Upload
jack-aldrich
View
215
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
1/40
EconomicVotingandtheNationalFront:
TowardsaSubregionalUnderstandingoftheExtreme-Right
VoteinFrance
SeniorPoliticsHonorsThesis
NewYorkUniversity
Fall2012andSpring2013,POL-UA950andPOL-UA951
ByJohnAmerlingAldrich
(203)948-6107
521East14thStreet,#12FNewYork,NY,10009
Acknowledgements
TheauthorwouldliketothankProfessorNathanielBeck,ProfessorOeindrilaDube,andOmarGarca-Ponce
intheNYUPoliticsDepartmentfortheirassistanceandguidancethroughouttheacademicyear,andAstrid
ParentyforhertirelesshelptranslatingfromtheFrench.
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
2/40
Aldrich 1
ABSTRACT
Sinceitselectoralbreakthroughinthemid-1980s,theextreme-rightFrontnational
hasbeenacontroversialyetundeniablyinfluentialpoliticalandculturalforceinFrance.
Betweenthe2007and2012Frenchpresidentialelections,thepercentageofvoteshare
receivedbythepartyincreasedfrom10.44%to17.9%nationally,arecordhigh.Despite
thisandotherrecentextreme-rightvictoriesacrossEurope,theliteratureonextreme-right
votingisempiricallycontradictoryandsurprisinglylimitedinbothbreadthandscope.In
ordertoformamorecompleteunderstandingofextreme-rightvoting,thispaperexamines
thecontributionsofunemployment,immigration,andcrimetothechangeinvoteshare
receivedbytheFrontnationalbetweenthelasttwopresidentialelections.Iconductthe
analysisatthesubregionalleveloftheFrenchdpartement.Theanalysisshowsthatthe
changeinthedpartementalunemploymentratehasapositive,statisticallysignificant
effectonthechangeintheFrontnationalvote,andthatthiseffectisevenlargerinareas
thathavehighpercentagesofimmigrantsrelativetotherestofthecountry.
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
3/40
Aldrich 2
I.INTRODUCTION
ThispaperseekstoexplaintheriseinelectoralsupportfortheFrenchextreme-
rightonthesubregionallevelofthedpartementbetweenthe2007and2012presidential
elections.Theaimofsuchaneffortistofurtheranddeepentheextantcorpusofacademic
literatureonextreme-rightvotinginrecognitionofa)theresurgenceoftheEuropean
extreme-rightinrecentdecadesandb)theabilityofextreme-rightpartiestoshapepolicy
andthenationalpoliticalagendaintheirfavorevenwhennotinpowerorcoalition.While
significantworkhasbeendoneexploringextreme-rightvotingoncross-nationallevels,
therehasbeenrelativelylittleworkdoneonintranational,subregionallevels,particularly
inFrancesincethe1986electoralbreakthroughofitspremierextreme-rightparty,the
Frontnational(henceforththeNationalFront,orFN).Itisinthisvacuumofliterature
thatthispaperstepsin,employingordinaryleastsquares(OLS)regressionanalysistothe
taskofassessingwhatchangingfactorsbetweenthe2007and2012presidentialelections
accountfortheincreaseofFNvoteshareexpressedbythe96dpartementsofMetropolitan
France(theFrenchmainlandplusCorsica).UsingthechangeinFNelectoralsupportas
measuredbythepercentageofvotesharereceivedineachFrenchdpartementasthe
dependentvariableandthechangeineachdpartementsunemploymentrateasthe
primaryindependentvariable,Iwilloperationalizethechangeindpartemental
unemploymentrateseffectonthedependentvariablefirstindependentlyandthenin
considerationofothercontrolvariablessuchasthechangeinthepercentageofimmigrants
ineachdpartementsrgion,thechangeinreportedcrimesineachdpartement,and
variousinteractionvariablesconstructedinconsiderationofhypothesespresentinthe
reviewedliterature.Reviewingandgroundingmyworkinthecontextofthisliterature,my
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
4/40
Aldrich 3
paperisultimatelyvaluableinsofarasitcontributestoanacademiclandscaperifewith
debateandcontradiction,andadvancestheunderstandingofextreme-rightvotingon
intranational,subregionallevels.Ultimately,Iascertainthatthechangeinregional
unemploymenthasapositive,statisticallysignificanteffectonthechangeintheFNvote,
andthatthevariableseffectismagnifiedevenfurtherbyitsinteractionwithhighlevelsof
immigration.Suchaconclusionisconsistentwithotherscholarsfindingsandlends
qualifiedempiricalsupporttoMattGoldersmaterialisthypothesis,partofwhichasserts
thatunemploymentincreasesthevoteforextreme-rightpartieswhenimmigrationishigh.
Myanalysisaimstocontributemeaningfullytooneofthemostinterestingandincreasingly
topicalsubfieldsofpoliticalscience,thatofextreme-rightvoting.Iproceedwitha
backgroundontheNationalFront,aliteraturereview,andthefullpresentationofmydata,
researchdesign,andresults,followedbymyconclusion.
II.BACKGROUND
Sinceitsfoundingin1972bythepartysideologicalleaderandformerpresident
Jean-MarieLePen,theNationalFronthasgonefromreceiving0.75%ofthenationalvotein
theprimertour(firstround)ofitsfirstpresidentialelectionin1974toarecord17.9%in
thefirstroundoftheApril2012presidentialelection,thepartysmostrecent.11Nowunder
theleadershipofJean-MarieLePensdaughterMarineLePen,theNationalFronthas
establisheditselfasoneofEuropesflagshipextreme-rightpartiesandaforcenottobe
trifledwithintheFrenchelectoralarena.17Howhasitaccomplishedthis?Whatdoesthe
partystandfor?AndwhatdoestheelectoralsuccessoftheNationalFrontmeanfor
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
5/40
Aldrich 4
France?Toanswerthesequestionsitbehoovesonetoexaminethepartybeforeandafter
1986,theculminatingyearofitselectoralbreakthrough.
Receivingsuchasmallpercentageofthevoteinitsfirstelectionandfailingto
qualifytoruninthefollowingpresidentialelectionof1981duetonotreceivingthe
recentlyincreasedminimumsofmayoralsupportneededbyanaspirantpoliticalparty,the
NationalFrontappearedpositionedtolanguishontheperipheryofFrenchpolitics.Yetby
leveragingpopulardiscontentwiththeeconomystillsufferingtheprotractedeffectsof
thepreviousdecadesglobaloilcrisisandeffectivelyshoringupsupportamongstits
mostlyblue-collarbase,theNationalFrontbrokeoutelectorallybetween1983and1986,
firstachieving10.95%ofthevoteand10seatsinthe1984electionstotheParliamentof
theEuropeanUnionandthen9.65%ofthevoteinthe1986Frenchlegislativeelections,
whichplaced35FNpartymembersintheFrenchNationalAssembly.8aActingintheFNs
favorwastherecentchangeintheFrenchelectoralsystemimposedbythenPresident
FranoisMitterrandfromasimpleplurality,orfirst-past-the-post(FPTP)systemtoone
ofparty-listproportionalrepresentation.PursuanttoDuvergerslaw,aprinciplein
politicalsciencethatpostulatestheestablishmentofatwo-partyregimeinasystemof
pluralityvotingandmultipartisminasystemofproportionalrepresentation,thechangeto
Franceselectoralsystemin1986removedbarrierstoentryforstartuppartieslikethe
NationalFrontandallowedmoredynamicismintheelectoralspace.7,30Whilethe
reinstatementofthemajoritarian,two-ballotsysteminthe1988legislativeelectionscost
theNationalFront34ofitsseatsintheNationalAssembly,thepartyexploiteditspast
success,burgeoningpopularity,andinfightingamongstFrancesmainstreamrightwing
partiestoachieve9.8%ofthefirstroundvoteinthe1988legislativeelections(and1seat
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
6/40
Aldrich 5
inparliament)and14.4%ofthevoteinthefirstroundofthe1988presidentialelection.
Since1988ithassubsequentlyenjoyedelectoralsupportinthefirstroundofFrench
presidentialelectionsintherangeofanormalized10%-15%.30
Whileithasonlyoncepassedthroughtothesecond,finalroundofapresidential
election(in2002beforesufferingthelandslide82.2%victoryofJacquesChiracs
RassemblementpourlaRpublique[RallyfortheRepublic]party),theNationalFronthas
neverthelessbecomeadominantpresenceinFrenchpoliticsandsocietyand,asitsrise
between2007and2012foreshadows,lookspoisedtoevenfurtherentrenchitselftherein.
