9, 2016. URL: http://www.ren.tv/video/epizod/84490 (in Russian).




pushiness. The generation that grew up with American goods and values views the United States rather favourably, and sometimes slightly condescendingly. Calls for greater political independence can be heard in Japan with increasing frequency. A part of the Japanese intellectual elite is displeased with Tokyo’s dependence on Washington, since the United States is used to resolving issues by force and only in their own interests. For instance, the columnist Yoshihito Karibe is extremely harsh in his statements, “People in the West have sold their souls to the devil and they know no limits in their desire to gratify their needs.”30

In other words, Japan is choosing to become more fully integrated into the global system, yet on the whole, it continues to pragmatically lean on the close ties with the United States, even though criticism of Washington is being stepped up.

Analysis of the Image of Russia in JapanAccording to the New Edition of the Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia, the official Tokyo’s policy vis-à-vis Russia is aimed at “the conclusion of a peace treaty through the solution of the issue of where the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai belong, which means the accomplishment of the normalization of Russia-Japan relations in the post-war period.”31 Hence, Tokyo’s misinterpretation of the 1956 normalization as incomplete has become a toxic factor of shaping the negative image of Russia.

Over several decades, the Japanese Cabinet Information Research Office carries out regular public opinion surveys. Relations with Russia are part of these sur-veys as well. Russia’s place in the Japanese mind is radically different from the place Japan holds in the Russian mind.

Prior to 2010, the graphs reflecting the favourable and unfavourable attitudes of the Japanese people slowly climbed up and down, never going too high or too low (see Fig. 31). Positive opinion towards Russia peaked in 1990–1991 (23.3–24.3 percent), when Mikhail Gorbachev (Gorby), to whom the Japanese people took a fancy, and his ideas about perestroika captured the public’s imagination. The next spike in pro-Russian sentiment, although less pronounced, could be seen when Vladimir Putin was elected President of the Russian Federation and met with Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in Irkutsk in 2001. That was another peak of positive expectations of changes.

During the severe crisis in relations (2010–2011), the share of people who do not view Russia favourably grew from 79.6 percent to 82.9 percent, and the share of those who do view Russia favourably dropped from 15.4 percent to 13.4 percent. It was only in 2012 that the Japanese attitude toward Russia improved, by 7.1 percent. 2013–2015 saw another drop in positive attitudes towards Russia, this time in connection with the events in Crimea and Ukraine:

30 Karibe Yoshihito. The Japanese Identity (from ancient times to the globalization era). Ph.D. dissertation (History). Moscow, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004, p. 87.

31 New Edition of the Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia. 1999. URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition01/preface.html


the share of Japanese people who held a favourable opinion of Russia dropped from 22.5 percent to 17.4 percent, while the share of ill-wishers and the indif-ferent grew from 74.7 percent to 79.3 percent. A survey conducted in Japan in 2014 showed some shocking results: Russia became the country that Japanese people “disliked the most” (see Fig. 30). Fortunately, in 2016, the trend made a symbolic turn: the former grew a bit from 17.4 to 19.3 percent and the latter dropped from 79.3 to 76.9 percent (see Fig. 31). The same indicators for the United States have remained practically at the same level, while the attitudes toward China and South Korea, after a long and steady decline, have become a little bit more favourable (see Fig. 32-34).

The Japanese people felt the events in Crimea particularly painfully, as they saw similarities with the Kuril Islands situation. What is more, anti-Russian senti-ments were artificially whipped up by the media. Some Japanese media outlets reported that, behind the scenes, Japanese politicians had started to discuss in all seriousness the idea of a “swap,” whereby Russia would cede the Kuril Islands to Japan and Japan would recognize Crimea as part of Russia.32 Such scenarios leave a strange impression: if Japan were to lift the sanctions unilater-ally, it would have changed nothing for Russia; it would have even forced Russia into a worse position that could have been interpreted along the lines of Tokyo having “grounds” to claim the islands, with the unification of Crimea and Russia being allegedly wrongful.

Nonetheless, the exacerbation of Russia–Japan relations as a result of the events in Ukraine paled in comparison to the sharp flare-up of Tokyo’s territorial disputes with China (the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) and South Korea (the Takeshima/Tokto Islands, also known as the Liancourt Rocks). Professor and retired diplomat Akio Kawato explains that, “Today, when Japan’s confrontation with China is getting more serious, Russia is gaining points in Japan. Compared to the situation with the Takeshima and Senkaku Islands, the Kuril Islands problem is far less tinged with hostility and negative emotions.”33

In 2012, Vladimir Putin took the top ranking position for the second time. How-ever, this time, he was not what he used to be in the eyes of many Japanese specialists, but a new Vladimir Putin who had specified his agenda.34 The image of “Putin-2” (the name the Japanese use to denote Vladimir Putin’s second pres-idential term) also played a substantial positive role. Statements by Japanese intellectuals are typical in this respect. Kazuhiko Togo and Kensaku Kumabe, eminent experts on Russia, write that, “Putin based his rule on something that is hard to explain through the generally accepted principles of Western European democracy. We think that it was manifested in his intention to use the political

32 The Japanese Propose Swapping Crimea for the Kuril Islands // Russkiy kod. August 12, 2015. URL: http://rusmi.su/news/08-2015/news3887.html (in Russian); Izotov I. Poklonskaya will Head the Russia–Japan Crimean Society // Rossiiskaya gazeta. March 11, 2015. URL: http://www.rg.ru/2015/03/11/reg-kfo/drujba.html (in Russian).

33 The Polis Journal Round Table. Inoguchi T., Harada Yu., Hakamada S., Kawato A., Shimotomai N. Russia and Japan. Part I. A look from Japan // Polis. Political Studies. 2013 (№ 6), pp. 108–130 (in Russian).

34 Togo K. Jidai-no setsumoku-no tankan ga tsukiugokasu nichiro kosho: Honto-no “owari-no hajimari” to naru ka? (Japanese–Russian negotiations opening “new chapter in history”: Will they really be ‘a beginning of the end?) // Sekai. 2013. No. 7, p. 69.




institutions of the vertical governance model to focus all the power on himself and, being a representative of Russia and acting as a leader named ‘Putin,’ to use the attractive ideals which draw people to him, to assemble everything together and to pull it after him.”35

Such statements reveal both bewilderment and poorly concealed admiration for Vladimir Putin’s knack for coping with seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Pro-fessor Nobuo Shimotomai of Hosei University provides arguments for an unusual and powerful metaphor: he believes that Vladimir Putin is motivated by his desire to transform Moscow into the geopolitical “Third Rome.”36

The Japanese people are impressed that the President of Russia understands certain specific features of Japanese culture. Even before his inauguration, in an interview to the Asahi Shimbun, Vladimir Putin aptly used the word “Hajime!” (はじめ), a sports term meaning “Start!” which opens any round in Japanese mar-tial arts. In the political context, the term transitioned from hints into promises to look for an alternative to the current state of Russia–Japan relations.

