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EARLY RATIONALITY AND MAGICAL THINKING IN PRESCHOOLERS: SPACE AND TIME

Eugene Subbotsky

Moscow UniversityDepartment of Psychology

Send reprint requests to E. Subbotsky, Department of Psychology, University of Lancaster, Bailrigg,Lancaster, LA14FY, U.K.

˙ABSTRACT

The problem of the study was to determine the process of acquisition of somefundamental notions (structures) of space and time in preschool children. A fundamentalstructure that underlies the idea of space is the opposition between permeability andimpermeability of a physical body for another physical body. A fundamental structure onwhich the concept of time is based is the opposition between reversibility andirreversibility of complex processes. In two experiments children of 4, 5, and 6 yearswere placed in situations in which they were free to reveal their beliefs inthe permeability of a solid body (a glass wall of a box) and in the reversibility of complexprocesses (turning back into a little boy or girl again). The results showed that at thebeginning of the experiment almost all the children denied that permeability orreversibility could occur in real life. However, under the influence of a fairy tale and anadult's instruction, the majority of 4- and 5-year©olds revealed their credulity towardssuch unusual properties of space and time both at the level of practical actions and at thelevel of verbal judgments.

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of the study was to investigate the acquisition of some fundamentalnotions (structures) of space and time in preschool age children. It is important to separate thefundamental properties (structures), which underlie notions of space and time from the propertiestraditionally investigated (metrical and topological object relations with regard to space, measurementof time periods through movement and other simple processes with regard to time).

The fundamental structure that underlies the idea of space is the opposition betweenpermeability and impermeability of a physical body with respect to another and its variants(opposition soft-solid, empty-full, etc.). This opposition of categories served as a framework forseveral early concepts of structure of Universe, such as Democritus' and Epicure's concepts of atomsand vacuum, Diodor Kron's idea of invisible particles, and so on (see Sextus Empiricus, 1976). Thisopposition is also present in contemporarymetatheories of physical space: the classical "empty space" of Isaac Newton and nonclassical" spaceof edges and surfaces" proposed by James Gibson are both inconceivable without the opposition ofempty and full, permeable and impermeable and the borders that separate them.

With regard to time, an equally fundamental structure isreversibility-irreversibility of complex processes. In contrast to the world of Newton'sclassical dynamics (a world of eternal and unchangeable natural laws, which exist beyondtime) modern science deals with irreversible processes (see Prigogin & Stengers,1986). The irreversibility of being, so strongly emphasized by ancient dialectics, is anessential feature not only of physical time, but of "psychological time" as wellAccording to a traditional view (e.g. Piaget) the process of acquisitionof these oppositional structures by a child is stage-based: the child initially lacks anyconception of solid (impermeable) bodies. Eventually, the infant's conceptions of subjective space andreversible subjective time are transformed (by approximately 2 years of age) into space and timebased upon solid objects and irreversible processes (Piaget, 1937). Contrary to this view, the processmay be considered not as stage-based replacement of one fundamental structure by another but as theirpermanent coexistence.

The ideas of impermeable object and irreversible process are present in the child's mind fromthe very beginning. They coexist with the opposite ideas of permeable object and reversible processfor the whole life span, but their domains of influence are different. In the domain of everyday realitynotions of space and time are based on the structures of mutual impermeability of solid objects and theirreversibility of complex processes (physical space and time). By contrast, in the domain of unusualreality (fairy tales, dreams, fantasies) unusual properties of space and time are attributed a legitimatestatus: the mutual permeability of solid objects, and the reversibility of complex processes are notruled out.

Once this hypothesis is accepted, it is reasonable to look for these opposingfundamental structures in two directions. On the one hand, it is possible to look for earlyforms of the child's sensitivity to the impermeability of solid objects (or its substitutes)even in early infancy, at an age when according to the traditional view, the infantlacks this sensitivity. On the other hand, one can also expect to find the idea of a "permeable solidobject" working in the consciousness of a preschool child (or an older child) even in the domain ofeveryday reality.

