Mind Association

Ecological Ethics and Politics. by H. J. McCloskeyReview by: Onora O'NeillMind, New Series, Vol. 93, No. 372 (Oct., 1984), pp. 627-630Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254279 .

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BOOK REVIEWS 627

does not allow one to show sensitivity for this dilemma, because it ties irrationality too closely to self-harm. Admittedly they do not say that all irrational actions should be prevented through paternalistic intervention, for they claim paternalism is justified if and only if it would be irrational for the subject of the intervention to choose the evil the intervention prevents, in preference to the evil of the paternalistic behaviour itself. In other words, paternalism is justified if and only if it prevents evils which are-sufficiently awful, easily to outweigh the evil inherent in the intervention. But this merely raises the dilemma again.

Although I have strong reservations about Culver and Gert's arguments, their book is thought-provoking, and certainly demonstrates the need for careful philosophical analysis in medicine.

UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD RICHARD LINDLEY

Ecological Ethics and Politics. By H. J. MCCLOSKEY

Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, I983. Pp. viii + I67. US $27.50.

Writing on applied ethics always raises demarcation problems. Ecological questions in particular are interwoven with famine and population problems, with questions of economic justice and animal rights, of technology and political order. Professor McCloskey brings an ecological awareness to this web of questions and discusses an impressive range of problems, possibilities and of connections between them. His approach is robust, sober and often pointed. He tackles claims about the need for an 'ecological ethic', but holds that 'the findings of ecology do not necessitate a basic revolution in ethics but simply more informed, more accurate thinking out of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p. 29).

McCloskey begins by pointing out questionable assumptions in eco- logical debates. Some ecological writers paint doomsday scenarios by depicting projections of present trends as predictions; some have buried social and technological assumptions in supposedly scientific discussion. Terms such as 'resource', 'optimal population' and indeed 'pollution' (one might add 'carrying capacity') are not neutrally scientific. Political interests

are served by doomsday scenarios which endorse no intervention on behalf of the poor by depicting them as living beyond help in the grip of Malthusian catastrophes.

But these are only preliminary skirmishes. The longer second and third parts of the book set out ethical principles for approaching ecological problems and suggest political moves for enacting them. The separation of ethics and politics both in the title and in the argument is significant. Ethical positions are seen as prior to political structures which can be judged in their terms. But if ecological problems depend in part on social structures it is difficult tb hold political questions in abeyance while discussing the ecological implications of ethical principles. McCloskey makes this separation work only because his ethical theory incorporates a liberal picture of the derivative character of political institutions. Even so

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628 BOOK REVIEWS

there are tensions where the domain of problems discussed depends on political and other social arrangements, for example over the extent to which private property rights are compatible with acting ethically toward the environment. (Compare the comments on the restricted and derivative character of property rights with the assertions that those whose property is taken for ecological reasons should be compensated.)

McCloskey's ethical theory includes a plurality of primafacie-rights. The right to respect, comprising rights to life, health, security, autonomy and integrity is basic; rights to liberty, property and privacy are derivative. This is avowedly a human-centered ethic. It is extended by principles of consideration of the welfare of those without rights (animals, future persons) and for intrinsic values such as beauty. This starting point has plenty of ecological implications; but without any ordering of prima facie principles it leads in too many directions. McCloskey handles this difficulty by emphasizing the impossibility of de-contextualised judgments. Ethically adequate thinking about ecological problems has to balance all these principles. This claim may not satisfy those who suspect that this is an area where not all of these principles can be respected.

McCloskey's main philosophical argument is not a vindication of his intuitionism, but directed against those who advocate a specifically 'ecological ethic', so assign no special value to human life or human rights. He labours with the difficulty that 'ecological ethics' have not been clearly formulated. His strongest weapon is therefore to point out the implausible conclusions to which such views lead. For example, if all species or all organisms are thought to have equal value then the destruction even of harmful or lethal bacteria is wrong. Yet many such interventions in the ecosystem have been improvements. 'Ecological ethics'-as opposed to ethics with ecological implications-try to take a non-speciesist view, so cannot countenance the destruction of some organisms or species for human benefit. But this seems unfair to the advocates of ecological ethics. They may well be willing to concede that it is permissible to destroy organisms which harm other organisms-a form of self-defence-while still maintaining that human organisms have no privilege, no rights to destroy where they are not threatened. Some human interventions in the order of nature could be condoned within an ecological ethic.

