MIGRATIONPOLICY PRACTICEISSN 2223-5248

Joint Managing Editors:• SolonArdittis(Eurasylum)• FrankLaczko(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Advisers:

• JoannevanSelm(Eurasylum)• KarolinePopp(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Coordinator:

• ValerieHagger(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

Editorial Assistants:• MyleneBuensuceso(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)• AnnaLynConstantino(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Committee:

• AderantiAdepoju(HumanResourcesDevelopmentCentre,Lagos,Nigeria)

• RichardAresBaumgartner(EuropeanAgencyfortheManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersoftheEuropeanUnion–FRONTEX,Warsaw)

• PeterBosch(EuropeanCommission,Brussels)

• JuanCarlosCalleros(StaffOfficeofthePresidentofMexico)

• DavidCostello(Commissioner,OfficeoftheRefugeeApplications,fromtheGovernmentofIreland)

• HowardDuncan(Metropolis,Ottawa,Canada)

• NeliEsipova(GallupWorldPoll,NewYork)

• AraceliAzuaraFerreiro(OrganizationofAmericanStates–OAS,Washington,D.C.)

• PhilippeFargues(MigrationPolicyCentre–MPC,Florence)

• LukasGehrke(InternationalCentreforMigrationPolicyDevelopment–ICMPD,Vienna)

• ShahidulHaque(MinistryofForeignAffairs,GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofBangladesh)

• MichelleLeighton(InternationalLabourOffice–ILO,Geneva)

• PietroMona(SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation,FederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs,Berne)

• WilliamMcClure(AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection)

• JenniferMcDonald(Passport,ImmigrationandCitizenshipAgency,MinistryofNationalSecurity,Jamaica)

• SankarRamasamy(DepartmentofLabour,NewZealand)

• DilipRatha(WorldBank,Washington,D.C.)

• CécileRiallant(EC-UNJointMigrationandDevelopmentInitiative,Brussels)

• NandKishoreSingh(MemberoftheIndianParliament,NewDelhi)

• SimonTonelli(CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg)

• AdrianavanDooijeweert(DutchAdvisoryCommitteeonMigrationAffairs–ACVZ,TheHague)

• MaiaWelbourne(CitizenshipandImmigrationCanada–CIC,Ottawa)

• KlausF.Zimmermann(InstitutefortheStudyofLabor–IZA,Bonn)

Published jointly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurasylum Ltd.

A Bimonthly Journal for and by Policymakers Worldwide

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TSVol.V,Number4,October–November2015

EDITORIAL BOARD

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IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

Measuring migrant integration in Germany: The SVR Integration Barometer as an instrument of scientific policy adviceAlex Wittlif

The independent migrants: Syrian separated children fleeing warAKM Ahsan Ullah

Missing in action: The unused temporary protection directiveJoanne van Selm

Migration’s silver bullets? A mythClaudia Natali and Michael Newson

Publications

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MigrantsandrefugeesinHorgos,attheSerbian-Hungarianborder.©IOM2015(Photo:FrancescoMalavolta)

Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE2IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank Laczko1

WelcometothenewissueofMigration Policy Practice, which focuses on the currentmigrantcrisisinEurope.

The first article, by Alex Wittlif (Expert Council ofGerman Foundations on Integration and Migration,Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen fürIntegration und Migration (SVR)), examines thecurrent methods for measuring the levels ofintegration of immigrants in Europe, following theEuropeanCommission’s call for thedevelopmentofanEU-wideunifiedcatalogueofindicatorsonmigrantintegration. The article discusses, in particular,Germany’sSVRIntegrationBarometer,whichisbasedonasurveyconductedeverytwoyearsamongbothimmigrants and German nationals. The Barometerprovidesadescriptionofperceptionpatternsandanexamination of previously unconsidered integrationprocesses. It is targeted at both policymakers andintegrationpractitioners.

The second article, by AKMAhsanUllah (Faculty ofArts and Social Sciences at theUniversity of BruneiDarussalam), discusses the situation of Syrianseparated children fleeing war. To date, thousandsof unaccompanied Syrian children have journeyedonfoottoseeksafetyacrosstheborderinLebanon,Turkey and Jordan. The article discusses the keyfindings of in-depth interviews conducted withofficialsofdifferentorganizations(UnitedNationsHighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), InternationalOrganization forMigration (IOM), and internationalhumanitarian non-governmental organizations suchas Médecins Sans Frontières and the InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross)workingonthegroundin the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Lebanon andJordan.Thestudyshows, inparticular, thatmanyoftheunaccompaniedSyrianchildrenwereslippedintothehandsofsmugglersandtraffickersandthatmostof thosewhoweretraffickedwereunawareof theirfinaldestinations.

The third article, by Joanne van Selm (Eurasylum),questions the reasons why the EU TemporaryProtection Directive has not yet been implementedinthecontextofthecurrentmigrantcrisisinEurope.TheDirective provides forMember States to agree,by qualified majority, that a named national groupshouldqualifyfortemporaryprotectionstartingfromaspecifieddate.Anestimateof thenumbersneedstobemade,and,underthesolidaritysectionoftheDirective,MemberStatesshouldindicatethenumberof temporary protection places they are willing tooffer.Thearticlesuggeststhat it ishightimefortheDirectivetobeconsideredbyEUleadersinthecontextoftheongoingSyrianinflux.

Thelastarticle,byClaudiaNataliandMichaelNewson(IOM),outlinesthe IOMapproachtoaddressingthecomplexmigration flows in theMediterranean. TheOrganization’s position is that while legal migrationchannelsshouldremainacentralfeatureofanypolicyresponseaimedatreducingirregularmigration,thisisonlyoneofanumberofcomplementaryinterventionsthatgovernmentsmustworkontoaddressirregularmigration.IOMbelieves,inparticular,thatanypolicyaimed at addressing seriously the challenges posedby irregular migration should include initiatives toimproveresiliencebybuildingsustainableanddecentlivelihood and employment opportunities for theyouth, and should raise awareness to promote safemigration and deter irregular migration. Sufficientresources should also be made available, includingwith a view to strengthening data collection effortsand therefore enhancing our understanding of thedriversandshiftingsourcesofmigration.

WethankallthecontributorstothisissueofMigration Policy Practice andinvitereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinasurveywhichaimstohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimary interests inour journal.Shouldyouwishtoparticipate inthissurvey,pleaseclick here.n

1 Solon Ardittis isManaging Director of Eurasylum Ltd. FrankLaczko isHeadoftheGlobalMigrationDataAnalysisCentre(GMDAC) at the International Organization for Migration(IOM) in Berlin. They are the co-editors ofMigration Policy Practice.

Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE 3

Akey task for all countries is to ensure equalparticipationandequalaccesstoallresourcesfor immigrants as well as citizens without a

migration background. In order to guarantee equalopportunities, an empirical basis that captures thecurrentintegrationleveloftheimmigrantpopulationandthatisabletoassesstheirchancesforparticipationisrequired.Theobtainedinformationcanbeusedforidentifying action fields for a specific target groupand serve as a basis for developing strategies fordiscriminationreduction.

Measuring the integration level in a comprehensivemannerisinmanyrespectsachallengingendeavourformigrationresearch,which,however,allcountriesare prompted to undertake. In 2009, the EuropeanUnion(EU)suggestedthedevelopmentofanEU-wideunifiedcatalogueofindicatorsonmigrantintegration,inordertogatherasmanysynergyeffectsaspossiblefor policy development acrossMember States. Thiscataloguewasworked up to comparably depict theintegration level of the immigrant third-countrynationalsineachcountryandconsequentlytofosterthe learning-from-others approach,which has beencommonly used in the migration policy for years.2The EU’s suggestion already included a number ofindicators which, in regard to the socioeconomicposition of the immigrant population, aimed atthe essential spheres of labour market, education,social inclusion and political participation.3 Thiskind ofmeasurement should be differentiated fromtheMigrant IntegrationPolicy Index (MIPEX),whichconsiders migration- and integration-specific State

1 Alex Wittlif is a Senior Researcher at the Expert Councilof German Foundations on Integration and Migration(SachverständigenratdeutscherStiftungenfürIntegrationundMigration(SVR)),whereheoverseesallquantitativeanalysesandisresponsiblefortheSVRIntegrationBarometer.

2 For more information, see: Swedish Presidency of theEuropean Union, Presidency Conference Conclusions onIndicators and Monitoring of the Outcome of IntegrationPolicies,MeetingNo.597,Malmö,Sweden,14–16December2009.

3 The suggestion was later elaborated and specified. See: T.Huddleston,J.NiessenandJ.DagTjaden,Using EU Indicators of Immigrant Integration: Final Report for Directorate-General for Home Affairs(Brussels,EuropeanCommission,2013).

policiessuchaslegalaccesstothelabourmarketforimmigrantsorpossibilitiesfornaturalization.

How can the “soft”, intersubjective integration data be collected?

GermanytookuptheEU’sproposalanddevelopedanextensivecatalogueofindicatorsbasedonthelargestavailable data source, the Microcensus, to depictthe level of migrant integration every two years.It is noticeable that the German implementationfocuses on the structural dimension of integration,thus neglecting the subjective dimensions of theintegrationprocess (also included in thementionedEU’s suggestion).4 Emphasis of the catalogue ofindicatorsisclearlyputontheobjectivelymeasurable“hard” data such as labour-market outcomes,educational performance, living conditions, publichealthandthelike.5Subjectivedataontheindividuals’attitudes towards and assessments of integration iscompletely lacking. For example, the assessment oflifeinamulticulturalsocietyorotheridentificationalintegration issues cannot be extrapolated fromthe available statistical data sources. In 2009, toaddress this lack of information, the Expert CouncilofGermanFoundationsonIntegrationandMigration(Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen fürIntegrationundMigration(SVR))developedatailoredempirical survey instrument, the SVR IntegrationBarometer.TheBarometerallowsforadescriptionofperceptionpatternsandanexaminationofpreviously

4 Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlingeund Integration, Integration in Deutschland. ErsterIntegrationsindikatorenbericht:ErprobungdesIndikatorensetsund Bericht zum bundesweiten Integrationsmonitoring(Berlin,2009).

5 Foranoverviewof the situation inGermany, see: L.BrandtandG.Fincke,“Germany:Monitoringintegrationinafederalstate”, in:Measuring and Monitoring Immigrant Integration in Europe: Integration Policies and Monitoring Efforts in 17 European Countries (R.BijlandA.Verweij,eds.,TheHague,TheNetherlandsInstituteforSocialResearch,2012),pp.144–164.

Measuring migrant integration in Germany: The SVR Integration Barometer as an instrument of scientific policy adviceAlex Wittlif1

4 Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

unconsidered integration processes.6 The survey– conducted every two years – involves not onlyimmigrants but also the majority population and,therefore, depicts the mutual acceptance on bothsidesoftheimmigrationsociety.