The first part of this hypothesis, albeit not explicitly stated, seems to inspire recent intensiveand successful efforts to find forms of behavior in young infants that can be interpreted as signs of a

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sensitivity to the mutual impermeability of solid objects and to the irreversibility of certain processes,or as prerequisites for such a sensitivity. Thus with regard to space these studies have shown thatinfants even in their first weeks of life can distinguish contours (Powers & Dobson, 1982), certaincolors (Hamer, Alexander & Teller, 1982), and the main "canonical" figures - an arrow, a triangle anda cross (Slater, Morison & Rose, 1982). There is also evidence of early sensitivity to intermodal(possibly, amodal) permeability versus impermeability. Thus, Gibson and Walker (1984) havedemonstrated that 1-month-old infants can visually differentiate solid objects from elastic objects interms of their deformations in movement. In Bower's (1971) experiment, newborns showed signs ofsurprise at being unable to touch a cube that looked visually solid. Moreover, some 3 1/2- month-oldinfants are surprised when an opaque solid screen appears to pass through a solid body placed behindit (Baillargeon, 1987).

The infant's sensitivity to the irreversibility of time has been investigated much less often.However, there are data revealing such a sensitivity. Thus, Leslie (1986) in a series of ingeniousstudies has demonstrated that 3- to 6-month-old infants attribute causality to particular successiveevents, with the implication, therefore, that the events are seen as an irreversible succession of causeand consequence.

A movement of scholars "down the age-scale" is represented by a vast range ofstudies, but the counter-movement "up the age-scale" is hardly detectable. A possibleexception is studies in "anomalistic psychology" showing the presence of "magicalthinking" (in the form of the so-called "beliefs in the paranormal") in the mind of an adult(see Zusne & Jones, 1982). As for children of preschool and school ages,their belief in magic and animism, with a few exceptions (Harris, Brown, Mariott, Whittal & Harmer,1991; Subbotsky, 1985) has been studied only in the Piagetian "verbal" tradition, which does notpermit an assessment of whether the fundamental oppositional structures (nonpermanent object,magical causality, permeable solid object, reversible time) are able to control the child's behavior in areal, practical situation.

In an attempt to partially remedy this gap, two experiments were undertaken inorder to determine a) if preschool children can attribute the fundamental oppositionalstructures of space and time to different domains (everyday versus unusual reality), and b) if theunusual properties of space and time can enter the domain of everyday reality.

EXPERIMENT 1: SPACE

METHOD

SUBJECTSSixteen 4-year-olds from the middle group (range: 4 years O months to 4 years and 11

months; mean, 4 years 5 months), 19 5-year- olds from the senior group (range: 5years 0 months to 5 years 11 months; mean, 5 years 4 months) and 10 6-year-olds fromthe preparatory group (range, 6 years 0 months to 6 years 11 months: mean, 6 years 7months) of a kindergarten in Moscow took part as subjects in the three main experimentalconditions. The same number of children from the same age groups (with mean ages 4 years 4 months,5 years 3 months and 6 years 8 months correspondingly) of another kindergarten took part in thecontrol condition. In each age group there was an approximately equal number of boys and girls. All

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children were native Russian speakers and came from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds.

MATERIALS A wooden box 27 x 40 x 22 cm. with two opposite walls made of glass was employed in the

experiment. The box had no lid or openings in it, so it was not possible to remove any of the objects,which it contained (a fountain pen, a brooch, a ring, a cigarette lighter, a postage stamp, etc.)˙PROCEDURE

Subjects were tested individually. Children in the experimental group were tested in foursuccessive stages. In the first stage they were asked questions about the permeability of variousobjects. The child was asked 1) Can you go through this wall (the wall of the room was indicated) ?Why/Why not? Can it be done in a fairy tale? 2) If you see a toy behind the glass, can you stretch yourhand through the glass and pick up the toy? Why/Why not? Is it possible to do that in a fairy tale? 3)If a coin is lying on the bottom of a bucket filled with water, can you pick up the coin? What is it youhave to stretch your hand through to pick up the coin? Why is it possible to stretch your hand throughwater and impossible through glass? 4) Please, take my fountain pen (the experimenter held the penin his hand). What is it you've stretched your hand through in order to take the pen? What is it betweenyour hand and the pen? The aim of questions 1 and 2 was to determine whether the child wasconscious of the impermeability of solid physical objects (a wall, a glass) with respect to another solidobject (his or her arm) as well as to determine whether he or she admitted such permeability in a fairytale. The aim of questions 3 and 4 was to ensure that the child was aware of a substance (water, air) inwhich the impermeable objects rested.

