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EditorialsCompetition to Sell Medicines [Fri, 16 Oct 18:01]

The battle between chemists and online pharmacies must be decisively resolved. read more

When Silence Is Not an Option [Fri, 16 Oct 18:01]

The "award wapsi" reminds us of the place of literature in society. read more

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Competition to Sell MedicinesVol - L No. 42, October 17, 2015

For some time now, retailers and e-commerce start-ups have been fiercely battling it out in India, and the latesttojoin are the chemists and online pharmacies. On14 October, a little over eight lakh chemists across thecountryremained shut to pressurise the government to take action against the “illegal” online sale of medicines. It isno secret that the retail drugs market provides a mouth-watering prospect and continues to expand with presentestimates putting it at a yearly Rs 80,000 crore. The All India Organisation of Chemists and Druggists (AIOCD)which is spearheading the attempt by chemists to nip the nascent competition in the bud, claims that the centralgovernment is being lethargic in putting a stop to online sales. While the organisation is convinced that it is fightingon behalf of the public health, since online platforms are susceptible to misuse, there is a large dose of cynicism inpublic minds. The easy availability of many drugs in chemists’ outlets without prescriptions (including antibiotics)and the reluctanceof many chemists to hire qualified pharmacists or pay themadequately are among the issuesthat have come up again and again over the years.

E-pharmacies, the popular moniker of online sellers of drugs, are a new phenomenon in this country (their numberis currently believed to be just 12). However, with the increasing use of smartphones to access the internet and thegrowing popularity of online buying, this is a segment poised to expand. What is adding to the ambiguity andexchange of allegations is that the law neither provides for nor prohibits the sale of drugs online—the Drugs andCosmetics Act 1940 obviously did not envisage such a phenomenon. In August this year, the central governmentset up a subcommittee to draft norms for the sale of medicines online and is reportedly studying how this is donein other countries. The AIOCD has pointed out that India is simply unprepared for this form of sale of drugs andhas raised the alarm about illegal sale of prescription drugs, apart fromsteroids and other substances that areharmful, if not prescribed by medical professionals. It has also made the interesting observation that such onlinesale is feasible in the developed world because the regulatory mechanism and agencies function effectively there.Incidentally, the Maharashtra Food and Drug Administration had raided the office of the well-known e-commercesite Snapdeal for selling prescription drugs online and other alleged violations.

The Drugs and Cosmetics Act requires the retailer to check a licensed and registered doctor’s prescription in thepresence of a pharmacist (Section 18 (c)). Only over-the-counter (OTC) medicines can be sold without aprescription. The online start-ups point out that every prescription received over the internet from a potentialcustomer is checked by in-house pharmacists. The AIOCD members feel that while they have to implement anumber of regulatory provisions, their online competitors seem to be getting away easily. The other side, in turn,alleges that most of these requirements are hardly observed by the brick and mortar retailers and it is simplycompetition for market share that is driving the chemists’ agitation. As in the online sale of other items, the lowerprices and the “privacy” element coupled with home delivery are said to tilt customers in favour of purchases frome-pharmacies. There are the inevitable disadvantages which have led even the United States Food and DrugAdministration to warn customers of such pharmacies of the huge risks involved. It has said that while there aremany websites that operate “legally and offer convenience, privacy, and safeguards for purchasing medicines,” the“rogue websites” indulge in outright fraud such as not making delivery of purchased drugs, and delivering spuriousmedicines.

The Indian Medical Association has unequivocally come out against the online sale of drugs in its white paper onthe subject. It has listed in detail all the disadvantages and violations ofexisting laws in this regard. The governmentnow seems to be caught between the e-commerce start-ups and giants who are pressing it to come out withguidelines which will put them legally in the clear and the chemists who want a total ban on the online sale ofmedicines. Following the nationwide strike by the AIOCD, it has said that it has not taken any decision in thisregard and that “views of all stakeholders” will be taken into account. However, it will have to be less ambiguoussoon since the “digital revolution” in India is not going to end soon.

The point then is how to regularise and monitor online sale of medicines. If the track record of the regulatoryagencies is anything to go by, there is a lot that needs to be done. Ultimately, it is the health of the ordinary Indianand her access to affordable medicines that should be the basic criterion.

This article was downloaded by calibre from http://www.epw.in/editorials/competition-sell-medicines.html

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When Silence Is Not an OptionVol - L No. 42, October 17, 2015

Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley chooses to dismiss it as “a manufactured revolt” but only a partisan can missnoticing that the decision of more than 40 poets, writers and performers to return national awards as a form ofprotest is something that India has not seen since independence. When the distinguished English language writerNayantara Sahgalreturned her 1986 Sahitya Akademi Award, along with Hindi poets Uday Prakash and AshokVajpeyi, few expected that this would escalate into a virtual flood of “award wapsi” as some have called it. Itssignificance lies in the wider context ofthe place of writers in a democracy. Why should writers from Maharashtra,Gujarat, Karnataka, Goa, Punjab, West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Delhi and elsewhere feel moved atthis juncture to return awards given to them by the country’s premier literary institution, the Sahitya Akademi? Fromthe common thread running through their statements of protest, it is clear that they are disappointed that theSahitya Akademi has said next to nothing about the daylight assassination of Kannada writer and Akademi awardwinner M M Kalaburgiin Dharwad in August this year, nor has it noted the growing atmosphere of intolerance thatthis murder represents. AsK Satchidanandan, former secretary of the Akademi pointed out, “Annihilation shouldnever be allowed to replace argument that is the very essence of democracy.”

It is this shrinking space for argument, for dissent, for difference, happening not through direct government fiat butby the actions of groups directly linked to those in power that has alarmed the literary community. Instead ofheeding these voices, ministers of the Modi government and Sangh Parivar members have chosen the typicalstrategy of asking why these writers did not return their awards when the Emergency was declared, or when the1984 anti-Sikh riots took place. Through this false equivalence, they deliberately choose to ignore why writers aremaking this gesture now. As the poet Keki N Daruwalla pointed out, they are decrying the death of values thatliterature stands for like “freedom of expression against threat, upholding the rights of the marginalised, speakingup against superstitions and intolerance of any kind.”

Also, although the lynching of Mohammed Akhlaq in Dadri is not directly related to the concerns the writers haveraised, that brutal killing was probably the last straw, the trigger that has led to this flood of protests andresignations. What followed the murder has illustrated the fears expressed by the writers. Rather than reining inthe mobs, people like the Union Minister of Culture, Mahesh Sharma, and other luminaries of the Bharatiya JanataParty have set new standards for insensitivity and lack of decency.

One writer, Amitav Ghosh, has struck a different note by suggesting that rather than returning awards, the writersshould seek ways to strengthen an institution like the Sahitya Akademi that has played a significant role inencouraging literature in all the major Indian languages. The system of awards draws attention to writers who, inthe marketplace of publishing, would otherwise never be noticed. Yet, in the process of returning their awards,many of the writers have called for the Akademi to revert to the role originally envisaged for it when it wasinstituted. The Sahitya Akademi was established in 1952 and became operational by 1954 with the aim ofencouraging writing in Indian languages. Its inaugural council included names like Jawaharlal Nehru, SRadhakrishnan, Maulana Abul Kalam, K M Munshi,K M Panikkar, D V Gundappa, Humayun Kabir, Suniti KumarChatterji, Masti Venkatesha Iyengar, Mahadevi Varma, Nilmani Phookan and many others. Though government-funded, it isautonomous and its awards have always been highly regarded.

Even if so far the Akademi has not felt that issuing statements was part of its remit, writers from across thecountry are suggesting that it is about time it did. Shashi Deshpande, the Bengaluru-based novelist, emphasised inher letter of resignation from the general council of the Akademi, “If the Akademi, the premier literary organisationin the country, cannot stand up against such an act of violence against a writer, if the Akademi remains silent aboutthis attack on one of its own, what hope do we have of fighting the growing intolerance in our country?” Also,Deshpande’s observation that in the current climate in India, writers are not considered intellectual leaders anymore and their voices do not matter, touches on another aspect of the place of literature in our society. When themarket takes precedence over ideas, and when only marketable ideas count, the “thought leaders” become thosewho attract the largest number of eyeballs or sell the maximum number of books. On top of this when you have a

minister of culture suggesting that writers should stop writing, the future of literature and free expression in India istruly bleak. The protest by writers is an important moment; it might not alter electoral arithmetic but it will stand asa reminder that silence is not an option at times like this. It is one way to counter those who prefer to settlearguments with bullets and lynching.

This article was downloaded by calibre from http://www.epw.in/editorials/when-silence-not-option.html

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CommentaryPunjab at the Crossroads [Fri, 16 Oct 12:30]

Punjab has been going through a churn in its society and its economy for some time and now its bipolar politics is being stirred with the emergenceof the Aam Aadmi Party. Will these socio-economic transformations be strong enough to upset the hold of the Shiromani Akali Dal and BharatiyaJanata Party alliance in the state? read more

Neither Brake Nor Accelerator [Fri, 16 Oct 12:30]

What does India's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution imply for its approach to climate negotiations? And what implications does it have fordomestic development choices? This article examines India's INDC through each lens, to understand the implied logic with regard to India's complexclimate-development choices, and with regard to its strategic international choices. It finds that the INDC reflects, as yet, an inadequate considerationof the climate and development linkages that should…

Narrator of Subaltern War Cries [Fri, 16 Oct 12:30]

Nabarun Bhattacharya's prose of counter-insurgency would continue to provide the necessary grammar of resistance to an otherwise somnolent andcomplaisant literary establishment in Bengal. read more

Commodification of 'Giving Back' in a Neo-liberal World [Fri, 16 Oct 12:29]

New ways of organising gifting of time and/or money are growing at unprecedented rates. They legitimise the capitalist system by providing the"human face" of the market. This article examines the trend of "philanthropic consultants" and "volunteer tourism" and how these practices fit into thecapitalist system as a whole. read more

A Flawed Climate Road Map [Fri, 16 Oct 12:29]

India submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution on 1 October. The policy document on climate change has received laurels fromdiverse quarters. INDC justifies the projected rise in India's emissions by emphasising the country's development imperatives. This obscures the factthat the well-off will stamp their ecological footprint and the country will justify the rise in its emissions by hiding behind the poor. read more

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Punjab at the CrossroadsVol - L No. 42, October 17, 2015 | Paramjit S Judge

The landmark victory of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)–Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) alliance in 2012 was a signalof the beginning of a new era in Punjab politics, for development shorn of religious issues won the day for thealready ruling coalition. In the absence of an alternate politics, farce and tragedies began to occupy public spacesin Punjab. On 11 October 2012, Rahul Gandhi in a speech at a National Students’ Union of India (NSUI) rally inChandigarh said that seven out of 10 (70%) youth were drug addicts. Rahul Gandhi’s statement of the fact wasbased on a study conducted by sociologist R S Sandhu (2009) of the Guru Nanak Dev University in Amritsar. Infact, it was a gross misrepresentation of the findings of the study. Conducted in Amritsar, Jalandhar, Patiala andBathinda Districts with equal size of urban and rural samples, 600 drug addicts were surveyed. It was found that73.50% of the total addicts belonged to the age group of “up to 35 years.” It was highest in the age group 18–26years, that is, 40.50% (Sandhu 2009: 34). Nowhere did the study say that 70% of Punjab’s youth was addicted todrugs.

