East Side Access Monthly report for Dec11

PMOC COMPREHENSIVE MONTHLY REPORT

East Side Access (MTACC-ESA) ProjectMetropolitan Transportation Authority

New York, New York

Report Period December 1 to December 31, 2011

PMOC Contract No.DTFT60-09-D-00007Task Order No. 2, Project No. DC-27-5115, Work Order No. 03

Urban Engineers of New York, P.C., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 1103, New York, New York 10121PMOC Lead: V. Simuoli, 212-736-9100; [email protected] of time on project: Five years on project for Urban Engineers

December 2011 Monthly Report i MTACC-ESA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

EAST SIDE ACCESS PROJECT (ESA)

THIRD PARTY DISCLAIMER......................................................................................................1

REPORT FORMAT AND FOCUS.................................................................................................1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..............................................................................................................1

ELPEP SUMMARY.........................................................................................................................9

1.0 GRANTEE’S CAPABILITIES AND APPROACH........................................................11

1.1 TECHNICAL CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY..............................................................................11

1.2 PROJECT CONTROLS..............................................................................................................16

1.3 FTA COMPLIANCE.................................................................................................................28

2.0 PROJECT SCOPE..............................................................................................................28

2.1 STATUS OF DESIGN/PROCUREMENT/CONSTRUCTION............................................................28

2.2 THIRD-PARTY AGREEMENTS.................................................................................................51

2.3 CONTRACT PACKAGES AND DELIVERY METHODS................................................................51

2.4 VEHICLES..............................................................................................................................51

2.5 PROPERTY ACQUISITION AND REAL ESTATE........................................................................52

2.6 COMMUNITY RELATIONS.......................................................................................................53

3.0 PROJECT MANAGEMENT PLAN AND SUB PLANS................................................54

3.1 PROJECT MANAGEMENT PLAN..............................................................................................54

3.2 PMP SUB-PLANS...................................................................................................................54

3.3 PROJECT PROCEDURES..........................................................................................................54

4.0 PROJECT SCHEDULE STATUS....................................................................................56

4.1 INTEGRATED PROJECT SCHEDULE.........................................................................................56

4.2 90-DAY LOOK-AHEAD OF IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES..............................................................69

4.3 CRITICAL PATH ACTIVITIES..................................................................................................71

4.4 SCHEDULE CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS...................................................................................73

5.0 PROJECT COST STATUS...............................................................................................75

5.1 BUDGET/COST.......................................................................................................................75

5.2 PROJECT FUNDING.................................................................................................................81

5.3 COST VARIANCE ANALYSIS..................................................................................................83

December 2011 Monthly Report ii MTACC-ESA

5.4 PROJECT CONTINGENCY........................................................................................................84

6.0 PROJECT RISK.................................................................................................................86

6.1 PREVIOUS RISK ASSESSMENTS..............................................................................................86

6.2 CURRENT RISK UPDATE........................................................................................................86

6.3 RISK MANAGEMENT STATUS................................................................................................87

6.4 RISK MITIGATION ACTIONS..................................................................................................88

6.5 COST AND SCHEDULE CONTINGENCY...................................................................................91

7.0 PMOC CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................94

8.0 GRANTEE ACTIONS FROM QUARTERLY AND MONTHLY MEETINGS.......103

TABLES AND GRAPHS

TABLE 1: PROJECT SCHEDULE................................................................................................7

TABLE 2: PROJECT BUDGET/COST TABLE ....................................................................8

TABLE 1.1: PROJECT OVERALL PERCENT COMPLETE TREND (ACTUAL VERSUS PLANNED).....................................................................................................................22

GRAPH 1.1: PROJECT OVERALL PERCENT COMPLETE TREND (ACTUAL VERSUS PLANNED).....................................................................................................................23

TABLE 1.2: AWARDED, INVOICED AND EXPENDITURE TREND..................................24

GRAPH 1.2: AWARDED, INVOICED AND EXPENDITURE TREND.................................25

TABLE 4.1: JULY 2009 BASELINE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT FOR ACTIVE CONSTRUCTION PACKAGES...................................................................................................58

TABLE 4.2: DECEMBER 2011 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT FOR ACTIVE CONSTRUCTION PACKAGES...................................................................................................59

TABLE 4.3: SCHEDULE SLIPPAGE AND COST OVERRUN OF ACTIVE CONTRACT PACKAGES....................................................................................................................................61

TABLE 4.4: FUTURE CONTRACT PACKAGES’ BASELINE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT*.........................................................................................................................62

TABLE 4.5: FUTURE CONTRACT PACKAGES DECEMBER 2011 UPDATE...................64

TABLE 4.6: FUTURE CONTRACT PACKAGES AWARD DELAY AND ASSOCIATED ESCALATION COST....................................................................................................................65

TABLE 4.7: THE PMOC’S BEST CASE SCENARIO..............................................................66

TABLE 4.8: AWARDED PACKAGE BASED ON PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT....67

TABLE 4.9: AWARDED CONTRACT PACKAGES SAVINGS AND ASSOCIATED ESCALATION COSTS..................................................................................................................68

TABLE 4.10: 90 DAY LOOK AHEAD.........................................................................................70

December 2011 Monthly Report iii MTACC-ESA

TABLE 4.11: EARLY FINISH “AND NEAR CRITICAL DATE” IPS PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT...........................................................................................................................72

TABLE 4.12: SCHEDULE CONTINGENCY.............................................................................73

TABLE 4.13: SCHEDULE CONTINGENCY DRAWDOWN (BASED ON THE 2009 SCHEDULE)...................................................................................................................................74

TABLE 5.1: COMPARISON OF STANDARD COST CATEGORIES: FFGA VS. CWB.....75

TABLE 5.2: PROJECT BUDGET................................................................................................78

TABLE 5.3: APPROVED PROJECT CHANGE ORDERS STATUS......................................80

TABLE 5.4: FEDERAL GRANT STATUS..................................................................................82

TABLE 5.5: PROJECT COST CONTINGENCY COMPARISON..........................................85

GRAPH 6.1: COST CONTINGENCY DRAWDOWN GRAPH...............................................91

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – LIST OF ACRONYMS

APPENDIX B – PROJECT OVERVIEW AND MAP

APPENDIX C – LESSONS LEARNED

APPENDIX D – PMOC STATUS REPORT

APPENDIX E – SAFETY AND SECURITY CHECKLIST

APPENDIX F – ON-SITE PICTURES

APPENDIX G – PMOC CONTRACT CM009/CM019 MILESTONE ANALYSIS

December 2011 Monthly Report iv MTACC-ESA

THIRD PARTY DISCLAIMER

This report and all subsidiary reports are prepared solely for the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). This report should not be relied upon by any party, except FTA or the project sponsor, in accordance with the purposes as described below.

For projects funded through FTA Full Funding Grant Agreements (FFGAs) program, FTA and its Project Management Oversight Contractor (PMOC) use a risk-based assessment process to review and validate a project sponsor’s budget and schedule. This risk-based assessment process is a tool for analyzing project development and management. Moreover, the assessment process is iterative in nature; any results of an FTA or PMOC risk-based assessment represent a “snapshot in time” for a particular project under the conditions known at that same point in time. The status of any assessment may be altered at any time by new information, changes in circumstances, or further developments in the project, including any specific measures a sponsor may take to mitigate the risks to project costs, budget, and schedule, or the strategy a sponsor may develop for project execution. Therefore, the information in the monthly reports will change from month to month, based on relevant factors for the month and/or previous months.

REPORT FORMAT AND FOCUS

This report is submitted in compliance with the terms of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Contract No. DTFT60-09-D-00007, Task Order No. 002. Its purpose is to provide information and data to assist the FTA as it continually monitors the grantee’s technical capability and capacity to execute a project efficiently and effectively, and hence, whether the grantee continues to be ready to receive federal funds for further project development.

This report covers the project management activities on the East Side Access (ESA) Mega-Project managed by MTA Capital Construction (MTACC) with MTA as the grantee and financed by the FTA FFGA.

MONITORING REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The East River tunnels in Manhattan are at capacity. The ESA project is anticipated to improve LIRR tunnel capacity constraints and enable the growth of the overall system. The project comprises a 3.5 mile commuter rail extension of the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) service from Sunnyside, Queens to Grand Central Terminal (GCT), Manhattan, utilizing the existing 63rd St. Tunnel under the East River and new tunnels in Manhattan and Queens, including new power and ventilation facilities. The project includes a new 8 track terminal constructed below the existing GCT and a new surface rail yard in Queens for daytime train storage. Ridership forecast is 162,000 daily riders (27,300 new riders) in 2020. The project will provide increased capacity for the commuter rail lines of the LIRR and direct access between suburban Long Island and Queens and a new passenger terminal in Grand Central Terminal (GCT) in east Midtown Manhattan, in addition to the current connection to Penn Station in Manhattan.

December 2011 Monthly Report 1 MTACC-ESA

2. CHANGES DURING 4th Quarter 2011

a. Engineering/Design Progress

The ESA Project Management Team (PMT) reported the design effort progressed to 95.5% completion vs. 100% planned for November 30, 2011, based on the current revised General Engineering Consultant (GEC) design schedule. Overall design progress continues to be hampered by minimal progress in the E/T design. Preliminary design efforts for the 48th Street entrance to GCT continued in the 4th quarter of 2011. For the CH057 Contract (Harold Structures 3A) all design efforts except the catenary are completed. Catenary design cannot be completed and incorporated into the final design package until Amtrak approval is obtained (E/T Catenary is currently at 60%). Progress on remaining E/T design for FHA02, FHA03, and FHA04 is stalled pending Amtrak approval (note: Amtrak can only review one E/T package at a time, currently the 60% design for FHA02 is with Amtrak since November 16, 2011 for approval).

b. New Contract Procurements

Contract CM014A (GCT Concourse and Facilities Fit-out) was awarded and Notice to Proceed was issued during the 4th Quarter of 2011.

c. Construction Progress

MTACC reported in the ESA November 2011 Monthly Progress Report that the construction effort reached 42.1% completion vs. 60.7% planned for this period. For the previous quarter (September 2011) the construction effort reached 39.9% complete vs. 56.9% planned. The overall construction progress continued to trend behind plan, consequently making the September 2016 RSD unachievable.

d. Continuing and Unresolved Issues

The following issues continue to be PMOC major concerns:

The inability of the ESA PMT to effectively manage the stakeholder relationship with Amtrak in order to improve the review and acceptance process for the catenary re-design work at Harold Interlocking continues to be a major concern. Contracts CH053/054A have been significantly impacted by the failure to obtain timely approvals from Amtrak, and late completion of work by the CH053/054A contracts has also impacted the progress on the follow-on Contract CQ031, Queens Bored Tunnels and Structures. The 60% Catenary Design package for Harold Stage 2 work has been with Amtrak since November 16, 2011 and has not been approved as of the end of December 2011.

The continuing problem of limited Amtrak force account support has further constrained construction progress on the Harold work (CH053 & CH054A).

The overall MTACC progress in updating and finalizing the ESA project procedures remains behind schedule. As of December 31, 2011, the MTACC has a total of 75 procedures approved. Two key procedures remain open: AD.15, Program Change Control; and Procedure AD XX.XX, Reporting Requirements to FTA to Obtain Additional Funding.

Since the approval of the FFGA in 2006, the average monthly construction progress rate has increased from 0.16% per month through 2009 to 1.0% for the last 12 months. The overall construction progress through November 30, 2011 was 42.1%, which falls short of


the 60.7% of completed construction planned for this period. The construction progress continues to lag the planned established in the September 2009 re-baseline of the project schedule.

The PMOC remains concerned about the ability of the MTA and the State of New York to provide future local funding for the project. The MTA Five Year Capital Program is currently being funded in two year increments and it remains to be seen if the next two-year increment will be fully funded. MTACC reported no progress on this issue during December 2011.

e. New Cost and Schedule Issues

Schedule:

In September 2011, MTACC announced that it was in the process of re-baselining its project schedule, which was to be developed and finalized in the 4th Quarter of this year to account for current project delays as well as the impact of Amtrak’s four-year plan for extensive track/tunnel rehabilitation for all 4 East River Tunnels (ERTs). The stated goal was to achieve a Revenue Service Date that, at a minimum, meets the April 2018 Federal date in the ELPEP. Although the re-baselining workshops were completed in December 2011, the ESA PMT was not able to finalize the new baseline as forecast in September 2011. The new goal is to finalize the baseline in January 2012, and present the results to the MTA Capital Program Oversight Committee (CPOC) meeting in February 2012. The PMOC has expressed its concern that MTACC is planning to do a risk assessment on the new baseline after the presentation to the CPOC, and has recommended that a risk-informed baseline be developed before the CPOC presentation. The PMOC is also concerned that according to the ESA Project Controls Group, the cost re-baselining has not been completed, and that cost impacts of the schedule re-baseline may not be presented to the CPOC at the same time.

3 PROJECT STATUS SUMMARY AND PMOC ASSESSMENT

a. Grantee Technical Capacity and Capability

The PMOC completed its review (based on Candidate Revisions) of the ESA PMP Revision 8.0 and forwarded its findings to the FTA Region 2 Office.

b. Real Estate Acquisition

MTA Real Estate is waiting for a more advanced design of the preferred 48th Street entrance before continuing the appraisals. The ESA Project is in the process of negotiating an easement agreement with the Rudins and refining the design of the preferred scheme. The Tech Memo #6 which describes the updated 48th Street design; was approved by the FTA on November 23, 2011. The PMOC is concerned about the length of time it is taking to finalize the 48th Street entrance.

Design of the elevators at 335 Madison Avenue has been stalled because the owners have not granted access to appraise the temporary and permanent easements needed.

Extensions for three easements in Queens are being negotiated.

c. Engineering/Design

Progress on the remaining Electric Traction (ET) design work continues to trend behind schedule. Amtrak acceptance of 60% catenary design for Contract FHA02 was initially forecasted for September 21, 2011, but has not occurred as of the end of December 2011. The MTACC’s Quality


Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) contractor for ET design has reviewed the design and believes that it is acceptable. The package was forwarded to Amtrak on November 16, 2011 and as of the end of December 2011, Amtrak has not approved the package. As a result of this delay, the October 28, 2011 target date for submitting the 90% design package was not met. Similarly, the October 14, 2011 target date for submitting the 30% catenary design for Contract FHA03 has not been met. Since Amtrak has stated that they can review only one package at a time, the design submittals are stacked up and approvals continue to be delayed. The catenary installation is on the critical path for the Harold work and is on the near critical path for the entire project. The MTACC President acknowledged at the December 2011 Executive Meeting with the FTA/PMOC that delays in Amtrak approval of these designs is an issue and that he is planning to meet with Amtrak executive management in January 2012 to discuss.

d. Procurement

As of November 30, 2011, the total procurement activity on the project was reported to be 59.3% complete, with $4.62B in contracts awarded out of the $7.791B budget. Only the first two years of the 2010 – 2014 MTA Capital Program have been funded by the NYS Capital Program Review Board (CPRB). The CPRB was to approve the next funding increment by December 31, 2011, but this has not occurred. Continuing delay in approving the next funding increment may impact the award dates for contracts CM014B – GCT Concourse/Cavern Finishes; CS179 – Systems Package 1 (Facilities); and CS084 – Systems Package 2 (Tunnels). The extent of the delays will be determined based on the level of funding approved for the next phase of the Capital Program, and the length of time it will take for the funding to be authorized.

The procurement process for contracts CS179, CM012 and CM014B, which are high dollar value contracts with long durations, is trending significantly behind schedule. A significant contributor to the delays in the procurement process for these packages is due to a large amount of scope shift among the packages being done to mitigate the potential impact of access delays for work in these packages due to the delays in the CM009/019 work.

At the November 2010 Schedule Update meeting, the FTA/PMOC requested that ESA perform a schedule impact analysis for shifting the advertisement dates for these contracts. This analysis was never completed. The ESA Project Controls Manager informed the PMOC that the delays in these contract procurements will be incorporated into the new baseline schedule that is currently being developed. Continuing procurement delays may have significant impacts on the entire ESA project schedule. [Ref: ESA-72-Nov10] More detail is provided in Section 2.1.2 of this report.

e. Railroad Force Account (Support and Construction)

The completion of Stage 1 Electric Traction (ET) construction may be significantly impacted due to an event which Amtrak announced in early March 2011. A detailed description of this and the PMOC’s analysis is presented in Section 2.1.3 Construction, Harold Stage 1 Amtrak Force Account. Briefly stated, Amtrak received an arbitration board ruling that all catenary system construction accrues to its Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way (BMWE) Electric Traction employees. This ruling is a direct contradiction to the initial Labor Clearance Agreement that the MTACC executed with Amtrak for the East Side Access Project in 2006, which was intended to permit the use of non-railroad forces for the construction of the catenary and signal tower systems. MTACC and Amtrak management began discussions immediately after the ruling and continue to work toward resolution of this potential problem.


As of this report, however, the MTACC has not resolved this issue with Amtrak. Nonetheless, both parties realize the potential schedule and cost impacts that this situation could have on the project. Therefore, both parties continue to work to resolve this issue one step at a time. The PMOC believes that this is a complex issue that will require an evolutionary process and a considerable amount of time to completely resolve. The PMOC also believes that both parties will continue to work together to ensure that this issue will have minimal negative impact on construction.

f. Third-Party Construction

Manhattan: CM009/CM019 Contracts – Manhattan Tunnels Excavation/Structures Part 1: The progress of both contracts slipped considerably during the last 3 quarters of 2011, to the point where the MTACC has forecasted Substantial Completion, Milestone 6A, as “Under Review” for its last 4 monthly reports. The MTACC is presently “re-baselining” the CM009/019 schedule. Nonetheless, the PMOC has forecasted that Milestone 6A will be at least 12 months late. While the re-baseline effort is underway, the MTACC and its contractors continue to develop “optimal” work plans with associated work schedules to allow Contract CM012 and other contracts early access to the common worksites with CM009/CM019. This may result in an adjusted construction schedule for CM009/019, which may further result in additional schedule slippage.

The contractor completed its concrete pours on the archway of the Westbound Cavern in December 2011 and began pours on the archway of the Eastbound Cavern in late November 2011. As of December 31, 2011, the contractor completed 5 of 23 total archway pours in the Eastbound Cavern. The contractor also completed shotcrete application on the archway and invert of Escalator Way #4, installed archway rebar in Escalator Way #3, waterproofing in Escalator Way #2, and continued excavation of Escalator Way #1 during December 2011. Although this represents significant progress, the PMOC remains concerned that the CM009/019 contracts are still behind schedule and will continue to be on the critical path.

Queens: On the CQ031 contract (Queens Bored Tunnels and Structures), the ESA-CM has worked closely with the contractor to prioritize work in the TBM Launch Area to prevent delay in achieving the milestone for starting the TBM mining. To date, the contractor has mitigated most of the schedule delays caused by the late start of the open-cut excavation and the additional delays due to necessary slurry wall repairs. TBM mining of the Yard Lead Tunnel commenced on May 17, 2011. TBM mining of the Track A Tunnel commenced on August 9, 2011 and was completed on December 22, 2011. Late completion of required CH053 work and CH054A work initially delayed a number of critical interface points with the CQ031 work. Based on work-around plans and deletion of two tunnel emergency exit/ventilation plant facilities, there remains only one critical interface points of the 8 identified in Q3-2010: tunneling beneath the existing, operational LIRR GO2 Substation. However, due to continuing delays to completion of work on the CH053 contract, new work zone and access point conflicts continue to develop between contracts CH053/054A and CQ031. Resolution of these new conflicts will require a high level of coordination by the ESA Construction Managers and will create some contractor inefficiencies resulting in extra costs. Maintenance of the proposed TBM mining schedule has been and continues to be the primary focus and goal of all construction management efforts and decisions for the Queens Construction site. See Section 2.1.3 under sub-heading “Queens Third-Party Contracts” for a more detailed discussion.

On the CQO39 (Northern Boulevard Crossing) contract as of November 30, 2011, based on the latest data available from the grantee, the cumulative actual percent complete is 47.8% versus


planned 57.9% on a cost expenditure basis, and 71% of the current approved contract time to Substantial Completion has elapsed. In July 2011, MTA approved a global settlement for project delays up to April 30, 2011. The settlement provided for a contract time extension of 300 CDs, inclusive of the previously approved 64 calendar days (CD) extension, and compensation of $6.5 million. The PMOC believes that this complex and challenging contract will continue to experience delays during its remaining construction duration that will consume the remaining available float and likely adversely impact the project critical path. Some of these anticipated additional delays have already materialized, e.g., encountering bedrock at a lower elevation than anticipated, which resulted in installation of additional freeze pipes and several weeks of delay. The PMOC does not believe that the contractor will be able to improve the rate of construction progress based on the particular characteristics of this contract including: very limited site access; labor intensive excavation/construction work; NYCT oversight of the construction work; and a high probability of encountering unforeseen field conditions during tunnel excavation that will result in re-design and a change in the construction means and methods. There is also concern that continued delays may impact the start of major construction work under the follow-on Contract CQ032 (Plaza Substation and Queens Structures) that the CQ039 contractor will need to accommodate within the work zone. See Section 2.1.3 under sub-heading “Queens Third-Party Contracts” for a more detailed discussion.

Harold Interlocking: ESA-PMT had previously approved the contractor’s re-baselined schedule for Contract CH053 (Harold Interlocking, Part 1 and G.O.2 Substation), which showed a Substantial Completion date of January 2012, 20 months later than the original date of May 2010. However, based on continuing delays, the ESA-PMT is now forecasting a Substantial Completion date of August 2013 (note: current IPS variance report shows this date as April 2014), which is 39 months later than its original date. As of November 30, 2011, the Schedule Completion by cumulative cost was 61.9% actual versus 93.6% planned, based on the contractor’s current approved re-baselined schedule, with 96% of the current approved contract time to Substantial Completion elapsed. Late Amtrak final approval for catenary package MP5 and the continuing problem of limited Amtrak force account support have further constrained construction progress. The PMOC is concerned that costs will continue to increase dramatically in response to continuing delays to the Substantial Completion date, as well as mitigating delays to the two remaining critical CH053/CQ031 interface milestones due to late completion of critical CH053 work. The PMOC also has concerns about Contract CH054A (Harold Structures Part 2A), which are similar to those discussed above for Contract CH053. During March 2011, a new concern materialized about the relationship between Amtrak and the CH053/054A contractor regarding division of construction work scope. At that time there was an arbitration board ruling in favor of Amtrak union’s claim to catenary pole and signal tower work that is a significant part of the CH053 base contract scope of work. The adverse impacts to the CH053 and CH054A construction schedules and budgets are potentially significant and the contractor’s experience in the spring and fall of 2011 confirm this concern. This issue is still not resolved as of this report, although discussions between MTACC and Amtrak continue.

g. Vehicles

In a report to the MTA Board, ESA represented that the funds dedicated to rail car procurement will be reassigned to contingency. FTA Region 2 Office informed the PMOC in early 2011 that the MTA has to put back the original funding allocated for the purchase of rail vehicles and abide


by the federal procurement rules and regulations to purchase the vehicles. There has been no change on this issue since the last report.

h. Systems Testing and Start-Up

The ESA Operational Readiness Group has produced a preliminary schedule for commissioning and start-up activities which they have provided to the ESA Project Controls Group. The Operational Readiness group presented a status of commissioning and start-up activities at a re-baselining schedule workshop held on December 16, 2011; however, the logical tie-ins to the project IPS were not shown or discussed.

i. Project Schedule

Table 1: Project Schedule

FFGAForecast Completion (F), Actual Start (A)

Grantee* PMO**

Begin Construction September 2001 September 2001 (A) September 2001 (A)

Construction Complete December 2013 TBD April 2018 (F)

Revenue Service December 2013 TBD April 2018 (F)

* Source – Grantee forecast Revenue Operations Date per updated MTA approved schedule information in September 2009 and updated

(July ’10) IPS.

**Source –ELPEP forecast.

j. Project Budget/Cost

The table below lists the FFGA total project cost along with the federal and local shares with corresponding obligated amounts, and compares it with the Current Working Budget (CWB) and lists the latest federal and local expenditures.


Table 2: Project Budget/Cost Table

FFGA

(as of December 18, 2006)

FFGA Amendment

s

MTA’s Current Working Budget

(CWB)Expenditures as ofNovember 30, 2011

($ Millions)(% of Grand Total Cost)

Obligated

(Millions)

TBD($ Millions)

(% of Grand Total Cost)

($ Millions) (% of

CWB)

Grand Total Cost $7,386 100 $8,119* $8,827 100 $3,315.9 37.6

Financing Cost $1,036 14.0 TBD$1,036

(FFGA est.)11.7

Total Project Cost

$6,350 86.0 $4,107 $8,119* $7,791** 88.3 $3,315.9 42.6

Federal Share $2,683 36.3 $1,148 $2,699 $2,699 30.6 $1,592.4 20.4

5309 New Starts share $2,632 35.6 $1,098 $2,436.6 $2,436.6 27.6 $1,346.6 17.3

Non New Starts grants $51 0.7 $50 $67 $67 0.8 $50.4 0.6

ARRA 0 0 0 $195.4 $195.4 2.2 $195.4 2.5

Local Share $3,667 49.6 $2,959 $5,420 $5,092 57.7 $1,723.5 22.1

* The ELPEP Estimated Total Project Cost (ETPC) is $8.119 billion (exclusive of financing cost), reflecting the medium level of risk mitigation.

** CWB represents MTA Board approved $7,791 budget exclusive of financing cost (September 2009).

k. Project Risk

In January 2010, the PMOC and the FTA worked with MTACC and ESA staff to finalize the Enterprise Level Project Execution Plan (ELPEP). Cost contingency and secondary schedule mitigations have been adjusted based on discussions between the FTA Administrator and MTA Chairman. Details of the ELPEP status are discussed below.

MONTHLY UPDATE

The information contained in the body of this report is limited, in accordance with Oversight Procedure 25, to “inform the FTA of the most critical project occurrences, issues, and next steps, as well as professional opinions and recommendations.” Where a section is included with no text, there are no new “critical project occurrences [or] issues” to report this month.


ELPEP SUMMARY

Status:

ELPEP meetings were held on December 6, 2011 and December 8, 2011. The current status of each of the main ELPEP components as discussed and updated during December 2011 is summarized as follows:

Technical Capacity and Capability (TCC): The PMOC has completed its review of the Candidate Revisions for the ESA-PMP and will discuss them with the FTA Region 2 Office before discussing them with MTACC. Also related to TCC compliance are two outstanding issues requiring MTACC action: MTACC completion of the final sub-plan elements discussed above, and the need for MTACC to develop and implement the PMP training process.