Sampling immigrants for the SVR Integration Barometer

Constructing an instrument for documentingintegration-relevant assessment patterns posesthe challenge for appropriately representing theimmigrant population. Is it sufficient to recruitan adequately large number of immigrants for asurvey and draw comparisons with the majoritypopulation? The SVR goes beyond a binary surveyof “immigrants versus non-immigrants” and evendifferentiates the different groups of origin in theIntegrationBarometer.Thus,it ispossibletoanalyseintegrationprocessesinthecontextofgreatlyvaryingimmigrationandsocializationpatterns.Theselectedmethod – depending on the geographic-origin-specificcompositionoftheimmigrants–isprincipallyapplicableforallcountriesoforigin,fromwhichthereis

6 This being the Barometer’s pilot project and due to themethodical challenges it raised, the collected data wasrestricted to the regional surveyareas. Thefirstnationwiderepresentativesurveyisscheduledfortheyear2016.

asignificantshareamongthegeneralpopulation.Thechoiceoftheorigingroupstobeseparatelyrecruitedfor the survey specifically orientates on the mostpertinentexistingimmigrantpopulation.AccordingtotheMicrocensusof2013,andreferringtothepersonsaged15andoldertobeinvolvedinthesurvey,thereare about 69 million Germans without a migrationbackground living in Germany and 12.8 millionpeoplewhoeitherimmigratedtoGermanyafter1949themselvesoraredescendantsofatleastoneparentwith a migratory history. Itemization of immigrantsby country of origin or alternatively immigrationstatusresultsintheirdistributionintoalmostequallysized four groups: 3.7 million immigrants from theEUcountries;3.4million“Aussiedler”,orimmigrantswithGermanrootsmainlyfromthecountriesoftheformer Soviet Union; 2.1 million immigrants fromTurkeywhocametoGermanyastheso-called“guestworkers”, or for the reason of family reunification;and3.6millionfromtherestoftheworld.Proceedingfromthisdistributionandbasingonapredeterminedquota, these groups (together with a comparisongroupofpeoplewithoutamigrationbackground)arecomponentsoftheSVRIntegrationBarometer2016.Thus,adetailedcompositionreadsasfollows:

Thisdifferentiatedallocationtakestheheterogeneouscomposition of the immigrant population intoaccount.Italsoenablesadetailedlookatintegrationprocesseswithin specific origin groups,which differdue to various legal and/or historical immigrationcircumstances. Furthermore, not only the largestimmigrationpopulations are taken into account butalso the migration flows that are currently gainingstrength(EUII).

Table 1: Population distribution in Germany and participants in the SVR Integration Barometer 2016Population aged 16 and older

in Germany (in million)Participants in the SVR Integration Barometer

Withoutmigrationbackground 56 1,300Aussiedler 3.4 1,000Turkey 2.1 1,000EUI(Entrybefore2000orborninGermany) 2.7 500EUII(Entryafter2000) 0.9 500Restoftheworld 3.6 1,000

Source: Microcensus, 2013.

Theaimofsuchadifferentiatedapproachistoprovidethepoliticaldecisionmakerswithanempiricalbasisof“soft”indicatorsinadditiontothestructuraldatarelating to the socioeconomic position. Due to thesamplesize,apartfromshowingdescriptivelyvaryingassessments between the origin groups, the SVRIntegrationBarometercanalsorevealinter-individualandintegration-relevantprocessestakingplacewithinadefinablesocializationmilieu,forexample,basedonvalueorientations of Turkish immigrants of thefirstandsecondimmigrantgenerations.

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Various discrimination patters across groups of origin

Previous SVR Integration Barometers providenumerous examples indicating different perceptionsof the integration processes within specificgroups of origin. In this context, a significantfactor hindering integration is discrimination.

TheBarometerdistinctlyshowsthatnotallimmigrantsare equally affected by discrimination. When(generally) asked about experienced discriminationat authorities’ offices and agencies, 31 per cent ofimmigrantsofTurkishorigin,17percentofAussiedlerandmerely 15 per cent of immigrants from the EUreporteddiscrimination.7

7 Thedescribeddifferencesalsoremainsignificant inmultiva-riateanalysesconsideringthesocioeconomicposition.

Figure 1: Discrimination experiences at authorities’ offices and agencies according to origin groups

12%

32%

21%

15%

24%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Withoutmigrationbackground

Turkey Aussiedler EU-27 Restoftheworld

Source: SVR Integration Barometer 2014. Note: Sample size amounts to 4,769.

Whenansweringthisgeneralquestion,whichinvolvedall discriminationdimensions, immigrantsof Turkishorigin reported to have experienced discriminationthree times more often than persons without amigrantbackground.Ontheotherhand,immigrantsfrom EU Member States were considerably lessaffectedbydiscrimination. Thedifferencesbetweentheorigingroupsaresignificant.Incomparison,whenconsidering the immigrantgroupsasawhole, thosewhofeltdiscriminatedagainstaccountfor21percent.Therefore, if the immigration population is viewedin a general way, important data and informationrelevant forconceivinganti-discriminationmeasuresgetlost.Consequently,theBarometerisapproachingtheempiricalrealityinwhichtheintegrationdisposalofayoungandmobileimmigrantfromtheEUcannotbecomparedwiththatofanimmigratedAussiedlerinthe1980s.Classifyingbothofthemasan“immigrant”and, on this basis, gathering subjective integrationsettingsdistortsthepictureexistinginreality.

The SVR Barometer’s key integration indicators

In order to comprehensively depict the integrationprogress, further indicators beyond discriminationexperiencesareneeded,whichshouldcaptureculturalattitudesandvalidlycover thesubjectivedimensionon both sides of immigrant society. Since its firstpublicationin2009,theBarometerhasincludeditemsthatarerepeatedlyused–withoutanychanges–formeasuringattitudes,valuesandnorms in fourfieldsessentialtotheintegrationprocesses:labourmarket,education, neighbourhood and social relationships.Inall fields, the surveyedpopulation is askedaboutgained experiences aswell as their individual norm

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and value concepts. Furthermore, the performanceof institutions relevant to the integration process isdeterminedfromtherespondents’pointofview.Forinstance, the field School deals specificallywith thequestionofwhetherrespondentsthinkthatlearningperformance suffers from ethnic heterogeneity.In addition to these assessments, behaviouraltendencies aremeasured.Here, the focus is on therespondents’ willingness to expose themselves toculturaldiversity.IntherelationtothefieldEducation,therespondentsareaskedwhethertheywouldenroltheirchildreninanethnicallyheterogeneousschool.Thiswaythedatacollectedoverseveraltimeperiodsprovides insights into the integration processes inspecificimmigrantgroupsandreflectthewillingnessofthemajoritypopulationtoencounter(andaccept)culturaldiversity.

ThefurthertopicsincludedintheupcomingBarometercontain, among others, criteria on belonging toGerman society. These criteria should, for instance,clarifytowhichextentitisimportantforthemajoritypopulationandespecially for the various immigrantgroups to have German citizenship or GermanancestorsinordertofeelasenseofbelongingnesstoGermansociety.Thisparticularquestionhasalreadybeen answered a number of times in the case ofthemajoritypopulation,whereas thedata fromtheimmigrantgroups’pointofviewhasbeenlackingsofar,althoughitconcernsakeyidentificationalfactor.

Conclusion

Thesuccessofanintegrationpolicydependsgreatlyonwhetherpoliticsmanagestoawakethewillingnessamong the majority and immigrant population toinvest in integration. Therefore, the SVR IntegrationBarometer addresses policymakers at all levels oftheFederalState in thefirstplace.Asan innovativeinstrument, theBarometercomprises thesubjectiveand interpersonaldimensions,allowsformonitoringofintegrationprocesses,andsuitsbothpolicymakersand integration practitioners. With the Barometer,theycanverifyand,ifnecessary,correcttheirpoliticalinitiatives,measures and activities in terms of theiracceptance. This way, the measuring instrumentmakesavaluablecontributiontothepracticalsuccessofintegrationpolicy.

Moreover,theSVRIntegrationBarometerisusefulforscientific integration research for two reasons. First,thesurveycontainsarepresentativesampleofmigrantgroups. Second, it provides hitherto nonexistentmigration- and integration-specific analysis options,which can be applied for narrowing research gaps.

TheresultsofthecurrentSVRIntegrationBarometerwillbeavailableinspring2016.

For further information, see www.svr-migration.de/en/barometer/.n

References

Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration,FlüchtlingeundIntegration

2009 Integration in Deutschland. Erster Integra-tionsindikatorenbericht: Erprobung des Indi-katorensets und Bericht zum bundesweiten Integrationsmonitoring. Beauftragte derBundesregierungfürMigration,Flüchtlingeund Integration, Berlin. Available fromwww.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Publikation/IB/2009-07-07-indikatorenber-icht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

Brandt,L.andG.Fincke2012 Germany: Monitoring integration in a

federalstate.In:Measuring and Monitoring Immigrant Integration in Europe: Integration Policies and Monitoring Efforts in 17 European Countries (R. Bijl and A.Verweij,eds.).TheNetherlandsInstituteforSocialResearch,TheHague,pp.144–164.

Huddleston,T.,J.NiessenandJ.DagTjaden2013 Using EU Indicators of Immigrant

Integration: Final Report for Directorate-General for Home Affairs. EuropeanCommission,Brussels.

SwedishPresidencyoftheEuropeanUnion2009 Presidency Conference Conclusions

on Indicators and Monitoring of theOutcome of Integration Policies. MeetingNo.597,Malmö,Sweden,14–16December.Available from http://sampac.nl/EUKN2015/www.eukn.org/dsresource6a5f.pdf?objectid=144316

“...the Barometer comprises the subjective and interpersonal

dimensions, allows for monitoring of integration processes, and suits both

policymakers and integration practitioners.”

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The independent migrants: Syrian separated children fleeing war AKM Ahsan Ullah1

This article is from the paper on the study done by the author about how unaccompanied refugee children from the Syrian Arab Republic made their way to destination countries, and how they become unaccompanied and the consequences of being unaccompanied. The study is based on interviews with Syrian child refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan, and aid workers of international organizations who provide support for the child refugees.

Introduction

Abouthalfoftheestimated59.5million(UNHCR,2015)displacedpersonsaroundtheworldarechildren, andmillions of these children have

been separated from their families (Touzines, 2007;UNHCR, 2013 and 2014). In the past decade,morethan2millionchildrenhavebeenkilledinconflict,withafurther6millionwoundedand1millionorphaned(FazelandStein,2002;UllahandRagsag,2008;Ullah,2011 and 2014; UNICEF, 2012). Only a decade ago,there were 37 million forced migrants. Since early2011,themainreasonfortheaccelerationinnumberhasbeenthewarintheSyrianArabRepublic,currentlythe world’s single largest driver of displacement(UNHCR, 2015). Syrian devastating conflict – oneof the protracted ones the region haswitnessed inrecenttimes–issaidtobeacontinuationoftheso-calledArabSpring,whichstartedin2010inTunisiatoputanendtoauthoritarianruleandcorruption,andto demand liberty, dignity and social justice. Thesedemands have transcended the borders, and theiroutcomeshavedifferedowing to the fact thatArabregimes are diverse among themselves in terms oftheir rulingmechanisms,domesticpowerstructuresand international relations (Darwisheh, 2013;Ullah,2014).Asaresult,approximately6millionSyrians–almostonethirdof thetotalpopulation–havefledtheSyrianArabRepublic.Abouthalfofthepopulationbecame internally displaced (UNHCR, 2014; Orhan,2015; Hinnebusch, 2008). About one third of the

refugeeslivingoutsidethecountryconsistofchildren(i.e. roughly 1 million). A portion of them becamerefugeesand the restwereable to successfully endupwiththeirrelativesorparents.Anecdotessuggestthat,sofar,amongthesethousandswhohavesoughtrefuge,more than 8,000 children have crossed intoneighbouringcountries–mostlyintoTurkey,Lebanon,Jordanand Iraq–withoutparentsoradult relatives(UNICEF,2013).

