EISENHOWER, INTELLIGENCE AND THE 1960 U-2 INCIDENT

University of AmsterdamThomas van der Brugge

10262652

Master’s ThesisMA American Studies

Prof. dr. R.V.A. JanssensJune 20, 2017

AbstractEisenhower and the intelligence community were interwoven in his presidency. During his

military career, Eisenhower became familiar with intelligence during World War II, as the

United Kingdom provided him information through their ULTRA program. When

Eisenhower became president, he wanted to diminish the influence of the Cold War on the

United States economy in the long run. Eisenhower used various forms of intelligence,

because it was more inexpensive than conventional warfare. The Central Intelligence

Agency overthrew governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954). These coup d’états

were perceived to be successful in the short run and therefore these covert operations

formed the basis for later clandestine missions. During the late 1950s, the need for

intelligence from the Soviet Union increased, as the bomber gap and the missile gap made

Congress and public wary about a possible Soviet technological advantage. Therefore, the

Central Intelligence Agency started flying Lockheed U-2 spy planes over the Soviet Union,

photographing Soviet military bases. On one of those missions, the U-2 of Francis Gary

Powers was shot down. The incident led to a deterioration of the American-Soviet

relationship. While Eisenhower wanted to incorporate intelligence to make the Cold War

less of a financial burden for the United States, his short term look on the use of

intelligence only intensified and extended the war.

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Table of ContentsIntroduction 4

Chapter One: Eisenhower’s Cold War Approach 10

1.1 NSC-162/2 13

1.2 “New Look” 20

1.3 Conclusion 24

Chapter Two: Eisenhower and Intelligence 26

2.1 World War II 28

2.2 Eisenhower’s Presidency 32

2.3 Conclusion 39

Chapter Three: The 1960 U-2 incident 42

3.1 “Intelligence gap” 45

3.2 Organization, Politics & Decision making 49

3.3 Conclusion 53

Conclusion 55

Bibliography 59

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IntroductionIn the early morning of May 1, 1960, a Lockheed U-2C spy plane took off from the Central

Intelligence Agency’s Camp Badaber, near the city of Peshawar, Pakistan. Its mission,

designated as “Operation GRAND SLAM,” was to photograph the alleged Soviet SS-6

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs) launch sites in the East Soviet Union. It would

have been the first intelligence mission in which an American spy plane fully overflew the

Soviet Union, as it would have landed in Bodø, Norway. The pilot of the aircraft was

Francis Gary Powers, an Air Force veteran who performed intelligence gathering flights for

the Central Intelligence Agency. After takeoff, he steered the aircraft towards the Soviet

border. However, even before he had entered Soviet airspace, the plane was already

being tracked by their radar. More than 1600 miles in to the Soviet Union, near the city of

Yekaterinburg, the aircraft was subsequently shot down by a SA-2 missile.1

The intelligence gathering mission had been initially planned to take place on April

28 and was postponed twice because of bad weather on the route. The first of May was

the last date the mission could have taken place, because President Dwight D.

Eisenhower did not want the mission to interfere with the Four Powers Summit, which

would take place in Paris on May 16. During this conference, the Americans, the Soviets,

the Brits and the French were supposed to talk about the rapprochement of East and

West. In the late 1950s, the relationship between President Eisenhower and Soviet Prime

Minister Nikita Khrushchev had been relatively calm, with both leaders using a less

hardline approach than their predecessors President Truman and Prime Minister Stalin.

During the summit, the countries’ leaders would address major Cold War issues such as

disarmament and a nuclear test ban, which was needed to reduce further escalation.2

Gregory Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach. The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead 1

Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974, (Washington D.C., Central Intelligence Agency, 1992). 170-175.

New York Times, “Spy Summit: The Leaders of East and West and the dramatic Case that beclouds the 2

Summit,” The New York Times. May 15, 1960, E1.�4

Since the Lockheed U-2 was shot down above Soviet territory, Khrushchev had

physical proof of the overflights, which Eisenhower could not deny. Moreover the, Soviet

Prime Minister presented the incident in a striking way, releasing information in batches,

which made the Eisenhower administration’s plausible deniability impossible. What started

as an incident on the May 1, turned in to an affair. Two weeks later, during the summit,

Eisenhower was absent. Khrushchev had made clear that he wanted to negotiate about

the situation in Berlin and East-West trade if Eisenhower apologized for the overflights.

President Eisenhower did not comply to Khrushchev’s demands and the talks were

terminated even before they had started. The failure of this conference was not the only

failure that was a consequence of the Central Intelligence Agency’s fatal overflight. The

incident caused a deadlock in the American-Soviet relationship and would herald in a

relatively tense period in the Cold War, with events such as the Berlin crisis and the Cuban

Missile Crisis.

Previous scholarship on Eisenhower’s presidency has focused mostly on the legacy

of the Eisenhower presidency. When his presidency ended, the public blamed him for his

lack of leadership. They saw him as a man who would play golf all day long, and delegated

his tasks to experienced government officials such as Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles. When the archives opened in the 1970s, this image of Eisenhower turned out to be

inaccurate. The debate changed and got a more appreciative approach to Ike’s

presidency, as he did make a lot of decisions regarding foreign policy. The role of the U-2

incident and intelligence in President Eisenhower’s administration has also been

discussed by scholars. In this debate, Eisenhower’s attitude towards the Soviet Union is

important. The President had an ambivalent approach, which is explained by political

scientist Fred I. Greenstein. In 1982, he published his book The Hidden Hand Presidency:

Eisenhower as Leader, in which he argues that President Eisenhower had multiple

approaches. The public approach of Eisenhower towards the Soviet Union was very warm,

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close and approachable. And in private, as decision maker, he aimed at making his own

decisions while delegating tasks to others. This approach made him both decisive while

retaining peace at the same time.3

Greenstein’s concept of Eisenhower’s hidden hand can also be applied to uncover

a different perspective. Eisenhower’s use of covert operations can be traced to this

“hidden hand,” as the Central Intelligence Agency effectively was Eisenhower’s hidden

hand in foreign affairs. This is made clearer by historian and Eisenhower biographer

Stephen E. Ambrose, who argues “Eisenhower was the first leader of the free world to

embrace espionage as a geopolitical tactic.” Furthermore, the President also 4

institutionalized the use of intelligence. His experiences with the British analysis of

intelligence during World War II had made him enthusiastic about the possibilities that

intelligence could offer. As a result, Eisenhower made extensive use of intelligence during

his presidency. Besides the aerial reconnaissance or espionage on Soviet targets,

Eisenhower also approved Central Intelligence Agency’s covert operations in Iran and

Guatemala, where the governments were overthrown. The Eisenhower administration was

so eager to use covert operations, that they did not fully consider the possibility of

unwanted repercussions or side effects, also known as blowback.

The U-2 incident was an example of such an intelligence failure. After the incident,

the American overflight of the Soviet Union was subsequently halted. Intelligence

historians Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach argue that the Central

Intelligence Agency’s endeavor in the world of overhead reconnaissance was nonetheless

successful. The CIA and the U-2 Program, a study written for and published by the CIA’s

Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 3

5-9.

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, (Jackson: University 4

Press of Mississippi, 1999), ix. While Ambrose offers a comprehensive history of Eisenhower’s experience with the intelligence community. In recent years, Ambrose has been criticized for plagiarism of other scholars and alleged fabrication of interviews with Eisenhower. Nonetheless, Ambrose’s products are useful because they provide a good view of what kind of person Eisenhower was.

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Center for the Study of Intelligence, draws its information from many interviews and secret

documents which other academics did not have access to. Welzenbach, a CIA veteran,

and Pedlow, a scholar and former Army intelligence officer, construct the narrative of a

successful intelligence program. They argue that the U-2 project signaled a greater

involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in overhead reconnaissance during peace

and war. However, was this influence really positive?5

While there are many scholars who stress that Eisenhower had the final decision,

there is evidence to believe that people within the Central Intelligence Agency had a

certain influence on the President’s decisions. This was particularly the case in the

approval of the overflights. Political scientist Raymond L. Garthoff adds to this that

Eisenhower did not believe in the missile gap. Then why did the President approve the

overflights? And what was the impact of the U-2 incident?

In recent years, post-revisionist scholars such as Tor E. Førland and Mary S.

McAuliffe have argued that the debate of the Eisenhower presidency should concentrate

itself on the effects of the policy that Eisenhower made, as it is now clear that the

President himself had the last word on the United States foreign policy. In her commentary

on Eisenhower’s presidency, Mary S. McAuliffe notes that it is the time for post-revisionist

historians to conclude how Eisenhower’s views worked out in the long run. Questions she

poses are predominantly about his vision and tone. What kind of vision did the President

have, and was it sustainable in the long run? Was he looking for peace or was he a

warmonger? In this thesis, these questions are combined with Eisenhower’s extensive 6

use of intelligence. Was Eisenhower’s extensive use of intelligence effective in the long

run? In order to answer this question, we need to evaluate different sub questions about

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 322.5

Tor Egil Førland, “Selling Firearms to the Indians: Eisenhower’s Export Control Policy, 1953-1954,” 6

Diplomatic History Vol 15 (1991), 223n6. And: Mary S. McAuliffe, “Eisenhower, The President,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1981), 631-632.

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Eisenhower’s approach of the Cold War and how he incorporated intelligence and dealt

with its consequences. How familiar Eisenhower was familiar with intelligence and how did

he use it during his Presidency? As the U-2 incident is a striking example of how

Eisenhower used his intelligence, the last question which will be investigated is about the

U-2 Program and the incident. What was the effect of the U-2 incident on intelligence?

In chapter one, Eisenhower’s foreign policy will be sketched. This is important,

because his need for restructuring the defense budget is key to his intelligence policy.

Eisenhower wanted to reduce the strain of government spending on the economy. He

understood that, if the American government wanted to win the Cold War in the long run, it

needed to have more financial stamina. The economy would play a key role in this

objective. With the help of relatively new tools such as nuclear weapons and intelligence,

Eisenhower was able to obtain his goal of diminishing the costs and make the Cold War

sustainable in the long run.

The second chapter revolves around Eisenhower’s experience with the intelligence

community. During World War II, Eisenhower had gained a lot of knowledge concerning

intelligence from the British intelligence services. It had enabled him to approach the war

more efficiently, since the United Kingdom had provided him with intelligence from

deciphered German messages. As President, Eisenhower used this experience to support

his foreign policy in various ways. During the 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency was

used to overthrow allegedly Communist regimes in Iran and Guatemala. These operations

were deemed successful, and they were in the short run. However, in the long run, they

would provide insecurity to the United States, because of the blowback that occurred.