Rahul Gandhi’s speech created countrywide curiosity and controversy in political circles. Whereas the Congressidentified this new issue for electoral success by pointing fingers towards certain SAD leaders as narcoticsmugglers, the young Punjabi aspirant for jobs faced stereotyped questions about drug addiction among Punjab’syouth; it turned out to be a serious threat to his job opportunities.

History of Drugs and Alcohol

The Congress accelerated its campaign not against drug addiction but against Akali leaders, particularly those itclaimed to be narcotic smugglers. Neither the study, despite its strong sociological inputs regarding drug addiction,nor the general consciousness was seriously engaged to know the kinds of drugs consumed by Punjabis. It wasclearly stated in the study that alcohol, poppy husk (bhuki), opium and smack were the main drugs about which thedata were collected and interestingly, only 20.17% were addicted to synthetic drugs and smack (Sandhu 2009:74).

Fortunately, eyewitness accounts about drug use in 19th century Punjab are available. One such account is of alieutenant colonel Steinbach, who was an officer in the army of Ranjit Singh. Published in 1846, his book containedan observation on drug use among the Punjabis thus:

The Sikhs are forbid [sic] the use of tobacco, but allowed to indulge in spirituous liquors, which they almostdrink to the excess, and it is rare to see a Sikh soldier after sunset quite sober. Their drink is an ardent spiritmade in the Punjaub, but they have no objections to either the wine or spirits of Europe when they can obtainthem.The use of opium to intoxicate is very common with the Sikhs, as with most of the military tribes in India. Theyalso take B’hang, another inebriating drug (pp 160–61).

Alcohol, opium and bhang (cannabis) have been traditionally consumed for centuries in India, of which bhang wasstrongly connected with the Saivite tradition as a sacred offering (prasad) consumed in various ways. Among theSikhs, Nihangs use bhang as drink and they call it sukha. Opium use seems to be linked with soldiers; however,alcohol seems to be the drink for common use and was not confined to a particular group. There was a caste ofKalals whose occupation was distillation of liquor and the existence of such castes was not uncommon in otherparts of India. What may seem distinctive about alcohol consumption in Punjab was its widespread use among thepeople—something common with the tribal population of India.

However, the rise in drug addiction is an empirical reality and its effects are visible in the border areas of Punjab.The general perception is that narcotic traffic is taking place along the international border with Pakistan.Interestingly, certain villages have become notorious for drug smuggling. Village Havelian in Tarn Taran District has

the distinction of having the most of its men serving prison terms for drug smuggling. However, the inflated figuresin the consumption of drugs in Punjab were the work of political parties. In spite of the fact that drugs could notbecome the main issue in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, it has continued to haunt all political parties, for theoutcome of the elections was unprecedented. A new party, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) appeared on the sceneusing social movement strategies and playing the politics of corruption.

The Third Factor

AAP came into existence in 2012 following the anti-corruption movement led by Anna Hazare, and Arvind Kejriwal’ssuccessful emergence on the political scene. It faced all those problems and challenges while in power which arebuilt into a social movement oriented activism. It decided to participate in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014 byarguing that participation in elections would help in establishing the party and build party cadres all over thecountry. It failed in all the states, including Delhi, except Punjab where it got 25.5% of the votes and won four seats(Kumar and Sekhon 2014). Punjab’s two major parties—SAD and the Congress—experienced a decline in theirvote share. In 2009, Congress had won eight seats and its loss was a clear-cut gain for the new party.

Despite the fact that the SAD–BJP alliance had gained one seat (BJP won two with a gain of one seat) incomparison to the 2009 elections, the Akali leadership sprang into action immediately after the elections. SADinterpreted the results in terms of defeat and concluded that the issue of drug addiction among youth, as raised bythe Congress, was the main reason for its poor performance. Interestingly, it did not take into cognisance theunprecedented performance of the new party, which won elections on the issue of corruption in government.Immediately after the election results the Punjab government began its crackdown on drug addicts, peddlers andtraffickers. It seemed that the political parties had abandoned the practice of analysing the socio-economicconditions before taking action.

One of the contributing factors to the victory of AAP was the support of the Punjabi diaspora. The Punjabi diasporahas always taken keen interest in Punjab’s political developments. The importance of the non-resident Indians(NRIs) in Punjab’s politics is underlined by the fact that the Minister of Higher Education, Surjit Singh Rakhra, is anNRI, besides many other contestants in the assembly elections being so. The Punjabi diaspora, with their live linkswith the state, is an important stakeholder in Punjab’s politics and economy. If we use Orozco’s model of diasporacontribution, then it could be established that Punjabis abroad contribute through tourism, transport,telecommunication, transfer of money, and trade to the economy of Punjab (2003). A large number of first-generation migrants from Punjab, mostly Sikhs, visit the state between October and March for various reasonsand interact with the state. They have been experiencing corruption at all levels of the government. AAP with itsanti-corruption agenda drew their support and the result was the victory of the party in four constituencies.

The overwhelming victory of AAP in the Delhi assembly elections earlier this year is the key factor in establishing itas an important political player in Punjab. The party has learnt lessons from its earlier mistakes and hasprogressively moved from pressure group politics to the party politics without changing its agenda. As it happens inmost of the parties which emerge from social movements, the division between purists and realists/pragmatists ledto the split and formation of the “Swaraj Abhyan” group on the part of the former. We have also witnessed thesuspension of two AAP Lok Sabha members, namely Dharam Vir Gandhi and Harinder Singh Khalsa from theparty. The split has given a moment of relief to the Congress and the SAD, for both the parties perceive that theirchances of success are low in the assembly elections due to be held in 2017. With the emergence of AAP thepolitics of Punjab has fundamentally changed from being a two-party contest to a triangular one, and has thus,become unpredictable. However, in the analysis of the political dynamics of Punjab there is a need to understandthe socio-economic changes which are taking place in the state.

A Land Revolution

Punjab was predominantly understood as the agricultural state with its highest contribution to the national stock offoodgrains, particularly wheat and rice. SAD has been riding on the Sikh issues since its inception and, as a result,the Sikhs, who constitute the majority community in the state, have become the most important socio-economiccategory for understanding the state’s political dynamics. Let us begin by underlining certain important features ofPunjab on the basis of the 2011 Census.1

The decadal growth of the population of Punjab is 13.7%, which is less than the national growth rate of 17.6%.Punjab is among the top 10 urbanised states with 37.5% of its population living in urban areas. Recently releasedfigures on the religious composition of the country show that among the major religious communities in India,namely Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, the Sikhs have the lowest population growth rate of 8.4%. The dataon Punjab in general and Sikhs in particular shows that there is a sizeable middle class in the state cutting acrosscaste and regional lines. In other words, the Scheduled Castes are also doing quite well. The best way to know isthe distribution of operational holdings in the state. The data presented in the table indicate interestingdevelopments in the distribution of operational holdings (Ministry of Agriculture 2014).

Whereas in the case of all social groups the number of marginal holding has increased and there has been afractional or negative increase in medium and large holdings, among the Scheduled Castes there has beensubstantial increase in the number and the area of all size classes of operational holdings since 2005–06. Thenumber and operated area of medium and large holdings of Scheduled Castes have increased by almost 200%.This increasing participation of the Scheduled Castes in agriculture could be interpreted in two ways. First, theScheduled Castes are developing economic capabilities to operate large areas by purchasing machinery. Second,agriculture is regarded by them as the means towards social mobility. On the other hand, the non-ScheduledCastes engaged in agriculture, consisting predominantly of Jats followed by Sainis, Rajputs, Kambohs, Lobanas,etc, are moving away from agriculture or their operational holdings are on the decline. There is a likelihood that theScheduled Castes’ income has gone up due to other sources, such as remittances and white collar occupationsand they have invested this surplus income in agriculture. Similarly, the non-Scheduled Castes could be losing onland control through sub-division of landholdings and leasing out uneconomical holdings.

Despite the fact that Punjab is contributing “11.0% of all-India foodgrains production and 18.3% of all-India wheatproduction” (Care Ratings 2013), the primary sector accounted for only 32.4% of the state gross domestic productin 2011–12, whereas the tertiary sector constituted 51.2%. Further, the contribution of its diaspora to Punjab’seconomy has not been accurately worked out but it appears quite possible that Punjab has benefited tremendouslyfrom their periodic visits as well as from their remittances.

Socio-economic and demographic information about Punjab indicates that changes are taking place at a rapidpace. Certain aspects of the state’s political economy have remained largely unnoticed but form the core of itspolitical dynamics. For example, the political elite have moved away from corruption in government, while sandmining and real estate have become its money spinning sectors. The present SAD–BJP government might not getany credit with regard to transparent and honest governance, but it has unleashed massive forces of urbanisationwhich are transforming the core of Punjab’s economy. In the process class inequalities are increasing within casteswhile caste solidarities are being forged through identity politics which are in turn derailing class-based politics.Despite the fact that the Punjab is not experiencing the kind of poverty as it exists in the so-called “BIMARU”states, a section of society has started experiencing a threat to their economic well-being.

In Conclusion

It can perhaps be stated that lot of churning is taking place in Punjab and the future of the state depends, to alarge extent, upon the politics it chooses for itself. At present, it seems that in the triangular contest fated for 2017,the SAD–BJP alliance may still have an advantage over the Congress and AAP, largely because there is erosion ofthe electoral base of the Congress and these two parties compete over certain common political constituencies.On the other hand, the Akalis and the BJP still seem to have their political base intact. It is still a long way to go forelections and one has to wait and see whether the churnings visible in society are strong enough to destabilisepolitics.

Note

1 The data for discussion has been taken from the online source: CARE Ratings (2013).

References

CARE Ratings (2013): State Update: Government of Punjab, available athttp://goo.gl/UFtz2V, accessed on 15

September 2015

Kumar, Ashutosh and Jagrup Singh Sekhon (2014): “2014 Lok Sabha Elections in Punjab: Emergence of AamAdami Party,” Panjab University Research Journal Social Sciences, 22 (2), pp 125–32.

Ministry of Agriculture (2014): “All India Report on Number and Area of Operational Holdings,” Agricultural Census2010–2011, Agriculture Census Division, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Government of India.

Orozco, Manuel (2003): “The Impact of Migration in the Caribbean and Central American Region,” Focal: TheCanadian Foundation for the Americas, Policy Paper, March, available at http://goo.gl/p7sLFL, accessed on 15September 2015.