In the second stage, children were told a fairy tale about a girl who was given a"magic box" of glass as a present; the box contained a number of attractive objects (afountain pen, a ring, etc.). The box could not be opened in the normal way, but if one said the "magicwords" (alpha, beta, gamma), the walls of glass became "just like air" and one could stretch a handthrough and take the objects. Children were asked to retell the story and then asked 1) Why has Ol'ia(the name of the story character) managed to get the ring? In real life, is it possible to make the glass"just like air" by means of magic words? The aim of the questions was to determine whether thechild's conviction in the impermeability of solid objects in real life could be influenced by a fairy tale.

The third stage took place one day later. Children were given a real box similar to the boxdescribed in the story and told: "Maybe it is a magic box as well". Children were then reminded of the"magic words" and told "You can try if you want. If you manage to get something out of the box - youcan keep it." The child was then left alone in the room and observed secretly. Indices of the child'sbelief in the permeability of a solid object ( a glass wall of the box) were judged to be those actions,that a)occurred after the child had said the magic words, and b)included an appropriate manual posturefor grasping an object. Such “magical” actions were distinguished from “investigative” actions(patting, touching, investigation of the box with a hand) and practical actions (attempts to uncover thebox in an ordinary way (see Figure 1).

________________Figure 1 about here________________

In the fourth stage, the experimenter returned and carried out apost-experimental interview in order to determine the children's emotional attitudetowards their failure to penetrate the glass. The experimenter asked the child 1) Did youtry? 2) Did you manage to get something out of the box? 3) Do you think that this box is a magical

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one or it is just an ordinary wooden box? If children really believed in thepermeability of the glass while making grasping actions, it was expected that they would bedisappointed with their failure and would reveal their disappointment in their answers to questions 1and 2 : they would complain that magical words were not effective and ask the experimenter to showthem how to act on the box properly in order for the "magic words" to have an effect. If, however,children were simply playing a game of pretend, they would not have anticipated being able to reachthe objects in the box, and therefore, could not be expected to show disappointment (i.e., they wouldnot complain, or request a demonstration of the proper way to penetrate the glass ). Question 3 wasasked in order to determine, whether the children's verbal behavior would be influenced by the fairytale despite their manipulations of the box: If so, many of the children would continue to regard thebox as "magical" despite their failed attempts to penetrate the glass.

Children in the control group were simply shown the box and left alone, having been promisedthat anything that they could extract from the box would be given to them as a reward.RESULTS

In the first stage, all subjects in the experimental groups acknowledged the impermeability ofthe glass and the wall for a hand in everyday reality andacknowledged the possibility of permeability in a fairy story (see Table 1). Most of thechildren in each age group described water as a permeable substance but they were notaware of air as a substance and said that there was "a floor" or "the walls" between theirhands and the pen. After the children had been told the fairy tale and had reproduced it in the secondstage, all of them still denied that it was possible to stretch one's hand through glass in real life.

_______________Table 1 about here_______________

In the third stage, most of the 4- and 5-year-olds and some of the 6-year-oldstried to pass their hands through the glass as if it were permeable. The number of childrenwho tried (at least once) to say the "magic words" and to stretch their hands through theglass was significantly lower among 6-year-olds than among 4-year-olds (z=3.02, p< .02) Most ofthese children clearly expressed their disappointment with the failure in the post-experimentalinterview (fourth stage). By contrast, in the control groups, only one child tried to obtain objects "in amagical way" having made a special "magical gesture" over the box. The rest either tried to do it in anormal way or did not tried all (see Table 1).

There were no significant differences between the experimental and control groups in thenumber of children who produced investigative actions. However, the number of children who (atleast once) employed practical actions was significantly higher among 4- and 5-year-old children fromthe control groups than among the children of the same ages from the experimental groups (z=2.6, p<.05: z=3.6, p< .01 respectively). Despite the fact that not all the children tried to obtain the objects in amagical way and all who tried failed, the majority of the subjects in each age group stillacknowledged that the box was "magical" at the end of the experiment .