In the third and final chapter, the U-2 Affair itself will be covered. This incident, near

the end of Eisenhower’s Presidential term, can be seen as the epitome of Eisenhower’s

ventures in the world of intelligence and covert operations. It was one of the first American

intelligence failures that became publicly known, and one of the last covert operations

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under Eisenhower’s guidance. Pedlow and Welzenbach argue that the U-2 Program was

successful despite its failure to fully overfly the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Eisenhower

and Allen Dulles gave permission for the U-2 overflights. Why was this the case? On the

other hand, the U-2 project served as the foundation for more, even rigorous

reconnaissance and covert operations during later presidencies. Examples of this include

the 1961 invasion of Cuba and the various intelligence failures during the Vietnam War.

The U-2 Affair epitomizes both the end, as well as the start of a new intelligence era.

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Chapter One: Eisenhower’s Cold War ApproachOn April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower delivered a speech for the American Society of

Newspaper Editors (ASNE). Former Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had died one month

before the “Chance for Peace” address, and Eisenhower used the opportunity to reflect on

the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The

new President argued that after the mutually coordinated victory over Nazi Germany, both

countries had grown apart, with the Soviet Union finding security in picking up arms. To

arm themselves against Soviet aggression, free nations such as the United States also

had to increase armaments, which resulted in multibillion dollar defense budgets.

Eisenhower now called for disarmament and the limitation of atomic weapons.

Furthermore, the President hoped to build on a better relationship with Stalin’s successor.

At first sight, Eisenhower’s plan seems to be straightforward and simple. By improving the

relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the need for further

mobilization decreased. In turn, this meant that the United States economy was less

restrained by large amounts of government spending that were needed to keep the

country secure from Soviet threats. However, Eisenhower’s plan was more complex.

Under the surface, his approach was not solely about creating a peaceful relationship with

the Soviet Union. It was just one tactic, part of a broader strategy.

An important element in Eisenhower’s approach towards the Soviet Union was the

United States government defense budget. The Presidents financial planning was related

with an improved relationship with the Soviet Union. In the same address, Eisenhower

explained his vision:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped

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hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement. We pay for a single fighter with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.7

In his speech, Eisenhower laid down what would be the blueprint for the policy of his

presidency. The newly elected President had come to the conclusion that spending too

much money on defense was not efficient. Instead of fighting a war with the Soviets, he

wanted to focus on the “war on poverty and need.” Eisenhower believed that conventional

war was not beneficial to most people, that most people wanted peace, and that many of

them lived in poor conditions. This change of battleground needed to be accomplished

through the stimulation of global trade and the creation of infrastructure that served the

needs of the ill-fated, such as hospitals and schools. After having spent more than thirty-

five years in the military, Eisenhower had come to the conclusion that military power was

not the way to solve the ongoing issues in the world.

Picking up arms would not be beneficial for the United States, as the President

believed that the increasing deficit of the government would eventually be fatal to national

security as well. Eisenhower had foreseen that the Cold War would not end in the near

future. He predicted that this war would have been very costly if the Truman

administration’s course would have been followed throughout his presidency.

Eisenhower’s policy was therefore aimed at keeping the nation secure with minimal costs,

but with the most effective outcome. Improving the relationship with the Soviet Union thus

was not the end goal, it was merely one of the methods to ensure that the United States

would be safe from Communist threats in the long run. Eisenhower’s goal was to minimize

the financial stress on the United States economy.

Another element that played a defining role in Eisenhower’s presidency was the

intelligence community. The overflights of the Lockheed U-2 spy plane over the Soviet

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors” (speech, Washington, 7

D.C., April 16, 1953), Eisenhower Presidential Library.�11

Union also need to be seen in the light of Eisenhower’s long term vision. Eisenhower

approved the flights, because they provided an excellent insight in the capabilities and

intentions of the Soviet Union. In turn, the Central Intelligence Agency helped reducing the

budget, because the United States buildup of arms could be tailored to the capabilities of

the Soviets. This helped reducing the defense budget from being a heavy burden to the

treasury and ensured that the American covert actions were kept under the radar of both

the Soviets and the American general public.

President Eisenhower’s long term vision is also stressed by historians Robert R.

Bowie and Richard H. Immerman in their book Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped

an Enduring Cold War Strategy. The authors argue that the main reason of Eisenhower’s

Presidential candidacy was his discontent with President Truman’s view of the Cold War,

who made excessive use of containment politics to limit the spread of Communism.

Truman’s Cold War approach led to massive government deficits through the creation of

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the Korean War. Thus, Eisenhower

believed that Truman’s policy was not sustainable in the long run, as it was not a cost

effective solution. Fighting wars and armament was not only not beneficial for national

security, it also cost a lot of capital maintain an army and keep the war going. Because of

Eisenhower’s ability to alter Truman’s foreign policy in a sustainable plan, Bowie and

Immerman also credit him for being the President whom matured the Cold War policies

laid out by Truman.8

In contrast to what earlier historians have argued about Eisenhower’s Cold War

master plan, Bowie and Immerman describe Eisenhower as someone with a clear vision,

who successfully altered Truman’s Cold War strategy from a reactionary to a proactive

one. They repudiate the earlier image of a President who cared more about playing golf

than foreign policy and left the most important decisions to his experienced staff. After his

Robert R. Bowie, Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War 8

Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3.�12

presidency ended, this image of Eisenhower had prevailed for more than 20 years. 9

Nonetheless, Eisenhower had more influence on his foreign policy than many Americans

during his presidency thought. To fully understand this negative sentiment that has

surrounded the Eisenhower Presidency we need to have a look at how Eisenhower

approached the Cold War. The low intensity conflict differed from a normal war in both

style and length. Therefore, the President used different measures. In his government, he

organized discussions to straighten foreign policy and made strategic investments in the

economy to counter the Communist threat. To fully understand his approach, we will look

at his previous experiences as general, his Presidential predecessors, his personal

experiences, and most important: how these influences shaped foreign policy. What were

his ideas? And what was the result of his vision?

1.1 NSC-162/2

During World War II, the Soviet Union had conquered many countries in Eastern Europe.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became incorporated in the Soviet Union, and many other

Eastern European countries became satellite states. Communist governments were

installed in all those countries. In the Middle East — Iran and Turkey, Communism got

support from an increasingly part of the population. For the United States, it was evident

that the Soviet Union was pursuing a world in which Communism would be the only

economic system, philosophy and social order. For the post-war American government,

this imminent threat meant that a plan to secure the freedoms of the United States was

needed. The first American experience with containment politics was in 1947. Under the

“Truman Doctrine,” aid was given to both Greece and Turkey, which was needed to bring a

halt to the Soviet sphere of influence in the region.10

Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, 11.9

Ibid. 12.10

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One of the more solid governmental plans against Soviet hegemony was made in

1947, in the form of NSC-20/4. In this document, the containment policy is officially

adopted “to reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer

constitute a threat to the peace, national dependence and stability of the world family of

nations.” Initially, the defense budget was not very high, but in the subsequent years the 11

American reliance on nuclear weapons made the creation of a strong air force necessary,

which in turn led to an increase of defense expenses. A military component was created

for this purpose: The Strategic Air Command (SAC), which was founded in 1946 and its

primary task was to protect the United States and allied states from a Soviet attack.12

On the 23rd of September 1949, President Truman announced that the Soviets had

successfully performed a nuclear test. In his statement, Truman did not seem to be

impressed. He stressed that it was inevitable that the Soviets would eventually be able to

produce nuclear warheads and called for “enforceable international control of atomic

energy.” While Truman’s statement was sedate, the test had a profound effect on the 13

defense policy of the administration. In the wake of the nuclear test, the President

envisioned that if the United States was not the only country to have nuclear weapons,

they might as well be the best. Following the nuclear test, Truman ordered the Department

of Defense to develop the fusion bomb.14

Another measure that was taken was the production of a new National Security

Policy. President Truman approved NSC-68 in April 1950, in which the Cold War strategy

of the United States was established. The strategy of the Truman administration was

National Security Council, NSC-20/4: Report by the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives With 11

Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security (Washington, D.C: November 23, 1948), 18.

Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, 14-15.12

Department Of State, Atomic Explosion Occurs in the U.S.S.R: Statement by the President, Department of 13

State Bulletin Vol. XXI, No 535 (1949), 487.

Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, 17.14

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based on the idea that the Soviets would have the possibility to use nuclear and hydrogen

bombs in the near future. In the case of a surprise attack, the United States not only

needed to be able to withstand a nuclear bomb, but also needed the military means to

retaliate against the Soviets. However, there were uncertainties about the Soviet nuclear

program. The United States intelligence community knew that their reports were not

providing a full image of the nuclear capabilities of the Soviets, which could lead to

problems with estimating the probable timing of a Soviet attack. The result of this 15

inaccurate intelligence was that the Truman administration needed to be careful with their

approach of the Soviets. Underestimating their nuclear progress could lead to deception,

which the administration wanted to avoid.

The National Security Council also advised the President to increase the defense

budget, as previous programs against the Soviets had proven to be inadequate for

protection of the free world. An example of a program that was not very effective was 16

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Eisenhower had been appointed as

the first Supreme Allied Commander in December 1950. Eisenhower allegedly complained

that he would refuse any “paper plans,” as he needed to deal with many financial and

political difficulties in his position as Supreme Commander. Eisenhower believed that the

objectives of the NATO and its financial position did not match. However, historian David T.

Fautua argues that NSC-68 alone was not able to persuade politicians to support the

higher defense budget. He contends that the main reason why NSC-68 was successful in

allocating resources for arms was the Korean War. When the North Koreans invaded

National Security Council, NSC68: A Report to the National Security Council by Executive Assistant on 15

United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (Washington, D.C: April 14, 1950), 19-20. https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf

National Security Council, NSC68, 63.16

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South Korea in June 1950, the budget for the Department of Defense rose to 48 billion

dollars, almost quadrupling earlier estimates.17

In his first year as President, Eisenhower wanted to create a uniform national

security policy. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed that

NSC-68 needed to be revisioned because Truman’s containment policy would eventually

be disastrous for the United States. Not because the United States did not have the

military power to cope with the Soviets. They thought that it would be disastrous for the

economy in the long run, which in turn would harm national security. Despite the shared

belief in repudiation of NSC-68, Dulles and Eisenhower disagreed on what the future

should look like. Dulles wanted to pursue a rollback strategy, as he predicted the Soviets

to be more aggressive in the near future. The Secretary of State believed that a hardline

attitude was the only way Western Civilization could survive Communism. While

Eisenhower had also stressed the need for rollback in his campaign, as a President he

advocated a milder strategy. To make everyone in his administration work in unison,

Eisenhower made a plan. This became Project Solarium, which was named after the “Sun

Room” on the top floor of the White House, where Dulles and Eisenhower had an informal

meeting and had once spoken about the trajectory of American national security.18

In the project, all officers were divided in three Task Forces. Task Force A’s

instruction was to develop a new iteration of the containment policy, which would focus on

military and economic strength while using vulnerabilities to destabilize the Soviet Union.