The meeting between Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the 2014 Sochi Olympics demonstrated that personal relations between the leaders of Russia and Japan allowed for an additional “framework” of interstate ties to be constructed. Both Russian and Japanese researchers emphasize the fact that personal diplomacy agrees with both Russian and Japanese mind-sets, and the leaders’ meetings contribute to improving the image of the partner country in the public opinion.37 The parties rely on this when preparing to turn a new page in the history of Russia–Japan relations. According to a statement made by the Russian Foreign Ministry on December 27, 2016, after the talks of Vladimir Putin with Shinzo Abe in Nagato City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in mid-December 2016, Japan and Russia have mutually eased visa restrictions from 1 January 2017. Henceforth, Russian citizens visiting Japan can extend their multiple-entry visas for short-term visits validity period to five years.38

It should be noted that the “Crimean saga” had its good points as well, points which the Japanese people liked. A meeting was held between the Crimean lead-ership and former Prime Minister of Japan Yukio Hatoyama when he visited the peninsula; after the meeting, the parties considered the possibility of opening a Crimean branch of the Japanese–Russian Friendship Society. This was a clear sign that the situation began to change towards more favourable attitude.

35 Togo K., Kumabe K. Abe–Putin-no sinseiki (Abe-Putin’s New Era) // Rosia to Nihon. Jiki ishiki-no rekishi-o hiko suru (Russia and Japan. The Comparative History of Self-Identifications). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2016, p. 230.

36 Shimotomai N. Shikyu-chiseigaku-kara yomu Roshia. “Daisan Roma”-wo mezasu Puchin (Reading Russia through Religion and Geopolitics. Putin Dreaming of the “Third Rome”). Tokyo − Nihon keizai shimbun shuppansha, 2016.

37 See, for instance, Streltsov D.V., Chugrov S.V. Evolution of Mutual Images in the History of Russian–Japanese Interactions as an Independent Factor in Bilateral Relations // Russia–Japan Relations as Parallel Histories. Ed. by A.V. Torkunov, M. Iokibe. Moscow: MGIMO-University, 2015 (in Russian); Hara K. San-Furanshisuko heiwa joyaku-nomoten (The Gaps in the Treaty of San Francisco). Hiroshima: Heisuisha, 2013.

38 President of Russia Visits Japan // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/rss/northern/page1e_000130.html; Japan, Russia to ease visa restrictions for each other from January 2017 // Y-Axis News. December 28, 2016. URL: https://www.y-axis.com/news/japan-russia-to-ease-visa-restrictions-for-each-other/


Historical Memory as a Catalyst of Distrust towards Russia

The historical memory of the Japanese and Russian people preserves some rather vague distrust, which is transmitted to the new generations. Japanese children are taught that during the Meiji era (1867–1912), Russia was among the states that forced unequal treaties on Japan and deprived Japan of “useful” territorial gains in Northeast China. Hence the feeling of danger stemming from the Russian presence in Manchuria in the late 19th century; it snowballed into the Russo–Japanese war of the early 20th century and was solidified after the Bolshe-vik coup d’état in 1917. The USSR dealt painful blows to Japan’s national pride when it joined the war against Japan on the side of the Allies, declared war on Japan in August 1945 and defeated the Japanese army in Manchuria, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands. The Japanese national mind-set had an extremely hard time coping with the internment of over 600,000 prisoners of war in Siberia, with one in every ten not returning home.

It was only in October 1993 that President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin offered an official apology for the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war, and several issues were resolved (visiting remaining cemeteries was allowed, certifi-cates of forced labour were issued, etc.). However, many Japanese people, espe-cially the older generation, still feel dissatisfaction, bitterness, and sometimes fear, fuelled by numerous films, which have the “harsh Siberian captivity” as their subject. Professor Kazuhiko Togo writes about the exceptionally strong national sentiment: “The trials those prisoners of war went through in the Soviet camps, and other tragedies of the Soviet occupation, have forever been imprinted in the Japanese national mind-set.”39

The Japanese are still dissatisfied with the lack of progress on the territorial prob-lem which, in their opinion, arose because the USSR had taken the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai and Shikotan, and retains them, disregarding Japan’s requests. This is an old, but persistent myth: the Japanese saw a threat from the north long before the Soviets took control. For instance, in 1942, when the contacts were fairly stable, the historian Shinichiro Takakura wrote that Russians had pushed the natives they viewed as aliens out of the northern border, and Russia’s threat to Japan in that region helped revive the old spirit of nationalism and nationalized the system of military governance.40

Tokyo’s intractable stance rests on the direct support of Washington, which is certain that Moscow will never agree to cede the islands. The United States believes that “the concept of the ‘four islands’ was the ‘wedge’ the Cold War logic had driven between Japan and the Soviet Union.”41 Under the influence of the media, some Japanese people are wary of the great size and unpredictability of their northern neighbour.

39 Togo K. Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945–2009. The Quest for a Proactive Policy. 3rd ed. Leiden, N.L. & Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 484.

40 Harrison J.A. Japan’s Northern Frontier. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953, p. IX.41 Hara K. San-Furanshisuko heiwa joyaku-nomoten (The Gaps in the Treaty of San Francisco). Hiroshima: Heisuisha, 2013,

p. 147.




Yet there are researchers in Japan, especially among the younger generation, who call for a rational perception of Russia’s stance. Iwao Osaki notes an inter-esting aspect: “The problem of the ‘northern territories’ invented by the Japanese government plays an important role in promoting ‘nationalism’ as a political prin-ciple or ideology, and in giving the ‘nation’ a common collective identity.”42 And this is not an isolated opinion, which testifies to the broad spectrum of opinions that exists in Japan on the territorial dispute. We could agree with the Japanese author: the problem of the islands is highly politicized.

It is generally believed that the problem of the “northern territories” blocks the development of relations between the two countries. Saying that the Japanese people dislike Russians due to the territorial dispute would be an exaggeration. We could suppose that rather the reverse is true: the dispute cannot be resolved because the Japanese people dislike Russia, since they view the country with suspicion and distrust. When we overcome this distrust, it will be easier to come to an agreement on the territorial dispute.

42 Osaki I. “Hoppo ryodo” mondai-ni kan-suru senko kenkyu-no totatsuten to sonno genkai (Revising Previous Research into the ‘Northern Territories’ Problem) // Kokusai kankei ronshu. (Works on International Relations) Kioto−Ritsumeikan daigaku kokusai kankei gakkai, 2007, p. 37.


Japan successfully utilizes its reputation as an “unusual and inimitable country” shrouded in a veil of mystery and charm. Colourful festivals, “floating world” landscapes known from the Ukiyo-e engravings and artistic traditions have transformed into Japan’s “soft power” elements. The Japanese people perceive the charm of their country with jealous sensitivity, leading some researchers to talk about Japanese narcissism.43 Official Tokyo exploits Japan’s cultural uniqueness for its own purposes, and does so effectively and pragmatically. In the early 1980s, when the notion of “soft power” did not yet exist, the Japanese government announced that “culture is of great interest in Japan and it represents national interests abroad.”44 We should not overestimate the range of possibilities afforded by “soft power.” Yet any political action has undoubtedly greater chances of success if it is taken against the background of a favourable perception of culture. Everybody knows that “soft power” is expensive, but “hard power” comes at a far greater financial, political and moral cost.