EXPERIMENT 2: TIME

METHOD

SUBJECTS Fifteen 4-year-olds from the middle group (range 4 years 0 months to 4 years 11

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months, with a mean age 4 years 6 months), 15 5- year-olds from the senior group (range5 years 0 months to 5 years 11 months, mean age 5 years 6 months) and 15 6-year-oldsfrom the preparatory group (from 6 years 0 months to 6 years 11 months, meanage 6 years 7 months) of a kindergarten in Moscow took part as subjects in three mainexperimental conditions. In the control condition, a total of 30 children from the same agegroups (with mean ages 4 years 2 months, 5 years 4 months, and 6 years 3 months, 10children in each group) also participated. Each group contained approximately equalnumbers of boys and girls.

MATERIALS A small wooden box 15 x 11 x 11 cm was used. It had a special mechanism inside which

could make a new postage stamp appear to replace an old one placed in the box (for a detaileddescription, see Subbotsky, 1991). In addition, there was a bottle withpure boiled water, a small box with sugar powder, an old (torn and crumpled) postagestamp, and an empty glass.

PROCEDURE˙ The children were tested individually. In the first stage children were asked 1) whoare you: a girl (a boy), a woman (a man) or an old woman (an old man)? 2)And who is your mother(who is your father)? 3) Who will you be when you grow up? 4)Can yourmother (your father) become a little girl (a little boy) again? Why/Why not? Is it possiblein a fairy tale? 5)Can an old and damaged object turn into a new one? Why/Why not? Is itpossible in a fairy tale?. The aim of these questions was to assess whether childrenunderstood the irreversibility of complex processes in real life ( in this case - theimpossibility for a human being to become much younger or for an old object to become a new one )and whether they admitted the reversibility of such processes in a fairy tale.

In the second stage, children were told a fairy tale about a girl who had been given a bottlewith "magic water", a small portion of which could "turn you and everything around you into what itwas two years ago". At first, the story continued, the girl did not believe it, but when she tried thewater (in order to bring her beloved dog back to life) she did, in fact, become a small 3- year-old child.Each subject was asked to recall the story and then was asked 1) Does it mean that it is possible in reallife as well, to turn time backwards? 2)But why did Lena (the name of the heroine) become a fewyears younger? The aim of these questions was to determine whether the fairy tale would have anyinfluence on the children's belief in irreversibility of complex processes in real life.

In the third stage, the child was shown a bottle with pure boiled water, a small boxwith sugar powder, an old (torn and crumpled) postage stamp, and a wooden box with aspecial mechanism inside that could turn an old postage stamp into a new one. The child was told thatonce the powder was dissolved in the water, it became "magic" water. Children were then shown, thatan old postage stamp "really" turned into a new one if it was touched by a drop of magic water (inreality, because of the mechanism concealed in the box). "If you drink a little bit - you will probablyturn into a little boy (girl)" - the experimenter said, and then suggested : "Now you can try the water,if you want. I just want to see if it works. But if you do not want to try - it is up to you". ˙If the child refused to try, the request was repeated with the promise of a postagestamp as a reward (stage 4). In order to determine whether the child's verbal disbelief inthe reversibility of complex processes in everyday reality was influenced by theexperimental manipulations, the child was asked the last question: "Now, what do you think, is this

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water magic or it is just ordinary sugar-water?"In the control groups, children were simply asked to try some "sugar water" in

order to find out if it was tasty; before the request, they talked with the experimenter onvarious topics for about 20 minutes (a duration equal to the two stages of the mainexperiment).

RESULTS

Among the 4-year-olds 33% acknowledged at least one of the three possiblevariants of reversibility (that their mother or father or they themselves could become alittle child again, or that the old object could become a new one again) (see Table 2). Therest of the subjects were surprisingly consistent in their emphatic denial of each possiblereversal ("Life does not go back", "Time only goes ahead", "Nothing old can become newbecause many years have passed", "It is difficult, to grow downwards", etc.). Despite the fact that allthe children admitted that time reversal could occur in a fairy tale,only three 4-year-olds and two 5-year-olds recognized the possibilityof reversal in real life after they had been told the fairy tale.