Task Force B used the aggressive containment policy: drawing a firm line around the

Soviet Union propagate that crossing this line would result in massive retaliation. The last

group, Task Force C, investigated the use of “rollback” of Communism. This was the most

offensive scenario, which used multiple techniques such as economic, psychological

David T. Fautua, “The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. 17

Army,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1997), 94-95.

Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, 127.18

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warfare and covert action. In the end, each team had to present the figures and estimates

they had made to the President.19

George F. Kennan, who was heading Task Force A during Project Solarium, pointed

out that Eisenhower carefully weighed the outcome of the three Task Forces, while paying

particular interest to the American economic prospectus for each plan. Also important to

Eisenhower were the risk of a general war between the United States and the USSR and

plans that could have impact on support from United States allies. Eisenhower’s focus on 20

the economy is confirmed by a view shared by Bowie and Immerman, who think that

Eisenhower’s preconceptions about the American approach towards the USSR played a

major role in the establishment of NSC-162/2. During World War II, when Eisenhower was

the United States General in Europe, he had learned that the economic budget was

essential to the military objectives that politicians had made. In his role as NATO’s

Supreme Allied Commander, he had dealt with many objectives but little budget. As a

President, Eisenhower therefore sought to balance the objectives with the available

resources. This was his primary goal, as he believed that the exorbitant military expenses

during the Truman administration were harming the United States economic growth.

Dulles critique on Project Solarium was mainly about the limitations of the

evaluation. Task Forces B and C shared many features as they were both directed more

aggressive forms, respectively containment and rollback. Task Force A, in his view, was

radically different from B and C and therefore it was easier to pick this strategy. This

critique of the Secretary of State was valid, because the President had indeed steered

towards the ideas that were emphasized by Task Force A. Despite this criticism, the

exercise was still useful. While the Task Forces themselves focused on the differences,

Eisenhower pointed out there were many similarities. The President knew that he could

Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, 12-15.19

George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963 (New York: Little Brown and Company 1972), 186.20

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not satisfy all participants of Project Solarium. Eisenhower chose his own direction, but the

project had been set up to give the members of his administration the feeling that they

were a valuable contribution to the future basic national security policy. The members of

the Solarium exercise provided answers within their respective frameworks and The

President handpicked the ideas that could fit his views.

The outcome of Project Solarium was subsequently distilled in to a new report,

which was further discussed by the National Security Council and eventually was turned

into NSC-162/2. The document provided the “Basic National Security Policy” for the

majority of the Cold War. It rested on the American perception that the Soviets would be a

long term threat to United States interests abroad, particularly in Western Europe.

NSC-162/2 furthermore estimated that the USSR would continue to seek opportunities to

broaden its influence, but at the same time it would be hesitant to attack the United States

and start a war. A nuclear attack was assessed as a possibility, as the Soviets “would soon

have the capability of dealing a crippling blow to our industrial base and our continued

ability to prosecute a war.” However, an effective defense could reduce the effects and

such likelyhood of such an attack. The NSC’s solution against the Soviet aggression was 21

mainly based on retaining a strong defense, with American and Allied forces working

closely together to counter a possible attack. The United States military needed to be

mobilized in such a way, that a victory over the Soviet Union was ensured in the case of a

sudden attack. Except for differences in estimating how long Soviet aggression would

hold, the assessment of the intentions and capabilities of the USSR does not differ that

much from the evaluation of the Truman administration in NSC-68/4.

Another key element in countering the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence was the

creation of a strong economy. Thus, the second important objective for national security

was the “Maintenance of a sound, strong and growing economy.” In NSC-162/2 this

National Security Council, NSC162/2: Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on 21

Basic National Security Policy, (Washington, D.C: October 30, 1953), 1-5.�18

economic focus needed to provide support for a long term Cold War or rapid mobilization

in the event of war.” By using the economy as a second objective to counter the Soviets, 22

the NSC stressed the importance of the American economy not only because it was

needed for budgetary reasons. It also made clear that the communist ideology was a

threat to free enterprise, a faith deeply rooted in American society.

A third element which needed to be countered by the administration’s practices was

the “maintenance of morale and free institutions and the willingness of the American

people to support the measures necessary for national security.” This objective was 23

interrelated with the former NSC objectives of maintaining a superior army and economy.

While a strong military was needed to outweigh Soviet actions in a possible attack, the

public support for a new Korean War would be limited. Furthermore, a robust and thriving

economy would ensure people that they were benefitting from the American freedoms. For

the Eisenhower administration it would be easier to sell the Cold War expenses to the

public if there was economic growth with additional benefits for the individual.

The longevity of Soviet aggression caused the NSC to form new supportive

measures. One of those measures was the development of a new intelligence system,

which needed to be capable of ensuring that both the United States military and economy

could run in the most effective manner possible. The National Security Council stated in

NSC-162/2 that the intelligence community needed to be able to “Accurately [evaluate] the

capabilities of foreign countries (…) to undertake military, political, economic and

subversive courses of action affecting United States security.” For Eisenhower and his 24

administration, intelligence was important, as it affected both the military as well as the

economy. First and foremost, intelligence gained insight about the intentions of the

National Security Council, NSC162/2, 6.22

Ibid. 6.23

Ibid. 6.24

�19

Soviets, which in turn could be used as a tactical advantage for the military. Secondly, it

was beneficial to the long term strategic goals of the administration. By rightly assessing

the intentions of the Soviet Union, the long term strategy could be adapted. The adaptation

of the military and strategic goals to intelligence was in turn positive for economic growth.

1.2 “New Look”

The Korean War was the first conflict in which Eisenhower could put his ideas into

practice. During the Presidential elections, Eisenhower had proclaimed in his “I Shall Go

To Korea” speech that the Korean War “was never inevitable, it was never inescapable,” as

he believed that it was the fault of the Truman administration to get involved in the war. 25

Eisenhower stressed that there would come no end to war if the United States would

continue to conduct its current foreign policy.

The President had made a promise to end the war, or at least end the American

involvement in the Korean War, as he believed that it had been the result of irrational

decision making of the Truman administration.

Military historian Allan R. Millet argues that the Korean War did not have much

influence on Eisenhower’s national security policy, because the Ike’s “New Look” had been

formed during his earlier experiences and NSC-162/2 was still in early stages of

development during the Korean War. While it is true that Eisenhower had a lot of 26

experience as General of the Army, being in the Oval Office and shaping foreign policy is

different from executing the same policy. The Korean question was Eisenhower’s first

experience with war in his presidency and therefore it is conceivable that it had a profound

effect on his foreign policy. Nonetheless, Millet also admits that the Korean War could have

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “I Shall Go to Korea” (speech, Detroit, October 25, 1952), Eisenhower Presidential 25

Library.

Alan R. Millet, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Korean War: Cautionary Tale and Hopeful Precedent,” 26

Journal of American-East Asian Relations Vol. 10, No 3-4 (2001), 155.�20

provoked an unwillingness to get involved in later conflicts, which undermines his own

argument. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Eisenhower continued to approach

conflicts with the Soviet Union in a similar way. He did not want to get involved in fighting a

war.

While Eisenhower’s “I Shall Go To Korea” speech might be full of campaign rhetoric,

the address showed a glimpse of how Eisenhower wanted to approach the Soviet Union.

First, he stressed the importance of intelligence through saying that the American

government had “failed to read and to outwit the totalitarian mind.” Eisenhower stated that

many members of Congress had been misinformed about the situation in Korea and

capabilities of the Soviet Union. He underlines this with various Republican

representatives in Congress, who were convinced that an American retreat from the

Korean peninsula would not lead to war. However, there also was intelligence available

that could have persuaded Congress to halt the retreat of American soldiers. The House

Foreign Affairs Committee had already reported that there was information that a joint

Soviet-Korean attack was imminent. And only one Republican Congressman, Lodge, had

his doubts about the retreat, saying that the “the presence of our troops there is a

tremendous deterrent to the Russians.”27

Despite his pledge to end the war, Millet shows that President Eisenhower first

considered various options to end the war. Surprisingly, one of the options was ending the

war with a victory. One of the options Eisenhower considered was increasing the number

of South Korean and UN troops by letting friendly nations pay for it. Another possibility the

administration considered was the reinforcement of the American troops with more

personnel and the use of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower was approaching the war

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “I Shall Go to Korea” (speech, Detroit, October 25, 1952), Eisenhower Presidential 27

Library.�21

differently than Truman did. The new President looked for the easiest way to resolve the 28

issue, or at least prevent the United States from getting dragged in a never ending conflict.

During the Korean War, Eisenhower became impressed by the impact of nuclear

weapons. After having had an argument with the South Korean President Syngman Rhee

about their view on the course of the Korean War, Eisenhower decided to move nuclear

warheads to the Air Force base on Guam. The armistice between North Korea and South

Korea was signed shortly after. Millet beliefs that Eisenhower and Dulles were impressed

by the effect of their actions. The administration believed that the positioning of their

nuclear weapons was the last push for the armistice to be signed.29

This nuclear lesson Eisenhower learned from the Korean War was part of his Grand

Cold War strategy. The President knew that the Soviet Union had been developing nuclear

weaponry and that they would soon have the ability to deploy these bombs. A year in the

Eisenhower presidency, and half a year after the Korean War ceasefire had been signed,

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gave a speech in which he outlined the American

Cold War strategy. In this speech, Dulles announced that the Eisenhower administration

had chosen a long term strategic policy, which would make an end to Truman’s reactionary

policy. The Secretary of State talked about the use of “massive retaliatory power,” by which

he hinted at the utilization of nuclear weapons in order to deter the Soviet threat. While the

weapon itself was effective, it was more about dissuasion the enemy than utilization of

nuclear weapons.30

For Eisenhower, the use of nuclear weapons brought to major advantages. On the

one hand, the policy of nuclear deterrence encompassed a reduction of the military forces

that previously served abroad, which ultimately resulted in a reduction of costs. On the

Millet, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Korean War,” 155-174. 28

Ibid. 171.29

John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” (speech, New York, January 12, 1954). Department 30

of State, 107.�22

other hand, the local defense of the United States was improved, as nuclear missiles were

more powerful than conventional weapons. Investments were made in army bases and

existing air defense objects were improved. One of the major implications of this policy

was the creation of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense

Highways. The 34th President used these strategic investments in the economy to ensure

national security. Eisenhower approved the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. The main

purpose of creating the Interstate System was to ensure that, in the case of a Soviet

attack, military logistics could be conducted as planned. Therefore, the system linked 31

major military bases together. It also provided road access to many ordinary Americans, in

a period when owning a car became more common. Furthermore, it provided work for a

significant workforce for an extended period of time. Thus, it was not only beneficial to

national security, but the economy and the American people also benefitted from the

creation of the highways.