So far, around200,000 Syrianswere killed; of themabout 15,000 were children (IRC, 2013). Theyhave been experiencing psychosocial stress as aresult of the conflicts, and many face persistentthreats of varied kinds of diseases (UNICEF, 2014).There is no denying that Syrian children are in anurgent humanitarian situation, which has ignited avigorous debate between advocates for refugeesand humanitarian organizations and the receivinggovernments. While there can be multiple reasonswhy children leave their country, Syrian childrenconsistently cite life-threatening violence as theprimemotivationformigrating, followedbypovertyandfamilyreunification.

AllpotentialrefugeesfromtheSyrianArabRepublicdid not find the doors of their neighbours open.Political and diplomatic relationships appearimportant determinant whether or not refugeeswouldbeallowedin.Egypthasanimportanthistoryof close ties and shared influences with the SyrianArabRepublic,andithasopeneditsdoorstoSyrians.Atthebeginningofthecrisis,thefirstwaveofSyriansfleeing toEgyptwasprimarily composedofpersonswith family ties, business connections or personalnetworks in Egypt. Iraq and Israel are not the bestfavoureddestinationsforthem.

1 AKM Ahsan Ullah is Associate Professor, Geography,Development and Environment, at the Faculty of Arts andSocialSciencesintheUniversitiBruneiDarussalam.

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Map 1: Syrian Arab Republic Administrative Area

Thousands of unaccompanied Syrian children asyoung as eight and nine years of age journeyed onfoot to seek safety across the border in Lebanon,Turkey and Jordan. The journey period has beensignificantbecausemanyof themwere slipped intothehandsofsmugglersandtraffickersontheirway.Mostofthosewhoweretraffickedwereunawareoftheirdestinations,whilesomeothersmanagedtoendupinrefugeecampswiththehelpofvolunteersandaidworkers.Thisstudyrevealsthatenroute,soldiers,militiamen,boatmenandunscrupulouspeopleoftenstolethechildren’sblankets,shoesandcookingpots,ifany.

Thisstudyusesthedefinitionof“child”fromthe1989ConventionontheRightsoftheChild(UNCRC):“everyhumanbeingbelowtheageofeighteenyears,unless,under the lawapplicable to that child, themajorityisattainedearlier”(Article1,UNCRC)(UNHCR,2012).“The term ‘separated children’ is a term which isnow increasingly used about the group of childrenpreviously known as ‘unaccompanied children orunaccompanied minors’” (Halvorsen, 2005:77).Conceptually,unaccompaniedchildrenarethosewhohave been separated from both parents and otherrelativesandarenotbeingcaredforbyanadultwho,bylaworcustom,isresponsiblefordoingso(UNHCR,2015; Kinch, 2008). Over the years, this definitionhasbeentailored,especiallywiththecreationoftheSeparatedChildren in EuropeProgramme (SCEP), inorder to encompass theunaccompanied children inEurope (Anderssonetal.,2005;Ayotte,1999;Kohli,

2007).Mediaattentionhasbeenaccordedprimarilyon the scale of the violence and warring factions.However, way less attention has been given to theplightof thechildren than theydeserve.Thispaperaims at exploring the ways how unaccompaniedrefugee children made their way to destinationcountriesandhowtheybecameunaccompaniedandtheconsequencesofbeingunaccompanied.

The paper is based on in-depth interviews withofficials of different organizations, such as theOfficeof theUnitedNationsHighCommissioner forRefugees (UNHCR), the International OrganizationforMigration (IOM),and internationalhumanitariannon-governmental organizations (NGOs) likeMédecinsSansFrontières(MSF)andtheInternationalCommitteeof theRedCross (ICRC),workingon theground in the SyrianArabRepublic, Egypt, Lebanonand Jordan. This study is based on a qualitativeresearch method using face-to-face and telephoneinterviews.Weinterviewed34separatedchildren(12inEgypt;8inLebanon(attheShatilacamp);7inTurkey(at theOsmaniye camp); 7 in Jordan (at the Jaataricamp))andatotalof12officialsfromMSF,IOMandUNHCR.Itisaninherentchallengeinsucharesearchtoselectparticipantsforinterviews.Theauthorreliedon snowball and convenient sampling technique forselecting the respondents (both unaccompaniedchildren and officials). Some six interviews withofficialswereconductedinpersonandsomewereontelephone.

Fractured family and separated children

Therewasalotofcoverageintheinternationalmediawhenaheartbreakingpictureofaseparatedfour-year-oldboywhofledtheSyrianArabRepublicwasfoundcrossingthedesertalone.Surprisingly,theboymadehiswayacrosstheborderintoJordanwithaplasticbagcontaininghispossessions.Alltheseparatedchildrendidnotnecessarilyleavethecountryunaccompanied.Some became unaccompanied after or when theycrossed the borders. Some of the children left thecountryontheirown;somewiththehelpoftraffickers;somewith relatives and neighbours and somewithaidworkers. Someof themmerged in the groupofpeople crossing borders. Most refugee groups areheadedbyparents,bringing several childrenandalltheirpossessionsoutofthecountry.Whenthegatesopen, there isalwaysacrushasdesperate refugeessurgeforward.Thus,everydaychildrenget lostandseparated.

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Oneimportantfactorwhytheylefttheircountryalonewas that their “well-wishers” had facilitated themto leave in order to avoid being recruited in armedgroups in the country. Some children reported thattheirparentshadbeendeployed inarmedconflicts,whowantedthemtoleavethecountryastheirfuturebecame uncertain. Boyden and Hart (2007) foundsimilarfindingsasthisstudy.Syrianchildrenhavebeenexposed to grave human rights violation, includingsexual violence, maiming, killing, torture, arbitrarydetention and force recruitment in armed forces(UNICEF,2012).Thereisnodenyingthattheyarethemost vulnerable and defenseless population. Theirsituation turnsworsewhen they become separatedfromtheirfamilies.

InsuchapoliticalsituationintheSyrianArabRepublic,diversefactorsappearactive–suchastraffickers,gangs

Amyriad of factors are responsible for pushing thechildren out of their countries without parents orguardians. Many of the children left because theirhomes had been damaged totally and relativeshad been killed or had left the country already.Militarization of children is one of the importantfactorswhysomeparentswanttheirchildrentoleavethecountry.Seven(21%)childrengotseparatedfromtheir families at the border when they altogethertriedtocrosstheborderandchildrengotlostinthecrowd. Insomefive(15%)cases,theygotseparatedaschildrenandparentstriedtocrosstheborderandtheywerenotallowedinatthesametime.Eightofthechildrenleftthecountryaftertheirparentswentmissingorgotkilled,andwith thehelpof relatives,neighbours or aid workers. Some children fearedbeing arrested for having family members fightingwith either the armed opposition groups or with

Table 1: Gender and age distribution of child refugeesDestination country Male (% of the total) Female (% of the total)

Egypt 9(26) 3(9)Lebanon 5(15) 3(9)Turkey 5(15) 2(6)Jordan 4(12) 3(9)Total 23 11Age f %7–10 7 2111–14 18 5315–18 9 26

Source: Field data, 2013–2014.

andotherillegalagents–totakeadvantage.Therefore,everyjourneypointbecomesveryprecariousforthem.Inourinterview,twooftherespondentsclaimedthattheyweretrappedbysmugglersandgotridofthematsomepointoftheirjourneywiththehelpofsomeaidworkersandcompatriots.Manyofthemarrivedattheirdestinationsclandestinely,hiddenbytraffickersorpaidsmugglers,or theymighthaveattemptedtomigrate through immigration checkpoints. Levinson(2011) found similar situation in his research thatsomechildrenpresented falsedocuments toborderofficials,orarrivedindesperationwithnodocumentsat all. One of the respondents in a Lebanese campwasdiagnosedwithintheautisticspectrum.Shewas11yearsold.Itwasindeedpainfultoseeaseparatedchildwhoneededherparentsmorethananyoneelse.Atleast,shecannotremembertheordealsshewentthroughinhercountry.

theSyrian regime.Somechildren,whoweremostlyPalestinians, became displaced for the second orthirdtime, as theyused to live in refugee camps intheSyrianArabRepublic(Ullah,2014).Twoofthegirlswerepregnant.Itwasunderstandablethattheywereraped while in the Syrian Arab Republic. Nineteen(56%)ofthechildrenhadnoideawhathappenedtotheirparents;eightofthem(24%)saidtheirmothersmightbestillaliveandtherestwerenotsure.

Consequences

The news on a four-year-old Syrian girl whosurrendered to a photographer when she mistooktheman’scameraforagunbledtheheartsofmany.Apicturewas takenat theAtmen refugee camponthe Syrian Arab Republic’s border with Turkey inDecember2014,showingtheyounggirlwasfrozenin

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fearwithherarmsraisedandherlipstightlypursed.Thesechildrenaredistressed,shocked,tired,hungry,woundedanduncertainaboutwhattodo.Theycarrymultiplepsychological andphysical burdens suchasanxietyfromseparationandthetraumaticexperiencethey have suffered in their countries and en route.Thismeansthattheydemandspecializedprotection,whichmayincludepsychologicalrehabilitation,healthandotherbasicneeds,education, foodsecurityandsafety.Itisliketheyfellfromonekindofvulnerabilityintheirowncountytoanotherkindinthedestinationcountry.This study found thatmostof thechildren,apartfromseparationanxiety,stillfeltunsafe.

Intheirtraumaticexperiencesmodel,FazelandStein(2002)mentionedthreestagesinthewholeprocessofmigrationofrefugeesandthedegreeoftraumaatdifferentlevels.Firstisintheircountryoforigin,wheretheyexperienceconsiderabletraumaofvariedkindsandlevels,whichforcesthemtofleetheirhomes,andwheretheyexperienceexposuretowarorcombatandhencewitness violence, torture, and lossesof closefamily and friends. The second stage is during theflight to safety,meaningon theway todestinationswhereontheycan face furthervulnerabilities. Itcantakemanymonths, and canexpose the refugees tomore life-threatening dangers. Refugee children atthese times experience separation from parents,either by accident or as a strategy to ensure theirsafety.Thelaststageisintheresettlingcountry.Atthislevel, refugees face additional difficulties, primarilybecausetheyhavetoprovetheirasylumclaimsandalso try to integrate intoanewenvironment (Ullah,2014;seealsoAmnestyInternational,1996).

Onerespondent(about13yearsold)fromtheJaatarirefugeecampinJordanwassheddingtearswhenhewas sharing what he experienced in his country oforiginandinthedestination.Hewasleftalonefortwodaysondebrisoftheirdamagedhouseafterhisfatherwaskilledandmotherwentmissing.

“I thought Iwasdying. Iwanted to shoutbutwasscared of shouting. I guess I fainted. I discoveredmyself in a kioskwhere one person offeredme apiece of bread and water. I followed them. Theyhelpedmealot.Iamhere.Iamnotsurewhereismymother….”