Cooperation in the Media In 2014, former Prime Minister of Japan Yoshiro Mori flew to Moscow for a few days to take part in the Second Russian–Japanese Forum “Points of Contact” organized by Rossiyskaya gazeta and Mainichi Shimbun, Japan’s largest media outlet (the first forum was held in Tokyo in February 2013). Having Russia’s figure-skating hope Elena Radionova, who is hugely popular in Japan, appear at the event was a strong move. “As the Japanese saying goes, whatever goes on, makes us stronger,” Teruo Tsuneda, Managing Director at Mainichi Newspa-pers Co Ltd, reminded the Forum’s participants. “Understanding contributes to improving relations, and such is the newspapers’ mission.”45

The Third Russian–Japanese Forum held in Tokyo in the spring of 2015 showed that frank communication had become vitally necessary at a time when the world was undergoing serious trials and dialogue and contacts simply had to be stepped up. Evgeny Afanasiev, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Rus-sian Federation to Japan, called the Forum “a powerful intellectual force.”46

Indeed, the efforts of both Rossiyskaya gazeta and Mainichi Shimbun could turn the Forum into an influential channel promoting solutions for a whole range of tasks concerning the enhancement of political, informational, cultural and sporting

43 Iwabuchi K. Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002, p. 14.

44 Bunka gyosei sogo keikaku-nitsuite (On the Principle Areas of Cultural Policies). Tokyo, 1982, p. 3.45 Latukhina K. The Character that Means Friendship. Vladimir Putin Meets with Japan’s Former Prime Minister Yoshiro

Mori // Rossiyskaya gazeta. September 11, 2014. URL: http://www.rg.ru/2014/09/11/mori-site.html (in Russian).46 Lenin A. Russia’s Ambassador to Japan: The Forum Has Become a Serious Platform for Discussion // Rossiyskaya gazeta.

May 21, 2015. URL: https://www.rg.ru/2015/05/21/forum-site-anons.html (in Russian).

3. “Soft Power” in Russia–Japan Cooperation in the Humanitarian Sphere

3. “SOFT POWER” IN RUSSIA–JAPAN COOPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN SPHERE



contacts between the two countries. The escalation of events around Russia, the imposition of sanctions, and the promotion of an atmosphere of distrust, make it extremely hard to expand ties between media organizations and the greater state.Nevertheless, meetings of journalists and businesspeople from both countries are held regularly. Today, both business and the media act as two leading social forces: business is the first to represent national culture on foreign markets, and the media creates positive images of the partner country. The bilateral Japan–Russia “Dialogue of Cultures: Business and Media Roles” symposium (held as a Moscow-Tokyo teleconference) has been held since 2013 with the aim of closing the gap between the images of what it is like to do business in the two countries and the reality of doing business in the two countries.47

A no less eloquent example of cooperation between business and the media is the Russia–Japan business seminar “Russia – Japan: Strategy of Economic Coope-ration” held in April 2015 by The Moscow Times newspaper. Journalists and businesspeople analysed the current state of Russia–Japan business coopera-tion, the reasons for Japanese companies succeeding on the Russian market, and Russian companies succeeding on the Japanese market.The media summit held on Russky Island in Vladivostok is a communication plat-form for the meetings of journalists, bloggers and PR specialists from Russia, Japan, China, and South Korea. The summit’s goal is to unite the media com-munity of the region and to resolve pressing issues in mass communications.48 Developing Russia–Japan cooperation in the media holds truly great potential for overcoming the atmosphere of distrust. Russian journalists accredited in Japan do not feel that governmental bodies somehow greatly impede their work, yet they complain that Japanese society is somewhat insular and strives to avoid direct contacts, and that the information they receive is uncertain and vague. At the same time, Japanese journalists in Moscow (most of whom genuinely and deeply like Russia) frankly admitted at multiple meetings that it was not easy to work in Russia, and that they were not always assured of their personal safety. Very often, they see Russia as an unpredictable country where the rules of the game change constantly. Unfortunately, even though they are, as a rule, fluent in Russian, they act as “unconscious re-transmitters” of information received from Western sources. Why does this happen? First, journalists often lack access to information, have fewer opportunities to get out of Moscow and travel around Russia than they would have liked, and they constantly complain that their editors in Tokyo somehow believe that information coming from the TV and the internet is quite enough. Second, Japan is exhibiting a certain (apparently temporary) decline in interest towards Russia. Still, in all fairness, it should be added that one Mainichi Shimbun journalist admitted that “Japanese readers are far more interested in Russia than they are in Ukraine.”49

47 The Role of Business and the Media in the Russia–Japan “Dialogue of Cultures.” Annual Bilateral Symposium // Russkiy Reporter. November 15, 2013. URL: http://www.rusrep.ru/article/2013/11/15/japan_russia (in Russian).

48 Over 900 Journalists from Russia, Japan, and China will Assemble in Vladivostok // RIA Novosti. June 9, 2015. URL: https://www.ria.ru/society/20150609/1068937524.html (in Russian).

49 If Politicians in Japan Criticize Journalists, It Has Little Influence on Newspaper Editors: [Oki Toshiharu] // Media-mneniia. March 4, 2010. URL: http://www.media-day.ru/opinion/interview/2446 (in Russian).


One national trait must be kept in mind – Japanese journalists avoid harsh state-ments. They prefer vague generalizations and they strive, on the one hand, to come in first before their competitors and send in information that is not fully fact-checked, and on the other hand, to avoid crude disinformation. In order to make sure that hints and omissions do not dominate Japanese news about Rus-sia, the Russian side for its part should ensure greater transparency of its various agencies (in addition to the flexible and diligent Department of Information and Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia). It would be expedient to hold more prompt, diversified and specialized (legal, academic, cultural) press confer-ences and briefings for journalists accredited in Moscow. Such events would aim to fully convey Russia’s stance and step up the exchange of news, interpretations, ideas, and representations.

Cooperation in Education, Science, and CultureRussia–Japan contacts in education, science, and culture, are highly diverse. They are, however, somewhat disproportionate. For Russia, these contacts, including long-standing festivals and student exchanges, are not the result of coordinated efforts. For Japan, they are part of the strategic policy of achieving political results through “soft power.”

“Soft power” is intrinsically attractive for the Japanese. Since time immemorial, they view “softness” as possessing great advantages. What comes to mind is the image that has been imprinted in the Japanese mental code: under heavy snow, an oak tree branch snaps, but a plum tree sprig bends and shakes off its bur-den. The names of Japanese martial arts include the character “ju” (柔) meaning “softness”: judo (柔道, “the soft path”), jujitsu (柔術, “the soft way”).

In 2004, the Advisory Council on Public Diplomacy headed by Professor Aoki Takotsu was formed. The council focused its efforts on creating a national brand.50

Japan has quite a few organizations engaged in enhancing cultural and intellectual ties with Russia. Many experts link their future with the “Japan–Russia” Society (formerly the Japanese–Russian Friendship Society), with the Japanese-Russian Connections Society (formerly the Japanese-Soviet Connections Socie ty), the Jap-anese Association of Cultural Connections with Foreign Countries (JACC) and the Soka Gakkai International religious and secular organization (SGI), among others.