Nuclear deterrence, diminishing costs and making strategic investments were not

the only policies which the Eisenhower administration relied on. They were part of a series

of measures that were directed at winning the Cold War in the long run. Making and

retaining alliances with other countries was also important. While defensive alliances such

as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization created a bulwark against Communism, Dulles

argued that they also diminished costs and would be more effective than multiple

operations. However, there also was a geographical factor which played a role. From 32

several European, Middle Eastern and Asian countries, intelligence missions would be

commenced. The United States is too far away too coordinate and start covert operations

from.

United States Congress, Public Law 84-627: Federal Aid-Highway Act of 1956, 374. https://www.gpo.gov/31

fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-70/pdf/STATUTE-70-Pg374.pdf

John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” (speech, New York, January 12, 1954). Department 32

Of State, 109. https://archive.org/details/departmentofstat301954unit_0 �23

During the Eisenhower administration, countries such as Taiwan, Pakistan, Turkey

and Norway facilitated multiple covert operations over Soviet and Communist Chinese

territory. These covert operations were supplemental to Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy,

and provided the administration with information about the capabilities and intentions of

the enemy. In response to the gathered intelligence, the Americans could tailor their

defense investments to the exact threat and did not need a too large or too small, thus

inefficient army. This meant that the administration could reduce costs while maintaining or

improving the level of national security, which made Eisenhower’s Cold War policy viable

for the Cold War in the long run.

1.3 Conclusion

While Eisenhower initially seemed to approach the Soviet Union in a more friendly way,

seeking rapprochement after Stalin had died, improving the relationship with the Soviet

Union was not his primary objective. It was merely a tool through which the President

could obtain his goal of diminishing costs. Eisenhower believed that United States national

security was linked to the cost of war, because he estimated that the Cold War would drag

on for a long time. Therefore, he thought the American Cold War approach towards the

Soviet Union needed to change.

His predecessor, Harry S. Truman, had invested millions in the containment of

Communism. Eisenhower did not believe that this policy was working effectively. Not in the

short run, and certainly not in the long run. Therefore, he wanted to end the American

involvement in the Korean War. Among many of his government officials, this was not a

very popular point of view. Therefore, Eisenhower invented the Solarium exercise to be

sure that everyone in his administration had the same approach towards the problem by

giving them the impression that they had given feedback on his policy.

�24

Eisenhower often sought the path of least resistance to achieve his goals, but this

did not mean that he was evading conflicts. For every dispute or obstacle, the

administration waged every solution and used the solution which had the most effect, with

the least costs or public interference. Most of the techniques the administration used were

not visible to the public, which is why Eisenhower for a long time was seen as the

President who preferred playing golf, instead of contemplating the Cold War future.

Through various covert or less overt actions, for instance the creation of a national

highway system or the Solarium exercise, he tried to increase national security while

keeping an eye on efficiency and the budget of the government at the same time.

To accomplish his vision as outlined in NSC-162/2, Eisenhower made use of

various tools, which were never the objective but were used as a means to reach this

objective. Through these tools, Eisenhower tried to reach his objective of minimizing the

impact of war on American society. The monetary problem of up keeping a strong army

was solved by using nuclear weapons instead of maintaining a large field army, which the

Soviets had. Eisenhower believed that the United States needed to decide what the world

should look such as, and how the army was arranged. According to the Allen Dulles, the

American people needed to dictate what the Cold War should look like.

�25

Chapter Two: Eisenhower and IntelligenceUnder supervision of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles, a new intelligence

campus was opened near Langley, Virginia in 1960. After considering a few sites, Langley

had been chosen because of its security and privacy, as the site was surrounded by parks

and had few residential areas in its surroundings. The location was also future proof, as

there was enough room for expansion of the new complex. It was the first permanent

home of the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, the agency had operated from various

buildings in downtown Washington DC, which had been difficult to secure and

uncomfortable for its workforce. Most of these buildings had been in use since World War

II, when the wartime intelligence agency Office Of Strategic Services (OSS) had its offices

there until it was dissolved in 1945. The Central Intelligence Agency had significantly

grown since its creation in 1947. Thus, the need for a new unified headquarter had been

high.33

On November 3, 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower laid down the cornerstone

for the Central Intelligence Agency’s main building. In a speech directed at the agency’s

employees, the President stressed that intelligence had utmost importance in both war and

peace:

In war, nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you are a part. No task could be more important.34

“The CIA Campus: The Story of Original Headquarters Building,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 33

May 10, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/original-headquarters-building.html

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The Cornerstone Ceremony” (speech, Langley, Virigina, November 3, 1959, 34

Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000200540044-6.pdf

�26

Eisenhower explained that the intelligence produced by Central Intelligence Agency was

key to the development of American policies. The President lauded the organization and

its employees because of their diligent work, wherein they could not celebrate successes

with or explain mistakes to the public. By mentioning both war- and peacetime implications

of intelligence, Eisenhower emphasized the dynamics of the Cold War. Eisenhower knew

that the Cold War was going to be a long process, in which the threat perception of the

Soviet Union would shift back and forth. The CIA therefore needed to use intelligence in

multiple ways. The agency not only needed to provide intelligence for long term policies,

but also intelligence about imminent threats. Eisenhower’s speech accentuates how he

saw the role of the intelligence community. The President believed that intelligence could

support his foreign policy by providing the right information about security threats, but also

by removing specific threats.

Nonetheless, Eisenhower was relatively new to intelligence. Historian Stephen E.

Ambrose has written about Eisenhower’s first experiences with intelligence. Ambrose

contends that Eisenhower did not know anything about intelligence before the United

States got involved in World War II. The main reason for this was that the United States

Army did not give any priority to intelligence gathering. This radically changed when the

Americans became involved in World War II. His experiences during the war made

Eisenhower very knowledgeable about intelligence and its uses. The British intelligence

services had provided Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, with the

necessary information to counter the German army. In the early beginnings of the war, the

British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) had progressed much further than the Americans

had. The United Kingdom had actively developed their intelligence program and were able

to intercept and decrypt German messages.

The experiences during World War II also shaped Eisenhower’s political career. As

President, Eisenhower made use of the vocational experience with intelligence he gained

�27

during the Second World War. Various intelligence gathering missions were secretly

conducted over or in foreign territory. On the one hand, the President made excellent use

of his experience with intelligence he obtained during World War II. In 1954, Eisenhower

had given the CIA permission to develop an aircraft capable of making clandestine flights

over hostile territory, which ultimately became the Lockheed U-2 spy plane. In 1955 the

CIA started wiretapping Soviet cables under East Berlin. And after the successful launch of

the Soviet Sputnik satellite, Eisenhower made effort to kick start the Corona program, from

which a series of reconnaissance satellites evolved. On the other hand, the Eisenhower

administration did not only make use of intelligence agencies to assess the enemy’s

intentions, but also approved covert operations that had more impact on foreign nations.

The administration attempted multiple regime changes in countries such as Iran (1953),

Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1957) and Congo (1961) when the government in these

countries did not aim for Western economic or political interests. Eisenhower subsequently

also planned the Bay Of Pigs invasion in 1960, but this operation was executed after his

presidency had ended. The result of Eisenhower’s incorporation of intelligence is therefore

mixed. While both the use of intelligence gathering missions with the Lockheed U-2 over

foreign nations and the coup d’états in Iran and Guatemala are invasive to sovereign

states, the latter is more destructive and the outcome could be more disastrous for the

United States, as the effect of the American actions would only become noticeable years

later.

2.1 World War II

Intelligence did not play a large role in the United States Army before World War II.

Eisenhower did not receive any training on the use of intelligence during his education at

the United States Military Academy. In the multiple positions he held during his military

career, he also did not make any use of intelligence. The Americans were not focusing on

�28

intelligence, but preferred to focus on operations instead. Command historian Michael E.

Bigelow argues “While [inter-war Army schools] gave some instruction in tactical

reconnaissance, they overlooked the broader fields of collecting and using intelligence.” 35

Eisenhower did not have any personal experience and intelligence was not deemed to be

important within the United States Army. Nonetheless, intelligence would dominate the

general’s mind during World War II.

During the war, Eisenhower became intrigued by intelligence. In 1942, the general

was introduced to the “wizard war” by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston

Churchill. Ambrose contends that Churchill had a lot of respect for the American general,

and wanted him to be the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe. Therefore,

the Prime Minister updated Eisenhower on the latest British secrets of war. The British had

more experience with intelligence than the Americans. Before the Americans got involved

in World War II, the British intelligence agencies already had multiple successes. Under

the Double Cross System, many German spies whom were active in the United Kingdom

had been identified by the British intelligence agencies. The information these spies sent

to Germany was subsequently altered by the British intelligence agency, through which the

British tried to mislead the Germans. However, the largest British success came in the

form of ULTRA, which was the codename for an operation in which German diplomatic

and military messages were intercepted and deciphered. After the German Enigma coding

machines had been obtained and British cryptologists spent months trying to crack the

code, the decoded messages provided the United Kingdom with valuable information

about movements and actions of the German army.36

Ambrose stated that most of the American army generals were reluctant to

incorporate intelligence in their warfare. One example is general George S. Patton, who

Michael E. Bigelow, “Eisenhower and Intelligence,” Military Intelligence Vol 17 No 1 (1991), 19.35

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, 4.36

�29

was not impressed by the achievements of the British intelligence agencies. He said he

“just liked fighting,” intelligence was not his interest. Furthermore, many American military

officials were selected for the Intelligence division, also known as G-2, based on how long

they had served their country, and not based on their ability. General Eisenhower, in 37

contrast to other members of staff, was susceptible to this new type of warfare and would

later incorporate it in his strategy to win the war. Based on the accounts of Sir Kenneth

Strong, a British intelligence officer, Ambrose also argues that Eisenhower had the ability

to comprehend intelligence. Eisenhower, as Army leader was open to “new ideas, new

techniques, new approaches to old problems.” His embrace of the intelligence, did not 38

only broaden his views of war but would also shorten it.

In December 1943, General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied

Commander for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). In this

position, he could make a lot of use of intelligence that had been intercepted and analyzed

through the British ULTRA program. While the British interception of German messages

had a huge impact on the Allied approach of the Germans, the ULTRA program was not

always successful. Eisenhower also had to deal with setbacks. An example of deception is

what Bigelow calls the “Lesson of Kasserine Pass.” In February 1943, the Allied forces

fought against Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps in Tunisia. The British G-2 intelligence staff

reported to Eisenhower that the Germans would launch an attack through the northern

Fondouk Pass. However, the Germans would attack from the southern Faid Pass. This

intelligence failure resulted in a minor victory by Rommel’s army. Bigelow argues that

British intelligence had only focused on ULTRA interceptions, and ignored other sources of

intelligence such as patrolling the area. From this point onwards, Eisenhower knew that he

could not rely on a single source of intelligence. Therefore, he replaced the G-2 officer and

Stephen E. Ambrose, “Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II,” Journal of 37

Contemporary History Vol. 16 No. 1 (1981), 154.