Throughtheprocessofpartisanrealignment,overthecourseofitshistorytheNational
Fronthasexpandedfromurbantoruralareas,embeddeditselfinlocalpolitics,acquired
votersfromotherright-wingfactions,andobligatedpartiesonboththerightandleftto
adjusttheirpoliciesinordertounderminetheFNsostensiblemonopolyonportraying
anddefiningcontentiousnationalissueslikethosepertainingtoimmigration,suchas
asylum,naturalization,therightsoffamilyunificationandmarriageforimmigrants,and
theissuanceoftouristvisas.30AsMartinSchain,ascholarofimmigrationandpoliticsin
WesternEurope,pointsout,theelectoralbreakthroughoftheNationalFrontensured
that,indecision-makingonimmigration,theelectoralcontextcouldnotbeignored[by
otherpoliticalparties].31Theresult,hecontinuestoexplain,hasbeentheemergenceof
morerestrictivepoliciesthroughoutFranceonanabundanceoftheseissues,including
manypassedbygovernmentsontheleft.Inthisway,thesheerpresenceoftheFNsinceits
breakoutinthemid-1980shasbeensufficienttocolortheideologicalagendaofthenation
andthetangiblepoliciesthroughwhichsuchanagendahasandcontinuestobe
expressed.Atvarioustimesinitshistory,theNationalFronthasbeenabletodothiswith
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
7/40
Aldrich 6
littletonoofficialrepresentationingovernment;suchistheirpoliticalclout.Theprinciple
thatobtainsnotonlyinFrancebutthroughoutEuropeisthatfringeparties,evenwhen
theyremainelectorallyassuch,enjoyagravitationalpullinpublicandpoliticaldiscourse
disproportionatetotheiractuallegislativeagency.Asextremistpartiesemerge,
consolidate,andgrow,theyarecapableofleveragingmoremainstreampartiesfearof
losingvotersinordertoshiftnationalpolicyformationclosertotheirpreferentiallines.30
Butwhatarethesepolicies,exactly?WhatdoestheNationalFrontstandfor?
Broadly,theNationalFrontlikemanyotherextreme-rightpartiesinEuropeis
sociallyconservative,nationalist,eurosceptic,souverainist,economicprotectionist,and
anti-immigrant.23,13Thepartyadvocatesazerotoleranceplatformwithrespecttolaw
andorderissues,andhasbeenembroiledincontroversyformuchofitsexistencedueto
thepolemicalpoliciesitpromotesandtheprovocativestatementsthatcontinuetobe
issuedbypartyfigureheads.13aIndeed,theFNoftodayisregardedasamoremoderate
incarnationofthepartyonceknownforitsunabashedlyxenophobic,WorldWarII
revisionist,andanti-SemiticplatformJean-MarieLePenhasbeenfoundguiltytwiceof
denyingtheHolocaust,firstin1991andthenin2008.,9,16Despitedownplayingthemost
inflammatorycomponentsofitsrhetoricandengaginginaaself-consciousprocessof
ddiabolisation(decontamination)undertheaegisofMarineLePen,theFNnonetheless
staunchlydefendeditscorepositionsinthefirstroundofthe2012presidentialelection,
whereitplacedthirdaftertheultimatevictorFranoisHollandesPartisocialiste(Socialist
Party)andthen-incumbentpresidentNicolasSarkozysUnionpourunmouvement
InFebruary2012aPariscourtupheldits2008rulingthatJean-MarieLePenwasguiltyofthecontestationofcrimesagainsthumanity,havingsaidin2005thatinFrance,atleast,theGermanOccupationwasntparticularlyinhumane,evenifthereweresomeexcessesinevitableinacountryof550,000squarekilometers.Hewasfinedandgivenathreemonthsuspendedsentence. 16
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
8/40
Aldrich 7
populaire(UnionforaPopularMovement).10Mediacoverageoftherun-uptotheelection
detailssupportbeingfoundintheFNsmantraaFrancefortheFrench,itsanti-immigrant
stanceinarepublicwheremanyarefearful[of]foreignersoverrunningthecountryand
strainingFrance'sgeneroussocialmodel,anditsanti-EuropeanUnionplatform,upon
whichitblamestheeconomicandpoliticalunionfortheunemployment,immigration,and
insecurityplaguingthecountry.20,26
ContextualizingtheNationalFrontsunprecedentedelectoralsuccesshasbeena
largerwaveofextreme-rightvictoriesbreakingupontheshoresoftheEuropeancontinent.
PropelledforthbytheEuropeanSovereign-DebtCrisisanditsattendanteconomicwoes,
EuropeanUnionPresidentHermanVanRompuyhasrecentlycriticizedwhathecallsthe
windsofpopulismblowingacrossEurope,fannedbyextremistmovements.20Indeed,
GeertWildersanti-immigrantandanti-IslamDutchFreedomParty,theAustrianFreedom
Party(FP)underJrgHaider,theupstartBritishFreedomPartyandtheassociated
EnglishDefenceLeague,theanti-immigrantandFlemish-secessionistBelgianVlaamsBlok,
theradicallynationalistHungarianJobbikparty,andGreecesostensiblyneo-NaziGolden
Dawnpartyareonlyahandfuloftheinfluentialextreme-rightpartiesthathave
commandedpublicandpoliticalattentioninEuropeinrecentyearsanddecades.27,32,33,30,
29,28AspoliticalscientistPiaKniggewrotein1998,Right-wingextremisminWestern
Europeis,ofcourse,notanewphenomenon.Forthemostpartofthepost-WorldWarII
erasupportforextremeright-wingpartieshasbeenmarginal.Theseparties,ifexistentat
all,remainedlargelyoutsidethepoliticalarena.Yet,startinginthe1980s,anewpatternor
trendappearedtomanifestitselfinthisregard.Newextremeright-wingpartiesemerged
rathersystematicallythroughoutthemajorWesternEuropeancountries.17Allvirulentin
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
9/40
Aldrich 8
rhetoricyetelectorallyandlegislativelysuccessfultovaryingdegrees,theseparties
neverthelessrepresentacleartrendinEuropeanpoliticsandacauseforconcernamongst
mainstreampartiesforcedtorespondtotheircontributionstothenationalandcontinental
conversation.AsthereexistsomeinstitutionssuchastheguerrillaEnglishDefence
Leaguethatarenotactuallydesignedtobefunctioningpoliticalpartiesasmuchas
vehiclesofpoliticalagencyandactivism,itshouldbenotedthatincontrasttheFrench
NationalFrontisanestablishedandlegitimatepoliticalparty.Likemanyotherparties
acrossEurope,scholarssuchasMattGolderhavecategorizedtheFNasapopulistextreme-
rightparty.QuotingCanovan(1994),Golderassertsthatthesepartiesaredifferentiated
frompartiesofthemainstreamrightinsofarastheirpopularismmakesthemadvocatesof
directdemocracy[that]claimlegitimacyonthegroundsthattheyspeakforthepeople:
thatistosay,theyclaimtorepresentthedemocraticsovereign,notasectionalinterest
suchasaneconomicclass.12Othercharacteristicsagreeduponbyscholarsthatseparate
theextreme-rightfromthemainstreamrightincludedistinguishingfactorssuchas
embeddednotionsofinequalityandsocialhierarchy(oftenexpressedintermsofethnic
andculturalnationalism)andabaseofsupportdrawnmostlyfromthelower-,working-,
andmiddle-class.3,30QuotingChristopherHusbands,RobertW.JackmanandKarinVolpert
(1996)specifythatWhatunitesallofthesepartiesistheirparticularcommitmentto
somesortofethnicexclusionismahostilitytoforeigners,immigrants,ThirdWorld
asylum-seekers,andsimilarout-groupsaswellasaggressivenationalismorlocalism.14
Finally,andmostcruciallyforthispaper,extreme-rightpartieshaveandsharea
willingnesstoworkwithinextantpoliticalframeworksinordertoachievetheirgoals.30
PartiesliketheNationalFrontareneitherrevolutionarynoraretheyephemeral,flash
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
10/40
Aldrich 9
parties,asMichaelS.Lewis-Beckdescribesshort-livedpartiesthataimtodisruptand
disband,ratherthanparticipateinthepoliticalprocessoverthelong-term.22Theselast
characteristicsareofparamountimportancebecauseitisonlywithintheconfinesofan
electoralinfrastructurebothutilizedandconsideredlegitimatethatwecanthoroughly
examinethefactorsthatcontributedtotheriseinFNvotesharebetweenthe2007and
2012presidentialelections,aswewilldoafterreviewingaselectionofrelevantliterature.