Sandhu, Ranvinder Singh (2009): Drug Addiction in Punjab: A Sociological Study, Amritsar: Guru Nanak DevUniversity Press.

Steinbach, Lieut-Colonel (1846): The Punjaub: A Brief Account of the Country of the Sikhs, London: Smith, Elderand Co.

This article was downloaded by calibre from http://www.epw.in/commentary/punjab-crossroads.html

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Neither Brake Nor AcceleratorVol - L No. 42, October 17, 2015 | Navroz K Dubash and Radhika KhoslaAssessing India’s Climate Contribution

This article was downloaded by calibre from http://www.epw.in/commentary/neither-brake-nor-accelerator.html

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Narrator of Subaltern War CriesVol - L No. 42, October 17, 2015 | Anindya Sekhar PurakayasthaNabarun Bhattacharya and the Literature of Dissidence

Fyataruder hatekhori mane oi bhangchur, chherachheri, hisu kora. [fyatarus are committed to sabotage,subversion and urination at the establishment]

— Nabarun Bhattacharya 2004, 14

With the demise of Nabarun Bhattacharya, the Sahitya Akademi award-winning author from Bengal, in 2014, theliterary fraternity lost a firebrand writer who was a revolutionary saboteur and a radical voice in the true sense ofthe term. He redefined and deepened the mode of subaltern representation by scripting the prose of counter-insurgency through literature. The present excursus pays homage to this noted maverick writer of dissidence andattempts an analysis of the singularity of Nabarun’s fictional domain in the light of some of his best known literaryworks such as Herbert, Mausoleum, Fyatarur Bombachaak, Fyatarur Kumbhipaak and Kangal Malsat.

All these five works constitute and explicate his prototypical subaltern anti-heroes such as fyatarus and choktars,who are brilliant metaphors of dissent and disgust at our contemporary socio-political praxis. While the popularliterary trends of the day have colluded with the hegemonic narrative of global capital that prevents the litterateurto coronate revolutionary anarchism or insurgency, Nabarun has consistently caused epistemic tremors through hisovert advocacy of radical violence and systemic change. His literary Bolshevism and social commitment elevatedhim to a unique locus of artistic activism that abhors all forms of aesthetic compromise in the name of decorum andaestheticism.

The Writer as a Crusader

Nabarun, like his mother, the Magsaysay award winning writer, Mahasweta Devi and his father, the actorplaywright Bijan Bhattacharya, has sharpened and reinforced the idea of the writer as the literary crusader, as theemancipatory agent. When the elitist cult of the writer is being valorised and appropriated by the ideology of themarket, Nabarun’s prose has foregrounded the dissident avatar of the writer whose sole objective is to unmask theprocess of shameless reification of the world. In doing that, Nabarun was influenced in a great way by the Russiananti-establishment writer, Mikhail Bulgakov who was also noted for his rants against the systemic norms.

Born in Baharampur in Murshidabad District of West Bengal, Nabarun was greatly inspired by his father who wasthe writer of the legendary play Nabanna on the Bengal famine. His aesthetico-political weltanschauung was alsoconstituted through his associations with the famous film-maker Ritwik Ghatak, who was a close relative. Nabarun,a radical Marxist in his political faith, evolved as a writer in Kolkata, where he relentlessly wrote about thesubaltern sections living on the city streets, in slums and dark alleys, “using satire, dark humour, and fantasy totelling effect to highlight oppression and exploitation.” His writings antagonised him with the powers that be, but tillthe end of his life he remained a fearless crusader against power and its misuse.

His novel Herbert got him the Sahitya Akademi award in 1997 and both Herbert and Kangal Malsat were madeinto films for their powerful radical contents. However, what makes Nabarun such a compelling voice incontemporary literature is not the recognitions lavished on him through prestigious governmental awards or hispopularity in box office hits but his scathing critique and vitriolic dark humour in scripting the gory details of socialanomie generated under the logic of global capital. In fact, Nabarun, through his fictional outpourings, has capturedthe bizarre canvas of the contemporary wasteland where human beings cannibalise other fellow beings in thename of laissez-faire and where the state has failed to provide the necessary succour for the needy and thesuffering multitude.

While many others before him have also engaged with such issues of state coercion, social anomie and economic

Darwinism, Nabarun’s uniqueness lies in the radical brilliance and efficacy with which he captured the state ofcollective angst, existential cynicism and economic disparities of a society that valorises the doctrine of thesimulacrum and hedonistic self-enclosure to conscript the ideology of status quo and conformism. Nabarun wasoften accused of anarchism and vulgarity, for his prolific use of slangs and street words in his novels and for hisovert endorsement of violence as a means of rebellious change in society, but such criticism ignores the fact thathis literary diatribes are the fallout of the reigning injustices and facades of a shameless system that endures andjustifies all forms of social misrule and anomie. For Nabarun, nothing could be more vulgar and anarchic than thecontinued endurance of poverty and other forms of social coercions.

The Raging Author

What can a writer do then, when she/he is pitted against such social and systemic apathies? Should she be amere chronicler of existential blues, scripting in the process a fictional testament of her times? In that way allliterary works attempt that and Nabarun was no exception but what distinguishes his works from that of hiscontemporaries or even his illustrious predecessors is the singularity of fictional rage and the vehemence andintensity of critique that he brought in capturing the agonies and tribulations of the marginalised sections of society.He did not stop there, the simmering anger of the subaltern outsider, the bizarre absurdity of the social fabric andthe unbearable indifference of the reigning bourgeoisie to the predicament of fellow human beings—all these areconcretised in the fictional narratives and in the robust invectives of his anti-heroes who are subaltern themselves.In that way Nabarun succeeded in carving a niche for his own genre of writing one which cannot be characterisedby any specific school of Bengali fictional writing. It is a curious mix of the agitprop, the magic real, the absurdgharana, artivism and the carnivalesque. One can find few parallels of Nabarun in Indian literary tradition and hisunique creative domain emerges as a powerful weapon for dissent and constitutes what Jacques Rancière calleda dissensual sensorium(2010: 119). The subsequent section would dwell on this role of artivism and literary critiquevis-á-vis the works of Nabarun Bhattacharya.

Scripting Resistance

The dispositif of globalisation has unleashed an unquestioning hegemon of marketised kitsch culture that nibbles atthe very ethos of resistance and agency. However, Nabarun through Herbert, Lubdhak, Fyataru, Kangal Malsat, orin his book of poems, Ei Mrittu Upottoka Amar Desh Noi, explored the possibility of the constitution of an ontologyof dissent through literature. Nabarun through the consolidation of resistant literary outpourings substantiated thenotion of an artistic sensorium that constitutes a singular aesthetico–political ontology of radicality. ReadingNabarun, one may propose for an aesthetic politics (Rancière 2006) which suggests a foundational drive forsubjectivity or constituent power of living creative labour that empowers literature to liberate from epistemicsubjugation and helps launch a counter-hegemonic historiography to reinstate the small voices of history, voicesthat undo the univocity of the current globalised elitist sign system. Nabarun through his explosive literary invectivesexactly does the same. While the gentrified middle class of aspirational India are bewitched by the catchy sloganof India Shining, forgetting thereby the reality of poverty, farmers’ suicide, economic exploitation and politicalgenocide, Nabarun played the spoilsport and reminded us, Ei mrittu upottoka amar Des noi (I do not call this valleyof death, my country)(Bhattacharya 2004).

In all his works, Nabarun remained ruthless to unmask the selfish subservience of the privileged classes and hispungent use of the four-letter words in his literary works were designed to subvert and dislodge the spinelesscolluders from their comfort zones. It is a strange world where farmers commit suicide as they fail to repay loansand the privileged classes continue to have their cushioned fundom. To undo this criminality of indifference andinjustice, a writer should be the purveyor of a new “dissensual politics” of aesthetics; in Nabarun one encounterssuch a promise of dissent. In his The Politics of Aesthetics, Rancière argued that we need to rethink aesthetics as“the invention of new forms of life” (2006: 25). Art as politics is thus a manifestation of what Rancière callsdissensus, or a gap in the sensible itself. Exemplifying the notion of such aesthetic politics or the spirit ofdissensual sensorium, Nabarun in his fiction literally bludgeons the capillaries of power and the ideologies ofexploitation through a brutal use of semantic assaults and invectives against the bourgeoisie.

His protagonists of rebellion, the fyatarus or choktars consist of social outcastes or mysterious members of theurban underbelly who resort to macabre mechanisms of subversion and sabotage to undo the matrix of power and

legitimacy. Their overt mission is to disrupt the capitalist order or the hegemonised narrative of capitalist legitimacy.Nabarun demonstrates how we, the so-called citizens of this country, are so over-enchanted with the seductivenarrative of the contemporary liberal democratic doctrine that we have forgotten to dissent at all on the aporias oflaissez-faire.

Against Bourgeoisie Façade

Nabarun’s best-known works, Herbert, Kangal Malsat, Fyatarur Bombachak O Onnanno are brilliantdocumentations of the cruel and shallow lives of the bourgeoisie and Nabarun articulates how collusive we all are inperpetuating the current zeitgeist of unabashed consumerism, injustice and self-interest. The poignancy in theportrayal of such gloomy ground reality does not fail to provide a severe jolt to our slumbering consciousness or toour complicity with the forces of domination and the sure-footed after-effects of such revelation are the birth ofsubjectivity that causes subtraction from the networks of hegemony. The clarion call for revolutionary violence inNabarun’s works which is described as “chakti ka khel” is accompanied by the justifying logic, Aakas, alo, jol,bayu, charE sokole jodi thake odhikarsob manuser bhumete kebolDu char joner rohibe dokhol? (The sky, the light,water and air—if all are entitled to enjoy these four natural resources to survive, then why are they beingexclusively usurped by the privileged class?) (2013: 92).

Nabarun’s fyatarus sound a scathing caution of abrupt subaltern insurgency in virulent linguistic onslaughts andsuch verbal assaults are indeed savage by our so-called civilised and constitutional norms. The normativestandards of our literary canon do not allow such wild vitriolic vocabulary, but Nabarun and his fyatarus wouldexactly look for that—sabotaging, subverting the elite canon, the normative codes so that a cognitive and epistemictremor takes place and we, the gentry wake up from our comfort zones to encounter the questions of social andeconomic disparities raised by the fyatarus. Such a scathing critique of the existing system is further reinforcedwhen Nabarun even refuses to spare God, the almighty of the allegation of complicity—Bhagaban gachhechhiloHuku huku dak diloGachh vora ata chhiloSob ata Bhoga nilo (God was on the tree/he chuckled andsounded a whistle/the tree was full of fruits/ all the fruits were possessed only by Bhoga, the privileged) (2004a:114).