The SGI’s experience in educational and cultural exchanges is instructive and useful. Since 1974, when the SGI’s leader Daisaku Ikeda first visited the USSR upon the invitation of Lomonosov Moscow State University, they started regular student and faculty member exchanges. The Rector of Moscow State University conferred on Daisaku Ikeda the title of doctor honoris causa for his service to education. Ikeda visited the USSR and Russia several more times; he met with Mikhail Sholokhov (Nobel Prize winner in literature), Valentina Tereshkova (the first woman in space), etc. Both countries published Ikeda’s books Dialogues that he co-authored with Soviet and Russian educational, cultural, and academic figu-

50 Katasonova E.L. The Japanese People in the Real and Virtual Worlds: Sketches of Today’s Japanese Mass Culture. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 2012, p. 318 (in Russian).




res, such as former Moscow State University Rector Anatoly Logunov, cosmo-naut Alexander Serebrov, Kyrgyz author Chingiz Aitmatov, and Russian children’s writer Albert Likhanov, etc.

Cultural exchanges carried out under the auspices of the SGI also expanded. Ikeda founded MinOn, the largest concert promoter in Japan, which organizes Japa-nese tours for artists and musical groups from various countries; MinOn also presents Japanese traditional music and dance abroad. MinOn invited promi-nent figures to Japan, such as the eminent conductor Gennady Rozhdestvensky, the Moscow State Academic Children’s Music Theater Named after Natalya Sats, the St. Petersburg Orchestra of the State Hermitage Museum Camerata, and folk groups from various Russian cities and towns. Soka Gakkai founded the Tokyo Fuji Art Museum, which held a series of exhibitions from several Russian muse-ums such as the State Russian Museum, Moscow Kremlin Museums, etc.51

The Seeds of Hope exhibition, a joint initiative of Soka Gakkai International and the Earth Charter International, was held on September 25-30, 2017, at Lomonosov Moscow State University. It was focused on encouraging viewers to overcome feelings of powerlessness and introduced the positive vision for sustainable living. The exhibition contained 24 panels, including one left blank with a simple tree design so viewers could attach their own statement of what they will do toward sustainability. Previously, Seeds of Hope has been shown in 34 countries in 13 languages and seen by 1,500,000 people around the world.

The Japan Foundation (国際交流基金, Kokusai Koryu Kikin) is the key instru-ment of Japan’s “soft power” in cultural and intellectual exchanges; it is a formally independent cultural agency that works under the auspices of Japan’s Mi nistry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimusho).

One of the principal tasks of the Japan Foundation is to promote Japanese lan-guage abroad. Every three years, the Foundation publishes its Study of Teaching Japanese Abroad. The latest monitoring conducted in 2015 showed that the number of people studying Japanese in Russia was staggeringly low and dropped from 11,401 people officially enrolled in Japanese classes in 2012 to 8,650 in 2015 (declining by 24.1 percent); the number of Japanese-language educational institutions dropped from 137 to 126 (declining by 8 percent) and the number of teachers decreased from 529 to 480 (declining by 9.3 percent).52

The Japan Foundation introduces an increasing number of innovative educational technologies, and we therefore may expect an uptick in distance education via integrated courses.

Russia is among the top ten priority countries for the Japan Foundation (See Fig. 35). However, in 2012, the Foundation allocated one ninth the money for the Russian programmes as for the US programmes, and allocated half of its money for Chinese programmes.

51 Soka Gakkai International. General Information. URL: http://www.sgi.org52 2015 nen kaigai nihongo kenkyu kikan chosa (The 2015 Study of Teaching Japanese Abroad) // Nihongo kenkyu keiku

(Studying Japanese). URL: http://www.jpf.go.jp/j/project/japanese/survey/result/dl/survey_2015/Report_all_e.pdf


The Foundation supports joint events (international congresses, symposia, seminars, master classes, etc.), finances research programmes, and ensures a favourable environment for Russian academics working in Japanese universi-ties. It sponsors translations of books about Japan and of classical and modern Japanese literature. In all fairness, it should be noted that the Japan Foundation essentially saved Japanese studies in Russia during the difficult period of the 1990s when the academic community found itself on the brink of extinction. Sup-port was provided tactfully, without offending the scholars. No ideology or “rules of the game” were imposed on them, even despite the territorial dispute.

The Japan Foundation’s annual reports shows that the Fukushima earthquake did not significantly affect Japan–Russia exchanges, which proceeded as schedu led.53 Moreover, the sympathy demonstrated by the Russian people for the victims of the tragedy produced a wave of positive emotions on the part of the Japanese people towards Russia. This is not an isolated incident, but a litmus test of sorts, showing the state of the collective mind-set in Japan in the “post-Fukushima” period.

Over the last three to four years, the spectrum of the Foundation’s activities in Moscow has been very broad, including: a meeting of the Kage Japanese Club on “Motifs from Genji Monogatari in the literature and art of the 18th–20th centuries”; the discussion “The 2011 Great Earthquake: A Study of the Literary Experience”; the Soul of Japan festival; lectures on gagaku music; a series of films directed by Seijun Suzuki; the Business in Healthcare seminar; a discussion of Japan (part of the “Lectures in the Loading Dock” series) held in St. Petersburg; an evening with organ player Mari Mihara; the 48th Japanese Film Festival; a festival with performances, lectures, and exhibitions held in Samara; an anime festival held in Nizhny Novgorod; and a Japanese film festival held in Birobidzhan. Residents of Moscow thought very highly of Japan’s presence at the Non/Fictio№ fair in 2013 and 2015, and 2016-2017 were dedicated to showing the best examples of the Japanese cinema.

Russia–Japan cultural and humanitarian ties are growing more steady and stable. Japanese cultural figures work even in the remote regions of Russia. For instance, the world-renowned dancer Morihiro Iwata was a principal dancer in the Bolshoi Theatre for several years. He then went on to become the Art Director of the ballet troupe of Buryat State Opera and Ballet Theatre.

Youth programmes are a special item of the Japan Foundation’s work in Russia. The Cool Japan project targets the younger generation, promoting Japanese youth subcultures – pop music, culinary fads, sophisticated fashion and cosplay, anime, comic books (manga), etc. The android singer Miku Hatsune, or a virtual vocal real-ity, which made its first appearance in 2007, is popular among the refined admirers of the Japanese pop music. Performances, symposia, and exhibitions of award-winning works have been part of the Japanese Media Arts Festival since 1997.

The Japanese culture festival J-FEST 2017 was held in a new open-air format at Garage Museum of Contemporary Art in Gorky Park, Moscow. Visitors experi-

53 Kokusai koryu kikin. Heisei 24 nendo komoku betsu gemmu jissei hokokusho (The Japan Foundation. The 2012 Annual Report). Tokyo, 2013, pp. 22–23.




enced the atmosphere of Natsu Matsuri (Summer Festival), discovered the art of ikebana, origami, and calligraphy, tried the traditional games go and shogi, became acquainted with Japanese cuisine, participated in the tea ceremony, and attended lectures on Japanese art and cinema and on Itchiku Kubota’s kimonos as well. The festival featured Yusuke Ito, famous master of the Kendama cup-and-ball, twice listed in Guinness World Records. The renowned Japanese drummers ASKA-GUMI also were the special guests of J-FEST 2017.