III.LITERATUREREVIEW
Aspreviouslymentioned,theliteratureonextreme-rightvotingisdiverseand
contradictory,aswellasincomplete.Diverseintermsofmethodology,regionalfocus,and
levelofanalysis,contradictorywithrespecttowhatitconcludesupontacklingsomeofthe
mostfundamentalquestionsofthefield,andincompleteinthesensethatthereisalways
moreworktobedoneinordertoclarifytheaforementioned.Beforeintroducingmyown
workandfindingsIwillreviewandcommentuponrelevantliteraturewithrespecttothe
following:
Methodology/regionalfocus/levelofanalysisoftheliterature:
Althoughtheparticularstrengthsandweaknessesofmyresearchdesignwillbe
describedinmoredetailinSectionV,itisworthstatingatthisjuncturethatnoscholarsin
thereviewedliteraturestructuredtheirworkasIstructuredmine:asafirstdifferences
regressiononanintranational,subregionallevel,whichistosayasamodeldesignedto
detectmeaningfulrelationshipsbetweenthechangesinthedependentandindependent
variablesovertime.Instead,utilizingavarietyofresearchdesignsoncross-national,
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
11/40
Aldrich 10
subregional,andindividual(survey)levels,authorsexploredtheeffectsofeconomic
factorslikeunemploymentandinflationrates,socialfactorslikethepresenceof
immigrants,andpoliticalfactorslikeelectoraldistrictmagnitudeandpeoplessatisfaction
withthecurrentpoliticalregimeonsupportforextreme-rightparties.Allworkinthe
reviewedliteraturedealsexclusivelyacrossandwithinthecountriesofEurope,andall
resultsaretheproductsoftheeachauthorsuniqueanalyticalmodels,data,andsetof
assumptions.Therefore,whilealiteraturereviewisusefulincontextualizingtheworkof
thispaper,thereadershouldkeepinmindtheaforementionedqualificationsandrecognize
thattheliteratureonextreme-rightvotinginEuropeis,likeallacademicwork,neither
completenordefinitivelyconclusive.
Theoreticalbackgroundsandresultsoftheliterature:
Whenanalyzingtheeffectsofeconomicfactorsonextreme-rightvoting,most
scholarsworkingonanylevelofaggregatedatachooseatleasttheunemploymentrateas
anoperationalizablevariable.InTheecologicalcorrelatesofright-wingextremismin
WesternEurope(1998),PiaKniggeemploysapooledtime-seriescross-sectionalresearch
designacrosssixWesternEuropeancountriesbetween1984and1993inordertoexamine
therelativestrengthofthreepopularexplanationsofcontemporaryright-wing
extremism:theimpactofeconomicconditions(unemploymentandinflation),social
developments(immigration),andpoliticaltrends(publicsdissatisfactionwiththepolitical
regime).Usinglatentpublicsupportforpartiesoftheextreme-rightratherthanactual
electoraloutcomes(i.e.intentiontovoteforanextreme-rightparty)asherdependent
variable,Kniggefindsthatrisinglevelsofimmigrationandpublicdissatisfactionwiththe
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
12/40
Aldrich 11
politicalregimesignificantlyfacilitateright-wingextremismandthat,contrarytothe
initialhypothesisresultssuggestthatadecliningnationaleconomy(unemploymentin
particular)diminishestheelectoralappealofextremeright-wingparties.Basingher
hypothesisthataseconomicconditionsworsen,WesternEuropeancitizensaremore
likelytolendtheirsupporttoextremeright-wingpartiesontheworkofLewis-Beck
(1988)andPowellandWhitten(1993),Kniggeassumesthatifconditionsofstableprices
andlowunemploymentaremet,theincumbentpartyorcandidateisrewarded.Iftheyare
not,votersinsteadsupporttheopposition,embodiedbyextreme-rightpartiesinWestern
Europe[that]havebeenexcludedfromparticipationingovernmentatleastforthetime
frameconsideredinthepresentcase(i.e.,19841993).17
ForKnigge,avotefortheextreme-right(or,specifically,theintentiontosupportthe
extreme-right)isanactofprotestagainstmainstreampartiesseentohavemismanaged
theeconomy.Aquestioncanberaisedhere,however:wouldanincumbentextreme-right
partyfacethesamethreatofgettingvotedoutwhentheeconomyisunderperforming?
Whilenotanswereddirectly,bothKniggeandMarcelLubbers,writinginExtreme-right
votinginWesternEurope(2002),suggestthatvoterstreatextreme-rightparties
differentlythanmainstreampartiesinsofarasextreme-rightpartiesareviewedas
representativeofaninstitutionalizedopposition,andnotjustanominalone.Goingonand
drawingupontheoriesofeconomicinterestscoveredinBlalock(1967)andOlzak(1992),
Lubberswritesthatincountrieswherecompetitionforscarceresourcesintensifiesdueto
worseningeconomicconditionsoranincreasingnumberofimmigrants,socialgroupsare
morelikelytoperceivestrongercompetitionoverthesescarceresources.Becausepeople
arenotverylikelytoblametheirowngroup(in-group)fortheseincreasinglycompetitive
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
13/40
Aldrich 12
circumstancestheyblameothers(i.e.,out-groups).Itispreciselythisnotionofblaming
out-groupswhichimmigrantscomposeandareplacedintothatformsthebasisof
extreme-rightpartyplatforms,leadingLubberstoencapsulatesuchsentimentinthedual
hypothesisthatIncountrieswheretheunemploymentlevelishigherandthenumberof
immigrantsislarger,supportforextremeright-wingpartiesisgreater.24Lubbersexpands
uponthislogicinanother2002paper,FrenchFrontNationalvoting:amicroandmacro
perspective,wherehewritesthat,onthebasisofRealisticConflictTheory,manual
workersaremorelikelytovotefortheFrontNationalbecausemanualworkersmay
perceiveastrongercompetitivethreatfromethnicminoritiesthanotheroccupational
categories,asimmigrantsfirstandforemostoperateinthesamelabormarketsegmentas
manualworkersdo(Thave2000).Here,beingorsimplyperceivingtobethreatened
byan[ethnicallydistinct]otherisreasontosupporttheextreme-right,thepartythat
categoricallyblamesnationalout-groupsforacountryswoes,andthusLubbersonceagain
ultimatelyhypothesizesthatastheunemploymentlevelisanindicatoroftheeconomic
situationinaregion(Olzak1992),weexpectagainthatinregionswheretheunemployment
levelishigherorwhereunemploymentincreasesstronglypeoplearemorelikelytovotefor
theFrontNational.Goingontoanalyzebothindividuallevelandcontextual(i.e.regional
onthelevelofthedpartement)predictorsofNationalFrontvoting,Lubberssupports
Kniggeinfindingnodirecteffectofunemploymentontheregionallevel,althoughhedoes
findsmallindirecteffectssuchthathigherunemploymentlevelsevokeamore
unfavorableattitudetowardsethnicout-groups,astrongeridentificationwithFranceanda
strongerauthoritarianattitude,whichinturnincreasesthelikelihoodofavoteforthe
FrontNational.Whilealsofindingthatthenumberofethnicimmigrantsdoeshavea
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
14/40
Aldrich 13
directeffect[onsupportfortheFN]insofarasthemoreimmigrants[that]liveinaregion,
thestrongerthesupportforLePen,heconcedesthatbreakingdowntheregionallevelof
analysishassometimesledtodifferentoutcomes,andthatwhenthereisnocontrolfor
compositionaleffects,[the]findingsarenotveryvalid.25
InEconomicsandtheFrenchVoter:AMicroanalysis(1983),MichaelS.Lewis-Beck
revealsthatanaggregatelevelregressionmodelexaminingtheeffectsofeconomic
conditionsonvotinginlegislativeelectionsinapreviouspaperofhis(Lewis-Beckand
Bellucci[1982])[indicated]thatincreasesintheunemploymentratesignificantly
[enhanced]thevoteshareoftheLeft.Insertingthesefindingsintoalargerdiscussion,he
assertsthatitisnotreallysurprisingthattheunemployedshouldvotefortheleft,
becausesuchavotemightbemadeonstrictpolicygroundsthatis,votersmaybelieve
thattheLeft,perhapsbecauseofitsworkingclassbase,ismorelikelytoinitiateprograms
thatwillreduceunemployment.Ultimately,his1983workconcludesthatonanindividual
level,themoreeconomicmalcontentsthereare,themoreLeftistvotesareexpected.This
isatodds,however,withthepreviouslydiscussedliteraturethatpredictsanincreasein
votesharefortherightspecificallytheextreme-rightinbadeconomictimes.Sucha
contradictionrevealsnotonlytheunderdevelopedcausalscenariowithinLewis-Becks
ownwork(whereinheadmitsthat,Ifonethinksaboutit,therearemanyreasonswhy
Frenchcitizensmightnottaketheirpersonaleconomicsituationintoaccountwhen
decidinghowtovote,suchasiftheyfailtoperceivetheirdeterioratingeconomic
circumstance,and,eveniftheydo,decidetoblameothersinsteadofelectedofficials),but
alsotheamountofcontradictionpresentthroughouttheliteratureonextreme-right
voting.21Whatarewetomakeofthesevaryingconclusions?AsMattGolderwrites,The
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
15/40
Aldrich 14
problemisthateconomicvotingtheoriesfocusonhowincumbentpoliticalpartiesare
rewardedorpunishedfortheireconomicperformance.Theydonotexplainwhyvoters
whowishtopunishincumbentpartiesshouldvoteforextreme-rightpartiesoveranyother
oppositionparty.12Despitetheeducatedguessesofsomescholars,Golderiscorrectin
sayingthatwehavenounambiguous,theoreticalscenariothatpredictswhereonthe
ideologicalpartyspectrumweshouldexpectvoterstoturninrejectionofanincumbent
partyshandlingoftheeconomy.