Another respondent (about 14 years old) in Egyptshared how she was injured when their home wasdestroyedbybombing.Sheraisedherpyjamatoshowthescaronher leg.Sheisstayingwithafamilythat

wasfromtheSyrianArabRepublic.Buttheydidnotknoweachotherbefore.Thewomanwhowastakingcareofherwhisperedwithanxietytotheinterviewerthattheteenagerwaspregnant.Herpregnancywasthereasonforherheadache.ThewomanrealizedthatthegirlhadbeenrapedintheSyrianArabRepublic.

The displacement of these children has taken atremendoustollonthem.Oneboy,11yearsofage,whoarrivedacoupleofweeksattheJaataricampinJordan, was still crying and looking for his parents.During the interview[takenafter twomonthsofhisarrival], he looked very blank and pale. He perhapsthoughtweweretheretotakehimbacktohisparents.Hestartedcryingwhenweleftaftertheinterviewwasover.

“Where are my parents? My younger brother? Iwanttogohome....”

AmongtherespondentsinEgypt,twoofthemwerebrothers.Theywere fortunateenoughtobe leavingtogetherfromtheSyrianArabRepublic.TheyendedupinEgyptwiththehelpofaidworkersandarebeingtaken care of by an international NGO. They havealreadystartedtheirschoolingthoughthey lostoneyearwhileintheSyrianArabRepublic.Onerespondent(11 years old) in Turkey mentioned that he neverthoughtthathewouldsurvive.Hewas inhisschoolin the Syrian Arab Republic. Suddenly, the schoolcompoundbecameveydark.Peoplewererunningineverydirection.Hewasrunoverinstampedeandhewasdiscoveredinalocalhospital.Hisparentsdidnotcome to see him though some school teachers did.Thedaybeforehewasreleasedfromthehospital,hisrelativestoldhimthathisparentshadbeenkilled.

“...Iwantedtokillmyself.Ifledmyrelative’shouseandhoveredaroundforacoupleofdays.Icriedandshed tears on the streets. I realizedmany peoplewere leaving the country. I joined them. On thewaysomanytimeswewereinterceptedbyarmedpeople.Wewerereleasedthough.IknewthatthetripwouldbedangerousandthatImightdieontheroad,butifIstayedhome,Iwascertaintodie....”

Their vulnerabilities are a result, in part, of theirdependenceonadults.Sincetheyarephysicallyandpsychologically weaker than adults, they count onadults for care and protection (Ullah and Ragsag,2008; Enenajor, 2008). Most children were alreadypsychologically traumatized because of what theyhadwitnessed: killing, violence and being uprooted

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(Ajdukovic and Ajdukovic, 1993). Refugee girls areeven more vulnerable than refugee boys. This isoriginated from the cultural and social contexts inthe regionwheregirlsare lessvalued thanboys.Asa result,girlsaremoreoftensubject toneglectandabuse,includingsexualabuse,assaultandexploitation(UNHCR,2012;Koser,2000).

There are many instances of adolescent girls beingconscripted into armies to look after the troops inmore ways than just cooking and cleaning. Rapeas a crimeofwar is not restricted to adultwomen.OnerespondentinLebanon(girlof12yearsold)stillshiverswhensheisremindedofherpastdaysintheSyrianArabRepublic.Shewasabductedandforcedtojoinacombatantgroup.Duringhertraining,shewasrapedmanytimes.Sheisstillsufferingtrauma.

“...Iwasbeatenuproutinelyandmercilessly.Icriedandcried.Icriedtogotomyparents.IwasreleasedatsomepointandIrushedtothedirectionofourhome. But I was unable to locate anything. Thensomepeoplebroughtmehere....”

Refugee children suffer from the effects of comingfrom a war zone and of adjusting to an unfamiliarculture. There is evidence that refugee childrenare at significant risk of developing psychologicaldisturbance, as they are subject to a number ofrisk factors. Figure 1 provides a framework forconceptualizingtheseriskfactors.Mostofthechildrenwere still anxious, saddened and physically weak.Moreover,consistentresearchfindingsshowthatasthenumberof risk factorsaccumulates forchildren,itismorelikelythattheywoulddeveloppsychologicaldisturbancedramatically(FazelandStein,2002).

Figure 1: Vulnerability of child refugees

“...we are really not sure how they are going tocope with what they experienced in their such ayoungage.Iftheyevermeettheirparents,wehopetheycanforgetthescartheyhadintheirmindandheart....”

“...Iwashaving fever. Iwas givena fewcookies, abananaandabottleofwater.IwasnotsureaboutthelocationwhereIwastaken.Iaskedformedicinebut none paid heed to me. They were talking tothemselves that I had temperature because I wasscared. I had a few sips of water and fell sleep.

Aroundmidnight, Iwasraped.Thedayafter, Iwasraped.Whiletrainingwasgoingon,rapehappenedon a regular basis. A few months I was kind ofcaptive. One day the house we were staying wascapturedbymilitary (perhaps government!).MostcombatantswerekilledandIwasrescued.Ipleadedthem that theyhelp return tomyhome.Theydidnotlistentome.Theyleftmeonthesideofastreetfar way from the place I was rescued. I followedthepeoplewalkingtowardsomewhere!Here Iamnow....”

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One aid worker who rescued a 10-year-oldunaccompanied boy sharedhis experiencewith theboy. The boywas lamenting as he remembered hislost sister, though he was physically well and waseatingwell.Hemanagedtoescapethestrife.Hewasfoundtobetalkingonhisownabouthissister.

“...Iamnotsurewheremysisteris.Shewasonly5yearsoldin2013.Weusedtoplaytogether.Idonotknow....”

“Whenwepickedhershewashungry,dehydratedandexhausted. Shewasnot talkingbut looking intheblank. Irushedhertoadoctorwhosuspectedthat she was raped. That traumatized her. Doctorchecked and confirmed that she was raped. Shewasshyofdisclosingthefact.Sheneededmedicaltreatment, psychological support and at the sametimewehadtoensureherthatwewerehercloseones.Itriedtomakeherunderstandthatsheneededtreatmentforthat.Shebegantocry.Astimepassed,shewasgettingbetterbutstilloutofhermind.”

Conclusion

Therearenoprecisefiguresabouthowmanyhaveleftwithoutanyparentoradultrelativesandhowmanyofthesechildrenhavelostaparent,havebeenorphanedor have finally reunited at some point of timewiththeir families. Separations continue to occur in thecase of Syrian children fleeing violence. Separationfrom family brings devastating consequences tochildren. These children are from a wide range ofsocioeconomic background with different religiousand cultural orientations. It is obviously difficult fortheorganizationprovidingcareandservicestohandlesuch issues when the inflow of refugees is huge.They have suffered both physical and psychologicalbaggage.

Some of the children were reported to have beentortured and raped; some children got pregnantas a result of being raped. Some children becameconflict orphans and left the Syrian Arab Republic.Some reported that they became separated orunaccompaniedfromtheirparentsorrelativeswhilecrossingtheborderinthemassexodus.Someparentswere arrested in the Syrian Arab Republic by theGovernment.Somechildrenwereleftalonebytheirrelatives on the border in order to avoid violence,and somewere smuggled.These factsdemand thatinternational organizations, aidworkers andUNHCR

take all these facts into consideration to betteraddress the causeof the children.Theorphansandchildren of economically poor families became thetargetofthecombatantstorecruitinarmedgroups,thoughsomechildrenvolunteeredtojoinforsurvival.Theywereused in support functions suchas cooks,porters, messengers and spies of armed groups. Atsomepoint,someofthemmanagedtoflee.

In refugee camps at least there arehealth services,schools and psychological rehabilitation servicesavailable. However, in Egypt there are no refugeecamps. Unaccompanied children are taken care ofby some Syrians who have settled in Egypt. Thesechildren of course are entitled to internationalprotection under a range of international humanrightsinstruments(Halvorsen,2005).AlotofeffortsarebeingmadebyUNHCR,UNICEF, IOM,andotherinternationalNGOssuchastheICRCandMSF,aswellasnationalagencies,toaddresstheprotectionneedsofseparatedandunaccompaniedchildreninandfromtheSyrianArabRepublic.Itisstillquiteinsufficient.

Children’sbestinterestshouldreceivethetopprioritywhenitcomestorefugeechildren,andallneighbouringcountriesirrespectiveoftheirpoliticalinterestshouldshare the responsibility of children fleeing conflict.Ifchildrenarewithoutfamilyprotection,theyareatgreaterriskofbeingexploitedandabused,andmayfindithardtocope.Therefore,organizationsworkingfor this vulnerable group should concentrate theireffortsonthepurposeofreunifyingunaccompaniedand separated children with their parents, wherepossible,andonprovidingprotectionandalternativecareinthemeantime.Atleast,theyshouldbecaredforby theirextended families, andwhen this isnotpossible, by neighbours, friends or other substitutefamilies,ratherthanininstitutions.n

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Andersson,H.E.etal.2005 The asylum-seeking child in Europe: An

introduction. In: The Asylum-seeking Child in Europe (H.E. Andersson et al., eds.).Centre for European Research, GöteborgUniversity,Göteborg,Sweden.

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policy harmonization and unaccompaniedasylum seeking minors. University ofToronto,Toronto,Ontario.

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Kohli,R.K.S.2007 Social Work with Unaccompanied Asylum-

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2013 The Future of Syria: Refugee Children in Crisis. Findings from the Inter-Agency Child Protection and Gender-Based Violence Assessment in the Za’atari Refugee Camp.UNHCR,Amman.

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when it comes to refugee children, and all neighbouring countries irrespective of their

political interest should share the responsibility of children fleeing conflict.”

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Missing in action: The unused temporary protection directive Joanne van Selm1

ThemassivearrivalsofSyriansandotherasylum-seekersandimmigrantsinEuropein2015needno reference or description. Not since the

heightof theBosniacrisis in1992and thechaosoftheKosovocrisisin1999haverefugeesandmigrantsheading in large numbers towards the EuropeanUnion (EU) received suchmedia coverageor suchamixedreception:humanitarianismandthedesperatedesiretohelpontheonehand,andcautiousregardtothestrengthoftheright-winganti-immigrantpartieson the other. Although each time it all seems new,actually Europe has been here before. The majordifferencesnowarethepost-9/11worldofnotonlyheightened security concerns but also legitimatepause forconsiderationof ISISorothergroupswithterrorist intent, and the fact that politicians andpopulations have the knowledge and experience ofthepreviouscrisesandhavebeenmakingeffortstoworkcollectivelyonasylumandimmigrationintheEUsincetheearly1990s.

The reception of asylum-seekers, arriving as theyare in what has long been termed a “mixed flow”,hasbeencastbymanyasa“shambles”,2withstarklydivergent approaches and neither any measures tostemtheflows(byworkingtoremovetheprotectionneed)noranyclearactionstohavearrivalsorganizedinamoreeffectiveandhumaneway(acategoryinto

1 JoannevanSelmisAssociateDirectorofResearchatEurasylumLtd.Shewasco-editorof the Journal of Refugee Studies for10yearsuntil2011,andhastaughtatGeorgetownUniversityandtheUniversityofAmsterdam.ShewaspreviouslyattheMigrationPolicyInstituteinWashington,D.C.,andeditedthevolumeKosovo’sRefugeesintheEUpublishedbyContinuumin2000.

