RESTRICTED

El CV nAW18Vol. 5

This report was prepared for use within the Bank and its affiliated organizations.They do not accept responsibility for its accuracy or completeness. The report maynot be published nor may it be quoted as representing their views.

!NTEKRNATIONAL BAINK FOR REUCONSLRUCTION AND DE-VELOPMk<N[

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMEINTl ASSOCIATiUN

FHE CURRENT ECONOMIC POSITION

AND PROSPECTS

OF

GHANA

tin t-n IIuIne s)

VOLUME V

AGRICULTURE

October 26, 1970

Western Africa Department

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

1 New Cedi u US$0.98

1 dollar a NO 1.02

This annex is based on the finclings of a mission in Apriland Miay 1970 to Ghana composed of:

Mr. Barend A. de Vries Chief of' Mission

Mr. Fateh Chaudhri General Economist

Mr. Thomas Klein Bialance of Payments & External Debt

Miss Katharine Mortimer Pbpulation, Emnployment & Education

Mr. M. Taher Elajani* Fiscal

Mr. Ved Gandhi Fiscal

Mr. Nake Kamrany Social Sector

Mr. Jivat Thadani Industry

Mr. Alfredo Soto Transport

Mr . Hans Schulte Transport

Mr. Charles Metcalfe Agriculture

Mr. Bruce Johnston** Agriculture

Mr. Merrill Bateman-* (Cocoa

Mr. Herman Nissenbaum Project List

Mr. John Weston Electric Power

Mr. Edward Mirmig Electric Power

Mr. S. Rangachar Research

Miss Beverley Baxter Secretary

* Seconded by the International Monetary Fund-*E Consultants

This report is based on the findings of an economic mission headedby Mr. Barend A. de Vries which visited Ghana in AprilhvIay 1970.This volume wals prepared chiefly by Mr. Bruce F. Johnston, Consultant,and Mr. Charles E. Metcalfe.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

I. OBJECTIVES OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND MAJOR PROBLEMS ......... 3

A. Objectives .......................................... 3B. Performance of the Agricultural Sector .... .......... 3C. Food Supply Problems and Price Trends .... ........... 6D. Marketing Problems .................................. 7E. Present Situation and Prospects for Expanded

Production of Export Crops ........................ 8F. Possibilities for Economic Import Substitution in

Food Crops and Agricultural Raw Materials ... ...... 10G. The Organization and Effectiveness of Agricultural

Research .......................................... 11H. State Farms and Settlements ......................... 13I. Problems Relating to Mechanization .... .............. 14J. Farm Credit and Cooperatives ........................ 15K. Land Tenure Problems ................................ 18L. Processing of Agricultural Commodities .... .......... 18

II. POLICY ISSUES AND STRATEGY FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ...... 20

A. Scarcity of Capital and Foreign Exchange andEmployment Problems as Factors InfluencingAgricultural Strateay ............................. 20

B. Problems of Implementation and Determining Prioritiesfor Government Action ............................. 25

C. The Role of Ministry of Agriculture .... ............. 27D. Allocation of Responsibilities Between the Public and

Private Sectors ................................... 28E. The Role of Autonomous or Semi-Autonomous Agencies 31F. Policies for Increasing the Effectiveness of

Agricultural Research and Extension ............... 31

ITT. AGRTCUTIJTRAI. PRO.TFfTS ANT EXTERNAL ASSTSTANG.F .......-- ........ is

A. Sugar Pr,iprt -_3

B. Oil Palm Projects ................................... 37C. Other Vegetable Oil Projects A38

Thlis report i's based on the -findingso - n econom4c missio headed

by Mr. Barend A. de Vries which visited Ghana in April/May 1970.Thuis volu..e was prepareA chiefly b-y Mr. Bruce v. Johnston., Consul=

tant, and Mr. Charles E. Metcalfe.

1,MAD, V r tVLJJrrrhTm _ _%Ln1..a.2.. 1 'bU fl..... tU..

D. Grain rroauction Programs ........................... .

E. Agricultural Credit Program ......................... 39F. Fiber Crop Production ............................... 41G. Irrigation Projects ................................. 42H. Fruit and Vegetable Development at Vea Dam .... ...... 42I. Fruit Processing and Fresh Fruit Exports .... ........ 42j. Rubber .......... .................................... 43K. A Rural Farm Shop Program ........................... 4.3L. Urban Market Development ............................ 4.3M. Tobacco ......... .................................... 44N. Livestock Project Possibilities ..................... 440. Integrated Development Projects ..................... 45P. External Technical Assistance ....................... 45

STATISTICAL TABLES Table No.

Ghana - Land Acquired and Utilized by State, Cooperative,Institutional and Peasant Farms in 1965 ..................... 1

Ghana - History of Agricultural Development Bank's Performancein Lending Since 1964 ....................................... 2

Estimates of Consumption and Projected Consumption of SelectedAgricultural Commodities .................................... 3

VOUTTME V

AGRICULTURE

1. It is r-ell knom. that ag-r, iclIture 4 the acko. o nf tVhe Ghanain

economy. lt

2. It is conventional to note a broad division of Ghanaian agricul-ture into the forest zone of the south and te s n ro the f north.

This does not begin to do justice, however, to the diversity of the natu-rfial .4nvirorm.e and the fnr.ingn. sys__te .that _ r_vail _ / As a m ni.u, re-

ference should also be made to the coastal savanna that includes the Accraplai4ns andA to the rai4n forest of the sout.hwest where the rainfall is at aI. L. L LC D J.L .~. CD J. L.JL L .I J I lw %_ I. WIL 1-LLLC A GJ.L A.. L.A. ~L L.

maximum. Because of leaching out of plant nutrients, the soils of thesouthl,&wIest AU-o not pe,...Lit the econAomLLic -prodQJucJti0n Vo.f cocoJa .althoughJ the re=

gion is well suited to rubber and oil palms. The sandy coastal strip iswell sulted to coconul pal.ms.

3. ~ ~~~~ In spite of the emphasis on State Fa.mis In th1,e early 1960' Is , thUe.JLi L. L.JLLL C LE ii L± IJL I L. LC A LID LL L&IC ~ LJ. A J 0 L. LC

independent Ghanaian farmer with an average holding of some six acres re-mains the ma.instay of the Ghanaia ecoomy -her is grea vaiaio inID.A.iflD LLAC i..DJ.iIDL.Dy .J LLIC N'31L& L LDI CLA.%JLLVI1tY A.14=1. C LO 5. UCDL. V"&D L 6.LD .LJLL A.iL

the extent to which Ghanaian farmers have made the transition from essen-Ltiall.y sUUbsisteLnLc LU coUIIUIIecL :LaLL 'LDLI.ILg . MI1C 1ULUst bseliU-CdeciUous LUL CoLr

areas where cocoa thrives is also a region where commercial food productionLLDD UC1..ULLC .LLLLpU L~LIL * J.I LLIC UIULLIICI ii dIU UPPtCL ItCr, LV IZ%, LAIM LLaLDLU1Lhias become 'L mportant. Ir, the NortheIMrn and Uppe Reios ternsition to-

wards commercial production has been very limited as a result of distancefLror, the popuLatiLon centers and coastal ports, the late and lim.ited develop-

ment of roads and other infrastructure, and the failure to introduce a majorcash crop to play a role comiparable, for exanple, to groundnuts and cottonin northern Nigeria.

1/ The Nathan Consortium has just completed an Agricultural Sector Study,tne resuits of wnicn are reported upon in a generai volume and eigntannexes dealing respectively with demand projections; crop productionprograms; mechanization; irrigation; agricultural processing; market-ing, storage and transport; livestock; and forestry.

2/ The volume, Agriculture and Land Use in Ghana, edited by J. Brian Willsand published in 1962, contains contributions by specialists dealingwith various features of the physical environment, patterns of land use,land tenure, forestry, and a mnmber ot papers on cocoa. S. La-Anyane'sbook, Ghana Agriculture, published in 1963, is especially valuable forthe historical perspective that it provides. A chapter by Tony Killickon agriculture and forestry in The Economy of Ghana, edited by WalterBirmingham, I. Neustadt, and E. N. Omaboe and published in 1966, givesa particularly useful summary account.

4. There is also a substantial range in the size of holdings. Manyof the m.ore energetic cocoa farmers and those with more substantial resour--ces have made use of laborers hired under various contracts to build upvery large cocoa fam.s. In spite of such differences in scale and in theuse of hired labor, the farming techniques have had important features inco,m.....on . 1Thus 4it I-Las been noted that :

The. faIC e i - n Ghana I-as '-ad -in Ah pattozop i

practice to a relative abundance of land, soils that easilybecom,e exhausted if'Lc fa rtL,ed-E it = LL 0 iv L y-, an acutle s c a rciLt yof capital funds, and a shortage of alternative employmentoppunLtXLes outLLUe agr*Lcu'Lture an'u petty LraU'LGLL. AS a

consequence, farming embodies techniques that will maintainthe fertility of the soil with 'Large inpULb UJ of land la-

bour relative to the small inputs of purchased capital goods. 1/

There is the beginning, however, of the emergence of a new type of large-scale, comtmercial farmer wno utijizes relatively Large Inputs of purchnaseducapital goods and relatively small amounts of labor per acre and per unitof output. I.t is this development that gives rise to the important anddifficult issues in relation to mechanization policy that are examined la-ter.

5. The! first Section of this Anne!x discusses the objectives of agri-cultural policy in Ghana and briefly reviews some of the major problemsconfronting the agricultural sector. it is noted that the performance ofagriculture during the past decade has been highly unsatisfactory in con-trast with the positive role that it played in the economic development ofthe country in the preceding half century. A second Section examines inmore detail a set of important policy issues. Attention is given to cer-tain characteristics of the agricultural sector and of the Ghanaian economythat need to be taken. into account in designing and implementing suitablestrategies for promoting the development: of the nation's agriculture. Afinal chapter reviews; a number of specific projects giving particuiar at-tentiork to projects that seem likely to attract external assistance.

1/ K:Lllick, op. cit., p. 217.

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I. OBJECTIVES OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND MAJOR PROBLEMS

A. Objectives

6. In looking to the future, agricultural policy in Ghana must beconcerned with three straightforward objectives and a fourth objectivethat is not so obvious but is of great importance. The straightforwardobjectives are: (1) to expand domestic supplies of food and agricultur-al raw materials to satisfy the growth of demand and to bring about a re-duction in the present high-level of food prices: (2) to increase exportproduction to augment foreign exchange earnings from cocoa; and (3) to en-large domestic production of selected agricultural commodities to substi-tute for imports where this is economic. The fourth objective is to con-tribute directly and indirectly to providing opportunities for productiveemployment for the country's rapidly growing labor force. For reasons con-sidered later, it is desirable that a considerable part of the annual addi-tions to the labor force will have to be absorbed by the agricultural sec-tor.

B. Performance of the Agricultural Sector

7. The performance of Ghanaian agriculture during the past decadehas been highly unsatisfactory in contrast with the positive role that itplayed during the preceding half century. The remarkable expansion ofcocoa production and exports that began in the 1890's was the major factorresponsible for the significant increase in per capita incomes and the de-velopment of transportation and other infrastructure in the period of to1960. The growth of the cocoa industry was almost entirely a result of theenterprise of Ghanaian farmers who adopted an innovation that was profit-able and well suited to the forest region of southern Ghana. In 1960 some20 per cent of the total labor force was engaged in cocoa production as pro-prietors or as hired labor.

8. The simultaneous expansion of food production to meet the needsof a growing population was also an important factor. To a large extentthis was simply a "horizontal" expansion of production as a growing ruralwork force brought additional land into cultivation. The opening up ofland for cocoa led initially to increased food production since the plan-tains and cocoyams planted as nurse crops provided additional supplies oftwo of the country's maior staple foods. In addition, areas planted tococoa which failed because the soil conditions proved to be unsuitablewere planted to cassava and other food crops. As in the case of cocoa,the contribution of government action was largely limited to extendingthe road network and nroviding other infrastructure. Agricultural re-search and extension activities were on a very limited scale. Those pro-aram.s were iulst heglnning to reach a level of develonment which might

have enabled them to have an effect on food production when emphasis wasshifted to State Farms, the etehnsicn prganization dlsmantled anrd re-search reorganized. Thus technical progress leading to increased crop

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yields has to date made only a slight contribution to increase farm out-nut. Nevertheless it is clear that outnut ner farm worker was increasedin response to the expansion of demand on the part of a growing urban pop-ulation. By 1960 nearly a auarter of the population was living in townsof 5,000 or larger, and it was not until the end of 1950's that food im-ports hegan to innrease substantially in resnonse to rising demand.

9. The fdbhak effec of tfhe xpannsinn of the 'nrna industry onoverall economic development were considerable but less than might havebeen expected= P,ihliin invs-ment- n the rail system, the road network-

and in ports and commrLunications were largely financed by the increase intax revpn"ier thtai rpsu,i-d d irert-lv nr ineiirertlv- frnm t-hr pxnanginn of

__6~~~~. ,…____ _-_________ __= - ----- Sw - -r--~~~

cocoa. The same is true of the large public outlays for the rapid expan-sion of educstion, but the posaitive imnprt- of thi- inuest-mpnt in hulman

capital has been limited. As noted in Volume III, there was an emphasison qlu-antity rather than quality, antd the rate of expnnsion waQ so ranitdthat a signii-icant decline in quality was inevitable. This also made itmnre difficril ton carry thrniouh tbp nAxs,t4ronnl reforms that might hsave

increased the relevance and developmental value of the educational system.More recent!- the relatively slow growth of the economy has limited the

opportunities for the educated to apply their knowledge and skills in pro-ductive activity, and the problem of unemployAed school-leoavers has been amatter of serious concern. Finally, it would appear that the growth ofr-ral 4 incomes has hacl onl,, a 14m4-.a ef£,c4- 4n fosatei4ng Admesatic produ

tion of farm equipment or consumer goods. An important issue to be con-s4Adered is the poss4i4b1i4lity t -rhannas strateg four agrin.ulual develop-

ment can in the future have more positive interactions with the growth ofAoULmes.tc mCanufactur. 4Ilg

in. A d3rastic reorientation of agricuiltural policy -was associated.LV £1 %A ~LL . UL 5 LL.1UL I.L L. JL ULUSL IJJL.Ly ~ L.

with the furious effort to accelerate the pace of economic growth launchediLn the ear ily 'L960' ' s .T.he- attem.pt to expand' agricultural production buy prco=viding supporting services that would assist individual Ghanaian farmersL. inca L thi L a LLLprLoJductiL.LVt.LL y was abaLLdnUeIU W.LLILUUt beingLLL6 giVnLl a ser.LUous

trial. Emphasis was placed on direct production by governmental or quasi--goverrciLentadl uniLts, anU investrent fLunds anu thLe trLir.ned personnel avail

able were concentrated on launching various types of State Farms and onestabUL i shLLng Loou process'ing lndLuUstries LinaLLnLceLU Uy sUpp.L.LCL rLrU.LLe .

These efforts absorbed large amounts of capital and foreign exchange, buttLIh eLuluonom retULrns were: very smlla'LL. s1i'te U'epLetLonL Vtj forignL excl'lange

reserves and the balance of payments criris that resulted from the growinpdeficit in the trade balance led to the im1position of imUport controls thatmade it difficult or impossible for farmers to obtain essential inputssuch as Lhoes a..d cutlasses a-.dU iL.secticdes Lor sprayiLng cocoa. One seri-

ous effect of the agricultural policies initiated in the early 1960's wasto discourage food production by the traditional sector, arid the suppliesthat the large-scale, capital-intensive farm units of the public sectorwere supposed to provide did not materi.alize.