Throughouttheliterature,andparticularlywithaneyetrainedonthepostulated
effectsoftheeconomy(throughtheavatarofunemployment)onextreme-rightvotingas
wehavehadsofar,onecanobservetheconflatingofeconomictensionswithsocialones
suchasthepresenceofimmigrants.Indeed,recallthatLubbersputthetwotogetherinone
hypothesiswhenheclaimedthatsupportforextreme-rightpartiesishigherincountries
withhighunemploymentandahighnumberofimmigrants.Manyauthorsconcur,and
overwhelminglytheliteraturesuggeststhathigherimmigrationisassociatedwithhigher
levelsofsupportforextreme-rightparties.Thisspeakstothefactthat,inthewordsofPaul
Hainsworth,immigrationistheextreme-rightsissueparexcellence,ortheissuethrough
whichallothermeasuresofsupportforextreme-rightpartiesarechanneled.14HildeCoff,
authorofFertilegroundsforextremeright-wingparties:ExplainingtheVlaamsBloks
electoralsuccess(2007),agrees,addingthatifanysingleissuedominatestodays
extremeright-wingplatforms,thenitiscertainlytheissueofimmigration.Coffsupports
suchastatementbyreviewingsomeofthesametheoreticaljustificationcoveredby
Lubbers,suchastheoriesofeconomicinterestandconflicttheory.Illustratingthe
inconclusivenessofallaspectsoftheliteratureonextreme-rightvoting,Coffultimately
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
16/40
Aldrich 15
claimsonlythatthepresenceofimmigrantsmayfacilitate[extreme-rightparties]
electoralgrowth(italicsmine),citingopposingtheoriestothehigherimmigration,higher
extreme-rightvotescenariolikethosediscussedbyW.D.Chapin(1997)andPascal
Perrineau(1997),whichclaimthatpeoplewholiveinclosecontactwithimmigrantsmay
actuallydevelopmorepositivefeelingstowardsthemthanthosewhodonot.CitingP.
Martin(1998),Coffalsodescribesadissentingtheorywhereinanegativerelation
betweenthepresenceofimmigrantsandextremerightvotingmayalsooccurifpeoplewho
arehostiletowardsforeignersleaveplaceswheremanyimmigrantsliveandconcentratein
jurisdictionswithfewerforeigners.Shecouchesbothclaims,however,bysayingsuch
theorieshavelimitedempiricalsupport.4a
If,then,itismorewidelyacceptedthatimmigrantsdocontributetohigherlevelsof
supportforextreme-rightparties,whatisthenatureofsucharelationship?Thesituation,
accordingtoscholarslikeSchainandLubbers,isthatimmigrantsareseenasrepositories
theultimateout-groupsforthewoesofavotingcommunitywillingtoscapegoatthem
inlieuofblamingmembersoftheirownin-group.Extreme-rightpartiesplayintothisin
obviousways,asimmigrantissuesprovideaneasy,visiblefoundationuponwhichagreat
dealoftheirplatformiserected.Oneonlyneedstoreadmediacoverageofanextreme-
rightpartyscampaignorattendarallyinordertoseetheco-optionandpropagationof
suchanissueinaction.Lostintheimmigrationastheextreme-rightissueparexcellence
mix,however,arethemorenuanced,causalexplanationsofextreme-rightvoting,whichis
oneofthereasonswhypoliticalsciencethattriestobreakdownsuchaphenomenoninto
smaller,quantifiablepiecesissovaluable.Onarhetoricallevel,however,immigration
dominates,andletusnotbemistakenthatindeedimmigrationisasignificantcomponent
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
17/40
Aldrich 16
ofextreme-rightvoting.Butwhatisreallygoingonhere?InExplainingVariationinthe
SuccessofExtremeRightPartiesinEurope(2003),MattGolderwrites,Althoughthe
successof[extreme-right]partiesiscommonlyassociatedwithhighlevelsof
unemploymentandimmigration,thecausalstoryremainsambiguous.Dovoterssupport
extreme-rightpartiesbecauseimmigrantsnegativelyaffecttheirmaterialwell-beingor
becauseimmigrantsposeathreattotheirnationalidentity,culture,andwayoflifemore
generally?12Furthermore,doesthereexistsomeimmigrantthresholdwherein
immigrantsizeturnsintoimmigrantrejection,asGallyaLahavquestionsinOpposition
toImmigration:Self-InterestorPublicInterest?(2003)?19Tothatpoint,isitalwaysthe
casethathigherlevelsofimmigrationproducehigherlevelsofsupportfortheextreme-
right,orcoulditbeasCoffandLahavwriteofsomesuggestingthatproximityto
immigrantsactuallydecreasesextreme-rightvotingbecauseimmigrantsarehumanized
andstereotypeseroded,pursuanttotheorieslikePerrineausaforementionedcontact
hypothesis?4a,19,15Whileitisoutsidethescopeofthispapersresearchtopursuethese
questionsindetail,theyneverthelessservetoinformandfilloutthecomplexitiesofissues
suchasimmigration,andcertainlymeritfurtherstudy.
Critiquingmanyoftheauthorshithertodiscussedinmethodologicaltermsand
recognizingtheinconsistenciesinmuchofthesameliteraturethatwehavereviewed(such
asthefactthatKnigge[1998]claimsthatunemploymentreducesthesupportforextreme-
rightparties,whereasJackmanandVolpert[1996]concludetheopposite),MattGolders
ExplainingVariationintheSuccessofExtremeRightPartiesinEurope(2003)examines
theeffectofelectoralinstitutions,unemployment,andimmigrationonthesuccessof
extreme-rightpartiesacross19countriesandover165elections.Amongtheauthors
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
18/40
Aldrich 17
variousfindingsisthatimmigrationhasapositiveeffecton[extreme-right]parties
irrespectiveoftheunemploymentlevel,[and]unemploymentonlymatterswhen
immigrationhishigh.Procedurallyenablingthelatterfindingistheconstructionofan
interactionvariablebetweenimmigrationandunemploymentdesignedtoanalyzewhathe
callsthematerialisthypothesis,whichstatesthat,Unemploymentincreasesthevotefor
extreme-rightpartieswhenimmigrationishigh.Unemploymentdoesnotaffect(orlowers)
thevotesharereceivedbyextreme-rightpartieswhenimmigrationislow.Highly
emphasizingthisinteractionvariable,GoldercriticizesauthorslikeJackmanandVolpert
fornotincludingitintheirmodels,fortonotdosoistoassumethatunemployment
causesindividualstovoteforextreme-rightpartiesinanunconditionalway,whichhe
viewsasfallaciousduetothefactthattheeconomicvotingliteratureprovidesnoevidence
whyhigherlevelsofunemploymentwouldcausepeopletovoteforextreme-rightparties
overanyother.12Aswehavediscussedonlyvarioustheoreticalreasonsthatcouldordo
notcompelapersontovoteforeithertherightorleftunderconditionsofhigh
unemployment(withoutconcludinganythingsubstantive),itshouldbenotedherethat
Golderusesthewordevidence,whichheiscorrectinsayingispresentneitherherenor
intheliteraturereviewedinhiswork.