Here, Bhoga, the colloquial version of the capitalist usurper, coalesces with God, the almighty and divineprovidence is painted in the dark shadow of collusion, God and Evil are shown as party to the same act ofusurpation of the poor. The only deliverer, the sole source of succour for the poor then is the fyataru, the subalternsaboteur, who keeps alive the dream of relief, the possibility of emancipation or at least sustains the element ofdissent in a society where complicity and fidelity to the reigning hegemon is the only norm, the only religion tofollow. Such aesthetic politics of dissensus is only possible according to Rancière through the artistic savoir faireand Nabarun’swritings exactly execute thatartivism of dissensus.

Conclusions

For Nabarun, the one and only way out of the pervasive cult of subservience, the tradition of enduring collusion withthe existing system is through revolution—fat fat sai sai—the sound of flight of the fyatarus, the presaging ofrevolution. Fyatarus, the subaltern forces of immanence, are everywhere, in every nook and corner of the eliteworld—they are lurking around the book fair, in the glossy glitzy lavish marriage parties, in poetry festivals, socialceremonies and fashion parades—waiting to pounce on, just looking for the best moment to subvert, to devastate.It is because of this resuscitation of the radical rage potential in an age when compromise and conformity havebecome the only norm, the legacy of Nabarun Bhattacharya would remain with us although he is no longer there. Ina society which is blinded with the seduction of hierarchy, overconsumption, privilege and interpellation, Nabarun’sprose of counter-insurgency would continue to provide the necessary grammar of resistance so lacking in thispervasive ambience of mindless subservience.

References

Bhattacharya, Nabarun (1993): Herbert, Kolkata: Dey’s Publishing.

— (2004a): Fyatarur Bombachak O Onnanno, Hooghly: Saptarshi Prokashan.

— (2004b): Ei Mrityu Upotyoka Aamaar Desh Na, Hooghly: Saptarshi.

— (2006): Lubdhak, Barasat: Abhijan Publishers.

— (2013): Kaangaal Maalshaat, Hooghly: Saptarshi Prakashan.

Rancière, Jacques (2006): The Politics of Aesthetics, London: Continuum.

— (2010): Dissensus on Politics and Aesthetics, London: Continuum, p 119.

This article was downloaded by calibre from http://www.epw.in/commentary/narrator-subaltern-war-cries.html

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Commodification of 'Giving Back' in a Neo-liberalWorldVol - L No. 42, October 17, 2015 | Jahnavi Sen

Theorising the act of giving is not new; in the social sciences it has been approached from different perspectives—economic, sociological, anthropological, etc. Marcel Mauss’s influential work argued that it is a mistake to look atthe market economy (a characteristic of “modern” societies) and the gift economy (a characteristic of “primitive”societies) as segregated and mutually exclusive. Rather, this dual ontology that was particularly vivid in theenlightenment rationality of the 18th century (Muehlbach 2012: 21) is an attempt to delink the individual fromsociety, show the movement of development towards economic individualism and conveniently forget that capitalistsocieties too operate on cultural designs (Appadurai 1988: 11). All principles of exchange are based both on self-reliance and social relationships. In fact, gifts can be argued to be underlying some of the most central contractsof capitalism, such as wages (Hart 2000: 184).

Mauss also pointed out that the act of giving gifts is not simply an act rooted in selflessness and affection; it isbased on social obligations and an inherent sense of reciprocity. According to him, “a gift necessarily implies thenotion of credit” (Mauss 1954: 35). The act of gifting is embedded in social relations and links between theindividual and society, just like other forms of exchange (Hart 2000: 184). In this article I argue that the gifteconomy is more embedded in the capitalist market system than before, and new forms of “gifting” are growing atunprecedented rates. These new ways of organising “gifting” of time and/or money are systemically rooted incapitalism, serving as legitimisation for the system by providing the “human face” of the market. I consider thisargument specifically in relation to the growing trends of philanthropy and volunteerism, and how these practices fitinto the capitalist system as a whole.

Philanthropy

Philanthropy is defined here in the narrow sense of how the wealthy (whether individuals or corporations) use theirincome and wealth in a redistributive manner or for more social benefits. Philanthropy and capitalism areintrinsically linked in today’s world—both financially as well as in the production of discourses (Holmes 2012: 185).Philanthropic involvement can be seen as voicing the aspiration to cut state involvement from welfare: not only isthe state not providing certain basic fundamentals to its citizens, but there is also no need for it to do so becauseprivate agents will take care of the matter (Villadsen 2011: 1). Philanthropy makes the provision of welfare a partof market activities, making the receding role of the state more legitimate. In order for the culture of philanthropyto sustain itself, it is in fact an imperative that the world does not become more equal and that the accumulation ofwealth does not stop, because “the super-rich need to stay super-rich in order for their charitable enterprises tofunction” (McGoey 2012: 187).

The city of Geneva in Switzerland provides some classic examples of the extent to which the process ofphilanthropic “giving” is embedded in the capitalist market structure. The openness with regard to the profitability ofcharitable giving is clear here in extreme form, with the emergence of a category of people who make money fromthis act, but neither as “donor” nor “beneficiary.” Reflecting its geopolitical history as well as the high wages andper capita income, Geneva has become a hub of global “philanthropy advisors,” who can tell the rich where their“gifts” will be best utilised (for a price, of course). The city is home to the head offices of several of these“philanthropic consultants”—including Geneva Global, WISE (Wealthy Individuals and Social Entrepreneurs) andPhilanthropy Advisors. An individual or a firm can approach these entities to express their philanthropic interests,and these advisors will, in turn, suggest, based on their research, where the money will be most “efficientlyutilised.” The rhetoric of business and capitalism is applied to philanthropy, building a system that embeds ideas ofefficiency, performance and results into the act of giving and “revolutionising the act of giving” (Geneva Global2012a).

‘Our clients take a business-minded approach to solving social problems. They know philanthropy isn’t aboutsimply writing checks; it’s about catalyzing real, positive change. With a focus on achieving outcomes, theyembrace innovation and pursue opportunities for collaboration, co-investment, and aggregated giving around acommon goal’ (Geneva Global 2012b).

The vocabulary of performance- based profitable outcomes that is widely used in corporate discussions is thusimported into the field of giving, making it a more marketised process that requires specific management. Thismanagement is what the philanthropy advisors provide.

We act as an intermediary and we pledge accountability, good management and sound ethical standards forall your philanthropic investments’ (Philanthropy Advisors 2014a).

All of these firms portray the act of giving through philanthropy as an aspiration that can be achieved with theirhelp. Since “traditional philanthropy isn’t cutting it,” according to the Geneva Global website, these firms selloutcome-based giving. It is the commodification of “doing good”: the more they can convince people to donatetheir money for the sake of a perceived social good, the more money these firms make. The donors are madecentral to the entire process—it is about their needs and desires. The projects that are being funded and the“beneficiaries” of these projects find very little place on these websites, other than a few typical photographssignifying “development”—a happy child, a woman on a field and the like. The donors, their experiences and theirimportance, however, are highlighted again and again in different ways—making it clear that they are what thisentire process is about anyway.

‘Our vocation is to accompany donors and their families in fulfilling their philanthropic aspirations. To achievethis objective, we first and foremost listen attentively to donors to thoroughly understand their needs andaspirations. We provide them with expert advice to guide them in choosing among the multitude of existingorganisations, those that best meet their expectations and correspond to genuine needs. At each stage of theprocess, we offer donors the possibility of becoming personally involved in their philanthropic engagement. Wehave developed tools and processes to meet the standards of transparency and impact, ensuring that theopportunities created will make a sustainable difference’ (WISE 2014a).

This “revolutionised” giving experience does not end with just a donation. It is a long-term process, includingregular updates, photographs and personal stories from the “beneficiaries” and even field visits to programmesites to “see the lives you have changed” (Geneva Global 2012a). These intermediary firms have made explicitwhat was already suspected and claimed by many—capitalism and its forms can commodify anything from agood/commodity to “doing good.” By bringing into the picture people otherwise seen to be “left behind” by thesystem, there is an attempt to moralise inequalities by emphasising the desire of those that have been able toaccumulate wealth to “give,” to “help,” to “change.” The emergence of “philanthropy advisors,” however, showsthat this process is also marketised and made profitable, and the ones gaining the most are probably not thosewho are called the “beneficiaries.”

Volunteering and Free Labour

The second kind of “gift” worth considering is the gift of time, or free labour. One of the most common examples ofthis is the act of volunteering, or giving up your time for the purpose of a social or communal good. This actcontains within it the idea of souci des autres (concern for others) (Muehlbach 2012: 8) and often comes out of thedesire to make a difference, and build a social identity and feeling of community belonging. However, the activitiesthat are performed in this time that is “given away” are often welfare provisions that would otherwise be expectedto be provided by the state. Of course, this is not to say that everyone who participates in these activities believesthat the role of the state should be minimised. Muehlbach’s ethnography of volunteers in Italy shows that often theyare people who resist neo-liberal state withdrawal and protest state cutbacks, but also think that it is necessary tofill certain gaps in the short run (Muehlbach 2012: 47). Yet most forms of volunteerism seem to suggest that it isnot a resistance to capitalism but another way of legitimising it, of minimising community resistance and ofreinforcing certain hierarchies.

Consider a specific kind of volunteering: volunteer tourism or “voluntourism.” This refers to volunteers from the

Global North (or from relatively urban, cosmopolitan, well-off contexts of the Global South) crossing borders intothe Global South in order to volunteer for a social purpose. It is a form of “giving back in neo-liberal times” (Vrasti2013), a way to travel to exotic locations while feeling that you are making a contribution to a larger good—without, of course, getting into politically loaded questions like redistribution.

Volunteer Tourism

Volunteer tourism has approximately 1.6 million participants a year at the moment, and is estimated to be one ofthe fastest growing sectors of the travel industry. One possible explanation for this is that people see it as a wayof “making a difference” and as a critique of mass tourism. But ethnographic studies have shown that “CV-building”is also an attraction. Volunteering in situations outside your comfort zone makes an individual the owner of “exoticcultural knowledge” and professional acumen outside the classroom (Vrasti 2013: 2). Mary Mostafanezhad’sinterview with a Canadian voluntourist in Thailand and Vrasti’s interview with an Australian voluntourist in Ghana putthis very aptly:

‘There is something in it for me. It’s not just helping others, it’s helping me. Doing something worthwhile. Evencare-givers, they have self-interest. It’s good to me. It makes me look good in front of others. Other peoplegenerally look at me with some form of admiration…’ (Mostafanezhad 2014: 122).‘…on an entirely superficial but legitimate note, it looks great on my CV because I want to go into internationalrelations, maybe work for an NGO. And I know this is a far cry, but anything helps’ (Vrasti 2013: 86).