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11. A vigorous program of capsid spraying and related measures fo-cused on cocoa represented the only significant concession to the trad4-tional agricultural sector. Even in this instance the emphasis was onblock spraying by laborers hired and superv-ised by goverentstaff 4-

stead of training farmers to carry out capsid control on their own unitsas in ot-her 'West Africa countries. AlthughU th lokspain a

QO ~~~ ~ ~~ L CL £'.QL A.JL_ L I * LJ. L.LI%JUrtl #_I Lue ULIJ.L r.. DJL CyL.JL&6L Iiiay

have had short-term advantages, it was subject to abuse by teams that de-m.andL eA illegal pa-ym,ents and in an -- en the~ hire laborers col not -be -- 1A*an.Au ~.IL 6 O. jiyieLL OkU ~Ll I LIY =V CILL LILE tIJLLCU .LCXULL C1 % LUU.LU LULVL LIE

expected to have a keen interest in the quality of work performed. Thecaps±Lu programdIL, tLIe com'LrLg~ LULn- UEL LI Cd ±LE _±ILJIA~,dcapsidprogr. th cor.ing i.to bearing of earlier p_lantings60, aLnd severlC4

seasons with favorable weather conditions led to a sizable expansion ofco o production 'Ln U- 1 a Ln L C - - - . - .I. . L _ _A - wt - - - - - - - Z_cocoa L?UUL yL±JLIS .Lt LhC 1960-65JJ perioLUU ULUL LLCY L..L.LCU LU LLCJ. CdrC LUL -

eign exchange earnings because of the offsetting decline in prices asso-ciatedU WtLILL th'Ue demand con'ULtLIons anadLyzedU i1n the ,uiain report. IA subDse-quent drop in production, partly a result of the acute shortage of

,arira'LLn LU Lor capsiU control, Ihas meant that GLhana's shiare in wor.Ldexports has been at a lower level and the increase in export proceedsLLUIII LUUUd lidS DeeH mUUeaLt i11 SpItLe 01 Lne consideraDLe increase Lncocoa prices since 1965.

12. The final disappointment to be noted is that there has been vir-tually no development of new agricultural products to augment the foreignexchange earnings from cocoa. Consequently, the total value of agricultur-al export proceeus not only failed to increase but declined by more tnan i1per cent between 1960 and 1966. In that regard, it should be noted that anumber of other African countries have managed to increase their foreign ex-change earnings from agricultural products in spite of unfavorable pricetrends for their traditional export crops. Between 1960 and 1966 Kenya in-creased the value of its agricultural exports by 51 per cent, Urganda by 57per cent, and the Ivory Coast by 79 per cent. The experience of Tanzaniais especially interesting because increased production by smallholders wasalmost entirely responsible for the impressive increases in export earningsregistered during the 1960's. Export prices for sisal, traditionally Tan-zania's major export crop, have been so unfavorable that production declinedby 6 per cent between the 1960/62 average and 1968, and because of the sharpprice decline the value of sisal exports in 1968 was little more than halfthe value of exports in 1962. The loss in export proceeds from sisal, how-ever, was more than offset by rapid expansion of production and exports of anumber of other products. Cotton production increased at a rate of nearly 6per cent between 1960/62 and 1968, and the increase in the value of cottonexports offset much of the loss in proceeds from sisal. The expansion ofother export crops was, except for coffee, from a much smaller base thancotton, but the rates of increase over the period 1960/62 to 1968 were im-pressive: tobacco 18.2 per cent, pyrethrum 15.6 per cent, cashew nuts 12.6per cent, coffee 10.5 per cent, and tea 9.6 per cent. Tanzania's develop-ment efforts have, of course, been seriously affected by the sisal situa-tion. The increased export earnings from the six crops mentioned have, how-ever, more than compensated for the decline in sisal receipts; total exportproceeds from those crops and sisal registered an increase of about 30 percent between 1962 and 1968.

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13. The following review of a number of problems in the agriculturalsector is intended to give a fairly comprehensive view of the range of pro.-blems confronting Ghana's agricultural sector. Some of the problems thatare described briefly at this point are considered in more detail either illthe discussicon of agricultural policies and choice of strategy in SectionII or in Section III where a number of specific projects are identified.

C. Food Supply Problems and Price Trends

14. The growth of food production in Ghana seems to have kept pacewith the increase of demand associated with population growth and risingper capita incomes urLtil the late 1950's or early 1960's. 1/ Prior tothat time there was a slow increase in the imports of products such aswheat i'lour, sugar, and dairy products that are universally consumed inincreased amounts as incomes rise and urbanization takes place, and thosewere items whiich were not produced locally. In the case of wheat that re-mains true because Ghana's physical environment is not suitable for effi-cient production. The substantial investment required to develop a sugarindustry has now been made, but the two mills are still operating at onlyabout :10 per cent of capacity. It will probably be a number of years be-fore it will be economical for Ghana to attempt to overcome the difficulttechnical and managerial problems involved in establishing a dairy indus-try (except for the production of reconstituted milk that has already beeninitiated). From about 1959! the rate of increase of imports of wheatflour, sugar, and especially rice accelerated, and it appears that importswere accounting for a growing fraction of urban food supplies.

15. Beginnine :Ln 1961 there is clear evidence of a tendency for do-mestic food prices to rise more rapidly than imported supplies, and thisincreased pressure to) imnort at a time of mounting trade deficits led tothe imposition of quotas on imported foodstuffs. These severe import re-strictions reduced the level of food imnorts by roughly a third in the1963-65 period, and even though imports have since risen the flow of im-ported sunolies has continued to be muclh less resPnnsive to seasonal

shortages. This curitailment of imports and the quota restrictions nodoubt contributed to the accentuation of seasonal fluntuations in foodprices that seems to have characterized much of the past decade and wasnrobablv resnonsible to some extent for the sharn rise in food nricesduring those years. (The Accra retail price index for local food rosefrom 139 in 1963 (with 1954=10) to 226 in 1969! the rnrrrsnnndina in-crease in the price index for imported food was from 126 to 161.)

1/ A sharp rise in food prices between 1948/49 and 1950/51 gave rise toserious concern about fond supnlies and al1egations ahout the low

elasticity of domestic supplies. Analysis of the extraordinary cir-cumstances responsihle for t-he rise in fontd npri-ea nat that Htine and

of subsequent developments make it clear that there was little basisfor such aTrpeiga tAic,ns. 15 , pp. T26 2-6 4.) EoI - e oWestern Tropical Africa, 1958, pp. 262-64.)

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16. The major factor responsible for the rise in food prices duringthe nperiod was undoubtedly the failure of domestirc fond nrodtution to keepnpace with the growth of demand. The inadequate increase of supply was re-lated to the shortaes of essential innuits already mentioned AS well aSreduced incentives for farmers to fully utilize their land and labor be-c2use of sharnpl rediired Av2ilnbility of imported consumer goods together

with the deterioration of the transport system. In addition there was anexreption II" Cmall increase in the fa.m. lab1nvr fnrce- katuan D 19Q60 and 1965

as a result of the rapid increase in employment in construction and othernonfarm. activitieso Many pAierns whon 1A wld4l Athen havir ben engage infarming on individual smallholder units also opted for wage employment onState Farm.s, in Workers' Brigade Units, arnd in farm.s operated by the UGFCC,or on settlements where their contribution to output was very small inspite of heavy investment in farm equipment. Finally, there was areduc-tion during this period in the number of young people entering farming be-c u,se o f the 4 a 4:nrease i n *14 e percnn 4o- -f ,.l-s 1 A.rn Af sonl.nl A1t.LlOL. A. V. L. i a LISG J.LL.C^ a O&zL.O .LL 1[ L Wi IC. 4. C.C& a1 C. ISA C.L fl Ct.*SJS a

attending school. On the demand side, the extraordinarily rapid growth ofurban populati 4on and money n.o..es as a resultC oLf the construction bo,...

increased government employment, and other effects of the heavy expendi-tures that were being r.,ade as tle co;untry's foreign exchAange reserjVes werebeing depleted and heavy debts incurred in the attempt to accelerate de-V: E J.UpLlCIL; 1.

1 7. Tn the fall1 of I'll there was a rapid eain of -h siuaio znd-U +-4- -.4. I .41 LiI L .L di. U ± 27U I ItJ C W O 0 IL aJJ'. C_DOLL&r, W.1 IS 4 L .L U0 L.ULSl QiLL.

a sharp decline in the price of maize and other products. This appears tohtave been th'e resu'lt of in crtea-sied cacrecagge planted to fooU-d c ro0p s,u bettte r thuanaverage yields as a result of a favorable growing season, and increased foodim,ports, i.nL-uding l[alze brought iL aL th[t timiIle under r P.L. 480 and Lth

World Food Program. Exceptionally heavy rains and floods in the spring of1968, however, led oUce again to a sharp seasonal rise in food prices (theindex for local food in urban markets rose nearly 25 per cent between Marchand July of 1968), and food prices have C*ontinued at a high level since thattime. Although prices have continued at an excessively high level, the sea-sonal rise in 1970 appears to have been relatively moderate.

D. Marketing Problems

18. Commodity trading in Ghana, with the exception of major exportcrops such as cocoa, is in the hands of thousands of small traders distrib-uted throughout the country. The traditional marketing system of foodstuffsis extremely complex, but considering the constraints and limitations ofstorage and the problems of handling the semi-perishable foodstuffs such asplantains and yams that bulk large in Ghanaian diets, the system seems to bereasonably efficient.

19. Analysis of a very useful survey of the movement ot toodstuftsinto Accra carried out in the late 1950's demonstrates that the traditionalfood marketing system was doing a rather effective job of provisioning thecity. Supplies were obtained from a number of specialized areas of commer-

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cial food production that had become important by that time. A noteworthyfeature was the rather complex seasonal pattern whereby the major sourcesof supply changed during the course of the year in response to seasonalchanges in the availability of the major staples -- maize, plantains, andcassava and cassava products. This pattern was also influenced by compe-ting demands for the lorries available which was mainly related to theseasonal concentration of the movement of the cocoa crop to ports. One con-sequence of this flexibility in supply and consumption patterns is that forthe typical consumer the effect of seasonal peaks in the prices of particu--lar commodities is moderated because of the tendency to shift from productsthat are seasonally scarce and dear to the relatively abundant and cheaperitems that are available.

20. Recent investigations of the operations of the food marketingsystem have unfortunately been limited in scope and more in the nature ofreconnaissance surveys than detailed studies.l/ A survey of maize market-ing by the FAO marketing economist attached to Ghana's Food Research Insti-tute and the recent survey carried out by the marketing specialist as partof the Nathan Sector Study indicate that distribution margins are not ex-cessive and that the system is fairly efficient, although there is clearlyneed for substantial improvements. For example, there appear to be specialproblems in corganizing the processing and distribution of local rice to en-able it to compete effectively with the imported supplies that have been sa-tisfying such a large part of the growing urban demand.

21. There is some evidence that urban food shortages of the past de-cade stemming from insufficient production have been accentuated by defi-ciencies in marketing. The deterioration in the food distribution systembetween 1961 and 1966 must have been seia sus. The average age of lorriesincreased because of restrictions on impcdts. and the number in operationwas reduced because cf shortages of tires and spare parts. The conditionof main roads and feeder roads was poor because of inadequate maintenance.Although there has been considerable improvement since 1966, the seriouseffects on food supplies that resulted f-rom the heavy rains and floods inthe spring of 1968 were presumably intensified because of the deterioratedcondition of roads and vehicles.

E. Present Situation and Prospects for Expanded Production of Export CrcDs

22. It has beerL noted that Ghana has not been able to develoD exnortsof new agricultural products to augment the foreign exchange proceeds fromcocoa. In fact; cocoa's share in total exnorts increased from 59 to 65 Dercent between 1960 and 1967 as shown in the following tabulation:

1/ A detaiLed survey of market conditions and problems has been started bythe Institte nf Statistial, - Snpcil and F.rnnmir Rpqpnrrh (TS9FR) T.onnUniversity under the title "Factors of Agricultural Growth in Ghana".

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Ghana - Per Cent Of Total Exports 1960-69

1960 1967 1969

Cocoa bean and products 59 65 54

Timber and logs 14 9 10

Gold 10 9 8

Diamonds 9 5 4

Manganese 6 5 2

Other* 2 7 22

100 100 100

* Exports of aluminium began in 1967 and amounted to1170 of exports in 196a

In contrast, the Ivory Coast's reliance on its traditional exports of cocoaand coffee declined from 70 per cent of the total value of exports in 1960Uto 51 per cent 4n 1967. Mo --- ve, the 4 -cased- A plantin 0f some new crops,

notably palm oil, is only now beginning to have its impact on export pro-

23.Unfortunately , Ghana's prospec. s of rapdlU.Ly .LLL .increasing expoJrL UeaLrL

ings from crops other than cocoa is not very promising and only in the caseof rubbUUCer, where a Joint enterprise operation W Ut an expatr4ate com..pany hasbeen undertaken, is there some chance of making a significant contribution tothLe economy. Exports of rubbUer are expected to rLLse from. N¢I 120',00 0i in 1971

to over NO 8.0 million in 1980. It is likely that exports of other agri-cultural comum.odities will not contriLute r,.ore th'lan N¢£ au million buy 19780 to

foreign exchange earnings. The more promising possibilities are for pineap-ples and other processed or fresh fruit, copra and coconut oil, cashew nuts,groundnuts for the confectionery trade, cassava chips, and ginger and certainotner specialty crops. The rate of expansion of new exporL crops will naLu-rally be influenced greatly by the prices paid to Ghanaian farmers. Since itis an established perennial crop with a strong comparative advantage, cocoaproduction and exports tend to be fairly well maintained, at least in theshort run, in spite of unfavorable producer prices. But the decision to in-vest in developing a new export crop is bound to depend to a great extent onthe price of the product. Given the present overvaluation of the exchangerate, export bonuses or some other type of special incentive is undoubtedlyneeded to achieve even a modest rate of export expansion.

24. It is possible that the momentum of a successful program ot im-port substitution for rice would go beyond the point of self-sufficiencyand that exportable surpluses would emerge. In view of the rapid import

- 10 -

substitution that is underway in most of the rice importing countries, weare skeptical of the view, unless marked changes take place in the preseni:level of export incentives, that the country should aim at becoming a riceexporter. Given an effective program to increase productivity, there wou:Ldseem to be good prospects that Ghana could export maize as a feed grain aindcassava chips, especially in years when. weather conditions are favorable.

F. Possibilities for Economic Import Substitution in Food Crops andAgricultural Raw Materials

25. As opportunities for expanding export crops are limited and pro-gress is likely to be slow, there is an acute need to exploit the chancesthat do exist for import substitution where this is economic. In 1968Ghana's imports of commodities and foodstuffs which could be produced inthe country if suita,ble policies and programs were adopted amounted tomore than NO 30 million.

Ghana - V'alue of Imports in 1969 of Commodities thatcould be Produced Locally

Value NO millions

Sugar 8.5

Rice 6.0

Vegetable oils and tallow 5.6

'Livestoclc products 10.0

Cotton (fibre) 1.9

Jute (fi'bre) 0.8

Tobacco 3.8

Total 36.6

One of the worst examples of the failure to take advantages of the opport:u-nities that exist for import substitution is in the production of sugar atthe Asutsuare and Komenda factories which have a joint capacity for produc-ing 35,000 tons of sugar. The Asutsuare factory commenced operations in1966 and the Komenda mill in 1967. Their combined production in the currentseason will barely exceed 3,500 tons or 10 per cent of capacity. These -pro-duction figures and consideration of the organizational and management dif-ficulties faced by the two factories indicate that drastic changes are need-ed if the Ghanaian sugar industry is to play its proper role in the economy.Some movement in this direction is indicated in the Government's 1970/71 bud-get message which cited the weaknesses of this industry and announced a spe-cial development levy on imported sugar.

- 11 -

26. Another example of the failure to grasp the opportunities avail-able is the oil palm plantation at Pretsea operated by the State Farms Cor-poration. Management problems and organizational constraints result in ex-tremely high production costs in comparison with similar enterprises else-where in West Africa. Palm oil has to be sold at three times the worldmarket price in order for the project to pay its way. At last report, theMinistry of Agriculture was preparing a project proposal to rationalize thePretsea operation.

G. The Organization and Effectiveness of Agricultural Research

27. Agricultural research in Ghana is the responsibility of the Coun-cil for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the Faculties of Agri-culture at the University of Ghana and the Kumasi University of Science andTechnology, and the Ministry of Agriculture.