2 See, for example, S. Ardittis, “How can refugees be fairlydistributedamongmemberstates?”,EurActiv,17September2015, available from www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/how-can-refugees-be-distributed-fairly-among-eu-member-states-317713; A. MacDonald, “EUleaders scramble to halt refugee shambles”, Reuters,18 September 2015, available from www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/18/us-europe-migrants-eu-shambles-insight-idUSKCN0RI0OO20150918; S. Kent, “Slovakia threatens EUexitovermigrantpolicyshambles”,Breitbart,8October2015,available from www.breitbart.com/london/2015/10/08/slovakia-threatens-eu-exit-migrant-policy-shambles/

whichbuildingfencesishardtoplace).3AlthoughtheEuropeanCommission,ledonthisissuebyFirstVicePresident Frans Timmermans, has made strenuousefforts to coordinate among Member States, thefocus, since the Dublin Regulation clearly brokedown,hasbeenoncompulsoryquotasforrelocationofasylum-seekersandthose foundtobe inneedofprotection. The resulting imagehasbeenoneof aninability tomanagenotonly theasylumarrivalsbutalsotheEuropeanintegrationprocesswithregardtobordersandmovement(andthatcominghotontheheelsoftheeurocrisis).

It is likely that nothing could have provided a trulyeasypathtoassessingtheclaimsofSyrianandotherasylum-seekersonthescaleofarrivalsbetweenApriland October (and significant arrivals continue asin autumn2015,unlike inprevious years, theboatskeepondeparting,inspiteofdeterioratingweather).However, one directive that the EUMember Statesdecided on back in 2001, when they numberedonly 15, and were in the relatively early stages ofharmonizing their asylum and immigration policies,couldhavebeen–andindeedstillcouldbe–putintoeffect to give at the very least the appearance of agroupofStatesthatcanbepragmaticanddealwithasituationthat,likeitornot,theywillhavetomanage.Applying the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)sooner would have made a statement about unity,the value of work already done, and confidence insolidarityand theasylumsystemto face the future.Asitis,theTPDhasnot(yet)beenimplemented,andwecanonlywonderwhythatisthecase.

Back to the future: What was Temporary Protection and what did it become?

Duringthe1990s,amajortopicintherefugeeworldwas about access to protection: whether Bosniansand Kosovars were in a situation thatmatched theunderstanding of the 1951 Convention definition.

3 D.Robinson,S.WagstylandJ.Shotter,“AustrianandGermantensionsflareovermigrantcrisis”,Financial Times,28October2015, available from www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7089b2a-7d5d-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#axzz3rlXwRUaC

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The prevailing government approach was to applythe 1951 Convention strictly to people with ademonstrable, individual fear of persecution, andnottopeoplefleeinggeneralizedconflictorviolence.Another prevailing notion was that asylum wouldalways be permanent. It had been during the ColdWar, and, as these were the first post-Cold War,European crises requiring protection for peoplefleeingtheirreach,itwasassumedthatthosepeoplereceivingprotectionwouldstayforever,orneedgreatencouragementtoreturn.What ismore, theBalkanconflicts came hot on the heals of concerns thatthe fallof theBerlinWallwould result in significantEast–Westmigration(whichdidnotmaterialize)andatatimeofupheavalintermsofunderstandinghowEuropean societies could integrate newcomers orindeed longer-present migrants. Multi-culturalismwaswaning inmanyplaces,butnonewmodelwasemerging.Muchattentionwasthereforegiventotheideaoftemporaryprotection.

Temporary Protection had history: Hungarianswereprotected temporarily in Austria in 1956, Czechsin 1968 and Poles in 1981, when their countriesin turn became flash points of resistance to Sovietdomination. The short-term protection of Indo-Chinese in Asia prior to resettlement in the 1970sand 1980s was another example, and the UnitedStatesalsoalreadyhadaTemporaryProtectedStatuscovering individuals from specified countries andgroupsforalimitedperiod.4

Thenewmodeloftemporaryprotectionasitemergedin the 1990s in Europe wasmore of an alternativeto asylum than a short period of protection priorto resettlement or return, as those earlier modelshad been. Key points of discussion was how long“temporary” could really be, and the level of rightsto be upheld and how they needed to relate toConvention rights. Different States developeddifferenttemporaryprotectionpolicies.

4 See: J. van Selm-Thorburn, Refugee Protection in Europe: Lessons of the Yugoslav Crisis (Kluwer,1998).

By the end of the Kosovo crisis, which saw EU andother States launch a Humanitarian EvacuationProgramme to (temporarily in most cases) resettlemorethan50,000Kosovarswhohad initiallysoughtsafetyintheformerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia,several lessonshadbeen learned.Oneofthesewasthat in a time of sudden mass influxes Europeancitizensexpecttheirgovernmentstostayincontrol.Assuch,beingadministrativelyontopofthesituationisofgreatimportance:processingclaimstoasylumwiththeassociatedpotentialforlong-termresidenceiskey,butstaffingandsystemsthatannuallyaccommodatefor example 10,000 applicants cannot suddenly, inthe space of say three months, produce the sameoutcomesforupwardsof150,000applicants.

That lesson led to thenewest versionof temporaryprotection, contained in the 2001 directive, butneveryetput intopractice.Nolongeranalternativeto asylum, this model has temporary protection asa “waiting period”, a time in which those in needofprotectionwhohave requested it inEurope (andcome from a specified group or situation) receiveprotection but wait to have their individual asylumclaims adjudicated. The wait could be one year, oratmosttwo,and inthe interveningperiodMemberStates have the duty to expand their administrativecapacitiesinsuchawaythattheycanproperlyassessallclaimsoncetheproceduresareopened.Assuch,temporaryprotectionisnolongerinsteadofasylum,it is prior to asylumadjudication (although in somesituations it could, of course, be the case that thesituationinacountryoforiginchangessufficientlyforpeopletowanttoandbeabletoreturnbeforetheirasylumclaimsareactuallyprocessed.

The TPD provides for Member States to agree, byqualifiedmajority, to a Commission proposal that anamed national group should qualify for temporaryprotectionstartingfromaspecifieddate.Anestimateof the numbers needs to bemade, and, under thesolidarity section of the directive, Member Statesshould say how many temporary protection placestheycanoffer.FundingisavailableundertheEuropeanRefugee Fund, and when capacity according to theinitialagreement is reached, theDirectivestipulatesthattheCommissionshouldreturntotheCounciltoseekmoreplacesandoffermorefunding.

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The2001TPD5wasadirectproductof the1990s:aresultofexperiencewithprotectionforBosniansandKosovars,andaveryearlyoutcomeoftheEUeffortstoharmonizetheirasylumand immigrationpolicies,which officially started in 1992. It has been on thebooks for 14 years, but it is never used. States andthe Commission have suggested its use on at leasttwooccasions– forAfghans in2001,6although thatwasapreemptivesuggestionandtherewasnomassinflux, and more broadly in 2012, when discussionwastriggeredduringtheArabSpring,althoughagain,no decision was taken and the Directive was notimplemented.7

InMay2015,theCommissionapparentlydidconsideritsapplication,butnevertabledit,andmorerecentlytheCzechGovernmentisreportedtohaveconsideredit,butnotmadethesuggestionconcrete.8Ahandfulof non-governmental organizations and academicshave raised the question ofwhether it ought to beused for Syrians over the past three years.9 In lateOctober 2015,UNHCRAssistantHigh Commissioner

5 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 onminimumstandards for giving temporaryprotection in theeventof amassinfluxofdisplacedpersonsandonmeasurespromotingabalanceofeffortsbetweenMemberStatesinreceivingsuchpersonsandbearingtheconsequencesthereof,OfficialJournalL212 ,07/08/2001P.0012-0023.Available fromhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32001L0055

6 Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and HomeAffairs),Brussels,20September2001,SN3926/6/01REV6,paragraph30.

7 M.Garlickand J. vanSelm, “Fromcommitment topractice:The EU response”, Forced Migration Review, No. 39, NorthAfrica and Displacement 2011–2012, June 2012. Availablefromwww.fmreview.org/en/north-africa/garlick-vanselm.pdf

8 L. Bednárová, “Prague abandons plans to sue EU overrefugeequotas”,EurActiv,25September2015.Availablefromwww.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/prague-abandons-plan-sue-eu-over-refugee-plan-317982

9 See, for example: J. van Selm, “Temporary protection: EUhadaplanformigrantinflux”,EUObserver,14October2015,available from https://euobserver.com/opinion/130678;M. Ineli-Ciger, “The missing piece in the European agendaon migration: The Temporary Protection Directive”, EULaw Analysis blogspot, 8 July 2015, available from http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/07/the-missing-piece-in-european-agenda-on.html; C. Orchard and D. Chatty,“High time for Europe to offer temporary protection torefugees from Syria?” Open Democracy, 2 October 2014,available from www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cynthia-orchard-dawn-chatty/high-time-for-europe-to-offer-temporary-protection-to; Human Rights Watch, “EU:Provide protection for Syrian refugees, allow access to EUterritory, step up assistance in region”, 23 December 2012,available from www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/23/eu-provide-protection-syrian-refugees

for Protection Volker Türk indicated in an interviewwith the European Council on Refugees and ExilesthatheconsideredtheconditionsforactivationoftheDirectivetohavebeenmet(althoughhewouldliketoseestrongersolidarityconditionsattached).10

Why not implement the Temporary Protection Directive?

ThereisthusanEUagreementalreadyinplacethatdoes pretty much all the Commission is currentlyaskingfor,withoutreferringtothatagreementatall.Now the influx is large, and the Syrian componentcanbeclearlyidentifiedashavingspecificprotectionneeds. The question is: Why not implement thisdirective?

•Whypushforcompulsoryquotasratherthanuseadirectivethatincludesvoluntaryrelocations?

• IstheTPDsomehowinsufficientintermsofeitherprotectionorcollective,integratedEUaction?

•WhilehindsightsaystheTPDcouldusefullyhavebeen applied as of June or July 2015, or evenearlier,isit,byOctober2015,toolatetoactivateit?

The European Commission and some key MemberStatesseemtohavedecidedthatcompulsoryquotasarethewaytogo.BytheendofOctober2015, it isnot clear that even a qualifiedmajority decision inSeptember11wassufficienttomakeanyMemberStatequicklyliveuptotheirnewnumericalobligations(by25October,itwasreportedthatonlyabout700placesfor refugee relocationhad actually beenoffered, asopposed to 160,000 promised).12 It could well bethat the political decision to push for mandatoryquotasforrelocationisandwasanefforttocreateanopportunityoutofachallenge.TherehadbeennoEU

10 ECRE interviews Volker Türk: “We should not forget historywhen addressing current challenges”, 23 October 2015,availablefromwww.ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1233-ecre-interviews-volker-tuerk-we-need-to-remember-why-asylum-was-so-necessary-when-it-was-first-instituted-and-why-it-is-so-necessary-now.html

11 D. Robinson and P. Spiegel, “EU ministers force throughrefugee quota plan”, Financial Times, 22 September 2015,available from www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/76c2dd9e-6111-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html#axzz3phAK9zaQ

12 L. Cook, “EU lashes nations for foot-dragging on migrantpledges”,AP,27October2015,availablefromhttp://bigstory.ap.org/article/a18a9d040f8947bfb02ff113c30424bc/eu-lashes-nations-foot-dragging-migrant-pledges

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decisiontocreatea large-scalerelocationapproach,althoughrelocationhadbeendiscussedoften,13andpiloted as the EUREMA project when Malta facedwhatseemedlikealargeinfluxin2010–2012.14Yet,itisnotclearthatforcingquotasthroughinthemidstofacrisisisgoingtocreateeitheraworkablerelocationpolicyoralong-termEuropeancoordinatedefforttomoreeffectivelymanagesignificant,orindeedlowerthelevelsof,asylum-seekerarrivals.

