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Marriage and the Family
• Focus on 3 issues1) Race differences in marriage and family structure:
- changes over time; - economic explanations.
2) Male marriage premium
3) Divorce:
- economic analysis;
- economic consequences.
• Three Possible Explanations:
1) Changes in marriage markets
2) Changes in wage rates
3) Role of the welfare system• Probably all 3 have played a role for women; some
for all women, some for specific groups of women.
More on Changing Marriage Markets
• Male Marriageable Pool Index (MMPI): ratio of the number of employed men to the number of women (calculated separately by race and age; also could be calculated by education)
• MMPI = [# employed men / # women]• Balance in marriage market: if MMPI 1, poor
prospects for women• At birth: MMPI = 1 (approximately).• But what if MMPI falls?
Falling MMPI
• Reasons for MMPI:
1) decline in the number of employed men
2) increase in incarceration rates
3) increase in mortality rates • All of the above have disproportionately
affected black men
Women’s Wage Rates and Race Differentials in Marriage
• Gains from the trade model: – As women’s wages rise, differences in market productivity between
men and women falls so gains are reduced.– Data supporting this possible cause of lower marriage rates: sex wage
differences less for blacks than whites.
• Supply and Demand model: – As women’s wages rise, their supply of marriage curve shifts left,
reducing marriage rates.
• Also, as women education, they delay fertility. So like-educated men face worse marriage prospects as well.
The Welfare System
• Key: “production” while single.– Supply and Demand model: if Zf , then likelihood of
marrying falls.• History of Welfare– Social Security Act of 1935: created ADC (became
AFDC); now TANF.– Beneficiaries: poor mother-only families.– In 1935: mostly widows (deemed “deserving” of support)– Today: monthly benefits are quite low
Marriage and the Earnings of Men
• Marriage wage premium: – On average, married men earn more than unmarried men. – Hard to disentangle source of premium.– Has persisted throughout most of the 20th century and exists
in other countries as well.
• Three theories: 1) Married men not more productive, just paid more because
employers know they support families. 2) Marriage productivity effect (from specialization); 3) Selectivity effect: more productive men more likely
to marry.
• What about married females’ wages?– Family pay gap:
• Lower wages for married women.• Lower wages for mothers.
• The divorce rate started increasing in the 1950s.• Current divorce probabilities:
– Within 5 years: 20% disrupted.– Within 10 years: 33% disrupted.– Within 20 years: 50% disrupted.
• Disrupted= divorce or separation• Rate per thousand people actually peaked in 1981, and has been declining
over the ensuing quarter century. • The divorce rate in 2008—16.7 divorces per 1000 marriages.
Economic Analysis of Divorce
• If marriage results from gains to trade, then divorce is the opposite; couples will divorce if they’ll be better off divorced than married.
• Imperfect information and costly search– Can’t know everything about a potential spouse before
marriage– Search is costly
• Utility from search is maximized by balancing marginal costs and benefits of search
– Information that surfaces after marriage may be positive or negative; if the latter, divorce may result
The Coase Theorem
• The Coase Theorem: If transaction costs are small or nonexistent, then a change in property rights does not change resource allocation but does influence wealth.
• The Coase Theorem relies on four strong assumptions: – Costless bargaining– Symmetric information– Transferability
The Coase Theorem (continued)
• If we put the Coase Theorem in the context of divorce:– “transaction costs” are costs that are incurred when
obtaining the divorce– “property rights” refer to which person in the couple gets to
decide whether he or she wants to divorce.