The first large-scale exhibition by Takashi Murakami was opened at Garage Museum of Contemporary Art in September 2017. Consisting of five sections that each explore a particular phenomenon in Japanese culture that has been formally or se mantically examined by Murakami, the show revealed the artist’s inquiries into the nuanced facets of Japanese culture and public consciousness, blurring the line between high and low culture, while merging various media into one continuous flow of images. Presenting paintings, drawings, and films by Murakami, the exhibi tion also featured eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Japanese engravings and paintings from the col-lections of the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow.54

Russia should take note of the low efficiency that its “soft power” exhibits in Japan. The relatively new federal body, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), would do well to study the methods used by the Japan Foundation. Its methods could partially be used by the Russian Centre in Tokyo, which opened in 2016 under the auspices of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, with the support of Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russian Embassy in Japan.55 The main tasks of the Centre are to promote the study of the Russian language in Japan and to increase the number of exchange students. According to the Centre’s faculty members, it is gaining popularity among younger Japanese people. However, Rus-sia should put more effort and finances into the Centre so that it does not have to rely in its work on donated books and the enthusiasm of Japanese volunteers.

In May 2015, the Third Russian–Japanese Forum “Points of Contact: Business, Investments, Sports” was held in Tokyo, where the academic monograph RussiaJapan Relations as Parallel Histories was presented. In early autumn of 2015, Tokyo University published the Japanese version of the Russia–Japan relations and, importantly, their joint assessments revealed more points of contact than differences.56 This result allows for a more optimistic view of the prospects of mutual political understanding between Russia and Japan.

In April 2016, Ministers of Culture of both countries negotiated holding a Russian- Japanese Cultural exchange year in 2018. The final decision to conduct Russian-Japanese Cross Year was taken during the talks of Vladimir Putin with Shinzo Abe in Nagato City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in mid-December 2016.

54 J-Fest Summer 2017 // Official Site of the Japanese Culture Festival in Russia. URL: https://www.garagemca.org/en/event/j-fest-summer-2017.

55 Russkiy Mir Foundation Opens Russian Center in Tokyo // Information Portal of the Russkiy Mir Foundation. June 11, 2016. URL: http://www.russkiymir.ru/news/208582 (in Russian).

56 Lenin A. Difficult Narratives. Russian and Japanese Experts Summarize the Experience of the Bilateral Relations // Rossiyskaya gazeta. May 21, 2015. URL: http://www.rg.ru/2015/05/21/nauch-trud-site.html (in Russian).


Cultural pinnacles and triumphs provide great impact on mutual interest and respect. On the one hand, festivals of Russian culture have been held in Japan annually since 2006, in 2015 alone, when the bilateral agreement on future events for 2017-2021 was outlined, Russian festival was visited by 652 thousand people. The total number of visitors over the past 10 years reached 13.3 million people. There are 50 events planned for 2018. The festival has become a traditional event acquainting the Japanese with ballet, music, theatre, circus and other feats of Russia’s outstanding culture.57 On the other hand, Russian people are more and more drawn to the achievements of Japan’s tech culture. Yet the key to the hearts of the young generation is pop culture, which Russians sometimes call “animka.” Japan deftly uses the interest in its youth subculture as it helps maintain the positive image of the Land of the Rising Sun, despite all the political nuances. The style of manga, no matter how primitive it might appear, goes back to the laconic Zen drawings, sophisticated Ukiyoe engravings and the aesthetics of cal-ligraphy, which at least partially explains the ineffable appeal this type of pop art holds. Here we have an organic connection between past and present.

Russian society still exhibits an unbiased interest in Japan’s “high culture”: in the classical three-line haiku verse and the five-line tanka verse, in the Noh and Kabuki theatres. People of various ages and from various strata of the Russian population love Haruki Murakami’s books with their keen insights into Generation X, and Yukio Mishima’s masterpieces with their dark celebration of the unique-ness of the “Japanese soul.” Russian people also love the books by Ryunosuke Akutagawa and Junichiro Tanizaki, and think very highly of the cinematic master-pieces of Akira Kurosawa, Takeshi Kitano and others.

Japanese people, in turn, sincerely admire the Russian musical school and they invite Russian pianists, violinists, and singers to teach in Japan. The “flamboyant maestro” Valery Gergiev and Japan’s idol, the figure skater Evgeni Plushenko, still hold top places on the Japanese list of attractive celebrities. The positive image of Russia in Japan is still largely shaped by an unbiased interest in the Russian classics, which could be said to still dominate Japanese society (and not only the intellectuals). We are talking primarily here about the best works of Leo Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Anton Chekhov, who in their psychological pitch and tone are close to the ethno-psychological mind-set and archetypes of the Japa-nese worldview. The Japanese people consider the works of Pyotr Tchaikovsky and Sergei Rachmaninoff to be the pinnacles of world music.58 It can be argued that the feelings of mutual distrust and suspicion are to a great degree offset by the traditionally high level of admiration for Russian culture in Japan, and for Japanese culture in Russia.

57 Year of Russian-Japanese cultural exchange planned for 2018 // Welcome 2018. December 19, 2016. URL: http://www.welcome2018.com/en/journal/materials/year-russian-japanese-cultural-exchange-planned-for-2018; 2018 announced Russian-Japanese Cultural exchange year // Information Portal of the Russkiy Mir Foundation. July 5, 2017. URL: https://www.russkiymir.ru/en/news/226951/

58 Chugrov S. Japan in Search of Its New Identity in the Globalization Era // “Nihon ishiki”-no mirai. Gurobarizeshon to “Nihon ishiki” (The Future of the “Japanese Mind-Set.” Globalization and the “Japanese Mind-Set.” Ed. and published by: Hosei daigaku kokusai nihongaku kenkyujo, Tokyo, 2015, p. 118.




The present working paper has revealed similar, albeit ambivalent, trends in the collective consciousness of the Russian and Japanese peoples. On the one hand, both countries have moved towards the Western model of political culture. On the other hand, each time the onslaught of Western values has produced a “counter wave” setting off defence mechanisms to preserve fundamental moral norms and spiritual values. The high potential of patience, self-sacrifice, the sense of belong-ing to an ethnic community and the attachment to hierarchical structures in the mind-sets of both nations provides an opportunity for them to rather harmoni-ously survive through the changes in the direction of development that occur in response to sociocultural traditions that weaken under external influences. When conditions are similar, that is, when a threat to military, economic, or information security emerges, then, regardless of other economic, political, social, and cul-tural factors, the same model of domestic and foreign political reactions is repro-duced: they set off the mechanism that lowers the barrier to threats that could damage the fundamental conservative values of collectivism and the paternalist model of relations between society and the state. In this regard, both Japan and Russia could be classified as societies undergoing the process of globalization while retaining strong elements of traditionalism and conservatism.

Russia’s perception of Japan, and Japan’s perception of Russia, rely greatly on historical memory. Japanese people are taught from a young age that Russia was among the states, which forced Japan to accept unfair treaties, depriving Japan of “useful” territorial gains in Northeast China during the Meiji era. Japan’s national pride suffered painful blows when the USSR declared war on Japan on the side of the Allies in 1945, defeating the Japanese army in Manchuria, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

What is the difference in the ways the Japanese view Washington and Moscow, the victors in the Second World War? Despite the atrocities of the nuclear bomb-ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States used large-scale reforms and military aid to secure Japan as an ally. The USSR, and then Russia, offered no such compensation for the blows delivered to Japan’s national pride. Japanese conservatives managed to galvanize Japanese public opinion over “the injus-tice of the Soviet behavior.” The “syndrome of the northern territories” prevailed over the “Hiroshima syndrome.”59 The understanding of this matter explains to an extent why most Japanese have no claims against the United States for the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which caused countless civilian fatalities, and call them “a necessary evil” or even a “necessary measure”, while the loss of insignificant territories is seen as a national tragedy.