Such examples suggest that this can be far from being a selfless act of giving; it is often a calculated decisionmade for personal interest, perhaps supported by the ideal of “doing good.” It is the new formulation of a neo-liberal subject, where

instead of the rational, calculating and cold-blooded American Psycho, the good neo-liberal subject of thetwenty-first century is the rather schizophrenic figure of the compassionate entrepreneur, the happyworkaholic, the charitable CEO, the creative worker, the frugal consumer and, last but not the least, thevolunteer tourist(Vrasti 2013: 21).

As Wanda Vrasti’s ethnographic study of volunteer tourists in Ghana and Guatemala shows, these volunteers aremostly made aware soon into their time as a volunteer that what they are doing has little to no real impact on thepeople they are supposed to be “serving.” This excerpt from her interview with Patricia, a white South Africanvoluntourist in Ghana, is telling:

‘I don’t think I’ve helped anyone while I was here. Only I benefited. I changed but I don’t think I initiated anychange. […] I feel like Projects Abroad was a bit to blame. They make it sound as if you weren’t here, Ghanawould fall apart, as if your presence is sought for. They painted a picture that’s not in any way correct’ (Vrasti2013: 99).

The company mentioned by Patricia, Projects Abroad, is an organisation that sends around 10,000 voluntourists todifferent countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe every year. This is done for a “project price”that is paid by volunteers to the organisation, and in return they set the volunteers up with local projects and helpthem with their accommodation and everyday lives in the country they are to work in. Similar to the concept ofPhilanthropy Advisors, it creates an intermediary in the “giving back” process that makes a profit out of thissituation, a commodified gifting.1 The more they can convince individuals to give, the more money they make.There exist several of these firms, that link potential voluntourists to organisations in the Global South (see forexample http://www.voluntourists.org). Since these acts do not fall outside the neo-liberal agenda, it is possible forpeople to make them a source of wealth accumulation and profit-making. People’s ability and desire to give uptheir time for free is used by the system not only to put a moral face on capitalism, but also to support the systemof accumulation by capitalising on people’s time.

This capitalisation of time is particularly visible in cases of “voluntary” free labour. As a room full of young peoplewas told by the UN Secretary General in a question–answer session on youth unemployment in July 2014, “If youcannot find a job, you can always volunteer.”Free labour is thus made to sound like something we should

all want to do, sold as beneficial for the individual/society rather than recognised as appropriation of unpaid labourby capital. Even more insidious is the way in which capital makes free or unpaid labour appear as an obligation.The Geneva Interns Association (GIA) estimates that at a particular moment in time, there are 2,000 unpaidinterns in Geneva. It can be argued that the interns perform unpaid labour as a repayment for the “experience” and“training” or CV-points “gifted to them” by the organisation. The organisation gifts the intern these things and getsunpaid labour in exchange, a relationship of reciprocity. For example, The Human Rights InternshipProgrammeclaims to

provide on-the-job training opportunities to students or graduates from a range of educational and professionalbackgrounds” and to “deepen their theoretical knowledge on human rights and acquire practical skills… (CAGI2014).

Additionally, the system has managed to structure itself in a way that finding a paid first job without experience isnext to impossible, and the only way to gain experience is to pay for it and to work for free for others. Even gettingthese unpaid positions involves a high amount of competition, further proving that it is seen as the only way to getrelevant work experience for the young. The Human Rights Resource Centre tells us,

it is extremely competitive to obtain internships from these organizations but if you feel you are sufficientlyqualified, they also could offer one of the best learning experiences of your life (CAGI 2014).

What necessitates and lies beneath this constructed “gifting” and “returning” is the present structure of capital.

The Idea of Reciprocity

These new forms of gifting are very different from each other, but it is not difficult to find a common thread runningthrough them. In all cases, the idea of “reciprocity” that is assumed to exist in the act of gifting is unconventional.Most of these “gifts” will never be repaid in kind. This raises an important question—what does the lack ofreciprocity entail?

This is significant because the lack of reciprocity can be seen as an announcement of legitimate superiority. Maussmakes the argument that as long as a gift goes unreciprocated, the givers remain superior to the receivers. If theone receiving the gift is unable to repay in material kind, they owe the giver spiritual deference (Hart 2000: 185).This reduces the chance of collective action against the unequal world system. It can reduce the sense ofexclusion (through the formulation of souci des autres) without making any radical social or distributional changes—thus reducing the chances of dramatic dissent from excluded sections. John Hutnyk sees charity work of this kindas “the soft side of an otherwise brutal system of exploitation,”as it relegates some to the disempowered positionof discretionary aid and benevolence (Hutnyk 1996: ix).

The commodification involved in these new forms of giving and the growing popularity of intermediaries involved isalso telling of its implications. Clearly those indulging in these acts of giving and the structure that has been builtaround them do not see the current structure of things as a particular problem—this is why even these acts ofgiving can be explicitly and deeply embedded in the neo-liberal market system and serve the purpose ofprofitability. They are not intended to create long-term change, but to find new ways of reinforcing the status quowhile making it look more humane and less oppressive.

Note

1 While perhaps not suitable for an academic article, an interesting anecdote was shared by a classmate in theCultures of Capitalism class on being a voluntourist. While agreeing with the feeling of not being needed, sheadded that the aspirational youth from the community they were working in actually wanted to start an organisationsimilar to the one that had taken the voluntourists there. The profitability of the situation was not hidden fromanyone, and more than anything else this idea of “giving back” was seen as a business opportunity.

References

Appadurai, Arjun (1988): “Introduction,” By The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, 3–63.

Cambridge University Press.

CAGI (2014): Job, Internship, Volunteer Opportunities, http://www.cagi.ch/en/ngo/ngo-recruitment-platform/job-internship-volunteer-opportunities.php?emploi=1828&type=2 (accessed on 17 December 2014).

Geneva Global (2012a): Home Page,http://www.genevaglobal.com (accessed on 18 December 2014).

— (2012b): Overview: Our Services, http://www.genevaglobal.com/overview-ourservices#notcuttingit (accessedon 18 December 2014).

Hart, Keith (2000): Money in an Unequal World, London.

Holmes, George (2012): “Biodiversity for Billionaires: Capitalism, Conservation and the Role of Philanthropy inSaving/Selling Nature,” Development and Change 43, No 1, 185–203.

Hutnyk, John (1996): The Rumor of Calcutta: Tourism, Charity and the Poverty of Representation, New York: ZedBooks .

Mauss, Marcel (1954): The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies.

McGoey, Linsey (2012): “Philanthrocapitalism and Its Critics,” Poetics 40, No 2, 185–99.

Mostafanezhad, Mary (2014): Volunteer Tourism: Popular Humanitarianism in Neoliberal Times, Ashgate.

Muehlbach, Andrea (2012): The Moral Neoliberal: Welfare and Citizenship in Italy, University of Chicago Press.

Philanthropy Advisors, (2014a): Mission, http://philanthropyadvisors.org/philanthropy_advisors/missions/ (accessedon 16 December 2014).

Villadsen, Kapar (2011): “Neo-Philanthropy,” Social Work and Society 9, No 2.

Vrasti, Wanda (2013): Volunteer Tourism: Giving Back in Neo-liberal Times, Routledge.

WISE (2014a): Organisation, http://www.wise.net/organisation_en.php, accessed on 16 December 2014.

This article was downloaded by calibre from http://www.epw.in/commentary/commodification-giving-back-neo-liberal-world.html

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A Flawed Climate Road MapVol - L No. 42, October 17, 2015 | Nagraj Adve and Ashish Kothari

On 1 October 2015, the Indian government submitted India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It has been received to surprisinglywide acclaim, in the media, by large non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and policy experts.

Climate change policy documents have become developmental road maps. In presenting either mitigation ofcarbon emissions or adaptation measures, the 38-page INDC touches upon existing and planned policies in theareas of urbanisation/smart cities (p 13), transport (p 14), agriculture (p 20), water (p 21), public health (p 22) andcoastal regions (p 23). Preliminary estimates, it says, suggest India needs $2.5 trillion to meet its stated climatechange obligations between now and 2030. India is clearly expecting “low-cost international finance.” The rightnessof the principle notwithstanding, it is doubtful whether international funding on any meaningful scale will actually bereceived.

Some aspects of the INDC are indeed welcome: a huge expansion of grid-connected rooftop photovoltaic hasbeen planned (p 9). It lists a number of energy efficiency measures, including standards issued to 478 industrialplants in eight energy-intensive sectors, and improved standards in appliances, lighting and buildings (p 11). Theexpansion of mass rapid transit systems (MRTS) of over a thousand kilometres in a number of cities has beenproposed (p 15). However, India’s INDC is deeply problematic at its core.

Hiding behind the Poor

Central to the INDC are two proclamations: “to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP [gross domestic product]by 33% to 35% by 2030 from 2005 levels,” and to generate “about 40% cumulative electric power installedcapacity from non-fossil fuel based energy resources by 2030” (p 29).

Emissions intensity refers to the amount of carbon dioxide (co2) and other gases emitted per unit of GDP. Areduced intensity implies a slower rise. But working through the numbers reveals that it will result in a massive risein India’s total emissions. Given the worsening economic crisis worldwide, let us conservatively assume that Indiawill have an annual GDP growth rate of 5% over the period 2005–30. This would imply, after accounting for thereduced emissions intensity of 33%–35%, India’s emissions in 2030 would be 2.5 times what they were in 2005.According to an Indian Network on Climate Change Assessment (INCCA)/Ministry of Environment and Forestsreport, India’s gross emissions in 2007 were 1,904 million tonnes of co2 equivalent, CO2-eq (INCCA 2010: i).(CO2-eq includes other greenhouse gases, GHGS, as well, such as methane and nitrous oxide, measured in termsof their capacity to trap heat relative to co2.) So in 2030, India’s emissions would be equivalent to about 5 billiontonnes of co2, very likely more. This is staggeringly high, and would form a significant part of straining the Earth’scapacity to absorb GHGs.

This large rise in emissions is justified, by government and several independent observers, in terms of a“development deficit.” Since India needs to still develop, it is only reasonable, they say, that our emissions willgrow significantly. In this is an implicit assumption that future emissions will be to everybody’s benefit. This has littlebasis in reality: despite electricity generation capacity more than doubling, from 1,12,700 MW in 2004 to 2,34,600MW in 2014, 304 million people in India still have no access to electricity (INDC: 5). Or take energy/fossil fuel use:in rural areas, 87% of Scheduled Tribe and 70% of Scheduled Caste households still use firewood for cooking(Rukmini 2015). Consider poverty: incorporating multiple indicators to measure poverty beyond just calorie intake,such as hygiene, clothing, education and health, one study found that “69% of India is below the poverty line ...therural situation is much worse at 84%” (quoted in Shetty 2008: 13). Or take the nature of employment, a key factorin persistent, rising inequality: while there has been an increase in jobs in recent years, almost the entire increasehas been in the unorganised sector (Shetty 2008). Crucially, real wages for factory workers in 2012 were lower

than they were in 1996.