One distinct difficulty with relocation by numbers(puttingtoonesidetheobviousproblemwhensomeStatesdonotevenvoteforit,andobjectvociferously)isthatthepeoplebeingmovedarejustthat–people–with rights, and a senseof autonomous decision-making. If the Dublin Regulation has apparentlycollapsedlargelybecauseitdidnottakethewishesofasylum-seekersintoaccountandtheykeptonarrivingwhere theywanted to arrive (andboth arrivals andthecollapsecouldalsobeblamedoncontinuinglargedisparitiesbetweenasylum systemsandoutcomes),then howwould relocation work? Peoplemight bewillingtobemovedonfromtheStateborderthroughwhichtheyhaveentered,butwilltheybehappywithbeingsenttotheStatechosenforthem?Notonlyarethere issues of affinity and language, where familymembersaretobetakenintoaccount:iftheasylumsystems remain different in various EU MemberStates, then asylum-seekers are naturally going toseek to go to the place in which they believe theyand their families will have the optimal chances of(rapidly)achievingstatusandsettlingintoanewlife.

The TPD contains language on voluntary quotas –Member States would pledge a number of placesavailableratherthanbeinstructedtoacceptagivennumber decided by the European Commission. Itis not necessarily the case that voluntarism wouldwork better; however, it could have the advantagesof allowing the population of the receiving States

13 See: Ramboll/Eurasylum, Study on the Feasibility ofEstablishingaMechanismfortheRelocationofBeneficiariesof International Protection, JLX/2009/ERFX/PR/1005, July2010,availablefromhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/common-procedures/docs/jp_final_report__final_en.pdf

14 UnderEUREMA,some262peoplewererelocated intheEUfromMalta in2011,while307wereresettledtotheUnitedStates.See:EuropeanMigrationNetwork,CountryFactsheet:Malta 2012, available from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/country-factsheets/malta-emn-country-factsheet_en.pdf

to have the sense that their governing authoritieshave willingly, and with due consideration, made aparticularofferofspaces,andgivethesameimageofwillingness to theasylum-seekeror refugeearrivals.A voluntary system also stands at least as much ifnot more chance, in principle, of being mutuallyreinforcing–somehowseeinganotherStatedomoremight promptmore from others, whereas if one istoldtodoacertainamounttheinstinctisrathertotrytobargainthatdown.

Atfirstsight,therewouldseemtobenoreasonstoconsidertheTPDdeficienteitherintermsofrefugeeprotection (it offers an administrative pause butupholds rights and asylum space, in fact if anythingit should encourage the more effective use of theasylum system) or in terms of collective EU action.In fact, not using the single instrument available,already agreed and specifically designed to addressmassinfluxsituationsatthemomentofthegreatestinflux certainly since the 1990s and potentially thegreatestforcedmigrationmovementEuropehasseensinceWorldWar II, would seem to be the greatestchallengetoEUcollectiveactionontheasylumissue.IfStateshaveagreedonaplan,haveanapproach,andthen thosewith thepower to shape theEUasylumsystemshelveitinfavour,perhapsoftryingtocreateacompulsorysystemthattheyhopewouldmakeamorelastingimpact,thenthequestionhastobewhetherthey are, in effect, shooting theCommonEuropeanAsylumSystem in itsproverbial foot. Logically,whatcouldbethereasonfornotusingacollectivetooltopauseasylumthatneedsnodiscussionandoffersthebreathingspaceofmanagingtheEuropeanaspectofthe movements (acting together) while addressingthe very real difficulties of where to host asylum-seekers, how to feed themand address issues suchaseducationforasylum-seekerchildren,andinsteadhavingfrequentcrisismeetingsandsummitstocometo an agreement on how to impose quotas whilearguingoveropenorfenced-offborders?

Onepossibility is that theflowbeingasmixedas itis, involvingmultiple largegroupsofasylum-seekers(Syrians, Eritreans, Afghans), aswell as peoplewithno asylum claims, has meant that officials haveconsidered it somehow discriminatory or unwieldytoaddressonesectionofthisflow(e.g.Syrians)withtemporaryprotectionwhilenotapplyingtheDirectivetoothers.However, if thatwere tobe the concern,one could also imagine that multiple temporaryprotection programmes per nationality could work,forexample.

19Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

IsitalreadytoolatefortheTPD?Ifsomewerecallingittimeforitsapplicationasfarbackas2012,andiftheCommissionconsidereditinMay2015,hastheflownowsimplybecometoolargeandthetimepassed?AsthebasisoftheDirectiveistoaddressmassinfluxes,thatwould hardly seem to be an argument for notusingtheapproachatall–justoneforsayingitcouldhavebeenstartedsooner.Doesthe fact thatDublinseemsdoomedmeanthatalltheotherpreviousworkdoneonasylumdirectivesandtheconstructionofaCommonEuropeanAsylumSystemisalsodead?Isitnow simply too late to turn the compulsory quotasdecisiononitsheadandsay,“Well,actually,wecanuse the TPD instead”? Part of the answer to thatlies in thedeeperquestionofwhether thepush forcompulsoryquotaswasmadeonthebasisofthinkingthattheTPDwasitself insufficientandtooweak,orthatthiswasthetimetopushforquotastomakeanopportunityoutofachallenge,orthattheTPDwassimply old and dusty, in a drawer somewhere, andthe fresh new teams either did not know it existedorwerenotfamiliarenoughwithitanditsoriginstoseethatitsmomentofutilityhadcome.Presumably,if theCommission consideredusing it inMay2015,then the TPD was not simply forgotten or ignored.Adeliberatedecision topush for compulsoryactionon quotasmust have beenmade. That was then apoliticaldecision,andapoliticaldecisioncouldequallybemade,nottobackoffbuttochangetacktousetheTPDnowandrecognizethatthenextstep,afterthiscrisis isunder control,willbe todevelopa strongersysteminwhichthebalanceofdecisionsandactionsbetweenMember States, and between the CouncilandtheCommissionwillbeclearlyestablished.

Never say never

If ever therewas a time for the implementation oftheTPD,thecurrentcrisissoundslikethemoment.Averysignificantandsuddeninflux,muchofitfocusedon onemember State (one would expect Germanyto call on the Commission to propose this to theCouncil,althoughGreece,Hungary,Croatia,Sloveniaor actually several otherMember States could alsodo so). Solidarity, which the Commission and someMember States seek, is built into this existing tool–noneed to renegotiate it.Buildingon theKosovoHumanitarianEvacuationProgramme,itwouldnotbeinconceivableforavoluntarysystemtobesetupwithotherMemberStatesofferingtotransportSyriansbyairfromGreece,Hungary,SloveniaandCroatiaeveniftheoriginalmodelwasevacuationfrombeyondtheEU,andevacuationassuchisnotexplicitlypartoftheTPD.

TheEUMemberStateshavenotagreedonverymuchintheasylumarea,andseemunabletoagreeonwhattodoaboutthecurrentcrisisatall.Acrisisisnotthetimeforbigdecisionsandvariationsonwhatisknown.CoolheadsagreedtotheTPDinthelightofthelastrefugeecrisis–perhapsitsmomenthascome?ItisafullyEuropeanplan,allhaveagreedtoitasablueprintdirective.Itshouldsurelybeonthetable.Ifnot,whynot?TheSyrianinfluxisalreadyinEurope,andmorearrivingbytheday;whynotgetoutyesterday’splanandgivetheEUitsbestchancetolookcoordinated?

TheTPDmightnotbeconsidered ideal,but it istheonlypre-agreedtoolfordealingwithacrisisliketheSyrianarrivalsinEuropein2015.IfthisDirectiveisnottobeimplementednow,thenitsurelyneverwillbe.It’snowornever;makeorbreak.n

“The Syrian influx is already in Europe, and more arriving by the day; why not get out yesterday’s

plan and give the EU its best chance to look coordinated?”

Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE20

Migration’s silver bullets? A mythClaudia Natali and Michael Newson1

While no silver bullet, expanded legal migration channels remain a central feature of any approach aimed at addressing the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean

Here is the thing: while we all wished therewereone,there isnosilverbullettoaddress(irregular) migration, let alone to solve the

ongoingcomplexmigrationflowsintheMediterraneanand Andaman seas. Any migration expert willimmediately explain to you how migration is acomplexphenomenonthatcutsacrossmanydifferentareas such as health, gender, development, trade,securityand theenvironment.Moreover, it involvescountriesoforigin,transitanddestinationatdifferentlevels. As such, any serious attempt to address thecomplexmigrationflows intheMediterraneanmusttakeintoaccountall itsdifferentfacets,actors,theirrespective interactions, motivations and impacts.We speak nowadays of “mixed migration” flows inorder to recognize that the peoplewe see crossingdesertsandseastogettoEuropedosoforavarietyofdifferentandinterrelatedreasons:someareprimarilydrivenbythesearchforemploymentandabetterlife,whileothersareinsearchandhavealegitimatelegalclaim to international protection,whichmeans thatanymigrationresponsemustensurethatappropriatemechanismsareinplacetodetectgenuinerefugeesfrom labourmigrants.Giventhecomplexitiesof theissue,theideathataneasyfixexists–beitimprovedbordersecurity,supportingdevelopmentincountriesof origin, targeting smugglers, or opening moreregularmigrationchannels–wouldbenaïveatbestandlikelycounterproductivetoaddressingtheissuesathand.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM)believesthatacomplexchallengesuchasmigrationrequires a nuanced and thoughtful response. Thisarticle aims to clearly outline the IOMposition and

approachtoaddressingthecomplexmigrationflowsin theMediterranean.TheOrganization’sposition isthat, while legal migration channels should remaina central feature of any policy response aimed atreducingirregularmigration,andmoreadvocacyhastobedonewithdestinationcountriestoopenregularmigration channels, be they circular or permanent,thatareaccessiblebythosecurrentlygoingirregularly,this is just one of a number of complimentaryinterventions that governments must work on toaddressirregularmigration.

Reinforcingbordersecurityisoftenthefirstknee-jerkreactionof governmentswhen facedwith the rapidescalationoflargeirregularmigrationflows.Ifbettersystems are in place to detect irregularmovementsat borders, and border officials are provided withenhancedcapacitytoidentifyvulnerablegroupssuchasvictimsoftraffickingorsmuggling,itseemslogicaltothinkthatthevolumeofuncontrolledmovementsandcross-borderexploitationwoulddecrease.Whilethisholdstruetoacertainextent,andIOMisengagedwith a number of governments to improve bordermanagement and security capacities, more controldoes not automatically mean that people will stopcrossing borders. As we have heard from so manyirregular migrants in North Africa, as well as thosewho havemade it to Europe, even in themidst ofsevere suffering, it is “Europe or death” and “Wearenotgoinghome”.Migrantswillcontinuetomaketheirway across borders as the decision tomigrateis often more related to socioeconomic factors inthe country of origin than the policies of countriesofdestination.Whatwill change thoughwill be theroutes and means used to get to the destination,oftenincreasingthevulnerabilityandriskformigrantsen route. Over the past decade, we have seen theebb and flow of migrants across various migrationroutesfromtheWesternMediterranean,totheEast,then to the Central Mediterranean and now withincreasingnumbersagaincomingthroughtheEasternMediterranean.Thefocusonbordercontrolhasquitevisiblyshiftedmigratoryroutes,butithasneverbeenable to entirely stop the movements themselves.Border control is not the silver bullet to irregularmigration,butitshouldcertainlybepartofabroaderresponse.