28. Agriculture is only one of a number of fields of research overwhich the CSIR exercises very general supervision. A coordinator for agri-cultural research is attached to CSIR and there is also a research coordi-nator assigned to the Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture. Itappears, however, that each of the research institutes -- the Crop ResearchInstitute and the Soil Research Institute at Kwadaso near Kumasi, the CocoaResearch Institute at Tafo, the Animal Research Institute near Accra, andthe Food Research Institute in Accra -- operates as an independent unitwith a minimum of coordination or guidance in establishing research pro-grams and priorities among projects. The Crop Production Division of theMinistry of Agriculture has certain responsibilities with respect to fieldtrials, especially in connection with the UNDP/FAO "program for increasedfood production through fertilizer use" that places considerable emphasison fertilizer and variety trials. Agricultural scientists in the Facultiesof Agriculture at Legon and Kumasi also carry out field trials at agricul-tural stations maintained by the University or by other organizations.

29. It seems clear that there is considerable frazmentation of effortso that the scarce resources represented by trained research workers are notbeing utilized efficiently. In particular, the organizational structure ap-pears to encourage individual scientists to work in comparative isolation onproblems of their own choosing. Some improvement in the level of cooperationbetween the Ministry and the Crop Research Institute has resulted from theqtudies that the nlanninv unit are carrving out for initfat1ng oil nalm andmaize projects but much more is needed before a satisfactory relationship can

30. As a result of poor ondnrtion hptweepn the recsroh institutesand the Ministry of Agriculture in developing agreed programs, the Ministryhas tended to ignore the T.-rk of the research institutes as not being suf-ficiently applied or relevant and to go to an opposite extreme of relyingvery heavily on ad hoc introductions of crop varieties without adequate at-tention to the need for local, adaptive research. The failure to evolve anefficient tea.m. approach amnong research workers, including close cooperation

- 12 -

with agricultural field staff, in order to exploit the opportunities thatexist for the development and diffusion of yield-increasing innovationsadapted to the needs of farmers in various agricultural zones has been oneof the most fundamental shortcomings in Ghana's anproach to agricultural de-velopment.

31. Substantial efforts have been made to rebuild the Ministry ofAgriculture's extension staff and programs which were effpetivelyv di-man-tled in the early 1960's. The Crop Production Division is responsible forfarm advisory w7ork rfr crnns nther than cocoa and also fnr the dictribhtionof a few inputs, notably seed and fertilizers. It is the largest divisionin the Ministry -f fth thca eoxeptjnn of tho Corno TI44orn,n and a large nprt

of the resources of the Cocoa Division are devoted to regulatory and diseasecontrol functions rather than extension work. The effectiveness of the M4n-

istry's extension efforts appears to be rather limited. Probably the mostfundamental difficulty has been a failure to develop detailed extension pro-grams aimed at specific and limited objectives and then insuring that thoseprograms 4 .I1-mplmentd.A The tendenc has rather been to expect f l Astaff to carry out a very general and vague program of promoting "improvedp-acti-es c:r "helping fa...ers .th- their- probler.,s."

32 Os... ~ .A plot sche.me LtJ. z as the Focus and Concentrate ProgramC was

started in six of the 40 districts in 1968 with assistance from the US/AIDMIAsson. The -r ----- 1 - .volves the sele-Ction of L4 -------- 4- fz.,,ers in

each district and assistance is given in laying out farms, measurement andrecordi4ng oi- inputs -an yie-lds, -an enor_e n to _ zdot .prve-pAc

L AU A.* ~A. *ALFU~S O "&LU Y C,UO , an-u CItJltOCICL t "UUljJ JJ-ljLWIV U Cu. U-

tices. In 1970 it is intended to cover all the 40 districts of the countryanu to iLnvoLve up to 640 farmers.

33. The Focus an' Conicentrate Program has provided valuable LLain±,Jg

for some memnbers of the agricultural field staff because those participatingin the program have been obliged to familiarize themselves in detail WithL.the problems and production possibilities of a few selected farmers. Theheavy eLiphasis on311 L£1 mianag11 emWIent WLUV.UJULy WOrK means, however, that the pro-gram is very costly in its manpower requirements and cannot be expected tohave an immediiate wide impact. Although the rundamentai importance of fct-cusing and concentrating limited resources in order to achieve results isunquestionably sound, it is suggested below that substantially greater re-turns could be realized by focusing research and extension activity on de-veloping andl implementing a few commodity-oriented programs for raising pro-ductivity through the introduction of a set of innovations that would spreadbecause of being profitable and capable of being adopted by large numbers offarmers.

34. The training activities of the Ministry of Agriculture emphasizerelatively expensive residential farm training institutes. The courses of-fered are of a very general nature and include considerable emphasis on theuse of equipment beyond the reacn of ali but a nandful of farmers becauseof the limited level of cash income that is characteristic of Ghanaian farm-ers. It is our impression that the Ministry of Agriculture makes very lLt-

- 13 -

tle use of its training facilities for in-service or on-the-job trainingcourses to prenare field staff to carry out resnonsibilities in connnertionwith specific extension programs. But that lack is, of course, just anothermanifestation of the basic oroblem stemming from the failure to design andimplement integrated programs of research, extension, and training focusedon a carefully selerted packnge of innovatinns and conrenfrated on thosecrops and areas where the highest returns can be expected.

H. State Farms and Settlements

35. During the period from 1961 to early 1966 the emphasis on develop-ment was on State Farms and the construction of governmTent factories forprocessing. A total of 125 State Farms were established by the State Farms

Corplo-r/ati-on , Al f~% -hn UJnveore R-r4oq,An ari t-ha Vn...r. Vn~,at

T-M-,, -,ACopoaton 4 y heWokrs Bigd and the Young ____.rs Teau,- and870 by the UGFCC. These enterprises affected a very small proportion of the

aola otinn on en .n. -d 4, 4r.A acount, fr on-y about I pe- cent ofrl t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i 6sL5_aL JfliJlJ. UVS iG WL. 4. jX

total agricultural production during the period, but they absorbed largeamounts of capital and diverted resources, m,anmower anA facilities away fromthe smallholder sector of the economy.

36. Since 1966 the number of State Farms has rapidly decreased, andof those a-aininn 91 ho a ermanmnt 4tra r, ( 1 -1-fir. r. Atl ' - Am

citrus and cashew), 7 are poultry farms, 2 are pig farms, and 2 are cattleanA r4 ce farms. The arable far-n.s for ra4ize a-nd rice are being closedA AoWn.

The progress of the State Farms Corporation since 1966 is indicated below,and Lurther im..provemC,ents in manageimient anA organization are planneA for1970/71.

Ghana - State Farms Operating Progress 1966-68 /1

February1966 i967 i968

Area cultivated(excluding rubber project) 35,300 22,704 36,371

Numbers employed(including staff andcasual labor) 16,400 6,083 5,382

Number of farms 112 62 44

Average acreagecultivated per farm 312 366 599

/1 Jean M. Due, "Agricultural Development in the Ivory Coast and Ghana,"Journal of Modern African Studies, December 1966.

37. The Settlement Division took over the responsibilities of thevYoung Farm,ers' League iLn 1968 The_ Legesatd savlnar raia

JAJL£A6

£ A. II~L ~ L 96.LJU. ± 1IC U=LU_ LOU L L.=%J CLO C VU..4.LLUaALy %JI. LL~

tion with the primary objective of.encouraging and training middle school~ ~L LLI L~N~up 0L L±U L~L~L±1~ ~ L~LC~L 1)' LZC~I I.. . t1. 0 LILleavers to t-akre up setLtled fa.lmning as a career. Bjy the enAd of 1964 thLe

League had 39 farms with 1,824 settlers. After the coup the recommendationwas .ae -'at -le L ea;gue ue abolJisheIdU, andU thi'e ' ettLeriiient DiViSiOn of thLle

Ministry of Agriculture has taken over responsibility for the 21 farms sti].lin operatl4on. Alth ough the settlem,ent sclem,e has attracted bilateral ass's-.LLA ~~~~~~ ~~~AL JL. £1.L LIIJU 11 LAI ~ 0 U1 A.L IL LL IL L Ia & LLL d. Le ±L J k. d 0~

tance, it is doubtful if the expenditure of over NO 1,000 per settler forsou-,e 700 settlers each. year will huavqe any signi4ficant im1,pact on the udevelop-ment of the agricultural sector or serve any demonstration function for the

I -- D__.-_A MI_- I_ _-7 _f%1 n7n1 t ---- _ _-- ----- 1 _spreaGu UL .LIlpLUVIU LedLLIL.LL1 L.LLuLU.bqUt LL. .37 I/V/ I L UUUKtgXL, dt.LALU± Ullg±y, LU-

flects a reduction in capital development expenditures from the 1969/70 lev-el.

L. Pro'uenls _' laL±ng Lo Mechanization

no .._ al .l - tra___ _Jo. UntiL Lne early l,uu s, G'nana s principal experience witn tractormechanization was the Gonja Development Company which initiated mechanizedcultivation of sorghums and a few other crops in the Damongo area of theNorthern Region. This scheme was a costly failure and was liquidated inthe mid-1950's. A sc:heme to introduce bullock plowing was initiated on asmall scale in the Upper Region in the 1930's. Wartime conditions limitedthe availability of plows, but the effort to popuiarize bulIock cuitivationwas intensified in setveral areas in the Upper and Northern Regions in the1950's, and considerable progress was made, especially in Bawku Districtwhere the nurnber of plow farmers increased from 497 in 1952 to 2,645 in1960.

39. With the shift in emphasis to State Farms, efforts to promotesmall-scale mechanization were abandoned and large numbers of tractors andother equipment were imported. It is estimated that 4,000 tractors and7,000 items of farm equipment including plows, grain dryers, and combineharvesters were imported during a four-year period at a cost ot approxi-mately NO 25 million. Much of the equipment imported in the 1960's is nowcontrolled by the Mechanization and Transport Division of the Ministry otAgriculture which has made provision for spare parts for repairing 500wheel tractors for land preparation and 100 crawler tractors for land ciear-ing. It has been estimated that as of October 1969 only about 40 per cenl:of the wheel tractors were serviceable, and our observations in the Northernand Upper Regions suggest that the percentage is now considerably lower. Asevere shortage of spare parts and long delays in obtaining parts because otthe cumbersome procedures for requisitioning and obtaining licenses and for-eign exchange allocations has contributed to the frequency of breakdowns andfailure to get equipiment back into operation. The fact that much of theequipment is of Czech, Yugoslav, or Russian origin has complicated the pro-blem of obtaining spare parts. The tractor hire services operated by thegovernment for land preparation and land clearing have been very heavily sub-sidized. Although the rates charged are very low and therefore attractiveto farmers, the quality of work is often poor and it is reported that farn-ers often faLil to receive plowing services that they have requested and paidfor in. advance.

- 15 -

40. During the past three years a limited number of new tractors andancillarv enqu{nment have hben imnnrtpd by indiuidtiA1 farmprs. A n;imThr nfthese farmers have demonstrated the ability to manage tractors and otherequipment fairly well even though they have had littlp nrpv1inti exnpripnrpwith tractor operations. An outstanding example is a rice farmer nearTam.ale in the Northern Region who has reported using his tractor to prepareseedbeds for 250 acres of his own and 350 acres of his neighbors' land.ThlIT wsC aocompalshed 4n a perIod nf threeio nnA n h:lf mnnthc Tn rnntr:ct

the government's mechanization units averaged about 30 to 45 acres per trac-tor, counting only tr-ctors that wrea -searvcab,1.

41. A pro4isin, recent development is that the Government's new one-

year Development Plan states: "Ministry (of Agriculture) will continue,anA in 1970/71 largel y co..plete U the process ofA Csengagem,ent from. the ear=lier policy of State-controlled ... investment in major mechanization ...schemes = a policy that contributed lo stagnation in agricultural produc-tion." The 1970/71 capital budget indicates less funds for mechanizationLLan were spenL Last year. It is int erestng to no-e, L --i- ------ -tio

that six Ministry of Agriculture officials have resigned from the govern-ment L ,echanizati0LnL bCeLV iC Ue and Iave boughit tractors and set up private con-cerns to provide contract plowing. Although they are obliged to chargeratLes considAerabl-yVU hgler than Ile subsidized govern-ment rates to coverL~LCO .UJILOUCLLI. L.1. 11 Lit~L LUit OUOULC.u ,JCLIICI L . aL.O LU .. AV

their costs, they report a brisk demand for their services because withstrong incentives and close supervision of tractor operators they can pro-vide more reliable service and work of better quality.

J. Farm Credit and Cooperatives

42. The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1964anda has played an important part in providing credLt lor al Lypes of agri-cultural enterprises. The amount of lending was increased substantially ini969 and the level of lending activity is continuing to expand. (See Table2). The Bank received a total of 982 loan applications in 1969/70 to avalue of NV 12 million; 524 loan applications were considered viable andloan facilities worth NO 3.21 million were granted. A major portion of theloans, No 1.54 million, was for the cultivation of industrial crops, sugar-cane, tobacco, oil palm, citrus, and rubber. Loans of the ADB have been ra-ther heavily concentrated among the larger tarmers and other eligible bor-rowers as indicated by the following tabulation:

Ghana - Total of ADB Loans by Amount Since Inception to 1968

Range (NO) 1-400 401-800 801-10,000 10,001-40,000 40,001-and up

Total loanssince 1964(NO) 2,530 9,099 279,429 627,511 2,215,421

- 16 -

This situation illustrates the problem of the small farmer who does not haveaccess to credit through a coonerative oYr other organization. Only Nt 11;629in loans of less than No 800 have been written since ADB's inception. Thesmall faLrmer has not had direct access tci instItutionalized credit in Ghana.Recent attempts to increase the volume of small-scale lending for food cropnroduction through "groun lending" may rhange the situation to some extent.Relatively little attention has been paid to financing of storage facilitieSand nrncpqqing, equipment to date.

L3. In principle at least a very strong case can be made for a deter-mined effort to revitalize agricultural cooperatives in Ghana. A well-runlocal cooperative society can bea very useful instrumient for amiinisteringcredit programs to reach large numbers of small- and medium-scale farmers.As development proceeds, they can also be avaluable mechanism for mobili-zing rural savings to finance nonagricultural as well as agricultural in-

veostment per,arntie ttn socAieie cc -Cas or. soe, na useful to Ain dAT' T C

tributing fertilizer and other inputs to farmers, and the organization offarmers into cooperatives can increase the effectiveness of extension pro-grams aimed at: disseminating improved practices to large numbers of farm-ers.

-- .L L JEO W;lT' .nIL , wlknwn C V h owev r .t Lha . 1 pC I- .WC LU LO Cs eLx reCm'l l LA_ -

ficult to achieve those objectives. Lack of training and inadequate under-standing of t.-;e comm.,er-wal oper-tons of a -cooper -ative soit on th part_ 1- _ o UtLL LiE, LL Me LLLC LLUpE UVLiJL.O a LJtCLaLV CZIU=LLV O3L=L L U)OL& UILC partof employees, officers, and members frequently leads to inefficient manage-..ent, anA problem,s of financial -irresponsibili4ty andA misappropriation of

fiLh , .MA .J SUALILO ut A.LiaiU.aL LA I.. CC L4 L).L L .L U) aL. iiLap LJA a LJLIA.

funds are often serious. Detailed case studies of a sample of cooperativesociet Les in UIhle Cen tral an nd VoL ta Regio cied out Jn L Li U) i LAOA

consultant document the fact that those are real problems in Ghana.

45. The cooperative movement in Ghana also faces a number of special… £ - - 2~~~~~~~~~~~~~A- ---- Icl problULemi UteCause of the suppression olf th,eL inICieperduent cooperaLtives ir, 196U1

when the government-sponsored UGFCC was made the sole buyer of cocoa and ex-propria;:ed the buildnugs anid othier assetsL of1 the co,peratLve societies. ThleCooperative Bank was disbanded the previous year and its assets transferredto the ULGFrUC. Following tne coup the cooperatives repossessed their con-fiscated assets except for cash and moveable assets that could not be re-covered. They once again became active as licensed buyers for the StateCocoa Marketing Board, and in 1966/67 accounted for 25 per cent of cocoabuying and in 1969/70 purchased 40 per cent of the totai crop. The FAO in-vestigation mentioned above suggests, however, that the percentage has de-clined, because of the! financial difficulties that a number of the societieshave encountered as a result of increases in their operating costs, includ-ing honoraria paid to members of management committees, ana a level of incomethat has not :Lncreased as anticipated.