There is no denying the justified, huge demand for electricity among the common people. There is also no denial ofthe huge benefits of electricity on people’s lives. But there is no basis to assume that their lot is going to improvemagically due to a pathway that would treble India’s emissions by 2030. Nor is the future direction promising, giventhe recent attacks by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government on rights of organised workers andforest communities, its attempt (aborted so far) to amend land acquisition laws and its regular criticisms of theMahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and the Forests Rights Act.

What is even worse, the underclasses in whose name India’s sharp rise in emissions is being legitimised, tend tobe the worst victims of climate change impacts, as seen during the Uttarakhand disaster (2013), the Mumbaifloods (2005) and in the Sunderbans. The gains for the poor from much higher emissions are small, the adverseimpacts huge.

Meanwhile, the better-off are growing. According to Kotak Wealth Management, the number of households with aminimum net worth of Rs 250 million has been rising steadily: 62,000 households in 2010, 81,000 in 2011,1,00,900 in 2012, 1,17,000 in 2013–14. So when the Indian government states in the INDC that India’s per capitaemissions are only 1.56 metric tonnes (p 2), it is shamefully hiding behind the poor. It has the temerity to say “thisis because Indians believe in nature friendly lifestyle and practices.” This ignores the lifestyles of the 1,75,000households with assets of one million dollars or more (RUPE 2014: 41), whose per capita carbon emissions aremuch higher than the average European and even American. The ecological footprint of the richest 1% of Indians isover 17 times that of the poorest 40% (Shrivastava and Kothari 2012). India’s valid position regardingdifferentiated responsibilities and historically unequal emissions between countries is not reflected in similarscrutiny of inequality between the rich and the poor within India itself.

This lack also pervades the INDC’s proposals regarding climate change adaptation. Reducing risk and improvingthe capacity of people to adapt to climate change is linked to effective poverty eradication, improving food securitythrough sustainable farming, promoting greater biodiversity, improving public health, and strengthening communityresilience. These linkages have simply not been made explicit.

Indiscriminate Expansion

This rise in wealth of and consequently higher consumption by the better-off has resulted in a huge andindiscriminate planned expansion of electricity generation, which the INDC reflects.

First, the INDC uses the term “non-fossil fuels” rather than “renewables.” This allows the government to includenuclear power. It sets a target of 63 gigawatts (GW) by 2032, a huge expansion from the current and under-construction installed capacity of 10 GW. It calls this power “a safe, environmentally benign and economicallyviable source!” After Chernobyl and Fukushima, to call nuclear power “safe” is delusional. And if one looks at theimpacts of nuclear fuel mining, and the still-unsolved problem of safe disposal of nuclear waste, calling it“environmentally benign” is plain dishonesty. Nor is it economically viable, partly because “every reactorconstructed by the Department of Atomic Energy has experienced cost overruns” and “importing 10,000 MW offoreign reactors would cost trillions of rupees” (Ramana 2012: 189). All these reasons make nuclear power theleast suitable form of generating electricity in a climate crisis.

Second, within “renewable,” the INDC includes “a vast potential of more than 100 GW” of hydropower. Of India’s46 GW of currently installed hydroelectric capacity, an overwhelming 42 GW comprises large hydro. Since there isno mention of priority to micro-hydel, the INDC clearly implies a further expansion of large hydroelectric projects.Dozens of such projects are under construction or being planned, especially across the fragile Himalayanecosystem. The enormous displacement, ecological damage to rivers and riverine ecosystems, submergence offorests, impacts on agriculture and people downstream, and methane emissions from reservoirs will all intensifywith the expansion of large hydro, which cannot by any stretch of imagination be designated as “clean energy.”

Third, the INDC also slips in “clean coal” as “clean energy.” Coal of any quality has to be mined from mostlyforested and inhabited areas, so its expansion will mean massive deforestation and displacement. The INDC says

“coal will dominate power generation in future,” which hardly seems like a vision of an environmentally and sociallysustainable future. The Modi government has recently drastically cut down the list of forested areas in which coalmining would not be allowed. Coal combustion and fly ash cause mercury poisoning; exposure to other heavymetals, such as arsenic and lead, even to premature deaths. And as the climate scientist James Hansen haspointed out, a single large coal thermal project causes the extermination of innumerable species as a consequenceof co2 emissions over its lifetime. We appreciate that coal mining in particular is a huge source of employment,however hazardous, for lakhs of workers. Discussions about the possibilities of transitioning from coal and otherfossil fuels to clean energy, and how “green” employment could be part of this are therefore urgent. Some unionfederations and other collectives in India have been engaging with these questions, but the INDC and thegovernment in general are silent.

We are not against all forms of electricity generation. But an indiscriminate expansion of power generation whichthe INDC proposes will have huge adverse impacts on communities everywhere. Even climatically benign largesolar parks and wind farms have social and environmental hazards, such as grabbing land from farmers andpastoralists, and damaging ecosystems. Rooftop solar aside, we are concerned about the ultra mega solar powerprojects and 25 solar parks mentioned (INDC: 9), with several private corporations making blistering profits.

Hence, it would have been heartening had the INDC stated instead that much of the 40% generation from non-fossil fuels would be decentralised renewable energy (DRE, including solar, wind, hydro, biomass). DRE is not onlyecologically less damaging but also more easily managed (and even set up) by communities, and therefore moreable to provide quick energy access to the poor. Large-scale electricity production goes into centralised grids,from where access to the underprivileged has been poor. This issue of energy justice is mirrored by the issue ofenergy democracy: who decides about energy source, distribution and price? With DRE, decision-making canmuch more easily be with communities who need the energy.

A Sinking Feeling

Another important area is potentially harmful. The INDC says India will create by 2030 an additional carbon sink of2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of co2-equivalent. India will enhance carbon sequestration by 100 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent per year, by afforesting 5 million hectares (mha) and improving forest cover over another 5 mha (pp 16,29).

It is hypocritical to talk of new areas under forests when existing forests, some of it millions of years old, are beingaxed in the name of development. Forestland diversion for mining, irrigation, power, industry, expressways andurbanisation is intensifying, with over 6 lakh hectares of forestland diverted since 1992 (CSE 2012). Compensatoryafforestation of a few species can never replace this loss. Now funded under compensatory afforestationschemes, afforestation also takes over lands from communities dependent on them, often in violation of theirrights. What is more, the NDA government proposes to hand over 40% of “degraded” forests to private capital.This will entail the further enclosure of commons lands. All of this has harmful implications for all forestcommunities, so it is not clear exactly what “increasing the forest/tree cover” would imply.

Beyond Tipping Points

We also need to situate India’s INDC within a larger frame. By now, all the major carbon emitters and 148countries overall have submitted their INDCs. What do their proposals imply for the planet?

The US says it will reduce its absolute emissions by 26%–28% below 2005 levels by 2025. It has shifted itsbaseline year from 1990, which it was in the Kyoto Protocol, to 2005. With a 1990 baseline, the US’s reductiontarget is a mere 13%–15%, much less than needed. Its emissions in 2013 were actually 7.4% higher than its 1990levels (Narain and Bhushan 2015). China proposes to lower its carbon emissions intensity by 60%–65% from 2005levels. It has also said it will try to peak its emissions before 2030, but has mentioned no target, and its emissionsby then should be in the range of 13–15 billion tonnes. If one adds India’s 5 billion tonnes of CO2-eq, and the USfigure, then just the big three will have taken emissions well beyond what the planet can absorb.

Include the emissions of all the other big emitters, and we have a recipe for massive disaster. The Delhi-based

research and advocacy organisation, Centre for Science and Environment, says the carbon budget is beingovershot:

INDCs submitted by all major emitters indicate that cumulative emissions between 2012 and 2030 would be in therange of 700–800 billion tonnes of CO2...the world is not on a path to the 2 degrees C target. This would bedisastrous for poor people across the world (CSE 2015).

It would be even more disastrous for innumerable species, with a staggering proportion of all species worldwidecommitted to extinction.

Completely missing from India’s and all these INDCs is a sense of urgency. Last year was the hottest year inrecorded history. July 2015 was the hottest month in 1,627 months, since monthly records began in January 1880.Several feedbacks in the climate system (ecosystem responses that cause further warming) such as melting Arcticice, methane escaping from thawing permafrost, more water vapour in the atmosphere, etc, have already kickedin. They will soon begin to feed on each other on a scale that will make it impossible for us to intervene. TheINDCs and negotiating positions that India, China, the US and other major emitters bring to the table at the COP21in Paris in December would need to be far more ambitious and qualitatively different if the planet is to avoidcrossing dangerous levels of global warming.

References

CSE (2012): http://www.greenclearancewatch.org/themes/phw/images/fsheet_overview.pdf

— (2015): “India’s INDC Is Fair, Says CSE,” http://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/climate-change-package-51338

INCCA (2010): India: Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2007, Delhi: MoEF.

Narain, Sunita and Chandra Bhushan (2015): Capitan America: US Climate Goals, A Reckoning, Delhi: CSE.

Ramana, M V (2012): The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India, Delhi: Penguin.

Rukmini, S (2015): “Two-thirds of Rural Houses Still Use Firewood for Cooking,” Hindu, 1 August.

RUPE (2014): “A Middle Class India?,” Aspects of India’s Economy, No 58, September.

Shetty, S L (2008): Growing Inequality: A Serious Challenge to the Indian Society and Polity, Bengaluru: ISEC.

Shrivastava, Aseem and Ashish Kothari (2012): Churning the Earth: The Making of Global India, Delhi: Penguin.

This article was downloaded by calibre from http://www.epw.in/commentary/flawed-climate-road-map.html

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Book Reviews

Little-known Communist Movement [Wed, 14 Oct 15:19]

Communism in Pakistan: Politics and Class Activism 1947-1972 by Kamran Asdar Ali, London/New York: I B Tauris, 2015; pp 304, $80. read more

Towards Integrated History [Wed, 14 Oct 15:19]

Modern Times: India 1880s-1950s by Sumit Sarkar, Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2014; pp xiv+464, Rs 895(hardback). read more

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Little-known Communist MovementVol - L No. 42, October 17, 2015 | Aasim SajjadRadical Left in Pakistan

The words communism and Pakistan do not appear together all that often. Literature on progressive politics inPakistan is so sparse that only the keenest observers of the country’s political scene are aware of its historyand/or the contemporary state of the Pakistani left. Which makes anthropologist-cum-historian Kamran Asdar Ali’sCommunism in Pakistan a must-read for anyone with an interest in going beyond the caricatures of beards,bombs and burqas that dominate scholarship on Pakistan.