1 Claudia Natali is LabourMobility and Human DevelopmentSpecialistattheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)RegionalOfficeforWestandCentralAfricainDakar,Senegal.MichaelNewsonisLabourMobilityandHumanDevelopmentSpecialistattheIOMRegionalOfficefortheMiddleEastandNorthAfricainCairo,Egypt.

Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE 21

Migrants face risks throughout their journey, fromorigin through transit and destination. Bordermanagement should take into consideration thenegativeeffectsonmigrants’possiblerelianceontheservicesofsmugglers, increasingboththecostsandrisks ofmigration. Amarket space is hence createdfor smugglers to sell their very expensive services.Whenthepromiseisa“tickettoEurope”,desperatemigrants – including refugees, and low-skilled andunemployed youth and women – are ready to paywhatever price to buy their dream of a better life.Lessdesperatemigrantsoftenalsorelyonsmugglersas these are seen, and they often are, the onlyoptiontofacilitatetheirmovetoEuropeandbeyond.The lives of thousands ofmigrants are put into thehands of unscrupulous smugglers each month andwe have recently witnessed the dire consequencesthis can have. Any programme aimed at managingmigration,andspecificallyataddressingthechallengeof irregular migration, should hence allow for theprovisionofsupportservicesforvulnerablemigrants,including stranded migrants, victims of traffickingandsmuggling,aswellasasylum-seekers, identifiedalong the migratory route. Among other initiativesintransitcountries,IOMadvocatesthedevelopmentof Migrant Resource and Response Mechanisms(MRRM)whereby thosemigrants en routewho arein need can receive a range of services, includingdirect medical or other assistance, return homeunderdignifiedandsecureconditions,andprovisionof information regarding asylumpolicies and labourmarketinformationatdestinationtohelpthemmakeinformed decisions. Again, assistance provided ina vacuum of othermeasures to address or preventirregularmigrationisnotthesilverbullet,but it isanecessarypartofanysolution.

Recognizing that lack of sufficient livelihoodopportunitiesincountriesoforiginandmisinformationaboutthejourneyandtheconditionsthatawaitthemintheEuropeanUnion(EU)aretwooftheprincipledriversthatfueldemandforsmugglingandirregularmigration. IOM believes that any policy wishing toseriously address the challenge posed by irregularmigration must include initiatives to: 1) improveresiliencebybuildingsustainableanddecentlivelihoodand employment opportunities for the youth; and2) raise awareness to promote safe migration anddeterirregularmigration.

As identified in numerous studies, un- andunderemployment are the critical root causes forirregularmigrationofyouth,andparticularlyforyoung

males who remain by far the largest demographicof cross-Mediterranean irregular flows. Indeed, themajorcountriesoforiginforirregularmigrationacrosstheMediterraneanallsufferfromhighratesofyouthunemploymentandpoverty.TheprincipalNorthandWestAfricancountriesoforiginforirregularmigrationtotheEUsufferfromdualchallengesregardingyouthemployment:

•Ayouthbulgeintheirdemographicshasresultedinmorenewentrantsintothelabourmarketthancancurrentlybeabsorbedduetosloweconomicgrowthanda lackof capital for investment,andthisbulge is projected to increaseover thenextdecadebeforeitrecedes.

•Education systems, including technical andvocational training programmes, are outdatedand no longer alignwith the skills needswithinthe labour market, leaving a large number ofyouth increasinglyunemployable indecentworkopportunities.

IOM believes that investments in projects tostrengthen livelihood opportunities for the youthin origin countries should be a critical part of acomprehensive migration policy that also aims ataddressing the ongoing flows of irregular migrants.IOM is convinced that collective funds and supportof the large diaspora populations of countries oforigin and transit, if guided by sound policies andprogrammes that encourage their engagement, cancontribute substantially to economic developmentand job growth. In addition to the estimated USD436billioninremittancesthatweresentbymigrantsin developed countries to developing countries in2014, and which are primarily used to support thedaily subsistence and consumption needs of familyand friends, diaspora populations can contributesubstantiallytostimulatingeconomicgrowththroughinvestment, development of trade networks, andtransfer of knowledge and skills. The impressiveeconomicgrowthofChina,India,Ireland,theRepublicofKoreaandTaiwanProvinceofChina,forexample,overthepastfewdecadeshaveallincludedaroleforthediasporawithintheirstory.ItisestimatedthattheAfricandiasporaasawholecurrentlyholdsavingsofUSD40billion2thatcouldbeputtowardsphilanthropicorinvestmentprojectsincountriesoforigin.Engagingthe diaspora in both philanthropic and investment

2 FiguresfromtheWorldBank.

22 Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

initiativesthatstimulateentrepreneurshipandgrowthof the small andmedium-sized enterprise sector incountries of origin can thus leverage considerableamounts of funding and technical support thatservetoaddressmigrationdriversanddevelopmentchallenges.

But development aid alone is not a silver bullet tothe complex migration flows in the Mediterraneaneitherandwillnotbesufficienttoaddressthevariouschallengesinstimulatingeconomicgrowthincountriesof origin and in so doing providing alternatives toirregularmigrationformanymigrants.Indeed,somestudies have indicated that development aid, if nottargetedspecificallytowardsstimulatingjobgrowth,may actually contribute to irregular migration bydistorting terms of trade. However, the fact thatdevelopment aid has to be carefully designed doesnotmeanthatitisnotdesirableorthatitisapolicyoptiontobediscarded.Developmentaidisyetanothercomponent of the broader approach advocated byIOM to address the complexmigration flows in theMediterranean. Concurrently, IOM promotes thefullparticipationofmigrants insocietiesbybuildingthe capacities of both migrants and communities.IOM works closely with municipalities and localauthorities,andcarriesoutcapacity-buildingactivitiesandresearchdesignedtoimproveintegrationpoliciesandidentifybestpracticesatbothlocalandnationallevels.

The decision to engage in irregular migrationand purchase the services of human smugglersis not one that is taken rashly or quickly. Often, aconsiderableamountoftimepassesbetweenthefirstconsiderationsofengaginginirregularmigrationandwhentheprospectivemigrantmakesthefinaldecisionandacquiresthefinancialresourcesrequiredtobeginhisorherjourney.Thisdecision-makingprocessleavesample time and opportunity for public messagingandawareness-raisingcampaigns todeterwould-beirregularmigrants fromcarryingout thepracticebybreakingtheconsumerdecision-makingprocessusingavarietyofpublicmarketingtechniquesthatrespondto the different stages of decision-making andofferpositive alternatives. However, currently, limitedknowledgeandresearchexistontheeffectivenessofawareness-raising campaigns that could contributetothedevelopmentofmoretargetedandsuccessfulcampaigns. IOM seesmore research to identify themosteffectivecampaignsindifferentcircumstancesasanimportantaspectofthebroadapproachtotackleirregular migration. Also, targeted and evidence-

basedcampaignsbothatorigin–toinformpotentialmigrants–andatdestination–toreduceinstancesofxenophobia– shouldbepartof this comprehensiveandmultiprongedapproach toaddress thecomplexmigration flows in theMediterranean, or any otherirregularmigrationcrisis.

Smugglers operate freely and have no competitorsbecausecountriesofdestinationdonotofferregularentryoptions,orofferveryfew,tomigrantsinneed.Opening legal migration routes for lower-skilledmigrantsincountriesoforigin,ashasbeenillustratedby circular, temporary and permanent migrationschemes implemented in Australia, Canada, NewZealand,theRepublicofKoreaandSingapore,amongothers,hasbeendemonstratednottoeliminatebutat least to significantly curb demand for irregularmigrationbothbyprovidingopportunities for thosewhowouldotherwisehavemigratedirregularlyandbyreducingdemandforirregularmigrantlabouramongemployers in countries of destination as they haveaccesstoregularmigrationprogrammestomeettheirreallabour-marketneeds.Thedevelopmentofregularmigrationschemesiscertainlyapoliticallychallengingissue to navigate, and their design deserves carefulanalysis and a tailored approach to ensure thatthey are responding effectively and directly to theirregular flows. While certainly not a silver bullet,enhancingaccesstolegalmigrationopportunitiesforrefugeesandlow-skilledworkersisbothamorallyandpracticallynecessarypartofthebroaderframeworktoaddressthecurrentMediterraneanmigrationflows.

Acknowledging the need for a broad andcomprehensive response to the complex migrationflowsintheMediterraneanisthefirstimportantstepthatgovernmentsanddonorsshouldmakeiftheyareseriousaboutsolvingtheissue.Furtherchallengeliesin the implementation of the envisioned responseplan. This task is further complicatedby the lackofaccurate and reliable data on irregular migrationflows.Moreprecisequantitativeandqualitativedataon irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean,broken down by sex, origin, marital status andmotivations, will provide better insight into thedriversandsourcesofmigration,and thiswill allowgovernments to develop policies and programmes,including labour migration programmes to allowregular entry to low-skilled workers, that moreeffectively and successfully respond to the complexmigrationflowsintheMediterranean.Aspartofthebroadframeworkenvisionedtoaddressthesituationand irregular/desperationmigrationmore generally,

23Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

IOM advocates better data collection and analysisonmigration, and supports various governments inAfricaandbeyondtostrengthentheircapacityinthisdirection.

Conclusion

There is no easy fix to the ongoing desperationmigration phenomenon such as the ones we havebeenwitnessingintheMediterraneanandAndamanseas. A series of interlinked and complementaryactionshavetobeput inplace if theongoingcrisesaretobeseriouslyaddressed.Openingupmorelegalchannels formigrants is only onepart of a broaderand complex response mechanism to be put inplace.Governments, internationalorganizationsanddonorsshouldallworktogethertoensurethatsucha response is well articulated and targeted. To doso,itisimportantthatsufficientresourcesaremadeavailable,includingstrengtheningofdatacollectiontoenhanceourunderstandingofthedriversandshiftingsourcesofmigration.IOM,throughits long-standingand global experience on migration issues, followsthis multipronged approach to continue supportingandadvisinggovernmentsanddonors inaddressingcomplexmigrationflowsworldwide.n

“Governments, international organizations and donors should

all work together to ensure that such a response is well

articulated and targeted. “

24 Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

FORTHCOMING A NEW CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM DEDICATED SOLELY TO MIGRATION,

ASYLUM AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECTS WORLDWIDE

Crowdfunding is an increasingly popular and successful mechanism to generate funding for worthwhile projects and initiatives.

Today, there is no crowdfunding platform that is dedicated solely to the migrant communities established in major countries of immigration, or to migrant organizations, public agencies (including international organizations), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals supporting such communities. MIGFUNDER aims to bridge this gap by establishing the first dedicated crowdfunding site catering for migrants looking to create (or grow) their businesses abroad or in their countries of origin, as well as migrant organizations, public agencies, NGOs, and individuals looking to launch a development or humanitarian initiative in support of immigrant and refugee communities worldwide, or a research project/conference in the field of migration, asylum or human rights policy. This is a pioneering initiative that will contribute potentially to reducing the effects of budget cuts and under-funding in major refugee, migration and human rights programmes around the world.