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, 13.38

�30

demanded a more thorough approach, combining multiple sources, from his successor. 39

Bigelow thinks the failure of Kasserine Pass was one of the greatest intelligence lessons

that could be learned from World War II. The intelligence officer had to present a full

overview of the enemy to the commander.40

On July 12, 1945, at the end of the Second World War in Europe, Eisenhower wrote

a letter to the head of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Sir Stewart Menzies. In

his personal message, Eisenhower lauded the achievements of the cryptanalysists at

Bletchley Park, where the members of the ULTRA program had operated from.

Furthermore, the general also emphasized the constructive collaboration between the

United Kingdom and the United States:

The intelligence which has emanated from you before and during this campaign has been of priceless value to me. It has simplified my task as a commander enormously. It has saved thousands of British and American lives and, in no small way, contributed to the speed with which the enemy was routed and eventually forced to surrender.41

Eisenhower, through a series of different events, learned to appreciate the value of

intelligence for his work as Supreme Allied Commander. Furthermore, he was able to

efficiently work with intelligence and the intelligence community because of the high quality

British intelligence. The intelligence that was presented to Eisenhower was generally

broad, and the general was able to incorporate this in his view of the battlefield. It was the

synergy between the British intelligence and the American operational leadership that was

key to the success of Eisenhower and intelligence. However, World War II was not won

by intelligence alone. In the end, only sheer manpower played a decisive role in winning

the war. The actions of, mainly the British, intelligence agencies supported the armed

forces on the battlefield by supplying generals such as Eisenhower with information about

Bigelow, “Eisenhower and Intelligence,” 190.39

Ibid. 195.40

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letter to Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Stewart Graham Menzies, 41

July 12, 1945.�31

the enemy. Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander, was one of the military men that

embraced the intelligence, through which the war eventually was shortened. A large part 42

of Eisenhower’s success with intelligence was the synergy between British intelligence and

American manpower. Eisenhower drew from British intelligence and combined this with his

experience on the battlefield. This is not stressed enough by either Ambrose or Bigelow, as

they focus on the implications of intelligence on Eisenhower’s battlefield.

A few years after World War II had ended, Eisenhower became President of the

United States. The experience with intelligence he had obtained during World War II

proved to be highly beneficial to his presidency. During his term, more intelligence would

be gathered and more covert operations would be held than any other previous President.

2.2 Eisenhower’s Presidency

In the period between the end of World War II and Eisenhower’s presidency, the American

dependency on British intelligence had decreased. It took some time for the United States

government to re-evaluate the need for intelligence. Between 1942 and 1945, the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS) had operated from Washington and was modeled after its British

counterpart, MI6. After the war, the agency had been dissolved and some of its tasks had

been delegated to various departments within the Department of War. The increasing

Soviet threat, however, pressed the need for a new agency that was able to coordinate the

gathering and analysis of intelligence in a simpler way. Therefore, the Central Intelligence

Agency was created with the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 by President

Truman.

Another governmental body that was created by the National Security Act of 1947

was the National Security Council. The National Security Council was created to advise

the President regarding national security. National defense specialist Richard A. Best

Ambrose, “Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II,” 164.42

�32

explains that under Truman, it consisted of several statutory members: the President; the

Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Chairman of the

National Security Resources Board. “Since the creation of the National Security Council,

every administration has had a different approach towards the council. Truman, for

instance, was not present during most of the board’s meetings. By doing so, he underlined

the advisory role of the board. Setting policy or coordination of policy, he believed, was not

a task of the National Security Council. While the board of advisors had become more

important during the Korean War, with more meetings and more attendance from the

President, Truman held on to his belief that the role of the council was an advisory one.43

Eisenhower attended the majority — 329 of out of the 366 meetings of the council.

While the council also had an advisory role, Eisenhower used the board more to debate,

formulate and coordinate future policies like Truman, the President did not take decisions

in the National Security Council. With help from his Secretaries of State and Defense, this

process took place in private. To facilitate the new role of the National Security Council, a

few changes were made. First, the position of Special Assistant for National Security

Affairs was created, which essentially was an advisor to the President. Initially this was

Robert Cutler, a former banker who had also served in the military. Secondly, two boards

were created, a Planning Board and an Operations Coordinating Board. The former board

focused on the planning of questions and drafting policies. The latter board was

responsible for the integration and implementation of the council’s policy in to the

executive branch. Thus, the National Security Council under Eisenhower evolved in to a 44

governmental body that was better able to cope with the increased threats and additional

paperwork of the Cold War era. Eisenhower knew that the various departments that were

represented in the National Security Council needed to efficiently work together and

Richard A. Best Jr, The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment, (Washington D.C: 43

Congressional Research Service, 2011), 6.

Best Jr, The National Security Council, 7-9.44

�33

modified the council on these grounds. Like the Solarium exercise, the National Security

Council caused the various members of the administration to move their heads in the

same direction. Nonetheless, the final decision was always in the President’s hands.

Among political historians, there has been much debate about the National Security

Council under Eisenhower. Political scientists Fred I. Greenstein and historian Richard H.

Immerman argue that the upcoming Bush administration needed to adopt the “productive”

manner in which the National Security Council was operated by Eisenhower. The

revisionist authors argue Eisenhower’s structure of the policy-planning process was key to

the success of his national security policy, and less about the outcome of the national

security policy. The National Security Council consisted of a few elements which were

safeguarding the process. Along a “policy-oriented, organization-minded President,” there

was a process manager who monitored the processes within the council on a neutral

basis; a Planning Board, which provided a policy agenda based on the administration’s

preconceptions; a central discussion held in the National Security Council; and the final

decision making process. While these elements did not guarantee operational success, it

brought new information and analysis to Eisenhower’s preconceptions.45

Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Junior approaches the National Security Council

under Eisenhower differently. He disapproves the policy based analysis of Greenstein and

Immerman and instead prefers to look at the outcome of Eisenhower's covert operations.

He asserts that the National Security Council was too inflexible and hierarchical and

therefore produced too many operational failures. Due to these failures, he argues, future

administrations should not incorporate Eisenhower’s organizational process. Schlesinger

thinks the administration’s involvement in Iran and Guatemala originated in “the absence

Fred I. Greenstein, Richard H. Immerman, “Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the 45

Eisenhower Legacy,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 115, No. 3 (2000), 337.�34

of planning and supervision of CIA projects,” which was inadequate. Most of 46

Schlesinger’s criticism is based on a 1956 report from the Board of Consultants on Foreign

Intelligence Activities. This board, consisting of former government officials, was created

by Eisenhower in 1956 and its task was to advise the President on intelligence activities.

The board criticized the administration’s coordination of intelligence. The

Department of Defense and State Department did not have a long range policy nor gave

guidance to the CIA’s covert operations. Furthermore, the board had critique on the lack of

responsibility. No single person was held accountable for the failure of covert operations

during the Eisenhower administration. This resulted in a Central Intelligence Agency which,

according to the report, had too many freedoms, and which could not be held accountable

for its actions. According to Schlesinger, Eisenhower’s reaction to the board’s conclusion

was mild. He “brushed off his own Board’s warning and recommendations.” Schlesinger

continues to assert that the failure of Eisenhower to take control over the CIA eventually

lead to the Kennedy administration’s Bay of Pigs debacle.47

As a former general, Eisenhower knew there were few limitations to the intelligence

community. The lack of restrictions was also an advantage for both Eisenhower and the

Central Intelligence Agency. To maximize the effort of the agency in covert operations, the

organization had to work in full secrecy and needed to be as flexible as possible. To be

more agile, the agency was placed under the President’s direct responsibility and not

under the Department of State or Defense. However, the skepticism of The Board of

Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities was cogent. The Central Intelligence

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, “Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent,” Political 46

Science Quarterly, Vol 115, No 3 (2000), 349.

Schlesinger Jr, “Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent,” 350. The board’s report 47

is analyzed and quoted in Schlesinger’s work and cannot be found online or in either the Eisenhower or John F. Kennedy Presidential archives. It is unknown how Schlesinger has obtained the document, as it is nowhere to be found.

�35

Agency’s director, Allen W. Dulles, was relatively free to move around because the agency

was not bound to the same legislation or budget as the Department of Defense or State.48

The freedoms of the CIA and its director Allen Dulles in particular are also reviewed

by journalist Stephen Kinzer. In his almost biographical work, the Dulles brothers are

portrayed as statesmen who made more than effective use of the freedoms in their

governmental positions to counter Communism. Both men breathed politics, as they came

from a politically active family where they came in to contact with Presidents and members

of Congress at a young age. The world of politics thus was no new domain to the brothers.

And like President Eisenhower, both brothers were also interested in economics and

international law, as they both worked as partners for the New York law firm Sullivan &

Cromwell. 49

It was this fascination of politics and economics which made Allen and John Foster

Dulles decisive to roll back Communism in Guatemala. The American involvement in the

Guatemalan coup is more complex than it seems to be, as the origins of American hostility

can be traced to 1944, when the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico came to an end through a

popular uprising. The democratically elected President Juan José Arévalo and his

successor Jacobo Árbenz, had introduced social reforms which included the reallocation of

land to peasants. The American United Fruit Company, a company which grew and traded

tropical fruits, was agitated by these reforms and actively lobbied in Washington to

intervene, as their economic interests in the country had been harmed.50

It is hard to say whether the former business relation influenced the way Allen

Dulles looked at the Guatemalan situation. The United Fruit Company had been a

customer of Sullivan & Cromwell in the past, and thus the Dulles brothers had been

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, 165-166.48

Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War (New York: 49

Time Books, 2013), 154.

Nicholas Cullather, Operation PBSUCCES: The United States and Guatemala 1952-1594, (Washington 50

D.C: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 3-7.�36

familiar with the company. Already in 1947, before the brothers were involved in politics,

the State Department ordered the United States embassy in Guatemala to help the United

Fruit Company. With the appointment of both men, and the increased Cold War tensions,

the Guatemalan situation was assessed as an immediate threat. Kinzer attributes the

extensive involvement of the CIA and the State Department to the Dulles brothers, as they

were very eager to counter communism at all costs, and protect the American business

interests. After Eisenhower’s approval of the mission, the CIA’s operation started in June 51

1954. Operation PBSUCCESS overthrew the leftist President Jacobo Árbenz by army

rebels lead by Castillo Armas. The rebels that Armas commanded, were given weapons

and had been intensively trained by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In 1994, historian Nicholas Cullather wrote a report on behalf of the Central

Intelligence Agency’s Center for the Study of Intelligence. In this formerly classified report

which was published under the Freedom of Information Act, Cullather describes the

agency’s distorted conception of the Guatemalan situation. The social reforms in

Guatemala were regarded to be part of a Communist movement, as the agency in the

1950s was dedicated to roll back the Communist threat. The agency’s directorate therefore

neglected the Guatemalan historical framework in which the events should have been

placed. The agency immediately tried to remove this Communist hazard from the United

States’ back yard.52

Eisenhower was fully aware of the covert operations that the Central Intelligence

Agency executed and had the final word on approving these operations. Nonetheless, the

influence of John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen Dulles was great. They could take 53

advantage of their positions to influence each other. Allen Dulles could influence John

Kinzer, The Brothers, 210.51

Nicholas Cullather, Operation PBSUCCES: The United States and Guatemala 1952-1594, (Washington 52

D.C: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 2.