The current efforts of Moscow and Tokyo to unblock the territorial impasse are complicated by some barriers of a socio-psychological character, including mutual mistrust and contradictory images of past events. Public opinion surveys

59 Hasegawa, T., Haslam, J., and Kuchins A. Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma between Distant Neighbors, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003, p. 103.

Conclusions and Recommendations


reveal predominant vectors in Russia-Japan relations, which strongly correlate with the evolution of the contradictory images. Apparently, these images sur-prisingly exhibit interrelated “mirror” dynamics connected with the independent variable – events happening in bilateral relations.60 The problem of the “northern territories” is one of the ideas connected with Japan in the Russian popular mind-set, and even though the Russian people do not know much about it, their atti-tude towards it can be very emotional. At the same time, the number of Russian people who think that Japan is responsible for starting the Second World War is dropping every year (while the number of those who think the United States is responsible is on the rise). When the collective consciousness uses the notions of “friends” and “enemies,” there is a very low incidence of people assessing relations with Japan as friendly, but they are equally likely to assess relations as hostile. This gives the impression that, politically speaking, Russian public opini on is indifferent towards Japan.

In 2013, the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by a number of countries, includ-ing Japan, placed a lot of pressure on the social consciousness of the Russian people. The Japanese sanctions could be called symbolic compared to similar measures adopted by the United States and the European Union, and this is why they had little appreciable effect on Russia’s perception of Japan.

Traditional factors that determine the attitude of Russian people towards Japan include Japan’s exquisite medieval art and flamboyant youth pop culture (inclu-ding manga, anime, and cosplay), its highly-developed system of corporate eth-ics, its unparalleled work ethic and manufacturing efficiency, and its cutting-edge nanotechnologies. The uniqueness of Japan’s image that creates the picture of an unusual and inimitable country shrouded in a veil of mystery and charm affects the attitudes of Russians people towards Japan rather strongly. And the unbiased interest in the Russian classics that dominates the Japanese mind could be con-sidered the primary instrument for shaping a more positive image of Russia in Japan. It could be argued that the feelings of mutual distrust and suspicion are to a great degree offset by the traditionally high level of admiration for Russian culture in Japan and for Japanese culture in Russia.

Russia–Japan contacts in education, science, and culture are highly diverse; they are, however, somewhat disproportionate. For Russia, these contacts are not the result of coordinated efforts. For Japan, they are part of the strategic policy of achieving political results through “soft power.” Russia should take note of the low efficiency that its “soft power” exhibits in Japan and study the methods used by Japanese institutions to bolster the country’s cultural and intellectual ties with the world’s other countries and regions.

The media’s efforts both in Russia and Japan create peculiar, contradictory, and sometimes even paradoxical mutual images, where truths, half-truths, and new myths intertwine, and it is very hard to separate the truth from an interweav-ing of negative stereotypes and symbols. If Russian identity in Japan refers to a

60 Chugrov S.V., Streltsov D.V. Interdependence of Russo-Japanese Relations and Mutual Images of Japan and Russia // Japanese Journal of Political Science. Vol. 18. No. 1, p. 25, 22. Cambridge University Press.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



certain type of a culture characterized by risk-taking, recklessness, and a lack of discipline and punctuality; the Japanese national character in Russia is attributed with the following qualities: excessive caution when doing business, pedantry, unwillingness to assume personal responsibility, and an inclination to endlessly coordinate decisions within one’s reference group. It makes bilateral economic cooperation and mutual understanding more difficult. The secret of future suc-cess in business is simple: study the similarities and differences in business cul-tures, and the legal and personnel practices of doing business in both countries.

Masaru Sato, an insightful analyst and a brilliant Russian studies specialist, believes it to be of crucial importance for Japan today that “Russia, which had previously turned to the West, has for the first time turned to the Orient, to Asia.” Of course, it is becoming a partner, but a partner that “thus far speaks a language that is not entirely comprehensible.”61

How do we bring Russia and Japan to speak the same language? Obviously, we need to break the vicious circle of mutual accusations; our actions must be based on principles, yet they must be infused with goodwill; we must take each other’s sore spots into account. Visiting the Kuril Islands is a categorical and absolute right of Russia’s leaders and of all Russian citizens, who certainly do not need any external advice on what Russian region they should be visiting. Moreover, these visits are useful for confirming sovereignty, for “putting in their place” those who doubt this right. Yet if sovereignty is unshakeable, why does it need to be constantly confirmed? How useful are such actions for enhancing mutual understanding between the peoples of Russia and Japan? Maybe there is a way to not yield an iota of one’s sovereign rights and at the same time, to add some sensitivity and demonstratively take Japan’s feelings into account?

Apart from meetings at the sidelines of international forums, in April 2017, Shinzo Abe visited Moscow for a meeting with Vladimir Putin. 29 memorandums of understanding were signed covering fisheries near the disputed Southern Kuril Islands, cooperation on energy, resource exploration, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, and ecotourism. As forecasted previously, one tangible humanitarian achievement the Japanese leader took away from Moscow was the pledge to launch visa-free air travel for the former Japanese inhabitants of the Southern Kurils in June 2017.62 An inch closer towards normalization of our relations.

It is generally believed that the problem of the “northern territories” blocks the development of relations between Russia and Japan. Saying that the Japanese people dislike Russians due to the territorial dispute would be an exaggeration. One could suppose that rather the reverse is true: the dispute cannot be resolved because the Japanese people dislike Russia, since they view the country with suspicion and distrust. When Russia and Japan overcome the distrust, it will be easier to come to an agreement on the territorial dispute.

61 Sato M. Kokka-no hakai (The Collapse of State). Tokyo: Ningen shuppatsu, 2006, p. 342.62 Murashkin N. Russia-Japan summit: Putin, Abe inch closer towards normalizing ties // RBTH. Apr 28, 2017.

URL: https://www.rbth.com/opinion/2017/04/28/russia-japan-summit-putin-abe-inch-closer-towards-normalizing-ties_752994


Appendixes. Results of Public Opinion Polls in Russia and Japan

RUSSIA AND THE WORLD

Figure 1. Who is held accountable for the outbreak of the Second World War? (several answers possible, % of respondents)

Source: Public Opinion 2014. Yearbook. Moscow: Levada Center, 2015. P. 218. URL: http://www.levada.ru/old/sites/default/files/om14.pdf (in Russian).

Figure 2. Which countries (apart from Russia) are great powers? (open question, no limit to the number of answers, % of respondents)

Source: Russia’s Foreign Policy: The Opinion of Russian Society // VCIOM, 2012. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/fileadmin/file/reports_conferences/2012/2012-09-28-vnesh-politika.pdf (in Russian).