Inhispaper,Golderfindsempiricalsupportforthesynthesisofunemploymentand
immigration(intheformofaninteractiontermbasedonhismaterialisthypothesis)
increasingthevoteshareforextreme-rightparties,observingthat,Unemploymentonly
increasesthevoteshareofpopulist[extreme-right]partieswhentherearelargenumbers
offoreignersinthecountry.ItshouldbenotedherethatGolderiscarefultodistinguish
populistextreme-rightpartiesfromneo-fascistonesinhiswork,fortheinteractiontermis
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
19/40
Aldrich 18
onlystatisticallysignificantwithrespecttotheformer.12AsGolderandothersdesignate
theNationalFrontapopulistextreme-rightparty,nofurtherdiscussiononthedistinction
suitsourpurposes.DiscussingGoldersmaterialisthypothesisaswellasitsinverseinthe
formofPerrineauscontacthypothesis(moreimmigrants,lesssupportfortheextreme-
right),DavidJesuitandVincentMahlerwriteinElectoralSupportforExtremeRight-Wing
Parties:ASubnationalAnalysisofWesternEuropeanElectionsinthe1990sthatmost
workpursuingeitherhypothesishasbeenbasedonnational-levelstudiesandnote,Of
therelativelyfewempiricalstudiesthathavebeenconductedattheregionallevel,none
hasfoundanunambiguouslinkbetweenimmigrationand[extreme-rightvoting].The
authorscitetheexampleofTerriGivensinTheRoleofSocio-EconomicFactorsinthe
SuccessofExtremeRightParties(2002)findingalinkbetweenahighnumberof
immigrantsandsupportfortheextreme-rightinAustrianandFrenchregionsbutnotin
GermanstatesbeforeadditionallycitingCassMuddesobservationthatthereisan
absenceofaclearcutrelationbetweenthenumberofimmigrantsandtheelectoral
successof[extreme-rightparties]incertainterritorialunits.Reviewingwell-worn
componentsofeconomicvotingliteraturesuchasthetheoryofincumbentpunishment
duringeconomicdownturnsandthequestionofwhyvoterswouldthenturntothe
extreme-rightovertheleft(whosesocialdemocraticparties,itispointedout,havealways
beenthepartiesoffullemployment),JesuitandMahlerdeemGoldersmaterialist
hypothesistheapproachthatismostconsistentwiththepoliticalrhetoricoftheextreme
right,whichoftenblamesnegativeeconomicconditiononforeignmigrants.15
TosingularlycreditGolderwiththisinsightwouldbetoerr,however,because
althoughhemayhavebeentheonetoformalizeandpopularizetheideasencapsulatedin
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
20/40
Aldrich 19
hismaterialisthypothesisheisnotthefirsttohighlightanexusbetweenextreme-right
votingandtheconditionalpresenceofimmigrantsandhighunemployment.Citingthe
wellchosenwordsofNonnaMeyerwhosaidthatbehindtheveryrealcrispationover
immigrationishiddenthedramaofunemployment,itwasMichaelS.Lewis-Beckwho
continuedontostateinFrenchElectoralTheory(1993)thatunemploymentappearsto
dependforitseffectuponthelevelofimmigration.In[dpartements]withfewimmigrants,
[a]highunemploymentratedoesnotreallyincreaseFNsupport.However,asthenumber
ofimmigrantsincreases,theimpactfromunemploymentintensifies.Inotherwords,the
presenceofunemployment,byitself,doesnotyieldsignificantlymoreFNvotingItis
unemploymentcoupledwithimmigrationthatmotivatesNationalFrontsupport.Claiming
thatthepsychologicalmechanismforsuchaninteractioneffectseemsstraightforward,
Lewis-Beckassertsthatvotersinregionswithahighnumberofimmigrantsbelievethat
immigrantscauseunemployment,anattributionencouragedbyapopular[Jean-Marie]
LePenslogan,twomillionunemployed=twomillionimmigrants.Thus,forthese
voters,hecontinues,theunemploymentproblemissolvedbyaballotfortheNational
Front,whichproposesharshimmigrationcontrols.HefurthercreditsPerrineau(1988)
forsurveyevidencethatFNvotersdoindeedoverwhelminglymakethispsychological
attribution,strengtheninghisargument.InFrenchElectoralTheory(1993),Lewis-Beck
looksatthethreesocialcleavagesofclass,religion,andideology(basinghisfirstoftwo
researchdesignsonindividuallevelsurveydata)andthenseekstoevaluatetheissue-base
ofFNsupportbyanalyzingimmigration,crime,andunemploymenttheissueshesays
areconsistentlyjudgedtrsimportantbybothsurveysandjournalisticaccountsonthe
aggregateleveloftheFrenchdistrict(inhiscase,thedpartement).Measuringtheseissues
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
21/40
Aldrich 20
upagainstthedependentvariableofFNvotesharereceivedinthe1986French
parliamentaryelectionsperdpartement,hesayshisaggregatelevelworkisdesignedto
avoidsurveydatasinherentproblemofonlyrevealingwhatvoterssaid,notwhatthey
did.Operationalizingtheeffectsofthenumberofimmigrants,crimesagainstpersonsper
1,000inhabitants,andtheunemploymentrate(allperdpartement)onthedependent
variableandincludinganinteractiontermunemploymentXimmigration,Lewis-Beckfinds
strong,positivecorrelationsforimmigrationandcrime,asurprisinglyweakbutstill
positivecorrelationforunemployment,andstrongsupportfortheinteractionof
unemploymentandimmigration,whosepositivecoefficientishighlystatistically
significant.Ultimately,hesayshismodelrevealsthat,Constituencieswithhighcrime
rates,andapronouncedimmigrantpresenceinthemidstofelevatedunemployment,are
fertilegroundforNationalFrontrecruiters.22
Whilecrimehasbeenlargelyabsentfromtheliteratureandresearchdesignswe
havereviewedthusfar,Lewis-Becksinclusionofthevariablespeakstoitsrelevancetothe
issueofextreme-rightvoting.InFertilegroundsforextremeright-wingparties:Explaining
theVlaamsBlokselectoralsuccess(2007),HildeCoffagreesthattherelationship
betweencrimeandextremerightperformancehasrarelybeenstudiedempirically,yet
callscrimeacentraltopicofextremeright-parties,particularlyforthepartyofherfocus,
theBelgianVlaamsBlok.Despiteitsrelativelackofscholarship,Coffhypothesizesthat
crimehasasignificanteffectonthesuccessoftheextremerightparties.Interestingly,
however,inherstudyshefindsthatcrimedoesnotdeterminetheelectoralsuccessofthe
VlaamsBlokonamunicipallevel.4aAlthoughthetwoaforementionedauthorsexamineit,
furtherstudyofcrimeseffectonelectoralsupportforextreme-rightpartiesmeritsthe
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
22/40
Aldrich 21
considerationofallscholarsduetothevariablesrhetoricalcentralityamongstsuch
factions.
Mycontributiontotheliterature:
Clearly,therearesignificantgapstofillacrosstheentiretyofthescholarshipon
extreme-rightvoting.Inadditiontocompletingmoreresearchoncrimeseffectonsupport
fortheextreme-right,thereismoreworktobedoneontheunresolvedissueofwhyvoters
wouldchooseonepartyoveranothergivenapooreconomy,aswellasinformingamore
completeunderstandingofwhatwemeanwhenwediscusstheeconomyseffecton
extreme-rightvoting.JesuitandMahler,forexample,admitthattherehasbeenlittleeffort
todeterminewhethernegativeeconomicconditionsotherthanunemployment,either
aloneorinconjunctionwithhighimmigration,areassociatedwithsupportfor[extreme-
rightparties]suchashigherpovertyorincomeinequality.15Whilstincomplete,thesum
oftheextantliteratureisenoughtoaidandinformadditionalstudiesofextreme-right
votingacrossanylevelsandregionsofanalysis.Tothisend,althoughmyresearchdraws
theoreticallyonallofthereviewedliterature,itspecificallyreliesuponthesubregional
workofMichaelS.Lewis-BeckinFranceandthecross-nationalworkofMattGolder,both
ofwhomhaveparticularlycontributedtoourunderstandingoftheinteractiveeffectsof
unemploymentandimmigration.Unlikethetwoauthorscross-sectionalresearchdesigns,
however,myworkemploysafirstdifferencesdesigninordertocapturetheeffectsof
changingvariableswithinaspecificperiodoftime.Theadvantagesofthismodelwillbe
elucidatedinSectionV.Itiswithalloftheaforementionedinmindthatwemoveontoa
reviewoftheincorporateddata.
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
23/40
Aldrich 22
IV.DATA
Dependentvariables:Mydependentvariableisthechangeinvotesharereceivedbythe
NationalFrontbetweenthe2007and2012presidentialelections(FNchange0712=%
voteshare2012%voteshare2007)perdpartement.Dataforbothyearswerecollected
fromtheNorwegianSocialScienceDataServicesEuropeanElectionandReferendum
Database,whichwereinturnsourcedfromtheCentrededonnessocio-politiquesatthe
Institutd'tudespolitiquesdeParis(SciencesPo).8TheFrenchdpartementisoneofthree
levelsofgovernmentbelowthenationallevel,betweenthergionandthecommune.
Rgionscontainsdpartementsanddpartementscontaincommunes.MainlandFrance
(which,asmentionedpreviously,includestheislandofCorsica)contains96dpartements,
allofwhichareincludedinmydata.ExcludedarethefiveoverseasdpartementsofFrench
Guiana,Guadeloupe,Martinique,Runion,andMayotte,whicharealsoknownasoverseas
rgionsandhavethesamelegalstatusasbothmetropolitanequivalents.