Cullather, Operation PBSUCCES, 4.53

�37

Foster Dulles’ foreign policy made in the State department and vice versa. They could also

exert pressure on the President, and had an advantage because they could influence his

decisions from multiple angles, through the positions of Secretary of State and director of

the Central Intelligence Agency.

That President Eisenhower approved the Guatemalan coup d’état was not

remarkable. In the previous chapter, we have seen that Eisenhower made extensive use of

intelligence because he wanted to diminish the impact of his military budget on the

American economy. Eisenhower supported Central Intelligence Agency’s covert operations

because they could be conducted in a relatively cost effective way. However, there are

also many other reasons that played a role in his decision to allow the government

overthrow to be executed. A year before, a successful regime change had taken place in

Iran, where Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh had been replaced, which gave the

Western oriented Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi more power. The success of this 54

covert operation made the American involvement in Guatemala possible. To execute a

regime change, not a lot of manpower was needed and thus the probability of American

casualties was low. By using covert operations, the United States could plausibly deny

their involvement in the program.

Another important factor was the notion of blowback, or rather the lack of this

notion. Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles did not have any knowledge of

blowback from a covert operation, simple because they did not have any experience with

it. The term blowback refers to the unintended consequences of the covert operations

which the United States executed abroad. The Central Intelligence Agency’s operations in

Iran and Guatemala were deemed to be successful by the Eisenhower administration, as

its objectives were completed. In Iran, the nationalist Mossadegh was overthrown and in

Guatemala President Árbenz was exchanged for the staunch anti-Communist Elfego

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, 206.54

�38

Hernán Monzón Aguirre. While the United States thought these covert operations were

effective, they would result in blowback in the long run. In Iran, the Shah proved to be a

dictatorial ruler who was toppled by a popular uprising in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This

resulted in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the anti-Western Ayatollah Khomeini as its

leader. In Guatemala, the overthrow of Árbenz resulted in a 36 year long civil war and an

anti-American sentiment.

While the American foreign intelligence services such as the Central Intelligence

Agency and the National Security Agency were founded during the Truman administration,

Eisenhower’s policy and intelligence were interwoven in such a way that it created ground

for intelligence success and failures in later administrations. In the introduction of his book,

Ambrose stated that the covert operations which failed in the 1960s and 1970s can be

seen as a reverberation of Eisenhower’s intelligence minded approach during his

presidency. The success of these early operations would ultimately lead to poorly 55

executed covert operations in the long run. Early covert operations were perceived to be

successful. While Iran and Guatemala were operational successes, in the long run the

operation would have a negative impact on American relations. This was not yet

acknowledged by Eisenhower or Allen Dulles, as they had not experienced this yet.

Examples of later failed Central Intelligence Agency operations modeled after Iran and

Guatemala are the U-2 incident, the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion, or even more recent

operations such as 1979 Operation Eagle Claw, through which the Iranian hostage crisis

needed to be ended.

2.3 Conclusion

As a soldier, Eisenhower did not have any experience with the use of intelligence.

However, this radically changed during World War II. As Supreme Allied Commander, he

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, ix.55

�39

made extensive use of the British intelligence agencies that provided him with valuable

information about the German enemy. In this role, Eisenhower experienced intelligence

success, but also failures and learned that intelligence always needed to provide him with

a full image of the enemy. During the war, Eisenhower used on intelligence to broaden his

view and swiftly win the war. His perceived short term success of the British intelligence

community inspired Eisenhower as President to make more extensive use of American

intelligence agencies.

Eisenhower made extensive use of the intelligence community as President of the

United States. While the Central Intelligence Agency had not been founded during his

presidency, the agency grew and became an institution that supported the President’s

views. Intelligence gathering and covert operations fit his policy of reducing the financial

cost of war and the low-level approach of foreign affairs. Nonetheless, the growth of

intelligence operations cannot be solely attributed to Eisenhower’s views. The start of the

Cold War was the main factor behind this growth, which made the United States

government revise its practices against the Communist world. Due to Eisenhower’s

acknowledgement of intelligence, the intelligence agencies and their operations grew as

well.

For Eisenhower, intelligence was one of the most important tools to diminish the

cost of the Cold War. Therefore, he gave the Central Intelligence Agency a lot of freedom

to develop effectively assess and attack the spread of Communism. Sometimes, too much

freedom was granted to the intelligence community, which resulted in a biased analysis of

the intelligence. Because of the Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency saw

Communism everywhere. Also in places were Communism was not a real threat, such as

Guatemala. Nonetheless, this resulted in a coup d’état. Another downside of the perceived

intelligence successes in the early Eisenhower Presidency is the administration’s

expectation that every covert action would be as successful. However, the blowback of the

�40

coups in both Iran and Guatemala would only be visible years later. Therefore, the long

term vision that Eisenhower wanted to develop during the Cold War was diminished by the

short term vision which Eisenhower and the Central Intelligence Agency had for

intelligence.

�41

Chapter Three: The 1960 U-2 incidentWith the start of the Cold War, many Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union

were closed down. The Soviet Union and its satellite states had been closed down, which

made it almost impossible for the United States to gather intelligence. From now on,

everything in the Soviet bloc was concealed for the outer world. Furthermore, the Soviets

had upgraded their conventional types of communication and made them more secure.

From now on, the American intelligence agencies were less able to intercept and decrypt

the Soviet communication systems. The Iron Curtain also made human intelligence

impossible, as it was harder to recruit Soviet moles or get intelligence officers behind

enemy lines. Even open source intelligence was not possible anymore, as it was not easy

to obtain Soviet open sources such as newspapers or books. For both American

intelligence officers and policy makers, the start of the Cold War thus was a challenge. 56

One of the solutions for the intelligence problem was the development of new

intelligence gathering techniques, as most intelligence on the Soviet Union quickly became

outdated. Aerial reconnaissance was one of the options which the United States

government started using. On several occasions in the late 1940s, Boeing B-47s, which

had been equipped with photo cameras were used to fly past the Soviet border. When the

aircraft was left undetected by Soviet radar, the crew maneuvered the plane over Soviet

territory. While these overflights were known to the Soviet Union, they only protested and

did not use any military force. This Soviet approach changed in 1950, when a United

States Navy Consolidated PB4Y-2 Privateer aircraft was shot down above the Baltic sea.

In the following years, more American aircraft were shot down, which would be a major

obstacle to American intelligence gathering on Soviet targets.57

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 2.56

Ibid. 3.57

�42

Therefore, the United States Army started to look for other ways to make aerial

reconnaissance possible. Many advocates of high altitude overflights believed that the

Soviet radar and Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) would not be able to reach the altitude of

65.000 feet. Three aircraft manufacturers proposed their variants of a high altitude spy 58

plane. An unsolicited design came from a fourth aerospace company: Lockheed Martin.

Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson of Lockheed Skunk Works had made a design based on the

Lockheed F-104 fighter jet. The design of this aircraft stood out from the other

manufacturers, as the aircraft had glider wings and a reinforced frame. It did not have a

conventional landing gear, but used two detachable wheels that would fall off after the start

and had to be placed back after landing. To save weight, the plane deviated from the Air

Force standards described in the tender, as it could only withstand 2.33G, instead of the

military 5.33G and its payload was only 600 pounds. Since the plane was not up to the 59

Air Force’s standards, it was rejected by the military. The Air Force generals wanted to

have a plane that had multiple engines, which was more reliable than a single engine

aircraft. Due to the Air Force’s rejection of the aircraft, Lockheed started lobbying at the

Central Intelligence Agency.

Another complication to American intelligence was a perceived buildup of Soviet

strategic bombers. The fear of a Soviet surprise attack increased in the 1950s, when the

United States government estimated that a large scale air attack would be possible. In the

1954 Special National Estimate of Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated

that in the event of an immediate attack, the Soviets would be able to reach 200 till 250

targets with approximately 300 Tupolev Tu-4 bombers with the NATO designator “Bison.”

Furthermore, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that approximately 1000 Tu-4

bombers would be able to be used in a 1958 Soviet attack. In the same report, the Director

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 7.58

Ibid. 10-11.59

�43

of Naval Intelligence and the Assistant Chief of Staff of the G-2 Department criticize the

Central Intelligence Agency’s estimates. They add that the Soviets had a high risk of losing

bombers in the event of an attack and state that many of the aircraft needed to fulfill a

supportive role.60

After the U-2 overflights over the Soviet Union had commenced, the bomber gap

was quickly put aside. The estimated 700 to 800 bombers that the Soviet Union would

have had in the period from 1955 till 1958 was too dramatic. In 1958, the CIA concluded

they would only have 150 strategic bombers in this period. What were the origins of these

intelligence overestimates? Historian Raymond L. Garthoff argues that the Central

Intelligence Agency was inclined to follow the most plausible worst case scenario. This

was the approach because an underestimation could bring disaster. An overestimation

was also not positive, because it would bring over insurance. This resulted in multiple

intelligence failures, which impacted foreign policy. War historian Luke B. Wells raises 61

different questions about the American intelligence analysis. He thinks the analysis of

intelligence conceived differently in United Kingdom than in the United States. This

resulted in the bomber gap in America and not in the United Kingdom. Using the same

source, the British intelligence services made a different analysis than the Central

Intelligence Agency. The British intelligence services were able to rightly asses the threat

because they had a different analysis. It is therefore likely that the American intelligence

analysts had a confirmatory bias about the bomber gap.62

Special National Security Estimate, “Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US,” Central Intelligence Agency, 60

24 February 1954, 8. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000269329.pdf

Raymond L. Garthoff, “Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities” in Watching the Bear: Essays 61

on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, eds. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett. Chapter V. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/article05.html

Luke B. Wells, “The ‘bomber gap’: British intelligence and an American delusion,” Journal of Strategic 62

Studies (2016), 2.�44

The alarming number of strategic bombers that the Soviets would have be able to

produce in a few years was the main reason that the Americans started the U-2 Program

and the subsequent overflights. It proved to be a failure of the American intelligence

community to rightly assess the technical capabilities. There are many of such failures that

can be observed in the American approach of aerial reconnaissance during the

Eisenhower Presidency. Some questions that arise are: What was the origin of these

failures and what were its results? This chapter will investigate how these intelligence

failures influenced the overflights and will link it to the legacy of Eisenhower and the U-2

incident. The overflights of the Soviet Union and the CIA’s aerial reconnaissance programs

are important because they provide the framework for covert operations in later

presidencies.