Schedule Management Plan (SMP): On November 3, 2011, the FTA confirmed that MTACC has responded to the Candidate Revisions identified in FTA’s conditional approval letter, dated October 26, 2010, and that the SMP is fully approved. The process of transferring the verification process to the respective project teams has been discussed in general terms at several recent ELPEP meetings (see Compliance Demonstration below). The issue of secondary schedule mitigation was clarified and agreed upon.

Cost Management Plan (CMP): FTA conditional approval of the Cost Management Plan, including five (5) Candidate Revisions was provided on September 1, 2011. MTACC has submitted its final revisions to the CMP, which incorporate its responses to those Candidate Revisions. FTA/PMOC final review of these revisions is in progress.

Risk Mitigation Capacity Plan (RMCP): Drafts of the ESA and SAS Risk Management Plans were transmitted to FTA Region II during October 2011. MTA addressed all PMOC comments in its submittal of the RMCP on October 28, 2011. Resolution of any final comments to the RMCP will be coordinated and combined with a review of the ESA and SAS Project Risk Management Plans. Reviews of these plans were completed, and comments were forwarded to the FTA Region 2 Office in December 2011.

Conformance and Compliance: Review of MTA TCC, Cost and Schedule compliance is a relatively straightforward matter and can be accomplished through existing reporting tools. Risk Management compliance is somewhat more complicated due to the qualitative elements of the process. Potential methods for this reporting process were presented and discussed. MTA will further evaluate and present its findings in a subsequent meeting.

Observation:

Although overall implementation of the ELPEP is behind schedule, the MTACC has begun implementation of schedule, cost and risk management plans. Both projects have updated their PMPs to support these management documents and processes based upon agreed upon Candidate Revisions.

Concerns and Recommendations:

Development of formal implementation of training, verification and reporting processes for each of these ELPEP elements should be given priority. The PMOC is concerned that currently there is little evidence that the ESA PMT has received training in ELPEP compliance as committed to by


MTACC. The verification process will ensure that all benefits associated with the ELPEP are realized to the greatest extent possible.


1.0 GRANTEE’S CAPABILITIES AND APPROACH

1.1 Technical Capacity and Capability

1.1.1 Organization, Personnel Qualifications and Experience

Status:

The ESA Organization Document (including position descriptions, organization charts and resumes) has not been formally updated since December 2008 [Ref: ESA-47-Jan10]. The PMOC was told by the ESA Chief Operating Officer in December 2010 that they are not planning to update this document but will update the PMP accordingly.

The ESA Organization has created and filled two new positions in the 4th Quarter of 2011: Deputy Program Executive and Program Manager for Harold.

Observation:

ESA provides periodic organizational chart updates and committed to updating the PMP appropriately. The PMOC reviewed the relevant section of Rev. 8 of the PMP and has found that it does not adequately replace the function of the ESA Organization document.


Given that the PMP does not fully replace the function of the ESA Organization Chart, the PMOC continues to recommend that ESA reinstate the practice of periodically updating the Organization document and forward it to the PMOC for review.

a) Staff Qualifications

At present, the PMOC has not observed any issues related to qualifications of personnel in management positions on the project.

b) Grantee Staffing Plan

Status:

The ESA Quality Manager has been given authority to hire two additional Quality staff. A new Quality Engineer started in early December 2011, and he has been assigned to the CM009/019 and CM014A contracts. ESA Quality Staffing was at three people for four months before this addition. There will be one additional hire. ESA continues to interview prospective candidates for this position.

Observation:

Since this new hire will replace a staff member who retired, the net gain to the staff will only be one, and when fully staffed there will be five Quality staff members. This means that the staffing level will only be one more than what it was in February 2011. However, since February 2011, there has been significant increased activity on contracts CQ031 and CQ039 and there have been two new substantial contracts awarded: CQ032 and CM014A.

According to the ESA Contracts Status Summary Report, issued December 1, 2011, there are seven construction contracts and one systems contract projected to receive Notice-to-Proceed (NTP) in the next nine months. This, accompanied by the continual growth of active contracts, may necessitate an increased oversight effort from the quality management team.



The PMOC is concerned that, even with the addition of one more person, the staffing levels may still be insufficient to cover the projects that are in construction as well as the new projects to be awarded in 2012.

The PMOC recommends that ESA consider hiring at least one additional staff member to cover the coming increase in project activity. [Ref: ESA-81-Jun11]

c) History of Performance, Adequacy of Management Systems

Status:

The East Side Access FFGA anticipated a seven-year project that would cost $6.350 billion (not including finance cost) and that would have a Revenue Service Date (RSD) of December 31, 2013. As of October 31, 2011, the current project cost estimate approved by the MTA Board of Directors remains $7.791 billion (not including financing cost), and the forecasted RSD will be determined at the conclusion of the project schedule re-baselining effort. See Section 5.1 of this report for further project budget details.

The average monthly construction progress rate has increased from 0.16% per month through 2009 to 1.0% for the last 12 months. MTACC reported in its November 2011 Monthly Progress Report that the actual project construction progress reached 42.1% completion, which falls short of the planned 60.7% construction progress planned for this period.

Observation:

Since the FFGA was signed in December 2006, the MTA Board approved a revised project estimated cost of $7.791 billion that is $1.441 billion more than the FFGA amount, and approved an extension of the RSD that is 33 months later than the date established by the FFGA.

Project delays and the Amtrak ERT work have resulted in the ESA PMT developing a new baseline schedule, which is set to be finalized in 1Q12. This 2012 re-baseline will push back the 2009 forecast of September 2016 for RSD.


The PMOC recommends that ESA utilize risk-informed decision making in its 2012 re-baselining effort, in order to provide a more accurate baseline. The PMOC is also concerned that the implementation of the requirements in ELPEP agreement, which was implemented as part of the project recovery plan, was not effective in preventing the need to re-baseline the project again.

1.1.2 Grantee’s Work Approach, Understanding, and Performance Ability

a) Adequacy of Project Management Plan and Project Controls

Status:

As of December 31, 2011, the MTACC adopted a total of 75 revised project procedures. The MTACC has indicated that there are an additional four procedures under development. There is no specific timetable for the adoption of these procedures. Two key procedures remain open: AD.15, Program Change Control; and Procedure AD XX.XX, Reporting Requirements to FTA to Obtain Additional Funding.


Observation:

The overall process for revising project procedures has trended significantly behind the plan for producing and implementing them. Procedures AD.15and AD XX.XX have been open for a considerable length of time and are critical procedures.


The PMOC remains concerned about the length of time MTACC has taken to develop and finalize all of its revised procedures. The PMOC recommends that MTACC complete development of the remaining procedures, particularly AD.15 and AD XX.XX, as quickly as possible, preferably by January 31, 2012. [Ref: ESA-49-Jan10]. (This is also referenced in Section 3.3 of this report).

b) Grantee’s Approach to FFGA and other FTA/Federal Requirements

Status:

MTACC-ESA did not initially provide a Recovery Plan as required in the Full Funding Grant Agreement upon recognizing in October 2007 and February 2008 that the schedule and cost commitments, respectively, would not be met. MTACC submitted three drafts of their Recovery Plans to the FTA. The final Recovery Plan, submitted on June 29, 2011, was approved by the FTA on August 11, 2011. During the week of September 26, 2011, MTACC announced publically at a Capital Program Oversight Committee (CPOC) meeting that it had begun the process of re-baselining its schedule; with a goal of finalizing the new baseline by the end of 2011. The re-baselining will account for both project delays experienced to date and the impact of Amtrak’s four-year plan that started in October 2011, for extensive track/tunnel rehabilitation for all 4 East River Tunnels (ERTs). An independent study to evaluate the impacts of Amtrak’s East River Tunnel Rehabilitation Project on the Harold Interlocking work on the project was also performed with a goal to overlay the ESA/Amtrak/LIRR study outcomes onto the draft ESA re-baselined schedule and then to finalize the overall new ESA Integrated Project Schedule baseline. Both of these efforts continued through December 2011 with the goal of completing the final draft re-baselined schedule by December 31, 2011. ESA did not meet its goal of finalizing the new baseline by the end of the year, and has stated that the final new baseline will be ready in January 2012. MTACC’s stated goal is to achieve a Revenue Service Date that, at a minimum, meets the April 2018 Federal date in the ELPEP.

Observations:

ESA did not achieve its goal of finalizing the baseline by the end of 2011. Both the FTA-approved MTACC Recovery Plan and the ELPEP will need to be revised to reflect the re-baselined IPS.


The PMOC remains concerned that the re-baselined IPS may result in significant cost increases and also that the new baseline does not take into account project risk.


c) Grantee’s Approach to Force Account

Status:

The MTACC released its final draft Force Account Management Plan (FAMP), dated December 2010, for review on March 16, 2011. The PMOC completed its review of the FAMP and forwarded a copy of its comments to the FTA and the MTACC on June 17, 2011. As of December 31, 2011, the PMOC has not received a response from the MTACC regarding its comments.

Observations:

MTACC has now had the comments to its FAMP for approximately six months and has not provided a response to the comments submitted.


PMOC continues to recommend that MTACC provide a response to the comments submitted on the FAMP back in June 2011.

d) Grantee’s Approach to Safety and Security

Status:

Overall, the ESA project safety statistics of 2.85 lost time accidents per 200,000 hours continue to trend above the Bureau of Labor Statistics national average of 2.20. The contractor’s safety performance statistics for the CM009/CM019 (Manhattan Tunnels Excavation/Structures Part 1) contracts continue to be less than satisfactory, despite senior management involvement from both the contractor and the MTACC. For November 2011(the latest data available), the injury ratio was 3.19 (for CM009) and 3.00 (for CM019) lost time accidents per 200,000 hours worked. The Bureau of Labor Statistics national industry average is 2.20. Additionally, a subcontract employee was fatally injured on November 17, 2011, when a section of shotcrete fell on him in the Eastbound GCT 1&2 Cavern (CM019 Contract). Coupled with the run-away mine car incident in October 2011, both these serious incidents indicate that the measures the management teams have taken to date do not appear to be working. Both incidents are under investigation by OSHA.

Observations:

Since the fatality, ESA has taken a number of measures including a review of the CM019 contractor’s means and methods; an extension of the restricted work zone under shotcreting operations; and a review of new construction and work plans.


Although the ESA PMT has made an effort to improve the safety performance on the project, the statistics remain above the national average. ESA should continue its efforts to improve overall project safety performance.

e) Grantee’s Approach to Asset Management

Status:

Details on the status of Asset Management related activities on ESA are presented in Section 2.1.5 (Operational Readiness) in this report.


Observation:

The ESA Operational Readiness Group, working in conjunction with LIRR, is developing a well thought out Asset Management Plan that will ultimately be used as a model for LIRR throughout its entire system.


There are no significant concerns or recommendations at this time.

f) Grantee’s Approach to Community Relations

The PMOC believes that the ESA Community Relations staff is reaching out appropriately to inform the community of upcoming and current changes, and has properly handled concerns and complaints from the community. See Section 2.6 for a detailed discussion.

1.1.3 Grantee’s Understanding of Federal Requirements and Local Funding Process Federal Requirements

a) Federal Requirements

Status:

During the week of September 26, 2011, MTACC announced that it is in the process of re-baselining its schedule, which will be developed and finalized in the 4th Quarter 2011 to account for the impact of Amtrak’s four-year plan for extensive track/tunnel rehabilitation for all 4 East River Tunnels (ERTs). MTACC’s stated goal is to achieve a Revenue Service Date that, at a minimum, meets the April 2018 Federal date in the ELPEP.

Observation:

The recently approved Recovery Plan submitted by the MTACC and approved by the FTA in August 2011, will have to be revised/updated once the new baseline schedule has been finalized.


The PMOC is concerned that the re-baselined IPS may result in significant cost increases.

b) Uniform Property Acquisition and Relocation Act of 1970

Status:

Some of the MTA Real Estate files lack final appraisals, negotiation logs, administrative settlements, and payment records. There has been no resolution from MTA regarding the historical files that included global settlement awards in condemnation actions.

Observation:

The MTA continues to proceed at a slow pace to remedy the above-mentioned items. The PMOC has requested these historical files, but the MTA has not supplied them. Without being supplied these files, it is not possible to determine whether the MTA is in compliance with the federal regulations for reimbursement.



The MTA should forward copies of the trade fixture appraisals (from the global settlement historical files) to the FTA for legal review and to determine if some of the items should not have been considered as tenant trade fixtures, but rather real estate considered in the fee acquisition. Also, it is not clear if the MTA will be requesting federal reimbursement for these parcels (global settlement historical files).

The PMOC recommends a file audit of the MTA to assure compliance with federal regulations for reimbursement.

c) Local Funding Agreements

Status:

The NYS Capital Program Review Board (CPRB) approved MTA’s Capital Program Amendment request in May 2010. Funding for ESA was increased by $915 million to a total of $5.56 billion. Commitments to date total $4.52 billion or 81.2%.

Observation:

In October 2009, the total ESA project cost approved by the MTA Board was $7.328 billion, $0.978 billion higher than FFGA Baseline Cost Estimate (BCE) of $6.350 billion. The ESA Current Working Budget (CWB) is $7.791 billion, which is a $1.441 billion increase over the FFGA BCE. [Note: Figures do not include financing costs.]

In May 2011 the USDOT announced the allocation of $294.8 million in Federal High Speed Rail funds for improvements to the Harold Interlocking as part of the Northeast Corridor. These funds will be allocated to a number of Regional Investment projects and progressed concurrently with the ESA project.


The PMOC remains concerned about the ability of the MTA and the State of New York to provide future local funding for the project, given the current state of the economy. The MTA Five Year Capital Program is currently being funded in two year increments and it remains to be seen if the next two-year increment will be fully funded. No further updates were provided regarding this situation during December 2011. [Ref: ESA-68-Oct10]

1.2 Project Controls

1.2.1 Scope Definition and Control

Status:

In response to critical issues and delays evolving on contracts in construction, the ESA-PMT continued to transfer scope during the 4th Quarter of 2011 in existing contracts and contracts not yet awarded to mitigate risks as they occur, as well as to try to optimize the project schedule during the schedule re-baselining process. Much of the proposed scope shift on the Manhattan Contracts is to create more access points to allow multiple contractors to work in the tunnels and caverns simultaneously. In total, over 40 scope of work items were proposed to be shifted among contracts CM009/019; CM012A; CM012; CM013A; CS179; CM013; CM014B. These proposed scope shifts were presented to the Change Control Committee (CCC) in October 2011 in a non-voting session, and as of this report, the PMOC has not received any documentation confirming the current status of the proposed scope shifts.


The scope of CM012 has also been re-evaluated after the cancellation of the bid in the 4th Quarter of 2011 in order to make the package more attractive to potential bidders.

Observations:

The PMOC understands ESA’s rationale for scope transfer as a method to mitigate risk; however, transfer of large amounts of scope needs to be carefully managed and the cost/schedule impact evaluated in order to avoid new sets of risks resulting from such transfer.


The PMOC continues to recommend that any new risks incurred resulting from these transfers be carefully analyzed and documented and compared against the benefits of mitigating existing risks to achieve a better overall “risk profile” as set forth in the “ESA Design and Construction Risk Management Plan”. ESA has not demonstrated as of this report that the potential risks of these scope moves have been thoroughly analyzed. The large amount of scope transfer between the Manhattan contracts will mean that multiple contractors will be working in the same general area simultaneously. This will require careful coordination and on-site management in order to be successful.

1.2.2 Quality

a) Quality Organization

Status:

On December 15, 2011, the ESA Project published an Organization Chart that has the ESA Quality Manager reporting directly to the Deputy Program Executive, Design and Support.

Observation:

The PMOC had several discussions with the Deputy Program Executive, Design and Support before the December 15th Organization Chart was issued and he acknowledged that the ESA Quality Manager should report directly to the MTACC Quality Manager (with a secondary reporting responsibility to the ESA Project). In addition, the ESA Quality Manager is also responsible for Construction activities and by reporting to the Design Executive on the Organization Chart, this additional responsibility is not shown.

The Organization Chart is incorporated, by reference, in the ESA PMP and its supporting plans and procedures. It is important that it reflect the objectivity and independence required for the ESA Quality Manager to properly carry out the duties required.


The PMOC is concerned that the ESA Quality Manager is shown as reporting directly into the ESA Project. The MTACC Chief of Quality has stated that the ESA Quality Manager reports to him and in fact interviewed and approved for hire the new ESA Quality Staff member who started work in December. The PMOC recommends that the MTACC Chief of Quality meet with the ESA Project to resolve the reporting relationship, and update the Organization Chart accordingly.

b) ESA Quality Audit of the GEC

Status:


The ESA Quality Manager conducted an audit of the GEC Quality function on June 6, 2011. As of December 31, 2011, he has still not issued an audit report.

Observation:

Prior to June 6, 2012, the PMOC had requested for many months that the ESA Quality Manager audit the GEC, as a part of his audit responsibility outlined in Section 14 of the ESA Project Quality Manual (PQM), Rev.6, from February 2009.

Since the audit, the PMOC has requested several times that the ESA Quality Manager issue his audit report, but the ESA Quality Manager has had difficulty finding the time, due to his functioning as the surveying expert for ESA, a physical move from Manhattan to Queens, and insufficient Quality Staff to cover all of the ESA contracts. The ESA Quality Manager has committed to issue his report in January 2012, following another request from the PMOC.

Concerns and Recommendation:

The PMOC is concerned that the report has not been issued, six months after the audit took place. The PMOC recommends that the report be issued immediately. Also, the PMOC’s concerns here are tied to ESA Quality Management staffing (discussed in the grantee Staffing Plan section).

c) Construction Work Plans (CWPs) and Quality Training

Status:

The ESA Quality Manager determined that work had proceeded without CWPs either being sent in for review or being followed up after comments have been made by the ESA contract quality managers. This occurred on new contracts, or when new staff was added to the project. The ESA Quality Manager has addressed this issue with the ESA Construction Managers in recent monthly progress meetings and in monthly quality management meetings. CWPs for active processes are currently being reviewed by the ESA Quality Staff for comparison to lessons learned and recommendations. To date, reviews have identified some areas/items for improvement or the need for implementation of additional measures.

The MTACC Chief of Quality had committed to provide training to the ESA Quality and Construction Management since February 2011 and has postponed it each month. They are now planning to begin training in February 2012.

Observation:

The PMOC agrees with the ESA Quality Staff reviewing CWPs for comparison to lessons learned and recommendations, as it should lead to quality improvements.

Due to a shortage of manpower and other priorities, the training kept slipping and it will now be one year since they planned to conduct initial training.


The PMOC is concerned that it took so long to initiate the training, and will attend one or two training sessions to evaluate.

The PMOC recommends that specific findings from the comparisons be identified.

d) As-Builts


Status:

There was no documented process that the GEC must follow with regards to adding/comparing the as-built information to the design drawings. The GEC was notified in July 2011 that they had to issue a procedure. Procedure GEC CPP-03, “As-Built and Record Drawings” was issued in November 2011. ESA Quality is currently monitoring the progress and will have metrics to compare to within the next 1-2 months.

ESA Quality will continue to monitor contractors’ as-built drawing submittals and will address the status of as-builts with each contractor during the Quarterly Quality Audits that will be conducted in January 2012. A training workshop will be held for each contractor in February 2012.

Observation:

The four-month time period for the issue of Procedure GEC CPP-03 was due to an extensive review period with comments from the GEC and the ESA Project Management Team (PMT). It is not unusual, on projects of this size, for ongoing discussions involving multiple people to cause delays in the issuance of a resulting procedure. Similar issues have delayed the issuance of several MTACC procedures over the past few years, though the as-built issue needed to be dealt with more immediately.

The situation involving contractors’ as-built drawings will be evaluated following the workshops that are scheduled in February 2012.


The PMOC is concerned that this important procedure took four months to issue and recommends that ESA develop a streamlined process to generate, review, and issue necessary procedures and other significant documents. In future cases involving procedures being generated to address issues occurring in the field, it is also recommended that a memo be issued by ESA Project Management to address the issue in a more immediate fashion.

The PMOC will determine whether there are any recommendations following a review of metrics that will be collected and analyzed by ESA to evaluate whether or not this issue has been resolved.

e) Use of Unsealed Drawings on CH053 and CH054A

Status:

The contractor stated that they are using drawings that are NOT sealed and, in some instances, there are different versions of the same drawing available. All concerned parties agree that only sealed drawings are to be used for construction and that only one version of a drawing is to be issued and sealed. As of December 2011, this status has not changed.

Observation:

It was reported by the GEC Quality Manager that the different versions were marked “INFO” and were sent to the ESA Construction Manager for internal use and should not have been released to the contractor. The PMOC observed that there was no documented system that told the Construction Manager not to release “INFO” drawings to the contractor.


The PMOC recommends that a memo be issued to all ESA Construction Managers stating that only “sealed” drawings are to be released to contractors. [Ref: ESA-82-Jun11]


1.2.3 Project Schedule

Status:

The ESA-PMT is in the process of finalizing a revised baseline schedule to account for the project delays to date, as well as the scope transfer among contracts, and the Amtrak East River Tunnel (ERT) project, consequently the IPS update #31 (data date December 1, 2011) was not updated but was only statused (i.e. some of the actual start and/or finish dates are updated, other activities are not). This activity was performed in parallel with the analysis of the ERT Project, a four-year major capital improvement program (results of which will be incorporated into the final re-baselined schedule). A series of workshops for each of the major program areas (Manhattan, Queens, Harold Interlocking, and Systems) were held during October 2011 and November 2011, and concluded in December 2011. The PMOC notes that the workshops were originally planned to be completed in November 2011; however, reconciliation of the Harold schedule and the Operational Readiness workshop were delayed to December 2011. Project stakeholders participated in the workshops with a goal of developing realistic schedules and examining ways of improving schedule performance going forward. The finalized revised baseline schedule was forecast to be completed at the end of 2011 after the workshops were completed. ESA is now projecting finalization of the new baseline for January 2012, with a target of presenting the new baseline to the MTA Capital Program Oversight Committee (CPOC) in February 2012.

Observation:

A preliminary revised baseline schedule produced in the 4th Quarter of 2011 indicates a new revenue service date in December 2017. The PMOC notes that this preliminary baseline did not contain the logical ties for commissioning and start-up activities (Operational Readiness) and also does not have the schedule contingency as required in the ELPEP agreement ,which in Section 4 (MTA’S ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ) states “Based on the FFGA revenue service date of April 2018, East Side Access shall maintain a minimum level of schedule contingency of 240 days through Q2 2016 at which time the schedule contingency minimums will be updated as mutually agreed. Failure to meet this requirement shall trigger the requirement for a recovery plan.” It is also contingent upon obtaining stakeholder concurrence for proposed methods of improving schedule performance.


The re-baselining effort has not taken into account project risk. The MTACC informed the PMOC during one of the workshops that a risk assessment for the entire project schedule will be performed after the finalized new baseline is officially presented to the MTA Board. Given the fact that this is now the second time that the project is going to be re-baselined, the PMOC recommended that ESA produce a risk-informed schedule prior to finalizing the new baseline before it is presented to the Board.

1.2.4 Project Budget and Cost

Status:


MTACC reported that, as of November 30, 2011, the overall project completion was 48.0%, representing a 1.0% progress increase since the October 2011 reporting period; however, the overall project completion significantly lags the planned progress of 63.2%.

MTACC also reported that the project expenditures as of November 30, 2011 were $3,315.9 million. This amount represents 42.6% of the Current Working Budget (CWB) of $7,791 million, approved in September 2009 by the MTA Board (excluding financing costs). The reported invoiced amount as of November 30, 2011 was $3,517.2 million.

Observation:

As of November 30, 2011, the ESA-PMT reported that the project expenditures increased by $31.6 million, representing a growth rate of 0.95% of total expenditures, as compared with October 2011 reporting period. If this rate continues, the PMOC estimates that the planned expenditure will only reach 78.6% by September 2016.

The PMOC estimated that the planned project growth should be 1.84% per quarter to reach the RSD of September 2016. Based on MTACC reporting, the PMOC calculated the actual growth rate for the 3Q11 to be 1.37% and, if continued at this rate, the project would only advance to 75.4% completion at the RSD of September 2016. ESA has acknowledged that the 2016 date is not achievable, as a result they are re-baselining their schedule. The 2012 re-baselined RSD has not been finalized as of this report.

Table 1.1 and Graph 1.1, below, illustrate the variance between planned and actual project completion percentage over time. Graph 1.1 shows the growth in the difference between planned and actual completion. From this graph, it appears as though the difference between planned and actual progress is not steady, but grows over time.

The Schedule Management Plan (SMP) stipulates that plans and measures are required for recovering the lag in progress. The PMOC requested MTACC to indicate how they plan to implement the recovery process as described in the SMP, Section 5.4.