_________________Table 2 about here_________________

In a real situation (third stage), all the children acknowledged that the old postagestamp "became newer" under the influence of the "magic" water; most subjects in all agegroups refused to try the water following the experimenter's initial request. Most of themjustified their refusal by saying that they didn't want to become a little child again ("I willbecome a little child again, and then...there is no "special" water that can make you older"), somesimply said "I do not want to drink it". When the children were promised a reward (fourth stage), themajority of 4- and 5-year-olds still refused the experimenter'srequest, but almost half of the 6-year-olds agreed. Among the 6-year- olds the totalnumber of the children refusing to try the water was significantly lower than among the 4- and 5-year-old children combined (z=2.8, p< .025). All children with the exception of three 6-year-olds answeredthe last question in the positive, acknowledging the water to be magic. None of the control childrenrefused to taste some sugar water.

DISCUSSION

As shown in previous studies (Subbotsky, 1985, 1990), preschool- age childrenare able to differentiate verbally between what can happen in everyday reality versusunusual realities (dreams, fairy tales, fantasy). They attribute impermeability of solidobjects and irreversibility of complex processes to the domain of everyday reality whileadmitting the opposite properties (permeability of solid objects and reversibility ofcomplex processes) to be possible through magic in a fairy tale. This differentiationbetween what is possible in everyday reality and what can be achieved by magic has alsobeen noted by Chandler and Lalonde (this volume) and Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling andGelman (this volume). In each of these studies, young children expected impermeability andirreversibility to obtain in everyday life (as reflected in their emotional reactions and

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judgements). At the same time, they described an apparent demonstration of permeability as magic,and they judged hypothetic examples of reversibility as possible for a magician.However, this differentiation between what is possible in everyday reality and what can be achievedthrough magic is not yet firm enough either on the level of verbal judgments or on the level ofpractical behavior: it can be attenuated under the influence of a fairy tale and an adult's instruction.The majority of 4- and 5-year-olds and some 6-year-olds tried to pass their hand through a glass wall(in order to obtain an attractive object) and refused to drink "magic" water (fearing to become atoddler again), thereby revealing their belief in the potentially unusual properties of space and timeeven in everyday reality.

As shown by the results, the differentiation between the dominant properties of space and timein everyday reality as compared with unusual realities at a verbal level was not influencedsignificantly by the fairy tale alone (an influence that was detected with respect to children'sjudgments about causality in our previous study, Subbotsky, 1985). Thus, even after listening to thefairy tale, children still asserted their belief in impermeability and irreversibility within the domain ofeveryday reality. However, the experimenter's subsequent instruction and manipulations with the boxand water did influence the children's verbal convictions: at the end of the experiment most of thechildren acknowledged that the box and the water were "magic". This suggests that the experimenter'scredulity towards unusual phenomena may play a crucial role in changing the children's beliefs. Tocheck whether or not it did play a crucial role two experimenters could give similar instructions, withone expressing credulity and the other skepticism.

The non-directive character of the experimenter’s instruction ensured the fact that thesechanges, at least at the level of practical behavior, were not due to simple compliance with theexperimenter. Indeed, in Experiment 1 the child was left alone in the room during the testingprocedure and was therefore free to decide whether or not to try to pass his or her hand through theglass; in Experiment 2, the child's autonomy was shown by the fact that the majority of the childrenrefused the experimenter's request to try the water, thereby revealing their belief in the water's magicpower. The initial reluctance of 6-year-olds to engage in a magical practice and their readiness to trythe water for the reward may be interpreted as a sign of their growing conviction that in everydayreality "normal" physical space and time predominate.

The role of social influence in experiments designed to test children's beliefs inphysical causality , object permanence or the fundamental properties of space and time isvery important from a theoretical point of view. The main issue is whether fundamentalbeliefs (e.g. the belief in object permanence or physical causality, in the impermeability of solidobjects and the irreversibility of time) have certain "natural" origins in the child'smind or they are socially conditioned. If they are socially conditioned and social influences aresupposed to play a leading role in the acquisition of both the belief in physical causality and the beliefin magical causality, then experiments on the problem must establish the degree of social influence(or social reinforcement) that can increase children's credulity in the existence of real magic andreduce their conviction that only physical causality may obtain in everyday life.