Intelligence historians Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzebach, both former

Central Intelligence Agency employees, have written an extensive report on the U-2

Program wherein the early stages of development to the downing of Gary Powers plane

are all covered. The formerly secret report was released by the Central Intelligence

Agency under the Freedom of Information Act in 2013. It is based on numerous interviews

and documents which are still inaccessible for the general public. The authors contend that

the U-2 Program and the successive OXCART program were very successful, because

both programs provided the United States government with “highly reliable information in

large quantities.” Moreover, they added that since the start of the U-2 Program, overhead 63

reconnaissance was one of the Central Intelligence Agency’s most important missions.

3.1 “Intelligence gap”

After the bomber gap had been cleared by the overflights of the U-2 spy plane, a new

problem arose. In October 1957, the Soviets had successfully launched the first man made

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 322. 63

�45

satellite, the Sputnik. While the beach ball sized satellite was nothing significant to current

day aeronautics, for the American government it signified that the Soviets had gained the

expertise and experience to launch Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) through

which they could attack the United States. Together with the development and detonation

of the first Soviet nuclear bomb, in 1949, the American public became worried that the

Soviets had gained a technological advantage.

However, Eisenhower had been skeptical about this perceived technological

advantage. Garthoff thinks Eisenhower was not convinced by the Soviet proclamations.

Nonetheless, Eisenhower had halted the flights that crossed Soviet airspace from March

1958 till July 1959. The Soviet Union had protested after nearly every flight, and in March

1958 vigorously protested against an overflight made from Japan. The President wanted to

take a more careful approach and thus discontinued the overflights that took place near

the border or crossed Soviet airspace. Eisenhower’s attitude towards the penetration of

Soviet airspace becomes even more clear after the Air Force had disobeyed his orders.

The Air Force had made balloons with cameras attached to them. These balloons needed

to cross the full Soviet Union’s land mass in sixteen days, but never made it to the site

where they were expected to land. According to General Andrew J. Goodpaster,

Eisenhower was furious was and told that the project needed to be discontinued

immediately and the Air Force was not allowed to proceed with penetrating the Soviet

Union.64

In the period following the ban, the rumors that the Soviets had a possible

technological advantage with their ICBMs persisted. The President, who had been publicly

characterized as uninterested in foreign affairs, now needed to make a decision. The

Department of Defense and senators had urged him to take action and allow the

overflights. Allen Dulles, stood with the President and tried to convince the propagators of

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 143.64

�46

the overflights with evidence. While the President still was not convinced that the

overflights were needed, he approved several overflights to gather more information.

Eisenhower wanted to disprove the missile gap debate. The first overflight after the ban 65

had been successful, with more information about a possible missile gap. However, the

debate about the missile gap also steadily increased. While Eisenhower wanted to remove

the threat perception of the missile gap, it only increased. The lack of intelligence, due to

his ban of overflights in 1957 and 1959 had spurred the debate. There was no such 66

bomber gap, nor was there a missile gap. It was more about missing intelligence of Soviet

missiles and the Sputnik satellite, which had surprised the American government. The lack

of accurate intelligence had made the missile gap possible. The lack of intelligence had

created a dilemma for Eisenhower. On the one hand, the President had not been

convinced that the Soviets were able to produce. On the other hand, he wanted to get rid

of the debate which pressed him to allow the overflights. This vicious circle was eventually

broken by allowing more aerial reconnaissance flights in early 1960.

The full image of the missile gap only became clear in 1963, when Eisenhower had

left office, and Kennedy had become the President. The early U-2 overflights had not

provided the right intelligence to remove the threat perception. During the late 1950s and

early 1960s, the Soviet Union had made use of deception and created rumors to give the

Americans the impression that they were able to produce and launch large quantities of

ICBMs. However, not all the failures that surrounded the missile gap and the eventual final

overflight were not related to interaction between the two nations. There were also many

organizational and governmental factors that made the incident possible. The few

successes that the Soviets had, were consistently overestimated by the American

intelligence agencies. Even after the final overflight, the National Intelligence Estimate’s

Raymond L. Garthoff, Assessing the Adversary: Estimates by the Eisenhower administration of Soviet 65

Intentions and Capabilities, 46-49.

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 150.66

�47

evaluation of the Soviet ICBMs overshadowed the actual number of missiles that the

Soviets had.67

If we solely look at actions between the United States and the Soviet Union, we

ignore the internal factors that played a role in Eisenhower’s decision making. This

conventional approach of foreign policy analysis is also called the Rational Actor Model by

political scientist Graham T. Ellison. According to Ellison, the Rational Actor Model has

several shortcomings. It sees the government as a sole actor and entity. Thus, for many

analyses this approach is not useful, as it ignores bureaucratic and political actions that

influence the decision making process. To efficiently research the posed questions about

organizational and governmental factors, we need to use two different models to assess

the actions that Eisenhower and his administration. Graham provides two other

frameworks which can provide a new look on how the U-2 incident came to be. In the

Organizational Process Model, it is assumed that the leader’s argument is distorted by

factors within the organization. Thus, the input of the decision maker is altered by the

organizational culture and structure. Another view Allison provides is the Governmental

Politics Model, which assumes that a government consists of multiple groups with each an

own approach and thus a different point of view. For the leaders of an organization, this

means that they have to negotiate to satisfy the needs of the different stakeholders. The

models provided by Allison can give us a different perspective of how Eisenhower’s

approval of the overflight was made in terms of organization and politics.68

Allison focuses on a later conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union,

the Cuban Missile Crisis. The frameworks are useful, because this crisis is similar to the

intelligence gap under the Eisenhower administration and the approval of the final

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-1960, Soviet Capabilities for Long-Range Attack. Department of 67

State.

Graham.T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Little, Brown & 68

Company, 1971), 4-5.�48

overflight. The plans for a Cuban invasion had already been made during the Eisenhower

administration. Furthermore, the same Central Intelligence Agency officials, such as Allen

Dulles and Richard Bissell, that had worked on the U-2 overflights, also worked on the Bay

of Pigs invasion which had been modeled after the Guatemalan coup. However, it was

President Kennedy that gave the green light for the operation.

3.2 Organization, Politics & Decision making

From the start in 1954, the U-2 Program had been part of a debate between different

stakeholders, with each had a different approach of the program. During the development

of the Lockheed U-2 aircraft, there are already multiple agents that try to influence decision

making. During the Korean War, the Air Force and the Navy had already conducted early

reconnaissance missions and both parties recognized the need for a new aircraft.

Lockheed had given an unsolicited design, which was rejected due to not fitting the Air

Force’s requirements. Due to the Air Force’s refusal of the design, Lockheed started to 69

actively lobby at both the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency. Some of the

government officials actually preferred the Lockheed aircraft over the designs from other

manufacturers and brought them into contact with Richard Bissell of the Central

intelligence Agency. Bissell saw potential in the overflights and worked out plans to adopt

the plane.70

Allen Dulles, the Central Intelligence Agency’s director had previously not been

eager to use overhead reconnaissance to gather intelligence on Soviet movements.

Pedlow and Welzenbach state that there is not much known about his precise attitude, but

they believe that Dulles wanted to stay away from operations that the Air Force was

involved in. He believed that the Air Force was better equipped to develop and operate this

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 5-869

Ibid. 15-16.70

�49

aircraft. The Director of Central Intelligence was wary of the competition between the

agency and the Air Force. In an all-encompassing letter, Edwin H. Land, the inventor of 71

the Polaroid instant camera, tried to convince Dulles of the benefits of aerial

reconnaissance’s for his agency. The letter from Land and the support from Eisenhower

persuaded Dulles to implement aerial reconnaissance in the Central Intelligence Agency.

There was often disagreement between the Department of Defense, the Air Force in

particular, and the Central Intelligence Agency. On many occasions, both parties made a

different analysis of the intelligence. The former felt that the latter had interfered with their

operations by using an airplane. This competition between the Air Force and the Central

Intelligence Agency would continue during all stages of the U-2 Program. In order to attract

funds and operations from the President, the intelligence estimates the Air Force produced

were significantly higher than those of the Central Intelligence Agency. This bias is 72

explained through Allison’s Governmental Politics Model, which explains how various

groups within a government are constantly using politics to achieve their goals. From this

point of view, both the bomber gap and the missile gap can be seen as the cause of

competition between two political entities.73

Historian Luke B. Wells also concludes there was no intelligence gap. There was a

failure in the analysis of the intelligence, as they were biased. His foremost criticism on the

American intelligence community is about its assumptions. Wells concludes: “Ask what

those who hold an assumption stand to gain by doing so.” The American intelligence 74

estimates were biased. This supports the theory that the Air Force used higher figures to

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 16.71

John Bird, Joan Bird, Penetrating the Iron Curtain: Resolving theMissile Gap with Technology, an 72

Overview, Central Intelligence Agency, 13. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cold-war/resolving-the-missile-gap-with-technology/missile-gap.pdf

Graham T. Ellison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little, Brown & 73

Company, 1971), 144.

Luke B. Wells, “The ‘bomber gap’: British intelligence and an American delusion,” Journal of Strategic 74

Studies (2016), 25.�50

draw more operations and funds towards their division. Eventually, the U-2 Project would

be a joint venture between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Air Force. The latter

provided support for the aircraft, ensuring that maintenance, repairs and overhauls were

conducted. However, in negotiations between the agency and the Air Force, the agency

assumed that the Air Force would provide funds for the aircraft.75

Eisenhower had acknowledged the competition between the independent entities

within his administration and also tried to bring them closer together. An example of

Eisenhower’s unification process had been the Solarium Exercise, through which he

wanted to remove the competition and steer them in the direction he envisioned. While

Eisenhower’s vision worked in the Solarium Project, the President could not perform the

same trick.

Richard Bissell played an important role in the final overflight of the U-2. Before

heading this project, Bissell had gained experience at the Office of Strategic Services and

later he had worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. For the agency, he had led the

involvement in the Guatemalan coup. In 1959, Bissell became the Deputy Director for

Plans on January 1, 1959. In this position, he wanted to strengthen the Central Intelligence

Agency’s influence on aerial reconnaissance. He took control over both the development

of the aircraft as well as the operational side.76

President Eisenhower had reduced the overflights and later forbade them during

most of 1958 and 1959 due to the protests. Therefore, Bissell came up with a new plan.

He wanted to give the overflights a boost by establishing an alliance with the British

intelligence agency MI-6. If an airplane was shot down or went missing, the United States

could more easily deny their involvement, as a British pilot was at the controls. The project

was eventually approved by both the British Prime Minister and President Eisenhower.