Table 1.1: Project Overall Percent Complete Trend (Actual versus Planned)

Period Planned (%) Actual (%) Variance (lag)Planned Growth Actual Growth

Jun-10 34.4 28.8 5.60 1.2 0.7Jul-10 35.8 29.8 6.00 1.4 1.0

Aug-10 37.4 30.7 6.70 1.6 0.9Sep-10 38.7 31.6 7.10 1.3 0.9Oct-10 40.30 32.90 7.40 1.6 1.3Nov-10 40.00 34.70 5.30 -0.3 1.8Dec-10 45.30 38.80 6.50 5.3 4.1Jan-11 47.00 39.60 7.40 1.7 0.8Feb-11 48.70 40.30 8.40 1.7 0.7Mar-11 50.60 41.40 9.20 1.9 1.1Apr-11 52.30 42.20 10.10 1.7 0.8May-11 53.90 43.10 10.80 1.6 0.9Jun-11 55.40 44.00 11.40 1.5 0.9Jul-11 56.90 44.70 12.20 1.5 0.7

Aug-11 58.60 45.30 13.30 1.7 0.6Sep-11 60.10 46.00 14.10 1.5 0.7Oct-11 61.70 47.00 14.70 1.6 1.0Nov-11 63.20 48.00 15.20 1.5 1.0


Graph 1.1: Project Overall Percent Complete Trend (Actual versus Planned)

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10Jul-1

0

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10Jan

-11

Feb-11

Mar-11

Apr-11

May-11

Jun-11Jul-1

1

Aug-11

Sep-11

Oct-11

Nov-11

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Planned (%)Actual (%)


Table 1.2: Awarded, Invoiced and Expenditure Trend

PeriodBudget

(thousands)Awarded

ValueInvoiced to

DateExpended to

DateAwarded Growth

Invoiced Growth

Expended Growth

Jun-10 $7,328,000 $3,892,152 $2,409,700 $2,362,079 0.71% 2.98% 3.47%Jul-10 $7,328,000 $3,900,682 $2,469,964 $2,394,313 0.22% 2.44% 1.35%

Aug-10 $7,328,000 $3,915,943 $2,534,943 $2,450,296 0.39% 2.56% 2.28%Sep-10 $7,328,000 $3,946,151 $2,607,700 $2,496,612 0.77% 2.79% 1.86%Oct-10 $7,328,000 $3,976,433 $2,690,131 $2,575,055 0.76% 3.06% 3.05%Nov-10 $7,328,000 $3,981,784 $2,760,446 $2,682,441 0.13% 2.55% 4.00%Dec-10 $7,328,000 $4,001,810 $2,840,400 $2,753,055 0.50% 2.81% 2.56%Jan-11 $7,328,000 $4,008,261 $2,899,940 $2,753,660 0.16% 2.05% 0.02%Feb-11 $7,328,000 $4,264,498 $2,955,465 $2,809,140 6.01% 1.88% 1.97%Mar-11 $7,328,000 $4,262,330 $3,022,700 $2,897,203 -0.05% 2.22% 3.04%Apr-11 $7,328,000 $4,296,884 $3,079,920 $2,941,514 0.80% 1.86% 1.51%May-11 $7,328,000 $4,307,279 $3,154,023 $3,021,554 0.24% 2.35% 2.65%Jun-11 $7,328,000 $4,328,649 $3,215,700 $3,091,579 0.49% 1.92% 2.27%Jul-11 $7,328,000 $4,329,440 $3,264,945 $3,122,118 0.02% 1.51% 0.98%

Aug-11 $7,328,000 $4,527,369 $3,316,075 $3,185,802 4.37% 1.54% 2.00%Sep-11 $7,328,000 $4,547,586 $3,215,700 $3,218,880 0.44% -3.12% 1.03%Oct-11 $7,328,000 $4,554,884 $3,441,192 $3,284,335 0.16% 6.55% 1.99%Nov-11 $7,328,000 $4,623,591 $3,517,191 $3,315,942 1.49% 2.16% 0.95%


Graph 1.2: Awarded, Invoiced and Expenditure Trend

Jun-10

Aug-10

Oct-10

Dec-10

Feb-11

Apr-11

Jun-11

Aug-11

Oct-11

$-

$1,000,000

$2,000,000

$3,000,000

$4,000,000

$5,000,000

$6,000,000

$7,000,000

$8,000,000

Budget (thousands)Awarded ValueInvoiced to DateExpended to Date


Because construction progress to date is behind the 2009 baseline schedule, and the variance between planned and actual completion continues to grow over time, the PMOC is concerned that the MTACC has not properly addressed this lag in progress, as stipulated by the SMP.

The PMOC recommends that ESA utilize risk-informed decision-making in any revision of the project budget that will accompany the current schedule re-baseline (1Q12).

More information is detailed in Section 5.1 – Budget/Cost.

1.2.5 Project Risk Monitoring and Mitigation

Status:

Through December 2011, ESA-PMT has continued its efforts to identify and mitigate risks that may adversely affect the program’s cost and schedule performance. Ongoing and significant new risk mitigation initiatives include the following:

In response to continued delays experienced on the Queens contracts to date, ESA-PMT and the associated ESA construction managers continue to manage all Queens area work to the critical CQ031 milestones related to TBM mining of the four rail tunnels.

ESA-PMT has started using 4D modeling of the B10 Substation to assist in coordination between Contracts CQ032 and CQ031 in the area of the Early Access Chamber along Northern Boulevard.

ESA-PMT worked with LIRR, Amtrak and the ESA-CMs to evaluate the impacts that the Amtrak planned capital improvements for the East River Tunnels will have on the track outages needed for the Harold Interlocking work. This effort continued through December


2011. The evaluation process included the use of an outside senior level review team to perform an independent evaluation of the remaining Harold Interlocking work.

ESA-PMT is proposing to advance some Harold force account work for track construction from Stage 3 to Stage 2 to increase the effectiveness of the construction phasing.

For a full discussion of the above cited mitigations, see Section 6.4.2 of this report.

Observation:

In the 60 months since the signing of the FFGA, MTACC has missed all but one of the basic annual mitigation milestones regarding design completion, contracts awarded, and construction completion (details are in Section 6.4.1 of this report). The ESA project has not met the cost and schedule commitments established in the FFGA. In applying the ESA-PMT’s strategies to halt continued delays in Queens, the ESA-CM continues to closely manage the single remaining critical interface between contracts CH053 and CQ031 in an effort to prevent delay to the CQ031 TBM mining, which commenced in May 2011. Seven of the original eight interfaces identified in Q3-2010 as critical between Contracts CH053 and CQ031 have been resolved. These efforts have generally been effective and have limited TBM mining schedule slippage to only about 4 weeks due solely to interface issues. However, due to continuing construction delays on the CH053 contract through December 2011, new critical interfaces with CQ031 are developing. The ESA-PMT has been working with the ESA-CMs to resolve critical CQ031/CH053 interface conflicts on a case-by-case basis. Similarly in Manhattan, the ESA-PMT has focused on schedule risk reduction by shifting work scope packages between contracts.

MTACC announced at the September 26, 2011 MTA Capital Program Oversight Committee (CPOC) meeting that they are analyzing the impact of the construction delays experienced on ESA to date as well as the anticipated delays caused by Amtrak’s 4-year program for major track replacement work in all four East River Tunnels. During December 2011, ESA-PMT continued work on a re-baselined IPS that accounts for schedule delays experienced to date and all schedule accommodations between ESA and the Amtrak ERT program with a goal of achieving a Revenue Service Date (RSD) that at a minimum meets the April 2018 FTA ELPEP date.


Starting in October 2009, the PMOC has been reporting that unmitigated risks identified in the 2008 ESA risk mitigation plan (based on the 2006 risk assessment) have caused MTACC to fail to achieve acceptable progress in support of the FFGA cost and schedule baselines. Subsequently, the PMOC expressed concern that continuing project cost and schedule trend, primarily caused by unmitigated risks, indicated that the ESA project will not be able to meet the revised project cost and schedule baselines approved by the MTA Board in 2009. In September 2011, ESA-PMT acknowledged that, as a result of these trends, they will not be able to complete the project in accordance with the 2009 cost and schedule baselines. MTACC further acknowledged that the poor cost and schedule trending was the primary basis for the decision, made in August 2011, to undertake a comprehensive schedule re-baselining of the entire ESA project. The PMOC recommends that MTACC-ESA continue to complete its current re-baselining efforts to account for the delays and increased project cost experienced to date, and focus on better managing the schedule and cost risks going forward. The PMOC further recommends that MTACC-ESA continue its detailed review of all new project risks that may be encountered due to Amtrak’s 4-year ERT program and the associated cost and schedule impacts.


The PMOC remains increasingly concerned that continued “schedule compression” required to meet the goal of an April 2018 RSD will force “contract stacking” in the many constricted work areas in Queens and Manhattan, which will create new coordination risks for MTACC-ESA. These new risks may expose MTACC-ESA to adverse cost and schedule impacts as well as potential quality issues.

See Section 6.0, Project Risk, for a more detailed discussion of these issues and concerns.

1.2.6 Project Safety and Security

Status:

Overall, the ESA project safety statistics of 2.85 lost time accidents per 200,000 hours continue to trend above the Bureau of Labor Statistics national average of 2.20. The contractor’s safety performance statistics for the CM009/CM019 (Manhattan Tunnels Excavation/Structures Part 1) contracts continue to be less than satisfactory, despite senior management involvement from both the contractor and the MTACC. For November 2011 (the latest up-to-date report available), the injury ratio was 3.19 (for CM009) and 3.00 (for CM019) lost time accidents per 200,000 hours worked. The Bureau of Labor Statistics national industry average is 2.20. Additionally, a subcontract employee was fatally injured on November 17, 2011, when a section of shotcrete fell on him in the Eastbound GCT 1&2 Cavern (CM019 Contract). Coupled with the run-away mine car incident in October 2011, both these serious incidents indicate that the measures the management teams have taken to date do not appear to be working. Both incidents are under investigation by OSHA. Since the fatality ESA has taken a number of measures including a review of the CM019 contractor’s means and methods; an extension of the restricted work zone under shotcreting operations; and a review of new construction and work plans.

The following activities related to the safety certification process took place during the 4th Quarter of 2011:

PHA Hazard logs for Contract Packages CM013A, CH057, CS081, were signed off by the Safety and Security committee at a meeting in October 2011.

Wood Interlocking Certificate of Completion was also signed off by the committee.

Modeling simulations and tunnel/station ventilation briefings to FDNY Fire Prevention. Briefings took place on October 20 and November 15, 2011.

CM for CM008A was directed to provide tests and signatures to certify system safety checklist. This activity is part of the contract requirement "close out" procedure.

Emergency action plan discussions took place with the MTA Chief of Security. The need to invoke one incident commander for GCT was discussed. It was agreed to, and as stated in the Emergency Preparedness Plan, that GCT must be crisis managed as a single establishment. A mandated life safety working group will be convened to discuss a path forward.

Observations:

Issues related to the safety certification process continued to be progressed during the 4th Quarter of 2011.


Since the fatality, ESA has taken a number of measures including a review of the CM019 contractor’s means and methods; an extension of the restricted work zone under shotcreting operations; and a review of new construction and work plans.


Although issues related to Safety Certification are being progressed, the PMOC continues to recommend that the Safety and Security Certification Committee meet on a regular basis to keep the certification process moving. The PMOC also recommends that the MTACC Director of Safety and Security present an overview of the safety certification process to both the MTACC Executive level and to the ESA Safety and Security Certification Committee.

Although the ESA PMT has made an effort to improve the safety performance on the project, the statistics remain above the national average. ESA should continue its efforts to improve overall project safety performance.

1.3 FTA Compliance

On August 11, 2011, FTA-RII approved the MTACC Recovery Plan submitted on June 29, 2011. However, due to the current comprehensive schedule re-baselining, the Recovery Plan will need to be revised. Based on MTACC’s forecast for completion of the re-baselining, the Recovery Plan cannot be revised until Q1-2012.

1.3.1 FTA Milestones Achieved

No new FTA milestones were achieved in this reporting period.

1.3.2 Readiness for Revenue Operations

Status:

A detailed status of the operational readiness activities taking place during the 4th Quarter of 2011 is presented in Section 2.1.5 of this report.

Observation:

The Operational Readiness group continued to progress and refine the activities comprising ESA project commissioning and start-up during the 4th Quarter of 2011.


The Operational Readiness activities were presented at an ESA re-baselining schedule workshop held on December 16, 2011; however, the logical ties into the new ESA IPS baseline schedule were not presented. The PMOC remains concerned that the system start-up and testing activities are not being properly integrated into the IPS since there has been no indication to date as to how these activities are being tied into the new baseline.


2.0 PROJECT SCOPE

2.1 Status of Design/Procurement/Construction

MTACC reported that as of November 30, 2011, the Engineering/Design reached 95.7% completed vs. 100% completion planned for this period and the total construction progress remained at 42.1% complete vs. 60.7% planned, on a cost expenditure basis, in accordance with MTACC’s re-baselined budget of September 2009.

2.1.1 Engineering and Design

Detailed Status:

MTACC has identified key interim milestones to ensure the timely review of the remaining ET designs. Missed milestones are discussed with MTACC at the staff and FTA/PMOC executive level meetings to ensure that proper action is taken. The first milestone date to obtain Amtrak approval of the 100% MP5 design package by August 26, 2011 was not achieved until October 6, 2011. Consequently, Amtrak review of the 60% catenary design package for FHA02, which was to have been reviewed and approved by Amtrak on or before September 21, 2011, was also delayed since Amtrak can only review one package at a time. Progress on the remaining Electric Traction (ET) design work continues to trend behind schedule. Amtrak acceptance of 60% catenary design for Contract FHA02 was initially forecasted for September 21, 2011, but has not occurred as of the end of December 2011. The MTACC’s Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) contractor for ET design has reviewed the design and believes that it is acceptable. The package was forwarded to Amtrak on November 16, 2011, and ESA has not received approval as of the end of December 2011. As a result of this delay, the October 28, 2011 target date for submitting the 90% design package was not met. Similarly, the October 14, 2011 target date for submitting the 30% catenary design for Contract FHA03 has not been met. The GEC has stopped working on the 100% design for CH057 since they cannot proceed until the 60% and 90% catenary designs have been approved by Amtrak. Since Amtrak has stated that they can review only one package at a time, the design submittals are stacked up and approvals continue to be delayed. The catenary installation is on the critical path for the Harold work and is on the near critical path for the entire project. The MTACC President acknowledged at the December 2011 Executive Meeting with the FTA/PMOC that delays in Amtrak approval of these designs is an issue and that he is planning to meet with Amtrak executive management in January 2012 to discuss.

Design work continues on the CH058 Contract package; however, design work on the B/C tunnel approach has stopped pending determination of the impacts of the 400 ft. tunnel extension on the design.

The ESA-PMT has negotiated a proposed change order with the GEC to incorporate an additional 28 design elements into the CM014B (GCT Concourse/Cavern Finishes) design package. The design Notice-to-Proceed (NTP) for these elements was issued to the GEC in December 2011.

Preliminary design efforts for the 48th Street Entrance (CM015) are continuing. The conceptual design has undergone several changes including a reduced footprint resulting from a reduction in the number of escalators in the existing structure that also reduced the amount of retail footage being taken. The ESA PMT has requested that the GEC provide a revised proposal for completing this design work by the end of the year.


Summary Observations:

The ESA-PMT has not made one of the target milestone dates for the ET design work on the project. The MP5 package, which was to have been approved by August 26, 2011, was not approved until October 6, 2011, and the 60% catenary design package for FHA02, which was submitted to Amtrak on November 16, 2011, has still not been approved. While the Amtrak approval process has been a significant cause of the delay, ESA has contributed to the delay by not having packages ready for Amtrak review. The MTACC President acknowledged at the December 2011 Executive Meeting with the FTA/PMOC that delays in Amtrak approval of these designs is an issue and that he is planning to meet with Amtrak executive management in January 2012 to discuss.

Summary Concerns and Recommendations:

The PMOC remains concerned about the continuing delays in finalizing the ET design work on the project. This issue was discussed at the June 2011 FTA Quarterly Program Review Meeting and the FTA requested that MTACC come up with a plan for addressing the multiple issues that are delaying the Harold Interlocking work. [Ref. ESA-A43-Jun11] As of this report, MTACC has not come up with a plan to address the Harold issues.

2.1.2 Procurement

Detailed Status:

Systems Package 1 (CS179)

The ESA-PMT is planning to transfer a significant amount of work that is not systems-related into the CS179 package, by addendum, including the tunnel bench walk; the 63rd Street tunnel rehab work, and various scope items in the Manhattan running tunnels. Also, as of the end of December 2011, there remained over a hundred open proposer questions. The addendum addressing these items has not been issued as of the end of December 2011. To address this delay, ESA has separated the due dates for the Technical proposals and Cost and Schedule proposals. The Technical proposals are still due at the end of January 2012, and the Cost and Schedule proposals due date will be moved out to February 2012.

CM012 – Manhattan Structures, Part 2

This contract had been previously scheduled to be advertised for bid on December 9, 2010. In October 2010, the advertise date slipped one month to January 6, 2011. The contract was advertised on February 18, 2011 and bid due date was again delayed from June 14, 2011 to August 15, 2011 due to the large number of addenda issued. The PMT extended the bid due date out to October 14, 2011 and then again to December 18, 2011, due to large amount of scope transfer work from CM019 and CM012A into this package. The CM012 solicitation was cancelled in November 2011 after MTACC was informed by several potential bidders that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to submit a reasonable bid given the requirements in the bid package. MTACC has scheduled meetings with perspective bidders and is planning to reissue the solicitation by the end of January 2012. Prior to cancellation of the bid, the NTP was forecast for March 2012 and ESA is now forecasting NTP for August 2012. ESA is still forecasting January 2013 for construction to begin on this contract. The PMOC does not believe that it will be feasible to start construction on this contract in January 2013 given the current significant procurement delay. The PMOC notes that the CM012 package will have to be carefully evaluated for its impact on the


revised ESA schedule baseline, since contractor access for the CM014B and CS179 contracts is dependent on the CM012 contract.

CM014 – GCT Concourse and Facilities Fit-Out

This contract had been previously scheduled to be advertised for bid on January 3, 2011. In December 2010, the ESA CCC approved a repackaging of the original CM014 into CM014A and CM014B to mitigate schedule risk by early completion of facility power and the Terminal Management Center (note: the 48th Street entrance and elevator work were previously removed from the CM014 contract). CM014A is the smaller package that contains the Terminal Management Center, which must be completed in order to avoid impacting the Systems 1 Package. The CM014A contract was awarded on November 2, 2011, 4 months later than originally planned. The Notice-to- Proceed was issued on November 7, 2011 and the kick-off meeting was held on November 15, 2011.

CM014B, the much larger package, contains the balance of the CM014 work and is now forecast to be advertised in April 2012, a 4-month delay from the previous projection of December 2011 that results in a 16-month total delay to the original procurement schedule for this contract.

CM013A – 55 th Street Vent Plant

This Contract Package was advertised for bid on June 7, 2011. Bids were initially due in August 2011, then September 2011, then November 17, 2011. Bid date was extended out in order to incorporate the 49th Street electrical feeder into this package. Procurement of this package continues to trend significantly behind schedule. The ESA-PMT is still considering undergoing revisions to reduce the excavation effort and add tunnel lining. This additional work will have to be incorporated into the contract by addendum. The bid date of November 17, 2011 had been extended to February 2012 to allow time for scope adjustments.

Summary Observation:

The PMOC notes that the schedule for all of the above packages has slipped significantly in one phase of the procurement process or another.

Summary Concerns and Recommendations:

CS179, CM012 and CM014B are high dollar value contracts and have long durations. At the November 2010 Schedule Update meeting, the FTA/PMOC requested that ESA perform a schedule impact analysis for shifting the advertisement dates for these contracts. ESA-PMT never completed this analysis. The ESA Project Controls Manager informed the PMOC that this analysis has not been done and that the delays in these contracts will be incorporated into the new baseline schedule that is being developed. Continuing delays may have significant impacts on the entire ESA project schedule. [Ref: ESA-72-Nov10]

2.1.3 Construction

Harold Interlocking Contracts

Detailed Status:

CH053 Contract – Harold Structures Part 1 and G02 Substation

Original Contract value: $137.3 million

Approved Change Orders: $31.9 million


Current Contract value: $169.2 million

Current Estimate-at-Completion: $200.2 million (includes approximately $15 million for additional work scope to be transferred from CH054 and Harold Stage 2 Force Account package).

NTP date: January 2, 2008

Original contract Substantial Completion date: May 2010.

Current approved plan Substantial Completion date: January 2012 (20-month delay)

Current forecast Substantial Completion date: August 2013 (39-month delay)

The original contract final completion date was September 2010. The current forecast final completion date is November 2013.

Schedule: ESA-PMT had previously approved the contractor’s re-baselined schedule, which had a Substantial Completion date of January 2012, 20 months later than the original date of May 2010. The forecast Substantial Completion slipped 6 months from February 2013 to August 2013, 39 months later than the original date. As of November 30, 2011, the scheduled completion by cumulative cost was 61.9% actual versus 93.6% planned, based on the contractor’s current approved re-baselined schedule and 96% of the revised contract time to Substantial Completion has elapsed. The schedule completion by cost expenditure for the November 2011 reporting period was 1.0% actual versus 3.6% planned.

Cost: Recognizing the impact of the continuing delays to the schedule caused by differing field conditions, changes due to re-designs and added scope, ESA-PMT increased the Estimate at Completion (EAC) from $191.7 million to $200.2 million in August 2011. 62 contract modifications (change orders) totaling $31.9 million have been executed as of November 30, 2011. The EAC is now $56.1 million, or 39%, over the original budget.

Construction status for the period of October– December 2011 :

Completed erection of the Harold Aerial Utility Structure; construction of West Bound By-Pass (WBBY) west abutment piles.

Continued fabrication of steel catenary structures; erection of catenary poles; construction of 12kV duct bank and manholes; construction of foundations for signal towers and catenary poles at various locations in Harold Interlocking; sewer construction along 43rd Street at the Amtrak/LIRR Mainline Bridge; and internal wiring of G.O.2 Substation.

Continued installation signal tower mono-poles.

Approximately 40 catenary poles have been released based on final Amtrak approval of design package MP5. Work on remaining portions of the Track A Approach Structure is still on hold awaiting relocation of existing catenary poles and signal towers. As a result, the CQ031 was required to relocate the Track A TBM reception pit.

During the period October - December 2011, the ESA-CM did not report any quality or security issues. There was one lost-time accident and one first-aid injury.

Observations:

During November 2011, which is the latest data available from the grantee, the contractor achieved only 1.0% actual versus 3.6% planned, based on cost using the current approved re-


baselined schedule. The August 2010 adjustment to the EAC results in a total increase of $62.2 million, or 45.8%, to the original contract award value of $137.3 million. Past delays to Amtrak final approval for catenary package and limited Amtrak force account support have caused additional construction delays.

The ESA-CM has negotiated contract milestone changes with the contractor to reflect the cumulative impacts of the various delays to date, and the continuing delays are summarized below:

The General Engineering Consultant’s (GEC) late responses to contractor’s Requests-for-Information (RFIs) and late completion of catenary construction staging plans have continued to delay construction work through 2008, 2009, 2010 and into 2011. The PMOC had previously expressed its concern about the GEC’s ability to respond quickly to contractor’s RFIs and unforeseen site conditions and to adequately plan for required construction staging. In response to these issues, the GEC changed its management organization and added staff and MTACC-ESA engaged HNTB to provide additional review of catenary re-designs prior to submission to Amtrak. Also, the GEC has re-organized the catenary design team under a new design manager. However, despite all these changes intended to resolve approval delays by Amtrak, delays have persisted. Completed re-design packages for both mainline catenary package MP5 and signal tower package MP3 were submitted to Amtrak in November 2010 and final Amtrak approval was expected by December 10, 2010. Similarly, final Amtrak approval for the 100% 12kV duct bank (both civil and electrical portion) was expected by the same date. Amtrak did provide final approval of the signal tower package MP3 on February 18, 2011and final approval of catenary package MP5 on October 6, 2011.

More recently, long-standing problems have been compounded by new issues:

Contractor’s current unofficial forecast for Substantial Completion is September 2013, 40 months later than the original date of May 2010.

Based on the contractor’s experiences in the field, the arbitration board ruling in favor of Amtrak unions’ claim to catenary pole and signal tower work that is a significant part of the CH053 base contract scope of work is likely to have substantial adverse impacts to the CH053/CH054A schedules and budgets.

The CH053 contractor continues to experience access and work zone conflicts with the CQ031 contractor. The CH053 contractor will sometimes be required to wait until the CQ031 contractor finishes work in a particular area and then returns the access/work zone back to the CH053 contractor. This leads to lower productivity and delays to the completion of certain structures.


Overall, the CH053 contractor failed to meet the rate of construction progress required to meet the goals of the contract re-baselined schedule. Because of this, the PMOC remains concerned that the contractor may not be able to achieve and maintain any higher level of production rate. Historical progress has averaged approximately 1.3% per month, yet the contractor’s re-baselined schedule shows that construction progress would now need to average 1.8% per month to meet the current forecast Substantial Completion date of August 2013. The current production rate is 11.5% for January 2011 through November 2011, an average of 1.05% per month. Given that continuing major problems remain unresolved, and new problems, such as the Amtrak labor unions


claim to CH053 work, continue to arise, the PMOC does not believe that any recovery is possible. The PMOC is very concerned about the continuing adverse impacts to the CQ031 contract as well as the follow-on Harold Interlocking Contracts CH057 and CH058. The PMOC continues to recommend that ESA prioritize the GEC construction support to this contract, expedite resolution of utility interferences, prioritize contractor’s requests for track outages and force account support and resolve the Amtrak design approval issues. [Ref: ESA-62-Mar10]

The PMOC previously expressed concern about the continuing delays to final Amtrak approval of catenary package MP5. Based on Amtrak’s final approval of catenary package MP5 in October 2011, the PMOC recommends that PMOC Concern and Recommendation Issue No. 35 be closed.

During March 2011, a concern materialized about the relationship between Amtrak and the CH053 contractor regarding division of construction work scope. There has been a recent arbitration board ruling in favor of Amtrak unions’ claim to catenary pole and signal tower work that is a significant part of the CH053 base contract scope of work. The adverse impacts to the CH053 construction schedule and budget are potentially significant, and the contractor’s experience in the field during April 2011, October 2011 and November 2011 confirms these concerns. For more details about this issue, see the discussion under “Harold Stage 1 Amtrak FA (FHA01)” later in this Section. [Ref: ESA-77-Mar11]

CH054A Contract – Harold Structures Part 2A



Current Estimate-at-Completion: $38.1 million

NTP date: August 24, 2009 (A)

The original contract Substantial Completion date: December 2010.

Current approve plan Substantial Completion date: December 2010.

The current forecast Substantial Completion date: April 2013 (28-month delay)

The original contract Final Completion date was March 2011. The current forecast date is July 2013.

Status:

Cost: As of November 30, 2011, the EAC has decreased $1.0 million from $39.1 million to $38.1 million. Fourteen change orders (contract modifications) totaling $1.62 million have been approved.

Schedule: The forecast Substantial Completion date has slipped 3 months from January 2013 to April 2013. Contract work has been delayed by late mobilization, differing site conditions, adverse weather, lack of Amtrak approved re-design of the 12kV duct bank and delayed completion of associated CH053 work. As a result, actual construction progress continues to fall well below the late finish progress curve. As of November 30, 2011, based on the latest data available from the Grantee, cumulative actual percent complete is 50.7% versus planned 100% on a cost expenditure basis. Substantial Completion was originally planned for December 2010. Recovery is no longer possible.


Construction status for the period October – December 2011 : Completed installation of pre-cast guy anchor for pole B-909E. Continued installation of 36” diameter RCCP storm sewer line along Track LP1A, fabrication of H-4 crib wall components and Signal Bridges E32 and E34, and construction of 12kV duct bank and manholes.

Sewer work is advancing slowly and only in locations where there are no interferences with existing structures. Additionally, lack of adequate Amtrak ET support for planned construction activities, late completion of critical CH053 work and the inability to schedule the required track outages has delayed completion of portions of the CH054A contract work and slowed overall progress.

Observation:

Recovery of lost schedule time is no longer possible because 100% of the contract time under the current approved plan has elapsed, and the work is only 50% complete.