46. A report is to be issued shortly by the Moore Commission whichwill make recommendations concerning the return of assets and compensationfor assets talcen over by the UGFCC. This will provide an appropriate oc-casion for a careful review of government: policy with respect to the coop-

- 17 -

erative movement. It is likely, for example, that the Moore Commissionwill recommend reestablishment of the Cooperative Bank (as was recommendedin the 1968 report of the adviser on cooperatives of the Overseas Develop-ment Ministry of the U.K.). There is also likely to be reconsideration ofthe 42.5 per cent company profit tax that is levied on cooperatives at thesame rate that is applied to commercial firms. Removal of the tax has beenrecommended by the Department of Cooperatives. 1/ It is pointed out thatthe tax is a deduction additional to the statutory requirement that 25 percent of the net proceeds of cooperative societies be placed in reserve. Itis also emphasized that the proceeds of an agricultural cooperative are notanalogous to company profits. Individual farmers would not be liable tosuch a tax, and the effect of levying it on societies is to discourage farm-ers from joining and selling their crop through cooperatives.

47. Another question that will have to be considered is whether theDepartment of Cooneratives should remain under the Ministry of Labour andCooperatives or be placed under the Ministry of Agriculture. An objec-tion that is raised to nlarino the Department under the Ministrv of Agri-culture is that the principles of cooperation are applicable to consumerscripties and other ooperatives onutside of acrirult,,1ture, hbt there mTi he

be important practical advantages if the Ministry of Agriculture hadcloser links with the Department of Goonpratives than now exist. The

work of the Department is handicapped severely by lack of funds and anacute shortage of nperonnenl (The 196iR ODM repnnrt mentioned earlier

noted that the Department in Ghana had a staff of 75 compared to the Co-.p.rative Departments 4 Tanznia and Uganda w_th 317 and 385 staff m.,_

bers respectively.) If the GOG reaches a policy decision to strengthenthe cooperative movement as ameans of promoting the development of theagricultural sector, a close link with the Ministry of Agriculture mightfacilItato transcfecrs of pmran" ml fonm dIv4Iscion nf the M4n4ctry t hat

are withdrawing from direct operational responsibilities. An essentialcomponent of a policy to revitalize the cooperative movement is the es-tablishment of training programs for the Department's field staff, forsecretaries andA other em.ployees of local societies andA unions, anA formembers of management committees.

48. Another policy issue to be resolved is whether efforts should beconcentLraeLL on strengthening thi'e sociletiles i,. the Ico CrLea or V WLhehLILL

a substantial effort should also be made to encourage the establishment ofsocieties inL othler taI1iniii regiiOns. [Most oL. the[ JU50 pL-iLIlary sUcietLies anU

50,000 farmers who were members of the movement in 1961 were in the cocoaregion. There were supposed Lo WU some 2,800 primary societies in hne

country in 1968, only about half of which were cocoa marketing societies.But many of the societies existed in name only; this was particularly trueof food marketing societies which had been set up by the UGFCC. In view

1/ The 1970/71 Budget has announced the removal of the burden of profittax from cooperatives.

- 18 -

of the difficult problems facing the cooperative societies, it would pro-bably be advisable to concentrate initially at least on strengthening thecocoa marketing societies. There are, however, a few relatively strongcooperatives outside the cocoa region t'hat certainly merit attention. Insome instances, such societies might be capable of performing a usefulfunction in oneratinL, storage farilitips Or mills for nrocessing nil seedsor rice.

K. Land Tenure Problems

49. There appears to be a need for and interest in an examination ol'annronriate rhAnanc in lann tonuire nprartioes anA regotlationas Past ex-

perience in Ghana has demonstrated that it has often been possible to adaptland tenure arrangem.ents tochanging conditions, resulting, for example,from the introduction of high-value, perennial crops such as cocoa. Thereare inA n+f4^- -Jhwver, th.at la- tenure problems ae---4 4- sorigareas that will give rise to protracted litigation and have adverse effecitson agricultur,al devaelopment.

50. Land tenure proble..s are sta-at to be easier to overcome in thenorthern areas of the country. However, development of previously unused

1 _ t 1 0 loA t]ttA f E . 1 A J -S_A i A ;Ay__2>..A..t .Lla*'A sonal.y LVV e LaIL.IoJ A.JUII.U LaJILa A IJL acamusy aUr .L LT ma Lorp IInla

resulted in some chiefs asking rents equivalent to 15 per cent of the pad-Ay proAuceA. Cont-inued uncertainty cor,cerning the tel,,ms under which ac-%* L.~JI.LLL uLL L L~.k L ~ I.JI _ I.L~L L.L LIIL UIIt WINI.L Li

cess to such land can be acquired could jeopardize the further developmentof faAam.a la-.d anA restrict i..ves--«, inclarn and cultivation*JA AG'.cIUc .LO.A aiu L .~L L L. ±L VCZLIUC~LkL ±LI L;±LCLL LLLr LU LU I.LV CLLiULL.

51.The r ecen actio o' te GOvr-VEXLIMent of Ghlansa jln et in u JI.. ±L&tc LcULALL IL;L.LuIl UL LLI~ .7VLUIeL UL 5CILL LL LL.LLLK Up il

Lands Commission is a step in the right direction. Increased orientationof Ghan.a's agriculture to production for market and enlarged capital in-vestment in land and farm equipment increase the need for establishingland tenure arrangements that will facilitate rather than obstruct agri-cultural progress. We would emphasize that the Lands Commission should1ncLeluude a highly competent agricultural, economist so that due attentionwill be given to the economic as well as the legal and social aspects ofthe problems. A review of the procedures for registering land titles pro-bably merits careful attention by the Commission because of its potentialimportance in encouraging investments in iand aevelopment and productivitygains.

L. P'rocessing of A.gricultural Commodities

52. In Ghana some 85 per cent of the investment in the manufacturingsector is in agriculturally related industries. Up to 1968 NW 67 mililonhad been inrested irL food processing p:Lants, the major part of it financedby supplier credits between 1961 and 1966. However, utilization of' capac-ity in the food processing sector is only 29 per cent compared with 50 percent ifor the manutacturing sector as a whole. Tomato processing plantshave been established at Wenchi, Pwalagu, and Nswam. The Nswam plant isproducing sraall quantities of tomato juice for the local market; the other

- 19 -

two factories are not operating. Pineapple, citrus, and vegetable process-ing facilities are in operation at Nswam. Of a total of 15 rice mills im-ported from West Germany only one is functioning, but it is planned to have10 in operation on a commercial basis during the 1970/71 season.

53. There are many reasons for failure of the food processing sectorto reach a more satisfactory degree of utilization. One of these has beenthe failure to carry out sufficiently critical studies of siting and solv-ing the associated problems of the supply of raw materials.

54. Case by case evaluation of the existing processing plants is ne-cessary to assess the future prospects and to form judgments as to whichfacilities can become viable propositions. In view of the interdependenceof crop production schemes and rehabilitation of existing processing facil-ities it is important that an inter-ministry committee be formed to investi-gate each project before further investments are made.

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II. P'OLICY ISSUES AND STRATEGY FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

A.J Scarcity of Cap' tal an FrU E and E Po. .s asFactors Influencing Agricultural Strategy

55. In formulating policies for fostering the development of agri-culture in nriana lL is important to cuntiiaer Lne major iSSUetS JLII reIdLLOto longer term strategies as well as immediate objectives. Although theimmediaLte goalis of expanding domestic production in order to bring downthe level of food prices from their present excessively high level and tosave foreign exchange through import substitution are of great importance,the choice of strategy should also take account of longer term objectivesof national development. It was suggest:ed in Section I that the objectivesof agricultural policy should include the contribution that agricultural de-velopment can make to providing opportunities for productive employment ofthe country's rapidly growing labor force.

56. Although the development of the nonagricultural sectors in Ghanais more advanced tharL in most of the countries in tropical Africa, by farthe largest part of the labor force is engaged in agriculture. Out of atotal gainfully employed population of 2.56 million i1960, 1.58 millionor 62 per cent were engaged in agriculture. 1/ Secondary industry, de-fined to include manufacturing, construction, and mining, employed 373,000persons or 14.5 per cent of the labor force. The remaining 23 per cent ofthe wor king population were engaged in tertiary activities -- governmentemployment, educatiorn, transportation, c ommerce, and other services. Com-merce dominates this miscellaneous category, accounting for 15 per cent ofthe total labor force; and 87 per cent of the 371,000 persons employed incommerce were petty l:raders, a great many of them women. Thus it is clearthat a very :Large percentage of the total labor force were in "self-employ-ment" either as members of farm households, as petty traders, or as arti-sans or family workers in the small-sca:Le indigenous manufacturing sector.

57. Much of the discussion in Ghana of the employment implications ofa rapicl rate of population growth has been focused on the problems of urbanemploynment and partic:ularly the "school leaver problem." Although this man-if estation of the problem in the cities is especially visible and may be themost serious political problem in the short run, it would be a mistake toignore the consequences of rapid growth of population and labor force forthe consequences of rapid growth of population and labor force for the mil-lions of Ghanaians who live and work in rural villages. To a considerableextent the possibilities for the sort of "horizontal" expansion of foodproduction that was rmentioned earlier means that the growing population in

1/ The 62 per cent figure was probably an understatement because of what:appears to be an unduly low participation rate reported for women inthe Northern and Upper Regions which are overwhelmingly agricultural,.For male workers only, the proportion was 64 per cent.

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the villages can at least continue to eke out an existence in subsistenceagriculture. But for both economic and social reasons it seems essentialto insure that economic development makes possible gains in productivityand levels of living for the rural as well as the urban population, espe-cially given the fact that the farm population and labor force are certainto continue to increase in absolute size for several decades even on thebasis of highly optimistic projections of the growth of nonfarm output andemployment and similarly optimistic expectations about the rate at whichfamily planning will be widely adopted. Moreover, there will be a lag of15 years or so before a decline in birth-rates begins to affect the rateof increase of the country's population of working age.

58. The foregoing considerations have a number of highly importantimplications with respect to the choice of strategy for agricultural de-velopment. The key elements of economic growth in Ghana, as elsewhere,are high rates of savings and investment and a rapid rate of increase inproductivity. The country faces a formidable challenge in satisfying theresource requirements for simultaneous expansion of the agricultural andindustrial sectors. And the nature of the interdependence between agri-culture and industry is such that the achievement of self-sustainedgrowth requires rapid expansion of agricultural production and still morerapid growth of output and employment in the nonfarm sectors.

59. The most general implications with respect to agricultural strat-egy is to underscore the great importance of agricultural innovations, suchas improved seed varieties and application of fertilizer, which are comple-mentary to the existing farm resources of labor and land. Such innovationsare likely to give substantially higher returns than investment of searneresources of capital and foreign exchange in mechanical equipment thatmainly substitute for labor that has a relatively low opportunity cost. Anadditional advantage of innovations such as seed-fertilizer combinations isthat thev are hiohlv div4sihlp so that they ran he used efficiently bvsmall-scale farmers and can be adopted by large numbers of farmers eventhniouh the ahilitu nf Ghanan' aaririiltiral seprtnr tn relv nn npirrhaQed in-

puts is limited and the total commercial demand for farm products if fairlycmall relative to the numher of farm households. It is true, of course,

that the growth in the relative size of the nonfarm population dependentupon niprchianse fotod will requji4r e a n irraiie i -iotpt npr fnarm t.wnrler; butiit

initially the rate of increase in productivity that this requires will berather low. In the case of a crop such as rice for which there is cn-der-

able scope for import substitution, the rate of increase can for a time bemore rapid without any risk of saturating dom-tic markets. And for any new

agricultural export product that Ghana may be able to develop, the rate ofincrease in output can be very rapid o On as 4o t1 A tn

4 -- e-its share of the market.

60. It is certain that Ghana has the potential for achieving large in-creases in far,m ------- thrug yied=nceain inovtins buteaizncrea eo in .CL a.III JL L. ~LLLUUr

6lZ y t. LLL a 1

6.L&,t,tV at. LLO, LtAU .CCt L ±LiLLL

that potential will require much more effective and better coordinate pro-gra,s of researcll, extensiot, andu traLiLig geared to the needs of small-

scale farm units. The recent experience of other developing countries inexploiting the new production possibilities of the "Green Revolution" isperhaps the most eloquent evidence of the potential that exists. The al-legedly "trad.ition-bound farmers" of a number of Asian countries haveadopted high-yeilding varieties of rice and wheat at a rate that exceededeven the most optimistic expectations. In the case of rice, the short-stemmed, fert.ilizer-responsive varieties: developed at the InternationalRice Research institute (IRRI) did not blecome available for multiplicationon a broad scale until 1965/66, but in the following year nearly 2.5 mil-lion acres were planted to the new varieties, mostly in India and thePhilippines. (Much of the acreage in India was a direct introduction ofTaichung Native 1 from Taiwan that has since been largely replaced by IRRIvarieties and now increasingly by local selections and crosses from the in-troduced varieties.) By 1968/69, the area planted to new varieties inAsian countries had increased to 11.5 million acres, nearly a fivefold in-crease, and the number of countries with significant acreage in high-yield-ing varieties. had also increased considerably.

61. The use of chemical fertilizers in these Asian countries had be-gun to increase appreciably in the late 1950's. The availability of thenew varieties with their capacity to respond to high levels of soil fertil-ity has, however, greatly accelerated the growth of fertilizer consumption.Recent increases have been remarkable as indicated by the following compar-ison of consumption in selected countries in Asia and the Near East in1965/66 and 1.968/69 (in thousand metric tons of N, P205, and K20):

1965/66 1968/69

India 765 1,682

Indonesia 95 212

Iran 41 84

Malaysia (West) 61 79

Pakistan 149 392

Turkey 149 380

1,260 2,829

For this group of countries, the 1968/69 consumption of 2.8 million tons oEnutrients represented considerably more than a doubling in three years andfrom levels that were by no means trivia.l. In Ghana conditions are, ofcourse, very different. It would be extremely unwise, for example, to usethe country's scarce resources to develop and introduce high-yielding vari-eties of wheat, a crop that does poorly in the humid tropics. For at leastthe short- and medium-term Ghana's principal possibilities for low-cost pro-duction of rice lie in expansion of acreage and yields of rain-fed rice ra-ther than development of irrigated production which is dominant in Asia.

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But Ghana's recent experience with the ad hoc introduction of C4-63 fromthe Philippines demonstrates that the scientific breakthroughs in plantbreeding have a sizable potential for yield increases for rice grown un-der GhanaianA conditi0-ons. T4- is also clear that the -centific advancesin the development of high-yielding varieties of maize can have a greati.mpact on production in Ghana. The ma4ze bree --- the Cro Research

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Institute is already taking advantage of the important work that has beenAdone at the Tnternational Center 'or Malize and3 T.M-ea Ir..rov,en (C M71r\

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and recent research in Kenya and Nigeria and in other areas can also great-l '. failit a te th'Lie task. of selecting andL breeding hLghLy[Le5A-y LeL'Ldn g varieties

of maize suited to the important producing areas in Ghana. The composites-I J. 1 _ WJ___O :3 11 _n _:_^ ____1 _ J F L_ -L.-

X, L. aiiu J uAvC.Lic L. LWdUCn CL Lu aLlu Lt:IL b.1LCLL V il VdL 1CL.LCt Z l:t±Lt.1t:!U Uy LIIc

plant breeder at Legon have a substantial yield advantage over the localvariety that has b -eeon promoted 'b the ofiILLy OL Agriculture. There isthus little doubt that further advances can be made in a fairly short pe-riod of time in both the yield and grain characteristics of selected vari-eties, and it may be feasible in the near future to incorporate the genesof high-lysine varieties ana thus signilicantly improve the protein qualityof this important staple food crop.

62. The general propostion that Ghana should emphasize a relativelylabor-intensive, capital-saving approach in the expansion of agriculturaloutput is, of course, subject to certain qualifications. Production of aLew crops such as sugarcane requires such close coordination between pro-duction and processing that large-scale units have important advantages.Because of the scale of sucn units and tne probiems of maintaining effi-cient supervision of large numbers of farm workers these units will tendto use more capital-intensive techniques than would be warranted giventhe scarcity of capital and the relative abundance and low opportunitycost of labor. in the case of rice, it is argued that substantial ca-pital investment is justified in order to accelerate the expansion ofdomestic production to replace imported supplies. We recognize thatthere is some validity to the argument, but for reasons considered later,this is an argument that can easily be pushed too far.