MIGFUNDER was established by a group of European migration policy experts, including former senior government officials, reputable researchers and IT developers, who set out to extend the facilities and benefits of a crowdfunding platform to the specific needs of immigration, refugee and human rights affairs worldwide.

MIGFUNDER targets, primarily but not exclusively, members of the diaspora who are willing and able to support viable business projects from their compatriots, as well as development, humanitarian and research initiatives in the countries of immigration or origin.

MIGFUNDER’s estimated launch date is the mid-December 2015. For any further information, or to submit a campaign, please contact Solon Ardittis (sardittis@migfunder.com) or Don Ingham (dingham@migfunder.com).

Migrant/Refugee development projects

Migrant/Refugee humanitarian projects

Research projects/Conferences

Migrant start-ups

25Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Publications

World Migration Report 2015 – Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility 2015/228pages/EnglishISSN1561-5502ISBN978-92-9068-709-2USD60

Etat de la migration dans le monde 2015 – Les migrants et les villes : de nouveaux partenariats pour gérer la mobilité2015/242pages/FrançaisISSN1020-8453ISBN978-92-9068-710-860dollarsE.-U.

Weliveinaworldwhichisbecomingincreasinglyurban.Over54percentofpeopleacrosstheglobewerelivingin urban areas in 2014. The current urban populationof 3.9 billion is expected to grow to some 6.4 billionby 2050.Migration is drivingmuch of the increase inurbanization,makingcitiesmuchmorediverseplacesinwhichtolive.

Nearlyoneinfiveofallmigrantsliveintheworld’stop20largestcities.Inmanyofthesecitiesmigrantsrepresentoverathirdormoreofthepopulation.Othercitieshaveseenaremarkablegrowthinmigrationinrecentyears.InAsiaandAfrica,rapidlygrowingsmallcitiesareexpectedtoabsorbalmostallthefutureurbanpopulationgrowthoftheworldandthismobilitypatterntocitiesandurbanareasischaracterizedbythetemporalityandcircularityoftheinternalmigrationprocess.

The fast rate of urbanization, and rising migration tocities,bringswithitbothrisksandopportunitiesforthemigrants, communities and governments concerned.The World Migration Report 2015 explores howmigrationandmigrantsareshapingcities,andhowthelifeofmigrants,inturn,isshapedbycities,theirpeople,organizationsandrules.

Thereportcontributestotheglobaldebateonmigrationandurbanizationinthreeways.First,itdocumentshowmigrationisshapingcitiesandthesituationofmigrantsincities.Muchofthecurrentdiscussionaboutmigrationtrends and migration policy tends to focus on thenational level.Taking themigrationenquiry to thecitylevel increases our understanding of the local political

economies of migration and the close connectionbetween migration and urban development. Second,thereportdrawsattentiontothelivelihoodofmigrantsinthecitiesoftheGlobalSouth.Theexistingdiscussionson migrants and cities are inclined to concentrateprimarily on the Global North and the integration ofinternationalmigrants.Third,thereportexaminesbothinternal and international migration with cities acrossthedevelopment spectrumhaving tomanagegrowingmobileanddiversepopulations.

The first two chapters of the report set out themaintrends in cities and migration, examine the variousurbansettingswhichhaveexperiencedrecentgrowthofinternalorinternationalorevenbothtypesofmigrationflows, highlighting the diversifying migration flows.Chapter 3 looks at aspects of urban vulnerabilities ingeneral– livelihoodandmobilitystrategies,barrierstoaccessingresourcesandspecificformsofvulnerabilities,as they affect the populations most at risk includingmigrantwomen. Chapter 4 explores howurbanizationand new mobility patterns can contribute to urbanpoverty reduction, growth and development andenhancemigrantwell-being.Chapter5studiessomeoftheurbangovernanceconditions formigrant inclusionandpartnerships.

The final part draws conclusions and makesrecommendations for future initiatives to developmigrant-inclusive urban governance, with referenceto the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 globalsustainabledevelopmentframework.

Informe sobre las Migraciones en el Mundo 2015 – Los migrantes y las ciudades: Nuevas colaboraciones para gestionar la movilidad2015/248pages/EspañolISSN1020-9026ISBN978-92-9068-711-560dólaresEE.UU.

26 Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Migration Health Annual Review 20142015/104pagesEnglish

Thisreport illustrates IOM’shealthactivities in2014and presents key achievements in the three mainmigration health programme areas: (a) migrationhealth assessments and travel health assistance;(b) health promotion and assistance for migrants;and(c)migrationhealthassistanceforcrisis-affectedpopulations. The report also highlights emergingthemes in migration and health – learning theimportanceofunderstandingpopulationmobilityandits health risks in the context of disease outbreaksfromthe2014‒2015Ebolacrisis inWestAfrica;andthe global public health value of migration healthassessments. This report aptly illustrates IOM’sgrowingmultidimensionalmigrationhealthactivitiesandglobalpartnerships.GuidedbytheResolutionontheHealthofMigrantsadoptedbytheWorldHealthAssembly in May 2008, the report demonstratesIOM’scommitmenttoadvancethehealthofmigrantsand their families worldwide, as well as supportIOMMember States in addressingmigration healthchallenges.

How the World Views Migration2015/68pagesEnglish

How the World Views Migration provides, for thefirsttime,aninsightintopublicattitudestowardsimmigrationworldwide.Thefindingspresentedinthereport–basedoninterviewswithover183,000adultsacrossmorethan140countriesbetween2012and2014–representthefirst steps towards understanding the lenses throughwhichpeopleviewimmigrationatagloballevel.

Adultssurveyed inGallup’sWorldPollwereaskedtwoquestions about immigration: 1) In your view, shouldimmigrationinthiscountrybekeptatitspresentlevel,increased or decreased? 2) Do you think immigrantsmostlytakejobsthatcitizensinthiscountrydonotwant(e.g.low-payingornotprestigiousjobs),ormostlytakejobsthatcitizensinthiscountrywant?

One of the key findings of the report is that in everymajorregionoftheworld–withtheimportantexceptionofEurope–peoplearemorelikelytowantimmigrationlevelsintheircountriestoeitherstayatthepresentlevelor to increase, rather than to decrease. This contrastswith the negative perceptions of migration oftenportrayedinthemediaincertainregionsoftheworld.

Europeanresidentsappeartobe,onaverage,themostnegativegloballytowardsimmigration,withthemajoritybelievingimmigrationlevelsshouldbedecreased.Thereis, however, a sharp divergence in opinions amongresidentsinNorthernandSouthernEurope.

The report also shows that certain sociodemographiccharacteristics are more consistently associated withfavourable or opposing attitudes to immigration. Forinstance, adults with a university degree are typicallymore likely than thosewith lower levels of educationtowanttosee immigrationkeptat itspresent levelorincreasedintheircountries.

27Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Addressing Human Trafficking and Exploitation in Times of Crisis 2015/16pagesEnglish

Trafficking inpersonsandother formsofexploitationoccur intimesof crisisyet remain largely overlooked in the context of humanitarian response. Thisbriefingdocumentprovidescontemporary,evidence-basedfindingsindicatingthat trafficking in persons is not a side effect of crises but is often directlyinterrelated.

BasedonfieldworkthatassessedongoingcrisesinIraqandLibya,aswellascasestudiesofman-madeandenvironmental crises in Indonesia, thePhilippines,theMediterraneanandmore,thebriefingdocumentdrawsonover120expertinterviews and provides a 20-year reflective analysis of various crises datingbackfromthe1990s.

The briefing offers a number of recommendations for States, the humanitarian community and the donorcommunitytoensurethatcounter-traffickingandtheprotectionofvulnerablemigrantsnolongerremainatthemarginsofhumanitarianresponseefforts.

MPP Readers’ Survey

Migration Policy Practice (MPP) waslaunchedthreeyearsagoandtheeditorswouldnowliketoinvitereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinashortreaders’satisfactionsurvey.

Thepurposeofthissurvey,whichcanbetakenanonymously,istohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimaryinterestsinourjournal.Thesurvey’sresponseswillcontribute,inparticular,toadjustingandimproving,asappropriate,MPP’scontentandstyle,andthusthereader’sexperience.

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28 Vol. V, Number 4, October 2015–November 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Call for authors/Submission guidelines

SinceitslaunchinOctober2011,Migration Policy Practice haspublishedover110articlesbyseniorpolicymakersanddistinguishedmigrationpolicyexpertsfromallovertheworld.

Past authors have included, inter alia:

Eric Adja, Director General of the International Migrants Remittances Observatory (IMRO) andSpecial Adviser to the President of Benin; John K. Bingham, Global Coordinator of civil societyactivities intheUnitedNationsHigh-levelDialogueonInternationalMigrationandDevelopmentandtheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopment;Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje,ChairoftheGFMD2013-2014;Mark Cully,ChiefEconomistattheAustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection;António Guterres,UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees;Khalid Koser,ChairoftheWorldEconomicForumGlobalAgendaCouncilonMigration;Khalid Malik,DirectoroftheHumanDevelopmentReportOffice,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP);Cecilia Mamlström,EUCommissioner forHomeAffairs;Ali Mansoor,Chairof theGFMD2012;Andrew Middleton,DirectorofCulture,RecreationandMigrantStatistics,AustralianBureauofStatistics;Najat Maalla M’Jid,UnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuronthesaleofchildren,childprostitutionandchildpornography;Robert A. Mocny,DirectorofUS-VISIT,USDepartmentofHomelandSecurity;Imelda M. Nicolas,SecretaryoftheCommissiononFilipinosOverseas(CFO),OfficeofthePresidentof the Philippines; Ignacio Packer, Secretary General of the Terre des Hommes InternationalFederation; Kelly Ryan (CoordinatoroftheIntergovernmentalConsultationsonMigration,AsylumandRefugees–IGC,Geneva);Martin Schulz,PresidentoftheEuropeanParliament;David Smith,DirectorofSurveysandReporting,AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection;Sir Peter D. Sutherland,SpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretary-GeneralforMigration; Ambassador William Lacy Swing,DirectorGeneraloftheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM);Myria Vassiliadou, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, European Commission; Catherine Wiesner, DeputyAssistantSecretaryofState,BureauofPopulation,RefugeesandMigration,USDepartmentofState.

Migration Policy Practice welcomes submissions from policymakers worldwide. As a general rule, articles should:

•Notexceedfivepagesandbewritteninanon-academicandreader-friendlystyle.

•Coveranyareaofmigrationpolicybutdiscuss,asfaraspossible,particularsolutions,policyoptionsorbestpracticerelatingtothethemescovered.

•Provide, as often as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant publicadministrations,orcivilsociety,inothercountries.

Articlesgivingaccountofevaluationsofspecificmigrationpoliciesandinterventions,includingbothevaluationfindingsandinnovativeevaluationmethodologies,areparticularlywelcome.

To discuss any aspect of the journal, or to submit an article, please contact:

• Solon Ardittis(sardittis@eurasylum.org);and

• Dr Frank Laczko(flaczko@iom.int)