The PMOC is concerned that work progress is very slow and that continued inadequate construction progress and late completion will put additional demands on both Amtrak and LIRR force account support services. The PMOC is also concerned that delay costs will exceed the budgeted post-bid contingency. The PMOC recommends that the Grantee evaluate this situation, work on possible solutions with the contractor, develop the most cost-effective approach to minimize the delay impacts, and reach an agreement with the contractor on a revised baseline schedule that is realistic. [Ref: ESA-56-Feb10]

VH051A (Part 1) – Harold and Point Central Instrument Locations (CILs)



NTP date: May 2009

Substantial Completion date: TBD (previous forecast August 31, 2013)

Final Completion date: TBD (previous forecast September 30, 2013)

Status:

The installation of Point CIL was accomplished in the 4th Quarter of 2011 however the subsequent CIL deliveries will slip due to the effort and resources focused on the delivery and installation of Point CIL. The labor resource issue is being addressed with the contractor to try to mitigate delays incurred at remaining locations. Substantial completion will be reforecast, at present it is TBD.

Observation:

The change in contract requirements, based upon LIRR input, that were given to the contractor at the project kick-off meeting have substantially impacted the initial project completion date (from June 2012 to August 2013). Although the PMT was aware of these changes before contract award, they chose to proceed with awarding the contract rather than delaying the procurement. The VH051B (Part2) contractor’s work on the “F” Harold Alternate Control System (FHACS) and expedited delivery of the equipment are necessary to mitigate further delays to the CIL deliveries and subsequent cut-over dates.



The PMOC remains concerned about the availability of contractor resources given the change in milestone dates and recommends that the contractor focus on mitigating this risk once the milestone dates have been finalized.

VH051B (Part 2) – Harold Tower Supervisory Control System (HTSCS)



NTP date: February 2009

Substantial Completion date: December 31, 2012

Final Completion date: November 23, 2013

Status:

The contractor continues to work on “F” Harold Alternate Control System (FHACS). Approximately 99% of the FHACS hardware has been received by the contractor.

Observation:

Substantial Completion has slipped three months due to the delays in approving the FHACS. Contemplated revisions to the work, ERT repair work, and availability of resources for cut-over support may further delay Substantial Completion. FHACS delivery, installation and in-service are required to support all CIL and CIH cutover.


The PMOC is concerned about the availability of Amtrak project management resources that will be necessary for the final implementation of the FHACS and recommends that the ESA PMT work to ensure that these resources will be available.

Queens Third-Party Contracts

CQ031 Contract – Queens Bored Tunnels and Structures

Original Contract value: $648.9 million (was $659.2 million prior to Feb. 2011)



Current Estimate-at-Completion: $778.5 million (includes $58.4 million option)

Award/NTP date: September 28, 2009 (Actual)

Start date: September 28, 2009 (Actual)

The original contract Substantial Completion date: September 2012

Current approved plan Substantial Completion date: September 2012

The current forecast Substantial Completion date: April 2013 (7 month delay)

The original contract Final Completion date was January 2013. The current forecast date is August 2013.


Status:

Schedule: The Substantial Completion date slipped 1 month from March 2013 to April 2013, a 7-month delay to the original date. As of November 30, 2011, based on the latest data available from the Grantee, the cumulative actual percent complete was 64.4% versus planned 78.6% on a cost expenditure basis, and 72% of the contract time to Substantial Completion has elapsed. From January 2010 through June 2011, the ESA has reported varying levels of float from 0 calendar days (on critical path) to 76 calendar days and most recently reported 76 days of float in the July 2011 IPS update (data date August 1, 2011). The PMOC notes that the IPS has not been updated since July 2011 due to the on-going re-baselining effort.

The contractor commenced TBM mining of the Yard Lead Tunnel on May 17, 2011 and has progressed excavation to 2,758 feet as of December 15, 2011. The TBM mining for the Track A Tunnel started on August 9, 2011 and the contractor has progressed excavation to 1,675 feet as of December 15, 2011. Failure to achieve the required performance of TBM safe haven ground freeze caused additional delays in September 2011. TBM mining of both tunnels did resume and continued through October 2011. Another delay occurred in November 2011 due to a contractor surveying error that caused the Yard Lead TBM to breach the safe haven structure. This resulted in a sinkhole developing beneath the Loop Track to Sunnyside Yard, which temporarily impacted NJ Transit operations during the weekday morning commute period. TBM mining of the Track A Tunnel was completed on December 22, 2011.

Cost: As of August 31, 2011, the Estimate-at-Completion remained at $778.5. As of November 30, 2011, the PMT reported that $488.4 million has been invoiced, representing 65.0% of the current contract value and 62.7% of the Estimate at Completion. 47 contract modifications (change orders) totaling $102.6 million have been approved.

Construction status for the period October – December 2011:

Completed TBM mining of the Track A Tunnel and construction of the Yard Lead TBM reception pit.

Continued fabrication of pre-cast concrete tunnel liner panels, now over 98% complete; waterproofing of the Yard Lead Approach Structure roof slab; sewer construction beneath the 43rd Street Amtrak/LIRR Mainline bridge;; excavation at the Yard Lead Emergency Exit/Ventilation Structure; construction of the CO8 Substation; environmental monitoring, water quality sampling and groundwater elevation readings for the Long Island Well Permit report.

Yard Lead Tunnel TBM mining: 2,758ft. (December 15, 2011)

The ESA-CM reported that there were three recordable accidents, five lost-time accidents and one first-aid injury during this period. No security or significant quality issues were reported for this period.

Observation:

The ESA-PMT and the CM have managed this contract to assure start of Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) mining as planned in May 2011. To achieve this goal, the initial set of slurry wall repairs were completed on an accelerated basis. Up until Q4-2010, the contractor had been able to mitigate all but 2 weeks of the schedule delays caused by late start of the open-cut excavation and additional delays due to necessary slurry wall repairs. Additional delays experienced during the


December 2010 through February 2011 and April 2011-May 2011 time periods resulted in an 8-week schedule slip. TBM mining commenced on May 17, 2011 for the Yard Lead Tunnel and on August 9, 2011 for the Track A Tunnel.

During the 3rd Quarter of 2010, ESA-CM identified eight critical interfaces related to TBM mining schedule between Contract CQ031 and Contract CH053, Harold Interlocking, Part 1. Since that time, seven interfaces were resolved with re-designs, construction workarounds and scope deletions. The single remaining critical interface, tunneling beneath the existing/operating G.O.2 Substation, will require mitigations that will result in additional costs and some delays. As the CQ031 work advances; however, the contract continues to be impacted by new interferences resulting from late completion of work under the CH053 contract. These new interferences often result in schedule delays and increased costs.


The PMOC remains concerned about the costs of the additional CQ031 work required to mitigate the potential delays caused by both late completion of key work by the CH053 contractor at the two remaining critical construction interfaces noted above and the continuing appearance of new CQ031/CH053 interferences. The PMOC recommends that ESA-CM closely monitor the schedule performance of both the CQ031 and CH053 contractors to ensure adherence to current work schedule, thus minimizing additional costs exposure. [Ref: ESA-67-Sep10]

CQ032 Contract – Plaza Substation and Queens Structures


Approved Change Orders: (none)



Award/NTP date: August 10, 2011 (Actual)

Start date: August 10, 2011 (Actual)

The original contract Substantial Completion date: August 2014

Current approved plan Substantial Completion date: August 2014

The current forecast Substantial Completion date: August 2014

The original contract Final Completion date: November 2014

Status:

Schedule: The contractor is revising the baseline schedule based on MTACC-ESA review comments. There is no change to critical dates.

Cost: The contractor has revised and resubmitted the Detailed Cost Breakdown Schedule.

Construction Status: The contractor has completed sampling for asbestos at all existing facilities and has started preparations for asbestos abatement at the existing Roosevelt Island ventilation/emergency exit facility. The contractor has installed construction fencing and temporary lighting at the Vernon Boulevard ventilation plant.

Observations: The contract was awarded within the ESA budget.


PMOC Concerns and Recommendations: The PMOC is concerned about ESA-PMT’s coordination efforts required for CQ032 access to the B10 Substation site.

CQ039 Contract – Northern Boulevard Crossing





NTP date: February 3, 2010 (Actual)

The original contract Substantial Completion date: October 2011

Current approve plan Substantial Completion date: August 2012

The current forecast Substantial Completion date: November 2012 (13 month delay)

The original contract Final Completion date was February 2012 and revised to November 2012. The current forecast date is March 2013.

Status:

Schedule: The contract was awarded on January 29, 2010 with a Notice-to-Proceed of February 3, 2010. To assure structural adequacy and water tightness, repairs to the Early Access Chamber (EAC) constructed by the CQ028 contractor needed be completed prior to excavation within the EAC and the start of tunneling work beneath Northern Boulevard. As a result, the start of the base contract scope-of-work was delayed. The forecast Substantial Completion date has slipped two months from September 2012 to November 2012, a 13-month delay to the original date. The contractor has forecast an approximate 3 month delay to the Substantial Completion date but notes that part of the delay was caused by the need for installation of additional freeze pipes because rock was encountered at a lower elevation than shown on the plans. The ESA-CM is reviewing the validity of this delay.

Cost: The EAC had previously been increased $3.0 million from $98.0 million to $101.0 million to reflect the addition of CQ032 tunnel invert work. As of November 30, 2011, based on the latest data available from the Grantee, the cumulative actual percent complete 47.89% versus planned 57.9% on a cost expenditure basis and 71% of the current approved contract time to Substantial Completion has elapsed. 11 contract modifications totaling $4.7 million have been executed as of November 30, 2011.

Construction status for the period October – December 2011:

Completed construction of internal reinforced concrete bracing at Level 7 of the Early Access Chamber; installation of additional horizontal freeze pipes

Commenced ground freezing on November 27, 2011.

Continued ground freeze process; modification of EAC bracing diaphragms; and rebracing on the CQ026 side.

The ESA-CM reported that there were four lost-time accidents, one recordable accident and three first-aid injuries during this period. No security or significant quality issues were reported for this period.


Observation:

Initial repairs to the exterior of the Early Access Chamber slurry walls, more recent repairs to the interior of these walls and additional repairs to the slurry wall at the lower elevations have significantly delayed progress of the contract base scope of work and have been very costly. Although the PMT and CM have pursued several initiatives such as tunnel liner and waterproofing re-designs to shorten particular construction activity durations, there remains a significant risk that any such time savings may be negated by the continuing additional delays caused by unforeseen field conditions and difficulties with certain construction means and methods.


The PMOC believes that this complex and challenging contract will more than likely experience delays during the remaining construction that will consume the remaining available float and likely impact the project critical path. Some of these delays have already emerged. The PMOC is concerned about the contractor’s ability to maintain acceptable progress during New Austrian Tunneling Method (NATM) excavation due to the particular characteristics of this contract including: very limited site access; labor intensive excavation/construction work; NYCT oversight of the construction work; a high probability of encountering unforeseen field conditions during tunnel excavation that will result in re-design and a change in the construction means and methods. Continued schedule slippage may delay the start of Contract CQ032 (Plaza Substation and Queens Structures) work in the Early Access Chamber area. The PMOC recommends that the ESA-PMT work closely with the ESA-CMs to properly manage the CQ039 work to minimize any delays and to properly manage the Plaza Interlocking work zone amongst the CQ031, CQ039 and CQ032 contracts.

CS810 Contract – Queens Instrumentation


Final Contract value: $3.06 million


NTP date: May 6, 2009

The original contract Substantial Completion date: May 2010.

Current approved plan Substantial Completion date: May 2011 (12 month delay)

Current forecast Substantial Completion date: September 2011 (4 month delay)

Status:

Substantial Completion was achieved in September 2011. Accordingly, the PMOC will no longer report on this contract.

Manhattan Contracts

The PMOC Observations and Concerns and Recommendations for the below GCT contracts are incorporated at the end of this section:

CM004 – 44 th St. Demolition and Construct Fan Plant Structure and 245 Park Ave. Entrance

Original Contract Value: $40.77 million


Current Contract Value: $41.97 million


NTP Date: September 2009

Substantial Completion: May 2012

Status:

The MTACC has decided to alter the scope of work for CM004. The Gantry Crane, previously scheduled to be removed this month (December 2011) will not be removed under this contract. Instead, it will stay in place to assist in the lining of the remaining vertical shaft #1 and horizontal shaft #1. This “Leave Out” will be placed into Contract 14B where that contractor will dismantle/remove the Gantry and complete the building façade. The CM004 contractor will complete the building and the 44th St. façade from the third floor up. The GEC A/E team is revising the drawings for the above-grade building structure to accommodate this change and the PMOC expects that the Substantial Completion date will be further extended to allow for this process.

Construction status for 44 th St. for the period October – December 2011:

Continued with rock excavation and removal down to Elevation 291.

Completed installation of rebar and set embedded plates in foundation walls, columns 2-4.

Completed rebar installation at Elevations 292 to 296.

Continued with installation of drainboard and waterproofing in the shaft.

Placed concrete foundation walls to Elevation 338, columns 2-4.

Completed construction of the Elevator Pit slab and placed the concrete slab in December

2011.

The contractor continues to work day and night shifts. Most work in the shaft is being done during the second shift (6:30PM – 10:30PM).

Construction status for 245 Park Avenue for the period October - December 2011:

Completed electrical rough-in work, power connection and startup & testing for entrance escalator.

Continued lighting and communication systems installation at the north end.

Continued with installation of engineered stone wall tiles at the Platform and cross Passageway.

Continued with installation of ceiling systems.

Continued with Escalator finishes.

Began installation of Plaza area, steps, railings and planters.

Began installation of the entrance canopy.

Began installation of Lobby pavers.


As of November 30, 2011, the total amount invoiced was $25,488,000, which represents 60.8% of the Current Contract Value. Thirty-nine contract modifications have been executed for a total of $1,152,086. Actual work performed is 61% versus 99.8% planned.

Observation:

The excavation worksite at 44th St. for Shaft #1 is located between two existing buildings and is very constrained. As a result, the CM004 contractor must do all excavation at this site mechanically due to the restriction on blasting, affecting production rates. Production rates are also restricted by the removal of muck along narrow New York City surface streets. The ESA PMT continues to work with the contractor to develop ways to increase excavation rates.

The new building plan noted above will likely create problems with Community Relations and the MTA Good Neighbor Initiative, particularly with the next door Yale Club. The Gantry Crane removal was scheduled for December 2011, and now may remain in place for another year or more. The community has been anticipating this completion schedule, and this new development will not likely be well received.


Although the PMOC had previously expressed its concern that the late turnover of Shaft #1 could impact the CM012 contract, the delayed advertisement of that contract will result in little, if any, such effect by CM004. The PMOC therefore recommends that the CM004 contractor continue its excavation, increasing its rate, if possible, until the shaft is completed.

CM009 Contract – Manhattan Tunnels Excavation



NTP Date: July 2006

Start Date: September 2007

Substantial Completion: Upon integration with Contract CM019. Currently “Under Review”

Status:

The CM009 contract vacillated between 3 and 7 months behind schedule since the early stages of the project. At present, the MTACC, due to its decision to provide early access to the worksites for other contracts, including CM012, continues to review the schedules of contract Milestones 5A, Completion of Caverns, and 6A, Substantial Completion, and has not projected completion dates for these milestones since August 2011. The PMOC’s latest forecast (see Appendix G) projects that the CM009 contract is at least 13 months behind the original baseline schedule. [Ref: ESA-38-Apr09]

As a result, CM009 continues on the project critical path. As of November 30, 2011, the total amount invoiced was $372,965,000, which represents 83.2% of the Current Contract Value of $448,421,000. Thirty four contract modifications have been executed for a total of $20,467,318. Actual work performed is 83.2% versus 89.9% planned.

CM019 Contract – Manhattan Structures Part 1





NTP Date: 4/1/08

Substantial Completion: Upon integration with Contract CM019. Currently “Under Review”

Status:

The CM019 contract vacillated between 3 and 7 months behind schedule since the early stages of the project. At present, the MTACC, due to its decision to provide early access to the worksites for other contracts, including CM012, continues to review the schedules of contract Milestones 5A, Completion of Caverns, and 6A, Substantial Completion, and has not projected completion dates for these milestones since August 2011. The PMOC’s latest forecast (see Appendix G) projects that the CM019 contract is at least 14 months behind the original baseline schedule. As a result, CM019, as with CM009, continues on the project critical path. [Ref: ESA-38-Apr09]

As of November 30, 2011, the total amount invoiced for this contract was $527,631,000, which represents 70.1% of the Current Contract Value of $752,347,000. Actual work performed is 70.1% versus 85.3% planned. Forty-eight contract modifications have been executed for a total of $18,347,328.

CM009/CM019 Contracts – Manhattan Tunnels Excavation/Structures Part 1

Combined Status: The combined CM009/CM019 contract continues to appear on the project critical path. MTACC personnel continue to develop ways to keep production rates on schedule, to determine ways to shift work scope to other contracts, and to jointly develop opportunities for schedule recovery with the contractor.

For the past quarter, the contractor has concentrated its construction efforts on placement of concrete on the archway of the Westbound Cavern, completion of the shotcrete of Escalator Way #4, continuation of rebar installation, waterproofing, and excavation of Escalator Ways #3, #2, and #1, respectively, preparation of the Eastbound Cavern for archway concrete placement, and excavation of “tights” and “cheeks” in various locations. The CM009/CM019 contractor’s safety record has continued to be unacceptable to the MTACC. There were two serious incidents during the 4Q-2011 which highlighted the need for increased attention to the contractor’s safety program. The first incident resulted in two lost time injuries, and the second incident involved an employee fatality. The combined CM009/CM019 contract safety performance for the period September 15, 2011 through December 15, 2011 included 3 Lost Time, 9 Recordable and 33 First Aid injuries, plus one fatality. Through November 30, 2011, the CM009 contract BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) injury ratio for 200,000 work hours was 3.19 and for CM019 it was 3.00, both versus the National Industrial Average of 2.20.

Construction Status for the period October 2011 – December 2011

Completed concrete placement on the archway of the Westbound Cavern, waterproofing of the Eastbound Cavern, shotcrete placement of the archway and invert of Escalator Way #4, installation of rebar in Escalator Way #3, and excavation of the GCT4 crossover.

Continued installation of PVC membranes, geodrains, and rebar in Tail Track tunnels L302 and L303 and between GCT5 and GCT3, excavation of temporary connections


between the caverns at the lower level, rebar installation in Escalator Way #3, waterproofing in Escalator Way #2, excavation of Escalator Way #1, and “tight” and “cheek” removal in the lower level tunnel bores.

Began concrete placement on the archway of the Eastbound Cavern, rebar installation in Escalator Way #2, and bench excavation at the north end of the Westbound Cavern.

Observations:

As the PMOC forecasted, the contractor completed placement of concrete on the archway of the Westbound Cavern in late December 2011, sustaining an average pour rate of 50’ per week. Based on this production rate, the PMOC estimates that the contractor could complete the Eastbound Cavern arch by early-mid April 2012.

The contractor has also picked up its pace in the escalator ways. During December 2011, it simultaneously installed rebar in Escalator Way #3, waterproofing in Escalator Way #2, and continued excavation of Escalator Way #1. Based on the contractor’s current construction rates, the PMOC estimates that all Escalator Ways will be complete by late 2012 or early 2013 (see Appendix G).

Based on its observation during a recent site visit, the CM004 contractor still has approximately 20’ of excavation in vertical Shaft #1 before it will hand it off to CM009/019 to complete the excavation in the bottom portion of the shaft. The PMOC estimates that the CM004 contractor will need at least 2 more months of excavation plus a month of finish work before it can make this handoff. As a result, the PMOC forecasts that the CM009/019 contractor will complete Shaft #1 during 4Q-2012 (see Appendix G). The milestone to have Shaft #1 completed by the end of 2011 so that the CM012 contractor could begin construction, however, has been supplanted by the MTACC’s decision to delay the award of the CM012 contract by several months.

The PMOC continues to update its analysis of the CM009/019 milestones against their respective schedules, which is presented in Appendix G of this report. The PMOC will continue this analysis in future reports.


The contractor has addressed all the PMOC’s stated construction issues except for the finish work in the tail tracks and approach tunnels, for which it must still demonstrate its ability. The PMOC remains concerned about this work and recommends that the contractor approach it in the same fashion that has proven successful for it regarding the PMOC’s previous concerns.

The PMOC is also concerned that the contractor’s safety performance, although it had appeared to be improving, suffered two very serious incidents during the past quarter. This reinforces the need for both the MTACC and the contractor to focus constant attention on safety and to jointly develop a program designed to effectively prevent all injuries.

CM013 – 50 th St. Vent Facility

Original Contract Value: $118.35 million (Includes $24.0 million for work by Property Owner)

Current Contract Value: $118.93 million (Includes $24.0 million for work by Property Owner)



EAC: $123.0 million

NTP Date: January 2010

Substantial Completion: December 2012

Status:

The MPT along 50th Street and 49th Street is ongoing and is being maintained successfully. MTACC reports that the project is six months behind schedule due to the rock excavation. The MTACC also reports that there has been no additional schedule slippage and the new forecasted milestone dates are being maintained and no change to the completion dates. An agreement has been reached between the MTACC and the contractor to add Milestone #5 to the schedule which will allow access to other contracts that need to come into the contract area, thus reducing some of the criticality in the schedule delay. The focus at the Vent Plant is completing the excavation and lining of the deep shaft from invert Elevation 309 to approximate Elevation 219.

Construction Status for 50 th St. Vent Plant for the period October - December 2011:

Work continued to trim the shotcrete wall areas at the Service Tunnel.

The contractor has scheduled a Special Inspection of the in-place shotcrete in early January 2012 at the Service Tunnel.

Continued installing the remaining rock bolts in the Service Tunnel.

The contractor is continuing with the localized excavation for manholes, conduits, plumbing and preparing for placement of the protection slab, waterproofing and finish structural slab in the Service Tunnel.

Completed rock bolt installation in the deep shaft between Elevations 293 – 287 at the Vent Plant.

Completed shotcrete in the deep shaft between Elevations 300 – 290 at the Vent Plant.

Continued with drilling, blasting and muck removal in the deep shaft, Elevations 287 – 279.

Continued at the new utility chase in the 300 Park Avenue wall.

As of December 31, 2011, the total amount invoiced was $61.5 Million, which represents 52% of the Current Contract Value. Fifteen contract modifications have been executed for a total of $575,443. Actual work performed is 44.3% versus 62.4% planned.

Observation:

MTACC is introducing a new milestone into the project. Milestone #5 will allow early access to the vent plant shaft and is intended to lessen the impact of the delay in achieving substantial completion. As of December 2011, an approved date for this milestone has not been set.


The MTACC CM should continue to work with the contractor to ensure that Milestone #5 is achieved on schedule.

CM014A – GCT Concourse & Facilities Fit-Out

Original Contract Value: $43.5 million


Current Contract Value: $43.5 million

Approved Change Orders: $0.00

EAC: $46.5 million

NTP Date: November 7, 2011

Substantial Completion: April 2013

Status:

The Notice-to-Proceed is November 7, 2011. The Construction Kick-Off Meeting was held on November 15, 2011. Subsequent Kick-Off Meetings for Quality, Safety and Scheduling were conducted during December 2011.

Observations:

The contractor for this contract is also the contractor for the CM004 contract and the ESA CM Team is also the same for the CM004 contract. This will make mobilization and project familiarity easier and may prove to be a benefit to the project. Construction Progress Meetings will be held at the same Madison Yard trailer on opposite Wednesdays from the CM004 Progress Meetings.


None at this time.

2.1.4 Force Account (FA) Construction Contracts

Harold Stage 1 Amtrak FA (FHA01)

Original Agreement Value: $9.50 million

Current Agreement Value: $16.83 million

Commence Stage 1: June 2007

Stage 1 Completion Date: Originally June 2012, presently scheduled for August 2013

Status:

As of November 30, 2011, the total amount invoiced for FHA01 was $13,503,000, which represents 80.3% of the Current Agreement Value of $16,825,000. Actual work performed is 68.5% versus 96.8% planned.

Harold Early Stage 2 Amtrak FA (FHA02)



Commence Early Stage 2: December 2008

Stage 2 Completion Date: Originally September 2011, now “To be Determined”.

Status:

As of November 30, 2011, the amount invoiced for FHA02 was $11,439,000, which represents 117.9% of the Current Agreement Value. MTACC has authorized Amtrak to proceed with limited Stage 2 C&S construction without the formal Project Initiation in place (on essentially a “Time


and Material” basis). Because the construction continues without a mutually-negotiated Project Initiation PI, there is presently no comparison of work performed versus work planned.

Combined Construction Status FHA01 and FHA02 for period October – December 2011:

Completed signal power wire transfer and cutover between Substation 44 and existing Tower 25 and removal of existing wires; removal of existing signal power wires between Towers 17 and 23; relocated ground wires for Harold Aerial Utility Bridge and for the Tunnel A TBM; and vertical and horizontal realignment of Lines 1 and 3 at “F” Interlocking in preparation for the installation of the new #747 and #771 crossovers scheduled for February 2012.

Continued ET support of CH053 contractor’s installation of Subsets A and C and Main Line signal towers and catenary poles; and trough, signal cases, conduit, nine-way duct, and pull boxes at various locations throughout Harold and “F” Interlockings.

In early March 2011, Amtrak received a ruling from a labor arbitration board that the construction of all catenary foundations and installation of all catenary poles and signal towers accrues to members of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way (BMWE) union, which represents Amtrak Electric Traction (ET) personnel. There are approximately 160 catenary poles, signal towers, and foundations to be installed during FHA01 – FHA04 construction. The BMWE had filed this claim with the arbitration board after Amtrak management had originally denied it. This ruling could have a significant negative impact on the construction of the catenary and signal tower systems in the Harold Structures contract. [Ref: ESA-77-Mar11]

As background, in September 2007, the MTACC obtained Labor Clearance from Amtrak that would allow the foundation, pole, and tower work for the ESA project to be performed by third parties. As part of this clearance, Amtrak maintained its right to install all catenary and signal wires and make all final connections on all new structures installed for this project. The MTACC subsequently issued contracts CH053 and CH054A, for which it had obtained labor clearance to do the work. This labor clearance, however, as resulted in 2011, was in direct conflict with the eventual arbitration board ruling. In order to progress the project, it is incumbent upon the MTACC to resolve this discrepancy with Amtrak management as soon as possible.

Since June 2011, no formal progress on this issue has been made, although increased catenary pole, foundation, and signal tower installation has occurred without incident in the field. For the present, Amtrak ET personnel, the CH053 contractor, and the MTACC have developed an informal procedure which, although more costly, appears to be working in order to progress project construction.