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 40.75

Ibid. 157.76

�51

Pedlow and Welzenbach argue that Eisenhower saw the use of British pilots as a chance

to spread the risk of being revealed while strengthening the relationship with the United

Kingdom. Allen Dulles, also pressed for more overflights during the ban. He wanted to

“settle the missile gap for once and for all and end the debate with the intelligence

community.” These are both examples of how the agency put pressure on Eisenhower to 77

resume the overflights.

The involvement of Bissell in both the Guatemalan coup as well as the final U-2

overflight is not remarkable. Bissell’s Guatemalan adventure with the Central Intelligence

Agency had worked out well for the agency, as it was perceived to be successful. As

explained in chapter two, both the agency and Eisenhower both had a short term look, as

they quickly wanted to get rid of the threat. In the case of the U-2, both Dulles and

Eisenhower had approved the final overflight because they wanted to deal with the

American debate about the Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. This decision can also

be explained by applying Allison’s Organizational Process Model. In the propositions of

this model, Allison describes how decision making is influenced by the magic of solutions

that have immediate effect. The final overflight needed to take away the rumors about a 78

Soviet build up. This builds on the thesis of the previous chapter, which concluded that

Eisenhower’s vision of intelligence was only directed at the short term. Furthermore,

Allison states that the time limit makes leaders effectively choose for an off-the-shelf

solution, which the Central Intelligence Agency could provide with its overflights. He did not

consider any different options.

The subsequent downing of a Lockheed U-2 spy plane on May 1, 1960 was also

the end of the overflights over Soviet territory. While the projects derivative, the OXCART

program and the development of the Lockheed SR-71 and AR-12 survived well in to the

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 165.77

Ellison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 67.78

�52

1970s, the overflights over the Soviet Union were indefinitely halted. With the launch of the

first satellite, the Soviet Sputnik, a new era in aerial reconnaissance had started. The

space race only spurred the development of American satellites. Already in 1956, the

American government had given priority to the development of aerial reconnaissance with

the use of satellites through the Corona program. From 1959 onwards, the Central

Intelligence Agency was able to make photographs of Soviet missile installations from

outer space. From now on, it was easier for both the Soviets and the Americans to spy on

each other without violating the air space of the arch rival.

3.3 Conclusion

As in every intelligence failure or airplane crash, there is never a single cause. It always is

a combination of events that ultimately leads to failure. In the case of the final overflight of

the U-2 it is a mix of operational, organizational and governmental failures. While the

operational failures are intrinsic to this incident and thus not applicable to other intelligence

failures, the organizational and governmental failures can be applied. Allison

Organizational Process and Governmental Politics models have provided us with a new

approach to assess the incident.

Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Air Force had lobbied for more funds

and more operations, which effectively meant that the intelligence estimates were adapted

to the aims of these organizations, and the Air Force in particular. Furthermore, the

pressure on Eisenhower from both the public as well as from Bissell and Dulles was key in

his approval of the overflights. The President took swift decisions using existing plans such

as the U-2 overflight to control the intelligence debate. However, these plans were aimed

at a short term solution and therefore not future proof.

Of course, the final responsibility was in the hands of the President, which is

something Eisenhower was fully aware of. In a conversation with British Prime Minister

�53

Harold MacMillan, he had said that the Americans were fully responsible for their activities

with the U-2 and the United Kingdom would be held fully responsible if something

happened to a U-2 when a British pilot was at the controls. Eisenhower did not negate 79

his own decisions when he failed to address a problem. Nonetheless, Eisenhower’s

approval of the final overflight can be seen as his failure to organize the intelligence

community.

What complicated the matter is that many American businesses were lobbying

within the government. The Lockheed Corporation wanted to sell its aircraft to either the

Central Intelligence Agency or the Air Force and therefore lobbied with both parties.

Corporate figures like Polaroid CEO Edwin H. Land used his influence in scientific

research groups to lobby for his company. This is a sharp contrast with Eisenhower’s 1961

“military-industrial complex speech” in which he warns for the influence of the military

industry on the Department of Defense. Therefore, the message can be evaluated not as 80

a warning but as a cause of his policy.

The covert operations during the Eisenhower administration set a benchmark for

later missions operated by the intelligence community. Whether they were successful or

failed, Eisenhower had institutionalized the Central Intelligence Agency by making frequent

use of its services in his foreign policy. On the one hand, many of the later intelligence

failures can be seen as the result of his legacy. The 1961 Cuban Missile Crisis under the

Kennedy administration was essentially a backwash of the covert operations that were

lined out during the Eisenhower presidency, as it was modeled after the Guatemalan coup.

On the other hand, today’s American intelligence community builds on Eisenhower’s

foundation of intelligence and can still learn from his lessons.

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 165.79

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” (speech, Washington D.C., January 17, 1961), Eisenhower 80

Presidential Library.�54

ConclusionEisenhower’s Presidential goal was to make the Cold War sustainable for the United

States. To reach this goal, he made use of various tools. One of these tools, was to seek

rapprochement towards the Soviet Union. The United States would benefit from an

improved American-Soviet relationship due to the reduction of arms, which were a heavy

strain on the American economy. His predecessor, Truman, had invested a lot of money in

the containment of Communism. Ending the American involvement in the Korean War was

part of this policy aimed at solidifying the economic position of the United States. Another

tool of Eisenhower was the intelligence community. Intelligence proved to be a relatively

cheap tool to assess the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union. After the analysis

of the produced intelligence, the production of arms could be optimized to the capabilities

of the Soviet Union. The idea was, that through this system, the defense expenditures

would not be an unnecessary burden on the American economy.

During World War II, General Eisenhower had gained a lot of knowledge about

intelligence. The United Kingdom had provided most of the intelligence through deception

of German ULTRA messages. In the United States, the intelligence community had not

been developed as much as in the United Kingdom. However this changed during

Eisenhower’s presidency. For his presidency, Eisenhower relied extensively on his wartime

experience with intelligence. He was the first President to extensively rely on covert

operations to complement his foreign policy. The impact of the use of covert operations is

enormous. While Eisenhower had not invented the use of intelligence and covert

operations, Eisenhower made more use of intelligence than his predecessors and

institutionalized the use of it through NSC-162/2. The President subsequently used the

Solarium exercise to efficiently make use of all members of his administration to enforce

his foreign policy. However, the institutionalization of the intelligence community also

meant that more failures occurred. The problem was that the preconception of intelligence �55

officials like Allen Dulles were distorted. They wanted to extinguish Communism in every

form, and sometimes made the mistake to intervene in non-Communist affairs. The 1953

Iranian and 1954 Guatemalan coup are examples of this kind of intelligence failure.

Furthermore, Eisenhower and his intelligence officials did not have any knowledge about

the unintended results of their covert operations. While the use of intelligence was aimed

at decreasing the Cold War, Eisenhower’s vision on intelligence was only aimed at the

short term. The Eisenhower administration believed that the covert operations in Iran and

Guatemala had been successful, as they had been able to alter foreign politics without

giving away the Central Intelligence Agency’s and thus the United States presence. What

they did not know yet, was that the American relation with the involved countries would be

tremendously harmed. The intelligence community and Eisenhower were now convinced

that covert operations would be able to help them in many other situations.

The Cold War also increased the need for intelligence, as it was almost impossible

to have a peek behind the Iron Curtain. The need for an aircraft that could penetrate the

Soviet airspace without being seen was high and was increased by the bomber gap in the

early 1950s. The missile gap proved to be more persistent and turned out to be a real

threat to American national security. Not because the Soviet Union had been able to

produce a lot of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, but because Eisenhower needed

intelligence to halt the debate. While Eisenhower had been skeptical of the perceived

missile gap, it spurred a debate among the public and members of Congress, which

diminished Eisenhower’s options. Using the different models Graham T. Allison prescribed

for the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U-2 overflights are re-examined. The various

stakeholders, such as the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency involved in

Eisenhower’s decision making process tried to influence him to increase their financial

position. This resulted in a distorted vision of the Soviet National Intelligence Estimate, and

eventually would end with the wrong decision about the final overflight. Another important

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lesson that can be learned from Eisenhower’s decision to allow the final overflight is the

influence on the decision maker. During both the Guatemalan coup d’état and the final

overflight, Eisenhower chose a solution that would only work in the short term and could

be used immediately. Eisenhower neglected the long term implications of his decision.

The U-2 incident was a major intelligence failure of the American government and

became publicly known because the wreckage could be salvaged by the Soviets. For the

Eisenhower administration, it became evident that the use of covert operations was not

always a solution. Through the promotion and heavy reliance of intelligence, and due to

the lack of knowledge about a possible blowback, Eisenhower had created an intelligence

framework which made operational intelligence failures possible. The U-2 incident

therefore played a central role in this framework, as it was the latest and greatest failure of

the Central Intelligence Agency under Eisenhower.

The profound influence of the intelligence operations also had another influence.

The military industry had been dependent on the many covert operations. The Lockheed

Corporation had been actively lobbying for the development of the U-2 spy plane.

Eisenhower acknowledged this in a 1961 speech, wherein he warns for the influence of

the “military industrial complex.” The speech can be seen as an acknowledgement and 81

warning for the intelligence framework he had created during his presidency. Through this

framework, Eisenhower had institutionalized the use of intelligence and set the benchmark

for many later intelligence missions. Some of these missions were successful, and some

failed.

Eisenhower was an intelligence pioneer, but this came at a cost. Eisenhower had

institutionalized the intelligence community, but did not take into account all of the hidden

risks that covert operations brought. Furthermore, Eisenhower did not make enough use of

the credo he had adopted after the intelligence failure at Fondouk Pass. After a British

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” (speech, Washington D.C., January 17, 1961), Eisenhower 81

Presidential Library.�57

intelligence officer had neglected to present the full image of the World War II Battle of

Fondouk Pass in Tunisia, Eisenhower came to the conclusion that intelligence needed to

sketch the whole image of the battlefield. And many times, his intelligence officers had

distorted their view by implementing their agenda in their intelligence product. This had

also been the case in the Iran and Guatemala, where the Central Intelligence Agency had

been convinced that there was a Communist threat. The U-2 incident builds on this, as

many members of Congress and the public were convinced the Soviets were able to

produce Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, while this was not the case.

The final question that needs to be answered is whether Eisenhower and his

administration were able to effectively incorporate intelligence to counter the impact of

Communism. The answer is negative. While Eisenhower’s policy of reducing costs through

intelligence operations was designed to win the Cold War in the long run, the use of covert

operations in Iran, Guatemala and the aerial reconnaissance over the Soviet Union did not

mitigate the Cold War impact on the United States. In fact, the U-2 overflights resulted in

an even more tense American-Soviet relationship. While Eisenhower only wanted to

assess the capabilities and intentions of the Soviets, to decrease the tensions of a military

build up, the reconnaissance flights only extended the Cold War as the U-2 detection and

subsequent crash deteriorated the relationship between the United States and the Soviet

Union.

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