63. A more fundamental consideration is the fact that Ghana has al-ready experienced considerable structural change so that the agriculturalsector is not as overwhelmingly dominant as in other countries of tropicalAfrica. Furthermore, the great importance of cocoa production and exportsmeans that the opportunity costs of farm labor tends to be higher than inother countries which do not have the possibility of producing a profit-able export crop that employs nearly a third of the total farm labor force.Hence, there is likely to be greater scope for the profitable introductionof mechanical equipment to reduce labor costs than in most other countriesof tropical Africa. On the other hand, Ghana's rate of increase of popula-tion and labor force is exceptionally high, and the country faces unusuallydifficult balance of payments problems because of its debt burden and thefact that anticipated increases in world cocoa supplies may lead to a de-cline in cocoa prices that will reduce the country's foreign exchange earn-ings from that source. Both of those considerations underscore the greatimportance of expanding farm output by means that will make maximum use of

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domestic resources. This argues for encouraging the introduction of rela-tively simple and inexpensive types of tarm equipment that ease labor bot-tlenecks rather than highly capital-intensive equipment such as largetractors and combine harvesters that drastically reduce the opportunitiesfor productive employment in agriculture.

64. The view is sometimes advanced that inasmuch as land is availablethat allows scope for expanding the cult:ivated area, there is no need to beconcerned about displacing farm labor. Some agencies have suggested thatrice cultivation in the northern regions should be expanded rapidly by usingmachine technologies similar to those employed in the U.S. It must not beoverlooked, however, that only about 5 per cent of the total labor force inthe U.S. is engaged in agricultural production so that the scope and needfor labor-saving mechanization is much greater. Such a degree of mechaniza-tion efficiently applied to a relatively few large-scale farms could fullysatisfy Ghana 's commercial requirements for maize and rice. That is, eventhough land is available the level of effective demand imposes a constrainton the rate at which income-earnings opportunities in agriculture can be ex-panded and therefore on the extent to which investment in labor-displacingequipment is profitable from society's point of view. The implications ofintroducing a highly capital-intensive technology into the agricultural sec-tor of a country with Ghana' s present economic structure are suggestedcrudely but forcefull.y by the fact that grain production in the U.S. is ap-proximately 43 tons per farm worker. At that level of mechanization and ef-ficiency, it would require less than a thousand farm workers to replaceGhana's rice imports of some 38 thousand tons; and a minute fraction of thefarm labor force coul]d satisfy the total commercial requirements of grainfor decades.

65. To the extent that potential :Lncreases in farm cash income aresatisfied by expandedl output concentrated in a small number of capital-in-tensive units, the possibilities for the great majority of farm householdsto make the transiticon from subsistence to commercial production will berestricted. Without at least a modest 'Level of cash income, farmers ob-viously cannot be expected to increase their productivity by adopting newvarieties and applyirng the chemical fer tilizers required to reap the be-nefit of higph-yieldirng, fertilizer-responsive varieties. Nor is thissimply a soc:Lal prob]Lem. To the extent that Ghana is able to expand itsfarm output by increasing the productivity of its own resources of laborand land, with only rnodest requirements for capital in the form of com-plementary inputs such as fertilizers and new varieties, there will begreater avaiLability of the scarce resources of capital and foreign ex-change required for rmore rapid expansion of output and employment in thenonfarm sectors of the economy.

66. As commercial demand increases relative to the size of the farmlabor force, there w:Lll naturally be increasing need for mechanical equip-ment. But the expanding demand for labor-saving equipment can provide avaluab[Le stimulus to the vrowth of local manufacturing if the timing andsequence of mechanical innovations is consonant with the advance in so-phistii-ation of the rountryv' metalwnrking firms whirh are still very few

- 25 -

in number and have not yet had time to reach a high level of technical pro-ficiency. TIt is also Im.portant thIat such evolutionary growth of mar.ufactur-

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ing, interacting with the development of agriculture, tends to encourage thegrow thl of small= anlU mediLum-scaUle fiIms 'Lh LataL employ relatively labor-in-tensive, capital-savings techniques. Thus a well-conceived strategy for pro-moIting agricultural developr,ient car. be expected to m,ak-e both a direct an' 'n

LJ .LLI LU L U J UV . pi1i L LULL U L p uI Le UI1m. Li Li U IL LLdU LI

direct contribution to the process of absorbing the country's rapidly grow-ling labor fLorce. LLILnU producUUUtive emiLp.LUyULtentL.

6. ILt wouLdU be unrealistic, oi course, to gugnore tL'le J'act th1at different members of the farming community will advance at different rates.VLLaaLiLULl faLIrmers:i UL tex;cpLlUllal muan1agerial abiliy hLatve alreaUy elllerged to

some extent and are establishing large-scale units. Particularly in thecase Of rice, these more progressive farmers are making erficient use ofmechanical equipment and accounting for a very significant part of the in-crease in rice production. Tne same is true or tne Ejura Farms Ltd. andthe Ghana Commercial Farm at Atebubu established with a combination of for-eign and government capital and making use of foreign managerial and tech-nical expertise. But the country's goals of economic development will bebest served if large units with strong managerial capabilities concentrateincreasingly on specialized activities such as seed production, productionof quality rice to meet the demand of sophisticated and relatively high-income urban consumers, and production of export products that requirespecial marketing skills and contacts. The expansion of large and capital-intensive units should not, however, be encouraged by government policiesthat result in underpricing of capital and overpricing of labor and thusexaggerate the profitability of investments in labor-displacing equipment.At the very least, policy should be aimed at reducing the discrepancy be-tween private and social profitability by offsetting the underpricing ofcapital and foreign exchange that exists because the existing exchange rateunderstates the scarcity value of foreign exchange to the economy. Ideal-ly, an attempt should be made to adjust the market price of labor-displacingcapital equipment so that its price more accurately reflects the opportunitycost of capital. Presumably this cotuld best be accomplished by levying im-port duties and taxes on such equipment and by measures to eliminate thesubsidy element in institutionally determined interest rates. Even more im-portant is the need for positive action to promote increases in productivityamong large numbers of Ghanaian farmers to bring about a reduction in foodprices and thus increase the relative profitability of the specialized linesof production in which large units have a real comparative advantage.

B. Problems of Implementation and Determining Priorities for GovernmentAction

68. Implementation of a strategy aimed at fostering broad increasesin the productivity and output of Ghana's farmers represents a formidableundertaking. The problems have been accentuated by past shifts in govern-ment policy, and some of the operating divisions of the Ministry of Agri-culture are still more preoccupied with the direct operation of enter-prises such as a hatchery, feed mixing, mill, and a tractor hire servicethan with the planning and implementation of programs aimed at assisting

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large numbers of individual farmers to expand their production. The em-nhasis has been either on the government carrying out commercial-tvne ac-tivities or programs "to help farmers" directly by providing heavily sub-sidized sprvires in the form of trartor rcjltivt-oin or the PetPnsivP gov-

ermnent assistance made available to farmers in settlement schemes. Thehi,h eost of nrnorams of thnt nature mpens that t-hey epnpfit- onlu r-

latively small number of favored farmers. Moreover, the demonstrationefferts nrp mininal becausees crases in ou tput that may be achieved arebeing obtained by techniques that are too costly to be generalized.

69. Fortunately, the Ministry of Agriculture has enunciated policiesfor witli1 lr.74ing from direct operations and concentrating its resources onadvisory work with farmers and on other supporting services to help farmersto help themnselves. Ti4s will reqi,4re a new- ephasis on th analy 4s and

diagnosis of the agricultural problems of different farming regions in orderto identify rest r aints to incre.ase 4oution, assessLn the possibilitiesof overcoming various restraints, determining priorities based on an assess-ment of thle prospective bUenefits relative tLo LthLe costs of alternative line.s

of action, and preparing projects or programs and insuring that they are ef-ficenly lmpler.ented.

70.IL Thee 'as in the past been an u.nfortunate tendency tooulnam/ U erIIL 115 Ii L11 pS oei diiUIIU tU1d !LlUe[i(;y LO UUL±Llnt dill

bitious objectives which are not implemented at all or only in small measure.Sh1oLLrtgs VI. persoUL1LL, tLhI f'LLULre UJ. 1.1aLc'ail. CUtLLoU.LLeLr t re.Lease fULIns

on time or in sufficient quantity, and similar reasons are often cited as thlereasons for inadequate performance, and they have certainly been contributingfactors. The more fundamental problem, however, appears to be a failure toestablish priorities and to develop programs for government action based on arealistic assessment of resources available or likely to become available.Tins ma'lure .n turn nas in large part De!en a result of tne lacK of clearlydefined policies that would provide a basis for determining priorities andworking out detailed programs consisting with tne funds and manpower avaii-able for implementation.

71. There is obviously no simple solution to these problems. It isbelievec, however, that there are four considerations that are of crucialimportance to increasing the effectiveness of the government's effortsto promote and support increased production of crops and ilvestock by thenation's farmers. The.y relate to (1) the need for a clear definition of thepolicies of the Ministry of Agriculture to guide the work or the operatingdivisions and field staff; (2) an appropriate allocation of responsibilitiesbetween the public and private sectors to enable the government to concen-trate on a manageable range of activities; (3) willingness to utilize auto-nomous or semi-autonomous agencies to handle activities that can be carriedout efficiently as separate programs; and (4) measures to increase the ef-fectiveness of government action to develop and disseminate yield-increas-ing innovations by concentrating on limited but important objectives andachieving closer coordination of research, extension, and training activi-ties.

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C. The Role of Ministry of Agriculture

72. We feel that the major responsibilities of the Ministry of Agri-culture should relate to the analysis of imnortant agricultural nroblemsand possibilities, policy formulation, planning, preparation of projects,coordination, and nroviding sunnorting services in those areas in which itis essential for the Ministry of Agriculture to assume direct responsibil-itv. Tt cannot he emohasized too stronelv that the resnonsibilftv forplanning or project preparation should also include responsibility formonitoring the imnpementatinn of nrograms and the investigation of reasonsfor shortcomings in achieving established objectives.

73. The steps that are being taken to strengthen the CoordinationUInit are a pro nrmis-inc, bainnino Tt choiild he rPcognizepd hw.ypupr thatonly a beginning has been made and further steps to strengthen the ca-pnai-ilitu rtf thait TTni anui ton define its, rnle vis-a-vis the ompe-rting di-

visions and other agencies concerned with agricultural development is amatter of 8reat importance. Seriou-s consideration should r als o be ogiven

to making it possible for the government to make more effective use ofthe knoledge and professional com.petence of me.mbers of the Faculties ofAgriculture at Legon and Kumasi. In addition to serving on specializedgroups such as the government's Livestock Cornnmitttee, consideration shouldbe given to establishing a policy advisory machinery to advise the Ministernnd Principal Secretary on specific issues of agricultural policy. TheCoordination Unit would presumably function as the Secretariat for suchmachine-.,, and it w--1A be 4.r-ta.nt to focusc Adiscussa4ns on c-arfuill

prepared position papers to avoid any tendency for the body to becomemerely a tim.e-consum.ing debating society.

74 The ro1 and fu,nctInning of the EnA Ft4-.t-4,tAcs Dl4,4.n4

also demands urgent attention. The program of work for the Division thataccompanried the 1969-70 budget estimates outlined ar. extremely demandIngagenda of activities relating to farm management studies, production statis-tics, Ad marketing 4 investigations. Good progress is being made with re-spect to the 1970 agricultural census exercise, and the Division continuesto collecta conside4A b-le body1- o Ata_ on fodA th4a...-tV Ls ibsi- I,. a- A 4.*

periodic reports on the food situation. It appears, however, that very lit-tle h*4as lbeen dUone iLn the way ofL ana'Lysi±s of t1he changJes in 'arm prices, 'orexample of changes over time in the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations, the

- 28 -

extent and changes in intermarket price spreads, or the relationship betweenthe prices of domestic and imported food. And there seems to be virtuallyno work in progress with respect to studies of the functioning of the mar-keting system or farm level studies of input-output relations, use of newpractices and purchased inputs commercial sales, on-farm storage, and otherimportant questions.

75. Those and oither studies aimed at identifying restraints to in-creased production could provide extremely valuable information go guidepolicy formulation, the development of agricultural programs, and the workthat the Coordination Unit will hopefully be undertaking in monitoring theprogress of ongoing programs. Some work of this nature is being dome atthe Faculty of AgricuLthre and the Institute of Statistical, Social, andEconomic Research at the University of Ghana, but coordination between that:work and the activities of the Ministry's Economics and Statistics Divisionseems to be limited. It must be recognized that personnel with the profes--sional training and analytical ability to plan, execute, and interpret in-vestigations of this nature are in short supply, not only in Ghana butthroughout the world. This is an especially clear example of the need forgreater realism in fixing priorities and defining a program of work consis--tent with the resources available. But owing to the importance of' economicdata and studies to the framing of agricultural policy and evaluating per-formance, serious consideration should also be given to increasing the ca-pabilities of the Division. It is believed that the Ministry would be wel:Ladvised to obtain the services of a highly qualified and experienced agri-cultural production economist to review the program of work of the Division,to assess the effectiveness with which it is being carried out, and to makerecommendations for strengthening the performance of the Division.

D. Allocation of Responsibilities Between the Public and Private Sectors

76. It has already been emphasized that one of the major reasons thatthe Ministry of Agriculture has been largely unsuccessful in its effort tosupport the efforts of individual farmers to increase their productivityand output is that a substantial part of its funds and personnel have beendevoted to direct operation of enterprises such as the livestock feed millor performing commercial-type operations such as running a tractor hireservice or distributing fertilizers. Needless to say, a strong case canbe made for the government to take the initiative in providing essentialservices whic:h private firms are unable to perform. The allocation of re-sponsibilities between the public and private sectors should be based on apragmatic viefw of the advantages and disadvantages of relying on the ini-tiative of individual farmers or firms and their response to opportunitiesand incentives versus; the need to insure that a function is performed byhaving the government undertaking direct: operation.

77. In the case of fertilizer distribution, for example, the FAO con-suiltant: who has rpreretlv r-omnleted a review of the management. record-keen-ing, and accounting aspects of the government's fertilizer distribution pro-gram found very eririous drifiripnripsz NeverthrflhP1 he has rerommpnded rp-

- 29 -

r,.edial action to improve thIle perfo UIII anCe f U LtIh pr eSeIn;L Sys LULII up-cause o0

indications that the current level of demand for fertilizers is insufficientto make distribution of fertilizers an attractive proposition for commercialfirms. There are, however, serious shortcoming in utilizing agriculturalfield staff to carry out wnat is essentially a commerciai-type operation.The extension organization lacks the incentives and operational proceduresto perform such a function efficiently, and perhaps of greater importance isthe fact that it diverts field staff from the advisory work for which theyhave been trained.

78. An important development with respect to the allocation of respon-sibility between the Ministry of Agriculture and private farmers is the de-cision to phase out the government's tractor hire operation.

79. It is increasingly recognized in Ghana that a government-operatedtractor hire service faces inherent difficulties in achieving efficient per-formance. Several former officials of the Mechanization Service have re-signed from government and have gone into the business of contract cultiva-tion and a number of farmers with tractors are doing supplementary plowingon contract. There are, however, differing views as to how the governmentshould phase out of this work, whether it should sell its crawler tractorsas well as its wheel tractors or retain the former and continue to carryout land clearing as a government service, and what steps should be takento facilitate the efficient operation of tractors by private owners.