In addition to the labor clearance issue, which has continued since the first quarter of 2011, in late November 2011, Amtrak FHA representatives indicated that they had received a directive from senior management that could severely limit their future use of overtime to perform work for the ESA project. Due to the manner in which Amtrak accounts for project charges, components of all projects appear in Amtrak’s “Core” cost performance reports. Its “Core” budget is funded entirely by Amtrak with no compensation from outside sources. Periodically, when Amtrak’s cost performance in its “Core” categories begin to trend negatively, Amtrak takes the appropriate measures, e.g. limit overtime, to bring its cost performance back into acceptable limits. In this particular case, the CH053 contractor, who depends upon Amtrak’s support for much of its construction, has indicated that its concrete pours for its catenary foundations have been severely


impacted by the lack of Amtrak support personnel at the appropriate time. This situation continued through the entire month of December 2011.

Observations:

Although the MTACC has not resolved the Amtrak Labor Clearance issue yet, it continues to progress the construction as effectively as possible. This arrangement is not only more costly but also extremely tenuous. The MTACC will not be able to manage the project as efficiently as possible if it has concern that the performance of the CH053 contractor could be upset at any time. The PMOC believes, however, that the work released by the MP 5 package approval will help to determine the eventual outcome of this situation. Amtrak approved the MP 5 design in early October 2011, but the earliest that the contractor and the MTACC will be ready to install the catenary poles released by this approval will be February 2012. If the Amtrak BMWE forces continue to support the installation as they have with the signal towers contained in the MP 3 package, the contractor will be allowed to construct the MP 5 package without labor incident. If not, and the BMWE forces exert their rights, Amtrak will install the catenary poles. This could be even more costly to the project, and more time consuming, than the ET support that Amtrak is presently furnishing the project.


The PMOC is concerned that, although Amtrak has the technical skill to perform the project electric traction work, it might not have the capacity. In addition to Amtrak’s support of the CH053 and CH054A contracts, it also supports the CQ031 and CS810 contracts, LIRR FHL01 and FHL02 construction, other Amtrak Force Account disciplines’ FHA01 and FHA02 construction, and will perform the final catenary installation and signal power wire configuration for the project. With all these various elements competing with each other for the limited Amtrak resources available, it is doubtful that Amtrak will be able to maintain a production schedule that will meet with all MTACC project requirements.

The PMOC is also concerned about the effect Amtrak’s recent overtime restriction will have on ESA project construction. Although such restrictions are historically relatively short-term in length, at present there is no indication that Amtrak intends to remove this one any time soon. This restriction has already negatively impacted CH053’s concrete pours for catenary pole installation and it could impact other aspects of the project if it continues much longer.

In order for the MTACC to address both the Labor Clearance and overtime issues while the MTACC and Amtrak field managers continue their efforts to keep construction on schedule, the PMOC recommends that the MTACC Program Executive seek resolution of both matters with Amtrak’s Chief Engineer. The Chief Engineer is the only one who has the authority to mitigate both matters. [Ref: ESA-77-Mar11]

Harold Stage 1 LIRR FA (FHL01)



Commence Stage 1: June 2007

Stage 1 Completion: July 2013


Status:

As of November 30, 2011, the total amount invoiced for FHL01 was $17,190,000, which represents 82.7% of the Current Agreement Value of $20,782,000. Actual work performed was 69.8% versus 100.0% planned.

Harold Early Stage 2 LIRR FA (FHL02)

Original Early Agreement Value: $7.35 million

Current Early Agreement Value: $7.35 million

Commence Early Stage 2: August 2009

Early Stage 2 Completion: Originally September 2011, currently “To be Determined”.

Status:

As of November 30, 2011, the total amount invoiced for FHL02 was $9,398,000, which represents 127.8% of the Current Agreement Value of $7,351,000. The MTACC authorized LIRR to proceed with limited Stage 2 Communication and Signal construction with a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in place (on essentially a “Time and Material” basis). Because construction continues without a mutually-agreed upon MOU, there is presently no comparison of work performed versus work planned.

Combined Construction Status for FHL01 and FHL02 for period October – December 2011:

Completed reconstruction of Port Washington #2 Track reconstruction; installation of continuous welded rail (CWR) on the Eastward LIRR Passenger Track in Harold Interlocking; installation of conduits, pull boxes, and signal cables in new “Point” Interlocking; installation of temporary pedestal signals and signal apparatus for new signal bridges 23 and 11, Harold Interlocking; and installation of communication poles and wires in “Point” Interlocking.

Continued signal cable installation for the new “Point” CIL and circuit revisions for existing “Point” CIL; and installation of server connections in the temporary Harold Interlocking signal trailer.

Observations:

Recently, LIRR representatives who attend the FHA/L01&02 progress meetings have indicated that the reconfiguration of its Westward Passenger Track, which had been scheduled for early in 2012, has been postponed until November and December 2012. This is a predecessor activity to the installation of turnouts which had been scheduled for late 2012. Although the LIRR has not announced what effect the reconfiguration work will have on its turnout schedule, the PMOC believes that it will delay this by at least 3 months.


The PMOC remains concerned that the LIRR continues to re-schedule its trackwork program, even when the work is relatively simple, with little regard to the effect that its changes have on the overall ESA construction program. This will cause construction to pile up at the end of the program. Unfortunately, a great majority of LIRR’s turnout installation is also scheduled in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. Construction that is deferred now will pile up in those ensuing years, which could ultimately delay the overall ESA program further.


To prevent unwanted schedule creep into those future years, the PMOC recommends that the LIRR and the MTACC agree on the project schedule well in advance and develop the mutual fortitude and management commitment to do everything possible to establish a “can do/will do” culture within their project team.

2.1.5 Operational Readiness

Status:

The ESA Operational Readiness group has focused their effort in several areas during the past quarter:

Asset Management

Continued development of room data sheets and location codes for supporting the Asset Management Plan (Asset Inventory).

Drafted for review by LIRR Information Technology and ESA/Special Projects instructions for the contractor to use for entry of data on templates and supporting attributes for LIRR Corporate Asset Management Plan (Asset Inventory).

Continued updating strategies for Interim Maintenance and administration of the project systems warranties, with focus on the warranty requirements for each of the systems.

Operations & Maintenance Plan

Created initial draft of Volume 2 focusing on infrastructure systems, and effort continued on the identification of maintenance strategies, along with updating of document’s structure.

Rail Activation Plan

Outlined the next steps for Rail Activation Group Leaders and began identifying actions necessary to support start of “Early Start” activities. Work is proceeding on development of materials that will be utilized by all Task Groups, on identifying the supporting activities.

Created graphic representation for monitoring of Operational Readiness activities in the IPS, along with a review of the impact that the shift in the IPS schedule will have on ESA-LIRR operational activities.

Transition Strategy

Development of materials that will be used by Task Group #2 (Train Operations) for the instruction and qualifying of Train & Engine crews.

Continue working with the LIRR on developing the supporting materials for the training and instruction of the LIRR’s Train & Engine crews, focus has been on determining railroad mileposts for locations along the alignment, and relationship to the locations in the Asset Inventory.

Continue on developing materials and preliminary cost estimate focusing on the application of the Cab Simulator to support the instruction and qualifying of LIRR Train & Engine crews on the new ESA territory and alignment, along with creating a strategy for upgrading of the simulator machine used for instruction of Train & Engine crews.


Observation:

The Operational Readiness group continues to make progress in progressing activities comprising system start-up and commissioning.


The Operational Readiness activities were presented at an ESA re-baselining schedule workshop held on December 16, 2001; however, the logical ties into the new IPS baseline schedule were not presented. The PMOC remains concerned that the system start-up and testing activities are not being properly integrated into the IPS since there has been no indication to date as to how these activities are being tied into the new baseline.

2.2 Third-Party Agreements

During December 2011, ESA and Amtrak continued to negotiate the Stage 2 of the Communications and Signaling (C&S) Project Initiative.

2.3 Contract Packages and Delivery Methods

Status:

Contract Packaging Plan (CPP) Rev. 9.0 was projected to be released in July 2010; however, it was not released until November 2010. There continues to be a significant amount of scope shift under evaluation by the ESA PMT (see discussion in Section 1.2.1 of this report).

Observation:

The PMOC has expressed its concern to the ESA PMT about the stability of the Contract Packaging Plan and the need to carefully track scope shifts along with any project budget/schedule impacts these scope changes may have.


At present, the ESA PMT continues to evaluate scope transfers since CPP Rev. 9.0 was issued. The PMOC has expressed its concern about the stability of the packaging plan and the need to carefully evaluate the impacts of all proposed scope moves. Given the potentially large amount of scope shifts among the various contract packages, ESA should consider issuing another revision to the CPP.

2.4 Vehicles

Status:

There has reportedly been some activity by MTACC/LIRR to remove the rail vehicle procurement from the federally funded ESA project, the details of which have not been shared with the PMOC. ESA has represented that the funds dedicated to rail car procurement will be reassigned to contingency in their report to the MTA Board. The PMOC was informed by the FTA Region II Office in April 2011 that the MTA has been notified to put back the original funding allocated for the purchase of rail vehicles and abide by the federal procurement rules and regulations to purchase the vehicles. [Ref: ESA-A26-Feb09]

The LIRR RFP for the procurement was initially planned for release in August or September 2010; it is now planned for January 2012. The contract was to be signed in 2011 with a 3-year production leading to a pilot test. The production units could then begin to deliver all ESA vehicles by opening day. Completion of pilot testing of 14 cars is now planned for June 2016.


Observation:

The PMOC has not received any verification that the original funding allocation for the rail vehicles has been put back in the ESA project budget.


ESA needs to adhere to the FTA request to keep the rail car procurement funding allocation back in the project budget.

2.5 Property Acquisition and Real Estate

Status/Observations

MTA Real Estate is waiting for a more advanced design of the preferred 48th Street entrance before continuing appraisals. ESA is in the process of negotiating an easement agreement with the Rudins and refining the design of the preferred scheme. Tech Memo #6, which describes the updated 48th Street design, was approved by the FTA on November 23, 2011. ESA is managing the negotiations with the Rudins. MTA Real Estate is waiting for an updated construction schedule from ESA before choosing a suitable timeframe for the public hearing.

ESA has requested that MTA Real Estate obtain preliminary appraisals for budgetary purposes of the temporary and permanent easements at 335 Madison Avenue associated with the construction and operation of an employee elevator. This elevator will connect the ESA/LIRR Station Master's Office on the ESA concourse level to the GCT Terminal Management Center on the GCT concourse level and another in the Biltmore room. Elevator designs have been stalled because the property owner, the Millstein family, has not yet granted access. Since designs of these elevators are preliminary, the review of the draft appraisals is on hold.

Extensions of three easements in Queens are being negotiated.

Observations:

Further information regarding the status of the negotiations with the Rudins has not yet been provided.

Appraisals cannot be done based on preliminary designs. The designs have not advanced past the preliminary phase, because the Millsteins have not granted access, as stated above. ESA instructed MTA to hold legal efforts to obtain a court order for surveyor and appraiser access. Once funding for the elevators has been secured, MTA Real Estate will advise a suitable timeframe for the public hearing.


The PMOC has no concerns or recommendations at this time. As more information regarding these issues becomes available, this section will be updated.


2.6 Community Relations

Status:

The ESA Community Relations team provides construction updates to affected communities in Queens and Manhattan and outreach to property owners/representatives, residents, and community board representatives.

During the period of October 2011 through December 2011, the ESA project team performed the following community outreach activities:

Distributed updated community flyers, newsletters and monthly updates to property representatives, residents and the local community board regarding construction work at various locations in Manhattan.

Continued to provide community updates about planned construction work along Northern Boulevard and in the area of Sunnyside Gardens, Queens.

Continued coordination of NYCDPR landscaping design for the area behind the Vernon Blvd. Facility in Queensbridge Park.

Performed outreach to 55th Street property owners/representatives, the Midtown Partnership and Community Board No. 5 about upcoming construction work on Contract CM013A (55th Street Ventilation Facility).

Continued work on indenture agreement with MTA legal, NYCDPR and the GEC regarding improvements to the existing Vernon Boulevard facility.

Finalized letter agreement with 250 Park Ave. and the Yale Club about construction under, respectively, Contracts CM009/019 and Contract CM004.

Met with Community Board No. 6 and local residents about construction requiring use of the Park Avenue sidewalk gratings.

Continued outreach to several property representatives, including NY Friar’s Club and 65 East 55th Street regarding Contract CM013A (55th Street Ventilation Facility).

Observation:

The PMOC believes that the ESA Community Relations staff is reaching out appropriately to inform the community of upcoming and current changes, and has properly handled concerns and complaints from the community.


There are no significant concerns at this time.


3.0 PROJECT MANAGEMENT PLAN AND SUB PLANS

3.1 Project Management Plan

Status/Observations:

MTACC provided a complete copy of the updated PMP, Revision 8.0, during the first week of May 2011. The PMOC informed MTACC that its review of the PMP is contingent upon receipt of a complete plan; however at the request of FTA, the PMOC began its review of the top ten candidate revisions (CRs) prior to the submission of the complete copy of Revision 8.0, and completed that review in the first quarter of 2011. The initial review was to verify that the top ten CRs had been incorporated as required by the TCC Implementation Plan approval letter. The PMOC subsequently completed its review of the remaining candidate revisions in July 2011 and has provided its comments to the FTA Region 2 Office.


Review comments should be forwarded to MTACC and discussed with them.

3.2 PMP Sub-Plans

Status/Observations:

The LIRR Rail Fleet Management Plan was updated, but does not contain information that is critical to the ESA project. [Ref: ESA-A09-Jun07]

The MTACC released its final draft Force Account Management Plan (FAMP), dated December 2010, on March 16, 2011, for review. The PMOC completed its review of the MTACC FAMP and forwarded a copy of its comments to the FTA and the MTACC on June 17, 2011. The MTACC stated that it will consider the comments and follow up with the PMOC. The MTACC is still in the process of addressing the review comments.

MTACC’s Director of Safety and Security committed to provide an updated Safety and Security Plan (SSMP) no later than December 2010. ESA transmitted a copy of the updated SSMP to the PMOC on March 10, 2011. The PMOC completed its review of the SSMP and forwarded a copy of its comments to the FTA and MTACC on June 20, 2011. ESA provided responses to the comments on the SSMP in November 2011. These responses are currently being reviewed by the PMOC.


The PMOC recommends that ESA respond to the comments made on the FAMP as soon as possible, since six months have passed since the comments were provided.

3.3 Project Procedures

Status:

The MTACC did not release any additional procedures during December 2011. The total number of revised procedures remains 75. Although this is the original number of procedures which the MTACC had committed to revise, the MTACC representative responsible for their development recently indicated to the PMOC that its procedure development remains a dynamic process and that there are 4 additional procedures presently under development. AD.15 – Program Change


Control and AD XX.XX – Reporting Requirements to the FTA to Obtain Critical Funding are critical procedures that remain open. [Ref: ESA-A34-Jan10]

Observations:

The MTACC remains behind schedule in its development of the revised project procedures. It had originally committed to the revision of 75 procedures by April 12, 2010, but it did not reach that total until October 2011, 18 months later. These revised procedures will, in many cases, replace the procedures that are currently referenced in the PMP.


The PMOC remains concerned about the length of time it has taken the MTACC to develop the revised procedures. Additionally, the PMOC believes that AD.15 – Program Change Control, is critical to the management of the program. With all the formal changes that have already occurred between project contracts and that will most likely continue to occur, based on the way that the MTACC is managing the ESA program, a revised procedure that details the manner in which these changes will be formally authorized, tracked, and closed is absolutely essential. Also, AD XX.XX – Reporting Requirements to the FTA to Obtain Critical Funding is critical, given the uncertainty of the local funding levels.

The PMOC recommends, therefore, that the MTACC direct its Contract Construction Manager in charge of developing the revised procedures to finish all the remaining procedures by no later than January 31, 2012, and that the MTACC authorize their implementation immediately thereafter.


4.0 PROJECT SCHEDULE STATUS

4.1 Integrated Project Schedule

Status:

The ESA PMT stated that the current IPS #31 with data date of December 1, 2011 (re-baselined in July 2009) is again being revised, with results expected in the 1Q12. IPS #31 still shows the RSD as September 2016.

MTACC stated in its November 2011 Monthly Progress report that it cancelled the bid advertisement of CM012. IPS #31 shows a five-month delay in the award date of CM012 from the award date given in IPS#30. MTACC also noted on its website that 40 contractors had signed up for the pre-bid meeting.

Observations/Analysis

The ESA PMT noted in their schedule re-baseline meetings that CM012 would be repackaged when the global settlement agreement is reached with the CM009/019 contractor. The repackaging will include elements of scope currently existing in CM009/019 to mitigate delays due to the advertisement’s cancellation. The PMOC believes that the CM009/019 contractor has an advantage in bidding on Contract CM012 since they currently have access to the site where gaining access may pose a problem to a new contractor. This site access granted them a similar advantage when bidding CM019 several years back.

The PMOC has performed a review of the ESA schedule performance since the re-baseline in July 2009 (up to current IPS #31). In its review, the PMOC divided civil construction packages into three categories. Note that the PMOC did not consider force account contracts in this analysis because the complexities involved in their performance makes them difficult to predict. The three categories are:

a) Contract packages active in July 2009. These packages where under construction when the PMT re-baselined the ESA in July 2009;

b) Future construction packages, which are set to be awarded in 2012 and 2013;

c) Active construction packages that have been awarded between July 2009 and December 2011.

The following is a breakdown of these categories:

A. Active Contract Packages

The PMOC analyzed the schedule and cost performance of these packages, which are represented in Tables 4-1 through 4-9. The PMOC compared the duration of each package (total of 7 packages) according to the July 2009 re-baseline (Table 4-1) with the current (actual) duration forecasted by the PMT, obtained by adding the original contract value and PMT potential change orders. The PMOC also considered the Contractor’s estimate for Substantial Completion of these packages. In July 2009, the ESA estimated its Revenue Service Date (RSD) to be in September 2016, with 131 days of contingency. At that time, the IPS critical path ran through the Queens Contracts CQ031, CQ032, and the Systems packages. The Manhattan Contracts (CM009/019 and CM012) had over 200 days of float.


The PMOC additionally compared each contract’s award amount and projected post bid contingency at that time with the current contingency projection (December 2011). As seen in Table 4.1 and 4.2, the Forecasted Post-Bid Contingency is greater than the Baseline Post-Bid Contingency. The difference between these values must come from a pool of unallocated construction contingency in ESA budget. (Please see the Cost Contingency section for a more detailed discussion). Table 4.1 and 4.2 shows cost growth and duration increases of these packages since the 2009 baseline.


Table 4.1: July 2009 Baseline Performance Measurement for Active Construction Packages

ContractBaseline Duration

NTP2009

Substantial Completion

Award ValueBaseline Post-Bid Cont. %

Baseline Budget

MANHATTAN ALIGNMENT CONTRACTS (Active)

CM004 713 15-Jul-09 28-Jun-11 $40,765,000.00 5% $42,803,000.00

CM008A 444 10-Mar-09 28-May-10 $38,983,000 5% $40,932,000

CM009 1482 10-Jul-06 31-Jul-10 $427,954,000 5% $449,351,000

CM019 1460 1-Apr-08 31-Mar-12 $734,000,000 3% $756,020,000

QUEENS ALIGNMENTS CONTRACTS (Active)

CQ031 1100 3-Aug-09 7-Aug-12 $648,884,000 17% $756,763,000

HAROLD INTERLOCKING CONTRACTS (Active)

CH053 1127 2-Jan-08 2-Feb-11 $137,280,000 5% $144,144,000

CH054A 483 4-Aug-09 30-Nov-10 $21,778,000 24% $27,067,000


Table 4.2: December 2011 Performance Measurement for Active Construction Packages

Contract NTP2011 Substantial

CompletionContractor's

Forecast2011 EAC


CM004 16-Sep-09 18-Apr-12 18-May-12 $45,303,250.00

CM008A 10-Mar-09 8-Apr-11 Completed $42,676,662.66

CM009 10-Jul-06 14-Aug-13 14-Dec-15 $456,324,975.51

CM019 1-Apr-08 14-Aug-13 14-Dec-15 $775,190,877.53


CQ031 28-Sep-09 11-Mar-13 26-Apr-13 $789,125,438.62


CH053 2-Jan-08 13-Aug-14 13-Aug-14 $203,885,247.40

CH054A 4-Aug-09 13-Aug-13 27-Apr-13 $38,311,334.57


To date, ESA has had a 15% ($2,350,817,786/$2,049,644,000) contingency usage for these active contract packages. These packages are, however, only 70% constructed, so the PMOC believes that the ESA PMT consider a 20% contingency allocation for future contracts.

The Table 4.3 below shows the schedule slippages for all active contracts. Note that Forecasted Post-Bid Contingency has increased in each case, creating a total unallocated contingency of over $133 million. This is the current actual amount; given the fact that these packages are only 70% constructed, the PMOC believes that additional contingency will be required.


Table 4.3: Schedule Slippage and Cost Overrun of Active Contract Packages

ContractActual IPS Duration Increase

Contractors forecasted

Duration Increase

Baseline Post-Bid Cont. %

Forecasted Post-Bid Cont. %

Unallocated Cont. %

Unallocated Cont. $ * Actual to date Cost progress


CM00432.54% 36.75% 5% 11.13% 6.13% $2,500,250.00 61.00%

CM008A70.95% 70.95% 5% 9.48% 4.48% $1,744,662.66 100.00%

CM00974.90% 132.39% 5% 6.63% 1.63% $6,973,975.51 83.20%

CM01934.32% 92.67% 3% 5.61% 2.61% $19,170,877.53 70.10%


CQ03114.55% 18.73% 17% 21.61% 4.99% $32,362,438.62 64.40%


CH053114.29% 114.29% 5% 48.52% 43.52% $59,741,247.40 61.90%

CH054A204.35% 181.99% 24% 75.92% 51.63% $11,244,334.57 50.70%

* The total amount of unallocated contingency for these active packages is $133,737,786.29.

.


B. Future Contract Packages

There are 14 future construction packages that appear in ESA’s latest Contract Packaging Plan (CPP) Revision 9.0. In analyzing these packages, the PMOC first considered the award delay since July 2009, and then calculated the amount of cost escalation due to these delays. It should also be noted that although the PMT has in some cases a 10% pre-bid contingency to cover bids coming in higher than anticipated, the history of active construction packages on this project does not support this amount of pre-bid contingency as an adequate amount. Table 4.4 shows the baseline cost and schedule for future packages.

Table 4.4: Future Contract Packages’ Baseline Performance Measurement*

Contract Duration NTP Substantial CompletionEscalatedEstimate

MANHATTAN ALIGNMENT CONTRACTS (Future)

CM012 (A)

CM012 1290 22-Feb-11 4-Sep-14 $373,694,253

CM013A 661 19-Aug-10 10-Jun-12 $66,587,339

CM014 1473 11-Feb-11 23-Feb-15 $203,632,600

CMR14 $4,095,173

CM015 1474 10-Feb-11 23-Feb-15

QUEENS ALIGNMENTS CONTRACTS (Future)

CQ033 760 7-Jun-12 7-Jul-14 $165,116,031

CQ034 865 19-Dec-11 2-May-14 $35,152,975


CH057 905 4-Jan-11 27-Jun-13 $217,569,688

CH058 1054 12-Jun-12 2-May-15 $109,413,530

CH059 377 3-Mar-15 14-Mar-16 $17,053,649

PROJECTWIDE SYSTEMS CONTRACTS

CS179 1645 6-May-11 6-Nov-15 $129,988,468

CS179 1645 6-May-11 6-Nov-15 $192,661,142

CS184 1487 28-Sep-10 24-Oct-14 $140,109,739

CS184 1355 11-Nov-10 28-Jul-14 $54,087,160

CS186 935 16-Apr-12 7-Nov-14 $104,258,419

CS186 $37,874,134

* Please note that empty cells represent that the information was not available in July 2009. For instance the ESA did not have package of CM012A in July 2009, and also CM015 did not have any budget in 2009.


Highlighted cells show some future dates that will be in the re-baselined IPS. Please note that the ESA PMT has decreased duration of CM012 by 4 months, but the PMOC has kept as 40 months that the baseline IPS of July 2009 had predicted in its analysis. Since all of ESA active contract packages are late compared with their baseline schedule, the PMOC does not agree with the PMT’s shortening of CM012’s duration (note: PMOC acknowledges that the ESA PMT has moved up the MEP work and had multiple concurrent concrete activities; however, it remains to be seen if these changes will result in the projected schedule savings). This is an important issue because CM012 is on the critical path of the current IPS.

Remaining Harold activities CH057 and CHO58 show an increased duration of half a year each in the December 2011 update. However, the independent study performed as part of the Harold work re-baselining projected a minimum of 4 years duration for each of these contracts.

Table 4.6, below, shows ESA has approximately accumulated a total of $126,690,643.58 in procurement escalation costs, due to delay in award of the aforementioned contracts. This amount would also need to come from unallocated contingency.


Table 4.5: Future Contract Packages December 2011 Update

Contract Duration NTP Substantial Completion Expected Bid* Forecasted Post-Bid Cont.


CM012 (A)$59,351,958

5.00%

CM012 1219 1-Aug-12 3-Dec-15 $310,381,3795.00%

CM013A 839 3-Apr-12 21-Jul-14 $60,553,5715.00%

CM014 B 969 24-Aug-12 20-Apr-15 $181,485,6965.00%

CMR14 $4,095,1730.00%

CM015 729 2-Sep-13 1-Sep-15 $32,299,3965.00%

QUEENS ALIGNMENTS CONTRACTS (Future)CQ033

739 5-Apr-13 14-Apr-15 $146,576,5485.00%

CQ034867 12-Feb-13 29-Jun-15 $35,227,476

5.00%

HAROLD INTERLOCKING CONTRACTS (Future) CH057

1278 13-Sep-12 14-Mar-16 $222,855,2285.00%

CH058 1278 8-Aug-13 6-Feb-17 $108,516,4195.00%

CH059 539 8-May-16 19-Jul-17 $16,913,8215.00%

PROJECTWIDE SYSTEMS CONTRACTSCS179

1645 1-Aug-12 1-Feb-17 $421,334,1605.00%

CS179 1645 1-Aug-12 1-Feb-17

CS184 902 11-Oct-12 14-Jul-15 $179,555,5065.00%

CS184 902 11-Oct-12 14-Jul-15

CS186 781 11-Jul-12 31-Aug-14 $17,797,8165.00%

CS186 781 11-Jul-12 31-Aug-14 $43,689,5885.00%

*The Total Amount of Expected Bid for these contracts is $1,840,633,735.