Threat to Muslim Pakistan

Pakistan is the only country in South Asia in which communist parties have always remained outside the politicalmainstream—and not by choice. The country’s early political leadership chose to become a virtual satellite of theUnited States, proudly trumpeting its status as a “frontline” state against communism. It did not take long for theallegedly irreligious perversions of communists from being projected as one of the biggest threats facing MuslimPakistan. By 1951, the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) was officially banned.

Notwithstanding these ominous beginnings, the book reveals that communists—their ideas, political mobilisationsand personal relationships with the powers-that-be—were actually important players in Pakistan’s political scene inthe formative years. While the book includes a chapter on the 1972 labour movement in the industrial centre ofKarachi, it is primarily a historical study that deals with the theoretical debates within the communist left in thelead-up to and aftermath of the partition in 1947, as well as the trials and tribulations of major communistpersonalities in the first decade or so of Pakistan’s existence. Ali unearths a substantial material—including partyliterature, circulars and position papers, as well as police and intelligence reports from both the British and earlyPakistani state—to put together a compelling narrative, albeit one that still suffers from significant gaps.

International Debates

The story begins with the topsy-turvy history of the Communist Party of India’s (CPI) understanding of and positionon the so-called “nationalities question” in the last years of the British Raj. Ali notes at least three clear U-turns inparty policy. Initially suspicious of Muslim nationalism, the CPI started to reconsider its stance following thecollapse of the Soviet–Nazi non-aggression pact in 1942 and the Communist International subsequent adoption ofthe “People’s War” line. The CPI’s response was to distance itself from the All-India Congress’s “Quit India”movement and thereby move closer to the All-India Muslim League’s pro-British position. In short, the CPIacquiesced the notion that Muslims were a distinct nationality within India, and even instructed its cadres inMuslim-majority regions to join or at least work closely with the Muslim League.

However, in the lead-up to partition, disagreements within the party started raising their head again. The partitionplan was eventually endorsed and the creation of Pakistan accepted, but the formal party line was to once againshift on the occasion of the CPI’s Calcutta Congress held in February 1948, barely six months after the end of theRaj.

There was no question of re-establishing an undivided India—the left now concerned itself with challenging whatwere considered—on both sides of the new border—reactionary regimes serving the interests of imperialistpowers. However, the state of Pakistan and the propertied classes that propped it up could not be confronted by aparty based in what was now a different country; the CPP was thus established. Party delegates designated assecretary-general, Sajjad Zaheer, a scion of landed aristocrats from the Urdu-speaking heartland of North India,whose relatives and many close friends occupied positions of power in the post-Raj political order.

It was, both literally and figuratively, unchartered territory. Here was a new state carved out of the western and

eastern-most regions of British India, the political leadership of which comprised predominantly migrants fromNorth India. The communist left resolved that this new political formation would serve only to reinforce theexploitative dictates of the departing imperialist power, and sought accordingly to attack the reactionary edifice ofstate and class power. Yet, in a startling historical parallel, the newly constituted CPP was also led by individualslacking any moorings in the society they wished to transform. Two other personalities are identified by Ali as beinggiven the task of building the CPP in the new state—Sibte Hassan and Mirza Ishfaq Beg—both of whom were alsomigrants from Uttar Pradesh and Bhopal, respectively.

As it sought to strike down roots in the new state, the leadership of the CPP—and Sajjad Zaheer, in particular—many a time took refuge with friends and family situated at the very highest echelons of state power. Alidocuments many such personal relationships, complicating our typical understanding of what in most historicalaccounts of Pakistan’s earliest years is a monolithic state apparatus committed to impeding democracy andingratiating itself with the US. This complication aside, Zaheer and his comrades faced incessant repression,confirming that, individual exceptions notwithstanding, state elites had little tolerance for the fledgling leftmovement.

And despite all of its weaknesses, the movement did constitute a genuine threat to the powers-that-be. Mostprominent in literary and journalistic circles—due in large part to Zaheer and other CPP leaders’ association withthe Progressive Writer’s Association—the left challenged a unitary state that denied its constituent ethnic-nationsmeaningful political voice, whilst also vowing to take on and dismantle a “feudal” class structure backed byWestern imperialism.

On Questions of Culture

Among the quirks of this otherwise straightforward leftist narrative was the opposition to literary figures likeSaadat Hasan Manto, whose works were attacked by numerous left critics for propagating pessimism and even“immorality.” The latter were willing to accept the multilayered depictions of social mores by Manto, but could notcountenance the absence of a “fix” for society’s ills. Ali argues that the communists emphasised a “historicalmaterialist lens and the primacy of social structure to undermine Manto’s empathy for individual experience.” Indoing so, the Pakistani left reflected the Cold War orthodoxies of the global communist movement.

Perhaps, what was more problematic about this posture was that it situated the progressive literary camp—unwittingly or otherwise—in proximity to statist discourse, particularly vis-à-vis the imperative of establishing a“new” Pakistan founded upon correct moral principles. Ali notes how the progressives competed with “non-progressives” such as Hasan Askari and M D Taseer in asserting a vision for the future, although he doesacknowledge that the latter ultimately associated themselves with the “official” position on “national” culture,whereas the progressives were vilified and eventually evicted from the cultural mainstream.

Military in Politics

Surely the biggest question mark about the CPP’s historical role in Pakistan’s early years, however, is whether ornot it systematically colluded with disgruntled elements in the Pakistani army to foment a military coup. The so-called Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case gets a significant mention in Ali’s narrative, and the impression one gets is that,all things considered, there was never any formal approval issued by the party leadership to be party to a coup.

Yet there is little doubt that there was contact between Sajjad Zaheer, other prominent affiliates of the CPP likeFaiz Ahmed Faiz, and officers in the Pakistan army. The idea of supporting a coup was doubtless discussed withinthe party hierarchy, which is to suggest that at least some of the leadership is likely to have been in favour of theendeavour. But Ali also clarifies that these flirtations were just that—and the subsequent criminalisation of the CPPby the authorities under the guise of sedition charges was not at all commensurate with the party leadership’s“offences.”

Of course it was not just in Pakistan that leftist revolutionaries contemplated a radical overhaul of the social orderthrough the agency of military men. Lenin’s revolution was at least partially successful because the Bolsheviks hadinfiltrated the Czarist services. Amongst the contemporaries of Sajjad Zaheer and Pakistan’s early communists

were Gamal Abdel Nasser and his “Free Officers” in Egypt. Libya and Ethiopia were among other countries thatalso boasted “revolutionary” army officers who overthrew regimes backed by Western imperialist powers. Themost well known of today’s revolutionaries is the 2013-deceased Hugo Chavez, who was a junior officer in theVenezuelan army when he first challenged that country’s oligarchy in 1992.

Whether or not the left in other parts of the world still considers “progressives” in professional militaries potentialallies, Pakistani leftists would—or at the very least should—now baulk at even the suggestion. The role that thecountry’s generals have played over the past seven decades is unambiguous—they have thwarted any and allattempts to institutionalise even the most harmless form of bourgeois democracy and have also been instrumentalin exacerbating ethnic tensions within society at large, given the Punjab-heavy composition of the army andbureaucracy.

All-powerful militaries like those in Pakistan pose a challenge to radical theory alongside political practice inasmuchas armies are never representatives of one particular class per se. There are some on the left—mostly thoseaffiliated with pro-Chinese currents—that have argued that Pakistan is a “feudal” society and the military is onlypowerful to the extent that feudal lords patronise it.

In fact, if landlordism—calling it feudalism opens up another debate altogether—continues to haunt modern-dayPakistan, then at least part of the explanation is that military rulers have patronised landed scions who mightotherwise have been greatly disempowered by the forces of history. Perhaps the most obvious example of this isthe Ayub Khan regime which otherwise depicted itself as the vanguard of industrialism, but ended up effectingwhat Hamza Alavi famously called land reform “in reverse.”

State Suppression

It was indeed during the Ayub Khan regime that the contradictions of a “modernising” authoritarian regime and theimperatives of an also “modernising” left movement came most dramatically to the fore. Part II of the book—whichhas only two chapters—chronicles the tribulations of the party in the aftermath of its banning. One chapter isdedicated to the story of arguably the first martyr of the Pakistani left—Hassan Nasir—who was killed in policecaptivity in 1960, barely two years after Ayub Khan took power.

Nasir, like Zaheer, was of impeccable elite pedigree. He hailed from an aristocratic family in the former princelystate of Hyderabad Deccan, and left his wealth and influence behind to build the CPP in Sindh, and particularly inKarachi, where he settled. Ali provides the important backdrop for Hassan Nasir’s life and work, noting that after1954 most communists worked “underground” within either trade unions and student fronts, or in the NationalAwami Party (NAP), which brought leftists together with ethnic-nationalists seeking to challenge the unitary statestructure.

Nasir was only 20 when he was given major responsibility in the CPP’s underground structures, and was also theoffice secretary of the Karachi wing of the NAP when martial law was announced in October 1958. Ali provideslimited details about Nasir’s political activities, only noting by way of testimonies of other organisers with whomNasir worked that he was deeply involved in organising industrial workers in Karachi through the 1950s. Most ofAli’s focus in this chapter is on Nasir’s final arrest in 1960—he was apparently in and out of jail in the precedingyears as well—and his eventual death in the torture chambers of the infamous Lahore Fort. When Nasir’s mothercame to take her son’s body back to India, she was unable to recognise the exhumed remains, and eventuallyrefused to accept that the mangled corpse was her son. She was to return to Hyderabad Deccan without a body.

Ali spends some time discussing the evolution of left politics in the wake of Nasir’s death, including the impact ofthe Sino–Soviet split that led to the break-up of the NAP into separate factions, and similar splits within the left-wing National Students Federation (NSF). Sectarianism continued to haunt the Pakistani left for many decadesafterwards, notwithstanding different factions’ principled resistance to state and class power. Ali does hint at therelative favour garnered within ruling circles by pro-Chinese leftists, especially after 1962 when the Ayub regimestarted to name China as its most reliable ally.

Yet no segment of the Pakistani left was able to maintain significant bases of support in society after the Bhutto

years (1972–77). By the time the Cold War ended, communist and socialist parties had already suffered seriousfragmentation—the trauma of the Soviet Union’s collapse served only to confirm just how nominal the left hadbecome.

Contemporary Left

In recent times this historical trend has been somewhat bucked, and the Awami Workers Party, which was formedin late 2012 and brought together almost all factions of the Cold War left, currently offers the best hope forprogressives seeking to challenge the forces of reaction which are, by any measure, formidably organised incontemporary Pakistan.

Nevertheless, it will be some time before the left can pose a substantive challenge to the established order. The1990s was a “lost decade” of sorts insofar as an entire generation of young people remained largely unexposed toleftist ideas, and left organisations started to stagnate as a result of a lack of youth within their ranks. Thisshortcoming has since been acknowledged and is slowly being corrected.