80. A major question concerns the procedure to be followed in disposingof the large numbers of tractors in the hands of the government. One view isthat the regional depots of the Mechanization and Transport Division shouldoverhaul all of the repairable tractors in government hands, bring them up to"90 per cent new condition," and then sell them to farmers. On the otherhand, the FAO Mechanization Adviser and others have argued that the govern-ment should assemble the tractors in several locations grouped and marked as"good", "serviceable", 'unserviceable", and "scrap", and then offer them forsale after an inspection period of at least a month. The FAO Adviser pro-poses that they be sold by public tender with sealed bids to be opened pub-licly, with sales on an "as is - where is" basis. It seems to us that thelatter procedure has important advantages. The government has not been ableto keep up with repairs and servicing of the tractors during the past threeyears so that there is reason to expect that the phasing out procedure wouldbe prolonged unduly if it were necessary to overhaul tractors before offer-ing them for sale. Tractor spare parts were put on Open General License sixmonths ago so that private repair shops would probably have less difficultyobtaining required spares than the government with its cumbersome procedurefor placing orders for imports. In order to increase the capability of theprivate sector to handle tractor repairs, the FAO Adviser has proposed thatthe government provide loans to qualified persons interested in setting up"village workshops" (he suggests ten a year over a five-year period) to pro-vide maintenance services and carry out related activities, and it is recom-mended in Section III that serious consideration be given to such a project.

- 30 -

81. We believe that there is considerable merit in enabling privateowners to get as much use out of the existing stock of tractors as nossible.Sale to the highest bidder will tend to maximize the economic return to thecountrv whereas an attemDt at limiting sales to "bona fide farmers" wouldbe difficult to administer, and would invite abuse. It should be recognizedthat the aovernment nrobablv will not receive verv attractive nrices for thetractors, but at least the losses that the heavily subsidized tractor hireservice is now inruirring will be reducpd or even eliminated. And sale ofthese tractors would assist private operators prepare to set up tractor hireservicesr Tt would also increase the incentive to so since it would elimi.-nate competition from the government units operating at subsidized rates.

82. A recent development affecting the allocation of responsibilitybetween the public and private sectors I-s the establIshmnnt, on an emergencybasis, of a National Task Force for foocd distribution in March 1970. Thisact-Ion was takilen n -n 4 II t-inn ,ti th thD ovi t-inn nf 1avt nn IF fnnZ i tOm

to the Open General License list, to overcome the recurrent dislocation inthe supply of foods to urbaman ma t n order to Imrove that fl-w, theGovernment has begun to purchase, collect, transport and deliver food toG-hana's ma4n populati4 n centers . In reviewing this action, there were notyet any evidence available of its effects. It appears to be related, his-to.icall, , ao aope 4ritent nns4nment t., *h 0- 4et4- -nmn-lrn4-n -A A4o.-

-a U - U- *---1o- ti.r - - ketin an --- =e

tribution arrangements are not effective. In this instance, moreover, thegovern-ment ac,tedon *1h e assunit-4 nn tha--t tea si tuain wa s4uff icie-tI

critical to warrant special priority-type measures since food prices hadbeen v.e7 5high after the rains and A 1iLS in the srin of 1946. la J esituation apparently was complicated by the unexpected departure of manyaliens wh.o were cent;ral in the transport- of -cood.1

83. ~The Task, Forc is no ntended t replace th a ke i g sy t rtit A 0. P 11)2 t14 AC -1116 AU*CtI C L- U IA&= OL.11C IiLfl. -LAr 19 y0 L.JL

but rather assist in making the system more effective. In its 1970/71budget statement, th;_ Governe.unt announced its plan t-o estab.1i.sh a modern.-ized food distribution system. This would be desirable depending on themans chosen. judgm...nts var; aubout th.e effectiveness of Ghtiana' a 0at -

marketing system but there is no dispute that the costs associated withso..e aspect-s ofL food di strib,uti 4on4in Ghan are- - _1 high T, evidenceiscer

014551 00p1t-L 11 214114 UA Li AL) 6L L AL '3 101,0 CIO. 9Ir1A6L. J.1L 1_ VA LU141 L4 k..LC.1L

moreover, that significant problems relate to the need to expand foodproAucti1on and t-o i.mprove the roadI ne-.ork ar.d upgrale the quali ty ofprOL_ULLA OLU L. ALIL9 vo-LLL iu L-W1L 0511 A u1 L.LI1 jUA Ly 42

motor vehicles available for transporting food supplies. In effecting theneeAeA 4in,.rovem.ents, it would be advisable to proceed on the recogniLtion11411441 AILL iU1L.4O AL L.WUUU 51 U .U .14LU p- LU11u LLI4LCULL.LI

that market mechanisms through which individual producers and traderscoordinate their aactivity by responding-LUA1L4 Lto miLLarS1-Let-Ut-L-L-i±-1d price signals

usually are very efficient means of allocating and distributing scarce re-sources. 'Lt. is also a comImIIIIon practiCCe LU pUoLnt LU LLLt 4A±l5Lt!LlCe or largt

numbers of small-scale participants in the marketing process as evidence ofinefficiency Uecaue UL LoLf LtteUncCy to exaggeraLt the importance oi econo-mies of scale and to consider technical rather than economic efficiency.However, these participants would not continue their services if those whouse the intermediaries did not find their services of value. Given theserious problems of labor absorption in Gnana, it wouid be advantageousfor substantial numbers of Ghanaians to find employment opportunities in

- 31 -

trading activity. Here is another opportunity for the government's agric-ultural program to reduce its costs and need for scarce managerial talentby greater reliance on commercial channels.

E. The Role of Autonomous or Semi-Autonomous Agencies

84. Under suitable circumstances autonomous or semi-autonomous agen-cies such aS the Ghana Tobacco Comnanv. the Cotton Develonment Board- orthe Ghana Rubber Estates can be effective instruments for carrying out cer-tain activities. This is especially likelv to be true of commodity-orientedprograms where the problems that arise because of the relationships betweenenternri qpq at the farm level nre Iess imnortAnt than the gainq that rian he

realized by utilizing a specialized organization. The first advantage isthat such arrangements eane the adminisQtrative burden nf the Ministry annd

enable it to perform essential functions more effectively. In addition, itic -ften nrcmih 1 n9A,asumpnt the 1nr-al raenuiri-eg nf mansaeoPv-al andl toehnit(-al

competence by drawing on experts from abroad. The role of the CFDT 1/ teamttached to the Gnttnn Theelnpment Bnard and being financed by French bilat-

eral aid is an example of such an arrangement. CFDT teams have made veryi rvtan.t con1trhibutio4.ns 4in an unimh r nf franni-rnhone cou-nint ries qnd the fnour-

man team in Ghana seems to have made a promising start in helping to launchthp rn trnr i -orstton nrnornm

F. Policies for Increasl nc the Effec-tiYeness of Agriciltfuiral Pesearchand Extension

85. The earlier discussion of the choice of strategy for agricultureemphasizes the Importan.ce of increasing the effectiveness of research andextension activities to raise the productivity and output of large numbersof G-hanalainn farmers. These considerations also offer certain guide linesfor fixing priorities and for choosing an approach that can be expected toyield the greatest returns.

86. Although the longer-term. goal is to activate the entire ruralpopulation so that they become active participants in a process of tech-nical ar.d e onomic change, the magnitude of S1 L the task and the limited re=.sources available impose limits on the accomplishments that are availablefrom year to year. Thus priority Must be given initially to programs thatfocus on commodities for which increase in production is of great economicimportance and which offer particular pro-ise for achieving gains in pro-ductivity. Among Ghana's food crops, maize and rice are prime examples.A'ilong livestock products, Ueef production -was idLUent[Lrie L b uy the L ve� LLstocSCommittee and the Nathan Group's livestock specialists as meriting specialattentiLon. AdIU thle Densu IlrriLgatiLonr roject nLear Accra, wh ich i's anotherproject suggested for priority consideration (Section III), promises largereturns largely because it can make an importaft contribution to satisfy-ing the growing demand for vegetables in Accra and other urban centers in

- 32 -

the south. Likewise, in order to concentrate limited resources so as toachieve a real impact at the farm level, it is necessary to focus initial-ly on areas where the greatest returns can be achieved. But weight shouldalso be given to prolzrams such as the cotton program that offer benefitsto farm groups that have been relatively neglected in the past.

87. A major factor determining the prospects for achieving rapid in--creases in productivity and output is the availability of technical know-ledge within the country or in other parts of the world that can be success-fully applied under the conditions that exist in Ghana. It has been sue-gested that one of the most promising areas of concentrated effort lies inexnloiting the imnortant hreakthrntiohR that have heen made in nlant hrepedineytechniques and in the availability of maize and rice varieties that are al-ready sunerior and which can he further improved within a relatively shortperiod of time. It was also noted that since this is really a "seed-fertil-izer revolutionn" the terhnical advances that have sbihstantiallv reduced thereal cost of fertilizers enhance the attractiveness of efforts in that di-rectionn The Annex on livestork prepared for the Nathan Sector Study sug-gests that analogous opportunities exist for increasing productivity in beefproduction under Ghanaian conditionsl and the following nassage from thatreport provides a concise statement of the application of this approach toidentifying and planning Iivetockt- imrovemnt nro4ects:

There 4 c aia4b1leh a co-nsc ideraehI hbrod of techIIni1al

klowledge both in Ghana and from other parts of the worldthat will help overcome some of the restraints to cattleraising and thus help to assure a beef supply and reducethe foreign exchange drain. Such information will helpdetermine the technical feasibility of production progressan.d heelp Casseess econom'ic Me.sblt.uuch of 4the techni4-cal information can be adapted straight away to conditions.inL GJIaIna anLdU nee d LnLo b . .D e- Vrdc L I=U or t Ii-le basic researchLI

repeated. In some cases only the applicability under com-m.ercial conditior,s needs to bDe veriffied .

E.xam.;,les are th le basic nutrLi tLional require.m.en ts o fc,attle at various ages; many husbandry techniques; thegrowthl, yeldU andU LU.LLuraL chilaracteriLstL iLcs of variLousgrasses, Legumes and forage crops; breeding and selectionprugraIlr , and t heir problemns. M'Iu;chl of this can b1 e oft di-rect application. The success of application will dependupon the level of manage,,,ent attained and the degree towhich a balanced approach can be obtained, i.e. all limit-ing factors treated as a group.

88. The Mission gave particular attention to tne possibility oflaunching integrated crop improvement programs for maize and rice becauseof the contribution that increased output of those cereals could make inreducing the excessively high level of food prices and permitting a reduc-tion in foreign exchange outlays that would clearly be economic. Expanded

- 33 -

production of maize and lower prices would also lead to increased produc-tion and lower prises of noutltrv and nig meatj and a reaIly successful1maize improvement program would even enable Ghana to export maize as afeed orain.

89. The two fund .mentml requirem.ents for implementing sucrcessful cropimprovement programs for maize and rice will he the adoption of an effi-cient team approach to research that Till be production-oriented and themounting of intensified extension campaigns in selected areas to promoterapied and widepneand adopntion of the~ ne.w unriat-ioc and asscz-iated p-ract-irces

An important advantage of the high-yielding varieties and an associated"package"~f tht4ncliAes tOe applica3tion o%f fertilizers -;,d chage iaro-

nomic practices such as closer spacing, is that the increases in yield arelarge enough to be visIble to farmers. Once such a crop Improvement hasbeen successfully launched, it tends to spread rapidlv as farmers respondto the dem.onstration effect of high yields obtained by techniques that theyare capable of adopting.

90. Particularly during the critical initial stages, a well-designedextension effort thb.at *s clJosel.y coordinated withLLLU the1 t research. progrjam isof critical importance. Experience seems to have demonstrated that agri-cultural- r extension programs operating under the difficult conditions that

prevail in developing countries can only be effective if they concentrateon clear-cut, 14nM.-ed ob4ect4ves that are k--nv. t- be prof4ta-u1e anA fe-

sible of adoption under the local conditions. The fact that such programsms §1w s A l A1 e ) w ~s _14 J 4 AS 4: 4 1 2 @_;A_4 A_

inuA st- mI,akeL use V-JL of oly par tl.y quCa E C .* Xu L aff emp1hasize sLljJL*C.OCC L *tCnU f oL

special short-course training of field workers for specific extension pro-grams andl the preparation of f uIl.ly worLkleU outJL routines for setting up ude

monstrations on farmers' fields, for conducting farmer meetings, and otherac tivi4LtiLe s.TIt is, of course, --prtn to r,ake ample provlsion for -xe-aL L.LV ~ * .1. A L UV 1. L ULb- 9 LAILPUL L..ILLL LU LICN CIILPLpt-- j9L%IV .L0_LLL LUL C.&LCLL

sion materials and to place considerable emphasis on group contacts.

91. The greatest need in order for Ghana to match the achievements ofother developing Countries thLL at hILave undertaken success'LuL Crop iLLL-prUvte2mU-nt

programs is to coordinate the present fragmented activities into an inte-grated program,l relating to:

(1) Research aimed at the introduction, yield testing, andselection of the best varieties of rice and maize foreach of the major areas of commercial production.

(2) Determination of an efficient package program covering therecommended variety, fertilizer recommendations, spacing,plant protection (if economic), and a few other modifica-tions in cultural practices that are of key importance toobtaining high yields at minimum cost.

- 34 -

(3) Action to insure the availability at the village level ofimproved seed, fertilizers, and other inputs included inthe package program.

(4) Carrying out short-course training programs for extensionstaff to be resnonsible for nromoting the cron imnrovementprograms in selected project areas.

(5) In the case of rice, appropriate steps to introduce improvednractices with resenct to threshing; cleaning, milling; grad-ing, and handling to increase consumer acceptance so that lo-rl rirce ran renlare imnorted. rice as ranidlv as nossible andwith a minimum price discount.

92. There will be special difficulties in achieving the coordinationreniuirpd fnr effertive, intperntpd imnnuvemant nrnorams fnr rirc and mavnz7in Ghana because the organizational structure and past experience in thecoulntiry are not conducive to close and effective working re 1lat-io%nQhips be'-tween research workers and extension st:aff. If the GOG is determined toachieve the sort of progress that is possible, to supplement its own pivo-tal decisions, it will be well advised to enlist the assistance of indivi-duals and organizations that have had experience in developingnsnd imple-menting successful crop improvement programs.

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III. AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS AND EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

93. The long-term nature of agricultural developm.ent necessitatesthe preparation of an adequate planning document and the provision of alist of potential pro4ects far f invstment c-ver4ng a priod4A f at l-eat

five years. It will be impossible for the GOG to effectively allocatesarceQ resouACrce ofF c.pia 4- nnA mrned Powear.,ar ta t-hon are- p- ne-

4_

ects that will produce the maximum returns to the economy unless a satis-factory pluan 4s evolved at an early date.9A. The following discusslon o possible proJects is an attempt to

J?1 *T .L L .L .LL.ALL L. ~ J.t.JL i. .11).L~ J J LL L L t ~U)I.identify those programs that demand immediate attention and others thatmerit considleration in preprin a devlopen plnfo heariculturalLUCI. LL L.t L -LUL a-L.UL .Ln p Lt-PLL p J. .I L a U =VtJAJJ9L VPL L L L jPJ. L L L LU I.LLAM .Lr L A. L. L.

sector. It is important that due consideration be given to all the cri-t-eriLa LILIC tha 0 I-tsho ul b' LI e aple i 1n evaluating- iniida -rorA or .. J Jt-I

LCI. J.~ ila I. ~LUU.LU U aJpL L tU A.L CVaLUdLLiLL6 ±LLLU±LViUUt.L PLUV6J.aUU0L VA JLVJ CL LZ~.

The rate of return or cost/benefit ratio for the project is the main con-cern, but account should also be taken of thLe needU to mlxImize thLe contrib-

ution of agricultural projects to the achievement of national goals foreconomLc UdeveLopment. ' [LLLs means tLat i evaluatng proJects iLt will usu-ally be necessary to consider both the market prices that will determineth'Lle financial viability of projects anu adUJusteU or sladuw prices that

reflect the opportunity cost of resources to the economy. In particular,the present acute balance ofL paymlents probllerus, wllich will contiLLnue to be

difficult until the export capacity of the economy has been substantiallystrengthened, means that a high shadow price should De usea in evaluatingthe foreign exchange costs and earnings associated with various projects.Similarly, the cost of farm labor inputs should be estimated on the basisof the opportunity cost of unskilled labor to the economy rather than theofficial minimum wage rate that is clearly much higher than the social op-portunity cost of farm labor inputs. In fact, as emphasized earlier, theproblems that Ghana faces in absorbing a rapidly growing labor force intoproductive employment are so serious that the approach to agricultural de-velopment should emphasize expanding employment opportunities in rural areasexcept in those few cases where economies of scale or other special circum-stances necessitate a more capital-intensive approacn.