It was just this premise that this study was based on. The study, therefore, was notdesigned to eliminate all social influences since social influence of a certain type was viewed as anecessary condition for the belief in magical (as well as in physical) properties of space and time tooccur. It did, however, aim to eliminate any direct pressure that could create a social conflict betweenthe child and the experimenter and turn the child's behavior into mere compliance with theexperimenter's expectations. The indirect social influences (the fairy tale, the experimenter's hint thatmagic can occur) cannot therefore be viewed as a fault in an experimental procedure that had not been

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completely stripped of all possible social influences. Just the opposite, the influences were a legitimateand necessary way to test the firmness and permanence of children's beliefs in the impossibility ofcertain events, such as the permeability of solid bodies or the reversibility of time.

If, however, these social influences are viewed as a sort of "compulsory reeducation" thatoverrides "true" beliefs (or "true" disbeliefs) then the premise of the purely "natural"origins offundamental physical beliefs is implicitly taken for granted. The trouble with this premise lies not inthe theoretical controversy between "innate" and "acquired" nature of fundamental beliefs, to whichthe problem is so often reduced. It lies instead in the methodological impossibility of revealingsomething that has no relation to "social interaction" in an experiment that involves people, i.e.reflecting and interpreting individuals. Of course, some "understanding" of magical and physicalcausality may be found even in infants, but there it exists not as “beliefs” but as “behavioural patterns”that require experimenter's interpretation.

As for the preschoolers' beliefs, they are, of course, the product of social influence. Evenseemingly spontaneous judgments about magic (see, for instance, Johnson and Harris's paper in thisjournal) reflect cultural influences that children are permanently subject to (fairy tales, collectiverepresentations, superstitions, etc.). Even more obviously "social" are children's beliefs in physicalcausality and object permanence. Young infants' "understanding" of the strangeness of certain events(Baillargeon's study) can only be perceived as genuine understanding after it is interpreted by us,contemporary adults, and presented to older children in the form of "true" and "false" beliefs.

One more problem relevant to this study is the distinction between "magical events"and "magical practice". Clearly, magical events (magical causality, magical properties of space andtime, etc.) can be easily defined merely as the violation of familiar physicalprinciples (see Piaget, 1937; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling & Gelman, this volume; Johnson & Harris,this volume). However, magical practice (or, in ordinary language, just "magic") involves somethingelse: it includes certain culturally conventional actions aimed "to make magical events possible"(suchas "magical words", "magical actions", etc.). It may also rest upon a cultural context normally linkedwith magic (i.e., images taken from fairy tales: fairies, ghosts, rejuvenating potion, etc.). The presenceof these "active attributes" distinguishes the practice of magic from mere conjuring. Althoughconjuring may enhance behaviors testifying to the presence of magical beliefs in children, it does thisto a much lesser extent than does magical practice. This may account in part for children's greatercredulity toward the magical events revealed in this study as compared with studies in whichconjuring was employed (see, for instance, Woolley & Phelps, this volume).

Did children simply assimilate the magical practice to a type of pretend play in the course ofthe experiment? Special precautions were taken to check whether children really practiced magic orjust played "magical games". The children's disappointment in Study 1 and the refusal of most 4© and5©year©olds to taste the rejuvenating potion in Study 2 strongly suggest that children's real beliefs(and not just their pretend beliefs) in the unusual properties of space and time were observed in thisstudy.

The last issue to consider is the "status” of preschool children's beliefs in thereversibility of complex processes and the permeability of solid objects: are childrenrevealing a latent (and suppressed) credulity toward unusual properties of spaceand time (irrespective of whether this credulity was "socially induced" or "spontaneouslyacquired" as discussed above), or is this credulity simply induced and inspired by theexperimenter who is acting in a credulous fashion at the time of the experiment? Thisproblem touches on the general question of "revelation versus inspiration" of variouscapacities in the child in the course of experimentation. The question is speculative because there are

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no adequate methods to reveal the child's "latent" capacities that do not run the risk of inspiring thosesame capacities at the very moment of a testing. However, it is much more reasonable to view therecurrence of capacities and beliefs that dominated the child's mind at an earlier point in time, as their"reactivation" rather than their "inspiration". This is especially true of the child's beliefs innonphysical properties of object, causality, space and time, as they can be detected even in very younginfants (Piaget, 1937).