Table 4.6: Future Contract Packages Award Delay and Associated Escalation Cost

Contract Award delayEscalation caused by

Award delay


CM012 (A)

CM012526 $16,853,611

CM013A593 $4,687,749

CM014 B560 $9,183,830

CMR14$4,772,229

CM015935 $29,387,509


CQ033302 $2,658,368

CQ034421 $1,627,583


CH057618 $12,793,098

CH058422 $3,457,468

CH059432 $907,254

PRPJECTWIDE SYSTEMS CONTRACTS

CS179453 $5,862,480

CS179$8,689,018

CS184744 $13,996,963

CS184$5,403,307

CS18686 $4,702,055

CS186$1,708,123

Total$126,690,645

ESA has only budgeted 5% post-bid contingency for all contracts, but active contract packages have a post-bid contingency consumption of 15% currently and as discussed above, the PMOC projects that this amount will be higher. The PMOC projects that the future contract packages may need $276,095,060 ($1,840,633,735 * 15%) to cover the possible cost overrun of future contracts.

The ESA has had significant schedule slippage in their active contract packages (the average schedule slippage based on baseline IPS in 2009 is 178%, see Table 4.1-4.3); therefore, even small percentage of these slippage in the future contracts will affect the new RSD that the ESA will propose soon. The PMOC then added a 30% increase to the future contract packages durations (the PMOC still considers such increase a very optimistic), which is presented in the following table.


Table 4.7: The PMOC’s Best Case Scenario

ContractPMT's Substantial

CompletionPMOC's Best case

scenario

CM012 (A)

CM0123-Dec-15 2-Dec-16

CM013A21-Jul-14 29-Mar-15

CM014 B20-Apr-15 4-Feb-16

CM0151-Sep-15 6-Apr-16


CQ03314-Apr-15 21-Nov-15

CQ03429-Jun-15 15-Mar-16

HAROLD INTERLOCKING CONTRACTS (Future)

CH05714-Mar-16 1-Apr-17

CH0586-Feb-17 24-Feb-18

CH05919-Jul-17 8-Apr-18

PROJECTWIDE SYSTEMS CONTRACTS

CS1791-Feb-17 9-Jun-18

CS18414-Jul-15 27-Dec-15

CS18631-Aug-14 22-Apr-15


C. Packages Awarded Since 2009

The ESA has awarded 5 packages since July 2009. Table 4.8 below summarizes the package slippages.

Table 4.8: Awarded Package Based on Performance Measurement

July 2009 Baseline Dec-11

Contract Duration NTPSubstantial Completio

nDuration NTP

Substantial Completion

CM002Did not exist 420 9-May-11 2-Jul-12

VM0141770 3-Mar-10 6-Jan-15 1675 27-Sep-10 29-Apr-15

CM013875 1-Jan-10 25-May-12 1050 4-Jan-10 19-Nov-12

CM014AIt was part of CM014 540 7-Nov-11 30-Apr-13

CQ039601 30-Oct-09 23-Jun-11 971 3-Feb-10 1-Oct-12

CQ0321078 6-Dec-10 18-Nov-13 1099 10-Aug-11 13-Aug-14

December 2011Monthly Report 67 MTACC-ESA

Table 4.9, below, shows the amount of saving ($78,064,336) that ESA has had for the award of these five packages.

Table 4.9: Awarded Contract Packages Savings and Associated Escalation Costs

Contract Estimate 1 AwardDifference between Estimate and award

Escalated Cost 3Planned Post-

Bid Contingency 4

To date Post-bid Contingency. 5

CM002It didn't exist in 2009 $4,772,229

0

CM013$97,759,037 $51,305,000 ($46,454,037) $0 5.00% 5.31%

CM014A$109,441,920 $94,355,000 ($15,086,920) $0 5.00% 5.00%

CQ039$57,351,419 $84,950,000 $27,598,581 $1,523,909 5.00% 18.94%

CQ032$219,418,308 $147,377,000 ($72,041,308) $2,361,359 5.00% 10.00%

Total($101,211,454) $3,885,268 $19,261,850 6

1. This is the amount estimate including pre-bid contingency.

2. This column shows the difference between the estimate and award amounts.

3. This column shows the accumulated escalation due to late award of these packages.

4. This column shows the amount planned post bid contingency.

5. This column shows up to date the actual amount of contingency in percentage.

6. This is the total amount of actual post bid contingency to date that has not been calculated for.


The summation of all columns is (($101,211,454 - $3,885,268- $19,261,850- $37,330,140.95 = $40,734,195.43) saving. Using analysis from sections A, B, and C of this in-depth performance measurement of all ESA’s third party construction contracts, the PMOC has calculated that ESA needs to have an additional $496M [$134M (from Table 4.3) + $276M (from Table 4.5) + $127M (from Table 4.6) - $41M (from Table 4.9)] in allocated contingency to cover cost overrun and schedule slippage. Note that the amount of $496M is excluding any additional force account, design changes, and soft cost. Concerns and Recommendations:

From the PMOC analysis of the data in the tables above, the PMOC is concerned that the delays as presented in IPS#31 incur an amount of unallocated contingency which is greater than the requirements of the ELPEP. Because of the amount of delays incurred since the last re-baselining effort in 2009 and the fact that they were incurred on all contracts that were a part of that re-baselining effort, the PMOC recommends that ESA utilize risk informed estimates (which are required in the SMP) in its current re-baselining efforts, to obtain a more accurate re-baseline in 2012.

The PMOC is also concerned that due to the nature of the additional scope work to be included in CM012 and risk involved with access, the only contractor that may be able to bid reasonably on the contract will be the current CM009/019 contractor.

4.2 90-Day Look-Ahead of Important Activities

Status:

The PMOC received IPS update #31 (data date December 1, 2011) and its associated variance report on December 29, 2011. The ESA PMT has announced that the RSD (September 2016) in the current IPS, which was re-baselined in July 2009, cannot be met. Consequently, ESA is in the process of producing a revised baseline that will have a new RSD, and, therefore, the current IPS#31 has not been updated. The following table shows important 90 look ahead activities:


Table 4.10: 90 Day Look ahead

Activity Name Start FinishCM013A: Real Estate Acquisition/Re-Location 50th Street

May/14/2007 A Jan/26/2012

CM013A: Bid Opening Feb/01/2012

CM014B GEC Repackage Completed/Pre-Bid Preparation for IFB

Dec/15/2010 A Mar/30/2012

CM015: GEC 60% Design Submission Mar/22/2011 A Aug/01/2012

CH053: Amtrak approves Temp relocation (B-928W and B-929W)

Apr/01/2011 A Dec/01/2011

CH053A: Amtrak Remove 26.5KV wire Jan/24/2012 Jan/27/2012

CQ031: Set Up Tunnel B/C TBM/Train Feb/21/2012 Apr/17/2012

CQ039: Perform Ground Freeze* Nov/29/2011 A Jan/12/2012

CH058: 90% Design Docs. Jul/20/2010 A Jun/15/2012

Sys Pkg 1: Technical Approach and Cost Due May/18/2011 A Jan/30/2012

Sys Pkg 3: GEC Signal Equipments Design (from 30% to 100%)

Apr/01/2010 A Dec/06/2011

* “A” represents the actual date

The following are near critical 90-day look-ahead construction operation activities in Contract CQ031, CH053, and CQ039:

TBM A intervention completed and mining resumed under Sunnyside Yard. Temporary Reception Pit continued and the pit will be ready in December 2011. Temporary Pit is to mitigate delay impacts from 12kV duct bank relocation and Tunnel A.

Reception Pit in CH053 did not progress per schedule and, as a result, a Temporary Pit will be constructed so that it eliminates the immediate need for the new 12kV construction as well as relocation of existing B-931W catenary structure.

For Contract CQ039, the contractor continued to install freeze pipe at Level 7. The freeze started on November 29, 2011. The overall schedule update indicates schedule impacts to the Substantial Completion date.

Observation/Analysis:

The ESA PMT has announced that “the current IPS update will have to undergo some major adjustments in the coming months”, however the PMOC has presented its analysis in Section 4.1 to demonstrate the current state of ESA schedule.

Additionally, since last quarter, the followings are the amount delay that has occurred in design stages of aforementioned contract since last month:

CM013A -- 1.5 month delay

CM014B -- 2 weeks delay

CM015 -- 11 month delay

System Package III -- 4 month delay in design


System Package I -- 1 month delay in RFP submission


Because the PMT is in the process of re-baselining the IPS, the PMOC cannot comment on impact of delay in design stages on award of future contracts; however, the PMOC has shown the escalation cost of delays, and potential impact on the RSD occurred to date in Section 4.1. As a result, the PMOC is extremely concerned about the design stages of contracts CM013A, CM014B, CM015, Systems Package III, and procurement stage of Systems Package I.

4.3 Critical Path Activities

Status:

The PMT has stated in its variance report that “A preliminary draft schedule will be presented in December 2011, at which time it will also include Amtrak comments. It is anticipated that a revised schedule will be ready for senior management’s review by mid-January. As part of the continuing the re-baselining efforts, ESA has commissioned a peer review of the remaining Manhattan and Queens work (excluding Harold which was already done). The same two paths continue to drive the schedule. The critical path now runs through Harold. A second, near-critical path runs through Manhattan, Queens and Systems. A significant driver of this second path is the current CM009/CM019 contracts. The revised schedule will reflect the on-going settlement discussions between the MTA and the CM009-019’s contractor.”

Observation:

The PMOC had stated in its March 2011’s comprehensive report that Harold’s contracts should be on the IPS critical path. The PMOC has presented its analysis on this issue in Section 4.1, table 4.8.

During the 4th Quarter 2011, the PMT had scheduled 958 (early finish) activities to complete and but only accomplished 215 activities (22%). Since the PMT has not released a new IPS, the PMOC was not able to gauge the number of critical path activities that were achieved during this period. Table 4-11 below demonstrates a good performance measurement for the PMT in terms of completing its planned activities per quarter since the 4th Quarter of 2009.


Table 4.11: Early Finish “and Near Critical Date” IPS Performance Measurement

Year# of Planned Activities/Q

# of Completed Activities/Q

Percent Complete

# of Near Critical

Activities/ Q

# of Completed

Near Critical /Q

Near Critical Percent

Complete

Q4-2009 169 35 21% 14 4 29%

Q1-2010 215 45 21% 62 9 15%

Q2-2010 613 215 35% 108 59 55%

Q3-2010 1158 279 24% 63 34 54%

Q4-2010 1226 319 26% 109 40 37%

Q1-2011 821 180 22% 9 0 0%

Q2-2011 910 179 20% 53 28 53%

Q3-2011 972 90 16% 90 0 0%

Q4-2011 958 215 22% N/A N/A N/A

IPS # 31 shows that there are 7,288 activities remaining to be completed prior to the RSD, and the average rate of accomplishment per quarter has been 173 activities. Going forward at the same rate, the PMT would need another 10.5 years (7,288/173=42 quarters /4=10.5 years) to complete all activities.

The MTACC has finalized its first draft of its Risk Management Plan where it is stated that: “Programmatic risk assessments, as well as risk assessments of individual contracts, will be conducted for ESA during all phases of the project. As the Project evolves, and risk profiles change as new contracts are awarded, lessons learned from previous risk assessments can be applied to future work. This plan is thus considered a living document and will be updated as necessary to reflect changes in managerial methodology or project structure.”

The PMP Section 10, “Construction Program Management,” requires the PMT to prepare Construction Staging Plans for Harold construction packages, and clearly demonstrate the 3.5 years durations for contract CH057 and CH058 are achievable, and that both Amtrak and the LIRR have committed to providing the force account labor necessary to achieve the schedule. Reasons for the increased duration from 28 months to 70 months in Contract CH053 should serve as a lessons learned guideline going forward on the remaining Harold work.


The PMOC is concerned about the status of Contract CM009/019 (note: the analysis is presented in Section 4.1’s concerns and recommendation). The PMOC believes the complications and delays of Contract CM009/019 pose a significant risk to the project schedule. Issuing a revised baseline schedule without resolving the underlying issues may cause the IPS to have two concurrent critical paths, which would violate the ELPEP section IV, MTA’s Roles and Responsibilities, Section b. Schedule Contingency Management, that states that “Minimum differences between the individual project level critical path and the next longest path(s) (namely “near critical” paths) for both ESA and SAS shall be 25 calendar days.”


The PMOC is also concerned about the ESA PMT’s assumptions of availability of force account labor for the remaining Harold contracts. The PMOC presented these assumptions in Section 4.1, and believes that the ESA PMT has not addressed the risk of availability of Amtrak and LIRR force account labor in the re-baselining of the Harold Contracts. ESA should take into account the lessons learned on Contracts CH053/54A pertaining to the impact of availability of force account labor on the schedule.

The PMOC recommends that the PMT performs a risk-informed schedule to establish the key milestones and reliable RSD for new re-baseline schedule.

4.4 Schedule Contingency Analysis

Status:

The PMT has announced that the current IPS RSD is not achievable and a new RSD is being developed. The following tables represent the PMOC’s opinion about ELPEP RSD of 2018 and the schedule contingency drawdown.

Table 4.12: Schedule Contingency

ScheduleForecasted RSD W/O

Cont.Total Contingency FTA RSD

ESA Baseline July 2009 IPS #3

30-Sep-16 552 1-Apr-18

ELPEP 4-Aug-17 240 1-Apr-18


Observation/Analysis:

Table 4.13: Schedule Contingency Drawdown (based on the 2009 Schedule)

YearMTA RSD

W/O Cont.

Contingency (in Days)

RSD with

Cont..

ELPEP W/O Cont.

FTA's Hold point Cont. Q2 of 2016(i

n Days)

Total Contingenc

y (in Days)

FTA RSD

Baseline Comparison

(in Days)

Q4-2009

22-May-16 13130-Sep-

164-Aug-

17240 679

1-Apr-18

Q1-2010

15-Jun-16 10730-Sep-

164-Aug-

17240 655

1-Apr-18

-24

Q2-2010

15-Jun-16 10730-Sep-

164-Aug-

17240 655

1-Apr-18

-24

Q3-2010

7-May-16 14630-Sep-

164-Aug-

17240 694

1-Apr-18

15

Q4-2010

7-May-16 14630-Sep-

164-Aug-

17240 694

1-Apr-18

15

Q1-2011

18-Jun-16 10430-Sep-

164-Aug-

17240 652

1-Apr-18

-27

Q2-2011

26-Sep-16 430-Sep-

164-Aug-

17240 552

1-Apr-18

-127

Q3-2011

26-Sep-16 430-Sep-

164-Aug-

17240 552

1-Apr-18

-127

Q4-2011

TBD 0 TBD4-Aug-

17240 TBD

1-Apr-18

TBD

The ELPEP states that “Based on Revenue Service Date of April 2018 the East Side Access project shall maintain a minimum level of schedule contingency of 240 days through Q2 2016 at which time the schedule contingency minimums will be updated as mutually agreed. Failure to meet this requirement shall trigger the requirement for a recovery plan.” At the current contingency utilization rate, it appears that it will be difficult to meet the ELPEP requirement of 240 days of contingency through Q2 2016. Given that the project schedule is currently being re-baselined, this ELPEP requirement will have to be re-evaluated once the new baseline is finalized. [Ref: ESA-76-Feb11]


The PMOC is concerned that, with the current rate of activities accomplishment (Table 4.11) and delay analysis from Section 4.1; it will be difficult to maintain the minimum level of schedule contingency required in the ELPEP agreement for FTA’s RSD of April 2018. Until the PMT issue the re-baseline schedule, the grantee is not in conformance with ELPEP. [Ref: ESA-79-Apr11]


5.0 PROJECT COST STATUS

5.1 Budget/Cost

The updated Project Cost Table is shown in the Executive Summary as Table 1 in the front of this report. Table 5-1 below shows a comparison of the MTA’s Current Working Budget (CWB) vs. the FFGA Baseline Budget in Standard Cost Categories (SCC) and the slight variance from the previous month’s report.

Table 5.1: Comparison of Standard Cost Categories: FFGA vs. CWB

Standard Cost

Category (SCC)

No.

DescriptionFFGA

baseline ($)

MTA’s Previous Reporting Period

CWB ($) – (October 31, 2011)

MTA’s CWB ($)

(November 30, 2011)

% Change

from FFGA

to CWB

10 Guideway & Track Elements

1,988,741 2,689,489 2,690,961 35.3

20 Stations, Stops, Terminals, Intermodal

1,168,655 1,436,385 1,433,452 22.7

30 Support Facilities: Yards, Shops

356,264 350,120 352,271 [1.2]

40 Site Work & Special Conditions

205,105 365,186 367,213 79.0

50 Systems 619,343 635,486 632,770 2.2

60 ROW, Land, Existing Improvements

165,280 203,639 203,639 23.2

70 Vehicles 493,982 674,372* 674,372* 36.5

80 Professional Services 1,184,000 1,436,322 1,436,322 21.3

90 Unallocated Contingency

168,529 0 0 0

Subtotal 0 7,791,000** 7,791,000** 22.7

100 Finance Charges 1,036,104 1,036,100*** 1,036,100*** 0

Total Project Cost (10 – 100) 7,386,003 8,827,100 8,827,100 19.5

*Rolling Stock (“Vehicles”) includes passenger revenue vehicles, construction locomotives, and construction flat cars.

** The ELPEP Estimated Total Project Cost (ETPC) is $8.119 billion, reflecting the medium level of risk mitigation excluding finance cost.

*** Current Budget Finance Charges are estimated at the same value as the FFGA.


Observations:

During the November 2011 reporting period, the following funding changes in SCC Codes 10, 20, 30 and 40 were made as indicated in Table 5.1 above and in Section 5.3 below:

SCC Code 10 – Change due to favorable bid results for motor generators (VHL02), Signal Bridge repackaging (CH053, CH057, CH054A, FHL02 and VHL02), access and protection EAC’s (FHA53, FHA54A, FHL53, FHL54A, FQA31, FQL31), and increased cost of Manhattan Building Improvements (CMR13).

SCC Code 20 – Change due to Signal Bridge repackaging (CH053, CH057, CH054A, FHL02 and VHL02) and increased cost of Manhattan Building Improvements (CMR13).

SCC Code 30 – EAC increase of Force Account Warehouse (VQ066) by transferring funds from construction contingency assigned to SCC Code 20.

SCC Code 40 – Change due to Signal Bridge repackaging (CH053, CH057, CH054A, FHL02 and VHL02) and access and protection EAC’s (FHA53, FHA54A, FHL53, FHL54A, FQA31, FQL31).

SCC Code 50 – Change due to Signal Bridge repackaging (CH053, CH057, CH054A, FHL02 and VHL02).

SCC Code 90 - Unallocated Contingency remains $0.


Section 5.3 – Cost Variance, and Section 6.5.1 – Cost Contingency contain concerns and recommendations related to the changes in SCC costs outlined above.

5.1.1 Project Cost Management and Control

Status:

As of November 30, 2011, MTACC reported that the overall project completion was 48.0%, representing a 1.0% progress increase since the October 2011 reporting period; however, it still lags the planned progress of 63.2% planned completion for this period.

MTACC also reported that the expenditure to date is $3,315.9 million, which represents 42.6% of the Current Working Budget (CWB) of $7,791 million (excluding financing costs).

The project expenditure reported in the August 2011 ESA Quarterly Report represents an increase of 0.95% over the previous reporting period of October 2011.

SCC Code 90 - Unallocated Contingency remains $0, which is in conformance with the CMP, but does not meet the requirement stated in Section 4a of the ELPEP to have a reserved contingency minimum of $260 million through the first Hold Point (90% bid and 60% constructed, forecasted for 4Q 2011). [Ref: ESA-A08-Jun07][Ref: ESA-83-Aug11]

Observations:

The variance between planned and actual cost is largely due to delays throughout the project’s design, procurement, and construction. These delays have resulted in ESA performing a re-


baseline of their schedule. This re-baseline will necessitate a revision to project cost estimate. As shown in Graph 1.1, the variance in planned vs. actual cost is not static, but has increased over time.

Section 6.1 of the Cost Management Plan (CMP) stipulates that there must be a reserved contingency minimum of $261 million. Section 5.4 of the Schedule Management Plan (SMP) stipulates plans and measures for recovering the lag in progress. In the May 23, 2011 Cost Review Meeting, the PMOC requested that the PMT indicate how they plan to implement the recovery process as per the SMP. At that time, the ESA-PMT agreed to report the status of recovery from its contractors’ schedules and include a recovery write-up with the Monthly Schedule update. As of the end of December 2011, this has not occurred.


The PMOC recommends that ESA utilize risk-informed decision making in their upcoming revision of the project budget and incorporate identified cost risks in the new cost baseline [Ref: ESA-70-Nov10]

The PMOC continues to recommend that the MTACC rectify the Unallocated Contingency amount and correct Section 6.1 of the CMP and conform to the ELPEP stipulation.

5.1.2 Project Expenditures and Commitments

Status:

Table 5.2, below, shows the ESA project budget, the awarded value and the expended amounts for Construction and Soft Costs as of August 31, 2011:


Table 5.2: Project Budget

ElementsCurrent Total Budget ($M)

Awarded Value ($M)

Expended ($M) (as of November

30, 2011)

% of Line Item Budget Expended

Construction 5,578.8 3,424.6 2,189.9 39.3

Soft Costs

Engineering 581.0 568.4 545.8 93.9

OCIP* 190.9 112.9 97.4 51.0

Project Mgmt. 609.0 416.8 383.3 62.9

Real Estate 166.3 100.9 99.5 59.8

Rolling Stock** 665.0 0.0 0.0 59.8316295850872

Soft Costs Subtotal

2,211.8 1,199.0 1,125.9

Project Subtotal 7,791.0 4,623.6 3,315.9 42.6

Financing Cost (current estimate)

1,036.0

Total 8,827.0 4,623.6 3,315.9 37.6

*The OCIP budget remains $250 million. A portion of the costs ($84M) has been paid by proceeds from the Surety payment for the default of the CQ028 contract. These funds are not included in the capital program.

**$463 million for ESA rolling stock (above the $202 million included in the project budget) is now included in a reserve pending review of a simulation of opening day service and fleet need.

The value of $1,036.0 million for Financing Cost, shown Table 5.2, has not been updated from the FFGA amount in 2006.

The schedule re-baseline is expected to be issued sometime in Q1 2012, consequently as of December 31, 2011, no in-process or revised cost figures have been presented to the PMOC

Observation:

The ESA PMT has stated that they will be revising the current project budget once the schedule re-baselining effort has been finalized.


Concerns regarding the lag in project expenditures (planned vs. actual) are usually discussed with the grantee at the Monthly Cost Review meetings, however these meetings have been temporarily suspended for several months due to the re-baselining efforts by the ESA PMT. These meetings will be reinstated in January 2012 after the re-baselining effort has been finalized and a new project budget established.


5.1.3 Change Orders

Status:

As of November 30, 2011, MTACC reported that there were 4 additional change orders executed valued at $0.1 million for a total of $373.5 million, representing 8.8% of the total value of awarded contracts ($4,623.6 million).

The following modifications were approved in November 2011:

For Contract CM004, three (3) modifications were executed for various miscellaneous work totaling $0.06 million. The remaining contract contingency decreased to 8.08% as a result of these modifications.

One (1) modification was issued to Contract CQ039 to replenish Bid Item No. 5 Allowance for Dispute Review Board totaling $0.05 million. The remaining contract contingency decreased to 9.68% as a result of these modifications.

Observations:

The PMOC notes that 6% of 8% of contract contingency for CM004 was added in July 2011 to cover pending potential changes that are identified, but not yet executed.

The PMOC also notes that the contingency for Contract CQ039 was revised to 15.01% in August 2011 to cover pending potential changes and that 5.33% of that contingency has been utilized for change orders through the end of November 2011.


Table 5.3: Approved Project Change Orders Status


Contract Number

DescriptionOriginal Award ($M)

Engineer’s Estimate

($M)

Approved Change

Order ($M)

Total # of Change Orders

% of Award Value

26 Completed Contracts

Subtotal of Completed Construction Contracts

474.4 (7.9) 262 (2.0)

One Terminated Contract

CQ028 Queens Open-Cut Excavation 121.5 154.0 (52.9) 19 (45.7)

21 Open Contracts

CM002 GCT Expansion Joint Replacement.

4.5 7.0 0 1 0

CM004 44th St. Vent Plant and 245 Park Ave Entrance

40.8 42.9 1.2 39 2.5

CM004 44th St. Vent Plant and 245 Park Ave Entrance

40.8 42.9 1.2 39 2.5

CM009 Manhattan Tunnel Excavation 427.9 482.5 20.5 34 4.8

CM013 50th St. Vent Facility 94.4 112.1 0.6 15 0

CM019 Manhattan Structures 1 734.0 562.6 18.3 48 3.5

FMM19 MH Force Account Support – MNR

31.8 31.8 0 0 0

CM014A

GCT Concourse/Facilities PH1

43.5 45.3 0 0 0

CQ031* Queens Bored Tunnels and Structures

648.9 475.6 102.6 47 14.6

CQ032 Plaza Substation and Queens Structures

147.4 237.2 0 0 0

CQ039 Northern Blvd. Crossing 85.0 57.4 4.7 11 0.4

FHA01 Harold Stage 1 – Amtrak FA 9.5 16.0 7.3 1 76.8

FHL01 Harold Stage 1 – LIRR F/A 28.8 19.1 (8.0) 1 (27.4)

FHA02 Harold Stage 2 – Amtrak F/A**

9.7 26.0 0 0 0

FHL02 Harold Stage 2 – LIRR F/A** 7.4 54.3 0 0 0

CH053 Harold Structures Part I 137.3 148.4 31.9 62 22.9

CH054A Harold Structures – Part 2A 21.8 37.1 1.6 14 7.3

VHA02 Harold Materials Stage 2 Amtrak

6.0*** N/A 0 0 0

VHL02 Harold Materials Stage 2 LIRR

6.0*** N/A 6.3 1 105

VM014 Vertical Circulation 24.1 103.2**** 0 2 0

VH051-1

Harold and Point CILs 25.8 36.4 0.2 2 0.1

VH051-2

Harold Tower Supervisory Control

5.4 7.2 1.8 4 33.3

Various Other Open Contracts 236.5 236.5 0 0 0

Subtotal 3,372.5 186.5 540 5.5

Professional Service Contracts

Completed Engineering (SEC, TEC) 232.0 8.5 31 3.7

General Engineering Consultant (Open) 140.0 159.3 26 113.8

PMC 219.8 19.2 4 8.7

CCM 74.6 0 0 0


Contract Number

DescriptionOriginal Award ($M)

Engineer’s Estimate

($M)

Approved Change

Order ($M)

Total # of Change Orders

% of Award Value

Subtotal – Professional Services 666.4 187.0 61 28.1Other Soft Costs

OCIP 112.9 0 0 0 Real Estate 98.6 0 0 0

Subtotal – Other Soft Costs 211.5 0 0 0Grand Total 4,250.4 373.5 601 8.8

*Contract mods include option for $58.4 M. **Partial Award. (to be in stages). *** Early Work procurement only. ****Engineers Estimate includes all options and services not yet awarded.