APPENDIXES. RESULTS OF PUBLIC OPINION POLLS IN RUSSIA AND JAPAN



Figure 3. Which countries does Russia currently have the most stable and friendliest relations with? (open question, maximum of five countries, % of respondents)

Source: Russia’s “Friends” and “Enemies” in the Sanctions Era // VCIOM. Press Release No. 2690. October 9, 2014. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115016 (in Russian).

Figure 4. Which countries does Russia currently have the most strained and hostile relations with? (open question, maximum of five countries, % of respondents)

Source: Russia’s “Friends” and “Enemies” in the Sanctions Era // VCIOM. Press Release No. 2690. October 9, 2014. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115016 (in Russian).



Figure 5. Which country do Russians trust the most? (closed question, one answer, % of respondents)

Source: Russia-Japan Relations: Reality and Prospects // VCIOM. Press Release No. 3192, September 6, 2016. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115848 (in Russian).

Figure 6. Which countries are Russia’s closest friends and allies? (open question, maximum of five countries, % of respondents)




Figure 7. Which countries are the most unfriendly and hostile towards Russia? (open question, maximum of five countries, % of respondents)


Figure 8. Which countries are hostile towards Russia? (open question, % of respondents, countries that were identified by at least 4% of respondents, results as of October 2014)

Source: Gorshkov, M.K., Petukhov, V.V. Russian Foreign Policy Orientation at the New Turning Point // Polis. Political Research, 2015, No. 2, p. 14 (in Russian).


Figure 9. In your opinion, which countries should Russia concentrate on cooperating with in its foreign policy? (several answers possible, % of respondents)


Figure 10. If there is a threat of a military attack on Russia, from which state is it likely to be from? (open question, one answer, % of those who believe that a military threat to Russia exists)

Source: The Russian Army 2015 // VCIOM. Press Release No. 2954. October 16, 2015. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115431 (in Russian).




Figure 11. Which countries would Russian people like Russia to emulate? (open question, maximum of three countries, % of respondents)

Source: Russia’s Foreign Policy: The Opinion of Russian Society // Moscow: VCIOM, 2012. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/fileadmin/file/reports_conferences/2012/2012-09-28-vnesh-politika.pdf (in Russian).

Figure 12. How do the Russian people view the United States? (one answer, % of respondents)

*In 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007 opinion polls were held several times a year; the data is given: in 2003 – for April and October; in 2004 – for May and December; in 2006 – for February and September; in 2007 – for April and December.

Source: Attitudes to Countries // Levada Center. URL: http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam (in Russian); International Relations // Levada Center. Press Release, April 7, 2016. URL: http://www.levada.ru/2016/04/07/mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya-2 (in Russian).


Figure 13. How would you assess relations between Russia and the United States? (one answer, % of respondents)

*In 2014 opinion polls were held several times, the data is given for January, March and September.

Source: Foreign Policy Orientation // Levada Center. Press Release, October 13, 2015. URL: http://www.levada.ru/old/13-10-2015/vneshnepoliticheskie-orientatsii (in Russian).

Figure 14. What role does the United States play in today’s world? (one answer, % of respondents)

*In 2008 opinion poll was held in July; in 2015 opinion poll was held in October.





Figure 15. What do people in Russia think about China? (one answer, % of respondents)

*In 2006, 2007, 2013-2016 opinion polls were held several times a year; the data is given: in 2006 – for July; in 2007 – for November; in 2013 – for March; in 2014 – for May; in 2015 – for May; in 2016 – for September.

Source: Attitudes to Countries // Levada Center. URL: http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam (in Russian).

Figure 16. How do Russian people view relations between Russia and China? (one answer, % of respondents)



Figure 17. In recent years, what influence has Chinese policy towards Russia had on the situation in Russia? (one answer, % of respondents)


Figure 18. How do Russian people view the United States, China, and Japan? (one answer, % of respondents)

Source: Twenty Years of Russian Reforms (looking at several years of surveys). Moscow: Sociology Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2011. P. 194. URL: http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Doklad/20_years_reform.pdf (in Russian).




Figure 19. How do Russian people see Japan? (closed question, multiple answers possible, % of respondents)

Source: Russia-Japan Relations: Reality and Prospects // VCIOM. Press Release No. 3192. September 6, 2016. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/ index.php?id=236&uid=115848 (in Russian).


Figure 20. What aspects of Japanese culture are interesting for Russians? (closed question, multiple answers possible, % of respondents)

Source: Russia-Japan Relations: Reality and Prospects // VCIOM. Press Release No. 3192. September 6, 2016. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/ index.php?id=236&uid=115848 (in Russian).




Figure 21. What symbols do Russian people associate with Japan? (survey of people from Irkutsk Region, open question, % of respondents)

Cultural stereotypes

Political and geographical stereotypes


Ethnic stereotypes

Technical and economic stereotypes




What qualities do Japanese people exemplify, according to the people of Irkutsk Region?

Ethnic stereotypes

Cultural stereotypes


Qualities of Japanese people

Source: Japan through the Eyes of Young People in Irkutsk Region // Window to Japan. Email Bulletin of the Russia–Japan Society No. 12, April 1, 2007. URL: http://www.ru-jp.org/goloshapova_01.htm (in Russian).

Figure 22. How do Russian people view overall Russia–Japan relations? (one answer, % of respondents)





Figure 23. What do Russians think about ceding the disputed islands to Japan? (one answer, % of respondents)

*In 1992, 1998 opinion polls were held several times a year; the data is given: in 1992 – for August and October; in 1998 – for January, October and November.

Source: Russia-Japan Dispute on Kuril Islands // Levada Center. Press Release, August 5, 2016. URL: http://www.levada.ru/2016/08/05/spor-rossii-i-yaponii-vokrug-kurilskih-ostrovov (in Russian).

Figure 24. What do Russians think about solving the disputed territories problem by recognizing the islands as part of Japan, but preserving Russian governance there? (one answer, % of respondents)

*In 1998 opinion polls held several times a year, the data is given for April and October.



Figure 25. How will the level of trust that Russians have in President Vladimir Putin change if he decides to cede the disputed islands to Japan? (one answer, % of respondents)

*Question was formulated as follows: “How will your level of trust in the President change if he signs the Peace Treaty with Japan, relinquishing the all four disputed islands?”

**Question was formulated as follows: “How will your level of trust in the President change if he signs the Peace Treaty with Japan and agrees on ceding the all four disputed islands?”


Figure 26. How important is concluding a peace treaty with Japan for Russia, from the Russians’ point of view? (one answer, % of respondents)





Figure 27. How should the Kuril Islands dispute be resolved from the Russians’ point of view? (one answer, % of respondents)


Figure 28. From the Russian perspective, what is the most important for Russia now: concluding a peace treaty with Japan and receiving Japanese loans and technologies, or keeping the disputed Kuril Islands? (one answer, % of respondents)



Figure 29. Do Russians know about the Russia-Japan negotiations on the ownership of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai? (closed question, one answer, % of respondents)

What point of view do Russians support? (closed question, one answer, % of respondents who know about the negotiations)

Source: Russia-Japan Relations: Reality and Prospects // VCIOM. Press Release No. 3192, September 6, 2016. URL: http://www.wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115848 (in Russian).