Independentvariables:Myprimaryindependentvariableofinterestisthechangeinthe
unemploymentrateperdpartementbetween2007and2012(Unempchange0712=%
unemploymentrate2012%unemploymentrate2007).Otherindependentcontrol
variablesinvolvetheregionalpresenceofimmigrants,incidentsofcrime,andvarious
interactionvariables.Duetotheunavailabilityofimmigrationdataonthedpartemental
level,thepercentageofimmigrants(trangers,ornon-Frenchnationals)perdpartement
wascodedasavariablerangingbetween1and5;1associatedwithaverylow
percentageofimmigrantsinthatdpartementsrgion(lessthan3%),2withalow
percentageofimmigrants(3%to4%),3withmediumpercentageofimmigrants(4%to
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
24/40
Aldrich 23
5%),4withhighpercentageofimmigrants(5%to8%),and5withaveryhigh
percentageofimmigrants(morethan8%)fortheyears2007and2012.Theactual
variable,then,isthecategoricalchangeinthepercentageofimmigrantsrepresentedby
eachdpartementscodedrgionalvariable(Immchange0712=codedimmigration
variable2012codedimmigrationvariable2007).Thecrimevariableisthechangein
reportedassaultcrimes(atteintesvolontairesl'intgritphysique)perdpartement
between2007and2011,theyearsforwhichdatawereavailable(Crimechange0712=
crimeperdpartement2011crimeperdpartement2007).
Inadditiontothesevariables,threeinteractiontermswerecreatedalongwitha
dummyvariable.Thedummyvariable,Immdummy,representsdpartementswithahigh
percentageofimmigrantsrelativetoothersinthebaseyearof2007.Eachdpartementwas
codedeither0or1,theformerifthedpartements[rgional]immigrationlevelwas
previouslycategorizedas3orbelow(lowimmigration)andthelatteriftheimmigration
levelwas4or5(highimmigration).Asevidentinthesummarystatisticsbelow,36%of
Frenchdpartementsin2007wereclassifiedashavinghighimmigration.Thisdummy
variableistheonlymeasureofhighimmigrationinthedataset,forthesummarystatistics
showthatthergionalpresenceofimmigrantsonlywentdownbetween2007and2012,a
trendcorroboratedbyjournalisticaccountsofimmigrationinFrancethatreferencethe
timeperiodathand.5Withrespecttotheinteractions,thefirsttwoincludethe
aforementioneddummyvariable:ImmdummyXunempchangeoperationalizestheeffect
ofchangingunemploymentonthechangeinFNvoteshareindpartementswithhigh
immigration,andImmdummyXcrimechangeoperationalizestheeffectofchangingcrime
onthechangeinFNvoteshareindpartementswithhighimmigration.Thethird
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
25/40
Aldrich 24
interactionterm,ImmXunemp,measurestheeffectofchangingunemploymentin
dpartementswithchanginglevelsofimmigration.Allimmigrationdata,toreiterate,are
measuredonthelevelofeachdpartementsrgion.
UnemploymentandimmigrationdatawerecollectedfromINSEE,theFrench
NationalInstituteofStatisticsandEconomicStudies(Institutnationaldelastatistiqueet
destudesconomiques),andcrimedatawerecollectedfromLaDocumentationfranaise,a
subsidiaryofDILA,theFrenchDirectorateofLegalandAdministrativeInformation
(Directiondel'informationlgaleetadministrative).1,2,4,6,18
Table1:SummaryandDescriptiveStatistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
VoteforFN2007 96 11.04792 3.144272 4.58 17.28VoteforFN2012 96 18.94292 4.441674 6.2 27.03Imm2007 96 2.885417 1.280377 1 5Imm2012 96 2.71875 1.335374 1 5Unemp2007 96 7.891667 1.600899 4.8 11.8
Unemp2012 96 9.722917 1.816154 6.2 14.4Crime07 96 4513.115 5999.926 237 33670Crime12 96 4875.115 6547.44 234 35750FNchange0712 96 7.895 1.572506 1.62 10.92Unempchange0712 96 1.83125 0.6207488 0.2999992 3.7Immchange0712 96 -0.1666667 0.3746343 -1 0Immdummy 96 0.3645833 0.4838397 0 1Crimechange0712 96 1.09207 0.0992172 0.9008572 1.371169ImmXunemp 96 -0.3302084 0.7695686 -2.900001 0ImmdummyXunempchange 96 0.5864583 0.8725787 0 3.2ImmdummyXcrimechange 96 0.3979343 0.5313959 0 1.3711569
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
26/40
Aldrich 25
V.RESEARCHDESIGN
Asmentionedintheliteraturereview(SectionIII),myresearchisstructuredaround
aseriesoffirstdifferencesOLSregressionsdesignedtoassesstheeffectsofthechanges
inmyindependentvariablesonthechangeinmydependentvariable,thechangeinFN
voteshareperdpartementbetween2007and2012.Althoughprincipallyinterestedinthe
effectofthechangeinunemploymentonFNvoteshare,embodiedintheestimating
equation[FNvotesharedr=+1Unempdr+dr],Iwillcontrolfortheother
confoundingindependentvariablesmentionedaboveinSectionIV,embodiedand
emphasizedintheestimatingequation[FNvotesharedr=+1Unempdr+
2Immdummy07r+3UnempdrxImmdummy07r+4Crimedr+5Crimedrx
Immdummy07r+dr].Inadvanceofpresentingandanalyzingmyresults,itshouldbe
mentionedthattheyareconstrainedbythepowerandrefinementoftheirunderpinning
data.Duetoalackofavailabledataonthedpartementallevelorlower,myimmigration
dataareparticularlycoarse,measured(onceagain)asordinalvariablesontheaggregate
levelofthergion.Futureresearchwouldbenefitfromutilizingdatameasuredas
continuousvariablesonthelevelofthedpartement,forwhilesummarystatisticsshow
thatnorgionscoded1-5variableincreasedbetween2007and2012itcouldverywellbe
thatthepercentageofresidentimmigrantsincertaindpartementsdidincrease.An
additionallimitationtomyresearchdesignistheuseofassaultcrimeasaproxyforcrime
ingeneral,whichwasalsoduetoalackofotheravailabledata.Futureresearchcould
benefitfromdistinguishingtheeffectsofdifferenttypesofcrimesonelectoralsupportfor
theextreme-right.Concedingtheselimitations,myresearchdesignisnonetheless
strengthenedbyitsfirst-differencesconfiguration.Thisdesignmeasuresthechanges
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
27/40
Aldrich 26
betweeneachvariable,thusnettingoutproblematiccompositionaleffects,orthe
characteristicsofeachdpartementthatdonotchange.Ihypothesizethefollowing:
H1:FNvoteshareandunemploymentarepositivelycorrelated,thusthechangeinFNvote
sharewillincreaseindpartementswithrisingunemployment.
H2:FNvoteshareandimmigrationarepositivelycorrelated,thusthechangeinFNvote
sharewillincreaseindpartementswithhigherpercentagesofimmigrants.
H3:FNvoteshareandcrimearepositivelycorrelated,thusthechangeinFNvotesharewill
increaseindpartementswithrisingcrime.
H4:TheeffectsofunemploymentandcrimeonFNvotesharearegreaterindpartements
withhighpercentagesofimmigrants,i.e.theinteractionofimmigrationwiththesevariables
leadstolargerFNvoteshare.
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
28/40
Aldrich 27
VI.RESULTS
Table2:OrdinaryLeastSquares(OLS)Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange071VARIABLES
Unempchange0712 1.091*** 1.069*** 1.083*** 1.056*** 1.255*** (.310) (0.309) (0.319) (0.319) (0.301)Immchange0712 -0.336 -0.351 (0.270) (0.274) Crimechange0712 0.328 0.489 0.174 (1.411) 1.429 (1.272)Immdummy 0.791**
(0.288)Constant 5.897*** 5.881*** 5.554*** 5.369*** 5.119*** (0.644) (0.647) (1.514) (1.539) (1.394) N 96 96 96 96 96r 0.186 0.192 0.186 0.193 0.241 Standarderrorsinparentheses *p
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
29/40
Aldrich 28
andpositiveeffectonFNvoteshare.Sincethechangeincrimeisnotsignificantlydifferent
than0itcannotbesaidtohaveaneffect.Controllingforboththechangeinimmigration
andthechangeincrimeincolumn4,thechangeinunemploymentstillexertsapositive,
statisticallysignificanteffectonthechangeinFNvoteshare.Thesignificance,however,has
fallenfromthe1%leveltothe5%level.Sincethechangeinimmigrationandthechangein
crimearenotsignificantlydifferentthan0,thevariablescannotbesaidtohaveaneffect.