A related concern is the fact that analyses of state, society and the global political economy from the 1970s and1980s continue to inform the ideas and practice of too many leftists. The mainstreaming of gender, ecology andother issues that must be central to socialism of the 21st century is an urgent task, just like the need to recognise“new” forms of class struggle.

There is, however, little doubt that Pakistan’s contemporary and future leftists will continue to contend with abloated security apparatus, as has been the case for most of the country’s 68-year existence. In fact, thebogeyman of terrorism has allowed generals to concentrate more power in their hands than ever before, thanks inlarge part to the imperialist powers—both Western and Eastern—that continue to engage with Pakistan and thewider region in a typically myopic fashion.

Military Democracy

Any radical transformative project in the interests of Pakistan’s long-suffering working people, ethnic and religiousminorities, and women would have to be premised upon a challenge to the military establishment. Which shouldmean a minimum level of cooperation with mainstream parties that also remain subservient to the uniformed“guardians of Pakistan.”

However, the democratic project in Pakistan has always been compromised by those political forces that havewilfully chosen the patronage of the military over the countervailing power of the people. For instance, it is widelybelieved that cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan (and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) has been secretly liaisingwith the men in khaki to pressurise the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. More generally, pro-establishment politicians litter the ranks of virtually all parties, thus rendering much of the democratic struggle aneyewash.

This is all to suggest that the Pakistani left faces a formidable task. But Ali’s study of the early years confirms thatthe left has always been swimming against the proverbial tide. One can only hope that today’s progressives learnof this long history, both for what it teaches us about ourselves and those that seek to keep the oppressed lockedin chains.

This article was downloaded by calibre from http://www.epw.in/book-reviews/little-known-communist-movement.html

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Towards Integrated HistoryVol - L No. 42, October 17, 2015 | Tirthankar Roy

From today’s perspective, 1970s was the age of innocence in the writing of the history of modern India. Therewere debates and controversies, no doubt. But most historians seemed to share the belief that the best way tocontribute to debates was to read a lot of archival documents and validate a story by citing these, whether thatstory derived from global theories like Marxism or was one suggested by an officer of the Indian administration itdid not matter much.

A Divided Field

The faith in an ultimate authority—documents—died in the next 20 years. Poststructuralist philosophers, who,despite sharing a vague form of allegiance to Karl Marx, were partly responsible for the decline of Marxism,replaced the subject of history. The documents did not create historical narratives, the reader of the documentsdid. In the modern world, the reader was an interested party, and knowledge was a vehicle for the exercise ofpower. Edward Said applied that insight to orientalist knowledge, suggesting that such knowledge servedEuropean power over non-European societies.

Said, in this way, inaugurated postcolonialism, a hugely popular movement that endorsed writing imperial history byexamining the cultural legacy of colonial rule. Source-based history was no longer a way to advance knowledge,except to show how the documents revealed or concealed power. There being no authority left to validate stories,postcolonialism turned insular. From the 1990s, new debates and developments in history began to take shape,such as those within economic history. The postcolonial history did not recognise these developments. Themovement increasingly became trapped in a style of historiography that a review of the Annales School calls “CiteOurselves” (Evans 2009: 12–14).

Still, the effect of postcolonial historiography has been constructive. In North America, the movement broughtIndian history out of the area-studies box, and into closer relationship with world history. It attracted research byadding new meaning to a variety of issues connected with governance, law being one of the most importantexamples. At the same time, the movement divided the field. It was singularly incompetent in handling issues, notdirectly connected with governance, markets and livelihoods, for example. Outside North America, in Britain, Japanand India itself, source-based history survived. In these traditions, historians taught postcolonial works, but in theirown research, tended to avoid the new method (I suspect because they could not write as stylish prose as someof the postcolonialists did). Signs are that, having completed an “exponential phase” and a “stationary phase,” themovement has reached a “death phase,” to borrow words from bacteriology.

Along with avoidance, there was reaction as well. Some historians, among them Marxists, received the totalitariancritique of documents and sources with a great deal of scepticism. Modern Times, while not a Marxist work, iswritten from that critical old-school perspective.

Seeking Synthesis

It is hard to define the book. It is not a monograph, nor a collection of essays. Each one of the five chapters canbe read as a stand-alone piece, in that respect the book reads like a collection of essays. Yet, there is an implicitaim that runs through all five chapters. The book revisits the social, political and economic history of colonial Indiain a broad sweep, with a view to explaining the rise, survival, effect, and fall of British colonial rule in the region andin that respect resembles the classic student text called Modern India that Sumit Sarkar had published in 1983.Modern Times is more than a textbook, however. It is a critical engagement with new writings in imperial historyproduced from different angles.

There are three distinctive qualities of the project. First, it retrieves the narrative within a craft that has often been

too hard on facts. The book does not represent a single analytical tradition, but deals with analytical arguments inappropriate contexts. The story rules in the main. Second, the book integrates historiographies. One of the strikingoutcomes of that project is the return of social and economic history in a book that is deeply and sympatheticallyengaged with the postcolonial power/knowledge perspective. The chapters synthesise diverse literatures, connectmany separate strands into coherent accounts, reflect upon new analyses of old issues, and integrate some ofSarkar’s own works published after the 1983 book. Third, Modern Times is remarkably catholic in its treatment oftheoretical perspectives. It is almost always careful to emphasise the strengths and innovations represented innew writings, while being mildly critical of a tendency to overgeneralise.

In other words, the book can be described as an attempt to create a theoretically informed narrative history. In thequality of the result, it is the work of a master craftsman.

Knowledge and Governance

The story is told in five long (85 pages each, on an average) chapters. Chapter 1 (“Imperial Structure, Policies,and Ideologies”) forms the core, and deals with the colonial state, institutions of the state, and politicalmovements. Chapter 2 (“Woods and Trees: The Environment and the Economy”) is a survey of the field that Indianhistorians misleadingly call environmental history, but which is essentially a study of imperial power exercised in thecontext of the commons. Chapter 3 (“Fieldwork: Agriculture and Agrarian History”) and Chapter 4 (“Trade,Industry, and the Political Economy of Empire”) deal with the major livelihoods and show how the colonial staterelated to these livelihoods to ensure its own survival and sustenance. Chapter 5 (“Society and Culture”) is broadlya study of the emergence of middle-class identity through literature and other forms of creative and publicexpression.

The strengths of the work come together, especially in Chapter 1 on state, institutions, and the trajectories ofnational politics. The first 17 odd pages present a chronological account of the evolution of the colonial state, fromits “restructuring” after 1857, to the influence of British domestic politics and foreign policy on shaping Indiangovernance, to “pressures” of public finances, and ending with the tortuous emergence of the idea of self-government. The longer remaining part titled “knowledge and governance” addresses more directly thepostcolonial tendencies in history writing. This section reflects on, broadly, the transformation of colonial power viaknowledge of India, and specifically, law and governance, the census and classification of peoples, education andthe emergence of a public sphere, Christian missionaries, science, and the princely states.

Sarkar acknowledges the key insights of recent works that show how the performance of colonial knowledgeprojects, like the census, cartography or science, were infused with ambitions of power and by preconceptionsabout Indian society, but qualifies that thesis frequently. For example, very limited funds created a gap “betweenthe desire and the ability” to turn cartography into a power tool (p 56, the cited text from Matthew Edney’s workdiscussed in the page). Sarkar rejects the idea that colonial ethnography of the kind pursued in the 1901 Censusshaped caste movements by remoulding identities. The link between census and caste is too inferential. He arguesthat “threats posed by lower-caste pressures explain [these movements] better” (p 37). Discussing ThomasMacaulay’s momentous endorsement of English education for Indians in 1835, Sarkar underrates its significance,in view of “the very niggardly sums... invested in education” (p 41). The revolutionary change did not consist in theaccent upon English, with no means to back it up, but in “the vastly enhanced importance of formal education” (p41).

Environmental and Economic History

Chapters 2–4 deal with environmental and economic history. Two themes recur often in the text, that an intellectualand administrative convention to divide India into a settled agrarian zone and a wild forest frontier should bediscarded in favour of a picture, wherein these boundaries are neither easy to define nor fixed, and that regionaldiversity is a reason to qualify almost everything that can be said about the environmental and economic impact ofcolonial policy. These arguments are used to criticise both such old school traditions as nationalist history and newtrends in history writing. Environmental history is a new field and has established itself as a major addition tohistory teaching programmes. It suffers from enduring gaps (the princely states, for example), but is an impressiveand exciting growth area nonetheless. Chapter 2 is one of the best surveys I have read of the field.

Chapters 3 and 4 on economic history and political economy, by comparison, are rather less novel in content. Butthere are instructive sections within these, in particular the section on peasant rebellion, a subject on which Sarkarhas a new perspective to offer. The economic history sections deal with tax policy, property right, drain,deindustrialisation and currency policy, all conventional themes. In recent years, some empirical economists haveextended the boundary of the field beyond these themes, which tendency the survey does not discuss. The oldschool bias of writing economic history by placing the colonial state at the centre of the narrative is retained. This,to the present reviewer, is an odd way of doing the economic history of India. If wealth indicates capacity andchoice, as it does to most economists, the British Indian state with an income that rarely exceeded 5% of domesticproduct was not wealthy, and therefore, had little capacity and little choice to mould the economic system in anydirect fashion. Why a whole field should be obsessed with the state beats me, and the old school does not evenask that question, let alone answer it.

On the other hand, seen as an updated survey of the conventional themes, occasionally with Sarkar’s ownbalanced critiques added, the two chapters add a great deal of value to the literature. I would like to cite thisstatement as illustration: “It needs to be emphasized that there has been no invariable or inevitable link betweencommercialization of agriculture and either stagnation... or growth. The key variables usually seem to have beenthe specificities of ecology and agrarian structure” (p 125). There is a big proposal here on how the boundaries ofthe discourse can be extended.

Transformation of Indian Society

Perhaps the most readable chapter of all is the last one on society. Sarkar presents an encompassing tour deforce on the transformation of Indian society and the emergence of middle-class identity during the colonialencounter. The chapter ranges from concepts of inequality, to the changing economic profile and social make-up oftowns and cities, patterns of “sociability,” communication and the formation of a public sphere, the growth of a printmedia on the back of growth in writing and publishing in vernacular languages, and movements in the arts. Thechapter reinstates social history in the mainstream, a position it had almost lost, and does it in bite-size length andyet with depth, insight and ease.

To conclude, in a quiet and understated way, Modern Times is a remarkably powerful book. The quality of thesurveys and synthesis is outstanding. The book gives theory its due, but does not allow theory to overpowerhistory. It is a great resource for newcomers to the study of Indian history.

Reference

Evans, Richard J (2009): “Cite Ourselves!” André Burguière’s review of The Annales School: An IntellectualHistory in London Review of Books, 31(23).

This article was downloaded by calibre from http://www.epw.in/book-reviews/towards-integrated-history.html

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