JAPAN AND THE WORLD

Figure 30. What country do Japanese people dislike the most? (one answer, % of respondents)

Source: Takahashi Koichi, Aramaki Hiroshi. Ji keiretsu chosa “nihon-no ishiki” hensen (“Japanese Value Orientations” as Reflected in the Changes of Survey Results over 40 years). Tokyo: NHK hoso kenkyūjo, 2014. July. PP. 225–226.

Figure 31. How do Japanese people view Russia? (1978–2016) (one answer, % of respondents)

Source: Naikakufu daijin kambo seifu kohoshitsu. Gaikō-ni kan-suru yoron chosa (Japanese Cabinet Information Research Office. Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy). 2016. URL: http://www.survey.gov-online.go.jp/h28/h28-gaiko/2-1.html


Figure 32. How do Japanese people view the United States? (1978–2016) (one answer, % of respondents)


Figure 33. How do Japanese people view China? (1978–2016) (one answer, % of respondents)





Figure 34. How do Japanese people view the Republic of Korea? (1978–2016) (one answer, % of respondents)


Figure 35. How much money does the Japan Foundation allocate to finance cultural and academic exchanges with other countries? (Top ten countries shown)

Source: Kokusai koryu kikin. Heisei 24 nendo komoku betsu gemmu jissei hokokusho (The Japan Foundation. The 2012 Annual Report). Tokyo, 2013. P. 14.


Sergei Chugrov is a Russian political scientist and sociologist whose research focuses on the problems of political communication, popular mind-set, public opinion, and sociocultural specifics of contemporary Japan, and the moderniza-tion of traditional societies.

Dr. Chugrov graduated from Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1973. He holds a Ph.D. in Sociology and a Professor’s diploma.

In 1977–1987, he worked as a reporter for the Izvestia newspaper.

Currently, Dr. Chugrov is a Professor of the International Journalism Depart-ment at MGIMO University, and serves as the Editor-in-Chief of Polis. Political Research, Russia’s leading journal on political science. He is also a senior researcher at Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and Inter-national Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN).

Dr. Chugrov has authored six books and monographs, and about 300 newspaper and journal articles that have been published in Russia, the United States, Japan, China, Germany and other countries.

About the Author

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Russian International Affairs Council

Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is a non-profit international relations think-tank on a mission to provide policy recommendations for all of the Russian organizations involved in external affairs.

RIAC engages experts, statesmen and entrepreneurs in public discussions with an end to increase the efficiency of Russian foreign policy.

Along with research and analysis, the Russian Council is involved in educational activities to create a solid network of young global affairs and diplomacy experts. RIAC is a player on the second-track and public diplomacy arena, contributing the Russian view to international debate on the pending issues of global develop-ment.

Members of RIAC are the thought leaders of Russia’s foreign affairs community – among them diplomats, businessmen, scholars, public leaders and journalists.

President of RIAC Igor Ivanov, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 1998 to 2004 and Secretary of the Security Council from 2004 to 2007.

Director General of RIAC is Andrey Kortunov. From 1995 to 1997, Dr. Kortunov was Deputy Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies.

InternatIonal actIvIty

Bu

sIn

ess

Civil SoCietyeduCation

an

al

yS

iS

an

d f

or

eC

aS

tin

g

dip

lo

ma

Cy

global politiCS



diS

Cu

SS

ion

S

dialogue

dialogueinternational relationS

netw

or

k

pr

oje

CtSexpert CommentarieS

Co

nfe

re

nC

eS

round tableS

Su

mm

er

SC

ho

ol

S

reportSworking paperS

library

SCenarioS

SeC

ur

ity

mig

ra

tio

n

partnerShip

CompetitionS

an

th

olo

gie

S

anthologieS

referenCe bookS

referenCe bookS

webSite

gl

ob

al S

Cie

nC

e

Civil SoCiety

SCienCe

eduCation

foreign poliCy


diplomaCy

global politiCS



inter

nS

hip

S

diSCuSSionS

dialogue

inter

na

tio

na

l r

ela

tio

nS

ne

tw

or

k p

ro

jeC

tS

expert CommentarieS

Co

nfe

ren

CeS

Co

nfe

re

nC

eS

ro

un

d t

ab

le

S

Su

mm

er

SC

ho

olS

re

po

rt

S

wo

rk

ing p

ap

er

S

gueSt leCtureS

library

Club meetingSr

oa

dm

ap

S

SCenarioS

SeCurity

bil

at

er

al r

el

at

ion

S

mig

ra

tio

np

ar

tn

er

Sh

ip

Co

mp

et

itio

nS

an

th

olo

gie

S

re

fer

en

Ce b

oo

kS

web

Sit

e

gl

ob

al S

Cie

nC

e

Civil SoCiety

SC

ien

Ce

eduCation

foreign poliCy


diplomaCy

dip

lo

ma

Cy

global politiCS

int

er

na

tio

na

l o

rg

an

iza

tio

nS

for

eig

n p

oliC

y t

alen

t p

oo

l


int

er

nS

hip

S

diS

Cu

SS

ion

S

dialogue

international relationS

netw

or

k p

ro

jeC

tS

ex

per

t C

om

men

ta

rie

S

ConferenCeS

round tableS

Summer SChoolS

reportS

working paperS

gueSt leCtureS

library

Club meetingS

roadmapS

SC

en

ar

ioS S

eC

ur

ity

bil

at

er

al r

el

at

ion

S

mig

ra

tio

n

pa

rt

ne

rS

hip

Co

mp

et

itio

nS

anthologieS

referenCe bookS

web

Sit

e

global SCienCe

global SCienCe

expert CommentarieS

eduCation

Civ

il

So

Cie

ty

SC

ien

Ce

ed

uC

atio

n

for

eig

n p

ol

iCy


dip

lo

ma

Cy

gl

ob

al p

ol

itiC

S

int

er

na

tio

na

l o

rg

an

iza

tio

nS

for

eig

n p

ol

iCy t

al

en

t p

oo

l

internShipS

diSCuSSionS

dialogue

international relationS network projeCtS

ex

pe

rt C

om

me

nt

ar

ieS

ConferenCeS

round tableS

Summer SChoolS

reportS

working paperS

gu

eS

t l

eC

tu

re

S

lib

ra

ry

Cl

ub m

ee

tin

gS

ro

ad

ma

pS

SC

en

ar

ioS

SeC

ur

ity

bil

ater

al

rela

tio

nS

migration

partnerShip

CompetitionS

anthologieS

referenCe bookS

webSite

global SCienCe


referenCe bookS


Se

Cu

rit

y

mig

ra

tio

ninternational organizationS

diSCuSSionSinternShipS

eduCation

Civ

il S

oC

iet

y

partnerShip

Inte

rn

atI

on

al

ac

tIv

Ity

dialogue

expert CommentarieS

Summer SChoolS

lib

ra

ry

reportSgueSt leCtureS

roadmapS

WORKING PAPER

RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL (RIAC)1, B. Yakimanka street, 119180, Moscow, RussiaTel.: +7 (495) 225 6283Fax: +7 (495) 225 6284E–mail: [email protected]


32 / 2016

RUSSIA AND THE WEST: THE NEW NORMAL

Cover_WP-32.indd 1 12.12.2016 18:01:14


33 / 2017

THE IMAGE OF RUSSIA IN JAPAN AND THE IMAGE OF JAPAN IN RUSSIA