Examiningthechangeinunemployment,thechangeincrime,andthedpartementswith
regionallyhighpercentagesofimmigrants(expressedbythedummyvariableImmdummy)
incolumn5,boththechangeinunemploymentandtheimmigrationleveldummyare
foundtobesignificant,thelatterresultwhichsuggeststhatitisalargepercentageof
immigrantsperrgionpersethatmeaningfullyinfluenceselectoralsupportforthe
extreme-right,asopposedtothefluctuationofimmigrantsfoundtobeinsignificantin
regressionmodels2and4.Thechangeinunemploymentisonceagainhighlystatistically
significantatthe1%level.Theimmigrationdummyvariableisassociatedwitha.791
(79%)increaseinFNvoteshareandissignificantatthe1%level.
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
30/40
Aldrich 29
Table3:InteractionEffects
(1) (2) (3) (4) FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange0712 FNchange0712
VARIABLES
Unempchange0712 1.091*** 0.688** 1.248*** 1.132** (0.310) (0.225) (0.293) (0.350)Immdummy -1.495 -5.089 (1.163) (2.933) ImmdummyXunempchange 1.297* (0.600) Crimechange0712 0.223 -1.729 0.584 (1.308) (1.338) (1.454)ImmdummyXcrimechange 5.383*
(2.628) Immchange0712 -1.777 (1.105)ImmXunemp 0.725 (1.105)Constant 5.897*** 6.1777*** 7.210*** 5.128*** (0.644) (1.373) (1.421) (1.612)N 96 96 96 96r 0.186 0.3 0.267 0.201
Standarderrorsinparentheses *p
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
31/40
Aldrich 30
increasesinelectoralsupportfortheFNindpartementswithinhighimmigrantrgions,
comparedtothosewithinrelativelylowimmigrantrgions(reflectedin
Unempchange0712).ThissupportstheinteractioncomponentofMattGolder's"materialist
hypothesis"onasubregionallevel,andisthemainfindingofmyanalysis.Thecoefficientin
column2suggeststhat,givena1standarddeviationchangeinunemployment(.62),the
interactions(.68)(.62)+(1.3)(1)(.62)=1.23effectonFNvoteshareis81%largerin
magnitudethantheobservedeffectinareasoflowimmigration,(.68)(.62)=.42.Wecan
thinkofthecoefficientasstemmingfromtheequation:[FNvoteshare=6.2+.68
(Unempchange0712)1.4(Immdummy)+1.3(Immdummy)(Unempchange0712)],where
6.2istheconstantterm.Immdummy,capturingdpartementswithahighpercentageof
immigrantsnotexperiencingachangeinunemployment,failstoachievestatistical
significance,asdoesCrimechange0712.
Likecolumn2,themodelincolumn3oftable3includesUnempchange0712,
Immdummy,andCrimechange0712,butinsteadoftheinteractionbetweenhigh
immigrationandthechangeinunemploymentitcontainsaninteractionbetweenthe
dummyforhighimmigrationandthechangeincrime,ImmdummyXcrimechange.Boththis
interactionandUnempchange0712werefoundtohavepositivecoefficientsandbe
statisticallysignificant.Givena1standarddeviationchangeincrime(.099),the
interactions(-1.729)(.099)+(5.383)(1)(.099)=.361effectonFNvoteshareisabout
53.2%largerinmagnitudethantheobservedeffectinareasoflowimmigration
(representedbyCrimechange0712),(-1.729)(.099)=-.171.Theaboveispursuanttothe
followingequation:[FNvoteshare=7.21.729(Crimechange0712)5.089(Immdummy)+
5.383(Immdummy)(Crimechange0712)]where7.2istheconstantterm.Thecoefficientsof
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
32/40
Aldrich 31
Immdummy(representingdpartementswithinhighimmigrantrgionsnotexperiencing
changingcrime)andCrimechange0712(representingdpartementswithchangingcrime
withinlowimmigrantrgions)arenotstatisticallysignificantandthuscannotbesaidtobe
differentthan0.
Aswehaveseenincolumns2and3oftable3,separateregressionsshowthatthe
interactionsbetweenchangingunemploymentandhighimmigration
(ImmdummyXunempchange)andchangingcrimeandhighimmigration
(ImmdummyXcrimechange)eachachievestatisticalsignificanceandcontributetorising
FNvoteshareindependentofoneanother.Thusanadditionalregressionmodel,notshown
above,wasdesignedtotestthesetwostatisticallysignificantinteractionstogether.
However,thedatadoesnothavesufficientvariationforbothinteractionstobeestimated.
Despitesuchinsufficientvariation,Inonethelessmaintainthatthechangein
unemployment(Unempchange0712)andthechangeincrime(Crimechange0712)
representtwodistincteffects,asthereexistsa-.22correlationcoefficientbetweenthetwo
variables.Giventheabove,wecanviewthestatisticalsignificanceoftheinteraction
betweenhighimmigrationandthechangeincrimeincolumn3oftable3asaninteresting,
yetnonethelesscomplementaryfindingwithrespecttoourprimaryresultofinterest,the
statisticallysignificantinteractionbetweenhighimmigrationandthechangein
unemploymentuncoveredincolumn2oftable3.
Incolumn4oftable3aregressionincludingUnempchange0712,Crimechange0712,
Immchange0712,andaconstructedinteractionvariablebetweenthechangein
immigrationandthechangeinunemployment(ImmXunemp)revealsthatonlythechange
inunemploymentattainedsignificance(atthe5%level).Thisfindingmayreflectthe
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
33/40
Aldrich 32
coarsenatureoftheimmigrationvariable,whichdoesnotvarymuch.ThusagainIview
column2oftable3asthemainspecification.
Principally,andinsummation,thedatashowthattheinteractionbetweenchanging
unemploymentandhighregionallevelsofimmigrantsexertsthehighesteffectonFNvote
share,causingittorisebyavectorof1.23per1standarddeviationincreasein
unemployment.ThevariableImmdummyXunempchangecapturesthiseffect.Tolesser
degreesthechangeinunemploymentingeneral,theinteractionbetweenhighimmigration
andcrime,andhighimmigrationingeneralalsocontributedtotheriseinFNvoteshare.
ThevariablesUnempchange0712,ImmdummyXcrimechange,andImmdummycapture
theseeffects.AreviewofthestatedhypothesesinSectionVrevealsthatH1,H2,andH4
werecorrect.H3,whichpostulatedthatrisingcrimebyitselfwouldcontributetothe
Frenchextreme-rightvote,wasnotcorroboratedbythedata.Aspreviouslystated,
however,theinteractionofchangingcrimewithhighrgionalimmigrationdidhavea
positive,statisticallyeffectonelectoralsupportfortheNationalFront.