The PMOC notes that there are several contracts (e.g., CQ031, CH053, the GEC design contract) where the percentage of change orders vs. Contract Award value is high. These trends are currently being analyzed by the PMOC.

5.2 Project Funding

Status:

The FTA executed an FFGA with the MTA on December 18, 2006 for $2.683 billion in federal participation and $3.667 billion in local share (financing not included). As of February 2008, the ESA forecast of the local share increased to $4.629 billion (no financing).

The MTA submitted a Capital Project Amendment to the CPRB in May 2010. The FTA’s obligated funding remained $1.563 billion, of that amount $50.4 million is allocated to LIRR and MNR as the ESA portion of shared facilities (Highbridge and Arch Street Yards and procurement of the Switch Exchange System machine).

There is no change in the status of project obligated funding from the previous report.


Table 5.4: Federal Grant Status

Grant Number To be Used ForObligated

Grant Amount ($M)

Disbursement ($M) thru November 30,

2011

NY-03-0344-01-02-03-04 ESA 81.5 81.5

NY-03-0344-05 ESA 73.8 73.8

NY-03-0344-06-07 ESA 99.2 99.2

NY-03-0344-08 ESA 333.2 333.2

NY-03-0344-09 ESA 300.0 300.0

NY-03-0344-10 ESA 210.7 210.7

NY-03-0344-11 ESA 207.5 207.5

NY-03-0344-12 ESA 246.9 40.6

Subtotal 1,552.8 1,346.6

NY-90-X467 Highbridge 7.6 7.6

NY-03-0406 Highbridge 5.0 5.0

NY-03-X489 Highbridge 1.1 1.1

NY-90-X467 Arch Street 7.6 7.6

NY-03-0395 Arch Street 7.5 7.5

NY-03-0427Switch Exchange System

(SES) Machine2.0 2.0

NY-05-0108 SES Machine 2.7 2.7

NY-05-0109 SES Machine 5.8 5.8

NY-95-X002 CMAQ 6.6 6.6

NY-95-X009 CMAQ 2.3 2.3

NY-95-X015 CMAQ 2.3 2.3

NY-95-X025 CMAQ 11.6 0.0

Subtotal 62.1 50.4

NY-36-X0002 ARRA 195.4 195.4

FFGA Total 1,810.3 1,592.4

Observation:

The PMOC noted that FTA awarded the remaining grant (N-03-0344-12) available in September 2011 to be used for the ESA portion of shared facilities. This grant fully covers the funding for the year increment of 2010 and 2011.

As of November 30, 2011, 16.4% has been disbursed out of the total grant of $246.9 million.



As of November 30, 2011, there are no concerns and recommendations for this section.

5.2.1 Overall Project Funding

There is no change in project obligated funding from the previous report.

5.2.2 Local Funding

Status:

In October 2009, the total ESA project cost approved by the MTA Board was $7.328 billion, $978 million higher than FFGA Baseline Cost Estimate (BCE) of $6.350 billion. The ESA Current Working Budget (CWB) is $7.791 billion, which is a $1.441 billion increase over the FFGA BCE. [Note: Figures do not include financing costs.]

The NYS CPRB has approved MTA’s Capital Program Amendment request in May 2010. Funding for ESA was increased by $915 million to a total of $5.56 billion. The next two-year local funding increment has not been approved as of the end of December 2011. [Ref: ESA-68-Oct10]

Observations:

MTACC has identified a potential funding constraint imposed by the 2-year incremental funding authorization process under the current MTA Capital Program. Although ESA is currently moving forward based on availability of full funding for the next two year funding increment, it is the PMOC’s understanding that the next funding increment has not been approved as of the end of December 2011. MTACC may have difficulties in awarding major contracts in 2012 without additional funding by the CPRB. MTACC cannot award any contracts without first obtaining financing to cover their budget. IPS #31 identifies four major contracts with an award date in 3Q12 that will require local funding to be in place.


The PMOC is concerned that without securing local funding, major 3Q12 contracts cannot be awarded. The PMOC recommends that MTA mitigate delays by working to secure local funding as soon as possible.

5.3 Cost Variance Analysis

Status:

In their November 2011 Budget Adjustment Memo, the ESA-PMT reported that there were seven (7) executed Budget Adjustments (BAs) with a transfer value of $16.4 million that include two (2) BAs for executed modifications, one (1) for contract repackaging, two (2) for budget increases, one (1) for access and protection adjustments, and one (1) for low bid award. This has decreased the project cost contingency by $8.9 million.

The project expenditures increased by $31.6 million for a total of $3.316 billion.

Observations:

Two (2) BAs were executed as a result of approved contract modifications. This resulted in fund movement of $0.1 million.


One (1) BA was executed as a result of the Signal Bridge repackaging for contracts CH053, CH057, CH054A, FHL02 and VHL02 for a total amount of $4.2 million. Funds for these BAs were shifted between these contracts. This repackaging did not have any impact on the construction contingency.

Two (2) BA’s were executed as a result of budget increases for expected future expenditures for contracts VQ066 and CMR13 totaling $2.7 million.

One (1) BA was executed for adjustments to access and protection for contracts FHA53, FHA54A, FHL53, FHL54A, FQA31 and FQL31 totaling $7.9 million.

One (1) BA was executed as a result of the low bid for contract VHL02 for a total amount of $1.5 million. These funds were transferred to the construction contingency.

Additional information is provided in Section 5.1.3 (Change Orders) and Section 6.5.1 (Cost Contingency Status).

The project expenditures increase this month represents a growth rate of 0.95% of total expenditures, as compared with October 2011 reporting period. At this rate of expenditures, the PMOC estimates that the project will only reach 78.6% of total expenditures by September 2016.


The PMOC is concerned that the rate of project expenditures lags the plan established during the re-baseline of the project cost and schedule in September 2009. Since the project is revising its cost and schedule again in 1Q12, the PMOC recommends the MTACC take into account the previous factors that caused the project expenditures to lag behind its plan and develop a risk-informed approach to expenditures.

5.4 Project Contingency

Status:

The FFGA established an unallocated budget contingency of $168.5 million. In the Project Execution Plan, an attachment to the FFGA, the MTA identified a total contingency of $855.0 million with an allocated contingency of $686.471 million.

In September of 2009, MTACC revised the project cost estimate as part of the Enterprise Level Project Execution Plan (ELPEP). The revised project cost estimate had $424.4 million of allocated contingency, and zero unallocated contingency.

Since September 2009, MTACC has been adjusting the project contingency on a monthly basis, to reflect usage, and reporting it on a quarterly basis. As of November 30, 2011, the remaining total contingency was $447.5 million, representing approximately 5.7% of the $7.791 billion of the September 2009 budget, and is distributed as shown in Table 5.5 below:


Table 5.5: Project Cost Contingency Comparison

Allocated Contingency Sept 09 ($M) Oct 11 ($M) Nov 11 ($M)

Pre-bid Construction 350.3 394.4 391.8

Engineering/Project Management 6.7 10.1 10.1

Real Estate 33.8 33.7 33.7

Rolling Stock 15.3 15.3 15.3

Owner Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) 18.3 18.3 18.3

Subtotal allocated 424.4 456.4 447.5

Unallocated Contingency 0 0.0 0.0

Total Contingency 424.4 456.4 447.5

Observation:

During November 2011, the contingency level was above the ELPEP minimum requirement of $260 million. MTACC decreased its project contingency by $8.9 million. The reduction resulted from executed contract modifications for contracts CM004 and CQ039 in the amount of $0.1 million, $2.7 million for budget increases to contracts VQ066 and CMR13 and $6.1 million for the adjustment of access and protection to contracts FHA53, FHA54A, FHL53, FHL54A, FQA31 and FQL31. The low bid adjustment for Contract VHL02 did not impact the overall contingency amount. These items are further discussed in Section 6.5.1 of this report.

The current project contingency amount is within an acceptable limit established; however, the remaining contingency is projected to drop below the ELPEP hold point in the 2nd Quarter of 2012.


The PMOC is concerned that the project contingency will drop below the threshold at Q2-2012 as shown on the MTACC contingency drawdown curve in the ESA November 2011 Progress Report, as future contracts are awarded. The PMOC recommends that the MTACC take the necessary steps to ensure that the ELPEP mandated contingency reserve is maintained.


6.0 PROJECT RISK

6.1 Previous Risk Assessments

An initial Risk Assessment was performed on the ESA project in 2004 in accordance with PG22. Prior to the signing of the FFGA in 2006, a more comprehensive Risk Assessment was performed in accordance with PG40, followed by a re-look in 2007/2008. In October 2008, the PMOC issued to the FTA the Technical Capacity and Capability analysis in accordance with PG31C. In Early 2009, the ESA project team provided an updated project budget and schedule. The PMOC subsequently provided modified PG33 and PG34 reports with a focus on changes from FFGA to 2009 Budget and Schedule reports as well as assisting in the development of Cost Risk Summary and “PG47” support documents. From late 2009 through to the current period, MTACC and ESA-PMT, working with the FTA and PMOC, have concurrently progressed both the development and then the implementation of the ELPEP. MTACC-ESA has also revised, or written new, most PMP sections/subplans/procedures associated with meeting the risk management requirements of the ELPEP.

6.2 Current Risk Update

Status:

The PMOC has documented the ESA Risk Assessment effort in various draft Spot Reports. The MTACC and FTA have identified and documented the risk mitigation initiatives in a scoping document for incorporation into the PMP. During January 2010, the PMOC and the FTA worked with MTACC and ESA staff to finalize the Enterprise Level Project Execution Plan (ELPEP). Cost contingency and secondary schedule mitigations have been adjusted based on discussions between the FTA Administrator and MTA Chairman. The agreement was to use a Medium Level Risk Mitigation for cost and schedule to allow MTACC to manage the project to its current working budget and Revenue Service Date. MTACC is developing a total cost contingency capacity to match the FTA requirement. The FTA schedule contingency float will be the difference between the Revenue Service Dates forecast in FTA and MTACC schedules. During the period of December 2011, MTACC continued working with the FTA and the PMOC to finalize the Cost Management Plan, and the PMOC completed its initial review of the Risk Management Plan. Concurrently, MTACC has completed the next update of the ESA Project Management Plan to reflect changes in project procedures and the programmatic plans and sub-plans.

Observation:

To date, MTACC has worked cooperatively with the FTA and the PMOC to produce various management plans in support of the ELPEP process. Production of elements of the ELPEP requirements has been affected by the mutual recognition that intermediate deliverables would be required in order to clarify the requirements of ELPEP compliant plans and procedures. Although the delay has been in some cases considerable, the development of these procedures has already benefited the project as the MTACC has worked to resolve organization and decision making issues related to upgrading management plans.



The PMOC continues to recommend that the MTA continue to provide the resources necessary to improve project management systems as called for in the ELPEP implementation effort.

6.3 Risk Management Status

Status:

At the FTA Quarterly Review Meetings and the monthly FTA/PMOC Workshops, ESA describes their efforts to incorporate the consideration of risk in their respective decision making processes. These efforts include the periodic review and update of risk registers, the consideration of risk, cost and schedule as part of a defined process for decision making, and periodic internal risk reviews to validate assumptions for individual contract package schedule and cost estimates.

Observations:

The implementation of the above processes will facilitate better management of risk from the agency perspective as well as greater effectiveness in assignment of risk in dealing with third party contractors and the railroads. This will help the agencies to better control cost and schedule assumption accuracy for the project.

The PMOC considers these efforts to be an important step in moving toward full implementation of processes included in the ELPEP.

During the period of October - December 2011, the PMOC continued to work on the following Risk Assessment update activities:

Review Grantee’s compliance with the 2006 through 2011 risk mitigation commitments;

Support FTA-RII with implementation of the ELPEP; and

Evaluate effectiveness of current risk mitigation strategies being employed by MTACC.

The PMOC continues monthly project monitoring and reporting by personnel with specialized skill sets for the following sectors: Tunneling and Heavy Civil Works (CM009/019); Cost/Scheduling; and Force Account work (FHA/L01). The specialists will review progress and analyze risk items, and the cost/schedule for respective project areas mentioned above.


The PMOC recommends that the ESA project ensure that there is sufficient mitigation capacity and/or contingency funding available to cover the impact of possible realization of identified risks. Specific FTA requirements for improvements to the Project Management Plan (PMP), as detailed in Candidate Revisions to the PMP, PMP sub-plans and project procedures were to have been implemented over the 9 month period from January 15, 2010 through October 15, 2010, and tracked throughout the project, in accordance with the ELPEP implementation schedule. Some of these efforts remain incomplete although MTACC-ESA continues to respond to FTA and PMOC review comments on various MTACC documents including the Cost Management Plan and Risk Mitigation Capacity Plan.


6.4 Risk Mitigation Actions

6.4.1 2006 Risk Mitigation Commitments at FFGA

Status

A detailed risk mitigation plan was developed in May 2008 based on the MTACC risk mitigation commitments made in 2006 and as described in the PMOC Spot Report 10, Rev. R0, dated July 31, 2007. MTACC has generally not been successful mitigating most of the specific risks identified in the following categories: requirements risk; design risk; market/bid risk; geotechnical risk; utility construction risk; and mid-range construction coordination risk. In addition, significant new risks materialized during this period that include contractor termination for cause (CQ028) and multiple issues concerning railroad force account construction and force account support to third-party contractors involving two essential project stakeholders, Amtrak and LIRR.

Observation

MTACC has missed all but one of the basic annual mitigation milestones as shown below:

Mitigation Targets

Design Complete Contracts Awarded*Construction Completed**

Basic Milestones Goal Actual Goal Actual Goal Actual

Q4-2006 70% 72% 25% 10% 8% 7%

Q4-2007 82% 78% 55% 12% 21% 9%

Q4-2008 93% 80% 58% 19% 38% 13%

Q4-2009 96% 88% 70% 43% 55% 19%

Q4-2010 98% 93% 92% 52% 69% 32%

* Based on current contract/package values

**Cost expenditure basis


The PMOC has had continuing concerns that ESA has not met FFGA cost and schedule commitments and, with one exception, has been unable to meet any of the basic annual mitigation milestone goals for design, contract award and construction progress. The PMOC recommends that MTACC continue to completion, its current comprehensive project re-baselining, revise their Recovery Plan accordingly, and work closely with the FTA to revise the ELPEP and to finalize an FFGA Amendment. Following this agreement, as part of the monitoring plan associated with the ELPEP, the PMOC will rework the Mitigation Monitoring Plan.

6.4.2 Current Risk Mitigation Commitments

Status:

Based on the ELPEP, MTACC-ESA has committed to the following: managing the project to the revised ESA cost and schedule baselines approved by the MTA Board in September 2009; establishment of risk baselines and a risk mitigation framework with milestones; adherence to


minimum cost and schedule contingency requirements; development of cost and schedule risk mitigation capacity including secondary mitigation strategies required to offset reserved contingency drawdowns; and implementation of specific design development, geotechnical, real estate and utility risk mitigation strategies.

Observation:

The PMOC observes that although MTACC has received conditional approval of the new Schedule Management and Cost Management Plans, the Risk Management Plan has not yet been approved. The revised Risk Management Plan was submitted to the FTA in October 2011 and the PMOC completed its initial review in December 2011. The PMOC also notes that the ELPEP will need to be revised based on the final approved re-baselined Integrated Project Schedule.


Accordingly, it is the PMOC’s opinion that in the absence of an approved Risk Management Plan, MTACC-ESA currently does not yet have a fully integrated approach, along with the required coordinated processes, to be fully compliant with the risk mitigation requirements in ELPEP.

6.4.3 Current Risk Mitigation Actions

Status/Observation:

The ESA PMT has continued its efforts to identify and mitigate risks that may adversely affect the program’s future cost and schedule performance. Ongoing and recent significant risk mitigation initiatives include the following:

In response to delays experienced on the Queens contracts to date, the ESA PMT and the associated ESA construction managers have managed, and continue to manage, all Queens area work to the critical CQ031 milestones related to TBM mining. It is the PMOC’s opinion that this approach has been generally effective in minimizing potential delays to the start and continuance of CQ031 TBM mining due to three critical issues: termination of the CQ028 contract for default in May 2008; significant repairs to the slurry walls constructed by the CQ028 contractor; and significant delays to completion of the CH053 contract.

Independent peer review of the Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) requirements for software testing. It is the PMOC’s opinion that such an independent review can provide valuable unbiased suggestions for acceptance testing improvements.

The ESA-PMT has conducted a Risk Assessment Workshop for Contract CM013A (55th Street Ventilation Facility). Initial results indicate that unmitigated risks will likely extend the contract duration from 20 months to 33 months due to two significant risks: utility relocations; and shaft excavation. The ESA-PMT continues to study options to mitigate cost and schedule impacts. It is the PMOC’s opinion that this risk review is valuable and will yield benefits during the construction phase.

Through December 2011, the ESA-PMT continued to work very closely with Amtrak and LIRR to evaluate impacts to the ESA project created by Amtrak’s planned East River Tunnel capital improvements program. Amtrak’s program requires a large number of track outages and is likely to require four years to complete. The ESA-PMT is working


with the construction managers on the active Queens/Harold work to coordinate reviews with the contractors. ESA-PMT has also engaged a senior level team to complete an Independent Study of Harold Progress that includes review of the ESA Harold construction schedule and development of independent schedule recommendations for completion of the Harold work. ESA-PMT anticipates that this intensive planning effort will continue until the end of this year and will result in a re-baselined IPS that accounts for all impacts. The PMOC believes that this is a critical planning effort that needs to consider all potential cost and schedule risks. The PMOC recommends the ESA-PMT ensure that all affected stakeholders are fully involved in the review and decision-making process. Any additional costs would accrue to the $120 million of Cost Risk identified for Construction Schedule Delays identified in the 2009 PG47 analysis.

ESA-PMT has started using a 4D model of the B10 Substation construction to better coordinate construction site activities between the CQ039 and CQ032 contractors. By advancing construction of the B10 Substation, the project will be able to achieve an earlier systems installation to support the permanent power needed for integrated systems testing. It is the PMOC’s opinion that while this approach offers an opportunity to mitigate some schedule risk, it does increase project coordination risk that will need to be closely monitored and managed.

ESA-PMT is proposing to advance LIRR force account work for the WLPc portion of the Westward Passenger track from FHL03 (Harold Stage 3) into FHL02 (Harold Stage 2) to be built in conjunction with the WLPb portion. The PMOC’s opinion is that this change would be beneficial provided that ESA-PMT can demonstrate, through the CCC process, a clear cost benefit or schedule advantage to mitigate potential risks.

During November 2011, MTACC continued to work with FTA-Region II and the PMOC to progess the Risk Mitigation Capacity Plan required by the ELPEP agreement.


The PMOC believes that to validate that these risk mitigation actions will generally reduce the potential for future schedule delays and will thus minimize cost overruns, ESA-PMT must thoroughly evaluate all possible new risks associated with these changes. The PMOC recommends that the PMT continue to perform a cost-benefit analysis, complete with schedule review, within the framework of the ESA Risk Management Plan, and in accordance with current project configuration change control, to confirm the effectiveness of these mitigation actions.

The PMOC remains concerned that continued “schedule compression” will force “contract stacking” in the many constricted work areas in Queens and Manhattan which will create new coordination risks for MTACC-ESA. One example of this situation is in Queens where ESA-PMT is now leading coordination efforts between CM009/019 (conveyor), CQ039 and CQ32 (Plaza Substation B10) at the location of the Early Access Chamber. Should the project realize any of these new risks, there will likely be adverse cost and schedule impacts. In addition, there is potential to create quality risks due to fragmentation of discrete work elements, like trackwork, among multiple contracts. The PMOC recommends that ESA-PMT, working with the CMs, GEC and Amtrak/LIRR, fully evaluate this increasing exposure to new critical risks. [Ref: ESA-80-Jun11]


6.5 Cost and Schedule Contingency

The project schedule contingence is discussed in Section 4.0 of this report. The project cost contingency is discussed in Section 5.0 of this report.

6.5.1 Cost Contingency Status

Status:

As of November 30, 2011, MTACC reported that the overall project contingency is $447.5 million. This represents a decrease of $8.9 million from the previous reporting period, which is due to executed contract modifications and budget increases as described in Section 5.3 – Cost Variance Analysis above.

Graph 6.1: Cost Contingency Drawdown Graph

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ELPEP Contingency

Revised Contingency Minimum

Planned Contingency

Actual Contingency

Projected Contingency

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Current Status65.3% Bid39.9% Constructed

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ELPEP Threshold90.0% Bid60.0% Constructed

ELPEP Hold Point100.0% Bid95.0% Constructed

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ELPEP Hold Point100.0% Bid95.0% Constructed

ELPEP Hold Point100.0% Complete

East Side AccessCost Contingency Drawdown

Planned vs. Actual

Observations:

The contingency trend for the last 12 months averaged $52.0 million above the Baseline Contingency, which decreased from $456.4 million in October 2011 to $447.5 million in November 2011 but is still above the Baseline Contingency established in September 2009 in the amount of $424.4 million as indicated in Graph 6.1 above.

The decrease in the project cost contingency for the current reporting period resulted from the following:

Executed Contract Modifications : The total value for executed contract modifications for November 2011 falls within the allocated contingency for each of the active contracts.


As stated above in Section 5.4.1, the adjustment for the active executed contract modifications decreased the contingency by $0.1 million.

Budget Increase : Two (2) Budget Adjustments in the amount of $2.7 million were executed to the VQ066 and CMR13 contracts for expected future expenditures and revised estimate respectively.

Access and Protection Adjustments : One (1) Budget Adjustment to reallocate access and protection to contracts FHA53, FHA54A, FHL53, FHL54A, FQA31 and FQL31 for the amount of $6.1 million.

As of November 30, 2011, the MTACC has not provided a plan to minimize the impact of the contingency drop as agreed in the ELPEP.

The overall project contingency decreased by $8.9 million as a result of the above transfers.


Although the project cost contingency is above the Baseline Contingency established in September 2009 in the amount of $424.4 million, the PMOC is concerned that it will dip below that amount upon the award of future contracts.

During the September 27, 2011 ESA Cost Contingency Drawdown Curve meeting, MTACC presented a revised Contingency Drawdown Curve to reflect changes in the project schedule since 2009. MTACC was reminded that if the contingency drops below the minimum level of $260 million, as agreed to in the ELPEP, they need to make provisions to replace the shortage with local funding. The FTA/PMOC recommended at the meeting that MTACC begin its planning for maintaining the agreed upon contingency as soon as possible. The PMOC is concerned that the MTACC has not provided a plan to minimize the impact of the contingency drop as agreed in the ELPEP.

6.5.2 Schedule Contingency

The Schedule Contingency is discussed in Section 4.5 of this report.


7.0 PMOC CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Priority in Criticality column

1 – Critical 2 – Near Critical

Number with Date

Initiated

Section Issues/Recommendations Criticality

ESA-35-Mar09

2.1.3

Construction: Harold Part I

CH053: GEC design support for construction is not sufficient and is causing construction delays, based on late GEC responses to RFIs, field conditions and late completion/approval of construction staging plans.

Status Update: Some improvements were noted during 2010, but the number of open design issues has remained high through much of 2011. Re-design approvals have required an excessive amount of time. In response to these issues, ESA has engaged HNTB to provide additional review of catenary re-designs prior to submission to Amtrak. Also, the GEC has re-organized the catenary design team under a new design manager. Currently, approvals have been obtained for all of the remaining Amtrak Electric Traction systems associated with Contract CH053.

PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC recommends that this issue be closed.

1

ESA-38-Apr09

2.1.3

Construction: Manhattan

Construction progress of CM009/019 was seven months behind the baseline schedule, and the progress of work continues to be behind the approved baseline schedule.

Status Update: The MTACC has forecast the Substantial Completion date for the combined CM009/019 contract as “Under Review” since its August 2011 Monthly Report. The PMOC has added two months to its forecast so that it projects Substantial Completion 13 months later than the original baseline. Additionally, the MTACC has postponed the award of the CM012 contract by several months, which relieves some of the pressure off the CM009/CM019 Substantial Completion.

PMOC Recommendation: The CM009/019 contractor has picked up its construction pace in the last quarter of 2011 and is constructing the project in many different

1


Number with Date

Initiated


locations, which the contractor had not been doing before. Since the contractor is doing this, the PMOC recommends that the contractor continue its construction on all fronts and achieve Substantial Completion as soon as it possibly can.

ESA-47-Jan10

1.1.1

Organization

The ESA project team issued an Organization Document in December 2008 consisting of: Position Descriptions, Resumes, and Organization Charts, and has not updated it since.

Status Update: While ESA has been reviewing and filling open positions as they arise, a formal reissue of the ESA Organization document has not occurred however, ESA has provided an updated Organization chart. The PMT stated that it will not be revising this document but will be updating the organization section of the PMP instead. PMP Rev. 8 describes the ESA organization but does not include updating frequency. ESA submitted a complete PMP (Revision 8.0) in May 2011. The PMOC notes that this latest PMP does not fully replace the ESA Organization Document.

PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC continues to recommend that ESA consider reinstating the ESA Organization document and updating it periodically.

2

ESA-49-Jan10

1.1.2a

Adequacy of Project

Management Plan and Project

Controls

The lack of complete development of the revised project procedures, together with incorporation of the ELPEP principles into the PMP, could result in not having a fully updated and FTA-approved PMP and referenced project procedures until 4Q-2010. MTACC also committed to have all new procedures implemented by April 12, 2010. Initially, the number of procedures to be developed was approximately 85, but the MTACC revised that number to approximately 75.

Status Update: The MTACC did not authorize any additional revised procedures during December 2011. The amount of revised procedures remains 75. The MTACC has indicated to the PMOC that there are 4 additional procedures presently being revised. The PMOC believes that the earliest possible date that the remaining procedures could be implemented is January 31, 2012. Likewise, the PMOC believes that earliest possible date for the revised PMP will be 1Q-2012.

1


Number with Date

Initiated


PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC recommends that the MTACC direct its Consultant Construction Manager responsible to develop the procedures to finish the process so that the MTACC can authorize and implement all remaining revised procedures by January 31, 2012.