The main problem, however, arises where human survival isn't threatened. Can there ever be justification for damaging the habitat, wilderness or otherwise, on which the lives of other species depend? McCloskey makes an impressive case for the claim that unrestricted respect for non-human life must fail to respect humans. In a world where vast numbers live in destitution a general refusal to develop wilderness areas and a general refusal to override some claims of non-humans does not take the positive aspects of respect for other humans seriously. Since he does not understand a right to respect as a merely negative right, McCloskey thinks blanket refusal to exploit the natural world gravely wrong. But do the advocates of ecological ethics have to accept this argument? It presupposes the very preference for human life and rights which they challenge. The only points that may give them pause are certain implausible implications of a non-speciesist ethic, to which McCloskey points. Does non-speciesism

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BOOK REVIEWS 629

demand respect for tapeworms and their habitat? If the advocates of an ecological ethic shrink from such implications they favour strong, but not unrestricted, ecological policies. McCloskey will then claim that these can be grounded in a human-centered ethic. Human rights and a broader concern for welfare provide excellent reasons for actions and policies which respect natural environments and species, avoid pollution and oppose cruel methods of farming and wasteful ways of life. Even if ecological ethics hasn't been shown untenable, it has at least been made clear that many of its favoured conclusions can be reached by other and perhaps more widely accepted routes. Despite his criticisms of their theoretical position, advocates of ecological ethics should see McCloskey as an ally.

A similar outflanking argument is addressed to advocates of animal rights. Animals may well be assigned legal rights, and this can be a useful way of protecting them. But the question of their moral rights is less clear. McCloskey doubts animal rights because 'for possession of a moral right to be meaningful the possessor or his/her representative must be able to claim it, exercise it, or the like' (p. 66). But cannot animals meet this standard? Their representatives may claim the rights, and they can themselves exercise some rights. Only some human rights are the sort that animals cannot exercise. Despite the fashion for 'animal liberation', the rights usually claimed for animals do not include rights to autonomy, integrity and the like, which McCloskey includes under a basic human right to respect. It is not clear what he can say against those who advocate only limited moral rights for animals-except that the implications of his own commitment to human rights plus the welfare of some non-humans (animals, future generations) generates equivalent protection for animals. However, this move does at least confront advocates of restricted animal rights with the question of the advantage of thinking in those terms. The disanalogies between limited animal rights and human rights are numer- ous. For wild animals, who have no contact with possible respecters of rights, the whole content of the claim that they have rights is captured by the claim that their welfare ought to be taken into account by humans who might invade and destroy them or their habitat. Unless we become the moral policemen of the animal kingdom, adjudicating and protecting the 'rights' of all animals, and organize an animal health service for wild animals, we may gain nothing beyond rhetoric in claiming that not only animal welfare but animal rights should be taken into account. Such considerations may still leave the determined advocate of animal rights with various options. He may for example insist that rights, including animal rights, should be thought of as indefeasible rather than prima facie. Or he may regard rhetorical advantage as politically significant. But it seems that the burden of argument has been shifted to those who think that animals have rights.

McCloskey starts his argument with multiple commitments to human rights and to the welfare of all lives, so has no difficulty in reaching numerous conclusions about ethical approaches to ecological problems. Waste and pollution can be justified only for very strong reasons such as the relief of destitution, which respect for other humans requires; the call for a no-growth economy may be only a demand that the poor remain so, and

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630 BOOK REVIEWS

hence impermissible; resource-frugal policies which provide room for sharing and extending the availability of resources may be morally required. Population control is morally required, but the most effective way of achieving it are coercive hence unacceptable from a starting point which includes a commitment to individual rights. The goals of ecologi- cally responsible action are not obscure; but they are numerous and hard to achieve.

McCkoskey acknowledges that 'political action is basic to any real solutions to major ecologically based problems' (p. 107). He faults ecological writers for their readiness to trade human rights for what they mistakenly think would be less liberal but ecologically sounder regimes. Illiberal regimes have had a poor ecological track record, and there is no better hope of implementing stronger ecological policies than through democratic political activity. Ecological philosopher kings are a mirage. Yet democratic polities do not readily implement unpopular or expensive measures-until the need for them is evident. At that point legislation which penalizes waste and pollution yet respects the rights of all, including the destitute, may be adopted. Conservationists do not help their cause by exaggerating aspects of the crisis, but could make some genuine progress by public education and political activity.

While McCloskey acknowledges the unbridled power of state insti- tutions and of multi-national corporations, he does not suggest how democratic politics might curb these, beyond pointing to the need for a 'legitimately constituted world political authority' (p. 155), and claiming that the states of an ecologically responsible world would have to be more than minimal states, but that they can and must remain democratic states if they are to respect the rights and welfare considerations which he places at the heart of ethics. However, while the ecological irresponsibility of existing non-democratic states casts doubt on the totalitarian recommen- dations of doom-ridden ecological writing, the success of liberal demo- cratic states in handling ecological problems has also been patchy. In par- ticular, as McCloskey repeatedly acknowledges, they have not responded adequately to the plight of impoverished peoples. The political forum in which that can change may not be a world of sovereign but liberal states and multi-national corporations.

UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX ONORA O'NEILL

Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. By HOWARD ROBINSON.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I982. Pp. x+ 130. ?13.50.

This is a vigorous attack, rich in wiry original argument, on what Howard Robinson refers to as 'a certain form of soulless, false and destructive modernism' (p. 125). I especially liked his determination to get things stated clearly, and his insistence on the need for argument rather than servile submission to the zeitgeist. I also liked a lot of the arguments, though I found the maip ones unconvincing.

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