VII.CONCLUSION
Asthedatashow,interactionsmatter.Suchaconclusionbuildsupontheworkof
MichaelS.Lewis-BeckandMattGolder,andparticularlysupportsanamendedversionof
Golders2003materialisthypothesisonasubregionallevel.Theamendmentwemust
makereferstothefactthatwhileGolderconcludesthatimmigrationhasapositiveeffect
on[extreme-right]partiesirrespectiveoftheunemploymentlevel,[and]unemployment
onlymatterswhenimmigrationhishigh,ourdatashowthatunemploymentdoesnotonly
matterwhenimmigrationishigh,andinsteadexertsapositiveandstatisticallysignificant
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
34/40
Aldrich 33
effectonFNvoteshareregardlessofthergionallevelofimmigration.12Itseffectissimply
enhancedbyaninteractionwithhighimmigration,byapproximately81%over
dpartementswithinlowimmigrantrgions.Interestingly,themostsalientinteractionterm
discoveredbyMichaelS.Lewis-BecktoaffectFNvotesharein1986,thatbetween
immigrationandcrime,wasnotours,andwhilestillpositivelycorrelatedhecalledthe
effectofourstrongestmotivatingforce,theinteractionbetweenimmigrationand
unemployment,surprisinglyweak.22
Consideringourresultsinthelightofthereviewedliterature,itappearsthat
subregionalmotivatorsofextreme-rightvotinglargelyconform,inmicrocosm,tothose
observedonthecross-nationalaggregatelevelinEurope.Thiswasatleastthecasein
Francebetween2007and2012.Whatcontinuestoeludescholars,however,isnotamore
variedpictureofextreme-rightvotingacrossdifferenttiersofanalysis;itisamore
universalconsensusastowhatdrivesthephenomenoninthefirstplace.Certainly,thereis
worktobedonetoimprovetheformer:asJesuitandMahlerobservedthatmostworkin
thefieldhasbeenbasedonnational-levelstudies,ithasbeenmygoaltoprogress
subregionalstudiesthroughtheanalysisofFrancebetweenitspasttwoelectioncycles.15
However,myfindingsultimatelycomeupagainstthemoreintractableandpermanent
problemsofthetheoreticalandempiricalcontradictionfoundrifethroughoutthe
literatureonextreme-rightvoting.WhileIcontributethefactthatunemployment,a
relativelyhighregionalpresenceofimmigrants,theinteractionbetweenhighimmigration
andunemployment,andtheinteractionbetweenhighimmigrationandcrimeincreasethe
extreme-rightvote,authorssuchasPiaKniggestillmaintainthatunemploymentdoesnot
matter,forexample,andothersmaintainthatevenifitdoes,thereisnoacceptable
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
35/40
Aldrich 34
theoreticaljustificationforwhyvotersshouldturntotheextreme-rightoveranyother
partyintimesofeconomicdownturn.17
Itgoeswithoutsaying,then,thatfutureresearchandanalysisisnecessary.Mywork
wouldspecificallybenefitfrombeingredonewithmorerefinedimmigrationdata,soasto
moreaccuratelyrepresentthedpartementalelectoralreactiontochanginglevelsof
immigrants.Additionally,theeffectsofdifferentexpressionsofcrimeanddeclining
economicconditions(suchaspropertycrimeandlevelsofpoverty)couldbetestedsoasto
achieveamorenuancedunderstandingofthosetwophenomena.Overall,suchfuturework
wouldnotonlyservetoadvancethescholarlycommunityscomprehensionofextreme-
rightvoting,itwouldilluminateextreme-rightpartieschannelsofelectoralsupportforthe
edificationofallwhoareaffectedbytheirpolicies,bothdirectlyandindirectly.AsFrances
economicanddemographicgeographycontinuetoevolve,furtherscrutinyoftheregional
motivatorsoftheNationalFrontvoteandtheelectoralsuccessestheyportendwould
benefitpoliticians,policymakers,andprivatecitizensalike.
VIII.REFERENCES
1Cadenel,Nicole,ed."Infosmigrations:Lapopulationtrangreen2007."INED.Institut
nationald'tudesdmographiques,Feb.2011.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
2"Chmageparcommune,dpartement,rgion,zoned'emploide20012012."INSEE.
Institutnationaldelastatistiqueetdestudesconomiques,2012.Web.18Feb.
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
36/40
Aldrich 35
2013..
3Chrisafis,Angelique."Frenchelection:MarineLePenvotersgrapplewiththeirroleas
kingmakers."TheGuardian23Apr.2012:n.pag.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
4"Circonscriptionslgislativespourleslectionsde2012."INSEE.Institutnationaldela
statistiqueetdestudesconomiques,2012.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
4aCoff,Hilde,BrunoHeyndels,andJanVermeir.Fertilegroundsforextremeright-wing
parties:ExplainingtheVlaamsBlokselectoralsuccess.ElectoralStudies26(2007):
142-55.PDFfile.
5Corbet,Sylvie."France:RecordNumberofIllegalImmigrantsExpelled."TheHuffington
Post10Jan.2012,Worlded.:n.pag.Web.28Feb.2013.
.
6"CriminalitetdlinquanceconstatesenFrance."LaDocumentationfranaise.Direction
del'informationlgaleetadministrative(DILA),2007.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
7Crowell,ThomasY."'FactorsinaTwo-PartyandMultipartySystem-TheTechnicalFactor:
TheElectoralSystem.'"PartyPoliticsandPressureGroups(1972):23-32.Print.
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
37/40
Aldrich 36
8"Dataset:France:PresidentialElection2012."EuropeanElectionDatabase.Norwegian
SocialScienceDataServices,n.d.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
8aFrance24."NationalFronthopestowinseatsinparliament."France24.France24,14
June2012.Web.4Mar.2013..
9Fouquet,Helen."Anti-EuroLePenPartyWinsFirstParliamentSeatsin15Years."
BloombergBusinessweek17June2012:n.pag.BloombergBusinessweek.Web.18
Feb.2013..
10"France'sNationalFront:Ddiabolisation."TheEconomist11Aug.2012:n.pag.The
Economist.Web.18Feb.2013..
11Gas,Valrie."LePen,sonuniversimpitoyable."RFI.RadioFranceInternationale,9Jan.
2006.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
12Golder,Matt."ExplainingVariationintheSuccessofExtremeRightPartiesinWestern
Europe."ComparativePoliticalStudies36.4(2003):432-66.Print.
13Haski,Pierre."WhythefarrightdidsowellintheFrenchelection."TheGuardian23Apr.
2012:n.pag.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
38/40
Aldrich 37
13aHenley,Jon."ThetruefaceoftheNationalFront."TheGuardian25Apr.2002:n.pag.
Web.4Mar.2013..
14Jackman,RobertW.,andKarinVolpert."ConditionsFavouringPartiesoftheExtreme
RightinWesternEurope."BritishJournalofPoliticalScience26.4(1996):501-21.
PDFfile.
15Jesuit,David,andVincentMahler."ElectoralSupportforExtremeRight-WingPatries:A
SubnationalAnalysisofWesternEuropeanElectionsinthe1990s."American
PoliticalScienceAssociation(2004):n.pag.PDFfile.
16JTA."LePenConvictionforHolocaustDenialUpheld."TheForward[NewYork]17Feb.
2012:n.pag.Web.28Feb.2013..
17Knigge,Pia."Theecologicalcorrelatesofright-wingextremisminWesternEurope."
EuropeanJournalofPoliticalResearch34(1998):249-79.PDFfile.
18"LaDlinquanceconstateenFrance."LaDocumentationfranaise.Directionde
l'informationlgaleetadministrative(DILA),2011.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
19Lahav,Gallya."OppositiontoImmigration:Self-interestorPublicInterest?"International
BiannualEuropeanUnionStudiesConvention(2003):n.pag.PDFfile.
20Lauter,Devorah,andKimWillsher."Frenchvillageembracesanextremist."TheLos
AngelesTimes29Apr.2012:n.pag.Web.18Feb.2013.
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
39/40
Aldrich 38
.
21Lewis-Beck,MichaelS."EconomicsandtheFrenchVoter:AMicroanalysis."ThePublic
OpinionQuarterly47.3(1983):347-60.PDFfile.
22Lewis-Beck,MichaelS.,andGlennE.Mitchell,II."FrenchElectoralTheory:TheNational
FrontTest."ElectoralStudies12.2(1993):112-27.PDFfile.
23Loyola,Mario."WhyDidSoManyFrenchVoteforFar-RightMarineLePenandHer
NationalFront?"NationalReview22Apr.2012:n.pag.NationalReviewOnline.Web.
18Feb.2013..
24Lubbers,Marcel,MroveGijsberts,andPeerScheepers."Extremeright-wingvotingin
WesternEurope."EuropeanJournalofPoliticalResearch41(2002):345-78.PDFfile.
25Lubbers,Marcel,andPeerScheepers."FrenchFrontNationalvoting:amicroandmacro
perspective."EthnicandRacialStudies25.1(2002):120-49.PDFfile.
26Mestre,Abel."MarineLePen:thefaceofFrenchEuroscepticism."TheGuardian26Jan.
2012:n.pag.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
27Rawlinson,Kevin."EnglishDefenceLeague'tobecomepoliticalpartyandstand
candidatesinEuropeanelections',says'TommyRobinson.'"TheIndependent11Oct.
2012:n.pag.Web.18Feb.2013..
7/29/2019 Economic Voting and the National Front: Towards a Subregional Understanding of the Extreme-Right Vote in France
40/40
Aldrich 39
28Samuels,Henry."FrenchandGreekpoliticalearthquakespointtoriseoftheanti-
austeritymovement."TheTelegraph7May2012:n.pag.TheTelegraph.Web.18
Feb.2013.
.
29Savaricas,Nathalie."Greecesneo-fascistsareontherise...andnowtheyregoinginto
schools:HowGoldenDawnisnurturingthenextgeneration."TheIndependent2
Feb.2013:n.pag.Web.18Feb.2013.
.
30Schain,MartinA."Extreme-RightVoting."NewYorkUniversity.NewYorkUniversity,
NewYork.15Feb.2012.Lecture.
31---.ThePoliticsofImmigrationinFrance,Britain,andtheUnitedStates:AComparative
Study.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2008.Print.
32"UnitedagainstJobbik."TheEconomist12Dec.2012:n.pag.TheEconomist.Web.18Feb.
2013..
33Villarreal,Ryan."DutchParliamentaryElections:WillFar-RightFreedomPartyDefyPolls
Again?"InternationalBusinessTimes12Sept.2012:n.pag.Web.18Feb.2013.