ESA-56-Feb10

2.1.3Construction:

Harold Part IIA

CH054A: Contract work has been delayed by late mobilization, differing site conditions, adverse weather and lack of Amtrak approved re-design of the 12kV duct bank. As of January 31, 2010, cumulative actual percent complete is 2.2% versus planned 8.8% – 16.6% (late – early) on a cost expenditure basis, and 31% of the contract time to Substantial Completion has elapsed.

Status Update: As of November 2011, based on the latest data available from the Grantee, the cumulative actual percent complete was only 50.7% versus 100% planned on a cost expenditure basis. Substantial Completion was originally planned for December 2010. Recovery is no longer possible.

PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC continues to recommend that the Grantee evaluate the situation, work on possible solutions with the contractor and develop the most cost-effective approach to minimize the delay impacts.

1

ESA-62-Mar10

2.1.3

Construction: Queens

Contract CH053: The PMOC is concerned that the contractor is not able to substantially increase its monthly construction progress. Historical progress is averaging 1.33% per month, yet the re-baselined schedule will require construction progress to average 2.9% per month to meet the revised substantial completion date of January 2012. While the contractor has recently increased its monthly construction progress in May 2010 to meet the goals of the re-baselined schedule, the PMOC remains concerned that the contractor may not be able to maintain this higher production.

Status Update: The PMOC notes that the reported actual progress curve, in October 2010, started dropping below the revised forecast late completion curve. As of November 30, 2011, based on the latest data available from the Grantee, cumulative

1


Number with Date

Initiated


actual percent complete is 61.7% versus planned 93.6% on a cost expenditure basis, and 96% of the revised contract time to Substantial Completion has elapsed. Historical progress is averaging 1.3% per month, yet the contractor will need to achieve 1.8% progress per month to meet the current forecast substantial completion date of August 2013.

PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC recommends that ESA prioritize the GEC construction support to this contract, expedite resolution of utility interferences, and prioritize contractor’s requests for track outages and force account support.

ESA-67-Sep10

2.1.3

Construction:

Queens

Contract CQ031: The PMOC is concerned about the costs of the additional CQ031 work required to mitigate the potential delays caused by late completion of key work by the CH053 contractor at three critical construction interfaces.

Status Update: As of December 2011, mitigation plans involving work re-sequencing and workaround plans continue to be developed and adjusted to meet the particular site and CQ031/CH053 coordination requirements. One critical interface, identified in Q3-2010 remains: tunneling for Track B/C beneath the existing/operating G.O.2 Substation.

PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC recommends that ESA-CM closely monitor the schedule performance of both the CQ031 and CH053 contractors to minimize the additional costs.

2

ESA-68-Oct10

5.1.3

Project Funding

Local Project Funding: MTACC has identified a potential funding constraint imposed by the 2-year incremental funding authorization process under the current MTA Capital Program. However, ESA is currently moving forward based on the assumption of full funding.

Status Update. As of December 31, 2011 there was no additional information on the status for additional local funding for the next two years increment of the MTA Capital Program.

1


Number with Date

Initiated


PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC continues to recommend that MTA and MTACC upper level management work to ensure the availability of local funding needed to be in-place at the scheduled contract awards to avoid project schedule impact.

ESA-70-Nov10

1.2.4

Project Budget and Cost

5.1.1

Project Cost Management and Control

The ESA PMT has not indicated if it intends to recover the lag in progress to date, and describe how it intends to do it. Section 5.0 of the Draft Cost Management Plan (CMP) stipulates that the Grantee will report on measures to be taken when the progress lags its plan.Status Update: As of November 30, 2011, the PMT reported that the overall project completion was 48.0% which lags the planned progress of 63.2% for this period. The ESA-MTACC agreed to report the status of the recovery schedules from its contractors and include a recovery write-up status with the Monthly Schedule update, but has not yet done it.PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC continues to recommend that ESA follow the processes detailed in the SMP and devise a strategy to recover lags in progress to the extent possible. The PMOC will keep this item open pending the recovery write-up by ESA-PMT in future Monthly Schedule update.

2

ESA-72-Nov10

2.1.2

Procurement

The FTA/PMOC requested a schedule impact analysis for shifting the advertisement dates for Contracts CM012, CM014, and Systems Package 1.Status Update: The ESA PMT never provided this analysis and now cite the fact that since the project is being re-baselined, the impact of the delays in procuring these contracts will be reflected in the new baseline.PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC recommends that the delays in the procurement of these contracts be accurately reflected in the new project baseline.

2


Number with Date

Initiated


ESA-76-Feb11

4.5

Schedule Contingency

The schedule contingency in the IPS #21 update (data date February 1, 2011) is 30 days, not the 102 days as reported by the PMT. The PMOC observed that, by removing the 104 days of remaining schedule contingency in the IPS, the RSD will be August 31, 2016, which would leave ESA with only 30 days of schedule contingency. (note: the PMOC discovered that the ESA PMT has calculated contingency based upon an assumption that the commissioning and start-up activities that occur between the end of integrated testing and the RSD are the responsibility of LIRR and therefore are not incorporated into contingency calculation). The PMOC believes that this is a flawed assumption, since RSD is based on all of the activities that must be completed before the system opens.

In addition, the PMOC found inconsistent dates between the updated IPS and the Quarterly Report ending in December 2010, which made it extremely difficult for the PMOC to conduct the schedule analysis.

Status Update: ESA has postponed the release of its new forecast for the RSD from 4Q2011 to the end of January 2012. There will be a new contingency drawdown of which the PMOC does not have the details as of yet.PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC recommends that the new baseline incorporate the schedule contingency requirement as detailed in the ELPEP agreement. In addition, the PMOC recommends that the ESA PMT redefine the ELPEP’s hold points in their new schedule.

1

ESA-77-

Mar11

2.1.3

Construction

Contracts CH053/54A: In early March 2011, Amtrak received an arbitration board ruling that Electric Traction construction work for the ESA project accrues to Amtrak Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE). The MTA, however, had executed a Labor Clearance agreement with Amtrak in 2007 which allows the MTACC to engage third parties to perform such work. These two approaches are obviously in conflict with each other.

Status Update: Since the announcement, project level MTACC managers have

1


Number with Date

Initiated


been working with their Amtrak counterparts to develop a solution to this issue. Through December 2011, progress on the resolution of this issue continued to be extremely slow. It appears to the PMOC that a formal solution will require months of development, which may put the project further behind schedule. Significant schedule impacts have already been realized on the CH053 contract.

PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC continues to recommend that, while the MTACC and Amtrak field managers continue to develop a process that will allow construction to continue, the MTACC ESA Project Executive engage Amtrak’s Chief Engineer to attempt to develop a formal permanent solution.

ESA-78-Mar11

4.3Project Schedule

Analysis

The PMOC analyzed the February 1, 2011 IPS to determine the validity of the RSD. The PMOC concluded that the current RSD of September 30, 2016 may not be achievable.

Status Update: The PMT did not release its new RSD as it planned for 4Q12. The new date is the end of January 2012.

PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC will evaluate the new baseline once it is issued.

1

ESA-79-Apr11

4.5Schedule

Contingency Analysis

The PMOC is extremely concerned about the amount of schedule contingency usage on the project to date. The ELPEP states that “East Side Access shall maintain a minimum level of schedule contingency of 240 days through Q2 2016, at which time the schedule contingency minimums will be updated as mutually agreed.”Status Update: IPS update #31 has not established a new RSD and, consequently, the amount contingency. The ESA PMT stated that it is in the process of creating a new baseline which was to be completed by the end of 2011, but it has not been released yet. The new forecast for finalizing the new baseline is the end of January 2012.PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC recommends that ESA use schedule forecasting as required in the SMP in order to obtain a more accurate schedule status of where realistically the project completion may be.

2


Number with Date

Initiated


ESA-80-Jun11

1.2.5Project Risk

Monitoring and Mitigation

The PMOC is becoming increasingly concerned that continued “schedule compression” will force “contract stacking” in the many constricted work areas in Queens and Manhattan which will create new coordination risks for MTACC-ESA. These new risks will likely result in adverse cost and schedule impacts. In addition, there is potential to create quality risks due to fragmentation of discrete work elements, like track work, among multiple contracts.Status Update: ESA-PMT has now commenced coordination efforts between CM009/019 (conveyor), CQ039 and CQ032 (Plaza Substation B10) at the location of the Early Access Chamber. Through December 2011, ESA-PMT/CMs continued to coordinate new work area and access conflicts between Contracts CH053 and CQ031.PMOC Recommendation: The ESA-PMT should continue to work with the CMs, GEC and Amtrak/LIRR, to fully evaluate the increasing exposure to new critical risks.

2

ESA-81-Jun11

1.2.2Quality

Staffing: The ESA Quality Manager has been authorized to hire two more Quality Engineers. One Quality Engineer who was on Maternity leave has returned to work and another Quality Engineer has retired leaving only three staff members. Since one of the two new hires will replace the Engineer who retired, the net gain to the staff will only be one.

Status Update: A new Quality Engineer started work in early December 2011. He will be assigned to the CM009/019 and CM014A contracts. Interviews for the remaining position will be conducted in January 2012.

PMOC Recommendation: With current activities increasing and new construction contracts to be awarded soon, the PMOC is concerned that the continued staff shortage may impair proper functioning of the project quality processes and therefore continues to recommend that the ESA management add additional Quality staff.(Update: December 2011)The PMOC recommends that ESA consider hiring at least one additional staff member to cover the coming increase in project activity.

1


Number with Date

Initiated


ESA-82-Jun11

1.2.2Quality

CH053/054A: The contractor stated that they are using drawings that are NOT sealed and, in some instances, there are different versions of the same drawing available.

Status Update: It was reported by the GEC Quality Manager that the different versions were marked “INFO” and were sent to the ESA Construction Manager for internal use and should not have been released to the contractor. All concerned parties agree that only sealed drawings are to be used for construction and that only one version of a drawing is to be issued and sealed.

PMOC Recommendation: The PMOC recommends that a memo be issued to all ESA Construction Managers stating that only “sealed” drawings are to be released to contractors.

1

ESA-83-Aug11

5.2Unallocated

Project Contingency

Unallocated Contingency remains $0, which is in conformance with the CMP but negates the agreement stated in Section 4a of the ELPEP which requires to have a reserved contingency minimum of $260 million through the first Hold Point (90% Bid and 60% constructed, forecasted for 4Q11).

Status Update: None

PMOC Recommendation: MTACC needs to rectify the Unallocated Contingency amount and correct Section 6.1 of the CMP to conform to the ELPEP stipulation.

1


8.0 GRANTEE ACTIONS FROM QUARTERLY AND MONTHLY MEETINGS

Priority in Criticality column

1 – Critical

2 – Near Critical

Number with Date

Initiated

Section Grantee Actions CriticalityProjected Resolution

Date

ESA-A09-Jun07

3.2

PMP Sub-Plans

LIRR has provided a June 2009 Rail Fleet Management Plan; however, it will require further update following the resolution of the number of vehicles to be provided for opening day and the procurement method.

Status Update: LIRR announced at its December 2010 FTA Quarterly review meeting that a revised RFMP will be issued shortly. There is no new information as of December 2011.

2 5/31/11

ESA-A26-Feb09

2.4

Vehicles

MTACC/LIRR needs to resolve the vehicle procurement method (Federal/Non Federal) for the ESA project. LIRR prefers non-federal procurement.

Status Update: Still an open item for almost two years. The PMOC was informed by the FTA Region 2 Office in early 2011 that the MTA has to put back the original funding allocated for the purchase of rail vehicles and abide by the federal procurement rules and regulations to purchase the vehicles.

2 5/31/10


Number with Date

Initiated

Section Grantee Actions CriticalityProjected Resolution

Date

ESA-A34-Jan10

3.3

Project Procedures

The MTACC was not able to meet its commitment date of April 12, 2010 to revise its procedures to a total of 75. It was also not able to complete and implement all these procedures by the end of 2010 [from 12-Jan-2010 FTA Quarterly Review Meeting].

Status Update: The MTACC did not finalize any additional revised procedures during December 2011. The total remains at 75. The MTACC has indicated to the PMOC, however, that it has an additional 4 procedures under revision. The PMOC forecasts that the earliest these remaining procedures will be implemented will be January 31, 2012.

2 9/30/10

ESA-A40-Jan11

5.4

Cost and Contingency

Variance Analysis

The PMOC recommends that the ESA-PMT document the relationship between the Budget Adjustment process and the Project Working Estimate (PWE).

Status Update: The ESA-PMT had committed to providing a procedure by the 3Q11 but, as of the end of 2011, this has not occurred.

1 11/30/11

ESA-A43-Jun11

2.1.1

Engineering and Design

At the June 2011 Quarterly Program Review meeting, the FTA requested that MTACC come up with a plan for addressing the multiple issues that are delaying the Harold Interlocking work before the next quarterly meeting.

Status Update: MTACC has not come up with a plan to address the multiple issues that are delaying Harold as of December 2011.

1 8/30/11


APPENDIX A -- LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFI Allowance for Indeterminates

ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

BA Budget Adjustment

CCC Configuration Control Committee

CCM Consultant Construction Manager

CM ESA Construction Manager assigned to each contract

CMP Cost Management Plan

CSSR Contact Status Summary Report

CIL Central Instrument Location

CPRB Capital Program Review Board

CPP Contract Packaging Plan

CWB Current Working Budget

DCB Detailed Cost Breakdown

ELPEP Enterprise Level Project Execution Plan

EPC Engineering-Procurement-Construction

ERT East River Tunnel

ESA East Side Access

FA Force Account

FAMP Force Account Management Plan

FFGA Full Funding Grant Agreement

FTA Federal Transit Administration

GCT Grand Central Terminal

GEC General Engineering Consultant

IEC Independent Engineering Consultant (to MTA)

IPS Integrated Project Schedule

LIRR Long Island Rail Road

MNR Metro-North Railroad

MTA Metropolitan Transportation Authority

MTACC Metropolitan Transportation Authority – Capital Construction

N/A Not Applicable

NTP Notice-to-Proceed

December 2011 Monthly Report A-1 MTACC-ESA

NYAR New York and Atlantic Railroad

NYCT New York City Transit

NYSPTSB New York State Public Transportation Safety Board

OCO Office of Construction Oversight (MTA)

PE Preliminary Engineering

PEP Project Execution Plan

PMOC Project Management Oversight Contractor (Urban Engineers)

PMP Project Management Plan

PMT Project Management Team

PQM Project Quality Manual

QA Quality Assurance

RAMP Real Estate Acquisition Management Plan

ROD Revenue Operations Date

ROW Right of Way

RSD Revenue Service Date

SAS Second Avenue Subway

SCC Standard Cost Category

SMP Schedule Management Plan

SSMP Safety and Security Management Plan

SSOA State Safety Oversight Agency

SSPP System Safety Program Plan

TBD To Be Determined

TBM Tunnel Boring Machine

TCC Technical Capacity and Capability

VE Value Engineering

WBS Work Breakdown Structure

December 2011 Monthly Report A-2 MTACC-ESA

APPENDIX B-- PROJECT OVERVIEW AND MAP

Project Overview and Map – East Side Access

Scope

Description: This project is a new commuter rail extension of the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) service from Sunnyside, Queens to Grand Central Terminal (GCT), Manhattan, utilizing the existing 63rd St. tunnel under the East River and new tunnels in Manhattan and Sunnyside yard. Ridership forecast is 162,000 daily riders (27,300 new riders).

Guideway: This two-track project is 3.5 route miles long, it is below grade in tunnels, and does not include any shared use track. In Harold interlocking, it shares ROW with Amtrak and the freight line.

Stations: This project will add a new 8 track major terminal to be constructed below the existing GCT. The boarding platforms and mezzanines of the new station will be located approximately 90 feet below the existing GCT lower level. A new passenger concourse will be built on the lower level of the terminal.

Support Facilities: New facilities will include: the LIRR lower level at GCT, new passenger entrances to the existing GCT, the East Yard at GCT, the Arch Street Shop and Yard, a daytime storage and running repair/maintenance shop facility in Queens, and ventilation facilities in Manhattan and Queens.

December 2011 Monthly Report B-1 MTACC-ESA

Vehicles: The scope and budget for the ESA project include the procurement of 160 new electric rail cars to support the initial service.

Ridership Forecast: MTA projects that, by 2020, the ESA project will handle approximately 162,000 daily riders to and from GCT. This Ridership projection is based on a 2005 study performed by DMJM/Harris (AECOM).

Schedule

9/98 Approval Entry to PE Estimated Rev Ops at Entry to PE

02/02 Approval Entry to FD Estimated Rev Ops at Entry to FD

12/06 FFGA Signed 12/13 Estimated Rev Ops at FFGA

09/16 Revenue Service Date at date of this report (MTA schedule)

42.1 Percent Complete Construction as of November 30, 2011

48.0 Over-all Project Percent Complete (based on RSD of September 2016) as of November 30, 2011

Cost ($)

4,300 million Total Project Cost ($YOE) at Approval Entry to PE

4,350 million Total Project Cost ($YOE) at Approval Entry to FD

7,386 million Total Project Cost ($YOE) at FFGA signed

8,364 million Total Project Cost ($YOE) at Revenue Operations

8,364 million Total Project Cost ($YOE) at date of this report including $ 1,036.104

in Finance Charges

3,316 million Amount of Expenditures as of November 30, 2011 from Total Project Budget of $7,791 million

48.0% Percent Complete based on Expenditures as of November 30, 2011 report

447.5 million Total Project Contingency remaining (allocated and $0 unallocated contingency)

December 2011 Monthly Report B-2 MTACC-ESA

APPENDIX C – LESSONS LEARNED

There were no Lessons Learned to report for 4th Quarter for 2011

# Date Phase Category Subject Lessons Learned

1 Nov-09 Construction Management Vacant Queens Area Manager Position

The PMOC recommended that the Grantee fill the position of Queens Area Manager although the Grantee resisted. The Grantee eventually acknowledged the importance of this position and has indicated that they will fill it on a permanent basis.

December 2011 Monthly Report C-1 MTACC-ESA

APPENDIX D – PMOC STATUS REPORT

(This is a separate attachment covering the East Side Access project)

December 2011 Monthly Report D-1 MTACC-ESA

APPENDIX E – SAFETY AND SECURITY CHECKLIST

Project Overview

Project mode (Rail, Bus, BRT, Multimode) Rail

Project phase (Preliminary Engineering, Design, Construction, or Start-up)

Construction

Project Delivery Method (Design/Build, Design/Build/Operate/Maintain, CMGC, etc.)

Primarily Design Bid Build

Project Plans VersionReview by

FTAStatus

Safety and Security Management Plan 12/2010 Rev. 2

2011 Grantee is incorporating PMOC recommended changes

Safety and Security Certification Plan 11/2008 Rev. 1 submitted

System Safety Program Plan 11/2008 Rev. 1 submitted

System Security Plan or Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP)

11/2010 submitted

Construction Safety and Security Plan3/2007

Rev. 1submitted

Safety and Security Authority Y/N Notes/Status

Is the grantee subject to 49 CFR Part 659 state safety oversight requirements?

Y

Has the state designated an oversight agency as per Part 659.9?

YThe New York State Public Transportation Safety Board (NYSPTSB) is the SSOA.

Has the oversight agency reviewed and approved the grantee’s SSPP as per Part 659.17?

In Development Further discussion between the Grantee, the PMOC, and the NYSPTSB will take place in January of 2012 to facilitate adequate understanding and fulfillment of requirements by Grantee.

Has the oversight agency reviewed and approved the grantee’s Security Plan or SEPP as per Part 659.21?

Y In October 2006

Did the oversight agency participate in the last Quarterly Program Review Meeting?

N

Has the grantee submitted its safety certification plan to the oversight agency?

N In development

December 2011 Monthly Report E-1 MTACC-ESA

Project Overview

Has the grantee implemented security directives issues by the Department Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration?

N

The MTA unified threat vulnerability methodology was applied to the ESA design. A vulnerability log was developed for ESA based on the feedback from the applied methodology. Controls within the design have been implemented to reduce the relative risk of those vulnerabilities identified. Analysis indicated that the controls within design were adequate for the vulnerabilities identified.

SSMP Monitoring Y/N Notes/Status

Is the SSMP project-specific, clearly demonstrating the scope of safety and security activities for this project?

In Development

Pending incorporation of the PMOC’s comments on the most recent SSMP revision, the SSMP will be in compliance.

Grantee reviews the SSMP and related project plans to determine if updates are necessary?

YThe Grantee has updated the SSMP as of 12/2010.

Does the grantee implement a process through which the Designated Function (DF) for Safety and DF for Security are integrated into the overall project management team? Please specify.

Y

Eric Osnes serves in the capacity of Safety and Security Director for the MTACC. Osnes meets regularly with the project management team. Additionally, the CCM and the Grantee’s safety and security personnel are integrated into the management team.

Does the grantee maintain a regularly scheduled report on the status of safety and security activities?

Y

Safety and Security are reported on during the monthly safety meeting and are incorporated into Grantee’s monthly project reports.

Has the grantee established staffing requirements, procedures and authority for safety and security activities throughout all project phases?

Y Contained within the Grantee’s safety procedure documents.

Does the grantee update the safety and security responsibility matrix/organizational chart as necessary?

In Development

Has the grantee allocated sufficient resources to Y MTA, GEC, CCM, and


Project Overview

oversee or carry out safety and security activities?contractors provide personnel and resources to carry out safety and security activities.

Has the grantee developed hazard and vulnerability analysis techniques, including specific types of analysis to be performed during different project phases?

YThe SSMP Committee process is comprehensive and provides for this.

Does the grantee implement regularly scheduled meetings to track to resolution any identified hazards and/or vulnerabilities?

YSSMP committee meetings as well as project wide monthly safety meetings take place.

Does the grantee monitor the progress of safety and security activities throughout all project phases? Please describe briefly.

Y

Accomplished through daily audits by contractor and CCM and through the comprehensive SSMP Committee process.

Does the grantee ensure the conduct of preliminary hazard and vulnerability analyses? Please specify analyses conducted.

Y

The SSMP Committee process provides for TVRA, safety, and security analysis as well as input from subject matter experts on the SSMP Committee.

Has the grantee ensured the development of safety design criteria?

YThe SSMP Committee has established the safety design criteria.

Has the grantee ensured the development of security design criteria?

Y Accomplished through the SSMP Committee process.

Has the grantee ensured conformance with safety and security requirements in design?

Y Achieved through the SSMP Committee process.

Has the grantee verified conformance with safety and security requirements in equipment and materials procurement?

N Project is not at this stage

Has the grantee verified construction specification conformance?

N Project is not at this stage

Has the grantee identified safety and security critical tests to be performed prior to passenger operations?

In Development

Has the grantee verified conformance with safety and security requirements during testing, inspection and start-up phases?

In Development

Does the grantee evaluated change orders, design waivers, or test variances for potential hazards and /or vulnerabilities?

In Development

Has the grantee ensured the performance of safety and security analyses for proposed workarounds?

In Development

Has the grantee demonstrated through meetings or Y The grantee has an


Project Overview

other methods, the integration of safety and security in the following: Activation Plan and Procedures Integrated Test Plan and Procedures Operations and Maintenance Plan Emergency Operations Plan

Operational Readiness Group which is addressing these aspects of the project.

An Emergency Preparedness Plan was promulgated by the Grantee in 11/2010.

Has the grantee issued final safety and security certification?

N Project is not at this stage.

Has the grantee issued the final safety and security verification report?

N Project is not at this stage.

Construction Safety

Does the grantee have a documented/implemented Contractor Safety Program with which it expects contractors to comply?

Y

The grantee reviews each contractor’s CHSP for compliance with ESA construction safety requirements and adheres to its implementation.

Does the grantee’s contractor(s) have a documented companywide safety and security program plan?

Y As above.

Does the grantee’s contractor(s) have a site-specific safety and security program plan?

Y As above.

Provide the grantee’s OSHA statistics compared to the national average for the same type of work?

Y

As of Dec. 31, 2011, the overall ESA lost time accident ratio was 2.85 per 200,000 MH vs. US BLS rate of 2.20

If the comparison is not favorable, what actions are being taken by the grantee to improve its safety record?

In Development Grantee is reviewing safety on each of its construction contracts

Does the grantee conduct site audits of the contractor’s performance versus required safety/security procedures?

Y

MTA OCIP, MTA Insurance Broker loss control personnel, CCM safety engineers, and contractor(s) safety engineers conduct these required audits.

Federal Railroad Administration Y/N Notes/Status

If shared track: has grantee submitted its waiver request application to FRA? (Please identify specific regulations for which waivers are being requested)

NThe ESA Project does not have shared track.

If shared corridor: has grantee specified specific measures to address shared corridor safety concerns?

NThe ESA Project does not include shared corridor.

Is the Collision Hazard Analysis underway?


Project Overview

Other FRA required Hazard Analysis – Fencing, etc.?

N/A

Does the project have Quiet Zones? N

Does FRA attend the Quarterly Review Meetings? N


APPENDIX F – ON-SITE PICTURES

(to be sent in separate file)

December 2011 Monthly Report F-1 MTACC-ESA

APPENDIX G

PMOC Contract CM009/CM019 Milestone Analysis1

December 2011 Monthly Report Update

Milestone

Description

ESA Mod

024/030 Contract Schedule

PMOC "Optimistic" Projection

PMOC "Most

Likely" Projection

Comments

1Turnover of Escalators 3

& 44/1/11 3/12/12

5/12/12

2

Turnover of Escalator 2, Shafts 2 and

3

9/1/105/21/12 7/21/1

2Escalator #2 controls schedule.

4ATurnover of

Shaft 1240 CD from

AR 3

11/22/12

2/22/13

Based on actual mechanical excavation of Shaft #1 and projected dates CM004 will turn over shaft to CM009/019.

5A

Turnover south 50th

St. (caverns), Shafts 4 & 5

3/1/12 1/12/133/12/1

3

Based on concrete of cavern archways and excavation of benches II and III.

6ASubstantial Completion

8/16/132 5/12/13

7/12/13

9 (new)Turnover of Escalator 1

12/31/11

11/18/12

1/18/13

AR 3

Hand over of Shaft 1 from CM004 to

CM019

9/1/11 3/22/125/22/1

3

1 The Complete CM009/CM019 Milestone Analysis is on file in PMOC’s office for review.

December 2011 Monthly Report G-1 MTACC-ESA

2 MTACC forecast based on second universal settlement presently being negotiated.

December 2011 Monthly Report G-2 MTACC-ESA

Documents

East Side Access Monthly report for Dec11