95. Particular attention is given to projects that seem iiiely to at-tract external assistance. The GOD may, of course, prefer to finance someof these programs from its own resources in order to avoid adding to itsfuture foreign exchange requirements for debt servicing. But the failureto take prompt action with respect to some of these projects, taking intoaccount the cost of potential savings or additional foreign exchange earn-ings that are being sacrificed, entails such a high cost to the economythat the government can ill afford not to secure external assistance wherethis is needed to achieve rapid increases in production.

96. Sugar and palm oil production are prime examples of ongoing proj-ects where there is a need for prompt action to reduce the high cost to theeconomy of continuing the present ineffective policies. Both the sugar and

- 36 -

industrial oil palm projects should be given priority of attention in 1970/72 by the agencies involved in their operation. Solutions must be found tobring an end Ito these flagrant examples of failure to exploit opportuni-ties for import substitution. The fact that the Komenda and Asutsuarefactories are operating at only about 10 per cent of capacity results inan annual foreign exchange requirement of close to NO 4 million for thatpart of the imports of sugar that could be replaced by sugar produced inthe existing plants. Development of these two projects would also createjobs for over 3,000 full-time employees, together with seasonal employmentfor additional workers and income-earning opportunities for substantialnumbers of outgrowers. Moreover, the prospects of attracting financialand technical assistance for overcoming the present management problems inorder to reach capacilty output are very good.

97. Further project possibilities leading to the development of theagricultural sector do exist and could attract external assistance. Itwould be necessary for the government to start to assemble the necessarydata so as to faeilitate the nrenaration of feasibility studies whichwould indicate economically viable projects. With the exception of thetwo above mentioned nroneits a11 nrograms are oriented toward smallholderproduction so as to ensure maximum diffusion of benefits to rural areas.

A. Sugar Project

98. The Asutsuare and Komenda sugar factories have failed to makereasonable progress on reaching their com1inaA cnapaitu nf 3i5 nnn tnns.In view of the large capital investment that has been made in these plants(NM- 2 millictn) a.nd the f-avrable cane gr-ing conrditions that exist, astrenuous effort should be made to rehabilitate these projects as soon asnnee4l.l

Ga. According tothe-IY.OCTur Sugar ProAucts Divii,,4.,4 producio of

sugar at the two factories has been as follows:

Ghana -- Production of Sugar 1966-70 (tons)

Asutsuare Komenda

1966 652 --

1967 942 1,864

1968/69 312 3,590

1969/70 up to 4/24/7(O 900 (2,500)-/ 2,600 (5,000)-/

a/ Grinding season due to end May 10th.b/ Figures in parentheses are the targets that were set for 1969/70.

- 37 -

100. As little as 14,000 acres of well-grown cane would be sufficientto enable both factories to operate at capacity and produce 50 per cent ofthe country's expected consumption of sugar in 1975. The present divisionof responsibility between the existing Management Group, GIHOC, the Minis-try of Trade, Industry and Tourism, the Ministry of Agriculture, and theMinistry of Finance and Economic Planning seems clearly to be an unwork-able arrangement. Moreover, there is probably need for a stronger con-tingent of sugar specialists to handle the agricultural, logistic and manu-facturing problems that need to be overcome. The present management, forexample, seems to have virtually no staff available to carry out extensionwork with outgrowers who account for a large part of the cane handled bythe two factories. It is. therefore. not surDrising that these Drivatefarmers do not use fertilizers. Sugarcane is a crop which gives a goodyield response to fertilizers, and present vields nrobablv cannot be main-tained unless farmers begin to use fertilizers in the near future.

101. A survey into the human, organizational, and accountancy problemsat Asututiarp has hben institiltud by rT7H-nC and this could form the basiqfor preparing an up-to-date feasibility study. It seems clear that todpal with the problelnms that miict hp overcomp to reach rnaritv nrodurtion,it will be necessary to create an independent, well-managed sugar company.It seems to us that on romnlption of thep nresen t st-udv the GnoG shouiild in-vite proposals from several companies, including the present managingagpncv, and rhoosQ the most attrrtivp nronosal, aiuing ronsider2b1e weiaght

to the performance incentive included in the various proposals.

B. Oil Palm Projects

102. The Pretsea/Benso industrial oil palm project managed by theState Farms.. Corporation would benefit from a more conup.erclally-orlentedmanagement and expansion of the existing planted area by 6,000 acres inan area to th~e north- wh.ere there i-s a more suitable ra-infall! regim.e. Itis believed that a well-run, commercially organized agency could attractthIe addlt.i4onal capital fapproximatelly N¢ 4 m..illion) required for expansionand improvement and produce oil and kernels at rates comparable to worldprices. At the present ti6.e prce are -so.4- three ti.e tewoldAr

jJL.A.CO fU ~LtiL C~t time prices are ~ VLILLC ~JLi CCULILC Ii ~W-J itttt t

price. Preliminary arrangements for acquiring and laying out the 6,000acre extension c-ould be ____1lte - by. 19)71/-72 whic should allwlaninaLl.C Ci Li1~±I.LL LJU LU UC %LLU~L=LF . UL LU jy £ ' I.L/ 1 L WLI± Lii OtLIVUU.ti a...AiW P£aLLL.ALLi

to commence in 1972/73 and be finished by 1976.

103. A smallholder palm oil production scheme and a program to en-courage the cultivation of groundnuts in the Northern, Upper, and VoltaRegions could also make an important contribution to overcoming the short-age of vegetable oils for local consumption and the provision of a raw ma-terial for soap and margarine production. Increased production of coconutsand copra in the coastal areas would aid import substitution and perhapslead to exports.

104. The Smallholder Palm Oil Production Scheme would incluce creditson subsidies for planting blocks of improved high-yielding palms totalling10,000 acres over a ten-year period commerncing 1970/71. The probable cost

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of such a program should not exceed NO 3 million and could result in theproduction of an additional 8,000 tons of palm oil to supplement that pro-duced on the commercial estates. Credit for small-scale processing units(probably Stork hydraulic presses) would be necessary to ensure exploita-tion of existing palms and those to be planted under the program. As seedsupplies are available and processing techniques fully understood, thescheme could start in 1971/72 as soon as a feasibility study establishesthat the project is economically viable.

C. Other Vegetable Oil Projects

105. A Smallholder Groundnut Program could aim at covering 20,000acres by the end of a five-year development period. The program whichshould begin in 1971,/72 would involve the production and supply of highyielding seeds, agronomic improvements, fertilizers, pesticides and cred-its for bullock-drawn equipment and improvements in marketing procedures.This program would have an important part to play in increasing cash in-comes of the rural nonulation in the northern areas of the countrv. Thereis also the possibility of including a limited program for groundnuts suil:-able for the confentionary trade= The groundnut program would involve in--vestments in training, demonstration, and extension services, together wit:hrpeonditioning of the groundnut nrocessing facilities that already exist.

Expenditure for a five-year program should not exceed NO 2 million, butthis would dpennd tn a great extent on hnw well the program c-uld he in-tegrated with other crop improvement schemes operating in the same regions.This program uiild atart in 1971/72 anA maTe an 4mmediate imnnpc on the

supply of vegetable oils in the country.

106. A Smallholder Coconut Rehabilitation and Planting Program alsomerIts attention. At present the existing coconut palms along the coastalstrip are old, diseased, and badly maintained and planted. Yields are verylow, arou.dA 600 -- Ands of copr-a pr ac e.W4th imroved hybrid palms plart

on the lines worked out by IRHO 1/ in the Ivory Coast, production could beincreased to over 1,4000 pounds of copra per acre. It is estimated thatan additional 7,000 tons of copra would be required to cope with local de-.and ir 1980( A - -a-llh -r -ro-ra- a-Lmed at the plantir.g of 20,000 acresover El ten-year period would provide sufficient copra for local needs andperhaps smal.1 quanr.4t-4

-a f-r -xort Tha Ministry of Agricltu,re and the

Crop Research Institute, together with external assistance, should preparet-e 4 .& i -v j- r _w .4 1eCi o s t- a 7- 4 " .07 /7 A.. e 4 -4 0- 4-1 e-A; , w 4 A A - -A., b.UtO f JJ S. I_. LU C LCA. L A^-nl I ~ j t J 0, U! -. .3 5 WV -- I - ' US - S U%XAJ.r L-

tion should be taken in 1970/71. The program envisaged would include anad'nVi 'Lsory se,rvice for ex-ist in.g pa'JLU gro-wers, grants or credUits for replant=ing, fertilizer application, disease surveys, reconditioning the Esiama cil

.11i2 ~ _ at JL - IC. 1 .. f1..t. -*._ Am'l.l, esablihn rrre facLl;e w:;hpic -sments as suggested inest LL~.L±I±L L MLLCLK L LLi±±L±b W.LLLI PLLt- iUJUjLUILL &_4 Li

the Nathan Sector Study. The cost would be in the neighborhood of NO 5mijlion ove-r the teen-year period.

i/ Institut de Recherches pour !es Huiles et Oleagineux.

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D. Grain Production Programs

107. The demand for cereals in Ghana is expected to rise by over 400,000tons during the next decade. with a oronounced shift in emnhasis to rice withcontinued urbanization and a rise in standards of living. The high leveland marked seasonal fluctuations in nrice8 of n_reals indicate serious hot-tlenecks in production, storage, processing and marketing. Techniques forgrowina the maior cereals have not been imnroved at the farmern' level toany great extent, so production tends to lag behind demand, necessitatingincreasing imnorts of wheat and rfce to fill the ganp A further factor

which will influence prices and supply of maize for human consumption isthe ranidly grnwino, nnpoltry ineiuicttrv whierh will requiire in^reasing nmminte

(up to 30,000 tons) of low-cost grain for poultry feed. Limited quantitiesnf mqi ze rani Guinea corn, twill -also he reqni4red fnr mnniuifactuire of Pito tffhe

local beer.

E. Agricultural Credit Program

108. External assistance to the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB)to enable it to increase its lending from. 1071!/72 onr.wrAa a s- to f4nance

imports of certain types of harvesting and processing equipment that couldmake a quick and sign4 f4cart- cotibtAoA tea dp idti4on of riv4

and palm oil. It would probably also be desirable to enable the ADB tomake loans to finance storage facilities for grain in rural areas as recom-mended by the Nathan Sector Study. An important advantage of ADB action4k L . .4 41A tat . A 4 n enco ura e pa _AS O _ e e _ 1- -4 -- a a o. - - -..- a -A _th-* -O*| ; i oWs t_e1d s-_w Cth Z; S*b -. 7 F - -F- - -L V

investing their own capital and who will therefore have strong incentivesto acLhieve efficiency ar.d m.inim.ize costs since they cannot rely on govern-ment subsidies to cover operating losses. (According to a recent studycarried out for thLe LMiLn isty s otfry0 Agriculture by two Ghanaian selimilling costs at the government-owned rice mill at Tamale are very highan"d the operationAdoes no- even co-ver variable costs 4n spite ofa- eta

ordinarily large processing margin.)

109. A major factor limiting the success of effort to expand localriLce prodLuct'ion to substitute fUor iLmptULLU supplieL.s iL teLI n aLL1eU=qUaLy of

present techniques for threshing, handling, and milling the crop. Thevery small pri-vate rice mills are old and those irn the north mill par-boiled rice that is apparently not very competitive with the imported ricethat currently satisfies most of the urban demand in the south. Moreover,the capacity of the small private mills and the government-owned mill atTamale is insufficient to handle the consisderable increase in productionthat should begin to make itself felt with the 1970 harvest. The millingand marketing problems arymade more difficult because the traditionalpractice of threshing the paddy by beating with sticks on a dirt floorresults in a considerable mixing of the rice with foreign matter, andthere is no grading of paddy by size or type to facilitate milling. Themilled product therefore contains a high percentage of brokens and con-siderable foreign matter that makes it unattractive to consumers. Intro-duction of combine harvesters is being advocated as an answer to harvesting

- 40 --

and threshing bottlenecks on the large ifarms, but experience in the majorrice growing areas of Asia makes it clear that satisfactory technologiesare available that are much less costly in terms of capital and foreignexchange. Because of the limited Ghana:Lan experience with commercial ricemilling and marketing, it would probably be desirable for this project tomake provision for the assignment to ADB of one or two engineers with ex-tensive knowLedge of suitable threshing and milling equipment to providetechnical assistance to Ghanaian entrepreneurs with respect to the choiceof equipment and operating procedures.

110. There is a:Lso a need for prompt action to assist Ghanaian entre-preneurs to expand facilities for processing palm fruit in areas wherehigh-yLelding oil pa:Lms are coming into bearing. If production of palmoil in such areas depends entirely on traditional techniques, processingbottlenecks will almost certainly discourage expanded production. Thereis need for a survey of the location of increased plantings of oil palmsas a basis for assessing requirements for additional processing capacity.It is believed. however, that the need is for relatively small-scale andinexpensive equipment which nevertheless has considerably greater capacityand efficiencv than traditional methods. (The Stork hydraulic hand press,.for example, has an extraction efficiency of 86 per cent compared to aboul:55 ner cent with the traditional method and a canacitv of 68 cwts. of fru:Ltper eight-hour day against 1 to 2 cwts. per day with traditional techniques.)

111. It is believed that the ADB should also give serious considerationto the nrpnaratinn of a loan program tn erncorage the rreatinn of "vi11age

workshops" as recommended by the FAO Mechanization Adviser. These would beestnhlishped in areas where farmerQ hae acniiuirpe rnnsidprablp ni_mhbrc oftractors, including the tractors being sold to farmers by the government.The wnrkschon wonldr nrovrIdP mAinteannet searuvlrpq ctnrk nnd nrtidr snarp

parts, and perform the functions of a village mechanic/blacksmith but withthe rAnprirt' to rarry out progressively more di ffiruilt reanirs and mnu-

facture as their technical competence increased. They could also act asagents for t:he nnlp of new equipment; it il rpnnrted that equipment mani-

facturers have expressed interest in providing credits, advice, and train-ina tro naallct cv"eh n pnrnor-m-

112. In order to increaas the siupply of mait it is saggested that aMaize Improvement Program be instituted in 1971/72 to cover an initial areaof L0,000 acres. It: would probably be advisable to concentrate this pro-

gram i.n the southern regions in the first instance. The package would in-clude provisEIon of 4.mproved seed and fertllizers, de.onstration of betteragronomic practices, and credits for storage facilities as discussed above.It should be. possible to increase yiel:is from approximatel- 800 to close

to 2,000 pounds per acre. The program should aim to cover by 1976 a totalof 170, 000 acres by the end of the five-year development- period. It isbelieved that a weLl-designed and competently executed program linked withprice stablizatlon. pli_ies4 ouIAd have a .4aj 4mi.pat and for.m the basis

for improving the effectiveness of the present agricultural extension serv-iLces. It woJuld b e possible to linkL te progrLa. with fertli4zer anA pest4-

- 41 -

cide distribution for yams and other food crops once the maize scheme iswell underway. This program would cost approximately No 2 million whichwould include NO 0.6 million for foreign exchange requirements.

113. In spite of the reservations expressed elsewhere on mechanizationschemes, tractors are important in facilitating the expansion of rice pro-duction. Large areas of seasonally flooded land (fadamas) in the Northernand Upper Regions which are suitable for rice production can only be croppedsuccessfully if tractors are available to cope with the operations neededto prepare seedbeds in a short period of time. Recent developments in theNorthern and Upper Regions suggest that a program could begin in 1971 andcover up to 30,000 acres of paddy annually would be a profitable proposi-tion provided improved varieties and fertilizers are used together withsuitable agronomic techniques. A program for developing the large areasof fadama land in the northern areas should be studied in detail so as toexploit natural advantages for mechanized farming and maximize returns onscarce foreign exchange resources. As discussed in the proposal for anAgricultural Credit Program, technical assistance should be provided forthe introduction of efficient but low-cost technologies for harvestingand processing the expanded output.