Two more reasons (one - theoretical, and the other - empirical) testify in favor of the"revelation" or "reactivation" hypothesis and against the "inspiration" hypothesis.First, it is theoretically impossible to accept that only one of two opposite structures (forexample, the concept of physical impermeability or the irreversibility of time) can bepresent in the child's mind without its being complemented in some way by its counterpart (theconcept of physical permeability or the reversibility of time). Second, the very facility with which thechildren accepted the experimenter's suggestion that the box and the water were "magical" reveal akind of "readiness" in the child's mind to accept such an interpretation (compare, for example, thetime and effort needed in order to teach children genuinely "inspired" concepts, such as addition-subtraction principles). However, it is widely assumed that the preschool child adopts the "rational"stance with respect to fundamental properties of space and time such as the impermeability of solidbodies and the irreversibility of complex processes. In this study, an attempt was made to call thiswidespread assumption into question.

REFERENCES

Baillargeon,R. (1987). Object permanence in 3 1/2- and 4 1/2-month-old infants.Developmental Psychology, 23, 655-664

Bower, T.G.R. (1971). The object in the world of infant. Scientific American, 225, 4,30-38

Glass, G.V. & Stanley, J.C. (1970). statistical methods in education and psychology. New Jersey:Englewood Cliff.

Hamer, R.D., Alexander, K.R. & Teller, D.J. (1982). Reyleigh discriminations in younghuman infants. Vision Research, 22ï, 5, 575-587

Harris, P.L., Brown, E., Mariott, C., Whittal, S., & Harmer, S. (1991). Monsters, ghostsand witches: Testing the limits of the fantasy-reality distinction in young children.British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 105-123.

Leslie, A. (1986). Getting development of the ground. Modularity and infants perceptionof causality. In P.L.C.van Geert (Ed.), Theory Building in Developmental Psychology (pp.405-437). North Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers.

Piaget, J. (1937). La construction du reel chez l'enfant. Neuchatel- Paris: Delachaux&Niestle.

Powers, M.K. & Dobson, V. (1982). Effect of focus on visual acuity of human infants. Vision Research, 22, 5, 521-528

Prigogine, I. & Stengers, I. (1986) (Order from chaos. New Dialogue of Man andNature). Moscow: Progress Publ.

Sextus Empiricus. (1976) (Works, Book 1). Moscow: Mysl publ.

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Slater, A., Morison, V. & Rose, D. (1982). Visual memory at birth. British Journal ofPsychology, 73ï, 519-525

Subbotsky, E.V. (1985). Preschool children's perception of unusual phenomena. SovietPsychology, 23, 91-114

Subbotsky, E.V. (1990). The preschooler's conception of the permanence of an object.(Verbal and actual behaviour). Soviet Psychology, 28, 3, 42-63.

Subbotsky, E.V. Existence as a psychological problem: Object permanence in adults andpreschool children. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 14, 1, 67-82

Zusne, L. & Jones, W.H. (1982). Anomalistic psychology. A study of extraordinaryphenomena and experience. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

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Table 1. Percentage of children in experimental and control groups showing various reactionsin stages I-IV (Space)

Stage________________________________________ I,II III IY Acknowledge Permeability____ _________________________________ ____________N of Age In everyday In a Try to pass Investigative Practical Disappointmentchil- reality Fairy tale hand through action action at failuredren the glass wall

Exper.groups16 4 0 100 82 12 44 4419 5 0 100 58 26 53 5310 6 0 100 20 50 30 20

Control groups16 4 -- -- 0 33 87 --19 5 -- -- 0 42 100 --10 6 -- -- 10 20 40 --

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Table 2. Percentage of children in experimental and control groups showing various reactionsin stages I-IV (Time)

Stage________________________________________ I,II III IY Acknowledge reversibility of complex processes __________________ _____________N of Age In everyday In a Refuse to drink Refused to drink Acknowledgechil- reality fairy tale following experimenter’s when promised at the end dren initial request a reward that the water was still magicExper.groups16 4 0 100 82 12 44 4419 5 0 100 58 26 53 5310 6 0 100 20 50 30 20

Control groups16 4 -- -- 0 33 87 --19 5 -- -- 0 42 100 --10 6 -- -- 10 20 40 --

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