F. Fiber Crop Production

114. It is estimated that Ghana will require annual imports of over90,000 bales of cotton lint by 1980 if local production of cotton is notdeveloped satisfactorily. Although there are social, technical, and cul-tural problems preventing the rapid increase in the area of cotton culti-vated, the success achieved during the past ten years in neighboringcountries with similar conditions indicate that cotton cultivation ispossible provided expert assistance is obtained and the advice is followed.A cotton development project along the lines suggested by CFDT, 1/ to coverup to 50,000 acres, would have an important effect on the standard of liv-ing of the inhabitants of the Northern and Upper Regions. There is anurgent need to design, with external assistance, a program to reach over30,000 farm families. The scheme should cover a ten-year period commencingin 1971/72 and the estimated cost would be NO 6 million of which NO 3million would be the foreign exchange requirements. External assistancewill be needed to set up a small cotton research team to adapt techniquesand knowledge developed elsewhere in Africa to Ghanaian conditions, andto provide research support for the Cotton Development Board. It is be-lieved that the most effective arrangement would be a long-term contractwith an organization such as the Cotton Research Corporation or I.R.C.T. 2/that has a permanent cadre of cotton specialists and which can make use ofthe work of their research teams in other African countries. There wouldseem to be a good prospect that such an arrangement could be supported bybilateral aid.

1/ Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles.

2/ Institut de Recherches du Coton et des Textiles exotiques.

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115. The search for effective jute substitutes, Kenaf, Urena Lobata,to supply the Kumasi bag factory is the responsibility of the Bast FibresDevelopment Board, and a German technical assistance team with experiencein other West: African. countries is at present investigating the possibili-ties. It is too early to say whether or not Kenaf cultivation is an eco-nomic pronosition in G.hana; hbt should this be dPmonstratPd further ex-ternal assist:ance to develop the crop would be required.

G. I_rigation Proje!cts

116. With the exception of two existing dams, at Densu near Accra:qn. the Vea I)nm In theo TUnner ReagIon the-re csaems tn hb avery little Iuseti-fication in proceeding with additional irrigation schemes except on anexperimental basis. The Mission is in agreement with the conclusion reachedby the Nathani Sector Study that for some years the needed increases inagr'icultural producti.on cn be obtained by much more economi c al methods

117- Tnrioi. Tr-v4rynt;nn P -n4artf T 4ae ;c "o-r^no,oA noQamti4c s1-nQ

117. De--Ir.*atioProi r-proposed as a multIple urposeproject, but irrigation need not defray any part of the cost of the dam be-cause the new,A dm is required for Twatar sul pur-pos with or wi4 thot,. 4 r-

rigation. The dam, :Located about eight miles west of Accra, has served aso -ourca of potabl wa tar foz many years. Wi4thr anrapproiatly A,so4gnnA

dam, about 3,500 acres of good land could be irrigated. The topographyis f-or,1 F- 4-rat+-4 on a.d ra-inage, and a min4mu... o clearin and

fI Jt .I5 55..I.f O*lr~LOA*Il , fLl U.LALlA* -A. -1..aL.f. 4 flfanA

leveling would be required. The Nathan Group has estimated the internalrate o:E return on th;e project at 47 per cent and the benefit/cost ratioat 4.0 (with a discount rate of 8 per cent). The total capital investment:4s est i mated at N¢2 2,445,200. Alt-ougl in general 4rrigat-on is a high

00 u5rn~0 ~ ~ - " " . ML V LIZ'J L~L L. JOI L .a± L. . L.J15 A.L I 1.A. Ls

cost means of expanding agricultural production in Ghana, special circum-stance.s, inc_ludir.g tb, - osblt of -usata -p JJ1-_roluction oftr,aos~ , i.Lnl±uJ.ing L;LL= PV 5JUJ.JL.LL.y VA. .UU LML0L&L.AkL.L IJuUI..L.LL LI L.VJI.2U =*oe ,

onions, and other high value vegetable crops near Accra and other urbancenters, maknes this proJecL an except'on dUeserving urtiler Udeta'LedU study..

TH. Fruitad--vbe eeore. at "ea DamL~* £L _OL I" U t _CL.t UJCVC.UPLL1__ e V5 LiJk

118. It is proposed that a detailed study of the Vea Project be madebefore incurring further expenditure and that the assistance and adviceof the Taiwanese Governmerit be requested to organize thfe extension anademonstration services for this project.. A development unit to look afterthre V:ea Darn area snou±a De createu ana a Live-year development plan pre-pared. Unless the necessary technical, social, and economic studies arecompleted, a continuation of the present project, wnich has given insuffri-cient attention to the wishes and interests of the local population, canonly l.ead to further iosses on a project wnich has cost in excess or IN 3million without resulting in any net increase in production.

I. Fruit Processing and Fresh Fruit Exports

119. G]:HOC are actively developing the area around the Nsawam factoryin an attempt to ensure regular supplies of the right types ot truit tor

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canning. The size and scope of the scheme would depend on the type ofmarkets that exist or could be developed for preserved fruits, vegetables,and juices. Any further development and investment in the project shouldawait the outcome of a detailed feasibility study which should include thepossibility of extending cashew nut cultivation in the area.

J. Rubber

120. The Ghana Rubber Estates (covering 25,000 acres) in the WesternRe4on rntild fnrm thp nuicleus estatP for Petah1ishing 8ma11hoAldr ruiihhpr

program for the production of crumb rubber. The project should begin im-mpdiatp1l and it should inrluide nrnuizi nn fnr an aitonnmous agency withan extension service to train tappers for existing farms and promote fur-ther planting of high-yielding clones with up t- 20,000 r-ra of amailhnolder

rubber. This project should be given priority and bilateral assistanceQhoillrl ho anAicht 4n nranrv-Ing the sztulde WP uinuAorntnA thnt tha nprnontagreement with the Firestone Rubber Company makes provision for technicalassistance in promoting smallholder production, but the nnt-re of thisco-operation would have to be specified as part of a detailed development

factory would need to be established. An autonomous rubber developmentagency wTnould probably be the most offct4ta devIc4ro for ImnlementIno thIcproject. The project would probably involve the investment of No 7 millionincluding Nd 3 million as foreignexhnecs.

K. A Rural Farm Shop Prnogram

121. Th1e- possili441-ty of creati n g shops to I-,.andle the slof fa-minputs in rural areas should be investigated in detail with the objectiveof making available improved 4nputs and advice a a co-4erp op-eration. This program should be linked with a national retail chain suchas u terGhan-a Nati -onal -- T-ading Cpay f,NTN so as to have the necessary

commercial guidance and outlook. It should be possible to undertake ther,ecessary studies inIn1971/. -so as to allow th=e prOJ.ct to bU=e rgin in 19.7132.

Costs should not exceed NO 1.5 million for a five year program.

L. Urban Market Development

122. In order to reduce wastage and damage to foodstuffs and eliminatehealth risks due to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions in the m11ain to-wlnsand cities, a detailed study of existing facilities and their shortcomingsshould be instituted. It is likely that such a study would lead to invest-ment in better urban markets which would improve the flow and quality offoodstuffs to the expanding urban communities. Ilt mignt De esiraDle to

limit the initial study, or at least a loan that might eventuate from such

a study, to Accra where the central markets are reported to be inadequatebecause of the large increases in population since the present facilitieswere constructed.

_ 4A

M. Tobacco

123. Since the reorganization of the old State Tobacco Products Cor-porations1 ons commul=ercial line;s in s Vl vxLt-LU of thes GlMna^ Tob=cCov Com---W, con-

siderable progress has been made in overcoming the problems that were limit-iLng the productio, of toLUbacco flor LocaL con.sum.ption. The 4.1ong. temn. JUec-J

tive of the Company is to produce up to 90 per cent of the total leaf re-quirements iLn Gbh-nar.. T" '.I e 't would be pr.-ture to cor.sider exports of

qu.LL~W.~LL~ ii ~7IaLi. V¶L"L± .L WIUU UC PLU~LUa L.) IULU=L CA.%PVL L~ J.

tobacco leaf from Ghana in the near future, examination of that possibilil:ysLhUU.LU be wr;Lnwnhle once the problems of extensior.Ut2LLtLU rULV 1 ar.U Ltrsin-

ing the large numbers of small farmers involved in the tobacco scheme areresolv ed.

N. Livestock rroiect Possibilities

(a) Calf Raising Projece: Tongu Distri,ct, Volta Region

124. This project as outLinleu in the Nathnan Group l i-VesLtCk reportenvisages changing traditional practices in this coastal savanna zone soas to reuucea calf' mortality and increase tne general producLivity oL lUCaL

herds of 50,000 cattle through supplemental feeding of weaned calves andeducating up to 2,000 cattle owners to adopt more advanced practices.The project would be a continuation of the Southern Savannah DevelopmentScheme wnich was abmndoned during the early 1960's after making a promis-ing start. It is estimated that the project would result in an annualincrease of production of N 740,000 bDy 1980. -This project would requiremore detailed preparation if external finance is to be attracted and adetailed feasibility study should be prepared in 1971/72 so as to allowthe project to be considered in 1972/73.

(b) Cattle Development Project Banda-Branam-Wenchi Areas. Brong Ahafo

125. This project, which is designed for the ecological conditions ofGhana's forest transition zone, would involve an increase in the populationand productivity of cattle in a 1.7 million acre area in Brong Ahafo Region.It would require investment in extension services, training tacilities, de-monstration units and improved pastures. At present the area supports avery low cattle population of only 5,000 head distributed in 65 herds. lheproposal is to increase this by 16 times to 80,000 head and improve 80,000acres of pasture wiith grass-legume mixtures. At the end of the developmentperiod an additional 16,000 head of cattle worth approximately No 1.6 miL.-lion would be marketed annually. The project would require more detailecdstudy and examination of the costs and benefits involved.

(c) Cattle Development Program, Northern Ghana

126. Seventy-nine per cent of the cattle in Ghana are concentrated inthe Guinea savanna zone of the Northern and Upper Regions, but the annual.take-off is less than 7 per cent of the total number of cattle. It is pro-posed that the percentage take-off be doubled in 10 years by better herd

- 45 -

management and feeding which would bring the present level of marketings oflocal cattle from 32,000 to 64,000 head. Preliminary surveys indicate thatthe program would be possible but more detailed analysis and study is re-quired before external financing would be attracted to support the scheme.

0. Integrated Develonment Proiects

127. In view of the nature and ssone of the various cron and livestockdevelopment programs suggested as independent projects and the acarcity ofresourres; both of canital and of trained nPeronnel1 it i9 nronosed thatconsideration be given to the creation of regional development commissionswhich rnuild Pyxminp the moat Pffertive wav of integrating cron and lvestor,kimprovement programs with the obvious needs for improvements in rural health,hygiene, family planning, .water supplies, migrntion, education, control ofriver blindness and other endemic diseases and improvements in transport andrnmminiir1 r-ti ono .

128. Tha rCnr twould mnAe ton obtain nias4stanne to cavrry ouit a reconn"ais-

sance soil survey of suitable agricultural areas and to prepare land usemaps for the selected areas. Ass4stance ould be needd to astuAd the ec-nnomic, social, and agricultural conditions of the farmers as well as re-viewing the present marketIng, processing and credit facilities mavilablein the area. Examination of the improvements needed in communications,transport, public health f4acilities, educatio.n and trainin ar.d water sup-plies would allow the preparation of a feasibility study and investmentproposaln for an integrate AdArevelopment project. Such studies ..hich, shoudA

begin in 1971/72 would probably take two years to complete but would nothld Aup the co4nmencement of .o.m.mdAi4- -

4orient-A 4 ---rovement p---- - for

LAJO.I LUL 6 JL - --II'JJ. ~ -- II. .UJ~ L -J . ~&LL jJ -5 -am

cotton, oilseeds, tobacco, etc. as these could be incorporated in theUveraA..L proJect w'L t.LouUL anly u J.J. J L CuL.L y

r. ExternaL TechrcaL L L 'ss'starce

129 IL Lt 'Ls desirable that the MiU.LsbLLy oL'. AgrLiLULtULr UU.Ld.U up a OLIh.LL

of development projects and studies as soon as possible and considerationsnoulU De given to enigaglng auuitlioal economiLLLsts anud agri,cuLturalists LU

assist in this work. There is need for additional staff with the necessaryqualifications to assist divisions of the Ministry, and perhaps the ADB,in preparing projects for which the necessary information could be assembledfairly easily and also to assist in tne preparation of project outlines andterms of reference so as to obtain the maximum benefit from independentconsultants employed to carry out feasibiiity or pre-investment surveys.

Table 1: GHAIL" - IAND ACQUIiED AIl UTILIZED BY STA3LE, COOPERATIVE,TNSTT'PTTTIODTT, AITD 7iXRAS--JT FAM4;S TN L965

Area % AcquiredTpe oD Area pln".ted land < TnriAholding; No. acquired Cleared to crops planted ilanted

Cooperativehi hfl-.- uJ.s 8L~A~*ILhJ70 3 J A J 705i L.'.L c 0.23u

State f.a.mU, i 12 '3IX Pr 080) c A).5 OA),2 19 0.80

IV4orker:.

Brigade 47 280,877 25,490 19,140 7 0.24

Young FarmersTeague 3 032 199 190300

'Ollher - 128 8386 18,238 0,369 12 0.13

IOUEU stuate 1,U20 ±L1,1n ) 4,315 LU0 7 1141 3 6 U 1.42

reasant 640U,00 n.a. 7,I37,3I 5 7,937,305 n.a. 98.58farms

Ghana total 641,205 n.a. 8,097,382 8,051,4t41 n.a. 100.00

*Source: Statistics or Large Scale, SDecialized, institutiona2, Cooper-ative, and Young Farmers League Fari-ng and Service Stations,2o5; ohana PLnist of- r.riculture, Division of Economics andStatistics,-Vol. ll/C 1965.

1/ This category ilncludes the Volta River iResettlement 'arms, Universityand ijission farms, Academy of Science farms, erison farms, etc.

n.a. -- not available

Table 2: GHM1a - HISTORY OF A,.GaICUCLTURAL DEVELIFkETBJAN' S PRF0412UANMC 1i MuIMING SriiCE 1964

(a) Total Loans WIritten-Ng amount

1964 88,1311965 1,271,8941966 823,8061967 687,0191968-/ 426,8001969-t 3,210,000

(b) Loans by TvpeIndustrial Agro-

Livestock Fooderops Fishing crops business

1964 38,441a -- 49,690 -- __1965 77,701 27,515 -- 1,166,598 --

1966 400,428 108,576 78,159 236,643 __1967 80,135 68,344 493,888 44,652 --

1968 127,040 88,820 11,508 187,374 12,0581969a, 600,000 810,000 140,000 1,540,000 120,000./1970& 700,000 2,150,000 750,000 1,500,000 1,150,000=r

a/ Estimates.

b/ Includes NO 850,000 for special projects, mechanization services,hatcheries and seed procduction enterprises.

Table 3; BST:IIiATES OF CO=SU3MVrIONi AND PROJECTED CONSUMPT1IONOF SELECTED AGIUCULTURL COMMIDITIES (000 LOIUG TONS)

AsM AMM rojected National Food Consunp-Commodities Conawujntion- ba-se- tin(onstant ;aer canita rates)

Mtaize (shelled) 252 316 371Tce (r. 1ed)r 65 82llheat 57 71 84M<-llet 75 94 llaor_hum 112 131

Tot,al Grains 5 675 _792

Total Roots, Tubersand plnt,4if-, 20 62( A,28 1,

(edible' portion

TotJ U matl 33 '.49

Poultry 7 8.8 10.4ri& 12iSI.84_I QAA 2.5,~~~~~~~~~~LI JLL

l'otal Animaidl SouaWces(includinE gae 177 221 261

Groundnuts (shelled) 9.2 11.4 13.2Palm fruit (truit) i24 0 i83Coconuts 15 19 24Palm oi1 20 25 29Other oilE & fats 20 25 29Shea nuts 3.7 4.7 5-5

Sugar 63 79 93Tomatoes (fresh) 50 74

Tobacco (million lbs) 4.3 5.0 6.4Cot-ton (bales) 55 75 90

Source: Nat:han Consortium for Sector Studies. Annex IProspective Demand and ilarket prosPects for Ghana'sAricultu-raL Commodities (April 1970)

| . 5 AD y~~ F2 E cu' 0)i L ~ > !.,I 7 ;0 6 uOLiG[SewCS < ZO Ci'tCtSP Z.QL % f ---------

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I 8 0 G h 4$ X_ , IneK la

Ts X t ); . s tS3W..................._ _ ...................... by SrY..a

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